WEBVTT 1 00:00:34.479 --> 00:00:38.600 Welcome to mid Rats with Sal from Commander Salamander and Egle One from Eagle Speak 2 00:00:38.799 --> 00:00:43.520 at Seer Shore your home for a discussion of national security issues and all things 3 00:00:43.520 --> 00:00:49.520 maritime. And welcome board everybody. I am the aforementioned Sal along with my 4 00:00:49.679 --> 00:00:53.759 ever genial co host Eagle one Eagles Speak, who hopefully, uh the electrons 5 00:00:53.759 --> 00:00:56.320 will find him. We dropped off for a second, but he's a pro. 6 00:00:56.439 --> 00:01:00.520 He'll be back here in a minute. Really appreciate everybody who's joined us 7 00:01:00.039 --> 00:01:03.920 for another edition of mid Rats, and if you happen to be joining us 8 00:01:04.000 --> 00:01:08.280 live as always, we've got the chat room that we'd like to extend an 9 00:01:08.280 --> 00:01:12.200 invitation for you to come join. And if during the course of the show 10 00:01:12.239 --> 00:01:17.040 you have some observations you want to share, or if you have a question 11 00:01:17.079 --> 00:01:19.719 you would like for us to direct to our guests, that is the perfect 12 00:01:19.840 --> 00:01:23.079 place to go. And I always like to do the altar call at the 13 00:01:23.079 --> 00:01:27.640 beginning. If you don't already subscribe to mid Rats, go ahead and go 14 00:01:27.719 --> 00:01:32.799 over to iTunes, speaker, Spotify, wherever get your podcasts. Go ahead 15 00:01:32.799 --> 00:01:36.760 and find mid Rats and subscribe. That way, we will be ready for 16 00:01:36.799 --> 00:01:41.319 you when things might be a little more convenient for your busy schedule, and 17 00:01:41.400 --> 00:01:47.000 for today we want to go ahead and bring on board a returning guest on 18 00:01:47.040 --> 00:01:49.560 a topic that for those who have been paying attention to the news recently, 19 00:01:51.319 --> 00:01:56.200 it's not just the US Navy that's been out there in the Red Sea and 20 00:01:57.200 --> 00:02:00.680 the Gulf of Oman helping protect shipping, but our friends in Europe have been 21 00:02:00.760 --> 00:02:05.640 as well. And this is an opportunity to look at the European navies that 22 00:02:05.680 --> 00:02:09.199 we see today, how they got there through the Cold War, through the 23 00:02:09.240 --> 00:02:15.080 peace dividend years, through a couple of decades where most of the alliance was 24 00:02:15.120 --> 00:02:20.080 focused on conflict in Central and Southwest Asia, and we're going to look at 25 00:02:20.080 --> 00:02:23.400 how they got here today and returning to mid rats to do that is doctor 26 00:02:23.520 --> 00:02:28.759 Jeremy Stroz, the co head of the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and 27 00:02:28.800 --> 00:02:32.280 Security Studies at the University of grots and a senior fellow at the Institute for 28 00:02:32.360 --> 00:02:42.400 Security Policy at Kiel University, and he has most recently authored a book titled 29 00:02:42.800 --> 00:02:47.520 European Naval Power from Cold War to Hybrid Wards Wars, and we'll be using 30 00:02:47.520 --> 00:02:52.479 that as kind of the kicking off point for our conversation today, Jeremy, 31 00:02:52.520 --> 00:02:55.159 welcome back to mid Rats. Thank you very much, gentlemen. It's great 32 00:02:55.159 --> 00:03:01.319 to be back, and we really appreciate the opportunity to talk to you. 33 00:03:01.400 --> 00:03:05.800 And when you have an author on who's just put out a new book and 34 00:03:05.879 --> 00:03:09.240 this is a book and a half, and when I first look at yeah, 35 00:03:09.599 --> 00:03:13.159 half a grand five hundred pages, like, oh my gosh. But 36 00:03:14.000 --> 00:03:19.520 just like Whitlock's book on fat Letter, going through this, I got to 37 00:03:19.560 --> 00:03:23.639 give you a compliment before I roll it to you. Is if somebody wants 38 00:03:23.639 --> 00:03:27.759 to get hold of a topic and a subject and wants to dig into it 39 00:03:27.800 --> 00:03:30.759 further, you can have a book. But when you have a book that 40 00:03:30.919 --> 00:03:37.759 has over one hundred pages of footnotes and references, if one little subtopic you 41 00:03:37.879 --> 00:03:43.360 cover a broad breadth of time and detail on occasion, they can grab those 42 00:03:43.400 --> 00:03:46.960 footnotes and those references and they could dive deep. So it really is almost 43 00:03:46.199 --> 00:03:52.280 a reference more than anything else. So congratulations on that. But to kind 44 00:03:52.319 --> 00:03:57.120 of roll the ball your way, tell us what you're booking about. Yeah, 45 00:03:57.159 --> 00:04:00.680 thanks very much. Also, thanks for everybody who's tuning in a little 46 00:04:00.680 --> 00:04:03.680 earlier than usual. But over here in Europe it's of course nine o'clock in 47 00:04:03.680 --> 00:04:08.280 the evening, and it just came back from a ten day road trip to 48 00:04:08.840 --> 00:04:15.360 Italy and Switzerland, also discussing maritime security, with especially focus on the Mediterranean 49 00:04:15.479 --> 00:04:19.000 or the why the Mediterranean region. So I'm very happy that we could move 50 00:04:19.040 --> 00:04:25.199 this today's discussion forward a little bit. And thanks again again for having me. 51 00:04:25.279 --> 00:04:28.079 It's my third time now on DRED, so three's a charmament and of 52 00:04:28.079 --> 00:04:30.560 course I hope to come back in the future. However, probably not with 53 00:04:30.800 --> 00:04:34.079 another book, at least not all too soon, because the one I just 54 00:04:34.240 --> 00:04:39.560 published has been long in the making. For those who know my work, 55 00:04:39.680 --> 00:04:44.639 I am an Austrian American, so both an Austrian citizens as well as an 56 00:04:44.680 --> 00:04:47.720 American, and a little over ten years ago I realized, well, there's 57 00:04:47.839 --> 00:04:57.639 this gap, there's this gap in research on contemporary naval forces, European naval 58 00:04:57.680 --> 00:05:03.920 forces. Of course, historians have difficulties approaching the subject academically because of the 59 00:05:04.000 --> 00:05:11.120 lack of you know, of resources that I have been declassified. So it's 60 00:05:11.319 --> 00:05:16.120 very often up to political scientists like myself to try to get to get an 61 00:05:16.160 --> 00:05:20.800 idea about how European navies have developed. And I have tried to take different 62 00:05:20.839 --> 00:05:27.120 approaches in different forms of describing their their development, their evolution, if you 63 00:05:27.199 --> 00:05:30.680 will. And my first book that was and I was happy to be invited 64 00:05:30.720 --> 00:05:34.319 in mid Rats to discuss that as well was The Decline of European Naval Forces, 65 00:05:34.480 --> 00:05:39.279 was published with Naval Institute Press in twenty eighteen. And then they are 66 00:05:39.319 --> 00:05:45.480 really looked at European navies from the perspective of decline and how they declined after 67 00:05:45.519 --> 00:05:48.439 the end of the Cold War. And already at that time I was already 68 00:05:48.560 --> 00:05:54.399 writing my PhD. And and I wanted to take a different approach with my 69 00:05:54.480 --> 00:06:00.600 PhD in and trying to really understand how European digital European naviies, so not 70 00:06:00.839 --> 00:06:05.399 the European Union, but the individual nations, which naval policies they had, 71 00:06:05.439 --> 00:06:11.079 how they shaped their naval forces, how they used their naval forces and tried 72 00:06:11.279 --> 00:06:18.040 or I used a different methodology in that I looked at each country individually from 73 00:06:18.319 --> 00:06:23.199 the end of the Cold War, so from the nineteen eighties until two thought 74 00:06:23.279 --> 00:06:29.120 weelve, and looking not only looking at them through a three pronged approach morals 75 00:06:29.120 --> 00:06:32.079 of three prisms, if you will. One is being strategy that documents the 76 00:06:32.120 --> 00:06:38.199 Capstone documents, what the nations said about naval forces, how they wanted to 77 00:06:38.279 --> 00:06:42.279 use them. The second prism. The second pillar was the structure, so 78 00:06:42.439 --> 00:06:46.759 forces, how they were structured, what procurement policies they had, which chips 79 00:06:46.800 --> 00:06:53.199 were being built, what the change from mandatory military service to professional militaries and 80 00:06:53.279 --> 00:06:56.639 things like that. And the third was, at the end of the day, 81 00:06:56.680 --> 00:07:00.560 how they applied naval power, so how they used those naval forces. 82 00:07:00.600 --> 00:07:06.759 And I borrowed a lot of my methodology from Jeffrey tail which Meyer very much, 83 00:07:06.800 --> 00:07:11.600 and he also wrote the introduction to My to My to My book as 84 00:07:11.639 --> 00:07:15.959 well, so he can contributed to this in many ways. And I wanted 85 00:07:16.000 --> 00:07:18.680 to really look at what they say, what they have, and what they 86 00:07:18.720 --> 00:07:23.480 do, and actually to see also the differences in what they say and what 87 00:07:23.519 --> 00:07:27.319 they don't actually do, or what they have and what they can do with 88 00:07:27.480 --> 00:07:31.600 what they have. And I also use a different methodology in that I analyze 89 00:07:31.800 --> 00:07:38.160 navies through either looking at them being and we can get into this in a 90 00:07:38.160 --> 00:07:43.279 bit. The missions they should fulfill, so which missions are they tailored to? 91 00:07:43.439 --> 00:07:48.199 Which missions do the documents layout? Are they more state centric competitive missions? 92 00:07:48.600 --> 00:07:51.439 We can get into this and I can also provide, of course you 93 00:07:51.519 --> 00:07:56.160 want the graph to get a better understanding of that, or are they more 94 00:07:56.360 --> 00:08:01.519 focused on collaborative system centric missions? And tried to really does a navy ten 95 00:08:01.600 --> 00:08:05.720 towards the one does it tend towards the other end? Do they do both? 96 00:08:07.560 --> 00:08:11.480 Are they more balanced? And I found that really for myself very insightful. 97 00:08:11.120 --> 00:08:13.160 Yeah, I'll leave it at that, maybe to give you an idea. 98 00:08:13.160 --> 00:08:16.079 And it's really from the nineteen eighties up until now, and it tried 99 00:08:16.079 --> 00:08:20.199 to cover all the naval forces danced why it's also five hundred page book, 100 00:08:20.319 --> 00:08:24.399 and of course there would be so much more to write about every single lady. 101 00:08:26.839 --> 00:08:31.080 Yeah, it's a it's an interesting book. I think one of the 102 00:08:31.080 --> 00:08:37.480 things that got me was that you identified kind of the the effects of the 103 00:08:37.600 --> 00:08:43.039 end of the Cold War as the when we said history had gone away, 104 00:08:43.279 --> 00:08:48.240 and then regrouping a different as history has moved along, regrouping of all these 105 00:08:48.360 --> 00:08:54.720 militaries into different into different structures to deal with the current situation. But not 106 00:08:54.879 --> 00:08:58.679 every country kept an eye on the long, a longer game where Russia or 107 00:08:58.759 --> 00:09:05.360 China might reappears threats. Can you kind of talk about how that color the 108 00:09:05.399 --> 00:09:09.240 way your book was was formatted. Yeah, absolutely, I mean I drew 109 00:09:09.279 --> 00:09:11.240 a lot already from my from my first book that I that I had written, 110 00:09:11.399 --> 00:09:16.039 the Decline of European Naval Forces, but of course it dived much deeper. 111 00:09:16.080 --> 00:09:18.679 Also got a lot of helpful comments from the community, you know that 112 00:09:18.799 --> 00:09:24.080 also you know, criticized me for not going into looking at the at the 113 00:09:24.639 --> 00:09:30.480 at the different sources from the individual states. So I really tried to get 114 00:09:30.519 --> 00:09:35.799 as much information both from from naval leaders, politicians, people involved in each 115 00:09:35.840 --> 00:09:41.639 individual country in those processes, as well as of course the documents that they 116 00:09:41.720 --> 00:09:43.360 publish and you know, journals and so on. So we're rented to get 117 00:09:43.360 --> 00:09:46.799 a better idea of what each country is up to. And of course then 118 00:09:48.240 --> 00:09:52.600 I can only do so much with the time it was given. But it 119 00:09:52.720 --> 00:09:58.519 is interesting if you look back and of course currently with this strong focus also 120 00:09:58.519 --> 00:10:03.240 in our defense community, great partition and war fighting and all that. If 121 00:10:03.279 --> 00:10:07.600 you put yourself, you know, if you just think about what twenty twenty 122 00:10:07.600 --> 00:10:11.919 five years ago, what we were actually most people were thinking about. Not 123 00:10:11.000 --> 00:10:16.240 everybody was thinking about, but most people. You definitely not Russia and it 124 00:10:16.279 --> 00:10:20.080 definitely was not China. Or their two really saw those risks or they thought 125 00:10:20.120 --> 00:10:26.240 they had those those a period of time until they could you know that putah 126 00:10:26.639 --> 00:10:30.519 sometimes some warning time that you will and to a certain extent, we had 127 00:10:30.519 --> 00:10:33.600 that warning time and it was roughly ten years and we just didn't see it. 128 00:10:33.919 --> 00:10:41.360 We didn't act upon that. But what is very interesting is just that 129 00:10:41.480 --> 00:10:45.720 of course, in a time of peace, naturally, and that is not 130 00:10:45.720 --> 00:10:50.600 not something that is unique to the nineteen nineties. For example, relative peace, 131 00:10:50.639 --> 00:10:52.919 I have the same and we had the wars in the Balkans, you 132 00:10:52.919 --> 00:10:56.960 know, desert storm, Somalia, you know, Sierra Leone. There were 133 00:10:56.000 --> 00:11:00.879 a lot of conflicts, but those were very different conflicts than the big one 134 00:11:00.919 --> 00:11:03.799 against the Soviet Union and the warsaw Pack. And it is natural that then 135 00:11:05.200 --> 00:11:11.639 nations cash in the peace dividend and you know, spend money not in gray 136 00:11:11.679 --> 00:11:15.320 halls but in you know, other things, and especially also in Europe, 137 00:11:15.399 --> 00:11:18.879 where we have, of course a bigger focus on welfare on a social stage 138 00:11:18.879 --> 00:11:24.679 and on providing people means to have good access to to cheap housing or also 139 00:11:24.720 --> 00:11:28.919 you know, medical services and so on. So that was natural to a 140 00:11:28.919 --> 00:11:33.000 certain extent for many states to buy into this and it was also in what 141 00:11:33.120 --> 00:11:37.240 I find very interesting, for navies that were under budgetary pressures. Also many 142 00:11:37.320 --> 00:11:41.720 of them bought into this notion of okay, we have to you know, 143 00:11:41.039 --> 00:11:46.679 hunt pirates and conduct anti piracy operations, not only because our big brother, 144 00:11:46.720 --> 00:11:50.639 the Americans, are doing it, but also because we can justify spending billions 145 00:11:50.679 --> 00:11:56.799 still and and millions on very advanced, advanced kit. And the problem maybe 146 00:11:56.840 --> 00:12:01.399 not so much even is the technological aspects, because in terms of technology, 147 00:12:01.440 --> 00:12:09.440 many European naval forces were actually caught up to other powers, also the US 148 00:12:09.480 --> 00:12:13.399 in certain areas. And you know, they can hold their own in certain 149 00:12:13.440 --> 00:12:18.360 areas of technology propulsion technology, gum technology, certain missile censures and so on. 150 00:12:18.679 --> 00:12:24.440 But it just was the amount of money available for building ships, operating 151 00:12:24.480 --> 00:12:28.720 ships, keeping the readiness for high and war fighting. And so it is 152 00:12:28.759 --> 00:12:33.399 a very very mixed it's actually a mosaic if you will, if you look 153 00:12:33.399 --> 00:12:37.240 across Europe, because there's just very different trends. And tried to pee to 154 00:12:37.480 --> 00:12:41.720 to tease the different developments apart in my book and giving you an idea of 155 00:12:41.720 --> 00:12:46.159 what the Germans said at a certain point in time, what they did at 156 00:12:46.159 --> 00:12:48.720 a certain point in dime and what the green structure looked like and which missions, 157 00:12:48.840 --> 00:12:52.919 especially which missions they focused on. And I think that is a very 158 00:12:52.919 --> 00:12:58.279 good indicator of where a navy is heading in acts of which navy which missions 159 00:12:58.080 --> 00:13:03.399 it focuses and prioritizes. And my argument is that there was a naval paradigm 160 00:13:03.799 --> 00:13:09.720 naming this system centric collaborative idea of naval forces, which epitomized by the US 161 00:13:09.759 --> 00:13:16.000 and it's a CS twenty one, a corporative strategy document and the thousand ship 162 00:13:16.120 --> 00:13:18.879 eighty concept of the two thousands. So the US also had this idea and 163 00:13:18.960 --> 00:13:26.399 the Europeans, many of the European nations followed suit. There's a common theme 164 00:13:26.600 --> 00:13:30.159 and you just mentioned half of it. That kind of weaves in through the 165 00:13:30.200 --> 00:13:35.120 book as you're trying to look at wise nations made the decisions that they made 166 00:13:37.039 --> 00:13:39.759 and what was the background of the thinking. And one of the concept the 167 00:13:39.840 --> 00:13:48.879 larger concepts that come up is that collaborative versus competition outline for everybody how those 168 00:13:48.960 --> 00:13:54.919 two concepts exist and contrast each other, and how that can impact fleet design 169 00:13:54.799 --> 00:13:58.679 well in general, my argument would be in that of others as well. 170 00:13:58.679 --> 00:14:01.559 I mean, there's nothing I came up with, but it is actually the 171 00:14:01.639 --> 00:14:05.159 twenty first century or the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty 172 00:14:05.159 --> 00:14:09.120 first century is unique in many ways, and that prior to that, every 173 00:14:09.200 --> 00:14:13.039 navy was built with primarily the idea of competition in mind, you know, 174 00:14:13.159 --> 00:14:18.840 states fend for themselves. We have a security dilemma. You build navies. 175 00:14:18.919 --> 00:14:22.519 If you think of ten booths triangle, that the basis of this triangle is 176 00:14:22.559 --> 00:14:26.200 actually war fighting. So the military function of naval forces is the foundation. 177 00:14:26.320 --> 00:14:30.879 And you could argue even throughout this period of over the last thirty years, 178 00:14:30.879 --> 00:14:37.480 it always was the basis of why you had naval forces. But I just 179 00:14:37.600 --> 00:14:45.720 found that it really was a break from the past in terms of the threat 180 00:14:45.759 --> 00:14:52.639 perception. The principal threat perception for many countries change from another state being predominantly 181 00:14:52.799 --> 00:15:00.559 formerly Soviet Union and in Russia, to proxies to terrorism, so share threats 182 00:15:00.600 --> 00:15:07.559 and challenges that weren't necessarily states, and that globalization linked nations together to such 183 00:15:07.600 --> 00:15:11.840 an extent that the protection of you know, by sea was essential to all 184 00:15:11.879 --> 00:15:16.240 the states, and that had become more or less the principal function of naval 185 00:15:16.240 --> 00:15:24.679 forces protecting seaborne trade, protecting the global maritime comments against any possible you know, 186 00:15:26.240 --> 00:15:31.039 threat. And you see this especially in the anti piracy operations, anti 187 00:15:31.120 --> 00:15:35.960 terrorism operations that all of a sudden had China and Russia cooperating to a certain 188 00:15:35.000 --> 00:15:41.080 extent in combating combating these these threats and challenges. And at the same time, 189 00:15:41.120 --> 00:15:46.960 also these challenges were further afield. They weren't in the NATO formerly you 190 00:15:46.000 --> 00:15:50.200 know, NATO's area of responsibility, but they were out of area. They 191 00:15:50.240 --> 00:15:54.639 were somewhere else. Because of the idea if there's a crisis that rupt somewhere 192 00:15:56.080 --> 00:16:00.559 far away, it has ripple effects that cause damage at home. Eleven the 193 00:16:00.679 --> 00:16:03.679 tacks of nine to eleven, of course, vindicating this idea that somebody plotting 194 00:16:03.720 --> 00:16:10.679 a terrorist attack in Afghanistan could strike terror at the center of the United States. 195 00:16:11.039 --> 00:16:15.159 So and you had to do something against that. You couldn't wait until 196 00:16:15.200 --> 00:16:18.960 those threats came home. And I think this is the principle of the main 197 00:16:18.960 --> 00:16:23.879 idea between this competitive state centric navies that are built to defend your own territory 198 00:16:23.960 --> 00:16:30.120 or maritime approaches, and then also the naval forces are shaped to do this 199 00:16:30.399 --> 00:16:36.200 and operate also in this way or if they are actually built and designed to 200 00:16:36.240 --> 00:16:41.919 conduct system centric collaborative missions, which for example, would be antipiracy operations. 201 00:16:41.919 --> 00:16:47.080 And you could argue those couple pirates, okay, that you know, didn't 202 00:16:47.159 --> 00:16:52.240 really oppose a significant threat to let's say the United Kingdom or the and the 203 00:16:52.320 --> 00:16:55.799 Royal Navy. That did not necessarily mean the Royal Navy would have to deploy 204 00:16:55.879 --> 00:17:00.240 its most advanced destroyers of the off the coast of Somalia, for example. 205 00:17:00.440 --> 00:17:03.039 So this is just where I'm trying, where I tried to go with the 206 00:17:03.400 --> 00:17:08.759 book, to contrast those different missions according to either your competitive state centric and 207 00:17:08.799 --> 00:17:14.720 of course, or system centric collaborative collaborative system centric and of course the issue 208 00:17:14.759 --> 00:17:18.839 is it's both in many ways. It's very often still focused on both things. 209 00:17:18.920 --> 00:17:22.200 So it's more a tendency. Do they lean more towards that one end 210 00:17:22.640 --> 00:17:27.599 or towards the other? Am I making myself clearer anyway? In any way? 211 00:17:29.400 --> 00:17:36.000 Of course? Super super super Yeah, So that's where I wanted to 212 00:17:36.039 --> 00:17:37.920 go with it. And I also think that that is a new approach, 213 00:17:38.200 --> 00:17:44.960 approach, a new methodology that nobody else has has has applied. Jeff Till 214 00:17:45.000 --> 00:17:48.079 writes about that and others have, but nobody applies it to the development of 215 00:17:48.200 --> 00:17:52.759 up navies over a thirty year period. Yeah. One of the things I 216 00:17:52.759 --> 00:18:00.079 found interesting too was a discussion of what happened to NATO's naval forces and of 217 00:18:00.160 --> 00:18:04.480 the EU not being a defense force necessarily, although they participate in anti piracy 218 00:18:04.559 --> 00:18:10.799 activities in at Atlanta. But I'm looking at the Libya campaign and thinking one 219 00:18:10.839 --> 00:18:15.640 of the lessons we should have learned from that was somebody's not Somebody's got to 220 00:18:15.640 --> 00:18:19.039 pick up the slack on who's providing all the munitions and stuff. And I 221 00:18:19.039 --> 00:18:22.279 don't know if that's a problem, because if you're if you're state centric, 222 00:18:22.519 --> 00:18:26.480 you you have enough munition, do you think to defend yourself. But if 223 00:18:26.519 --> 00:18:29.759 you're going to be cooperative, somebody's got to pick up the load and say, 224 00:18:29.799 --> 00:18:32.079 you know, if this happens, we're going to have to have X 225 00:18:32.759 --> 00:18:38.000 number of missiles or whatever. Is that a concern in this and I mean 226 00:18:38.039 --> 00:18:42.079 I cover this, I also cover this in my and you mentioned missiles and 227 00:18:42.079 --> 00:18:48.319 effectors, and then you know the thereof especially among European armed forces, not 228 00:18:48.319 --> 00:18:52.480 only navies, but armed forces. Speak about that in my study that also 229 00:18:52.559 --> 00:18:56.240 was invited to you know to you guys and mid rats as called the future 230 00:18:56.359 --> 00:19:03.119 of how high the future of European maye power were actually a European navies are 231 00:19:03.160 --> 00:19:10.960 far too few missiles and missiles inventory is insufficient conduct sustained operations in any you 232 00:19:11.000 --> 00:19:15.400 know, largest inarian weed and saw now in the Red Sea that it is 233 00:19:15.519 --> 00:19:21.240 you know, those those vls cells of tubes are are emptied quite quickly against 234 00:19:21.400 --> 00:19:26.599 let's say, not the most threatening of let's say, in all things considered, 235 00:19:26.599 --> 00:19:30.200 not the most threatening environment, despite it being a difficult environment to operate. 236 00:19:30.480 --> 00:19:33.799 So yes, I addressed that the lack of of if you will, 237 00:19:34.160 --> 00:19:37.960 the lack of foresight, and also the lack of the ability to actually, 238 00:19:38.279 --> 00:19:42.880 if it's a medium a high intensity area of operation, to hold their own. 239 00:19:44.039 --> 00:19:49.160 And yes, one would actually argue, one could argue that even if 240 00:19:49.200 --> 00:19:55.759 you are focused on collaborative systems centric missions, you should have enough means to 241 00:19:55.799 --> 00:19:59.720 conduct them. Of course, it was quite comfortable for Europeans and has been 242 00:20:00.720 --> 00:20:04.799 to free ride on American taxpayers money and on the US military, and me 243 00:20:04.960 --> 00:20:10.799 living in Austria, I'm not afraid to say quite frequently that we are you 244 00:20:10.839 --> 00:20:15.079 know, three riders par excellence here with our neutrality, but being happy that 245 00:20:15.119 --> 00:20:21.000 everybody else is picking up the slack for us. So that is an argument 246 00:20:21.119 --> 00:20:25.759 just in times of you know, economic difficulties, especially at the end of 247 00:20:25.799 --> 00:20:30.640 the thousand Sweden with the economic crisis, that was a topic that didn't really 248 00:20:30.920 --> 00:20:34.279 hit home with decision makers in the various capitals. And it is of course 249 00:20:34.319 --> 00:20:41.440 for small estates quite difficult to entertain and to maintain large arsenals of advanced weaponry. 250 00:20:41.440 --> 00:20:45.640 I mean, that is something we just have to always from a US 251 00:20:45.680 --> 00:20:51.319 perspective, something you have to keep in mind that some of those European navies 252 00:20:51.359 --> 00:20:53.680 are very small. You know, they might have a total of five thousand 253 00:20:53.680 --> 00:20:59.119 personnel, a ten thousand personnel, maybe three to five ships and a couple 254 00:20:59.160 --> 00:21:04.759 of vertical large systems, and having missiles for you know, is also expensive. 255 00:21:04.799 --> 00:21:08.119 So this is just something I would agree with you that was overlooked. 256 00:21:08.279 --> 00:21:12.480 And also maybe if you look at the collaborative element of it, I think 257 00:21:12.559 --> 00:21:17.960 many of the decisions that were made people were happy with that if something really 258 00:21:18.000 --> 00:21:22.079 would turn sour, the US would come to bankroll them or come come come 259 00:21:22.119 --> 00:21:26.279 to their aid anyway, and to a certain extent that still is the case 260 00:21:26.279 --> 00:21:30.200 of place. Yeah, it was up a habit, generations made in the 261 00:21:30.240 --> 00:21:34.799 making. And I like how in the book he broke the post Cold War 262 00:21:36.599 --> 00:21:41.400 era really into three different periods. There was nineteen ninety one to two thousand 263 00:21:41.440 --> 00:21:45.839 and one, the peace I'm calling the peace divenent era. Then you go 264 00:21:47.160 --> 00:21:49.480 from from two thousand and one to twenty fourteen, that's you know, nine 265 00:21:49.519 --> 00:21:56.119 to eleven to the Russians invasion of Crimea and the two provinces of Ukraine, 266 00:21:56.279 --> 00:22:00.240 and then twenty fourteen to now. You can all almost break it from twenty 267 00:22:00.279 --> 00:22:04.640 twenty two on. But one thing that dominated, especially that first period, 268 00:22:04.680 --> 00:22:10.680 and we experienced that here. That in the US as well, the last 269 00:22:10.720 --> 00:22:18.240 Supper period where our military industrial complex shrunk significantly and consolidated. And I always 270 00:22:18.319 --> 00:22:22.039 encourage people to look back at the figures that are available. NATO keeps the 271 00:22:22.039 --> 00:22:26.839 figures. You can find it a few places that during the Cold War even 272 00:22:26.920 --> 00:22:32.480 nations such as Belgium would spend over three percent of the DP on defense, 273 00:22:32.559 --> 00:22:37.839 but a lot of capabilities were lost in that peace dividend era. Then you 274 00:22:37.880 --> 00:22:42.880 had the error where we focused land combat in Central and Southwest Asia, and 275 00:22:42.960 --> 00:22:49.119 we find ourselves looking again, and I would also encourage people that look at 276 00:22:49.119 --> 00:22:56.400 the defense spending, especially in the Baltics and Central Europe right before the invasion 277 00:22:56.440 --> 00:23:00.680 of twenty twenty two. This is all very recent the underspending, but as 278 00:23:00.680 --> 00:23:07.720 a byproduct of that, significant capabilities, both industrial and institutional were lost. 279 00:23:07.079 --> 00:23:14.079 People forget that Denmark used to have a small but highly effective submarine fleet. 280 00:23:14.519 --> 00:23:19.480 That's gone away. The Dutch used to have a sovereign capability to build their 281 00:23:19.519 --> 00:23:26.359 own submarines, that's gone. So when we look across Europe over the course 282 00:23:26.559 --> 00:23:33.240 of the last two years and change since the Russian invasion and kickoff of the 283 00:23:33.279 --> 00:23:41.480 war and fall of twenty twenty two, what in the European military industrial complex 284 00:23:41.599 --> 00:23:47.599 from a naval point of view, do you see evidence of being fairly robust, 285 00:23:48.319 --> 00:23:53.519 rickety or something that's seeing some investment that people should be happy about seeing. 286 00:23:55.279 --> 00:24:02.559 Any maybe push back on this notion of or on the on the idea 287 00:24:02.640 --> 00:24:07.359 of the nineteen nine being this cashing in on the peace dividend. I would 288 00:24:07.440 --> 00:24:11.359 argue that was something interesting that I found in my research is that for some 289 00:24:11.480 --> 00:24:15.599 states, or for actually a number of states, this dramatic decline in defense 290 00:24:15.640 --> 00:24:21.880 spending and in capability is respective to other nations, because of course that's always 291 00:24:21.920 --> 00:24:26.599 you only have a decline or increase in capability respective to others. Really happened 292 00:24:26.599 --> 00:24:29.759 in the two thousands, and that has several reasons. First of all, 293 00:24:29.799 --> 00:24:34.599 because several states in Europe did not buy into this peace dividend or this idea 294 00:24:34.640 --> 00:24:40.440 of that the threat had threats had gone away in the nineteen nineties. You 295 00:24:40.559 --> 00:24:45.599 specifically see it in of course Northern Europe, Finland, Sweden and Norway still 296 00:24:45.720 --> 00:24:49.799 very much also in those strategic documents being focused on Russia, unlike other European 297 00:24:49.880 --> 00:24:56.119 states that quickly shifted towards okay, we'll you know, have a more more 298 00:24:56.119 --> 00:25:00.519 friendly relationship with Russia. You see it also in defense spending of states like 299 00:25:00.799 --> 00:25:07.319 Turkey and Briefs quite famous being known for also regional tensions. So the security 300 00:25:07.359 --> 00:25:11.880 dilemma is a slightly slightly different one if you look at southeas Eastern Europe and 301 00:25:11.960 --> 00:25:15.759 also in states is, particularly those that had nuclear forces the UK and France, 302 00:25:17.160 --> 00:25:22.799 you also still have not so much change in either what their strategic documents 303 00:25:22.799 --> 00:25:26.400 say, what their force structure is concerned, and even in terms of their 304 00:25:26.480 --> 00:25:32.240 operational patterns. Yes, of course the Royal Navy was released back into its 305 00:25:32.279 --> 00:25:36.279 more traditional role of being a global actor, if you will, at least 306 00:25:36.279 --> 00:25:38.240 in theory, they were released into being a more global actor, and not 307 00:25:38.279 --> 00:25:41.640 only um submergings in your North Atlantic. But if you look at the defense 308 00:25:41.680 --> 00:25:45.599 spending, if you look at the force structure, and whether the documents say 309 00:25:45.599 --> 00:25:48.200 actually there was still this period, especially the early nineties, but something even 310 00:25:48.240 --> 00:25:53.039 into the late nineteen nineties that were I would still argue, were quite competitive 311 00:25:53.079 --> 00:25:59.200 minded, quite state centric minded, and still focused on territorial defense. And 312 00:25:59.240 --> 00:26:03.559 then you have of course also some states already that very much, you know, 313 00:26:03.359 --> 00:26:08.319 we're happy to be to gain much more freedom of action, especially small 314 00:26:08.359 --> 00:26:12.079 states. If you look at the Danish Navy, that changed dramatically and only 315 00:26:12.240 --> 00:26:15.839 more or less a period of a decade, and I would argue that actually, 316 00:26:15.880 --> 00:26:19.920 this big, this real decline happened during the two thousand because there were 317 00:26:19.960 --> 00:26:25.279 no more or far fewer Cold War holdovers in terms of munitions, in terms 318 00:26:25.279 --> 00:26:29.920 of a block obsolescence of surface combatants still from the Cold War. And then 319 00:26:30.079 --> 00:26:37.160 really the dramatic and draconian budget cuts that then took effect, especially at the 320 00:26:37.200 --> 00:26:40.279 end of the two thousand, So that is maybe something where I would what 321 00:26:40.839 --> 00:26:44.960 this this period's brought to light. And one thing, of course, this 322 00:26:45.079 --> 00:26:48.599 is very Yes, nine to eleven was dramatic moment in history and you know 323 00:26:48.680 --> 00:26:53.039 also a watershed moment. But for some navies it didn't really play a role. 324 00:26:53.079 --> 00:26:57.279 So, for example, for the Dutch Navy, two thousand and one 325 00:26:57.599 --> 00:27:03.079 did not necessarily changed their pattern. There were other other dates for the for 326 00:27:03.160 --> 00:27:07.680 the Dutch Navy that played a more important role. But I have, of 327 00:27:07.680 --> 00:27:10.640 course, I had to, you know, choose certain sections in how to 328 00:27:10.880 --> 00:27:18.319 how they analyzed the military industrial complex very interesting to to to study the development 329 00:27:18.400 --> 00:27:21.799 of especially the naval industry, and of course it's not only naval industry, 330 00:27:21.839 --> 00:27:26.160 but in general the military industrial complex complex. I would agree with you. 331 00:27:26.200 --> 00:27:30.440 I mean, just the lack of funding took to catol on most most areas, 332 00:27:30.599 --> 00:27:37.480 there was you know, the wholesale of equipment of capabilities many states. 333 00:27:37.519 --> 00:27:45.279 You mentioned the Danish submarine flotilla which saw its last and final operations in during 334 00:27:45.960 --> 00:27:49.039 in two thousand and three in the Iraqi Freedom where it was deployed to the 335 00:27:49.119 --> 00:27:56.240 Persian Gulf. And then there were ideas of a trilateral submarine program together with 336 00:27:56.359 --> 00:28:00.240 war Wind and Sweden which never came to fruitioning and more or less and that 337 00:28:00.400 --> 00:28:07.319 the Danish underwater capability at least in terms of having submarines to their disposal. 338 00:28:07.640 --> 00:28:11.279 But that really depends to a certain extent also from state to state. Some 339 00:28:11.319 --> 00:28:15.640 states, for example, Spain is a very good example of actually bourgeoising a 340 00:28:15.759 --> 00:28:22.799 growing naval defense industrial complex, from initially building or actually getting ships from the 341 00:28:22.920 --> 00:28:29.799 US gearing class destroyers and things like that, to actually building in license some 342 00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:33.160 of according to all that has a parier class of building in license and surface 343 00:28:33.200 --> 00:28:37.759 combatants and then being able with of course US assistance, but still having an 344 00:28:37.759 --> 00:28:42.599 industrial complex with Navantia as the big ship builder to not only build state of 345 00:28:42.599 --> 00:28:47.680 the art surface combatants, but I actually also export their surface combatants, for 346 00:28:47.720 --> 00:28:52.279 example to Norway. Turkey is a similar example of this growing industrial complex, 347 00:28:52.400 --> 00:28:57.519 but of course there's a majority of In more cases we actually see a decline 348 00:28:57.599 --> 00:29:03.400 as you mentioned the consalidation workers being laid off because there aren't just aren't enough 349 00:29:04.920 --> 00:29:10.119 orders. We have certain time a systems like the NH ninety helicopter, which 350 00:29:10.160 --> 00:29:14.599 is not called NH ninety you know, for or it's called for a reason, 351 00:29:14.759 --> 00:29:18.799 but only seeing it's being introduced into service, you know, in the 352 00:29:18.839 --> 00:29:22.680 last couple of years, and some states actually have moved away from it again 353 00:29:22.720 --> 00:29:26.559 and said that that doesn't have the quality we need. So there is some 354 00:29:26.680 --> 00:29:30.599 of the procurement projects took forever, some of them really, you know, 355 00:29:30.720 --> 00:29:37.200 of the number of units initially detailed in the strategy papers, for example, 356 00:29:37.599 --> 00:29:41.039 calling for we need twelve surface combatants, and then it was scaled down to 357 00:29:41.119 --> 00:29:45.039 eight. Then it was scaled down to six, and it you know, 358 00:29:45.119 --> 00:29:47.880 takes so much longer to bruise that. So this is all the development that 359 00:29:47.920 --> 00:29:49.599 you see not only in the US, because of course you are from very 360 00:29:49.680 --> 00:29:53.519 much familiar with the same trend, but also in many areas of Europe, 361 00:29:55.720 --> 00:29:59.519 which, as you know, with naval forces, makes it much more difficult 362 00:29:59.640 --> 00:30:04.960 thinking in long term in twenty thirty forty years. Then actually when things get 363 00:30:06.000 --> 00:30:11.000 more testing, which they will and are already than to have those those capabilities 364 00:30:11.680 --> 00:30:15.039 yeah to your disposal. So that that's what I would say. In regard 365 00:30:15.039 --> 00:30:22.119 to the Mayiar industrial conflicts, Well, one of the examples you gave of 366 00:30:22.079 --> 00:30:27.160 a country which seems to have lost as well. It was Germany and development 367 00:30:27.200 --> 00:30:30.599 of their brigands. Could you talk a little bit about about the reasons why 368 00:30:30.680 --> 00:30:36.440 some countries just kind of lost the strategic picture of where they want to go 369 00:30:36.480 --> 00:30:41.279 with their names. Yeah, I mean I'm very critical with the German Navy 370 00:30:41.319 --> 00:30:44.200 because it's maybe the closest to my heart. So you know, you're very 371 00:30:44.279 --> 00:30:48.039 often, you know, something that means a lot to you than actually you're 372 00:30:48.079 --> 00:30:52.400 more critical with. And that goes for me with the German ava just because 373 00:30:52.599 --> 00:30:55.359 you know, I studied in northern Germany. I have very good context. 374 00:30:55.400 --> 00:30:59.200 I know many people I hold in high regard, many people working in the 375 00:30:59.200 --> 00:31:02.880 German Armed Force and of course also in the in the German Navy. But 376 00:31:03.200 --> 00:31:06.519 the German Germany is unique in many ways, of course as being in an 377 00:31:06.559 --> 00:31:08.920 industrial powerhouse, and you know that as much as I do. And at 378 00:31:08.960 --> 00:31:14.279 the same time, you know with the shared history that Austria and Germany have 379 00:31:14.680 --> 00:31:21.119 due to the Second World War. But there's aversion to anything remotely you know, 380 00:31:21.279 --> 00:31:25.160 remote and and and the strong you know, opposition also in certain parts 381 00:31:25.160 --> 00:31:29.039 of the population to the armed forces. Uh. And then of course also 382 00:31:29.279 --> 00:31:34.200 very much more than many other countries caching in the peace to evident several structural 383 00:31:34.200 --> 00:31:38.960 reforms which were really dramatic for the German armed forces in general. If you 384 00:31:40.000 --> 00:31:42.480 lived at the number of you know, main battle tanks Germany had in the 385 00:31:42.559 --> 00:31:47.079 nineteen eighties compared to the lowest point when they think they had one hundred and 386 00:31:47.079 --> 00:31:51.279 forty six or something like that, you know, it's one of the as 387 00:31:51.319 --> 00:31:53.799 the fifth largest, the fourth largest economy in the world, to have one 388 00:31:53.839 --> 00:31:57.519 hundred and twenty six battle tanks is you know, laughable. But that's this 389 00:31:57.680 --> 00:32:04.200 is you know, just shows also the myopia and the short sightedness of this 390 00:32:04.319 --> 00:32:07.480 generation of politicians, which is actually very interesting because many of those politicians were 391 00:32:07.480 --> 00:32:13.359 actually you know, knew the Cold War firsthand and should have understood also, 392 00:32:13.480 --> 00:32:16.759 you know, the terrems long term thinking, strategic thinking. And there's an 393 00:32:16.799 --> 00:32:22.720 interesting podcast by my colleague and professor as Unfortunate in German, but he also 394 00:32:22.920 --> 00:32:27.680 refers to this lack of strategic thinking in Germany, especially what armed forces are 395 00:32:27.720 --> 00:32:30.640 concerned and if you look at and one of the things, of course the 396 00:32:30.759 --> 00:32:35.160 German is unique, and that's other German Navy is unique, is that they 397 00:32:35.200 --> 00:32:38.640 always refer to NATO planning, so they always consider themselves a MATO navy and 398 00:32:38.680 --> 00:32:44.079 that is different to some other European navies live are quite happy with, you 399 00:32:44.079 --> 00:32:46.759 know, both their national duties that they have and at the same time, 400 00:32:46.839 --> 00:32:50.519 yes, we are NATO, but you know, we do our own thing 401 00:32:50.559 --> 00:32:53.359 anyway. So and Germany always and I don't think it's actually healthy for also 402 00:32:53.400 --> 00:32:58.759 for the German armed forces over the German Navy to always point to NATO and 403 00:32:58.799 --> 00:33:02.079 the NATO Capability Plan and saying that's actually what NATA expects from us, and 404 00:33:02.119 --> 00:33:06.920 that's why, that's how we will build our armed forces in our navy, 405 00:33:06.920 --> 00:33:10.559 because if you're in all seriousness, then NATO does not tell Germany to build 406 00:33:10.680 --> 00:33:16.359 more corvettes that were designed in the nineteen eighties now. But Germany still has 407 00:33:16.559 --> 00:33:22.160 industrial industry interests and has other interest interest group that then and think, okay, 408 00:33:22.160 --> 00:33:25.000 that might plug the hole that we have. So I do think that 409 00:33:25.480 --> 00:33:30.279 the Germany it would be better served and not reverting always into this idea of 410 00:33:30.960 --> 00:33:36.319 an alliance armed forced. But we are a strong national armed force, a 411 00:33:36.400 --> 00:33:42.519 strong national navy of course as part of NATO. And they will very often 412 00:33:42.640 --> 00:33:45.799 argue we will never fight alone, we will never be alone. But you 413 00:33:45.799 --> 00:33:50.519 know, you meet a certain amount of capabilities because you never know what you 414 00:33:50.559 --> 00:33:53.119 know, even in an article five scenarios, you never know what other nations 415 00:33:53.160 --> 00:33:55.640 will bring to the table and what they will be able to bring to the 416 00:33:55.680 --> 00:34:01.160 table. So having this critical masses I call it is really important to have 417 00:34:01.400 --> 00:34:06.599 across the board. And that costs money. And you know that costs three 418 00:34:06.680 --> 00:34:09.119 four five percent or you know, you know gross domestic product, that's what 419 00:34:09.159 --> 00:34:15.840 it costs. And currently not still many countries are not willing to pay paying 420 00:34:15.880 --> 00:34:19.199 death and with their frigates, I mean, you know, the Germans are 421 00:34:19.280 --> 00:34:21.960 very proud of their frigates and to a certain extent, you know, some 422 00:34:22.000 --> 00:34:27.159 of them, you know, are still Cold War holdovers or at least designed 423 00:34:27.159 --> 00:34:30.079 at the end of the Cold War. But maybe the major challenges that they 424 00:34:30.119 --> 00:34:37.679 don't have a continuation. They don't have a continuation in building naval vessels, 425 00:34:37.719 --> 00:34:39.760 like Japan for example, has and I would argue Japan is a good case 426 00:34:39.800 --> 00:34:45.960 with a similarly troubled history of the Second World War. It's it's also economically 427 00:34:45.000 --> 00:34:47.960 strong. Of course, it has a stronger maritime focused in Germany. You 428 00:34:49.039 --> 00:34:52.320 know, that's clear as an island nation, but I think they're very good 429 00:34:52.880 --> 00:34:59.800 example of how you can have a continuous, continued, steady stream of procurement 430 00:35:00.079 --> 00:35:04.960 of platforms, which really helps this you know, evolution of the platform really 431 00:35:05.000 --> 00:35:08.480 helps of course the shipyards, the industrial base, all the sub companies that 432 00:35:08.559 --> 00:35:15.159 work in subcontractors that work in that field. And Germany and this epitomized this 433 00:35:15.320 --> 00:35:21.440 idea collaborative system centric, a German collaborative system centric navy. And as you 434 00:35:21.480 --> 00:35:25.039 can guess, I come to the conclusion that Germany, the German Navy very 435 00:35:25.119 --> 00:35:30.079 much tended towards this collaborative system centric and during the Chosenes Wars that they then 436 00:35:30.320 --> 00:35:34.800 came up with the idea that they will do they will be an out of 437 00:35:34.880 --> 00:35:38.639 area operation navy. They will be able to deal with expeditionary operations, so 438 00:35:38.760 --> 00:35:44.400 they will be able to deploy far afield. They want to to also have 439 00:35:44.440 --> 00:35:49.679 a concept of sea basing similar to what the US Navy also has and was 440 00:35:49.760 --> 00:35:52.599 quite was quite prominent a couple of years back, but without without the big 441 00:35:52.719 --> 00:35:57.440 logistic ships because they didn't afford them. So we have actually a frigate that 442 00:35:58.199 --> 00:36:01.679 at the end of the day they should fill their role of expeditionary seat basing, 443 00:36:02.039 --> 00:36:06.440 peace support operation, constabulary operations, and all of a sudden, this 444 00:36:06.719 --> 00:36:12.480 very large frigate, very likely lightly armed frigate finds itself in a security environment 445 00:36:12.679 --> 00:36:15.280 that is very much a demand for a different kind of ship. And you 446 00:36:15.280 --> 00:36:22.199 wouldn't deploy probably that vessel even to an area like the Red Sea currently because 447 00:36:22.239 --> 00:36:24.320 the lack of its armor. So this is just an example of the German 448 00:36:24.360 --> 00:36:30.239 frigate more or less being the pinnacle of this idea of we're heading towards the 449 00:36:30.280 --> 00:36:34.519 collaborative future, and that is the ship and the capability we need down the 450 00:36:34.559 --> 00:36:40.400 line, which it is not one of the more interesting things this year. 451 00:36:40.480 --> 00:36:45.840 As we saw in January and then February, speaking of collaboration, we had 452 00:36:45.880 --> 00:36:52.440 a Dutch frigate that went through the South China Sea and I actually did a 453 00:36:52.480 --> 00:36:57.519 Taiwan Strait transit. And then about a month later we had the German frigate 454 00:36:57.599 --> 00:37:01.079 Bayern went through the South China. He did not do a taiwand straight transit, 455 00:37:01.320 --> 00:37:05.519 so you know, a little bit of presence, but that came to 456 00:37:05.639 --> 00:37:12.440 mind when in your book there's figure two point one from nineteen eighty four that 457 00:37:12.639 --> 00:37:19.880 shows the nominal view of the world's ocean, oceans, and something that I 458 00:37:20.000 --> 00:37:22.519 want to mention them for the second podcast in a row that will trigger our 459 00:37:22.519 --> 00:37:29.519 friend John Conrad, the naval control and protection of shipping. And there's you 460 00:37:29.519 --> 00:37:34.320 know especially you know, Canada caught my eye, Australia, New Zealand, 461 00:37:34.400 --> 00:37:37.440 France, Japan. It's back when the navies are much larger. You could 462 00:37:37.480 --> 00:37:43.360 make a viable argument that yes, the British Royal Navy can cover this much 463 00:37:43.400 --> 00:37:45.960 of the globe, so can the French, and the others can handle these 464 00:37:46.000 --> 00:37:51.480 other parts. But if the US Navy, at least numbers wise, is 465 00:37:51.519 --> 00:37:55.519 no longer the world's largest navy, the people's are publics in China numbers wise. 466 00:37:55.599 --> 00:38:00.199 But when you look at it from a strictly a regional name, maybe 467 00:38:00.639 --> 00:38:02.679 those teeth are a lot sharper than they look at in the global sense. 468 00:38:04.159 --> 00:38:10.440 And we are reaching a point of greater concern about the lack of a better 469 00:38:10.440 --> 00:38:16.079 phrase, international order at sea that greatly benefits Europe. One could argue even 470 00:38:16.320 --> 00:38:23.880 more than the United States. This is a planet that's it's seventy percent plus 471 00:38:24.079 --> 00:38:30.559 water. Uh. When you look at that glow that chart from nineteen eighty 472 00:38:30.559 --> 00:38:35.840 four and then you look at the capabilities and maritime strategies of today, do 473 00:38:35.880 --> 00:38:39.280 you see some large holes? There are? Are there other ways that we 474 00:38:39.320 --> 00:38:45.880 could try to recapture some sense of security should the present trends for the next 475 00:38:45.920 --> 00:38:50.800 decade or so about relative power balance ballance on the high seas continue the way 476 00:38:50.840 --> 00:38:53.519 they've been. Yeah, yeah, thanks for bringing it up. It's this 477 00:38:53.760 --> 00:38:59.639 actually this map from Competer Sports and John Haasendalarf and the Newport paper the Maritime 478 00:38:59.679 --> 00:39:04.159 Strategy in the nineteen eighties and the documents that were released back in the days 479 00:39:04.159 --> 00:39:07.719 and then circulated back in the days to the decision makers. You know, 480 00:39:08.000 --> 00:39:15.840 it's a very different world nowadays. So I especially because maritime security has become 481 00:39:15.880 --> 00:39:19.119 so much more important than Maritime security is so much more than you know, 482 00:39:19.280 --> 00:39:25.559 warships, and so many more states have a stake in maritime security. Even 483 00:39:25.760 --> 00:39:32.039 Austria has has a soldiers deployed on German vessels in the Mediterranean as a neutral 484 00:39:32.079 --> 00:39:37.840 state in the UNIFOL mission in Lebanon for capacity building. You have small, 485 00:39:37.039 --> 00:39:43.000 really small navies that didn't play any role during the Cold War really, and 486 00:39:43.079 --> 00:39:45.840 that's why I actually added this this first chapter in my book on cold the 487 00:39:45.880 --> 00:39:50.119 Cold War roots. Just to give you an idea that back in the day 488 00:39:50.199 --> 00:39:53.079 it was really bolt hard power. And if you're at the bottom of the 489 00:39:53.119 --> 00:39:58.239 totem pole you have osay. And I think that has changed a little bit, 490 00:39:58.519 --> 00:40:01.559 just because our world has become we're more connected and interconnected. You know, 491 00:40:01.639 --> 00:40:07.760 if you look at you know, the relations between the Soviet Union and 492 00:40:07.880 --> 00:40:13.280 US economically are entirely different. We're entirely different back then than the US and 493 00:40:13.400 --> 00:40:15.559 China as nowadays. So there is a new dynamic in the areas wall so, 494 00:40:15.760 --> 00:40:19.920 and of course the US Navy is not as dominant as it arguly was 495 00:40:20.000 --> 00:40:23.679 at the time. Of course, and especially these are you the People's Liberations 496 00:40:23.760 --> 00:40:30.119 Army, Navy and the Russian Navy, you know whereby I can't speak much 497 00:40:30.159 --> 00:40:32.599 on the Russiannavy because there are people better, better read and who know much 498 00:40:32.639 --> 00:40:37.719 more about that night. But I get a sense there is a certain sense 499 00:40:37.719 --> 00:40:40.679 of urgency, and there has been for a couple of years now. You 500 00:40:40.760 --> 00:40:45.960 see trends across Europe, you know, to invest more long term investment, 501 00:40:45.199 --> 00:40:50.639 investment in high end capabilities. We discussed it in our podcast on my study. 502 00:40:50.800 --> 00:40:54.280 A couple leaves back or two or three years back. But the challenge 503 00:40:54.320 --> 00:41:01.039 remains that you can't build navies quickly. And even despite all these uncrewed platforms 504 00:41:01.079 --> 00:41:07.119 that are only very slowly being integrated into naval forces, and Europeans are having 505 00:41:07.119 --> 00:41:15.400 the hardest time integrating anything uncrude apart from mind clearance into their navies, you 506 00:41:15.440 --> 00:41:20.159 will still be you know you now you now have the forces you designed ten 507 00:41:20.280 --> 00:41:22.400 fifteen years ago, and there is no quick fix for that. And then 508 00:41:22.440 --> 00:41:29.880 you have the additional challenges of personnel that is incredibly difficult now where all the 509 00:41:29.880 --> 00:41:35.079 most nations have switched to professional armies moving back, but still to get you 510 00:41:35.119 --> 00:41:38.199 know, people to join the join the military. So there are those compounding 511 00:41:38.280 --> 00:41:43.480 pressures and I don't see any easy fixes. What I do see what has 512 00:41:43.519 --> 00:41:46.800 been working better, I would argue in the last in the last let's say 513 00:41:46.880 --> 00:41:52.440 years, is that interoperability and the interchangeability is better than it was and probably 514 00:41:52.480 --> 00:41:55.880 ever was. If you you know, see if you look at the pacificate 515 00:41:55.960 --> 00:42:01.119 and see American F thirty five's landing on uh Japanese, I'll call it a 516 00:42:01.159 --> 00:42:06.800 carrier, which has the same if I'm not mistaken the same name as a 517 00:42:06.840 --> 00:42:10.239 carrier that attacked per Harbor several decades ago. You know that that says something. 518 00:42:10.280 --> 00:42:14.280 And also, you know, if you look at how interchangeability in their 519 00:42:14.320 --> 00:42:17.360 operability works across Europe, there is a lot to say. And even if 520 00:42:17.360 --> 00:42:21.800 we get into a little bit of more of this political discussion, let's not 521 00:42:22.159 --> 00:42:27.039 they like today too much of that. But even during the Trump presidence presidency, 522 00:42:27.079 --> 00:42:30.360 which was perceived very differently, very often across Europe maybe than it was 523 00:42:30.400 --> 00:42:34.599 in the US, but the US military was very present across Europe. Some 524 00:42:34.639 --> 00:42:37.039 of the biggest exercises that were held during this period. So it's not like, 525 00:42:37.320 --> 00:42:40.840 you know, there there is a real sense of abandonment in the US. 526 00:42:40.880 --> 00:42:45.000 Of course it's focusing on China, but it's also very present in Europe 527 00:42:45.000 --> 00:42:51.199 and you do see that, especially operations like the one in the Red Sea. 528 00:42:51.320 --> 00:42:53.760 Now they're you know, they're they're reaching new goals, they're reaching reaching 529 00:42:53.840 --> 00:42:59.559 new overcoming certain hurdles that they that they haven't faced before. Germany for the 530 00:42:59.599 --> 00:43:02.440 first time deployed its frigate in a combat mission, you know, and really 531 00:43:02.480 --> 00:43:06.679 destroying and shooting down drones. That was the first time it has done. 532 00:43:06.760 --> 00:43:09.239 So, you know, so that is for an American might seem some somewhat 533 00:43:09.440 --> 00:43:14.239 peculiar, but that is the case. And they also re armed those and 534 00:43:14.280 --> 00:43:17.480 reloaded these vertical launch systems in Jibouti, so for deployed if you will, 535 00:43:17.599 --> 00:43:22.440 the capability. So there are those incremental changes to where I would say there 536 00:43:22.480 --> 00:43:27.039 is more of a sense of urgency. Of course the military, many of 537 00:43:27.039 --> 00:43:30.760 the military leaders do understand there are a sense of urgency, but the difficulties 538 00:43:31.880 --> 00:43:37.480 I mean convincing politicians and of course population that that is necessary, and it 539 00:43:37.519 --> 00:43:39.199 is as difficult to do that in Europe as it is in the US. 540 00:43:43.000 --> 00:43:46.880 Is there a sense that it would be possible? I think you've discussed this, 541 00:43:47.000 --> 00:43:51.039 probably not, probably not happened, But is there a sense that one 542 00:43:51.039 --> 00:43:55.039 of the things that the European could benefit from some kind of coordinated effort. 543 00:43:55.400 --> 00:44:00.239 I know when NATO was on with certain nations specialized in certain things, so 544 00:44:00.360 --> 00:44:02.840 my worker was was a big deal. Is there a sense that that could 545 00:44:02.840 --> 00:44:07.400 happen again, there'd be a coordination. So if the Royal Navy and the 546 00:44:07.679 --> 00:44:13.719 French Navy want to have their SSBNs, that's fine, that helps all of 547 00:44:13.719 --> 00:44:16.320 this. But we'll do this, will do that you know, we'll specialize 548 00:44:16.320 --> 00:44:21.800 in a sw like you know the old days. But again there were asw 549 00:44:22.480 --> 00:44:24.639 people in the Baltic and all that specialties mine and as I said, min 550 00:44:24.679 --> 00:44:29.519 worker, is there a sense that could happen again? Is there accordant enough 551 00:44:29.800 --> 00:44:34.840 effort, either NATO or in the EU that people can actually get together and 552 00:44:34.880 --> 00:44:37.440 say, let's do this right, you know, let's try it, just 553 00:44:37.519 --> 00:44:39.840 try. We don't necessarily have to have a common navy, but we got 554 00:44:39.840 --> 00:44:45.119 to at least talk about structure that makes some sense. I mean I would 555 00:44:45.119 --> 00:44:49.280 put it, I would put it to you differently. I would argue that 556 00:44:49.280 --> 00:44:53.840 that there is, at least in the European theater visa the Russian military currently 557 00:44:54.519 --> 00:45:00.000 not maybe not necessarily the need for niche specialization to that extent. That's put 558 00:45:00.239 --> 00:45:06.199 it carefully. I'm not the biggest fan of niche specialization because that is has 559 00:45:06.239 --> 00:45:08.239 been something that has been going around here for a very long time, and 560 00:45:08.280 --> 00:45:12.800 it is something that you just mentioned. In the mine warfare. The Americans 561 00:45:12.840 --> 00:45:15.639 have relied on their allies, you know, to specialize in mine warfare, 562 00:45:15.719 --> 00:45:21.400 and you know, in a very contested environment. I think even the US 563 00:45:21.440 --> 00:45:23.599 maybe it would have it's hard time dealing with with with the threat of minds. 564 00:45:24.480 --> 00:45:29.000 So and there is the continuation of that in for example, you know, 565 00:45:29.039 --> 00:45:32.119 the Germans, the Dutch, the Dutch, the Belgians and some states 566 00:45:32.159 --> 00:45:37.079 like that that really still continue to focus on mine warfare to a great degree, 567 00:45:37.280 --> 00:45:40.039 Turks and so on. And there is a niche specialization to a certain 568 00:45:40.039 --> 00:45:46.840 extent also in who can provide carrier combat capability with you know, now Italy 569 00:45:47.039 --> 00:45:50.800 Spain, it's more or less still the same as Italy, Spain, the 570 00:45:50.920 --> 00:45:53.800 UK and France that could do that. Turkey maybe sometimes in the future, 571 00:45:54.199 --> 00:45:59.199 but that is just extremely expensive for small nabies to do. What my argument 572 00:45:59.239 --> 00:46:04.800 would be is that actually rather than niche specialized to that extent, would actually 573 00:46:04.840 --> 00:46:09.880 be to gain a greater critical mass of capabilities that you can integrate with other 574 00:46:09.960 --> 00:46:14.320 naval forces, especially with the US Navy, which is not easy at times. 575 00:46:14.960 --> 00:46:17.519 Jason Lencaster's article on SIMSEAC for that, and you know his experience in 576 00:46:17.559 --> 00:46:22.280 many of your experiences probably interoperating with the US Navy with allies that is not 577 00:46:22.320 --> 00:46:29.039 always that easy to communicate and be on the same page with things. But 578 00:46:29.159 --> 00:46:31.719 my argument would be that just European navies, even small navies, need a 579 00:46:31.719 --> 00:46:37.960 certain lethality and need a certain critical mass and capabilities, and that doesn't necessarily 580 00:46:37.000 --> 00:46:40.840 have to be especially in the European theater and naval forces. It can be 581 00:46:42.320 --> 00:46:47.440 land based because just land sea intradiction through technology has become more potent, more 582 00:46:47.480 --> 00:46:53.360 prominent, and to be I think the strategic the strategic argument and the strategic 583 00:46:53.480 --> 00:46:59.079 aim should be that the Europeans should be able to hold their own even if 584 00:46:59.119 --> 00:47:01.559 the US were tied down and somewhere in the Pacific, and would be able 585 00:47:01.599 --> 00:47:06.519 to hold their own in the European theater and at the same time be able 586 00:47:06.559 --> 00:47:13.480 to deploy at least some token capabilities to the Pacific to complicate Chinese strategic you 587 00:47:13.519 --> 00:47:16.159 know, calculations in the case that they, for example, tried to invade 588 00:47:16.159 --> 00:47:20.840 Taiwan, that they couldn't be sure that the Spanish or the Italians of the 589 00:47:20.840 --> 00:47:23.360 Germans wouldn't deploy with the Americans and make it even more complicated. So I 590 00:47:23.360 --> 00:47:28.079 think that should be the wrong goal, rather than try to emulate this Cold 591 00:47:28.159 --> 00:47:31.360 War Niche specialization, which was a totally different issue because of geography, because 592 00:47:31.400 --> 00:47:36.239 of you know, the Russia being in the Soviet Union being somewhere so much 593 00:47:36.280 --> 00:47:46.440 more potent at sea as well. Our discussion rightfully has been Europe's association and 594 00:47:46.519 --> 00:47:52.719 performance and utility and a NATO context. But though it's usually French, though 595 00:47:52.800 --> 00:48:00.559 not exclusively French, on occasion you will see a comment or a stress about 596 00:48:00.800 --> 00:48:04.880 the EU vice NATO, and the EU has a military structure, and back 597 00:48:04.880 --> 00:48:07.400 in my prior life I worked with them on a couple of things. So 598 00:48:07.679 --> 00:48:15.679 when you say EU the big pixel concerns is from the listener's point of view, 599 00:48:15.960 --> 00:48:19.760 that spins off North America, i e. The US and Canada, 600 00:48:20.119 --> 00:48:24.239 that spins off now the UK, and that spins off Turkey. When you 601 00:48:24.280 --> 00:48:30.239 look at if people are strictly looking at the EU naval requirements and emphasis, 602 00:48:30.719 --> 00:48:38.800 how much of an overlap is there about EU maritimes strategy and focus versus a 603 00:48:39.039 --> 00:48:45.440 NATO maritimes strategy and focus. Yeah, that's interesting that you has a maritime 604 00:48:45.519 --> 00:48:50.920 strategy, huh since two thousand and fourteen. And also of course Alliance paradigm 605 00:48:50.960 --> 00:48:53.440 strategy. I mean might couldmit dates mixed uff, but you as one. 606 00:48:53.519 --> 00:48:58.920 And of course the Alliance maritime strategy is still you know, it has still 607 00:48:58.960 --> 00:49:01.119 not been updated so it had we could argue it has a you know, 608 00:49:01.480 --> 00:49:06.199 has held its its own during you know, or the health the test of 609 00:49:06.239 --> 00:49:08.679 time. I should say, the EU is is just a different it's a 610 00:49:08.719 --> 00:49:13.800 different body, you know. It's it's primarily an economic and political union and 611 00:49:13.880 --> 00:49:19.920 not the defense you know union as NATO. You could argue is and you 612 00:49:20.119 --> 00:49:23.480 just correctly pointed to one of the major difficulties. Of course, there is 613 00:49:23.519 --> 00:49:29.159 a call for Europeans to do more, especially from the US government and the 614 00:49:29.239 --> 00:49:31.000 US perspective. But at the same time, if the Europeans would say, 615 00:49:31.039 --> 00:49:35.519 well, we you know, we will build our own ships and deploy our 616 00:49:35.559 --> 00:49:40.079 own capabilities and won't buy American radars and missiles and what you have it f 617 00:49:40.119 --> 00:49:44.119 thirty five, we will develop all that by ourselves. Of course the US 618 00:49:44.199 --> 00:49:49.159 would also not be too keen on that. Procurement policy across Europe is always 619 00:49:49.199 --> 00:49:52.039 also alliance policy in terms of NATO, and that is just something there are 620 00:49:52.079 --> 00:49:57.960 a lot of discussions about does NATO still have irrelevance and you know all that, 621 00:49:58.039 --> 00:50:01.039 and it can the EU substitute to know it cannot and I don't see 622 00:50:01.039 --> 00:50:08.360 any scenario currently even beyond the US election that that would would indicate that to 623 00:50:08.400 --> 00:50:13.000 that extent. So my argument would be that and what I found, of 624 00:50:13.039 --> 00:50:17.119 course also in my research is that the YOU maritime missions have grown in relevance, 625 00:50:17.199 --> 00:50:21.840 but they're important because of course the YOU is not seen as by some 626 00:50:21.960 --> 00:50:27.199 actors as problematic as NATO because it is does not involve the US for example, 627 00:50:27.320 --> 00:50:30.840 it has of course a strong focus in maritime security, which might also 628 00:50:30.920 --> 00:50:35.679 be a you know, beneficial to NATO to say okay, that we can 629 00:50:35.760 --> 00:50:39.000 we can focus low end operations in this European theater are a little bit beyond 630 00:50:39.000 --> 00:50:43.880 we can do via the europe Union and everything that is more you know, 631 00:50:43.960 --> 00:50:47.559 standing NATO and naval forces and then operations such as against Libya we have to 632 00:50:47.599 --> 00:50:52.079 do via by a NATO because nobody, because EU doesn't have the command and 633 00:50:52.119 --> 00:50:57.199 control a network set up to do that. And you for example also with 634 00:50:57.280 --> 00:51:00.719 its new battlegroups Maritime Battle Group being Spanish Italian, and to this force, 635 00:51:02.239 --> 00:51:07.119 they because NATO is the prominent, they have not come into any form you 636 00:51:07.119 --> 00:51:12.760 would say, okay, that is a credible EU force that could supplement to 637 00:51:12.840 --> 00:51:17.119 substitute NATO's NATO or a correlation of the willing as part of NATO or something 638 00:51:17.159 --> 00:51:22.559 like that. So I would still argue that currently there's no not that kind 639 00:51:22.599 --> 00:51:27.320 of role in terms of a hard defense, or they can substitute certain areas, 640 00:51:27.320 --> 00:51:32.039 but they can't substitute standing NATO standing forces or the structures that NATO has 641 00:51:32.079 --> 00:51:35.760 put in place. Nor is there really a necessity, because of course we 642 00:51:35.800 --> 00:51:39.480 also have the duplication of efforts usually cost more money. And as you've mentioned, 643 00:51:39.599 --> 00:51:43.000 the UK is not part of it, the Turkey is not part of 644 00:51:43.039 --> 00:51:45.559 it, which opens up a whole Norway as well, So that opens up 645 00:51:45.559 --> 00:51:50.360 a whole discussion about that as well. What you do see among the EU. 646 00:51:50.440 --> 00:51:53.599 If you would have told somebody what do you in the maritime realm has 647 00:51:53.639 --> 00:51:57.880 all been doing? If you would have asked somebody thirty years ago, they 648 00:51:57.880 --> 00:52:00.519 probably would have not believed you what they are realizing. Also, you have 649 00:52:00.559 --> 00:52:07.320 to make it as easy as possible foreign nations to buy into missions that they 650 00:52:07.360 --> 00:52:13.760 have. Also the cooperative maritime presence, of coordinated maritime presence, I'm sorry, 651 00:52:14.239 --> 00:52:16.079 more or less a plug and play or plug and fight, or plug 652 00:52:16.119 --> 00:52:22.800 and operate scenario where you can much easily transit force thiss in and out because 653 00:52:22.800 --> 00:52:30.079 there's relatively little interest in long and during large EU operations. So I leave 654 00:52:30.079 --> 00:52:32.800 it that that maybe if that answers the question, that's a whole big aspect 655 00:52:32.800 --> 00:52:36.119 that I cover in my book to a certain extent as well. Also this 656 00:52:36.639 --> 00:52:45.920 native EU aspect and and and divisions across European nations. Well, I think 657 00:52:45.960 --> 00:52:49.719 you've covered it, and I think one of the interesting parts of your book 658 00:52:49.760 --> 00:52:53.679 is the stress on the global nature of trade, which you know, to 659 00:52:53.880 --> 00:52:58.280 go back to my hand and some other folks. Does the EU I mean? 660 00:52:58.360 --> 00:53:01.599 And I guess what we're seeing is it that're beginning to divide and maybe 661 00:53:01.639 --> 00:53:07.079 maybe I'm wrong with the EU is willing to participate in clearing some of the 662 00:53:07.199 --> 00:53:09.760 choke points, the Red Sea right now being a good example. They'll they'll 663 00:53:09.800 --> 00:53:15.320 go play there, uh choke points which are important. They played in the 664 00:53:15.719 --> 00:53:17.639 Straights o her moves. They've gone down to the Indian Ocean for stuff. 665 00:53:17.760 --> 00:53:22.880 But then we also see the Indian Navy and the Japanese Navy and some of 666 00:53:22.880 --> 00:53:28.320 the other Southeast Asian countries beginning to participate too. Is this as you view 667 00:53:28.360 --> 00:53:30.360 this on a greater scheme of things, Because a lot of what you say 668 00:53:30.360 --> 00:53:32.519 about the European arias it is true from her navies all over the all over 669 00:53:32.559 --> 00:53:37.840 the world. Is this a trend where we're going to see the people are 670 00:53:37.840 --> 00:53:43.320 really interested in the global trade line to communication all playing together, whether it's 671 00:53:43.559 --> 00:53:45.800 coordinator or not, it's it's kind of like a division of labor. But 672 00:53:46.280 --> 00:53:52.480 my default rather than by three D or whatever. Yeah, that's a good 673 00:53:52.519 --> 00:53:55.519 that's a good point. You raise them, and I I'm my little hesitant 674 00:53:55.559 --> 00:54:00.679 on this point because I just find the answer to the threat that the hoodies 675 00:54:00.760 --> 00:54:07.159 poses is, you know, not our best moment in many ways. Would 676 00:54:07.480 --> 00:54:10.480 would a similar threat have been dealt with that way thirty years ago? Or 677 00:54:10.519 --> 00:54:16.039 would the collective West n their US leadership have been able to really deal the 678 00:54:16.079 --> 00:54:20.840 hooth is a decisive blow? I would argue probably they would have. Of 679 00:54:20.880 --> 00:54:23.880 course this you know, nobody wants boots in the ground and Yemen thirty years 680 00:54:23.880 --> 00:54:29.239 ago that might have deployed ground forces to deal with that kind of threat and 681 00:54:30.000 --> 00:54:36.880 or pressure Iran to reduce their support. That would be interested in your opinion 682 00:54:36.920 --> 00:54:42.480 on that, because I find yes, there is a Europeans European navies deploy 683 00:54:42.599 --> 00:54:46.000 within these operations. If they're more kinetic. It's a certain number of countries 684 00:54:46.000 --> 00:54:50.039 than do it, especially if it's land strike. You know, the Britz 685 00:54:50.079 --> 00:54:52.480 will came up with Americans and maybe one or two others. But then you 686 00:54:52.639 --> 00:54:57.880 run into the problem that European navies have very few land strike capabilities. You 687 00:54:57.920 --> 00:55:01.400 know, shooting harpoons at targets are war is maybe not the best option. 688 00:55:02.280 --> 00:55:06.159 And then you have all the other namings that say, okay, we might 689 00:55:06.800 --> 00:55:12.519 do less, a little less kinetic, more defensive operation, which more countries 690 00:55:12.559 --> 00:55:15.079 and more governments are willing to buy into because they kind of show you, 691 00:55:15.079 --> 00:55:16.559 hey, we're doing something. We're not getting rid of the problem, but 692 00:55:16.559 --> 00:55:21.079 we're at least, you know, trying to protect as many ships as possible, 693 00:55:21.119 --> 00:55:22.480 and whoop, see, well you know we can't protect there all the 694 00:55:22.519 --> 00:55:27.840 ships. So I think that's a very very difficult I just don't see the 695 00:55:27.840 --> 00:55:31.079 Europeans having enough capabilities to deal with those threats, which are absolutely in their 696 00:55:31.119 --> 00:55:35.559 interest to deal with, more so than even the US to your point, 697 00:55:35.719 --> 00:55:39.639 by themselves, you know, you, Jeremy, you triggered a flashback to 698 00:55:39.760 --> 00:55:46.480 the national caveats and matrix. I lived in the mid double zeroes, like 699 00:55:46.559 --> 00:55:51.239 the various cliches go. You know, coalition warfare is the worst thing, 700 00:55:51.280 --> 00:55:55.360 but it's better than not having a coalition. And that's the full hour. 701 00:55:55.400 --> 00:55:59.960 And for those that may have joined us late, we've been with doctor Jeremy 702 00:56:00.079 --> 00:56:05.840 Shrow's discussing his latest book, European Naval Power from Cold War to Hybrid Wars. 703 00:56:06.199 --> 00:56:08.599 Jeremy, I know you're you're a busy guy in all and you've this 704 00:56:08.760 --> 00:56:13.320 is was a heck of a project. But for the listeners if they wanted 705 00:56:13.320 --> 00:56:15.800 to keep track of what you're working on, where's a good place for him 706 00:56:15.840 --> 00:56:20.280 to keep their eyeballs? And is there a project you're working on right now 707 00:56:20.320 --> 00:56:23.280 that we could look forward to giving a good read. Well, I just 708 00:56:23.320 --> 00:56:28.079 published an article on war and the Rocks together with my good friends about stan 709 00:56:28.119 --> 00:56:31.000 Bruin on the Mirror on the Mediterranean, so you can check that one. 710 00:56:31.360 --> 00:56:35.360 We'll have a podcast coming up next week on that as well. And I've 711 00:56:35.360 --> 00:56:38.519 been still write on an article on the Mediterranean for fall that you can follow 712 00:56:38.559 --> 00:56:43.639 me on LinkedIn currently you can still follow me an x mostly because of the 713 00:56:43.760 --> 00:56:46.519 very positive defense community I have there. Everything else I'm not so sure about 714 00:56:46.559 --> 00:56:50.159 there. So who knows how long it will be. You can find me 715 00:56:50.199 --> 00:56:52.480 there, but otherwise if you google be you will find me and you happy 716 00:56:52.559 --> 00:56:57.639 to start a discussion, answer any questions you have, and thanks for having 717 00:56:57.719 --> 00:57:00.199 me again. And then a great to grin job and great work you guys 718 00:57:00.239 --> 00:57:07.519 are doing. I'm furthering in the discussion on everything maritime. Absolutely appreciate your 719 00:57:07.519 --> 00:57:13.920 time. Jeremy. Yeah, thanks you, and thank you everybody for joining 720 00:57:13.960 --> 00:57:16.920 us for another edition of mid Rats and until next time, I hope everybody 721 00:57:16.920 --> 00:57:38.239 has a great Navy day. Cheers. I'll cut that part up. Want 722 00:57:38.360 --> 00:57:46.559 to marry me and a friend of Godily for you being to blame for the 723 00:57:49.280 --> 00:58:00.400 on me SI folding your theame. It's a alway. It's a long way 724 00:58:01.159 --> 00:58:13.760 to go. It's a long way to dipperary, to the green all about 725 00:58:14.559 --> 00:58:22.480 think on a fair well the not well, it's a long long way to 726 00:58:22.679 --> 00:58:25.880 dipperate. But my life, my