1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:06,919 The decision making process. An understanding of the decision making process provides the pilot 2 00:00:06,960 --> 00:00:13,759 with the foundation for developing ad M and SRM skills. While some situations such 3 00:00:13,759 --> 00:00:19,679 as engine failure, require an immediate pilot response using established procedures, there is 4 00:00:19,760 --> 00:00:24,839 usually time during a flight to analyze any changes that occur, gather information, 5 00:00:25,120 --> 00:00:31,199 and assess risk before reaching a decision. Risk management and risk intervention is much 6 00:00:31,239 --> 00:00:36,399 more than the simple definitions of the term might suggest. Risk management and risk 7 00:00:36,439 --> 00:00:43,399 intervention are decision making processes designed to systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of 8 00:00:43,479 --> 00:00:49,159 risk, and determine the best course of action. These processes involve the identification 9 00:00:49,200 --> 00:00:53,840 of hazards, followed by assessments of the risks, analysis of the controls, 10 00:00:54,240 --> 00:01:00,119 making control decisions using the controls, and monitoring the results. The steps leading 11 00:01:00,119 --> 00:01:07,280 to this decision constitute a decision making process. Three models of a structured framework 12 00:01:07,319 --> 00:01:11,560 for problem solving and decision making are the five P the three P, the 13 00:01:11,599 --> 00:01:17,519 three with Care and Team, the O O, DA and Decide models. 14 00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:23,480 They provide assistance in organizing the decision process. All these models have been identified 15 00:01:23,480 --> 00:01:30,159 as helpful to the single pilot in organizing Critical Decisions sr M and the five 16 00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:34,879 P Check. Sr M is about how to gather information, analyze it, 17 00:01:34,959 --> 00:01:41,239 and make decisions. Learning how to identify problems, analyze the information, and 18 00:01:41,359 --> 00:01:46,560 make informed and timely decisions is not as straightforward as the training involved in learning 19 00:01:46,599 --> 00:01:52,200 specific maneuvers. Learning how to judge a situation and how to think in the 20 00:01:52,319 --> 00:01:56,920 endless variety of situations encountered, while flying out in the real world, is 21 00:01:56,959 --> 00:02:01,239 more difficult. There is no one right answer in ADM. Rather, each 22 00:02:01,280 --> 00:02:07,520 pilot is expected to analyze each situation in light of experienced level, personal minimums, 23 00:02:07,560 --> 00:02:13,039 and current physical and mental readiness level and make his or her own decision. 24 00:02:14,439 --> 00:02:17,800 SRM sounds good on paper, but it requires a way for pilots to 25 00:02:17,879 --> 00:02:23,680 understand and use it in their daily flights. One practical application is called the 26 00:02:23,719 --> 00:02:31,120 five pas refer to Figure seventeen Dash seven. The five pis consists of the 27 00:02:31,240 --> 00:02:37,439 plan, the plane, the pilot, the passengers, and the programming. 28 00:02:38,240 --> 00:02:42,599 Each of these areas consists of a set of challenges and opportunities that face a 29 00:02:42,680 --> 00:02:49,000 single pilot, and each can substantially increase or decrease the risk of successfully completing 30 00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:53,280 the flight based on the pilot's ability to make informed and timely decisions. The 31 00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:59,960 five p's are used to evaluate the pilot's current situation at key decision points during 32 00:03:00,080 --> 00:03:06,520 the flight or when an emergency arises. These decision points include preflight, pre 33 00:03:06,639 --> 00:03:12,000 takeoff, hourly or at the midpoint of the flight, predescent, and just 34 00:03:12,199 --> 00:03:17,000 prior to the final approach fix or for visual Flight Rules v FR operations, 35 00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:22,400 just prior to entering the traffic pattern. The five p's are based on the 36 00:03:22,439 --> 00:03:28,199 idea that pilots have essentially five variables that impact his or her environment and that 37 00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:34,080 can cause the pilot to make a single critical decision or several less critical decisions 38 00:03:34,120 --> 00:03:38,039 that, when added together, can create a critical outcome. These variables are 39 00:03:38,080 --> 00:03:43,280 the plan, the plane, the pilot, the passengers, and the programming. 40 00:03:44,080 --> 00:03:47,439 This concept stems from the belief that current decision making models tended to be 41 00:03:47,560 --> 00:03:53,080 reactionary in nature. A change has to occur and be detected to drive a 42 00:03:53,199 --> 00:03:59,599 risk management decision by the pilot. For instance, many pilots use risk management 43 00:03:59,639 --> 00:04:03,479 sheet that are filled out by the pilot prior to take off. These form 44 00:04:03,520 --> 00:04:09,280 a catalog of risks that may be encountered that day and turn them into numerical 45 00:04:09,360 --> 00:04:14,479 values. If the total exceeds a certain level, the flight is altered or 46 00:04:14,560 --> 00:04:20,120 canceled. Informal research shows that while these are useful documents for teaching risk factors, 47 00:04:20,160 --> 00:04:26,199 they are almost never used outside of formal training programs. The five P 48 00:04:26,439 --> 00:04:30,000 concept is an attempt to take the information contained in those sheets and in other 49 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:35,920 available models and use it. The five P concept relies on the pilot to 50 00:04:35,959 --> 00:04:41,959 adopt a scheduled review of the critical variables at points in the flight where decisions 51 00:04:41,959 --> 00:04:46,920 are most likely to be effective. For instance, the easiest point to cancel 52 00:04:46,959 --> 00:04:50,160 the flight due to bad weather is before the pilot and passengers walk out the 53 00:04:50,160 --> 00:04:57,000 door and load the aircraft. So the first decision point is preflight in the 54 00:04:57,000 --> 00:05:00,399 flight planning room, where all the information is readily ailable to make a sound 55 00:05:00,439 --> 00:05:08,319 decision, and where communication and fixed base operator FBO services are readily available to 56 00:05:08,360 --> 00:05:13,560 make alternate travel plans. The second easiest point in the flight to make a 57 00:05:13,600 --> 00:05:18,680 critical safety decision is just prior to takeoff. Few pilots have ever had to 58 00:05:18,720 --> 00:05:23,920 make an emergency takeoff. While the point of the five P check is to 59 00:05:23,920 --> 00:05:29,279 help the pilot fly, the correct application of the five p before takeoff is 60 00:05:29,319 --> 00:05:32,920 to assist in making a reason to go no go decision based on all the 61 00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:40,800 information available. That decision will usually be to go with certain restrictions and changes, 62 00:05:41,319 --> 00:05:46,000 but may also be a no go. The key point is that these 63 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:49,519 two points in the process of flying are critical go no go points on each 64 00:05:49,560 --> 00:05:55,000 and every flight. The third place to review the five piece is at the 65 00:05:55,040 --> 00:06:00,639 midpoint of the flight. Often pilots may wait until the Automated Terminal Information Service 66 00:06:00,839 --> 00:06:05,480 ADIS is in range to check weather. Yet at this point in the flight, 67 00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:12,600 many good options have already passed behind the aircraft and pilot. Additionally, 68 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,759 fatigue and low altitude hypoxia serve to rob the pilot of much of his or 69 00:06:16,759 --> 00:06:21,279 her energy by the end of a long and tiring flight day. This leads 70 00:06:21,319 --> 00:06:26,800 to a transition from a decision making mode to an acceptance mode on the part 71 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:30,879 of the pilot. If the flight is longer than two hours, the five 72 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:35,720 PEA checks should be conducted hourly. The last two decision points are just prior 73 00:06:35,759 --> 00:06:41,920 to descent into the terminal area and just prior to the final approach fix or 74 00:06:41,959 --> 00:06:46,800 at VFR just prior to entering the traffic pattern. As preparations for landing commence. 75 00:06:46,920 --> 00:06:51,639 Most pilots execute approaches with the expectation that they will land out of the 76 00:06:51,680 --> 00:06:59,600 approach every time. A healthier approach requires the pilot to assume that changing conditions 77 00:07:00,000 --> 00:07:04,240 the five peas again will cause the pilot to divert or execute the mist approach 78 00:07:04,319 --> 00:07:10,680 on every approach. This keeps the pile alert to all manner of conditions that 79 00:07:10,839 --> 00:07:15,160 may increase risk and threaten the safe conduct of the flight. Diverting from cruise 80 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:21,000 altitude saves fuel, allows unhurried use of the autopilot, and is less reactive 81 00:07:21,000 --> 00:07:27,519 in nature. Diverting from the final approach fix, while more difficult, still 82 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:31,839 allows the pilot to plan and coordinate better rather than executing a futile mist approach. 83 00:07:32,839 --> 00:07:39,120 Let's look at a detailed discussion of each of the five pas. The 84 00:07:39,279 --> 00:07:45,519 plan. The plan can also be called the mission or the task. It 85 00:07:45,560 --> 00:07:50,160 contains the basic elements of cross country planning, weather, route, fuel publications, 86 00:07:50,160 --> 00:07:56,360 currency, etc. The plan should be reviewed and updated several times during 87 00:07:56,360 --> 00:08:00,920 the course of the flight. A delayed takeoff due to maintenance, fast moving 88 00:08:00,920 --> 00:08:05,240 weather, and a short notice TFR may all radically alter the plan. The 89 00:08:05,319 --> 00:08:09,240 plan is not only about the flight plan, but also all the events that 90 00:08:09,360 --> 00:08:15,480 surround the flight and allow the pilot to accomplish the mission. The plan is 91 00:08:15,560 --> 00:08:20,360 always being updated and modified, and is especially responsive to changes in the other 92 00:08:20,399 --> 00:08:24,519 four remaining ps. If for no other reason, the five feet check reminds 93 00:08:24,560 --> 00:08:30,000 the pilot that the day's flight plan is real life and subject to change at 94 00:08:30,040 --> 00:08:35,720 any time. Obviously, weather is a huge part of any plan. The 95 00:08:35,759 --> 00:08:39,679 addition of data link weather information gives the advanced avionics pilot a real advantage in 96 00:08:39,679 --> 00:08:45,440 inclement weather, but only if the pilot is trained to retrieve and evaluate to 97 00:08:45,440 --> 00:08:52,000 weather in real time without sacrificing situational awareness. And of course, weather information 98 00:08:52,039 --> 00:08:56,000 should drive a decision, even if that decision is to continue on the current 99 00:08:56,039 --> 00:09:01,399 plan. Pilots of aircraft without data link weather should get updated, whether in 100 00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:09,639 flight through a Flight Service Station FSS and or flight watch the plane. Both 101 00:09:09,720 --> 00:09:15,759 the plan and the plane are fairly familiar to most pilots. The plane consists 102 00:09:15,759 --> 00:09:20,399 of the usual array of mechanical and cosmetic issues that every aircraft pilot, owner 103 00:09:20,519 --> 00:09:26,200 or operator can identify. With the advent of advanced avionics, the plane has 104 00:09:26,279 --> 00:09:31,679 expanded to include database currency, automation status and emergency backup systems that were unknown 105 00:09:31,679 --> 00:09:37,679 a few years ago. Much has been written about single pilot IFR flight, 106 00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:43,399 both with and without an autopilot. While this is a personal decision, it 107 00:09:43,600 --> 00:09:50,559 is just that a decision low IFR in a non autopilot equipped aircraft may depend 108 00:09:50,639 --> 00:09:54,639 on several of the other pas to be discussed. Pilot proficiency, currency, 109 00:09:54,720 --> 00:10:01,919 and fatigue are among them. The pilot flying, especially when used for business 110 00:10:01,919 --> 00:10:07,600 transportation, can expose the pilot to high altitude flying, long distance and endurance 111 00:10:07,840 --> 00:10:13,279 and more challenging weather. An advanced avionics aircraft, simply due to their advanced 112 00:10:13,320 --> 00:10:18,759 capabilities, can expose a pilot to even more of these stresses. The traditional 113 00:10:18,840 --> 00:10:24,000 i M Safe checklist see page seventeen, Dash six is a good start. 114 00:10:24,919 --> 00:10:31,440 The combination of late night pilot fatigue and the effects of sustained flight above five 115 00:10:31,480 --> 00:10:37,080 thousand feet may cause pilots to become less discerning, less critical of information, 116 00:10:37,720 --> 00:10:43,279 less decisive, and more compliant and accepting. Just as the most critical portion 117 00:10:43,320 --> 00:10:48,240 of the flight approaches, for instance a night instrument approach in the weather after 118 00:10:48,320 --> 00:10:52,360 a four hour flight, the pilot's guard is down the most the five p 119 00:10:52,600 --> 00:10:58,120 process helps a pilot recognize the physiological situation at the end of the flight before 120 00:10:58,200 --> 00:11:05,799 takeoff, and continues to update personal conditions as the flight progresses. Once risks 121 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:09,960 are identified, the pilot is in an infinitely better place to make alternate plans 122 00:11:11,000 --> 00:11:16,000 that lessen the effect of these factors and provide a safer solution the passengers. 123 00:11:18,360 --> 00:11:22,600 One of the key differences between CRM and sr M is the way passengers interact 124 00:11:22,639 --> 00:11:28,519 with the pilot. The pilot of a highly capable single engine aircraft has entered 125 00:11:28,519 --> 00:11:33,399 into a very personal relationship with the passengers. In fact, the pilot and 126 00:11:33,440 --> 00:11:37,879 passengers sit within an arm's reach all of the time. The desire of the 127 00:11:37,919 --> 00:11:43,600 passengers to make airline connections or important business meetings easily enters into this pilot's decision 128 00:11:43,679 --> 00:11:46,799 making loop. Done in a healthy and open way, this can be a 129 00:11:46,799 --> 00:11:52,320 positive factor. Consider a flight to Dullest Airport and the passengers, both close 130 00:11:52,360 --> 00:11:56,279 friends and business partners, need to get to Washington, d C. For 131 00:11:56,360 --> 00:12:01,720 an important meeting. The weather is fr all the way to southern Virginia then 132 00:12:01,799 --> 00:12:07,840 turns to low I FR as the pilot approach is Dullest. A pilot employing 133 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:11,279 the five P approach might consider reserving a rental car at an airport in northern 134 00:12:11,320 --> 00:12:18,879 North Carolina or southern Virginia to coincide with a refueling stop. Thus the passengers 135 00:12:18,879 --> 00:12:22,159 have a way to get to Washington, and the pilot has an out to 136 00:12:22,200 --> 00:12:28,279 avoid being pressured into continuing the flight if the conditions do not improve. Passengers 137 00:12:28,279 --> 00:12:33,720 can also be pilots. If no one is designated as pilot in command PC 138 00:12:33,480 --> 00:12:41,080 and unplanned circumstances arise, the decision making styles of several self confident pilots may 139 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:46,000 come into conflict. Pilots also need to understand that non pilots may not understand 140 00:12:46,080 --> 00:12:50,200 the level of risk involved in the flight. There is an element of risk 141 00:12:50,240 --> 00:12:56,200 in every flight. That is why SRM calls it risk management, not risk 142 00:12:56,240 --> 00:13:01,240 elimination. While a pilot may feel comfortable with the risk present in a night 143 00:13:01,279 --> 00:13:07,799 I FR flight, the passengers may not. A pilot employing SRM should ensure 144 00:13:07,879 --> 00:13:11,840 the passengers are involved in the decision making and given tasks and duties to keep 145 00:13:11,879 --> 00:13:18,159 them busy and involved. If upon factual description of the risk present, the 146 00:13:18,279 --> 00:13:22,559 passengers decide to buy an airline ticket or rent a car, then a good 147 00:13:22,559 --> 00:13:28,639 decision has generally been made. This discussion also allows the pilot to move past 148 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:31,799 what he or she thinks the passengers want to do and find out what they 149 00:13:31,840 --> 00:13:37,759 actually want to do. This removes self induced pressure from the pilot. The 150 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:46,159 programming the advanced avionics aircraft adds an entirely new dimension to the way general aviation 151 00:13:46,200 --> 00:13:52,759 aircraft are flown. The electronic instrument displays GPS and autopilot reduced pilot workload in 152 00:13:52,919 --> 00:14:00,279 increased pilot situational awareness. While programming and operation of these devices are fairly simple 153 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:05,440 and straightforward, unlike the analog instruments they replace, they tend to capture the 154 00:14:05,480 --> 00:14:09,960 pilot's attention and hold it for long periods of time. To avoid this phenomenon, 155 00:14:11,240 --> 00:14:15,720 the pilot should plan in advance when and where the programming for approaches, 156 00:14:16,000 --> 00:14:20,159 route changes, and airport information gathering should be accomplished as well as times it 157 00:14:20,159 --> 00:14:26,720 should not. Pilot familiarity with the equipment, the route, the local air 158 00:14:26,720 --> 00:14:31,919 traffic control environment, and personal capabilities vis vi the automation should drive when, 159 00:14:33,279 --> 00:14:39,240 where and how the automation is programmed and used. The pilot should also consider 160 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:43,279 what his or her capabilities are In response, to last minute changes of the 161 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:50,279 approach and the reprogramming required an ability to make large scale changes a reroute, 162 00:14:50,320 --> 00:14:56,200 for instance, while hand flying the aircraft. Since formats are not standardized, 163 00:14:56,399 --> 00:15:01,159 simply moving from one manufacturer's equipment to another should give the pilot pause and require 164 00:15:01,240 --> 00:15:09,679 more conservative planning and decisions. The SRM process is simple. At least five 165 00:15:09,759 --> 00:15:13,519 times before and during the flight, the pilot should review and consider the plan, 166 00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:18,679 the plane, the pilot, the passengers, and the programming and make 167 00:15:18,679 --> 00:15:24,440 the appropriate decision required by the current situation. It is often said that failure 168 00:15:24,480 --> 00:15:31,320 to make a decision is a decision under SRM and the five p's. Even 169 00:15:31,320 --> 00:15:35,639 the decision to make no changes to the current plan is made through a careful 170 00:15:35,679 --> 00:15:43,039 consideration of all the risk factors present. End of Part three of Chapter seventeen.