WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.040 --> 00:00:03.439 Disclaimer. We'd like to know before the start of this interview that the opinions 2 00:00:03.480 --> 00:00:07.719 about to be expressed by the guest of tonight's Getting Salty Experience podcast are that 3 00:00:07.879 --> 00:00:12.519 of the guest and do not directly or necessarily reflect the views of the host 4 00:00:12.720 --> 00:00:32.640 of the Getting Salty Experience podcast. You're listening to the Getting Salty Experience Podcast. 5 00:00:35.840 --> 00:00:45.759 Hello, a word, we go, Welcome back, Hank. See 6 00:00:45.759 --> 00:00:48.640 what I got on? Just fulfilter and I don't put it on. I 7 00:00:48.640 --> 00:00:59.719 got my look, I got my hasback jump shoot on baby has back jumpsuit, 8 00:00:59.799 --> 00:01:03.560 baby out of a mother and he I don't know how he has had 9 00:01:03.560 --> 00:01:06.280 the right color. I don't know, dude, it's what I got to 10 00:01:06.319 --> 00:01:10.319 do. Minute, bro, I don't know. I think it's gotta be 11 00:01:10.400 --> 00:01:12.680 like navy blue. No, I think they were brown. Look at the 12 00:01:12.719 --> 00:01:19.560 pictures. Hold on a minute, and washed so many times well from all 13 00:01:19.560 --> 00:01:22.840 the chemical changes they went through, and he ended brown. Look, there's 14 00:01:22.879 --> 00:01:26.959 Philly Mack in a brown jumpsuit. Baby. Yeah, okay, yep, 15 00:01:26.920 --> 00:01:30.319 welcome back to it. Against all these pans podcasts, this is the only 16 00:01:30.359 --> 00:01:34.799 one that brings the kitchen table to the firehouse, kitchen table to you we 17 00:01:34.959 --> 00:01:40.120 got senior dude, Hank Bolet because Roofie is on assignment right now out in 18 00:01:40.159 --> 00:01:45.079 Idaho doing kill him whatever. I don't know. He's on assignment. He 19 00:01:45.159 --> 00:01:47.680 might check in with us though he gets home in time. He's gotta fly 20 00:01:47.760 --> 00:01:51.200 and then he's got to uh he says he will. I was on the 21 00:01:51.200 --> 00:01:53.760 phone with him earlier. He's he was heading to the airport when we were 22 00:01:53.799 --> 00:01:56.359 speaking. Oh, he ain't got no jumpsuit though, I can tell you 23 00:01:56.400 --> 00:01:59.560 that. I bet your Philly is happy that I got the jumpsuit on. 24 00:02:00.239 --> 00:02:06.680 And I tried to get uh to the fabric store to get some like nice 25 00:02:06.799 --> 00:02:13.080 uh Drakes with the window shades to match lowis but working. No, no, 26 00:02:13.080 --> 00:02:15.280 no, he's in. He's in the Oval office. You gotta have 27 00:02:15.319 --> 00:02:17.800 an Italian wife to make those bro an Italian mother in law to make one 28 00:02:17.800 --> 00:02:23.000 of us. Is this roughy now testing with me? Uh? Nope, 29 00:02:23.080 --> 00:02:27.159 I don't know. I don't know any who. We got a good show 30 00:02:27.199 --> 00:02:30.240 tonight because we got a guy who dude not only to respect this guy really, 31 00:02:30.280 --> 00:02:32.240 truly, I could say this with the bottom of my heart. I 32 00:02:32.240 --> 00:02:37.599 love working with Philly. Max guy was the pinnacle of his of his game. 33 00:02:38.039 --> 00:02:39.560 It was has Mac guy. You think about Hasbat, you think about 34 00:02:39.560 --> 00:02:46.439 Philly Max right, thank he was listen. He was the one of one 35 00:02:46.439 --> 00:02:50.080 of the right guys to have in that firehouse making the transition when we became 36 00:02:50.080 --> 00:02:53.879 a squad there. You know, he was one of the voices of reason. 37 00:02:53.520 --> 00:02:57.240 Well, you had to keep the kindergarten kids in line, and he 38 00:02:57.319 --> 00:03:00.159 had to deal with you know, and and him and I used to I 39 00:03:00.199 --> 00:03:01.199 have to, you know, sit down once in a while and have a 40 00:03:01.280 --> 00:03:07.560 Powow's right of smooth things over. Yes, yeah, I always, guys 41 00:03:07.599 --> 00:03:12.599 do man. I always enjoy having filled in the flyhouse. Dude, Well, 42 00:03:12.639 --> 00:03:14.639 you know what, Mikey, we got to pay the bills. So 43 00:03:14.639 --> 00:03:16.599 why do you roll that commercial? Quick? I don't know how. Keith 44 00:03:16.639 --> 00:03:20.199 just jumpsuit on because which one or which one do you want? Tonight? 45 00:03:20.680 --> 00:03:23.039 Armor Tough? We got Alma Tough on Monday night. Baby, come on, 46 00:03:23.120 --> 00:03:24.120 all right, I forgot about that yet. It's been a while since 47 00:03:24.120 --> 00:03:27.199 I've been in the seat. So here we go to work from our friends 48 00:03:27.199 --> 00:03:32.080 over at Armourtuff. Armor Tough firehouse flooring was recently installed in Station number seven, 49 00:03:32.599 --> 00:03:38.560 the newest of the DACAB County Fire stations in Decatur, Georgia. Meeting 50 00:03:38.639 --> 00:03:44.960 Deputy Chief Smith of Support Services, Vince explained that Armor Tough interlocking flooring is 51 00:03:45.000 --> 00:03:49.960 the only floor that is tough enough to withstand the abuse of fire apparatus along 52 00:03:50.000 --> 00:03:54.840 with fire personnel at a very busy station. Chief Smith explained, the flooring 53 00:03:54.879 --> 00:03:59.919 in all of our stations over the years gave us multiple problems. We need 54 00:04:00.120 --> 00:04:03.039 floor that can last as long as the walls and the roof. That's why 55 00:04:03.080 --> 00:04:08.800 we chose Armor Tough. The installation team came from New Jersey and in three 56 00:04:08.919 --> 00:04:14.319 days they had completed their work without any disruption to our daily operations. We 57 00:04:14.319 --> 00:04:17.720 were very impressed with not only the product, but with the workmanship as well. 58 00:04:18.240 --> 00:04:24.199 I highly recommend Armour Tough for your station's floor. Call Vince today for 59 00:04:24.279 --> 00:04:29.759 a no obligation quote at nine oh eight nine one seven seven six nine to 60 00:04:29.839 --> 00:04:38.560 seven. Wonderful. Always nice to hear from Vince's good dude, play the 61 00:04:38.639 --> 00:04:43.560 on one really quick. May seventeenth, was it seventeenth? Eighteen nineteen? 62 00:04:43.639 --> 00:04:47.160 Me and Louis be down in Harrisburg Expo Hole booth before thirty. Come down 63 00:04:47.199 --> 00:04:49.759 and see us. It's a hoot. You haven't good time down the man. 64 00:04:49.839 --> 00:04:53.279 I think as a matter of fact, Gave Fox is taking us out 65 00:04:53.319 --> 00:04:55.600 to dinner one night. There he's a no yet. I mean, we're 66 00:04:55.600 --> 00:04:58.680 going out to dinner. I'm going to hit him with the bill. So 67 00:04:59.560 --> 00:05:02.120 what else? Beautiful? Yeah, I want to see if he's as funny 68 00:05:02.160 --> 00:05:05.839 in person as he is in the chat. Well, that's yet to be 69 00:05:05.920 --> 00:05:09.839 determined. We'll see if he can. You know, you can hold his 70 00:05:09.920 --> 00:05:13.920 own, bro. Report this is big boy Leak. You't playing with He's 71 00:05:13.959 --> 00:05:15.639 not swimming with the little fish, Hank. You know what I mean, 72 00:05:15.680 --> 00:05:19.560 He's with the big fish. How you going down to Florida? Yeah? 73 00:05:19.639 --> 00:05:24.800 How's it going down to Florida? There? Hot? Yeah, it's it's 74 00:05:24.839 --> 00:05:27.000 Florida. You know. People say, oh, how do you take the 75 00:05:27.040 --> 00:05:30.399 heat? I'm like, well, listen, I can't complain about cold and 76 00:05:30.480 --> 00:05:31.920 move to the warm and then complain about the warm. So to me, 77 00:05:32.000 --> 00:05:38.000 it's beautiful out here. Well, almost eighty in the sixties. You're working 78 00:05:38.079 --> 00:05:41.360 it's eight, you know, eighty five now this time of year, and 79 00:05:41.639 --> 00:05:45.279 I'll take it right. That's when I get the resorts, and that's when 80 00:05:45.319 --> 00:05:47.720 they have beach resorts, you know, beach resorts. I know what he's 81 00:05:47.720 --> 00:05:50.279 saying about. All right, might get it out of your system. Even 82 00:05:50.279 --> 00:05:54.680 nobody cares about hockey. Go ahead to do it well. The New York 83 00:05:54.800 --> 00:05:58.399 Rangers is Rob Procaccini was putting in the chat. How sweep it is a 84 00:05:58.480 --> 00:06:00.879 four game sweep over the Washington Capitals. I was very happy. Great Sunday 85 00:06:00.879 --> 00:06:04.079 for me. By the way, the Yankees win fifteen to five, Demolister 86 00:06:04.199 --> 00:06:09.439 Brewers. Nicks get a huge road win on the three, one on the 87 00:06:09.439 --> 00:06:12.879 sixth k not over yet, not over yet. They still got to win 88 00:06:12.920 --> 00:06:15.160 Game five tomorrow. And the Rangers they didn't play with their food. A 89 00:06:15.160 --> 00:06:18.600 little tight third period there, they weren't looking too good to score two goals. 90 00:06:18.600 --> 00:06:21.399 Put a bad boy away. Now they can chill out. Let Carolina 91 00:06:21.439 --> 00:06:25.519 and the Islanders duke it out and on to round two. They themselves up 92 00:06:25.560 --> 00:06:29.759 for a couple hope that goes back right after getting knocked out in round one 93 00:06:29.839 --> 00:06:31.959 last year, which was very bitter, especially after being in the Conference finals 94 00:06:32.000 --> 00:06:34.399 the previous year. They're back in round two. So once they have the 95 00:06:34.480 --> 00:06:38.079 Presidents Cup and be out in the first round. Bro, No, you 96 00:06:38.120 --> 00:06:42.199 don't, yep, Yeah, it's happened. All right, let's bring him 97 00:06:42.199 --> 00:06:44.959 in here. You want to bring him in heck, senior dude, the 98 00:06:44.959 --> 00:06:49.839 senior do okay, Well, it is my great pleasure to announce to a 99 00:06:49.959 --> 00:06:58.720 leatherhead Nation firefighter Phil mccarl there he is. Hey, guys, I are 100 00:06:58.759 --> 00:07:09.839 you there? Didn't have enough of me for like fifteen years, bro, 101 00:07:10.160 --> 00:07:16.279 Like you know what, I never got tired of you. But before we 102 00:07:16.319 --> 00:07:19.360 go anywhere, Mike, you know what we gotta do. How do you 103 00:07:19.399 --> 00:07:25.120 like? The cover rolls by the way, just for you. Actually did 104 00:07:25.120 --> 00:07:31.560 a wrong color. They are ship and the jump the jumpsuits actually when Navy 105 00:07:31.639 --> 00:07:35.079 flight suits they were black, they were or dark Navy blow. They will 106 00:07:35.120 --> 00:07:41.000 thank you, thank you, singing dude, got it right again? Cool 107 00:07:42.800 --> 00:07:46.120 listen they were military spec Yeah they was. My heart was in the right 108 00:07:46.160 --> 00:07:49.160 place, don'll Phil? You know? Yeah? All right, Mike, 109 00:07:49.279 --> 00:07:56.040 let's get patriotic, do it all right? Here we go. I pleasure 110 00:07:56.040 --> 00:08:01.879 allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for 111 00:08:01.959 --> 00:08:11.639 which it stands, One nation under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for 112 00:08:11.759 --> 00:08:30.079 all. Where did you go? I take this thing off of sweat my 113 00:08:30.160 --> 00:08:33.559 nuts off? Here? I don't know degrees that what are you doing? 114 00:08:35.320 --> 00:08:37.879 Oh, welcome to the show, Philly. Long overdue man. We've had 115 00:08:37.879 --> 00:08:43.279 Hazmat guys now, but we haven't had Hank Right, the the Hazmac guy. 116 00:08:43.519 --> 00:08:48.519 He's here. He's here. When we came and we went from edge 117 00:08:48.519 --> 00:08:50.200 of two eight eight to squad to he walked in like who is this guy? 118 00:08:50.240 --> 00:08:54.159 And then like Philly mac daddy bro, he's the mac daddy has Matt 119 00:08:54.279 --> 00:08:58.480 right. He was had all the answers. He was the guy training I 120 00:08:58.519 --> 00:09:01.080 gotta set for all the ship that we did. He was very calm and 121 00:09:01.120 --> 00:09:05.440 cool man. He never you know, because at any time he could have 122 00:09:05.440 --> 00:09:09.440 really choked the life of a helpie or any of those other guys. But 123 00:09:09.480 --> 00:09:11.679 he didn't. He was calm and cool, which I gotta give him the 124 00:09:11.720 --> 00:09:16.519 best to cool. That's correct, thank you. He said a good example 125 00:09:16.279 --> 00:09:20.600 that he did probably well. I liked you guys. I liked you guys, 126 00:09:20.639 --> 00:09:24.279 so I can't say that about all the hasback guys. They didn't like 127 00:09:24.399 --> 00:09:26.639 us, but you know, but you know what, you guys had a 128 00:09:26.720 --> 00:09:31.000 job to do. We had a job to do, and uh and that 129 00:09:31.159 --> 00:09:35.600 was important, you know, And and staying together. You know what, 130 00:09:35.000 --> 00:09:39.360 we never stayed together more than we did on nine to eleven. Right, 131 00:09:39.759 --> 00:09:43.279 we did house, came together. We were good firehouse. I actually went 132 00:09:43.320 --> 00:09:46.480 back there last week and I think I knew about maybe two guys and has 133 00:09:46.559 --> 00:09:50.399 met. There was a guy that looked like Cassidy, but he's the skinny 134 00:09:50.440 --> 00:09:54.120 Cassidy Now he lost all sorts of weight of Like, who was that looks 135 00:09:54.120 --> 00:10:00.519 like Cassidy but he's skinny. We had we had a brunch recently and the 136 00:10:00.600 --> 00:10:03.399 first John Cassidy was there when everybody's dying, who's that guy? I said, 137 00:10:03.399 --> 00:10:09.720 that's John Cassidys. Yeah, no, I said, that's the real 138 00:10:09.919 --> 00:10:16.080 John Cassidy. Yeah yeah. And who was the other guy? Kevin Chambers? 139 00:10:16.120 --> 00:10:18.639 But he probably wasn't there when you were there. Yeah, Kevin was 140 00:10:18.759 --> 00:10:20.720 Oh no, he wasn't there when I was there yet, right, probably, 141 00:10:20.720 --> 00:10:26.120 I don't think anybody but Cassidy was there when you were there. Uh, 142 00:10:26.279 --> 00:10:28.600 Cassidy was the only one, that's right, that's right? Ye, 143 00:10:30.639 --> 00:10:33.440 time time goes by, Phil, Yeah, yeah, I goes there. 144 00:10:33.440 --> 00:10:37.679 Ain't nobody he worked? Uh no, you met you worked with Dane Martin, 145 00:10:37.720 --> 00:10:43.120 didn't you. Uh? Johnny McCoy Johnny John McCoy man. Now, 146 00:10:43.519 --> 00:10:48.799 when I was there, I seen John McCoy. I'm trying to remember if 147 00:10:48.080 --> 00:10:52.360 I think I was gone when Dane got there. Dany came out after nine 148 00:10:52.399 --> 00:10:58.240 eleven, all right, so then a couple of months because they put me 149 00:10:58.320 --> 00:11:03.720 out and uh thousand and two after the World Trade Center met, they took 150 00:11:03.759 --> 00:11:07.919 you out the pasture. That's correctly done. But I'm still here, so 151 00:11:07.919 --> 00:11:11.159 I'm wanting a lucky I didn't shoot you make glue out of here, which 152 00:11:11.200 --> 00:11:16.080 is a good it's a good sign. But we're not here to talk about 153 00:11:16.120 --> 00:11:18.000 us. We're here to talk about Philly mac daddy's career. So Philly, 154 00:11:18.080 --> 00:11:22.919 let's go back to way back when it was a Philly Macarusu. Where'd you 155 00:11:22.960 --> 00:11:26.879 grow up? What the area where you're from, and what made you want 156 00:11:26.919 --> 00:11:31.159 to become a fireman? Well, to be perfectly honest, I grew up 157 00:11:31.159 --> 00:11:33.639 in the trogs Necks section of the Bronx, right near the trogs Neck Bridge, 158 00:11:33.639 --> 00:11:39.639 a place called Edgewater Park. And what was interesting about Edgewater Park It 159 00:11:39.679 --> 00:11:45.279 was one of the areas that had one of the volunteer fire departments that still 160 00:11:45.320 --> 00:11:48.240 existed in the city of New York there was ten of them. There was 161 00:11:48.799 --> 00:11:50.879 two in the Bronx, there were three in Queens, three in Brooklyn, 162 00:11:50.879 --> 00:11:56.679 and two in Staten Island. And I actually grew up and I was one 163 00:11:56.679 --> 00:12:01.759 of the volunteer firemen in Edgewater Park for a while. I was, I 164 00:12:01.879 --> 00:12:09.039 was the chief there and the health and safety officer there, and uh, 165 00:12:09.080 --> 00:12:13.320 that's where I got That's where I got my love for the fire department. 166 00:12:13.519 --> 00:12:16.360 Oh. We did a show on that Philly, on on the ones that's 167 00:12:16.399 --> 00:12:20.720 still that are still operational today. We did a show. Yeah, and 168 00:12:20.080 --> 00:12:26.720 uh, I actually lived right behind the firehouse, and uh, that's you 169 00:12:26.759 --> 00:12:30.399 know. I I I was an operating engineer I had. I had a 170 00:12:30.480 --> 00:12:33.519 very very good job, but I really really wanted to be a fireman more 171 00:12:33.559 --> 00:12:39.840 than anything. And my love for the fire service actually started there in a 172 00:12:39.919 --> 00:12:43.600 volunteer department. And not like not unlike a lot of guys on Long Island 173 00:12:43.600 --> 00:12:48.559 who started their careers in volunteer fire departments on Long Island or upstate. They 174 00:12:48.879 --> 00:12:52.759 there was a lot of them who started there. I'll bet you ask guys 175 00:12:52.759 --> 00:12:56.360 in the city now, they probably had no idea that even still volley houses 176 00:12:56.440 --> 00:13:00.440 in the city. But I a few of them have closed, but Edgewater 177 00:13:00.600 --> 00:13:03.159 is still lest It's still there today. Well, we still have the Two 178 00:13:03.159 --> 00:13:07.840 and Queens that are open. I think, yes, one of the Bronx, 179 00:13:07.159 --> 00:13:13.279 one of the Bronx. Yeah, yeah, there's Breezy Point broad Channel, 180 00:13:13.759 --> 00:13:16.360 Richmond. Yeah, yeah, there was. There was a few of 181 00:13:16.399 --> 00:13:20.480 them, you know, and some of them got along good with the city 182 00:13:20.519 --> 00:13:24.080 and some of them, you know, used to fight tooth and nail. 183 00:13:24.200 --> 00:13:28.080 You know. It was it was like a mix of things and stuff like 184 00:13:28.120 --> 00:13:31.840 that. What year we're talking here, Philly, What year we're talking here? 185 00:13:31.919 --> 00:13:37.480 Seventies, late seventies. H. I was the chief there in nineteen 186 00:13:37.559 --> 00:13:43.600 seventy seven, so you must have been a five and in early seventies then 187 00:13:43.679 --> 00:13:48.679 right at mid seventies. Yeah, and then uh, I think I took 188 00:13:50.039 --> 00:13:52.399 well, I took the seventy seven tests to get on the job, right, 189 00:13:52.519 --> 00:13:56.120 and I was hired. And I was hired in eighty two, so 190 00:13:56.600 --> 00:14:01.080 yeah, it was some time around then. Yeah. Nice. Uh. 191 00:14:01.120 --> 00:14:05.559 You come from a big family. I have. I have two brothers and 192 00:14:05.600 --> 00:14:15.360 a sister. My my twin brother was was our arch enemy and fight department. 193 00:14:15.519 --> 00:14:18.840 The people in the fire department who were in special operations, you know, 194 00:14:18.399 --> 00:14:24.919 stock companies and stuff like that. Our our our adversaries were the guys 195 00:14:24.960 --> 00:14:28.000 in police Emergency service. And I had a brother who was a lieutenant and 196 00:14:28.080 --> 00:14:35.519 police Emergency Service. So we used to do battle all the time about who's 197 00:14:35.559 --> 00:14:41.039 better and stuff like that. You guys know we were better than but you 198 00:14:41.080 --> 00:14:45.039 know, it was hard to convince them of that. You know, we 199 00:14:45.120 --> 00:14:50.440 tried, Yes, we tried. Was was he like the other guys? 200 00:14:50.840 --> 00:14:52.440 Did he have a dislike for the fight apartment? Your brother? He was 201 00:14:52.480 --> 00:14:56.080 like kind of didn't care. Well, yeah, you know what I didn't. 202 00:14:56.240 --> 00:15:00.799 I didn't have a dislike for the cops. But one of the things 203 00:15:00.799 --> 00:15:03.440 that I used to tell people all the time was, you know, when 204 00:15:03.440 --> 00:15:07.000 I was a union delegate and I was a union delegate for has Matt and 205 00:15:07.039 --> 00:15:13.480 I was a union delegate for the USA teams, you know, we used 206 00:15:13.480 --> 00:15:16.320 to deal with fire police issues all the time. So I was always dealing 207 00:15:16.399 --> 00:15:22.799 with issues that involve cops and firemen, you know, and you know, 208 00:15:22.320 --> 00:15:26.440 there was there was no convincing either side that the other side that they were 209 00:15:26.480 --> 00:15:30.639 wrong. You know, they were always right. It was the other side 210 00:15:30.639 --> 00:15:33.240 that was always wrong. So you know, you know, the kind of 211 00:15:33.279 --> 00:15:37.039 things that you had to deal with when you have a situation like that where 212 00:15:37.080 --> 00:15:41.840 nobody's admitting to anything that they did wrong. It's me and my wife. 213 00:15:41.879 --> 00:15:46.519 Sometimes it's almost like that, very very very similar to marriage. Yeah, 214 00:15:46.679 --> 00:15:50.240 yeah, no doubt. Yes, all right, so you get it. 215 00:15:50.360 --> 00:15:54.399 You go in and uh in eighty two you get appointed, right, yes, 216 00:15:56.360 --> 00:16:02.960 sixty all male personnel. The girls came to classes after you graduate eight 217 00:16:03.080 --> 00:16:08.840 five of eighty two and the class valedictorian look at us, Hang, yeah, 218 00:16:08.960 --> 00:16:14.960 yeah, Well you know, the only good thing about that was that 219 00:16:15.039 --> 00:16:19.480 I actually had a choice of where I wanted to go, and I selected 220 00:16:19.840 --> 00:16:23.039 fifty eight truck in the Bronx. And and part of the reason I went 221 00:16:23.120 --> 00:16:30.679 there was because some of the guys in that firehouse were I played football with. 222 00:16:30.879 --> 00:16:33.679 So I wanted to go to the same house that I played football with 223 00:16:34.200 --> 00:16:38.919 the guys I played football with. So I ended up going to that house 224 00:16:40.000 --> 00:16:42.960 and I met a lot of great guys in that firehouse. It was It 225 00:16:44.039 --> 00:16:49.840 was absolutely a fabulous place. Who they with? Phil, Uh, fifty 226 00:16:49.919 --> 00:16:56.559 eight was in with forty five nguls. Oh okay, that was their company. 227 00:16:56.840 --> 00:17:00.200 Phil. When you got when your class of sixty that was a small 228 00:17:00.279 --> 00:17:03.359 class for FDN. Why like the same I was on the same list, 229 00:17:03.400 --> 00:17:07.119 Like when I got on with the Chief Steve, they were putting one hundred 230 00:17:07.119 --> 00:17:12.240 and fifty in at a time, right, was yours like one of the 231 00:17:12.279 --> 00:17:15.880 first classes after like the lawsuit got settled. Is that why it was a 232 00:17:15.920 --> 00:17:22.880 small Well, it's interesting you say that, Hank, because the only reason 233 00:17:22.880 --> 00:17:27.319 my class got in was because of the lawsuit. The fire department had complained 234 00:17:27.359 --> 00:17:33.240 to Judge Stifton. There was the judge at the time that they were so 235 00:17:33.279 --> 00:17:38.640 short of manpower that they needed to get like people in right away just to 236 00:17:38.680 --> 00:17:44.640 reduce the overtime course and stuff. So he allowed them to put sixty in 237 00:17:45.359 --> 00:17:49.039 and then I think the class after me was one hundred and twenty or one 238 00:17:49.119 --> 00:17:53.359 hundred and fifty, and then the women came in the class after that. 239 00:17:53.559 --> 00:17:57.240 But yeah, it was a very small class. It was a court mandated 240 00:17:57.440 --> 00:18:03.400 class. So and at the time, you know, it's interesting when me 241 00:18:03.480 --> 00:18:08.599 and you were getting in, Hank, the classes were six weeks long, 242 00:18:08.960 --> 00:18:12.960 six weeks and then you went to the field. Now today they're doing twenty 243 00:18:14.000 --> 00:18:19.440 three weeks. Twenty three holy, twenty three weeks because now now they're doing 244 00:18:19.480 --> 00:18:26.559 the cfr D, so you're doing that, they're doing peace officer training piece 245 00:18:26.559 --> 00:18:30.160 of training. Well, and we did that too. It was thirteen weeks, 246 00:18:30.839 --> 00:18:33.440 yes, you know, like you said, we did six weeks. 247 00:18:33.480 --> 00:18:34.640 I'm going to tell you. You know, when they gave you the blessing 248 00:18:34.680 --> 00:18:40.599 and you got to the firehouse, while by fire you got they needed guys. 249 00:18:40.640 --> 00:18:44.480 You know, we were the influx of young bloods. You know. 250 00:18:44.559 --> 00:18:48.960 The guys that were in the firehouses were all the guys. I mean, 251 00:18:48.000 --> 00:18:52.000 they were great and they had experienced like nobody, but they were getting tired. 252 00:18:52.039 --> 00:18:53.960 They were happy to see us. You know, we were like an 253 00:18:53.960 --> 00:18:59.920 injection of of fun into the firehouse again because they got to be you know, 254 00:19:00.400 --> 00:19:04.200 to have probi's again, and they enjoyed our antics. But then when 255 00:19:04.200 --> 00:19:08.559 it came time to be serious, you know. So it was and part 256 00:19:08.559 --> 00:19:12.880 of the reason, part of the reason keV that it went from six weeks 257 00:19:12.920 --> 00:19:19.759 to twenty three weeks is over in the eighties, early eighties and into the 258 00:19:19.799 --> 00:19:27.039 early nineties, you had a lot of federally mandated training and what that was 259 00:19:27.160 --> 00:19:33.279 not only being pushed on municipal fire departments, but it was also being pushed 260 00:19:33.279 --> 00:19:37.839 on volunteer fire departments where you had to do a certain amount of training. 261 00:19:37.880 --> 00:19:41.880 There was no there was no way around it. So that's why a lot 262 00:19:41.920 --> 00:19:47.799 of the training that you see occurred because of the eighties and nineties and federally 263 00:19:47.839 --> 00:19:52.200 mandated training. I mean, but I came on the mid nineties and it 264 00:19:52.240 --> 00:19:55.279 was thirteen weeks, So what could they add to get to twenty three weeks? 265 00:19:55.359 --> 00:19:59.599 Well, whatever the fuck they're doing. Well, they added a tremendous 266 00:19:59.599 --> 00:20:03.440 amount of stuff. And and let me tell you something, the only reason 267 00:20:03.480 --> 00:20:07.400 that departments were adding training was because they were required to do it. So, 268 00:20:08.079 --> 00:20:15.480 I mean, nobody's going to give you a federal funding that was That 269 00:20:15.599 --> 00:20:18.759 was one of the complaints of a lot of fire departments, Hank, was 270 00:20:18.839 --> 00:20:26.240 that it was all unmandated. I mean, all unfunded mandated training. Is 271 00:20:26.279 --> 00:20:32.079 what what was happening? You know? I mean, uh, you you 272 00:20:32.240 --> 00:20:37.759 take any any area and and has hazardous material was a perfect example. Hazardous 273 00:20:37.759 --> 00:20:42.480 materials was a huge, huge, financial course on departments back in the early 274 00:20:42.519 --> 00:20:48.359 eighties because everything that they asked you to do had a training component to it. 275 00:20:48.559 --> 00:20:52.720 So the more you asked your guys to do, the more training they 276 00:20:52.759 --> 00:20:59.200 were required to do. And it just it just ate up fire department budgets. 277 00:20:59.599 --> 00:21:03.799 Was heating up fire department budgets. Yeah, you know, it crashs 278 00:21:03.839 --> 00:21:06.680 me up. Now, how much money did they actually get? Because if 279 00:21:06.720 --> 00:21:08.400 I go in there one more time and I had to hear Cassidy tell me 280 00:21:08.440 --> 00:21:11.559 about his new rig after we just got into rig two years before that, 281 00:21:11.920 --> 00:21:15.839 and we were sitting I was waiting to get our new rig ten years I 282 00:21:15.880 --> 00:21:21.480 was waiting to get a new rig. I'm going to tell you where there 283 00:21:21.559 --> 00:21:25.240 was a huge influx of money. There was a huge influx of money right 284 00:21:25.319 --> 00:21:32.359 after nine to eleven with all of terrorism related stuff. You've seen the astronomical 285 00:21:32.400 --> 00:21:34.799 amount of fire trucks that we got in the New York City Fire Department. 286 00:21:36.079 --> 00:21:40.039 You look at our Marine division, how much it grew after nine to eleven. 287 00:21:40.640 --> 00:21:45.799 I mean, you know, we went from having boats that were from 288 00:21:45.240 --> 00:21:56.119 the nineteen fifties and and and having engines in them that had had swastikas stamped 289 00:21:56.119 --> 00:22:00.319 on him from Nazi Germany. That's and that's the absolute truth, and to 290 00:22:00.359 --> 00:22:03.319 the state of the art boats that we have today. I mean, it 291 00:22:03.440 --> 00:22:08.680 was just absolutely amazing how much of a change that's been in a like a 292 00:22:08.839 --> 00:22:14.400 odd department because of terrorists money. I don't go too far past because let's 293 00:22:14.400 --> 00:22:17.880 go back to fifty eight trucks. So you get the fifty eight truck. 294 00:22:17.960 --> 00:22:19.079 That's a busy house. That had to be a new house too, right, 295 00:22:19.079 --> 00:22:23.319 because they were they were yeah, yeah, they were they It was 296 00:22:23.359 --> 00:22:29.759 actually a new building that was attached to right next to forty five engine. 297 00:22:29.920 --> 00:22:33.880 They had they shared a house watch, but they had separate kitchens, right, 298 00:22:33.039 --> 00:22:38.000 and uh, in fifty eight truck was in the newer building along with 299 00:22:38.039 --> 00:22:41.880 the eighteenth battalion. Right, battalion was in the same building. And how 300 00:22:41.920 --> 00:22:47.640 long are there before you catch your first job, Philly? Uh? Actually 301 00:22:47.759 --> 00:22:52.640 I pulled up to the front door and the bell rang and a guy was 302 00:22:52.759 --> 00:22:59.240 hanging himself on the fire escape right in front of the house watch. That 303 00:22:59.279 --> 00:23:03.319 was That was a job I had and has meant was a guy hanging I 304 00:23:03.359 --> 00:23:07.680 mean in uh, fifty eight truck, the first guy was hanging himself. 305 00:23:07.759 --> 00:23:12.240 Right. What about the first fire? Though first fire probably was the next 306 00:23:12.400 --> 00:23:18.039 night. It was the next night. We we actually had a fire right 307 00:23:18.039 --> 00:23:23.720 down the street on Treemont and Viz. It was it was an h type 308 00:23:23.960 --> 00:23:33.279 top floor fire. I'm going to say it went to a ten seventy five. 309 00:23:33.319 --> 00:23:36.319 It didn't get bigger than that. Uh. We had some very good 310 00:23:36.319 --> 00:23:40.680 companies in the area. We had eighty eight and thirty eight that was just 311 00:23:40.720 --> 00:23:44.319 a little bit north of US, and to the south of US we had 312 00:23:44.640 --> 00:23:49.039 uh eighty eighty two and thirty one. So uh, you know it was 313 00:23:49.079 --> 00:23:53.079 it was good area in terms of it was Dennis Smith when you were up 314 00:23:53.079 --> 00:23:59.480 there in eighty two. Dennis Dennis at that time had transferred to seventy Engine 315 00:23:59.519 --> 00:24:03.799 and uh City Island, right he he he was still there, but it 316 00:24:03.839 --> 00:24:08.720 was like, you know, the last few months or something and then he 317 00:24:10.519 --> 00:24:12.480 was on his way over to City Island. Who was so of your bosses 318 00:24:12.480 --> 00:24:17.400 there in fifty eight when you were there, Uh, the first boss that 319 00:24:17.440 --> 00:24:21.400 I had was Captain Terry Roach. Uh. He was a real good guy. 320 00:24:21.440 --> 00:24:25.519 He ended up getting promoted. A lot of guys got promoted out of 321 00:24:25.519 --> 00:24:30.319 that house. Uh, but Terry Roach ended up becoming a deputy chief. 322 00:24:30.640 --> 00:24:37.319 He was the deputy chief who actually had the Father's Day fire. Really, 323 00:24:37.359 --> 00:24:40.519 he was one of the chiefs at the far Father's Day Fire. Yeah. 324 00:24:40.599 --> 00:24:48.880 So so Terry was a deputy, he made deputy and then Citro was my 325 00:24:49.039 --> 00:24:56.640 other captain there before I left and went to Hasmat two good guys. I 326 00:24:56.680 --> 00:25:03.599 also worked with tough Timmy Alaga and Engine eighty eight because I was detailed over 327 00:25:03.680 --> 00:25:11.200 to eighty eight engine during my probationary period. That was one of the things 328 00:25:11.599 --> 00:25:15.240 back when I got in the job. Anyone who was assigned to a truck 329 00:25:17.279 --> 00:25:22.880 had to first go, well not first go, but during their probationary period 330 00:25:22.240 --> 00:25:27.359 they had to do thirty days in each engine in their battalion. So eighty 331 00:25:27.400 --> 00:25:32.720 eight was in my battalion, forty five was in my battalion. So truck 332 00:25:32.759 --> 00:25:42.079 guys actually did sixty days and in engine companies when they had no Because the 333 00:25:42.119 --> 00:25:47.079 class that your brother and I got on in seventy nine, and I think 334 00:25:47.119 --> 00:25:52.119 the couple of classes prior, everybody went to engines. Nobody went to trucks, 335 00:25:52.440 --> 00:25:55.640 right, Yeah, everyone went to any you went to to eighty first. 336 00:25:55.640 --> 00:25:57.279 I forgot right, right, I think, I think I think we 337 00:25:57.319 --> 00:26:02.160 all had in our first year show, we did a thirty day detail to 338 00:26:02.240 --> 00:26:03.799 the truck. Like I just went across the floor, I went thirty two, 339 00:26:03.920 --> 00:26:08.400 right, So I was kind of the opposite and then after a year 340 00:26:10.720 --> 00:26:14.200 you could put a transfer paper in if I were openings, and back then 341 00:26:14.680 --> 00:26:18.559 there were, uh, there was a decent amount of openings because guys were 342 00:26:18.599 --> 00:26:22.000 retiring, you know, with the influx new guys. They felt like, 343 00:26:22.039 --> 00:26:25.599 all right, you know, we passed the torch for a year to you 344 00:26:25.680 --> 00:26:29.359 guys. You know, I'm retiring now. So it was easy to get 345 00:26:29.359 --> 00:26:33.200 to the truck. We had a thirty day detail and it was just to 346 00:26:33.279 --> 00:26:37.119 a truck in the Italian So they were hurt. They were hurting for guys 347 00:26:37.119 --> 00:26:45.119 in in trucks. H when I was in probably school because the women were 348 00:26:45.160 --> 00:26:51.480 holding up so many classes that the fire department was severely shorthanded, really shorthanded. 349 00:26:51.960 --> 00:26:56.039 So who was your senior A lot of my class went to engine companies, 350 00:26:56.039 --> 00:26:59.920 but the guys didn't go to trucks. They were all ordered to go 351 00:27:00.400 --> 00:27:04.720 spend thirty days in every engine in their jurisdiction. Who was your senior? 352 00:27:04.759 --> 00:27:12.000 Man? There Philly in fifty eight we had that was a very senior house 353 00:27:12.119 --> 00:27:18.200 camp. One of the things that when I first started, I gotta tell 354 00:27:18.240 --> 00:27:25.279 you, I felt incredibly safe because I actually sat down and figured it out 355 00:27:25.640 --> 00:27:32.160 and there was one tour when I was working. There was one hundred and 356 00:27:32.359 --> 00:27:37.640 twenty one years of experience on the truck with me going out the door. 357 00:27:38.920 --> 00:27:44.359 So you had guys who had a lot a lot of time. There was 358 00:27:44.400 --> 00:27:51.160 a few guys who were on promotion lists, so they were studying. They 359 00:27:51.160 --> 00:27:57.720 were hard workers, they did good fire duty, so I really felt safe 360 00:27:57.759 --> 00:28:02.519 in that firehouse. Yeah, those guys there, if you were at a 361 00:28:02.559 --> 00:28:04.559 fire and you were in a jam, those are the guys you wanted to 362 00:28:04.559 --> 00:28:08.119 be with because there was they had so much experience, so much fire. 363 00:28:08.279 --> 00:28:11.400 I would say the same thing in the squad, but I don't want to 364 00:28:11.400 --> 00:28:12.400 really blow up his head, you know, So I don't know. I'm 365 00:28:12.400 --> 00:28:19.920 not going to see it. What was tough Timmy like Phil, that guy's 366 00:28:21.000 --> 00:28:25.559 name comes up all the time on the showf tough to me. When I 367 00:28:25.599 --> 00:28:32.960 first went over to be detailed into that firehouse, my first day over there, 368 00:28:33.680 --> 00:28:37.880 I ran into him and he said, look, he says, you're 369 00:28:37.880 --> 00:28:41.519 in my group for the next thirty days. He said, you can't make 370 00:28:41.559 --> 00:28:44.480 any mutuals. He said, you have to work with me every tour. 371 00:28:44.759 --> 00:28:47.559 He says, there's no other way for me to evaluate you. If you're 372 00:28:47.559 --> 00:28:49.960 making mutuals. I can't evaluate. You've got to be with me every day. 373 00:28:51.119 --> 00:28:55.119 And I'm going to tell you he's a great fire officer. He would 374 00:28:55.160 --> 00:28:57.880 get into the thick of everything. And you know, he was an older 375 00:28:57.880 --> 00:29:03.359 guy he at the time, and he could keep up with any twenty year 376 00:29:03.440 --> 00:29:08.559 old. He was playing hockey with UH with UH some of the fire department 377 00:29:08.759 --> 00:29:14.200 hockey teams and stuff like that. And he was a good fire officer, 378 00:29:14.319 --> 00:29:18.559 smart, sharp, UH, tough, you knew stuff exactly, hence the 379 00:29:18.640 --> 00:29:23.720 name tough. You don't get to I seen him. I seen him once, 380 00:29:25.319 --> 00:29:27.480 No kidding, I seen him once. We were going into a job 381 00:29:27.920 --> 00:29:33.960 and they were trying event windows. I don't know for whatever reason he did, 382 00:29:34.000 --> 00:29:37.319 but he took his glove off for some reason, and he was punching 383 00:29:37.359 --> 00:29:42.440 the windows out with his hand. When I was over, his hand looked 384 00:29:42.480 --> 00:29:51.880 like U a piece of raw meat, and h the chief said to him, 385 00:29:52.160 --> 00:29:53.440 Timmy, you gotta go sick. And he said, he says, 386 00:29:53.480 --> 00:29:56.000 I'm not going sick. Tell these guys to put a band aid on it. 387 00:29:56.079 --> 00:29:59.759 I'm going back to the firehouse. Put his hand looked like a piece 388 00:29:59.759 --> 00:30:03.039 of Why did he take off his glove. Why don't you leave? You 389 00:30:02.319 --> 00:30:07.160 guys have no idea. You gotta punch the window. I have no idea 390 00:30:07.240 --> 00:30:11.240 why he did. I I think get the radio or something like that. 391 00:30:11.640 --> 00:30:15.880 And then he sees he needed to get the window. And because he's tough, 392 00:30:17.400 --> 00:30:21.079 that's why. Maybe he thought the glove had too much cushioning and it 393 00:30:21.119 --> 00:30:27.079 wouldn't break the glass. Yeah, you know, yeah he was. He 394 00:30:27.119 --> 00:30:33.960 was an amazing guy. Wow. All right, So let's talk about how 395 00:30:33.960 --> 00:30:38.880 they decided to come up because Rescue four he used to do hasback for the 396 00:30:38.960 --> 00:30:44.759 job, right, Yes, so you're getting how it was people were doing 397 00:30:44.839 --> 00:30:52.480 has back first before. Here's what happened. There was an incident that happened 398 00:30:52.519 --> 00:30:56.680 on the George Washington Bridge. There was a propane truck that was going northbound 399 00:30:56.680 --> 00:31:03.039 on the George Washington Bridge. It was an M seat three point thirty propane 400 00:31:03.039 --> 00:31:08.559 tank. It was carrying nine thousand gallons of liquified propane. And what happened 401 00:31:08.720 --> 00:31:18.880 was the relief device on the container. It's normally designed to open and vent 402 00:31:18.920 --> 00:31:22.839 to the air, okay, and when when the pressure goes down, the 403 00:31:22.920 --> 00:31:30.079 springloaded pressure relief device reseats closes and then on its way, it keeps going. 404 00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:36.440 Here's what happened. The springloaded pressure relief device goes to vent, it's 405 00:31:36.559 --> 00:31:41.720 venting for a sufficient amount of time and it freezes in the open position. 406 00:31:41.559 --> 00:31:47.200 So now they have leaking propane coming out of a thing on a continuous basis. 407 00:31:47.720 --> 00:31:55.079 Big problem. So they stopped traffic on the George Washington Bridge going south 408 00:31:55.279 --> 00:32:00.160 as far as Trenton, New Jersey, and it's backed up that that's going 409 00:32:00.279 --> 00:32:05.200 north, and then on the southbound side, it's backed up from Bridgeport, 410 00:32:05.240 --> 00:32:10.640 Connecticut all the way to the George Washington Bridge. So now what happens. 411 00:32:10.720 --> 00:32:16.359 It takes almost a full eight hours for them to figure out what to do. 412 00:32:16.880 --> 00:32:22.759 Okay, so they fixed the leak. After that, the federal government 413 00:32:22.839 --> 00:32:29.319 says to the fire department, look, you can't allow this to continue. 414 00:32:29.480 --> 00:32:31.519 You have to get a haz mat team. You have to get a has 415 00:32:31.599 --> 00:32:36.640 met team. So you know how the fire department is. It's two hundred 416 00:32:36.680 --> 00:32:40.799 years a tradition, unimpeded by progress, and because of that, they don't 417 00:32:40.880 --> 00:32:45.400 really want to get a has met team. So they decide that you know, 418 00:32:45.680 --> 00:32:51.039 Rescue two, Rescue one is doing diving operations. Rescue three is going 419 00:32:51.119 --> 00:32:54.519 to do collapse, and we're going to assign Rescue four to do has met 420 00:32:55.519 --> 00:33:01.119 Okay, So Rescue four is doing asthma. They're doing it for two years. 421 00:33:01.240 --> 00:33:07.680 They decide to make it a two vehicle operation. They add additional people 422 00:33:07.720 --> 00:33:12.799 to rescue for staffing so that they can staff the company. Now it becomes 423 00:33:12.799 --> 00:33:17.279 a two vehicle response. And what ends up happening is they're spending so much 424 00:33:17.359 --> 00:33:27.559 time out of the borough of Queens. Okay that Donaldmannus, who's the and 425 00:33:27.599 --> 00:33:30.920 says enough of this. He goes to the city and says, look, 426 00:33:31.279 --> 00:33:36.720 he says, my rescue company that's supposed to be in my borrow is spending 427 00:33:36.799 --> 00:33:40.039 way too much time out of the borough. They're on colls fortween and four 428 00:33:40.079 --> 00:33:43.759 hours out of the borough. And we have a fire in Queens. We 429 00:33:43.799 --> 00:33:45.880 have no rescue company in Queens. You got to do something else. So 430 00:33:45.920 --> 00:33:50.640 the fire department decides and they come up with a plan. Well, we're 431 00:33:50.640 --> 00:33:57.000 going to make a separate rescue company, a separate HASMAG company. So Ray 432 00:33:57.079 --> 00:34:01.680 Brown at the time he was uh, he was the captain of Rescue one 433 00:34:01.759 --> 00:34:07.719 for a while. You remember that Hank ray Brown was his name. There 434 00:34:07.760 --> 00:34:13.719 be for you but anyway, Brown he said he was Gray Brown was was 435 00:34:13.960 --> 00:34:17.519 captain of what did you say? He was captain of rescue one at one, 436 00:34:19.239 --> 00:34:25.119 and then they made him the chief of Rescue services. So what ends 437 00:34:25.199 --> 00:34:32.039 up happening is this, they decided to make a separate hazmat unit and they're 438 00:34:32.079 --> 00:34:36.599 going to put them in Queen's and Maspeth, and they're going to put them 439 00:34:36.639 --> 00:34:39.079 right on the l I E. So they can they can run the they 440 00:34:39.159 --> 00:34:43.440 can run the l I E, they can run the b QUA, they 441 00:34:43.440 --> 00:34:46.679 can go in a lot of different directions. So it's the strategic decision was 442 00:34:46.719 --> 00:34:53.039 to put them in the quarters of two eighty eight. Anyway, Yes, 443 00:34:53.159 --> 00:34:57.760 they had an open bay. And what was going to be unique about this 444 00:34:57.880 --> 00:35:00.920 company was that it wasn't going to be staffed for twenty five firefighters. It 445 00:35:01.000 --> 00:35:06.960 was going to be staffed for thirty five firefighters. Because the company staffing was 446 00:35:07.039 --> 00:35:10.239 not going to be five firefighters in an officer. It was going to be 447 00:35:10.320 --> 00:35:15.199 seven firefighters in an officer. And uh, the company was going to have 448 00:35:15.639 --> 00:35:22.199 three lieutenants who uh were field lieutenants, one captain, and they were going 449 00:35:22.280 --> 00:35:25.960 to have one administrative officer to manage all of this, so they had a 450 00:35:27.000 --> 00:35:32.960 lieutenant as administrative officer, three lieutenants for field work along with the captains. 451 00:35:32.960 --> 00:35:37.360 So let me let me stop you one minute. So when Rescue four was 452 00:35:37.400 --> 00:35:42.559 responding on HASBAT runs because as we know has that, you know you have 453 00:35:42.559 --> 00:35:45.000 two entry guys, two backup guys, a resource guy, de contact, 454 00:35:45.559 --> 00:35:49.519 right, what was how are they set up then? Because they only had 455 00:35:49.559 --> 00:35:55.119 what five guys? No? No, no, the Rescue four actually tiet 456 00:35:55.239 --> 00:36:00.480 more guys to staff the company because here remember we were just talking about federal 457 00:36:00.519 --> 00:36:06.880 requirements and and why they why they uh? Why the uh stare uh? 458 00:36:07.639 --> 00:36:12.440 The amount of training was changing. Well, the federal requirements were saying that 459 00:36:12.880 --> 00:36:15.639 if you have a hazardous materials response team, you have to have a two 460 00:36:15.679 --> 00:36:20.000 man entry team, a two man backup team, you have to have a 461 00:36:20.000 --> 00:36:23.239 two man decon team. And what a lot of departments were doing was they 462 00:36:23.239 --> 00:36:29.920 wanted a resource person who could look up information about the chemicals, take that 463 00:36:30.079 --> 00:36:36.159 information, report it to headquarters. And so before rod with seven guys at 464 00:36:36.159 --> 00:36:39.039 the time, then yes, yes, they were riding with they were riding 465 00:36:39.079 --> 00:36:45.880 with seven. Now what what what ended up happening is you know John Dillon, 466 00:36:45.960 --> 00:36:49.599 the Duke. Most people know who I'm talking about. If you know 467 00:36:49.639 --> 00:36:52.719 anything about rescue for, you know about to do well. The Duke and 468 00:36:52.800 --> 00:37:00.719 a number of the rescue four guys had had actually designed a new second piece 469 00:37:00.760 --> 00:37:05.920 for them, okay, and that second piece was going to carry all of 470 00:37:05.920 --> 00:37:08.559 their hazmat equipment, all of their regular rescue equipment was going to be on 471 00:37:08.599 --> 00:37:14.320 their first piece. But what ended up happening is when they decided to make 472 00:37:14.360 --> 00:37:19.239 the new hazmat unit. Now they made they made Hazmat Rescue five and a 473 00:37:19.280 --> 00:37:22.079 five nine battalion, all on the same day, All on the same day, 474 00:37:22.239 --> 00:37:28.440 those three units were created, okay. And what they did was this, 475 00:37:29.840 --> 00:37:34.199 John Dillon and those guys were worked really hard designing that second piece. 476 00:37:34.880 --> 00:37:37.880 The day that it was supposed to be delivered to them, it was taken 477 00:37:37.920 --> 00:37:44.519 away from them and given to the guys and has Mat You're with me as 478 00:37:44.599 --> 00:37:52.719 their new first piece. They were pissed. You get where I'm coming from, 479 00:37:52.800 --> 00:37:57.719 right, because your original second piece was an engine right, Yes, 480 00:37:58.280 --> 00:38:07.440 yes, our original first piece was actually designed as rescue for as secies You 481 00:38:07.599 --> 00:38:10.880 with me? Oh so that make good relations with you and rescue for Yes, 482 00:38:12.400 --> 00:38:15.760 Well, you know what but you see, but I'm going to tell 483 00:38:15.800 --> 00:38:21.000 you what the problem was. There. There were some guys in rescue for 484 00:38:21.119 --> 00:38:23.039 who didn't want to do has Matt, and there were other guys in rescue 485 00:38:23.079 --> 00:38:27.599 for who did want to do has Matt. So you had a divided company 486 00:38:27.599 --> 00:38:30.320 who was who was kind of upset at the way they were being treated, 487 00:38:30.360 --> 00:38:35.559 And quite honestly, they weren't really being treated fairly. I mean, you 488 00:38:35.559 --> 00:38:38.280 know, they went to all of that work and research and development, and 489 00:38:38.639 --> 00:38:44.320 you know, politics, politics was the deciding fact. Right. They had 490 00:38:44.360 --> 00:38:46.519 to go away to school, they had to go to the EPA schools, 491 00:38:46.559 --> 00:38:51.360 they had to go to National Fire Academy schools, and those kind of things 492 00:38:52.719 --> 00:38:57.559 turned some of the guys in the company off, you know, other guys 493 00:38:57.719 --> 00:39:00.239 other guys. That's it. That's the piece right there. Right. So 494 00:39:01.519 --> 00:39:08.760 what what ended up happening is over time, some of those wounds healed a 495 00:39:08.800 --> 00:39:13.039 little bit, you know, like uh, John Dillon and me would talk 496 00:39:13.079 --> 00:39:15.880 all the time. Uh. He was still a lot of those guys, 497 00:39:15.960 --> 00:39:21.719 like Mike Milner, all of them, Uh, they still took Hasmack classes. 498 00:39:21.760 --> 00:39:24.880 They went and and and they they were all skilled Hasmac guys. You 499 00:39:24.920 --> 00:39:30.039 know, It wasn't like they were uh they were not. Now some of 500 00:39:30.079 --> 00:39:34.599 the guys from Rescue for left there and came over to Hazmat So that's how 501 00:39:35.119 --> 00:39:39.760 that's how the initial transition happened. Right when let's go back to how did 502 00:39:39.800 --> 00:39:43.840 they put that on an order? Guys who want to go to has matt 503 00:39:43.920 --> 00:39:47.320 and you saw it? What they did. What they did was this they 504 00:39:47.599 --> 00:39:51.840 they they put out on an order. They said, look, we're going 505 00:39:51.920 --> 00:39:55.320 to start a new unit. It's gonna be Hazardous Materials Company one. This 506 00:39:55.360 --> 00:40:00.400 is what you're gonna do. Yeah, anyone who's interested call this number. 507 00:40:01.039 --> 00:40:07.480 So they had one hundred and twenty six people called who were interested. Every 508 00:40:07.519 --> 00:40:12.320 one of those people were interviewed. Now, at the time, they were 509 00:40:12.360 --> 00:40:16.199 only going to take they were only going to take first grade fireman to come 510 00:40:16.239 --> 00:40:23.239 to the unit, okay, And what happened was every one of the one 511 00:40:23.320 --> 00:40:27.840 hundred and twenty five were interviewed. Joe Gallagher, who was going to be 512 00:40:27.880 --> 00:40:30.400 the captain, he did some of the interviews. Joe Buell, who came 513 00:40:30.400 --> 00:40:37.239 from Rescue three, he did some of the interviews. Al Jordan he did 514 00:40:37.280 --> 00:40:39.360 some of the interviews, and the captain did some of the interviews, and 515 00:40:39.480 --> 00:40:45.760 what they did was they whittled the list down to thirty five people. Okay, 516 00:40:46.119 --> 00:40:51.440 those thirty five ended up going to the Division of Training, and they 517 00:40:51.480 --> 00:40:57.239 went there for six weeks of training. Now they were being taught by guys 518 00:40:58.159 --> 00:41:05.280 rescue for and from those company officers Jack Calderone, Al Jordan and Joe Buell, 519 00:41:05.599 --> 00:41:08.639 Joe Gallagher, and they were taught for six weeks about what these guys 520 00:41:08.639 --> 00:41:15.440 had learned at the National Fire Academy. Then six weeks later, everybody goes 521 00:41:15.480 --> 00:41:19.559 to the firehouse and we walk into the firehouse and it was like, remember 522 00:41:19.559 --> 00:41:22.719 when you guys came and kind of like took over things. Yeah, the 523 00:41:23.000 --> 00:41:29.679 situation when has Matt got there and two eighty eight was there, they didn't 524 00:41:29.679 --> 00:41:31.559 want any part of this, and all of a sudden, now they're being 525 00:41:31.639 --> 00:41:36.599 invaded by thirty five guys. Thirty five new guys in the firehouse. They 526 00:41:36.599 --> 00:41:38.519 had taken over the firehouse. So it was the same. It was the 527 00:41:38.559 --> 00:41:43.679 same kind of deal. So let me ask you a quick questions. You 528 00:41:44.119 --> 00:41:47.840 were a first grade how'd you get over there? What you weren't first grade? 529 00:41:47.840 --> 00:41:51.719 How did you get over there? No? No, The reason they 530 00:41:51.760 --> 00:41:57.159 took me. Is because I was an operating engineer before I came into the 531 00:41:57.199 --> 00:42:00.119 New York City Fire Department. I was able to run power plants and heavy 532 00:42:00.119 --> 00:42:04.840 equipment and knew how it worked and operated and stuff like that. I could 533 00:42:04.880 --> 00:42:10.639 go into a steam generating plant or an electrical power plant and know what had 534 00:42:10.679 --> 00:42:14.039 to be on and what had to beyond. So were you Were you the 535 00:42:14.119 --> 00:42:17.400 junior guy then? One? I was a junior guy, That's right. 536 00:42:19.559 --> 00:42:22.159 I was. I was. I was only a third grade fire and when 537 00:42:22.199 --> 00:42:27.119 they took me, that's right. If I may ask a question, I 538 00:42:27.199 --> 00:42:34.960 was, I was? I was the tidy bowl planer. What's the question, 539 00:42:35.039 --> 00:42:37.840 Mikey, I canna say those early days eighty four, eighty five, 540 00:42:37.880 --> 00:42:40.719 eighty six, there's a lot that we didn't know back then about HASMAT, 541 00:42:40.760 --> 00:42:45.239 and a lot of it also was rooted in everyday use of certain chemicals, 542 00:42:45.239 --> 00:42:47.920 like, for example, our frigerators retained retain certain chemicals that are normal in 543 00:42:49.000 --> 00:42:52.320 certain dosages. So for you, this is a two part question. One 544 00:42:52.559 --> 00:42:55.519 the growing pains both personally and as a company, and two what were the 545 00:42:55.559 --> 00:43:01.119 early missions and goals of the unit? Okay, first things first, the 546 00:43:05.199 --> 00:43:09.559 federal laws and regulations that regulated has MAT and HASMAT training did not become effective 547 00:43:09.639 --> 00:43:15.639 until nineteen eighty six. The Super Fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act was actually in 548 00:43:15.719 --> 00:43:22.840 nineteen eighty six that mandated training, and the training that was mandated greatly expanded 549 00:43:22.880 --> 00:43:27.840 what we had to do in terms of training. But here's the problem. 550 00:43:28.360 --> 00:43:32.800 We're coming from a department that's one hundred and twenty five years of tradition, 551 00:43:34.480 --> 00:43:40.760 unimpeded by progress. It is heavily, heavily entrenched in tradition. So we're 552 00:43:40.760 --> 00:43:47.400 going to start this new company in the fire department that totally goes against everything 553 00:43:47.480 --> 00:43:52.440 that we've ever been taught. The guys in the fire department are taught an 554 00:43:52.519 --> 00:43:57.360 aggressive interior attack, that's the way we fight fires. The guys in has 555 00:43:57.440 --> 00:44:02.000 matter being told WHOA, Yes, we're not going to go in there and 556 00:44:02.079 --> 00:44:08.039 go ape shit crazy until we see what we got to deal with. So 557 00:44:08.760 --> 00:44:16.480 the written protocols and procedures for firefighting were one hundred and eighty degree difference from 558 00:44:16.599 --> 00:44:23.119 what the protocols and procedures were being taught for hazmat personnel. And that's at 559 00:44:23.159 --> 00:44:29.519 the federal, state, and local level. So now we're having a company 560 00:44:29.639 --> 00:44:36.079 that's being taught contrary to what the department believes. Okay, you're with me, 561 00:44:36.159 --> 00:44:42.559 Mike. So in terms of growing pains, every time that we had 562 00:44:42.679 --> 00:44:46.880 a problem or an issue, we're dealing with chief officers or people high up 563 00:44:46.920 --> 00:44:52.719 in the ranks who don't see things from the same point of view as we 564 00:44:52.760 --> 00:44:55.599 do. And not only don't they see things from the same point of view 565 00:44:55.679 --> 00:45:00.639 as we do, but they're also not trained or educate to understand the federal 566 00:45:00.679 --> 00:45:05.920 regulations and the federal requirements that say this is what you have to do. 567 00:45:06.039 --> 00:45:10.519 And just let me give you one simple example. When we first started, 568 00:45:10.519 --> 00:45:15.079 we were in the four six battalion. We were in the four six battalion 569 00:45:15.119 --> 00:45:20.519 man power pot. So anytime that we didn't have enough staffing, they would 570 00:45:20.559 --> 00:45:27.400 want to send us a person from the four six battalion pool. But when 571 00:45:27.400 --> 00:45:30.039 they sent us a guy, if they sent us an untrained guy, we 572 00:45:30.079 --> 00:45:34.760 would send him right back to the battalion and the battalion would go crazy and 573 00:45:34.800 --> 00:45:37.320 say, you can't send him back, And we're saying to the battalion, 574 00:45:37.440 --> 00:45:43.760 you can't send them here because the federal law requires that the people who fill 575 00:45:43.880 --> 00:45:49.880 these positions have to be trained to certain levels. You with me, yes, 576 00:45:50.320 --> 00:45:57.000 So it became one of the toughest jobs in the fire department. Was 577 00:45:57.400 --> 00:46:00.039 the delegate for Hazmat won Do you know why? Why was that? It 578 00:46:00.239 --> 00:46:05.280 was he had to fight an issue every day. And when I say this, 579 00:46:05.480 --> 00:46:08.519 every day, if you were to delegate in an engine company or in 580 00:46:08.519 --> 00:46:15.920 a truck company, you had literally one hundred people who've seen things from your 581 00:46:15.000 --> 00:46:20.119 perspective. Okay, when you were in a rescue company, you had at 582 00:46:20.199 --> 00:46:24.880 least five delegates who've seen things from your perspective. When you were in Hasmat, 583 00:46:25.400 --> 00:46:30.239 you were the only person who's seen things from your perspective. The chiefs 584 00:46:30.280 --> 00:46:37.280 didn't understand. Sometimes the company offices didn't understand, and push came to shove 585 00:46:37.760 --> 00:46:44.480 on many occasions when you talk in terms of growing pains. So I hope 586 00:46:44.519 --> 00:46:46.519 that kind of answers your question. It does, and it prompts a follow 587 00:46:46.639 --> 00:46:51.760 up. Naturally, over the course of a company's evolution and growth, there 588 00:46:51.880 --> 00:46:55.320 is not amongst you guys, but amongst outside observers the oh that's why they're 589 00:46:55.360 --> 00:46:59.000 here moments, you know. So, where did you start to feel that 590 00:46:59.079 --> 00:47:01.559 that respect factor was coming in and chiefs or any other officers for that matter, 591 00:47:01.599 --> 00:47:05.840 started to say it these scenes collectively, Okay, that's why we need 592 00:47:05.840 --> 00:47:09.440 them. Time. And when I say a long time, I'm going to 593 00:47:09.519 --> 00:47:16.119 say it took I'm going to be legitimately recognized in the job. Probably took 594 00:47:16.480 --> 00:47:22.679 over ten years. And I'm not saying that there were some people who recognized 595 00:47:22.760 --> 00:47:27.199 right away, but it took a long time. It took a long time 596 00:47:27.239 --> 00:47:30.559 for people to understand it. Hey wait a second, this is a completely 597 00:47:30.599 --> 00:47:34.039 different perspective. But you know what You've got to remember too, we were 598 00:47:34.079 --> 00:47:36.599 the new kids on the block, and the new kids on the block. 599 00:47:36.639 --> 00:47:40.039 It's like, I'm sure that Rescue five, which was created on the same 600 00:47:40.119 --> 00:47:44.719 day as us, how to go through a lot of growing pains out in 601 00:47:44.800 --> 00:47:50.280 Staten Island because companies out there were dealing with fires and stuff long before Rescue 602 00:47:50.280 --> 00:47:53.320 five was even established out there. You know what I'm saying, how would 603 00:47:53.320 --> 00:48:00.639 you like to be an engine company operate as a rescue company? Right right? 604 00:48:01.039 --> 00:48:05.760 Well, one thing I would like to say, you know, to 605 00:48:05.840 --> 00:48:12.719 back up what Phil said is that it did probably take, in most people's 606 00:48:12.800 --> 00:48:19.119 eyes that were in the fire department a while for them to be accepted or 607 00:48:20.639 --> 00:48:23.599 get the the you know, realize what they did. And listen, I 608 00:48:23.719 --> 00:48:27.639 was one of them, I know when when they when I saw that come 609 00:48:27.679 --> 00:48:30.960 about the Hasmat, I wanted nothing to do with that. I was having 610 00:48:30.960 --> 00:48:37.079 a great time doing those aggressive interior attacks fighting fires, and then you know, 611 00:48:37.159 --> 00:48:39.400 later on doing all the other stuff that the that the rescues did. 612 00:48:40.599 --> 00:48:45.480 I think where I got at least a much greater respect for what the guys 613 00:48:45.480 --> 00:48:51.519 in Hasma did was when when we became a squad and we had to do 614 00:48:51.639 --> 00:48:55.440 all that training and all the different level suits and and the dexterity you know 615 00:48:55.559 --> 00:48:59.920 what. I'm glad you brought that up, Pat, I mean I want 616 00:48:59.920 --> 00:49:04.760 to yet, well again, listen, it's still it wasn't my favorite thing 617 00:49:04.800 --> 00:49:07.320 to have to do, but at that point I knew that was one of 618 00:49:07.360 --> 00:49:12.880 my tasks if I was asked to do it, So I was, like 619 00:49:12.920 --> 00:49:15.719 anything else, I was going to train and become good at it. But 620 00:49:15.800 --> 00:49:20.119 it was definitely, uh, you know when you had to get those lets 621 00:49:20.199 --> 00:49:22.360 you know, lel level as it was, I mean it was daunting, 622 00:49:22.679 --> 00:49:27.480 uh with the you know, the hand out, yeah, you know, 623 00:49:27.719 --> 00:49:30.639 and and and you know, making sure something's not ripped I mean, it 624 00:49:30.719 --> 00:49:34.480 was just so many things to think about and to try to do in these 625 00:49:34.480 --> 00:49:37.519 spacesuits that you had no dexterity. It was, you know, it was 626 00:49:37.519 --> 00:49:44.239 definitely challenging. You know, you bring up such a great point, and 627 00:49:44.239 --> 00:49:46.559 and I just would like to if you guys are okay with this, I'd 628 00:49:46.559 --> 00:49:51.719 like to just expand on what what Hank mentioned for a second. You know, 629 00:49:52.760 --> 00:49:58.159 that was probably the turning point, Hank, when when all his terrorism 630 00:49:58.280 --> 00:50:04.480 stuff started and we started to train all of the rescue companies and the CPC 631 00:50:04.760 --> 00:50:08.840 trucks and the decontructs. What we did was we created what was called the 632 00:50:08.880 --> 00:50:13.920 tiered response, where we trained people to different levels, but we brought all 633 00:50:13.920 --> 00:50:19.920 of the companies out to the Rocky. We taught them about the capabilities and 634 00:50:19.960 --> 00:50:25.119 limitations of wearing chemical protective clothing. We taught them about decontamination. We made 635 00:50:25.159 --> 00:50:30.320 everybody get in the suit. And when I say we made everybody, every 636 00:50:30.440 --> 00:50:35.199 chief in Soccer had to get in a suit. Every chief in the safety 637 00:50:35.239 --> 00:50:38.880 Operating Battalion, any chief who was ever going to operate in the safety operating 638 00:50:38.920 --> 00:50:43.440 battalion how to get into chemical protective suits. And they had to go through 639 00:50:43.480 --> 00:50:46.840 a task oriented obstacle course where they had to climb over things, they had 640 00:50:46.880 --> 00:50:51.360 to open barrels, they had to do with a one person drag or two 641 00:50:51.400 --> 00:50:55.159 person drag, a four person carry, and you had to do all of 642 00:50:55.199 --> 00:50:59.079 that and complete all of that on one bottle of air. And if you 643 00:50:59.199 --> 00:51:01.719 ran out of air, you failed the course. Well, I'm going to 644 00:51:01.719 --> 00:51:07.199 tell you something. We had one chief he went through the thing. He 645 00:51:07.239 --> 00:51:12.880 failed the course and he said, he said, you know, I know 646 00:51:12.960 --> 00:51:15.480 I failed. He says, I'm not asking hear pass me. He says, 647 00:51:15.639 --> 00:51:19.320 I'm going to tell you one thing though. He says, that was 648 00:51:19.400 --> 00:51:23.239 the toughest course I ever had in my career. And he says, I'll 649 00:51:23.280 --> 00:51:27.840 tell you what he says. When I'm a safety chief. Now, if 650 00:51:27.880 --> 00:51:31.039 I get an incident and the incident commander thinks that he has enough guys to 651 00:51:31.079 --> 00:51:35.519 wear chemical protective suits to the job, I'm going to tell them, no, 652 00:51:35.880 --> 00:51:37.960 you need more guys. Get more guys. Because one of the reasons 653 00:51:37.960 --> 00:51:45.920 that we created this tiered response was when the chief officers were going through chief 654 00:51:46.000 --> 00:51:50.719 officer training, one of their programs that they had to take was the Hazardon 655 00:51:51.360 --> 00:51:54.440 Materials program. And what we said to them was this, Look, we're 656 00:51:54.440 --> 00:51:58.480 going to give you a situation, and we want to know. We don't 657 00:51:58.519 --> 00:52:00.920 want you to say out loud, I want you to write down what you 658 00:52:00.960 --> 00:52:07.199 would do, okay, And this is the situation we gave them. There's 659 00:52:07.239 --> 00:52:13.920 an incident at Grand Central Terminal. There's people down in Grand Central Terminal. 660 00:52:14.480 --> 00:52:19.199 First responding units get to the scene and all of the first responding units go 661 00:52:19.320 --> 00:52:23.079 down. What are you gonna do? What are you gonna do? Now? 662 00:52:23.400 --> 00:52:25.519 The first thing that you have to think in your mind, Well, 663 00:52:25.559 --> 00:52:30.199 civilians go down and not protected. All right. Firefighters are coming in in 664 00:52:30.320 --> 00:52:35.760 bunker gear and they're going down. So what is that telling you about their 665 00:52:35.800 --> 00:52:39.800 protective clothing? It's not adequate for the task in hand. Okay, So 666 00:52:39.840 --> 00:52:44.400 who are we gonna call? Well, at the time there was only one 667 00:52:44.440 --> 00:52:46.519 has met. How many people are getting in suits? Well, according to 668 00:52:46.559 --> 00:52:50.199 protocol, you have a two man entry, two man backup, and you 669 00:52:50.239 --> 00:52:53.280 have two decons. So you're gonna have two guys go in for literally one 670 00:52:53.360 --> 00:52:57.760 hundred people down, a full first alarm assignment down. How long is it 671 00:52:57.760 --> 00:53:01.800 gonna take them to get people out? Quite a bit long time? Understand 672 00:53:01.840 --> 00:53:06.920 the concept? Yeah, Now, now the job is in panic mode because 673 00:53:06.960 --> 00:53:12.639 they see the incident that happened in Tokyo and they're saying to themselves, we 674 00:53:12.679 --> 00:53:15.599 can't expect Hasmat to do this, and we're we're certainly not going to add 675 00:53:15.639 --> 00:53:20.880 more victims to the situation if we have if we have guys. So the 676 00:53:21.000 --> 00:53:25.280 solution is we got to train everybody in special operations to wear chemical protective clothing. 677 00:53:25.559 --> 00:53:30.119 Now, when we train guys, we have a lot of great people 678 00:53:30.239 --> 00:53:35.360 in in sock. And I'm not knocking anyone, but I am saying this, 679 00:53:37.440 --> 00:53:40.519 guys developed a more healthy respect for Hazmat because some of the guys were 680 00:53:40.559 --> 00:53:45.440 a bit closer FORWICK and they didn't like suits. No way, no how. 681 00:53:45.840 --> 00:53:49.840 But now I gotta go in a suit. I have to go in 682 00:53:49.880 --> 00:53:53.840 an unfamiliar environment. I have to go in and I have to physically work 683 00:53:54.079 --> 00:53:58.559 hard. I am going to be huffing and puffing because I got to hump 684 00:53:58.760 --> 00:54:02.519 people out of this scene. Then they understand how difficult it is to wear 685 00:54:02.599 --> 00:54:06.960 chemical protectives. And I know every guy that's listening right now, I can 686 00:54:07.039 --> 00:54:10.199 tell every guy that's listening, if you've never been in the level A suit, 687 00:54:10.360 --> 00:54:15.119 you have no clue what it's like man, And if it's like an 688 00:54:15.199 --> 00:54:20.960 eighty degree or eighty five degree day. Yeah, and you know what. 689 00:54:21.079 --> 00:54:23.159 The other thing that that made me realize this was the real deal. You 690 00:54:23.159 --> 00:54:27.480 remember the training that was part of the training was where we had to give 691 00:54:27.480 --> 00:54:32.079 ourselves different shots like in the thought. Yeah, I'm like, you know, 692 00:54:32.239 --> 00:54:36.679 with those injectable things. I said, well, if they're teaching us 693 00:54:36.719 --> 00:54:37.880 this, you know we're gonna be getting you know, we might be getting 694 00:54:37.880 --> 00:54:42.360 too some bad ship at some time, you know, Yes, what's out 695 00:54:42.400 --> 00:54:46.400 for sludge them? When I went to the Army Chemical Warfair School and I 696 00:54:46.440 --> 00:54:52.800 was working with Saren the uh, I'm working with it in a in a 697 00:54:52.880 --> 00:54:58.639 room that's not contaminated, but there's a medical team standing right outside the room 698 00:54:58.760 --> 00:55:02.719 in case something goes wrong. And they have a needle that's about this big, 699 00:55:04.679 --> 00:55:07.400 all right, that they're gonna inject into my heart if I go down. 700 00:55:08.320 --> 00:55:12.840 And before I even went the room, I had a sign a disclaimer 701 00:55:13.360 --> 00:55:19.840 holding the Army harmless if anything I was killed or died. So, Phil, 702 00:55:19.920 --> 00:55:22.880 let me answer your question from the time that has thatt one was developed, 703 00:55:22.480 --> 00:55:29.679 when did the thought process start to begin about building this tiered system because 704 00:55:29.760 --> 00:55:37.440 I mean the squads and the engines came later, right, So so a 705 00:55:37.480 --> 00:55:40.480 lot of this stuff, a lot of this stuff started when say Ern von 706 00:55:40.599 --> 00:55:47.039 Essen were the commissioners. Uh, the Tokyo Saren incident was like a wake 707 00:55:47.119 --> 00:55:52.360 up call to everybody because they looked at that, that incident and you know, 708 00:55:52.440 --> 00:55:55.559 fourteen people died in that incident, But they also looked at that and 709 00:55:55.599 --> 00:55:59.480 said, you know, if that happened in New York City here, what 710 00:55:59.599 --> 00:56:05.440 do we What are we gonna do? What are we gonna do if we 711 00:56:05.519 --> 00:56:08.039 have a ton of people go down. We can't say, as the New 712 00:56:08.119 --> 00:56:14.239 York City Fire Department that we can't get them. We're never gonna say we 713 00:56:14.280 --> 00:56:16.360 can't get them. We're always going to say we're going to get them, 714 00:56:16.800 --> 00:56:21.760 and and and how do we make that happen? How do we make that 715 00:56:21.840 --> 00:56:24.440 happen? And you know, like part of the chief development course was that 716 00:56:25.480 --> 00:56:31.920 we wanted guys to understand that that we have to change the way we think. 717 00:56:32.400 --> 00:56:37.400 You know, we don't have to tell chiefs, We don't have to 718 00:56:37.440 --> 00:56:40.239 tell people how to fight fires in New York City. Our guys are great 719 00:56:40.360 --> 00:56:45.960 at that, great all right. Second to none, But we get those 720 00:56:46.000 --> 00:56:52.039 situations and they're not They don't happen often. We get those situations where we're 721 00:56:52.079 --> 00:56:59.280 out of our element. Okay, and has met used to be is no 722 00:56:59.360 --> 00:57:01.639 longer, but used to be one of those situations where we were out of 723 00:57:01.639 --> 00:57:07.239 our element. Today because of the way we've trained Sock and the companies in 724 00:57:07.360 --> 00:57:13.960 SOCK, I don't think. I don't think that that we can't meet the 725 00:57:14.039 --> 00:57:19.840 challenge. I think that everybody in SoC today can meet just virtually any challenge 726 00:57:20.199 --> 00:57:23.599 that's placed upon us, whether it be diving, whether it be collapse operations, 727 00:57:23.719 --> 00:57:29.320 whether it be fires, whether it be medical incidents, whether we can 728 00:57:29.480 --> 00:57:36.800 meet all of that stuff because we've trained our people to the point where they 729 00:57:36.840 --> 00:57:40.039 are so good at their job and they're so intelligent at their job. And 730 00:57:40.079 --> 00:57:45.159 not only that, but they have the they have the skills. They do 731 00:57:45.239 --> 00:57:49.719 not only have the knowledge, but they have the skills to perform all of 732 00:57:49.760 --> 00:57:53.840 those functions and goog the job and do it safely and not get hurt. 733 00:57:54.119 --> 00:57:58.920 Right. So I think the best part was to fill The greatest thing was 734 00:57:59.320 --> 00:58:02.559 having the chief go through those courses because even heck, even when we used 735 00:58:02.559 --> 00:58:05.840 to show up or something they were like, Dad, no idea, what 736 00:58:05.920 --> 00:58:08.880 the ropes well with the systems, with the idea of our capabilities. Oh 737 00:58:08.920 --> 00:58:13.039 that robe, I'm not putting it up keV. You know one of the 738 00:58:13.079 --> 00:58:16.199 reasons. One of the reasons that I I said that, you know, 739 00:58:16.320 --> 00:58:20.480 like when when von Essen came to me and he said, he said, 740 00:58:20.519 --> 00:58:22.840 look, he says, you're going to make the chiefs do this stuff. 741 00:58:22.840 --> 00:58:24.559 He says, some of these chiefs in fifty years. I says, look, 742 00:58:24.920 --> 00:58:30.880 how can they how can they supervise guys if they don't know what the 743 00:58:30.880 --> 00:58:35.599 guys are going through. I said, you know, it's very easy to 744 00:58:35.599 --> 00:58:37.480 say, just have the guys keep working in there. No, no, 745 00:58:37.480 --> 00:58:40.639 no, I want you to go through the physical stress that they have to 746 00:58:40.639 --> 00:58:45.440 go through so you can understand. You know, you get to the scene 747 00:58:45.480 --> 00:58:49.000 of an emergency, Hey we need more resources here, what are you talking 748 00:58:49.000 --> 00:58:52.480 about? We need more resources? We got a full first lam assignment. 749 00:58:52.599 --> 00:58:57.239 This is not enough for the task at hand. You know what I'm saying, 750 00:58:57.800 --> 00:59:00.159 Well that they didn't even know what our capability these were quite honestly, 751 00:59:00.239 --> 00:59:05.599 that's right, that's right. But you know what the safety chief the safety 752 00:59:05.679 --> 00:59:09.239 chiefs and all the sock chiefs who went through this training. Those guys were 753 00:59:09.280 --> 00:59:14.960 smart guys. They knew right away. They they recognized what the problem was 754 00:59:15.840 --> 00:59:19.639 when when we had a mess incident where we have a lot of people down 755 00:59:19.679 --> 00:59:22.400 and we have firefighters going down and bunker gear. These guys know exactly what 756 00:59:22.440 --> 00:59:29.039 to do, right. That was the same problem that any of the what 757 00:59:29.199 --> 00:59:32.880 became Sock companies had before Sock, which was kind of what thirteen David came 758 00:59:32.880 --> 00:59:39.320 in because right as things became more specialized, whether it was asthmat, diving, 759 00:59:39.960 --> 00:59:45.280 high rope, confined space, a lot of the chiefs had never experienced 760 00:59:45.320 --> 00:59:51.719 any of that stuff right and and I think a lot of times they were 761 00:59:52.119 --> 00:59:54.880 they would take a step back because if they didn't understand the capabilities, they 762 00:59:54.880 --> 00:59:59.320 didn't want want to put guys in harm's away when they didn't understand it. 763 00:59:59.599 --> 01:00:02.400 So, you know, all had to go through and at least see some 764 01:00:02.480 --> 01:00:07.519 of these things. I think it helped tremendously for the whole you know, 765 01:00:07.599 --> 01:00:10.679 the whole aspect of Sock in the fire department. I'm going to tell you 766 01:00:10.719 --> 01:00:14.840 something, Hank, and you bring up another great point. There was a 767 01:00:14.880 --> 01:00:19.719 Captain John. His last name began with an m I forget it, but 768 01:00:19.800 --> 01:00:24.360 he was in thirteen David. He came from rescue one. Oh remember when 769 01:00:24.360 --> 01:00:29.079 the kid fell down the shaft. Remember when the kid fell down the shaft 770 01:00:29.079 --> 01:00:32.800 and the water tunnel in the Bronx. Yes, yes, the nine year 771 01:00:32.840 --> 01:00:37.760 old kid he was playing in he was playing in the water tunnel in the 772 01:00:37.800 --> 01:00:40.679 Bronx, fell down the shaft. We had to go down to the manifold 773 01:00:40.679 --> 01:00:45.639 in the Bronx, take a seven and a half ton cap off the manifold 774 01:00:45.719 --> 01:00:50.199 and we had to repel down one hundred and seventy five feet and then walk 775 01:00:50.360 --> 01:00:52.079 a few miles to get the body. That's what we had to do. 776 01:00:52.760 --> 01:00:59.559 Huge operation, right if it wasn't for thirteen David there we went had to 777 01:00:59.599 --> 01:01:01.440 fire him. A fatality at that job. Because I'll tell you what was 778 01:01:01.480 --> 01:01:07.159 happening. They were hooking up on ropes to repel down to get him, 779 01:01:07.199 --> 01:01:10.079 and Billy Quick was one of the guys who was going to repel down. 780 01:01:10.800 --> 01:01:15.960 Now Billy is straddling the chef that he's going to go down, repell down 781 01:01:15.960 --> 01:01:20.960 one hundred and seventy five feet, and just as he's getting ready to put 782 01:01:21.000 --> 01:01:25.840 over his foot, the Captain Neill stop stop, stop stop. Billy wasn't 783 01:01:25.880 --> 01:01:30.400 tied off. The only person and there must have been fifty guys standing around 784 01:01:30.440 --> 01:01:36.639 watching what's going on. The only person who's seen that was the captain from 785 01:01:36.679 --> 01:01:42.480 thirteen David, whose job it was to make sure they were doing everything safely. 786 01:01:42.920 --> 01:01:45.599 Nobody else seen that, right, right, somebody put up John Moran, 787 01:01:45.800 --> 01:01:51.199 But I don't think it was John Moran. I know it was entirely. 788 01:01:51.840 --> 01:01:55.079 He was a He was a lieutenant and rescue one and then he became 789 01:01:55.119 --> 01:02:02.440 a captain thirteen days and then he became the captain. But actually thirteen thirteen 790 01:02:02.559 --> 01:02:07.800 David was made up of captains, and then what they did was they made 791 01:02:07.800 --> 01:02:13.199 a Rescue Services Battalion, and then they made a Hazarmount Operations Battalion, and 792 01:02:13.239 --> 01:02:16.360 then it all became chief offices. Right, So in the beginning, that's 793 01:02:16.400 --> 01:02:20.599 what it was, thirteen David. Let me let me ask you something, 794 01:02:20.639 --> 01:02:24.840 Phil because going back to you know, like how things started, I was 795 01:02:24.880 --> 01:02:28.599 always and you were in the inner circle there with the hazmat stuff. So 796 01:02:28.639 --> 01:02:32.800 maybe you can either either confirm or deny. I was always under the assumption 797 01:02:32.920 --> 01:02:42.360 that the ninety three bombing planted the seeds for like the squads and further further 798 01:02:42.480 --> 01:02:45.840 moneies for terrorism because of that ninety three bombing, because it actually we had 799 01:02:45.920 --> 01:02:51.320 terrorism on our shores there and it hit us in New York and that kind 800 01:02:51.320 --> 01:02:58.119 of was the impetus to it kind of started making it kind of started. 801 01:02:58.400 --> 01:03:01.280 It kind of started the ball rolling. And one of the things that a 802 01:03:01.320 --> 01:03:08.639 lot of people you know, no, but don't really know, is that, 803 01:03:09.320 --> 01:03:13.800 you know, we have something that's rather unique in New York City when 804 01:03:13.800 --> 01:03:15.119 you compare it to the rest of the country. And let me tell you 805 01:03:15.159 --> 01:03:21.719 what that is. We have foreign governments that are enemies of ours, that 806 01:03:21.840 --> 01:03:27.920 have embassies and consulates in New York City that go to the UN. So 807 01:03:29.079 --> 01:03:32.760 we have people from Cuba and the Cuban mission here, we have people from 808 01:03:32.760 --> 01:03:38.519 the Arab countries that are here, and because of that, we have over 809 01:03:39.199 --> 01:03:45.400 five hundred protected visits every year. In other words, people from foreign countries 810 01:03:45.480 --> 01:03:51.800 coming here that people want to kill, okay, And because we have so 811 01:03:51.960 --> 01:03:59.039 much of that and so much un dignitary protection here, it makes us a 812 01:03:59.280 --> 01:04:03.239 huge, huge target. And the ninety three bombing is just a perfect example 813 01:04:03.519 --> 01:04:08.719 of what you're talking about, Hank. You you look at the number of 814 01:04:08.760 --> 01:04:13.239 resources that were tied up for the ninety three bombing, and you know, 815 01:04:13.760 --> 01:04:16.960 it gave people an idea of what to do. You know, we top 816 01:04:16.960 --> 01:04:19.519 of one of these buildings here, what's it going to be like for these 817 01:04:19.519 --> 01:04:26.039 people to get back in business? And that's that's what it's about. That's 818 01:04:26.039 --> 01:04:29.519 what it's about. It's about getting back in And the name that we were 819 01:04:30.559 --> 01:04:38.360 the name we were searching for is John Serato. That's it. That's the 820 01:04:38.760 --> 01:04:45.679 time. Serrato saved Billy Quick's life. He saved his life. He saved 821 01:04:45.719 --> 01:04:48.320 his life. Getting back what you were just saying, Hank, You know, 822 01:04:48.559 --> 01:04:58.760 like we one of the things with all of this stuff was that if 823 01:04:58.800 --> 01:05:02.159 we didn't do some of the things that we were doing to prepare ahead of 824 01:05:02.199 --> 01:05:06.039 time, we really would have been in trouble. You know. Ninety the 825 01:05:06.159 --> 01:05:10.679 ninety three bombing was like a wake up call. It was basically saying, 826 01:05:11.119 --> 01:05:15.039 you know what, you guys have to do more. And we realized that 827 01:05:15.079 --> 01:05:16.599 we have to do more. And one of the things that came out of 828 01:05:16.639 --> 01:05:21.760 the ninety three bombing that a lot of people don't realize was the USAR teams, 829 01:05:23.079 --> 01:05:29.440 the urban Search and Rescue teams from FEMA. They were created around that 830 01:05:29.519 --> 01:05:33.480 same time, and it was this was the reason they were created. When 831 01:05:33.480 --> 01:05:38.199 you look at the Oklahoma City bombing, Okay, and we went to the 832 01:05:38.199 --> 01:05:45.159 Oklahoma City bombing. Our task was, but you have a community it is 833 01:05:45.280 --> 01:05:49.079 so devastated by the event. Now, how do they function? How does 834 01:05:49.119 --> 01:05:54.079 their fire department function, how does their police, their ems function? Well, 835 01:05:54.119 --> 01:05:58.800 what the female USAR teams was created to do. That was part of 836 01:05:58.880 --> 01:06:04.000 what was called the National Response Plan ESF nine Emergency Support Function nine, which 837 01:06:04.079 --> 01:06:11.599 was USA. The USA teams were created to go into a jurisdiction and now 838 01:06:12.719 --> 01:06:17.280 help the community, the local community deal with that event so that their local 839 01:06:17.320 --> 01:06:21.239 police and local fire could back get back to the business and taken care of 840 01:06:21.679 --> 01:06:27.760 the normal every data fires, the normal everyday crime, the normal everyday ams. 841 01:06:28.039 --> 01:06:32.159 Our job was going to be to go in control, manage, and 842 01:06:32.239 --> 01:06:38.440 recoup from that event. And that's basically why do U SAW teams were created. 843 01:06:38.559 --> 01:06:42.800 A lot of it had to do with nine to eleven And basically you 844 01:06:42.840 --> 01:06:45.880 mean the ninety three bombing, Yes, the ninety three bombs, So a 845 01:06:45.880 --> 01:06:48.440 lot of that, Yeah, there was a lot of There was a lot 846 01:06:48.480 --> 01:06:54.679 of stuff on the table between ninety three and two thousand and one in terms 847 01:06:54.760 --> 01:07:00.599 of that, Yes, and each time as challengers came up, we met 848 01:07:00.639 --> 01:07:05.159 those challenges. You know, the ninety three bombing happened, the Tokyo incident 849 01:07:05.199 --> 01:07:09.920 happened. We looked at that. We looked at that seriously and said, 850 01:07:10.639 --> 01:07:13.239 what if that happens in New York, what are we going to do? 851 01:07:13.440 --> 01:07:16.239 And and and how are we going to respond to them? And didn't the 852 01:07:16.239 --> 01:07:23.480 military? Yes, I remember the Seabirth team coming to the Rock one time. 853 01:07:23.639 --> 01:07:27.760 Yes, when and when we observed them, and I mean like young 854 01:07:27.840 --> 01:07:30.360 kids, but they were you know, Marines or whatever. What they were 855 01:07:30.400 --> 01:07:34.159 like boom boom boom they you know, they were what they What they did, 856 01:07:34.239 --> 01:07:39.360 Hank, was the Sea Birth was a unit out of the Marine Corps. 857 01:07:39.400 --> 01:07:45.519 And basically what they were coming in to do was do very similar to 858 01:07:45.599 --> 01:07:48.559 what we did with our tear response, create a group of guys who could 859 01:07:48.599 --> 01:07:54.800 go in and drag people out and then decont them and and un lessen the 860 01:07:54.840 --> 01:07:59.159 impact of the event on those people, you know what I'm saying. So 861 01:07:59.159 --> 01:08:03.400 so yeah, between what the federal government was doing and we were doing, 862 01:08:03.719 --> 01:08:08.320 we were kind of on the same page, we were on the same page 863 01:08:08.360 --> 01:08:11.840 with that. If I may, I was going to say, even without 864 01:08:11.920 --> 01:08:15.000 terrorism incidents, there's an opportunity with each incident to kind of look at operations 865 01:08:15.039 --> 01:08:18.359 and essentially rewrite the playbook. You had an MCI in nineteen ninety one with 866 01:08:18.399 --> 01:08:23.399 the Uton Square derailment, and operations were going on with tools that dispersed chemicals 867 01:08:23.399 --> 01:08:27.000 that made first responders on the scene sick. To your point earlier about guys 868 01:08:27.000 --> 01:08:30.920 going down that are entering to rescue those who were initially injured. Nineteen ninety 869 01:08:30.920 --> 01:08:32.720 four, Edward Leary lets off the fire bomb on the fore train. Now 870 01:08:32.880 --> 01:08:36.600 that wasn't as big an ins as ninety one, but another collective opportunity to 871 01:08:36.600 --> 01:08:41.159 look at the manual and rewrite things. So even without terrorism being on the 872 01:08:41.159 --> 01:08:45.119 forefront of your mind, just with general MCIs where there is a hazmat risk 873 01:08:45.319 --> 01:08:47.680 like ninety one and ninety four, how did you guys look at that and 874 01:08:47.680 --> 01:08:50.439 how much tinkering, if anything, was done to the collective playbook at the 875 01:08:50.439 --> 01:08:57.720 time. Well, well, I think that when you look at all of 876 01:08:57.760 --> 01:09:02.399 this stuff, it wasn't really time to catch your breath, because, uh, 877 01:09:02.279 --> 01:09:06.399 when you look all of these incidents. You know how long it takes 878 01:09:06.439 --> 01:09:11.880 to change a policy or procedure, Okay, and that usually takes a long 879 01:09:11.960 --> 01:09:15.439 time. So what ends up happening in a situation like this, We're having 880 01:09:16.039 --> 01:09:21.840 one problem occur right on top of another problem before we have time to write 881 01:09:21.880 --> 01:09:27.079 a new procedure, test a new procedure, and implement the new procedure. 882 01:09:27.239 --> 01:09:30.079 Does that make sense? Yes, you know, so there's there was a 883 01:09:30.079 --> 01:09:34.159 lot of times where like, uh, I'm not going to say we were 884 01:09:34.159 --> 01:09:38.640 flying by the seat of our pants, because we were. We were we 885 01:09:38.640 --> 01:09:43.680 were following doctrine, we were we were following all the protocols that we knew, 886 01:09:44.000 --> 01:09:47.760 and we were anticipating what was coming next, you know what I'm saying. 887 01:09:48.199 --> 01:09:51.960 And as a result of doing all of that, like I mean, 888 01:09:53.000 --> 01:09:57.000 you know, we didn't wait for a Tokyo Sarah incident to occur in the 889 01:09:57.079 --> 01:10:00.560 United States. That incident happened, and then we were already on the drawing 890 01:10:00.600 --> 01:10:04.239 board looking at how we're gonna how we're gonna deal with that kind of situation 891 01:10:04.520 --> 01:10:11.119 if it happened to you, But you want to that's that's happening today right 892 01:10:11.159 --> 01:10:15.800 now with Again, now I'm not talking Sarah or Anthrax. But you look 893 01:10:15.840 --> 01:10:20.439 at it, but it is has Matt fire related the lithium ion batteries, 894 01:10:21.439 --> 01:10:26.079 the same thing. There's no playbook on that. We're writing the playbook as 895 01:10:26.079 --> 01:10:30.000 we go along, right right, right, you know, Yeah, that's 896 01:10:30.039 --> 01:10:32.239 Mass doing a lot of work now, Philly Max doing a lot of running 897 01:10:33.000 --> 01:10:38.720 warriors. Yeah, it's there, that's true. You know, it's like 898 01:10:39.600 --> 01:10:44.920 that is the next big thing in the fire service because you know it's going 899 01:10:44.960 --> 01:10:49.000 to be how to extinguish and contain these type of fires. Right, you 900 01:10:49.079 --> 01:10:54.880 got guys like Paulie Rodgers from York has Matt one that's out there and like 901 01:10:55.000 --> 01:10:58.640 the head of the spear kind of stuff. But you know, but it's 902 01:10:58.680 --> 01:11:02.520 the same scenario brought up about things getting thrown at you. We're actually involved 903 01:11:02.560 --> 01:11:05.479 in these things and there is no playbook and we're kind of you know, 904 01:11:06.319 --> 01:11:12.800 right. And and the other thing is too that that we've developed so well 905 01:11:12.920 --> 01:11:16.039 in Sock And I'll give you a perfect example. We have a we have 906 01:11:16.119 --> 01:11:20.039 a collapse or a confined space event. The main key players in those types 907 01:11:20.079 --> 01:11:24.640 of events for us is Rescue one and Rescue three. They go in there 908 01:11:25.119 --> 01:11:30.600 to do what has to be done, stabilize the area, get victims and 909 01:11:30.600 --> 01:11:34.520 stuff like that. Who supports that hazmat comes in, They do air monitoring, 910 01:11:34.720 --> 01:11:40.359 make sure that there's no gas leaks, make sure it's safe for them 911 01:11:40.399 --> 01:11:44.640 to work. And the way that even even like on the USA teams, 912 01:11:44.800 --> 01:11:48.000 when the hazmat goes like to an Oklahoma City bombing, what is the hazardmat 913 01:11:48.000 --> 01:11:53.880 specialist on the scene for. He's there for force protection. Force protection means 914 01:11:54.159 --> 01:11:58.560 you make sure it's safe so that everybody else can do their job. Make 915 01:11:58.600 --> 01:12:01.279 sure there's no contaminants there that are going to hurt people. Make sure there's 916 01:12:01.319 --> 01:12:05.119 no contaminants there that are going to get people sick. Make sure there's something's 917 01:12:05.159 --> 01:12:11.920 not going to explode or kill somebody. So when when Hasman is operating, 918 01:12:13.079 --> 01:12:16.880 people support us. When other people are operating, we support them, and 919 01:12:16.880 --> 01:12:23.880 and and we have such a good system in New York City now, but 920 01:12:23.960 --> 01:12:27.560 it took it took time to develop that system, and and and you know 921 01:12:27.600 --> 01:12:34.479 what, it gets better every every day because you have guys who who like 922 01:12:34.720 --> 01:12:40.159 I'll just use diving as an operation as a perfect example. You have guys 923 01:12:40.159 --> 01:12:44.800 in the New York City Fire Department who are skilled divers. Okay, those 924 01:12:44.840 --> 01:12:50.159 skilled divers are always going to be there because these guys love diving, They 925 01:12:50.199 --> 01:12:55.159 know their shit. They do it on a regular basis. Not just only 926 01:12:55.199 --> 01:12:59.159 are working, but when they're diving. Okay, now, who supports them? 927 01:12:59.560 --> 01:13:04.520 Every body else? Everybody else supports them. And that's just the way 928 01:13:04.560 --> 01:13:09.760 the system is right now. But the system is built very well. But 929 01:13:10.119 --> 01:13:15.520 another reason, in my opinion, why FDNY has gotten so good at all 930 01:13:15.560 --> 01:13:20.199 these specialty things is because we used to do some of this stuff with no 931 01:13:20.359 --> 01:13:25.880 funding. Right, we go into our own pockets to buy a regulator or 932 01:13:26.239 --> 01:13:31.840 you know, like we always say, it always takes a tragedy, right, 933 01:13:31.880 --> 01:13:38.319 get somewhere, And it took after nine eleven the floodgates opened up with 934 01:13:38.439 --> 01:13:42.560 funding. So when you have the funding to do training and get all the 935 01:13:42.680 --> 01:13:46.560 right equipment, it makes you job that much better and your skills that much 936 01:13:46.640 --> 01:13:51.239 better. Yeah, and you know what, the federal government now realizes that 937 01:13:53.039 --> 01:13:57.399 New York City is a number one target for every terrorist organization. Why because 938 01:13:57.439 --> 01:14:00.640 we have so much infrastructure here. We have to stop market here, We 939 01:14:00.680 --> 01:14:05.119 have the u N here, we have we have more religious institutions here than 940 01:14:05.159 --> 01:14:10.680 anywhere else in the world. So all the stuff is here. All the 941 01:14:10.720 --> 01:14:15.119 stuff is here. If New York has a problem and the emergency responds, 942 01:14:15.119 --> 01:14:20.159 people in New York can't handle it. We're in deep trouble. And don't 943 01:14:20.199 --> 01:14:26.960 just get the bridges, the tunnels, the subway. It's like that infrastructure. 944 01:14:29.159 --> 01:14:34.359 Just just just look and and and and I hate to deviate from the 945 01:14:34.439 --> 01:14:38.520 subject, but let's let's just look at the Port of Baltimore right now. 946 01:14:38.560 --> 01:14:42.479 It's a perfect example. You don't think the terrorists look at that bridge situation 947 01:14:43.000 --> 01:14:47.439 and and say to themselves that's the perfect thing that we could do and and 948 01:14:47.479 --> 01:14:53.920 cause a major problem. But absolutely, hijack a ship, run it right 949 01:14:53.960 --> 01:14:58.760 into a bridge that's vulnerable, not shut down. They shut that bridge down 950 01:14:59.560 --> 01:15:02.159 right right, that's right middle the middle of the middle of Russia hour or 951 01:15:02.159 --> 01:15:08.439 something. People people were killed, luckily it was it was you know, 952 01:15:08.439 --> 01:15:12.159 it was late at night, but they could I mean that caused death. 953 01:15:12.399 --> 01:15:16.600 It caused a great financial you know issue, you know, great issues. 954 01:15:16.680 --> 01:15:19.920 So yeah, it has all of all the variables that they're looking for. 955 01:15:20.880 --> 01:15:25.359 Yeah, if you'll get back to when they started the squads, Like when 956 01:15:25.359 --> 01:15:29.600 did that idea the concept first start, Like was it. Oh. I. 957 01:15:29.760 --> 01:15:34.319 I think part of the reason they wanted the squads was because we needed 958 01:15:34.359 --> 01:15:39.199 to add to that tid response and that component, you know, and and 959 01:15:39.199 --> 01:15:45.600 and and part of part of uh getting the squads, from von Essen's perspective, 960 01:15:45.119 --> 01:15:50.399 I think was too Uh. If the right we only had five rescues, 961 01:15:50.560 --> 01:15:56.000 and you know, you know, with with with fires in the city 962 01:15:56.079 --> 01:16:00.880 and all other jobs, they could easily be tied up up at other jobs 963 01:16:00.880 --> 01:16:04.159 if we had some type of major event and didn't have enough units to respond. 964 01:16:04.880 --> 01:16:09.279 You're with me, yeah. In other words, Rescue one could be 965 01:16:09.319 --> 01:16:17.640 at an auto accident on the side highway or something like that, Rescue four 966 01:16:17.720 --> 01:16:23.920 could be doing some kind of BS and queens, and and Rescue three could 967 01:16:23.960 --> 01:16:27.399 be at something. What happens if all of the rescue companies are tied up. 968 01:16:28.399 --> 01:16:33.039 We needed to have something as a backup for the rescue companies. And 969 01:16:33.039 --> 01:16:36.880 and you know, here's the other thing, keV too. When you make 970 01:16:36.960 --> 01:16:43.239 these special units. If you make special units and you don't have work for 971 01:16:43.319 --> 01:16:45.239 them to do, how do you how are you going to return personnel? 972 01:16:45.720 --> 01:16:51.880 You have to keep them interested. You have to give them jobs and opportunities 973 01:16:51.920 --> 01:16:56.600 where they're going to enjoy going to work. If you go to work and 974 01:16:56.640 --> 01:17:00.920 you sit around all day and do absolutely nothing, I mean, number one, 975 01:17:00.920 --> 01:17:04.079 you're not productive. But number two, guys who were really into the 976 01:17:04.159 --> 01:17:11.800 job and stuff motivated, And it's hard for a boss to keep his guys 977 01:17:11.840 --> 01:17:15.920 motivated, right right, I mean, you know, there's only so much 978 01:17:15.960 --> 01:17:18.640 training you can do. You actually have to you have to. You have 979 01:17:18.720 --> 01:17:26.479 to write a response policy that includes these units and make sure they go to 980 01:17:26.560 --> 01:17:30.039 events. So like, as a perfect example, when Hazmat started, you 981 01:17:30.079 --> 01:17:32.960 know, what are we gonna send Hazmat to. Well, we're gonna sign 982 01:17:33.000 --> 01:17:35.479 him to all airpot boxes. Why are we going to sign them to the 983 01:17:35.520 --> 01:17:40.600 airport boxes. Well, if we have a crash, there's gonna be fuel 984 01:17:40.680 --> 01:17:43.960 lare. If there's gonna be fuel layre, there needs to be a haz 985 01:17:44.000 --> 01:17:47.159 Matt unit there because of fuel. You get where I'm coming from. You 986 01:17:48.000 --> 01:17:51.560 when we create the squads, what kind of work are we going to give? 987 01:17:51.840 --> 01:17:55.560 Well, if the rescue companies are tied up on a job or if 988 01:17:55.560 --> 01:17:59.800 they have a ten to seventy five, let's make sure that they get involved 989 01:17:59.800 --> 01:18:02.560 in that. If we have an incident in Grand Central Terminal where we have 990 01:18:02.640 --> 01:18:08.920 a lot of firefighters go down and bunker gear. We need those units to 991 01:18:09.000 --> 01:18:15.159 respond in from everywhere to assist as CPC companies and and and get in there 992 01:18:15.199 --> 01:18:17.039 and help out. You know what I'm saying, because I think originally what 993 01:18:17.079 --> 01:18:20.199 they said was that they were just going to make them has that units, 994 01:18:20.279 --> 01:18:23.600 right, and then they're like, well, we're not going to get guys 995 01:18:23.600 --> 01:18:25.439 to go there. So that's when they said, well, that's right, 996 01:18:25.840 --> 01:18:30.640 that's right, that's right. It doesn't make sense because you know what, 997 01:18:31.640 --> 01:18:35.560 we're there for the waffs all the time. You know, it's it's easy 998 01:18:35.600 --> 01:18:40.760 to go to fires all the time. It's much much harder to go to 999 01:18:40.920 --> 01:18:45.399 jobs that only occur once in a blue moon. Yep, you know it 1000 01:18:45.439 --> 01:18:49.960 really is. We got a hanky. Well, yes, that is correct. 1001 01:18:50.000 --> 01:18:53.600 In order to recruit guys to the new squads, they had to make 1002 01:18:53.640 --> 01:18:58.000 it appealing you. You had to have a good sales pitch, right myself 1003 01:18:58.039 --> 01:19:00.479 included when when I was asked from Dennis to come over, it's like, 1004 01:19:00.520 --> 01:19:03.800 well, we're gonna be doing You're gonna have you're doing has Matt, And 1005 01:19:03.840 --> 01:19:05.760 I was like, you know, like if you know, I said, 1006 01:19:06.199 --> 01:19:11.800 I'm not you know that's not everybody's cup of tin, correct, But but 1007 01:19:12.640 --> 01:19:15.479 you're gonna do everything that a resting company is doing, except you're trading to 1008 01:19:15.560 --> 01:19:18.000 dive in for the has mat. So to me it was like, okay, 1009 01:19:18.039 --> 01:19:21.279 so I'm gonna learn another skill and like Phil said, you're not doing 1010 01:19:21.319 --> 01:19:25.159 it all the time, but when it happens, you got you got. 1011 01:19:25.159 --> 01:19:27.199 You have to be on top of your game. You know you're not gonna 1012 01:19:27.199 --> 01:19:29.359 sit there, you come up your ass because you don't know what you're doing. 1013 01:19:29.359 --> 01:19:31.920 You got to do the training. But to keep my interest, I'm 1014 01:19:31.920 --> 01:19:34.920 still gonna go to fires and I'm gonna go to collapses and I'm gonna go 1015 01:19:34.960 --> 01:19:39.079 to the high angle rope. So so it was for me it was like 1016 01:19:39.119 --> 01:19:44.039 a win win right right. I think said you're gonna work with Kobland too, 1017 01:19:44.119 --> 01:19:47.439 So I mean, here's the other thing they had. You know, 1018 01:19:47.520 --> 01:19:49.960 it's not like you know, when a guy has time on the job, 1019 01:19:50.279 --> 01:19:54.439 you might want to slow down a little bit. And but you know, 1020 01:19:54.640 --> 01:19:57.640 and I go to get a specialty skill like a has mat, or you're 1021 01:19:57.640 --> 01:20:00.520 going to go out to a to a slower compan andy that's still getting some 1022 01:20:00.600 --> 01:20:04.079 work, but they're not doing all the running and stuff, but like a 1023 01:20:04.159 --> 01:20:09.039 squad where they were gonna be bringing in all you knuckleheads that had three years 1024 01:20:09.039 --> 01:20:12.279 on the job and you're all young guys and all, you know, chopping 1025 01:20:12.319 --> 01:20:15.720 at the bit, you know, in the starting gate. So you know, 1026 01:20:15.359 --> 01:20:17.600 they were able to say, well, we can recruit these guys in. 1027 01:20:18.439 --> 01:20:20.760 We're gonna we're gonna give them all the stuff they want to do because 1028 01:20:20.760 --> 01:20:25.039 they're still gonna go to fires and we're gonna get some longevity out of them 1029 01:20:25.039 --> 01:20:28.680 because they're young, right, So you know, and if that was the 1030 01:20:28.720 --> 01:20:34.000 thought process, it worked, because yeah, because the squads, they they 1031 01:20:34.039 --> 01:20:38.039 they happened. Yeah, and there's always some growing pains, you know, 1032 01:20:38.199 --> 01:20:41.720 just like the has Matt and everything else. You know, But now that 1033 01:20:41.800 --> 01:20:45.279 it's you know what twenty five, twenty six years and they've all established themselves 1034 01:20:45.359 --> 01:20:49.319 and what they can do and and uh and and the city has the the 1035 01:20:49.520 --> 01:20:58.119 has Matt personnel with all the training beyond the squads now with with the has 1036 01:20:58.159 --> 01:21:02.600 Matt engines and that, you know, so the city has what they need 1037 01:21:03.039 --> 01:21:06.359 in the event there is a big has Man incident, you know, or 1038 01:21:06.439 --> 01:21:09.560 you know, golf. But I mean, you look how far it's come 1039 01:21:09.640 --> 01:21:13.760 and just a short amount of time just from the house five rescues to what 1040 01:21:14.279 --> 01:21:17.039 you know, the whole sock has not battalion, socc battalion, all the 1041 01:21:17.039 --> 01:21:23.399 squads, all the rescues, all the CPCs. It's tremendous and credit to 1042 01:21:23.439 --> 01:21:26.720 the city, you know, I mean, this was this was not an 1043 01:21:26.760 --> 01:21:30.880 easy thing to put all of this together. I mean it really really really 1044 01:21:30.560 --> 01:21:34.479 took a lot, a lot. Yes, it is a credit to the 1045 01:21:34.560 --> 01:21:39.000 city, yes, but I'm not giving them that much. It's it's a 1046 01:21:39.119 --> 01:21:43.199 necessity for the city, like you said, number one target for terrorism, 1047 01:21:43.920 --> 01:21:48.039 and shame on the City of New York if they don't have the find and 1048 01:21:48.159 --> 01:21:55.239 make the training available to those emergency service personnel that needed because the civilians that 1049 01:21:55.359 --> 01:21:57.880 count on them, you know, if they don't, if they don't have 1050 01:21:57.920 --> 01:22:00.359 the training, what you call them ghostbusters. Not so those you know, 1051 01:22:01.520 --> 01:22:04.159 F D, P D, E, M S. They all need to 1052 01:22:04.199 --> 01:22:09.199 have the proper training for when that incident and you know, I hate to 1053 01:22:09.239 --> 01:22:13.760 say it, but not for if it occurs when it occurs. Right right 1054 01:22:13.840 --> 01:22:15.720 now, I was gonna ask you, what do you see? What do 1055 01:22:15.760 --> 01:22:19.720 you see coming next? Phil? What what would you say in your in 1056 01:22:19.760 --> 01:22:24.800 your experience. I think I think that it's not us up to us, 1057 01:22:24.880 --> 01:22:27.960 Kevin, it's up to it's up to like the guys, like the terrorists, 1058 01:22:27.960 --> 01:22:31.720 because they look at they look at how cities prepare for what they're doing. 1059 01:22:32.640 --> 01:22:38.000 They have very good planners. Terrorists are very good planners. They they 1060 01:22:36.680 --> 01:22:43.439 they they understand military applications, they stand strategy, they understand tactics, and 1061 01:22:43.479 --> 01:22:46.520 they look at what people are doing and they look for weaknesses in the system 1062 01:22:46.840 --> 01:22:53.560 and see how to exploit those, and and and and what what we do 1063 01:22:53.920 --> 01:22:58.560 in New York is we look at what happens around the world. We do 1064 01:22:59.199 --> 01:23:03.800 we look at what happens around the world, and if we see something significant, 1065 01:23:05.239 --> 01:23:09.439 somebody in New York City, whether it be in the police department, 1066 01:23:09.680 --> 01:23:13.359 whether it be in Office of Emergency Management, whether it be in a fire 1067 01:23:13.399 --> 01:23:16.800 department, somebody looks at that and says, what do we have to do 1068 01:23:16.880 --> 01:23:20.640 to be prepared for that? And we do it. We do it, 1069 01:23:21.399 --> 01:23:26.399 we do it. We figure out a way to do it and make it 1070 01:23:26.479 --> 01:23:30.680 work. And like Hank said, one of the biggest problems was funding to 1071 01:23:30.800 --> 01:23:38.720 do all of these things. But today, under the current situation, I 1072 01:23:38.760 --> 01:23:45.159 think when we can show that we actually have a vulnerability that's worth going after 1073 01:23:45.760 --> 01:23:53.800 or being prepared for, somehow they find the money, order resources to give 1074 01:23:53.920 --> 01:23:58.520 us the tools and equipment and knowledge we need to do that job. So 1075 01:23:58.680 --> 01:24:04.359 do you think that they had any clue as to terrorist hijacking three fucking jets 1076 01:24:04.399 --> 01:24:08.399 and taking down two buildings? Do you think that was even on their radar? 1077 01:24:08.600 --> 01:24:12.000 Or I don't know if that was on their radar. But you know 1078 01:24:12.079 --> 01:24:15.039 what, after the ninety three bombing, they should have said to themselves, 1079 01:24:15.600 --> 01:24:19.640 look, we see what they're trying to do here. They're trying to take 1080 01:24:19.680 --> 01:24:27.239 down a building and make it, make it a major catastrophe. Now where 1081 01:24:27.239 --> 01:24:31.920 did they try and take down the building by taking that? Not in Chicago, 1082 01:24:32.199 --> 01:24:34.840 not in another place. They tried to do it in New York. 1083 01:24:34.880 --> 01:24:39.000 They tried to do it at the Foundation, They tried to do it in 1084 01:24:39.039 --> 01:24:44.720 the Wall Street area. So you have to say to yourself, this is 1085 01:24:44.720 --> 01:24:49.000 what they're shooting for. In twenty ninety three, in two thousand and one, 1086 01:24:49.039 --> 01:24:54.560 they were successful in going for something that they're drying. He listen, 1087 01:24:54.640 --> 01:24:59.000 just a sidebar, and I've talked about this before. You know, I 1088 01:24:59.039 --> 01:25:03.720 worked with Ronnie book Or and Rescue one. And Ronnie, you know, 1089 01:25:04.399 --> 01:25:06.760 was in Delta Force and then when he went to the reserves, he was 1090 01:25:06.800 --> 01:25:13.119 in the Army Intelligence. And after the ninety three bombing, I remember him 1091 01:25:13.199 --> 01:25:15.840 coming to quarters. He didn't work that day, but he came to quarters 1092 01:25:15.880 --> 01:25:19.680 that night because at that point he was a fire marshal because remember he had 1093 01:25:19.760 --> 01:25:25.079 fallen five stories off the fire escaping to his back and stuff, so he 1094 01:25:25.119 --> 01:25:27.880 really couldn't do the firefighting anymore, but he didn't want to leave the job, 1095 01:25:28.520 --> 01:25:30.920 and he sat in quarters and he told us, he said, he 1096 01:25:30.920 --> 01:25:35.840 said, there's this group called al Qaeda, and you know the we're trying 1097 01:25:35.840 --> 01:25:40.000 to get the powers to be to listen to us. And he said, 1098 01:25:40.079 --> 01:25:45.359 this group, if they go after a target and they didn't accomplish what they 1099 01:25:45.399 --> 01:25:47.399 wanted to do, which in ninety three was knock that building over, he 1100 01:25:47.439 --> 01:25:51.359 said, they will come back and attack that same target at their convenience. 1101 01:25:53.119 --> 01:25:57.199 And eight years later they did, and Ronnie was one of the only fire 1102 01:25:57.199 --> 01:26:00.760 marshal that went up in the building and got killed. So they know it 1103 01:26:00.800 --> 01:26:04.079 was known. It was just that it was falling upon deaf ears at that 1104 01:26:04.199 --> 01:26:09.680 time. Austin EDGs in the sand, and they didn't want to hear it, 1105 01:26:10.159 --> 01:26:12.800 or they didn't want to hear it from certain people because how do they 1106 01:26:12.840 --> 01:26:16.479 know? You know, But it wasn't it wasn't like it was, you 1107 01:26:16.520 --> 01:26:19.680 know, because people didn't know about it. Well to your point about that, 1108 01:26:19.720 --> 01:26:23.720 Hank, there there's a story and this was verified. So two years 1109 01:26:23.760 --> 01:26:27.760 later Ramsey usaid who orchestrated that bombing, gets caught in Pakistan. They bring 1110 01:26:27.800 --> 01:26:30.319 him back the night he's brought back by FBI escort in a helicopter. They 1111 01:26:30.359 --> 01:26:33.439 had a blindfold over him. They take off the blindfold. This is nineteen 1112 01:26:33.479 --> 01:26:36.640 ninety five, and they point to the towers and say, see they're still 1113 01:26:36.680 --> 01:26:41.600 standing sarcastically to Ramsey. Ramsey has a six smile on his face and looks 1114 01:26:41.680 --> 01:26:44.159 them and says, all I needed was a little bit more money and a 1115 01:26:44.199 --> 01:26:47.279 little bit more time and I would have brought him both down. Sure enough. 1116 01:26:47.359 --> 01:26:53.039 Six years after that conversation, what happened? Mm hmm, Yeah, 1117 01:26:53.279 --> 01:26:58.760 Hey, Phil, did you when you went all part of where the squads 1118 01:26:58.760 --> 01:27:02.119 were located? Was that the did you? I didn't have any saying that. 1119 01:27:02.279 --> 01:27:05.880 No, So why did they picked two eighty two eight with Hasmad in 1120 01:27:05.960 --> 01:27:11.359 it. Uh, you got many Uh you know what I think they were 1121 01:27:11.399 --> 01:27:14.560 trying to do with the time cap. They were trying to make it easy 1122 01:27:14.600 --> 01:27:18.880 with keeping special units together, okay, or close to each other. So 1123 01:27:19.840 --> 01:27:25.560 two eighty eight actually was a perfect location for a squad because you already had 1124 01:27:25.600 --> 01:27:30.079 one sock company in the firehouse. It made it easier for the command and 1125 01:27:30.159 --> 01:27:35.720 stuff to do that now and rescue one's case and rescue fourth case. They're 1126 01:27:35.800 --> 01:27:40.199 single firehouses, you're not putting anybody in with them, you know what I'm 1127 01:27:40.239 --> 01:27:44.800 saying. And you're not going to displace people who were already in some of 1128 01:27:44.840 --> 01:27:48.399 these single fire you know, double firehouse for North Queens you had it was 1129 01:27:48.479 --> 01:27:54.800 it was a pretty good spot. You had rescue for a little north right, 1130 01:27:55.840 --> 01:27:59.279 but it also gave so you had two companies responding. Plus it was 1131 01:27:59.439 --> 01:28:02.159 a real quick as we know, keV really quick and to bet which we 1132 01:28:02.199 --> 01:28:06.880 did get called to yes, yes, And that was that's another thing that 1133 01:28:08.039 --> 01:28:11.920 was the reason the Hasmont was selected for that firehouse. Easy access to all 1134 01:28:11.920 --> 01:28:15.199 the highways, right, yeah, I just take that maybe three sixteen would 1135 01:28:15.199 --> 01:28:17.720 have been a be a spot over the Hank you know single engine, then 1136 01:28:17.720 --> 01:28:20.439 I would have then I would have never seen you. That's right, very 1137 01:28:20.479 --> 01:28:24.039 good point, Phil, You know what things happened for a reason. Maybe 1138 01:28:25.880 --> 01:28:28.800 let me ask you a question, how did you How did you prepare the 1139 01:28:28.800 --> 01:28:30.680 guys, because I know some guys in Hasbat weren't down for it. You 1140 01:28:30.680 --> 01:28:34.840 know, these guys coming in, you know, for for a squad coming 1141 01:28:34.840 --> 01:28:39.359 in there with a bunch of young guys, and you know, you know 1142 01:28:39.399 --> 01:28:43.239 what what goes around comes around. We did it to two eighty eight when 1143 01:28:43.279 --> 01:28:45.720 they were there, you were doing it to us. It's not a big 1144 01:28:45.760 --> 01:28:47.880 deal, you know, I mean, it is what it is. You 1145 01:28:47.920 --> 01:28:51.920 know. It was probably more of a big deal for the guys in two 1146 01:28:51.960 --> 01:28:55.560 eighty eight. We didn't want to be in a squad. Yeah, they 1147 01:28:55.600 --> 01:29:00.159 had. I'll tell you a funny story when when when and when the captain 1148 01:29:00.199 --> 01:29:09.439 of two eighty eight found out that we were coming, he transferred really his 1149 01:29:09.600 --> 01:29:15.920 name his name was Morgan O'Brien. O'Brien he found out as soon as as 1150 01:29:15.960 --> 01:29:20.640 soon as he heard Hasman was coming. Somebody asked earlier, Phil, what 1151 01:29:20.800 --> 01:29:29.560 was Hasbat's first run? Uh, it's a good one, jeesus, that's 1152 01:29:29.600 --> 01:29:33.199 a good question. Oh stop, I don't even know if I was working 1153 01:29:33.239 --> 01:29:40.840 for their first run. I'm not really sure. Really, look at that 1154 01:29:41.840 --> 01:29:45.079 picture, that picture that you have up there on the board that came from 1155 01:29:45.159 --> 01:29:49.239 Penhouse. I will tell you this. I'm probably the only firefighter in the 1156 01:29:49.359 --> 01:29:53.600 history of the f d n Y who went who appeared as a centerfold in 1157 01:29:53.680 --> 01:30:00.199 Penthouse. Let's go through some of the other pictures, Mikey, Yeah, 1158 01:30:00.239 --> 01:30:06.079 let's pull them up that This is my favorite picture of all. Uh. 1159 01:30:06.239 --> 01:30:13.880 Me and Larry Singletary were We were selected to take this picture for one of 1160 01:30:13.920 --> 01:30:17.520 the magazines, and it was taken out at the rock and the guys who 1161 01:30:17.560 --> 01:30:21.399 weren't in the picture, they were doing the fire behind us, and they 1162 01:30:21.399 --> 01:30:26.800 were making the fire so hot that the hair on the back of mine and 1163 01:30:26.880 --> 01:30:30.880 Larry's next was actually singed, and we actually had it. We actually had 1164 01:30:30.880 --> 01:30:35.199 to throw away the suits because they were no longer serviceable after this because they 1165 01:30:35.239 --> 01:30:48.920 have melted so much. You know, two badass dudes right there. This 1166 01:30:48.960 --> 01:30:54.199 is uh This is me down at the National Fire Academy. Uh. This 1167 01:30:54.399 --> 01:30:59.399 was one of the classes I tore down there, Hazardous Material, tactical considerations. 1168 01:31:00.239 --> 01:31:01.960 We had people from all over the country who would come there, and 1169 01:31:02.760 --> 01:31:05.800 we teach them how to wear chemical protective suits. We teach you how to 1170 01:31:05.800 --> 01:31:15.560 handle certain you know, hasmat tools and stuff like that. This class was 1171 01:31:15.600 --> 01:31:19.600 actually discontinued at the hazard at the National Fire Academy because they got away from 1172 01:31:19.600 --> 01:31:24.159 hands on training down there. This was one of the last classes that did 1173 01:31:24.239 --> 01:31:28.720 hands on training down at the Fire Academy. I heard one of the requirements 1174 01:31:28.720 --> 01:31:30.439 for that class was they had to bring you a patch, so it looks 1175 01:31:30.479 --> 01:31:35.720 like you have a lot of friends there. Actually everybody grow up patches. 1176 01:31:36.359 --> 01:31:42.159 I know, I can see them behind you. I went to I went 1177 01:31:42.199 --> 01:31:47.279 to Russia with with Tom Harring and Chief Mayas, and we were there to 1178 01:31:47.319 --> 01:31:53.079 evaluate the Russian Fire Service. And when we were there, uh, we 1179 01:31:53.079 --> 01:31:58.680 were staying in Saint Petersburg, and one of the knights that we were there, 1180 01:31:58.840 --> 01:32:02.239 there was a fire in uh a warehouse that was on the other side 1181 01:32:02.279 --> 01:32:08.039 of the river, across from our hotel, and me and Harry Mayas actually 1182 01:32:08.119 --> 01:32:13.600 ran across the street and got people out of the apartment house that was adjacent 1183 01:32:13.640 --> 01:32:18.359 to the warehouse. And uh, this is one of the officers from the 1184 01:32:18.399 --> 01:32:25.279 Russian Fire Service actually thanking us for getting them out of the out of the 1185 01:32:25.319 --> 01:32:34.600 fire. These were like the many different UH types of chemical protective clothing that 1186 01:32:34.720 --> 01:32:38.840 has Met had. Obviously, we had the Level B suits, we had 1187 01:32:38.840 --> 01:32:43.399 the Level A suit in the middle, we had the proximity flare suits and 1188 01:32:43.479 --> 01:32:51.600 my famous jumpsuit so much. Yeah, the dark navy blue one was in 1189 01:32:51.640 --> 01:33:01.279 the lot line gimble Rick. Yeah and Jacquie Lie too. Yeah. Yeah, 1190 01:33:02.880 --> 01:33:08.960 yeah. So when I when I was the Health and Safety officer for 1191 01:33:09.119 --> 01:33:13.239 the u f A, Uh, this is me talking at the annual UH 1192 01:33:13.680 --> 01:33:20.279 nine to eleven memorial. That'spatakis sitting there at the thing. So given my 1193 01:33:20.319 --> 01:33:27.279 two cents, give four. Uh. This was one of the most spectacular 1194 01:33:27.319 --> 01:33:31.239 fires that we went to. Actually, uh has Matt was actually working in 1195 01:33:31.319 --> 01:33:35.159 Queens and when we got the call for this job, we were coming over 1196 01:33:35.199 --> 01:33:40.800 the Throgs Neck Bridge. Now this fire is in Hunts Point, so if 1197 01:33:40.800 --> 01:33:44.680 you know the distance between Hunts Point and the Throgs Neck Bridge, we could 1198 01:33:44.760 --> 01:33:48.159 see this fire from the Throgs Neck Bridge. We were on the Trugs Neck 1199 01:33:48.199 --> 01:33:54.640 Bridge. It was pretty pretty spectacular. Guy ripped the valveof right, the 1200 01:33:54.720 --> 01:33:59.720 kind of guy yeah yeah, yeah, And what he did was he he 1201 01:33:59.720 --> 01:34:03.319 he ignited the whole street. I mean, the we had to go there 1202 01:34:03.359 --> 01:34:10.039 because the the substation, the Connate substation was right next to it was on 1203 01:34:10.159 --> 01:34:15.760 fire and they had these huge battery rooms that was producing a lot of hydrogen 1204 01:34:15.840 --> 01:34:19.680 gas. So we actually had to go in there and and try and resolve 1205 01:34:19.760 --> 01:34:24.720 the issue with the hydrogen gas in these things. It was a mess. 1206 01:34:24.800 --> 01:34:29.720 It was a pin but with something like this because i mean, after your 1207 01:34:29.760 --> 01:34:32.399 fire department life, you had a conned life, so you know the operations 1208 01:34:32.439 --> 01:34:36.039 of both. But like that was a high pressure gas Maine. I mean, 1209 01:34:36.600 --> 01:34:40.119 FDNY, we can do just so much. You still need to have 1210 01:34:40.199 --> 01:34:44.319 somebody in Kanye that knows, like where the remote shut off and stuff off. 1211 01:34:44.560 --> 01:34:47.760 Yeah. You know that's a good point because this fire, this fire 1212 01:34:47.800 --> 01:34:53.800 went on for hours because it took them a tremendously long time to shut the 1213 01:34:53.840 --> 01:34:58.000 gas off, and it was it's not just shutting the gas off, it's 1214 01:34:58.119 --> 01:35:01.560 all the residual stuff that's in the line. It still has to burn off. 1215 01:35:01.880 --> 01:35:04.560 I mean, you're not putting this fire out, You're just letting it 1216 01:35:04.680 --> 01:35:11.399 burn, that's all. We had one fatality at this fire, the backo. 1217 01:35:12.199 --> 01:35:19.119 Yeah, yeah, yeah, Uh, this is every year the city 1218 01:35:19.239 --> 01:35:24.239 has a thing, it's called the one hundred Year Association, and they give 1219 01:35:24.279 --> 01:35:31.119 out awards to city employees who who they feel make a difference. So, 1220 01:35:31.840 --> 01:35:38.600 uh, in ninety five I got the Outstanding City Employees. So this was 1221 01:35:38.720 --> 01:35:45.960 stuff awards Man van Essenaire and Juliani basically a few awards. So and you 1222 01:35:45.000 --> 01:35:51.119 had to buy the first round afterwards. Yes, this young fellow. Oh 1223 01:35:51.359 --> 01:35:59.279 yeah, that's graduating Provay School with my family. Uh. That's my wife 1224 01:35:59.279 --> 01:36:02.600 on the end, my mother, my aunt in the background, my two 1225 01:36:02.680 --> 01:36:08.079 brothers in the back, the girl up front that's my sister in law, 1226 01:36:08.159 --> 01:36:11.399 she's an FBI agent, and my father and me in the middle. Oh 1227 01:36:11.840 --> 01:36:18.319 FBI agent. Huh, little g woman. It will be entry a picture. 1228 01:36:21.319 --> 01:36:27.279 We had those kind of operations all the time. So, Phil is 1229 01:36:27.319 --> 01:36:30.079 a level A suit like having a pipe at a job. Like if you 1230 01:36:30.119 --> 01:36:34.800 go to a level A suit, you make entry. It's not fun being 1231 01:36:34.880 --> 01:36:43.319 in the entry suit. One of the things that you obviously sweat a lot. 1232 01:36:43.479 --> 01:36:49.079 It's very claustrophobic. If you're claustrophobic, it's not the area for you. 1233 01:36:49.079 --> 01:36:51.560 You have to know how to get yourself out of the suit. One 1234 01:36:51.640 --> 01:36:56.359 of the things that I told people all the time was that, as a 1235 01:36:56.399 --> 01:36:59.960 matter of fact, I had actually run a special program down at the New 1236 01:37:00.039 --> 01:37:05.920 National Fire Academy training people you can suffocate and die in a chemical protective suit 1237 01:37:06.000 --> 01:37:11.960 if if you get if you get separated from people and people can't get you 1238 01:37:12.000 --> 01:37:14.199 out of the suit, and you don't know how to get out yourself, 1239 01:37:14.920 --> 01:37:19.359 you can suffocate and die in that suit. And so it's very very important 1240 01:37:19.399 --> 01:37:24.319 to not put you It's like diving. When you dive, you need to 1241 01:37:24.359 --> 01:37:28.319 be able to take your gear or off underwater and put it on underwater to 1242 01:37:28.359 --> 01:37:30.680 make sure that you know what to do with you get snagged on something. 1243 01:37:30.920 --> 01:37:34.359 Well, being in a chemical protective suit, you got to do exactly the 1244 01:37:34.359 --> 01:37:36.880 same thing. You got to know you got to know how to get the 1245 01:37:36.960 --> 01:37:49.159 suit off yourself. If you have a problem is visibility is a nightmare and 1246 01:37:49.399 --> 01:37:54.880 aways always a problem? Am I do I remember? Correctly? Didn't they 1247 01:37:54.880 --> 01:37:58.279 tell us like if you had to have a pocket knife or something in there, 1248 01:37:58.319 --> 01:38:04.680 like just like you said at the I always told people this that if 1249 01:38:04.760 --> 01:38:11.159 you're in a chemical protective suit and you can't open the zipper for some reason, 1250 01:38:11.239 --> 01:38:15.000 either the suit is designed where it's behind you and you can't get to 1251 01:38:15.119 --> 01:38:18.000 it. You have to have a means to get yourself out of the suit 1252 01:38:18.079 --> 01:38:25.159 because if you can't get out of the suit and people, like in non 1253 01:38:25.319 --> 01:38:30.800 line of sight operations where people can't see you, if you get stuck and 1254 01:38:30.880 --> 01:38:34.600 you run out of air, you have a very very short window of opportunity 1255 01:38:34.640 --> 01:38:38.960 to open that suit. Otherwise, this is what's going to happen. You 1256 01:38:39.079 --> 01:38:42.640 run out of air inside of the suit, the first thing you're going to 1257 01:38:42.680 --> 01:38:44.840 do is you're going to take off your mask. You got to take your 1258 01:38:44.880 --> 01:38:46.520 hands inside the suit. Take off your mask. Now you're going to be 1259 01:38:46.560 --> 01:38:50.279 breathing the air inside of the suit. At some point that air is going 1260 01:38:50.359 --> 01:38:57.199 to become oxygen deficient. You're going to start to hyperventilate. At some point, 1261 01:38:57.239 --> 01:39:01.039 you'll hyperventilate and pass out. Once you pass out, if somebody hasn't 1262 01:39:01.079 --> 01:39:04.680 gotten to you in four to six minutes, you're going to suffocate and die. 1263 01:39:04.960 --> 01:39:12.119 So it's important to have a plan. You're in the suit, you 1264 01:39:12.560 --> 01:39:17.199 move to an area that's not suspected of being contaminated, and then do your 1265 01:39:17.199 --> 01:39:19.960 best to get out of the suit and get out of the situation. Right, 1266 01:39:20.039 --> 01:39:24.439 Yeah, that was a good point. Like you say, to try 1267 01:39:24.439 --> 01:39:28.840 to get out of the contaminated area. I mean, worst case, if 1268 01:39:28.880 --> 01:39:30.960 you can't, well, if you're breathing, and then they can get you 1269 01:39:31.000 --> 01:39:34.359 out, then you'll you know, maybe there's something that they can give you 1270 01:39:34.399 --> 01:39:39.800 to counteract whatever contaminant. It was, right, and in some cases I'd 1271 01:39:39.920 --> 01:39:44.239 rather be exposed than that, right, right, exactly right. Yes, 1272 01:39:44.279 --> 01:39:47.600 somebody's asking quick, Phil about were you're working on on eleven. I actually 1273 01:39:47.600 --> 01:39:49.680 met you that. I don't know if you remember this. I yes, 1274 01:39:51.319 --> 01:39:56.079 I actually was working on nine to eleven. As a matter of fact, 1275 01:39:56.640 --> 01:40:01.399 there was a few guys from Hasman who actually survived nine to eleven. I 1276 01:40:04.319 --> 01:40:09.920 had gotten off that morning and I was actually going to meet Chief Fanning at 1277 01:40:09.920 --> 01:40:15.720 the Division of Training because we were gonna we were discussing training issues for the 1278 01:40:15.800 --> 01:40:19.560 company. And while I was on my way to the Division Training, the 1279 01:40:19.640 --> 01:40:29.560 first the first plane hit the towers. Jack had left and went down to 1280 01:40:30.600 --> 01:40:36.479 the trade center, but he left Jeff Borkowski at the at Hasmont Operations and 1281 01:40:36.520 --> 01:40:40.720 told him as soon as Phil gets here, I get you and Phil take 1282 01:40:40.760 --> 01:40:45.279 a suburban and come down to me. So I got to the division training 1283 01:40:45.960 --> 01:40:49.199 went down to see Jeff. I mean went down with Jeff and we pulled 1284 01:40:49.279 --> 01:40:55.439 up on West Street just as the South Tower had come down and our vehicle 1285 01:40:55.520 --> 01:41:00.680 had got showered with the debris. So we got out of the vehicle. 1286 01:41:00.319 --> 01:41:05.159 We started to walk in and I found Dave Hanshew. He was in one 1287 01:41:05.199 --> 01:41:12.159 of those pictures that I had sent you, and he he was lying in 1288 01:41:12.199 --> 01:41:16.279 the middle of the street. He had a compound fracture of his leg and 1289 01:41:16.399 --> 01:41:19.560 me and Jeff had found him and I said, I said, we have 1290 01:41:19.680 --> 01:41:24.560 to move you. And he was in tremendous pain. We didn't have anything 1291 01:41:24.600 --> 01:41:28.039 to splint his leg with or anything like that. So we picked him up 1292 01:41:28.039 --> 01:41:33.359 and we physically carried him, and we carried him like a block away farther 1293 01:41:33.800 --> 01:41:40.760 west on towards the Hudson River, and we put him inside a Delhi And 1294 01:41:41.560 --> 01:41:45.520 when we after we put him into deli, we told him that somebody would 1295 01:41:45.520 --> 01:41:48.399 be back for him, and we went back and we were starting to go 1296 01:41:49.119 --> 01:41:56.000 into the North Tower when the North Tower collapsed. So me and Jeff and 1297 01:41:56.399 --> 01:42:00.079 a guy named Charlie Wells from MEMS who was a deputy chief, and in 1298 01:42:00.159 --> 01:42:02.600 the ms. We actually ran and there was a lot of people who were 1299 01:42:02.680 --> 01:42:06.680 running the same time as us, and we ran and we tried to get 1300 01:42:06.720 --> 01:42:12.079 close to the columns because we felt that there'd be some strength in some of 1301 01:42:12.119 --> 01:42:20.159 the columns. So everything came down around us. It took eight or nine 1302 01:42:20.199 --> 01:42:27.640 seconds to come down. Then it was like eerily quiet, and then me 1303 01:42:27.800 --> 01:42:30.399 and Jeff and Charlie Wells actually worked our way out, but like the thirty 1304 01:42:30.439 --> 01:42:35.199 or forty people who were around us, they were all dead and in it 1305 01:42:35.319 --> 01:42:40.439 reminded you that was kind of it. It reminded me of like after it 1306 01:42:40.520 --> 01:42:44.000 snows, how quiet it is, you know, and everything was white, 1307 01:42:44.279 --> 01:42:46.319 and it's just like eerily quiet, right Phil, Like it was. It 1308 01:42:46.399 --> 01:42:51.079 was weird. Yeah, then you would hear pass along going out a different 1309 01:42:51.760 --> 01:42:56.800 you know, I'm going to tell you it's a very interesting story. And 1310 01:42:56.840 --> 01:43:00.119 it just goes to show, like you know, you always have to put 1311 01:43:00.119 --> 01:43:04.880 things in perspective. After nine to eleven happened, and you know, we 1312 01:43:04.880 --> 01:43:09.319 were taking care of the families in the firehouse and stuff like that, and 1313 01:43:09.399 --> 01:43:14.800 you know that like we had we had had to go and do some public 1314 01:43:14.840 --> 01:43:18.159 relations stuff after nine eleven and what I mean by that is we were getting 1315 01:43:18.159 --> 01:43:20.880 a lot of money. And one of the things that I want to mention 1316 01:43:21.399 --> 01:43:26.399 here today is, you know, our firehouse was the only fire house, 1317 01:43:26.479 --> 01:43:31.920 the only firehouse who gave money to all three hundred and forty three families. 1318 01:43:32.119 --> 01:43:36.439 We everything that came into our firehouse we brought up to the bank and we 1319 01:43:36.479 --> 01:43:41.319 asked them to divide it three evenly amongst three hundred and forty three families, 1320 01:43:41.319 --> 01:43:44.079 and we were the only we were the only firehouse to do that. So 1321 01:43:44.159 --> 01:43:47.279 I just wanted to make that point. But anyway, one of the things 1322 01:43:47.319 --> 01:43:50.880 that we had to do as part of public relations after nine to eleven is 1323 01:43:50.920 --> 01:43:55.279 we had to thank some of the people who were contributing to us and stuff 1324 01:43:55.319 --> 01:44:00.119 like that. So I was asked to bring a few of the wives of 1325 01:44:00.199 --> 01:44:06.520 the widows over to England and we were going to I was going to give 1326 01:44:06.560 --> 01:44:13.119 a talk at the US Embassy in London. So I give to talk about 1327 01:44:13.239 --> 01:44:17.039 what it was like in uh to be at nine to eleven and stuff like 1328 01:44:17.079 --> 01:44:23.079 that. And in the end, somebody asked me a question, and this 1329 01:44:23.199 --> 01:44:26.560 is the question that they posted me. They said, what was it like 1330 01:44:26.800 --> 01:44:31.800 being there on nine to eleven and you have to know your audience. And 1331 01:44:32.039 --> 01:44:38.479 one of the things that I said is book it was a lot like the 1332 01:44:38.520 --> 01:44:43.840 Blitz during World War Two. I said, you what you people went through 1333 01:44:43.920 --> 01:44:50.960 for months. We only had one two hours of during our time down there, 1334 01:44:51.119 --> 01:44:57.760 you know. And it was interesting because after the talk, you know, 1335 01:44:57.800 --> 01:45:00.840 they had a small reception and one of the people who was in the 1336 01:45:00.920 --> 01:45:02.399 audience came up to me and said, he says, you know, that 1337 01:45:02.520 --> 01:45:08.840 was a very interesting observation of yours. He said, I was kind of 1338 01:45:08.880 --> 01:45:11.760 surprised you made it. But now I'm going to tell you a little piece 1339 01:45:11.800 --> 01:45:15.279 of information. He said, do you know that if you were in the 1340 01:45:15.399 --> 01:45:20.720 London Fire Brigade in World War Two and you wanted to join the British Army, 1341 01:45:21.199 --> 01:45:28.119 you were considered a coward because statistically it was safer to be in the 1342 01:45:28.159 --> 01:45:33.640 British Army than it was to be in the London Fire Brigade. They had. 1343 01:45:35.000 --> 01:45:39.920 When you look at all of the military units in World War two and 1344 01:45:40.039 --> 01:45:46.279 combat losses, none of them compare to the combat losses of the London Fire 1345 01:45:46.319 --> 01:45:50.600 Brigade in World War Two. They had a three hundred percent loss in World 1346 01:45:50.640 --> 01:45:59.279 War two, three they lost the entire fire department three times. So you 1347 01:45:59.319 --> 01:46:02.000 know, you look at that kind of stuff and that kind of gives you 1348 01:46:02.079 --> 01:46:06.920 a perspective. You know what you think you've seen, there are people in 1349 01:46:06.960 --> 01:46:12.439 the world who've seen far worse. You know. They meant to that. 1350 01:46:12.439 --> 01:46:15.439 Brother. Yeah, you remember when I ran into you down there film probably 1351 01:46:15.560 --> 01:46:20.359 remember I ran into you down there and you said, we lost everybody here. 1352 01:46:20.439 --> 01:46:25.239 You know at that time that did that thought didn't even cross my mind. 1353 01:46:26.000 --> 01:46:29.960 Yeah, it was everybody here. Yeah, it was like, no 1354 01:46:30.000 --> 01:46:31.079 way, what do you mean we lost everybody here? Like, yeah, 1355 01:46:31.079 --> 01:46:35.359 we lost everybody here. Yeah you're guessing you were like, we lost over 1356 01:46:35.479 --> 01:46:41.119 three three hundred people somewhere, like yeah, in no way. Yeah that 1357 01:46:41.279 --> 01:46:47.520 was huge. Yeah, it was huge. Yeah, there was. There 1358 01:46:47.560 --> 01:46:55.319 was at least there was at least eighty people that I knew personally, you 1359 01:46:55.319 --> 01:47:00.479 know, from from the SOCC companies where I knew them. I knew the 1360 01:47:00.600 --> 01:47:04.640 wives' names, and I knew that names. It was it was, uh, 1361 01:47:05.079 --> 01:47:09.840 it was, it was. It was stunning. I don't know, 1362 01:47:10.600 --> 01:47:14.520 it was incomprehensible, you know what I mean. I mean, you know 1363 01:47:15.720 --> 01:47:18.760 me and I'm sure Hank, you know, we were in firehouses where we 1364 01:47:18.840 --> 01:47:23.720 lost guys over the years, right, Frank, uh Hank, And and 1365 01:47:24.560 --> 01:47:29.439 you know, losing one person is devastating, losing losing the amount of people 1366 01:47:29.479 --> 01:47:34.680 we lost was like incomprehensible. You know, nobody, nobody ever expected someone 1367 01:47:35.319 --> 01:47:41.279 just from a firehouse nineteen. But again, you know that that that technically 1368 01:47:41.359 --> 01:47:44.760 it was an act of war. It wasn't just yeah the fire with a 1369 01:47:44.840 --> 01:47:50.279 class that was war. And uh, unfortunately the people who set out to 1370 01:47:50.319 --> 01:47:54.439 do, you know, they pretty much accomplished what they wanted to do there. 1371 01:47:54.920 --> 01:48:00.000 Yep, yeah, yeah, you know like that you couldn't I mean, 1372 01:48:00.439 --> 01:48:04.920 you know, all the debris in the air, I mean, everything 1373 01:48:05.000 --> 01:48:09.399 was so micro pulverized. You couldn't see a thing, you know, and 1374 01:48:10.039 --> 01:48:15.319 you couldn't see the sky. And I could hear planes flying overhead, you 1375 01:48:15.319 --> 01:48:19.560 know, and I knew they were jets. They weren't like commercial airliners because 1376 01:48:19.600 --> 01:48:24.359 you could hear how fast they would flying. So the pitch is completely different. 1377 01:48:24.720 --> 01:48:30.640 And one of the things is like a few, like a year or 1378 01:48:30.680 --> 01:48:35.800 two after nine eleven, I actually had to go down to testify in Washington 1379 01:48:36.199 --> 01:48:39.880 as to the health effects the nine to eleven you know, because I was 1380 01:48:39.920 --> 01:48:43.800 the help and safe few officers for the union and stuff, and I was 1381 01:48:43.840 --> 01:48:48.319 staying at one of the hotels, and the hotel I was staying at the 1382 01:48:48.399 --> 01:48:54.039 Chief of Naval Operations was actually in the hotel at the bar when I was 1383 01:48:54.079 --> 01:48:57.960 in there having a drink, and I went over to him. And I 1384 01:48:57.960 --> 01:49:00.159 didn't know he was the Chief Naval Operations at the time. I mean, 1385 01:49:00.199 --> 01:49:03.119 I just seen a guy in the navy uniform. I had no idea who 1386 01:49:03.119 --> 01:49:10.840 he was. And he wasn't the Chief of Naval Operations at at on nine 1387 01:49:10.880 --> 01:49:14.720 to eleven, but he was in charge of a carrier task force off the 1388 01:49:14.760 --> 01:49:17.920 Carolina coast and we were talking about nine to eleven and I said, you 1389 01:49:17.960 --> 01:49:24.560 know, I said, I was extremely nervous when when I couldn't see the 1390 01:49:24.600 --> 01:49:29.159 sky and I heard planes flying overhead. But I said, I kind of 1391 01:49:29.199 --> 01:49:33.520 knew they were all planes because of the pitch. It sounded completely different than 1392 01:49:33.520 --> 01:49:40.359 a commercial aircraft carrier. He says, that was fighters from my aircraft carrier 1393 01:49:40.439 --> 01:49:45.319 flying over in New York being told to shoot down anything that they seen flying 1394 01:49:45.359 --> 01:49:50.239 over New York. Wow, right, they And they didn't. They weren't 1395 01:49:50.239 --> 01:49:55.000 there just that day because I remember the second night when they finally made us 1396 01:49:55.079 --> 01:49:59.319 leave the site and I went back to Fantasy Island, you know, in 1397 01:49:59.359 --> 01:50:02.279 the you know, under the fifty nine street bridge, and it was still 1398 01:50:02.279 --> 01:50:05.319 it was still eerily quiet, although you know, every once in a while 1399 01:50:05.359 --> 01:50:12.319 you'd hear a siren going down the drive there. But and every once in 1400 01:50:12.359 --> 01:50:14.720 a while there would be a fighter plane. That was the only thing that 1401 01:50:14.960 --> 01:50:17.359 wasn't that weird? Like see if fighter plane fly over the upen Yeah, 1402 01:50:16.880 --> 01:50:24.920 it was really eerie, you know, yeah thing yeah, yeah. They 1403 01:50:24.960 --> 01:50:27.039 told you to go back and get some rest, they ordered us, but 1404 01:50:27.079 --> 01:50:30.880 you couldn't rest. You were just two wounds now, like you would remember, 1405 01:50:30.920 --> 01:50:32.920 we would we were all like up against the edge of the railing looking 1406 01:50:32.960 --> 01:50:36.600 at the water going by, and just you know, like you know, 1407 01:50:38.000 --> 01:50:43.279 like and you know that that brings up another memory too, that like you 1408 01:50:43.319 --> 01:50:46.159 know, nine to eleven happened, and uh, a lot of people don't 1409 01:50:46.199 --> 01:50:50.600 remember this, but you know how we do nine in fifteen, right, 1410 01:50:51.119 --> 01:50:57.760 we do nine and fifteen, nine to eleven happens. They decide we're going 1411 01:50:57.800 --> 01:51:01.239 to do twenty four hours twenty four and we're going to keep running that schedule. 1412 01:51:01.680 --> 01:51:04.720 Well here's what happens, and a lot of people don't realize this. 1413 01:51:06.560 --> 01:51:17.319 The department goes back to a regular work schedule sometime in November. Suck doesn't 1414 01:51:17.359 --> 01:51:23.840 go back to a regular work schedule till the end of December. Correct, 1415 01:51:24.239 --> 01:51:28.600 you know when has what went back to a regular work schedule? When May? 1416 01:51:30.319 --> 01:51:34.640 Eight months later? So we worked twenty four on twenty four off, 1417 01:51:35.720 --> 01:51:40.720 just like the squad did. And what were we guys doing on our twenty 1418 01:51:40.720 --> 01:51:46.439 four off? We were going to funeral funerals, family funeral or our guys, 1419 01:51:46.560 --> 01:51:51.800 our guys. The guys who were most impacted by the event were the 1420 01:51:51.880 --> 01:52:00.119 guys who got the least amount of relief. Ye'll think, right, you 1421 01:52:00.119 --> 01:52:02.600 know, we we and you know I used to say to people, and 1422 01:52:02.640 --> 01:52:06.800 people didn't believe me. I used to say, look, don't ever tell 1423 01:52:06.840 --> 01:52:11.600 me anything about the sock guys. They are tough baskets. They can they 1424 01:52:11.640 --> 01:52:15.479 can they can handle just about anything. They lose a lot of people, 1425 01:52:15.920 --> 01:52:19.720 They keep grinding away, they keep working. My kids were my twins were 1426 01:52:19.720 --> 01:52:24.560 born in December. I didn't see them for six seven months, eight months. 1427 01:52:24.640 --> 01:52:30.000 Yeah, yeah, yeah, we we We basically just threw the meat 1428 01:52:30.000 --> 01:52:32.720 grinder and there was no stopping us, you know, I mean we were 1429 01:52:33.000 --> 01:52:40.199 we incredible. I have an incredible amount of respect for the for the sock 1430 01:52:40.279 --> 01:52:45.560 guys and and what they did on nine to eleven and afterwards they did, 1431 01:52:45.720 --> 01:52:50.000 They did more than their fair share, one hundred times more than their fair 1432 01:52:50.039 --> 01:52:57.439 share. Most people would have cracked and and and uh and uh and falling 1433 01:52:57.520 --> 01:53:00.560 apart. Our guys stuck with it, stuck through with the entire time. 1434 01:53:00.760 --> 01:53:04.880 And we had to rebuild too. We had to rebuild the companies. Yeah, 1435 01:53:05.199 --> 01:53:11.680 train them all again. Right, tremendous problem. That's that's all because 1436 01:53:11.760 --> 01:53:16.159 of I mean, obviously there's a certain makeup of the people that become firefighters, 1437 01:53:16.439 --> 01:53:20.520 but a lot of the credit goes to the our senior guys that broke 1438 01:53:20.600 --> 01:53:26.239 us into the job the right way, right, you know what's important and 1439 01:53:26.319 --> 01:53:30.439 what's not important? Right, Our guys, our guys were over and above, 1440 01:53:31.119 --> 01:53:36.079 over and above. Yep, agreed exactly all right, one fifty three. 1441 01:53:36.159 --> 01:53:39.359 I think it might be that time, PHILM. Do you have your 1442 01:53:39.520 --> 01:53:45.000 little tip ready? Can we get uh, well, you know, but 1443 01:53:45.039 --> 01:53:46.800 hey, let me present you first. You just can't. We have a 1444 01:53:46.840 --> 01:53:49.840 whole thing here, bro hold on a second, stand by you ready, 1445 01:53:49.840 --> 01:53:56.439 Mike, Yes, it's time for the old school tip tip of the day 1446 01:53:56.520 --> 01:54:04.520 of the day. The tip of the day is to know your adversary. 1447 01:54:05.319 --> 01:54:10.720 And I'm going to talk about it from a hazmat perspective and from a hazmat 1448 01:54:10.760 --> 01:54:15.039 perspective, and it even applies to fire when you think about it. Knowing 1449 01:54:15.079 --> 01:54:18.479 your adversary. You need to know the product that you're dealing with. Okay, 1450 01:54:19.079 --> 01:54:25.199 you need to know its physical and chemical properties, what makes it dangerous? 1451 01:54:26.600 --> 01:54:32.680 You need to know the type of container it's in. What is it 1452 01:54:32.720 --> 01:54:39.479 a pressurized container? Non pressurized container, doesn't have safety devices to all those 1453 01:54:39.520 --> 01:54:45.039 safety devices working properly, and so on and so forth. And not only 1454 01:54:45.079 --> 01:54:47.399 that, you need to know the product, the container, and the container's 1455 01:54:47.479 --> 01:54:54.079 environment because all of those things are factors on whether you're going to be able 1456 01:54:54.119 --> 01:55:00.600 to safely deal with this type of internet. That environment can be it's exposures, 1457 01:55:00.039 --> 01:55:03.359 uh, it's it's environment. Is it on land? Is it in 1458 01:55:03.399 --> 01:55:13.199 the water? Is it in the atmosphere? And knowing that the product physical 1459 01:55:13.239 --> 01:55:17.600 and chemical properties tell you you about what type of protective clothing you have to 1460 01:55:17.680 --> 01:55:21.000 wear. How do you monitor for it? How do you know where it 1461 01:55:21.119 --> 01:55:27.439 is okay. So those are the issues that you need to think about product, 1462 01:55:27.439 --> 01:55:31.119 container and container's environment, and those are the three issues that will keep 1463 01:55:31.199 --> 01:55:36.359 you safe at most hazardous material incidents, but they also apply to fire situations. 1464 01:55:36.399 --> 01:55:43.479 To excellent, Phil, absolutely, I want to thank you for a 1465 01:55:43.479 --> 01:55:47.279 great show. And actually i'd like I'd like to thank you for making me 1466 01:55:47.279 --> 01:55:51.800 a better fine and film for be the young guy. And you know, 1467 01:55:51.920 --> 01:55:55.479 I mean, well you said that many times, but Phil, thank you 1468 01:55:55.520 --> 01:55:58.279 one of the guys that has man. I always said, you know what, 1469 01:55:58.279 --> 01:56:00.560 whatever this guy tells me, I'm gonna put it in here. Bro 1470 01:56:01.319 --> 01:56:04.319 of a better five. And I enjoyed being on your show. You guys 1471 01:56:04.319 --> 01:56:06.479 did a good job, you know, and you just do. You just 1472 01:56:06.479 --> 01:56:10.479 do a good job with all of the shows that you're doing. I'm glad 1473 01:56:10.479 --> 01:56:15.520 to say that. You know, guys who have retired from the job are 1474 01:56:15.560 --> 01:56:19.000 still promoting the job. That's that's that's exceptional. Very well. Yeah, 1475 01:56:19.039 --> 01:56:24.279 I mean in your blood, you know that you just said that hanky you 1476 01:56:24.399 --> 01:56:29.199 said it. Yeah, like I said, I still miss it. So 1477 01:56:29.560 --> 01:56:32.000 I'm glad you like this because it makes you still feel like you pought of 1478 01:56:32.119 --> 01:56:35.319 something. You know. I think on Thursday. We have a guy that's 1479 01:56:35.359 --> 01:56:39.640 older than you, Hank. We get a guy who was in one oh 1480 01:56:39.680 --> 01:56:45.000 three second section back in the day. We have Anthony von Bommel, a 1481 01:56:45.079 --> 01:56:48.960 nice German guy. Okay, and bombl on Thursday Night Show, Phil Again, 1482 01:56:49.479 --> 01:56:53.159 I was engaged the whole time. Man, you're talking. It's like, 1483 01:56:53.319 --> 01:56:55.279 you know, one of those guys are talking. You're like waiting on 1484 01:56:55.319 --> 01:57:00.640 every word. Whoever was watching tonight was very lucky because they got to hear 1485 01:57:00.680 --> 01:57:05.640 the guru of haz Matt. This man knows it, you know. And 1486 01:57:05.680 --> 01:57:10.880 I'm sure the point is you gave tonight even for a chiefs officer with a 1487 01:57:10.880 --> 01:57:14.359 little tidbits and stuff there, it's all important stuff. I learned stuff tonight 1488 01:57:14.479 --> 01:57:16.279 listening to you. Right, nuggets, I like to call them nuggets, 1489 01:57:16.319 --> 01:57:20.239 Hanks nuggets, a little nuggets, little nuggets. And don't forget the fortieth 1490 01:57:20.239 --> 01:57:25.800 anniversary for haz MAT's coming up right, yes, yes, coming out November, 1491 01:57:26.399 --> 01:57:29.840 oh September, September to having a party. I'm to throw it out 1492 01:57:29.880 --> 01:57:34.079 on the chat for the guys. Yeah, maybe I'll bring Hank. All 1493 01:57:34.199 --> 01:57:38.640 right, I'll bring Hank is my date? What do you think I want 1494 01:57:38.680 --> 01:57:41.920 to come with me. Okay, Mike, it was nice meeting you for 1495 01:57:41.960 --> 01:57:45.560 the first time. Likewise your dude and Kobs. I hope to see you 1496 01:57:45.560 --> 01:57:49.319 guys again. That was very good. I don't sign off yet because we're 1497 01:57:49.319 --> 01:57:54.880 gonna be in the back room. Have to be done. Henky, I'll 1498 01:57:54.920 --> 01:57:59.840 see you soon. Brother. You know, we gota be safe. Yeah, 1499 01:58:00.079 --> 01:58:02.119 Louis, I hope you killed something or whatever you did tonight. I 1500 01:58:02.159 --> 01:58:06.640 know you're home safe. He said he landed safe. Give all right, 1501 01:58:06.760 --> 01:58:10.840 So we got to get on that story's thing. So I'll call you tomorrow. 1502 01:58:11.159 --> 01:58:13.600 I just thought about that now. So I mean, Henk's gonna tell 1503 01:58:13.680 --> 01:58:17.039 some five stories and he's got plenty. I'll make him up. Don't worry, 1504 01:58:17.800 --> 01:58:21.800 no, no lies. All right, I'll see you guys, say 1505 01:58:21.920 --> 01:58:25.800 Thursday. Until then, stay long ago, I'm gonna say, we have 1506 01:58:25.840 --> 01:58:30.319 to say, stay low and go. Indeed, thanks to everyone for supporting 1507 01:58:30.359 --> 01:58:31.479 us. This is our two hundredth episode, by the way, so we 1508 01:58:31.520 --> 01:58:35.199 would not get here. Wow, Phil, you got number two hundred. 1509 01:58:36.880 --> 01:58:41.600 We didn't mention that earlier. We'll mention it briefly now. It's been quite 1510 01:58:41.640 --> 01:58:43.840 the ride and it's great to be a part of it. So without you 1511 01:58:43.880 --> 01:58:45.079 guys, the audience. We would never have gotten to this point. So 1512 01:58:45.159 --> 01:58:47.880 much love to all of you, and on behalf of Phil MCGARTERO, Hank, 1513 01:58:47.920 --> 01:58:51.039 Phil mcgardo, rather excuse me, Hank Malay and Kevin Coopler and Mike 1514 01:58:51.039 --> 01:58:55.520 Colonne. We'll see you next time. It's always be advised the tones are dropping.