WEBVTT 1 00:00:11.839 --> 00:00:17.160 Welcome to Veterans Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in this edition is 2 00:00:17.239 --> 00:00:22.359 retired US Air Force Brigadier General Richard Bond. He is a veteran of both 3 00:00:22.440 --> 00:00:26.920 World War Two and the Vietnam War in general. Thank you very much for 4 00:00:26.960 --> 00:00:31.199 your time today, Sir, You're welcome. Where were you born and raised? 5 00:00:31.600 --> 00:00:36.759 I was born in Kasaboks, Iowa, September twenty sixth, nineteen twenty 6 00:00:36.799 --> 00:00:41.039 three. Was there a history of military service in your family? No? 7 00:00:42.000 --> 00:00:47.039 How did you hear the news of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor on December seventh, 8 00:00:47.439 --> 00:00:52.479 nineteen forty one? What do you remember about that day? I had 9 00:00:52.520 --> 00:00:58.920 gone to a movie with two friends on the Sunday, December seventh. In 10 00:01:00.119 --> 00:01:06.280 we came out of the movie, the newspaper boys back then were yelling X 11 00:01:07.760 --> 00:01:12.000 about the news of the bombing. Now you had recently turned eighteen years old. 12 00:01:12.079 --> 00:01:18.120 How quickly did you realize you could be part of a war? I 13 00:01:18.159 --> 00:01:23.120 didn't really think too much about that at that time. You pursued becoming an 14 00:01:23.239 --> 00:01:30.120 officer in the US Army Air Forces through the Aviation Cadet training program. Why 15 00:01:30.120 --> 00:01:36.000 did you choose that path and why did you choose the Air Corps? Well, 16 00:01:36.040 --> 00:01:40.400 I had a desire to fly since by those early as I can remember, 17 00:01:41.159 --> 00:01:44.439 as a young boy, had spent a lot of time on my grandfather's 18 00:01:45.159 --> 00:01:49.519 farm, and back then the old airways used to go right over his farm, 19 00:01:49.599 --> 00:01:55.920 and I was I knew there's schedule. There weren't many airplanes back then. 20 00:01:56.799 --> 00:01:59.599 They all flew low and slow, and I would get up on the 21 00:01:59.640 --> 00:02:06.799 highest sale and watched them fly by. Now, the aviation cadet training program 22 00:02:06.920 --> 00:02:10.719 lasted about fifteen months. Tell me a little bit about that. What different 23 00:02:10.800 --> 00:02:15.879 elements did the program involve? Well, first of all, of course, 24 00:02:15.879 --> 00:02:22.960 they gave us a tough physical and a pretty good metal examination. There was 25 00:02:23.000 --> 00:02:27.159 a lot of hazing back in those days. They were trying to eliminate the 26 00:02:27.199 --> 00:02:32.400 people that didn't have a lot of desire to fly, and that continued on 27 00:02:32.719 --> 00:02:39.599 until we're over halfway through our flying training program. Where did you end up 28 00:02:39.639 --> 00:02:45.319 doing your flight training? Well, I started in Chickashe, Oklahoma in the 29 00:02:45.400 --> 00:02:51.360 primary, and then Garden City, Kansas in our basic flight school, and 30 00:02:51.400 --> 00:02:58.199 then advance was in Victoria, Texas with some P forty training, and then 31 00:02:58.199 --> 00:03:06.960 it took advance training after we graduated in the way across Georgia. Did flying 32 00:03:07.039 --> 00:03:12.240 come naturally for you? Pretty much? So I was first in my class 33 00:03:12.319 --> 00:03:17.560 the solo which sort of surprised me, and I enjoyed it very much. 34 00:03:17.719 --> 00:03:23.840 Or got to work solo wings, and I think I was more mind for 35 00:03:23.879 --> 00:03:31.479 about a week. By instructor accidentally sold me with less fewer hours than they 36 00:03:31.520 --> 00:03:36.639 were supposed to, and he didn't find out about it until it was too 37 00:03:36.719 --> 00:03:40.960 late. So anyway, I spent about a week, I guess, with 38 00:03:42.120 --> 00:03:46.120 solo wings before any of my classmates sold. What is the key to being 39 00:03:46.199 --> 00:03:51.199 a good pilot, particularly a good fighter pilot, Well, you have to 40 00:03:51.240 --> 00:03:55.719 have a stroll desire, a great desire to do it, because it's not 41 00:03:55.919 --> 00:04:00.199 the easiest thing in the world to do a proper job. And flying fighters 42 00:04:00.680 --> 00:04:05.960 were there moves that all fighter pilots were taught in terms of evading and pursuing. 43 00:04:06.080 --> 00:04:12.319 Or did you develop your own combat tactics? Well, we started flying, 44 00:04:12.439 --> 00:04:16.879 we immediately tried to when we had the opportunity to stick out one another 45 00:04:17.519 --> 00:04:24.759 and try to get on one another's tail, and it just came naturally. 46 00:04:25.920 --> 00:04:31.360 And then of course we progressed even more as we went through flight school and 47 00:04:31.360 --> 00:04:36.639 then P forty training. It became a routine thing. You mentioned the P 48 00:04:36.759 --> 00:04:41.399 forty, but you flew a different plane at first, correct, Well, 49 00:04:41.439 --> 00:04:46.800 I flew a PT nineteen and primary of BT thirteen in basic and an eighty 50 00:04:47.000 --> 00:04:55.480 six in advanced training. We're still at advanced flight school after we graduated. 51 00:04:56.000 --> 00:04:59.959 We've got a short course in P fortys. And how big of a difference 52 00:05:00.120 --> 00:05:03.319 was the P forty one. Hell of a difference, like being in a 53 00:05:03.360 --> 00:05:08.079 different world. Tell me about it. Well, it's much more powerful, 54 00:05:08.199 --> 00:05:14.399 much faster, a little more difficult to land than the T six. Just 55 00:05:14.439 --> 00:05:17.759 a heavy, powerful fighter, a lot more speed. Oh yeah, speed 56 00:05:17.959 --> 00:05:25.199 was at least twice the speed of the T six, probably a little over 57 00:05:25.240 --> 00:05:29.839 twice the power the T six had. When did you change to the P 58 00:05:29.959 --> 00:05:34.120 fifty one. Not until I got overseas and we had a short course, 59 00:05:34.199 --> 00:05:40.959 and I think we got about four or five rides in the P fifty one, 60 00:05:41.040 --> 00:05:45.519 and then we were assigned to a fighter group and sort of flying combat. 61 00:05:45.959 --> 00:05:48.680 When did you get to England and when did you start flying missions. 62 00:05:49.160 --> 00:05:56.240 I've got there in the first part of Septembers, I recall and started flying 63 00:05:56.319 --> 00:06:00.800 a probably about two or three weeks later, and what you were You assigned 64 00:06:00.839 --> 00:06:06.120 to the three sixty fourth Fighter Group in the three eighty third Fighter Squadron, 65 00:06:06.399 --> 00:06:11.319 So what kind of missions were you assigned? Was it mainly bomber escorts? 66 00:06:11.519 --> 00:06:16.720 Primarily bomber escorts, and then we do some straping, and then later on 67 00:06:18.480 --> 00:06:24.399 we escorted the bombers in and back to a safe territory, and then we're 68 00:06:24.439 --> 00:06:30.160 directed to go back in and straight airfields and other are targets of opportunity. 69 00:06:30.839 --> 00:06:34.720 How long were those bombing missions and what was your range on the P fifty 70 00:06:34.759 --> 00:06:39.839 one. Oh, we T fifty one could fly quite aways, and for 71 00:06:39.959 --> 00:06:46.279 quite a long time we carried external fuel tanks. I think the longest mission 72 00:06:46.319 --> 00:06:51.319 I ever had and P fifty one was about somewhere between eight and nine hours. 73 00:06:51.800 --> 00:06:56.680 That's a long time. The bomber crews always talk about how cold it 74 00:06:56.879 --> 00:07:00.720 was on their planes. Was it just as cold for you and fighters? 75 00:07:00.040 --> 00:07:03.319 We flew higher than the bombers to begin with, and it was a little 76 00:07:03.360 --> 00:07:10.519 bit colder up there, but the bombers had some open windows. Of the 77 00:07:10.600 --> 00:07:15.399 crews that were exposed to those open windows really had it rough. But we'd 78 00:07:15.439 --> 00:07:21.319 be flying in forty five to fifty bows or the weather around thirty four thirty 79 00:07:21.319 --> 00:07:30.720 thousand feet, and we had we really dressed warm. We had heavy layers 80 00:07:30.759 --> 00:07:38.319 of clothing and fur lined boots and that sort of thing. It wasn't at 81 00:07:38.399 --> 00:07:43.600 least a bit comfortable. And then you worked all that warm, but not 82 00:07:43.720 --> 00:07:46.560 as bad as he opened some of the open spaces of the bombers. Now, 83 00:07:46.600 --> 00:07:53.720 you mentioned just a moment ago about your attacks strafing German airfields. Tell 84 00:07:53.759 --> 00:07:58.439 me about those attacks and how you executed those. I might mentionine that when 85 00:07:58.480 --> 00:08:03.920 we started doing that are law losses quadruples. There's a book by doctor Richard 86 00:08:03.000 --> 00:08:11.319 Davis who brings that out, has extensive reports of aircraft losses, and you 87 00:08:11.360 --> 00:08:18.600 can see where the fighter losses almost quadruple when we started strafing, because the 88 00:08:18.639 --> 00:08:24.959 PFD one had a liquid cooled engine and one little twenty two caliber slug through 89 00:08:26.560 --> 00:08:33.000 coolant line could knock your engine out. And then the flat was extremely heavy, 90 00:08:33.600 --> 00:08:39.600 and if you made more than one pass, they just put up a 91 00:08:39.720 --> 00:08:45.120 layer of lead and you had to fly right through it. We had occasions 92 00:08:45.159 --> 00:08:50.559 where a flight of four would make a shaping pass across the field and anywhere 93 00:08:50.600 --> 00:08:56.919 from two to three of them would be shot down. That's the reason that 94 00:08:56.000 --> 00:09:01.000 the losses were so high. How low were you getting on these strafing passes? 95 00:09:01.480 --> 00:09:05.120 Just as low as we could get. I would cut grass if I 96 00:09:05.159 --> 00:09:11.240 could with my problem. So were there any particular tactics you could use on 97 00:09:11.279 --> 00:09:16.399 that on that first pass to help you avoid the ground fire? Or was 98 00:09:16.440 --> 00:09:18.919 it just the element of surprise? If we were lucky, we had the 99 00:09:20.000 --> 00:09:24.320 element of surprise and we could get across in good shape. It's when you 100 00:09:24.399 --> 00:09:28.519 started circling the wagons that you had your losses. The more passes you made, 101 00:09:28.600 --> 00:09:31.200 the better chance you were going to get a shot. Pat. How 102 00:09:31.240 --> 00:09:37.080 about when you were at higher elevations escorting the bombers, how intense was the 103 00:09:37.159 --> 00:09:43.080 flack at that altitude? Well, at that altitude we normally going back and 104 00:09:43.159 --> 00:09:50.279 forth across the bombers, and the flack really wasn't much of a problem up 105 00:09:50.279 --> 00:09:54.799 there. That's when you got down the little on the fire concentration of automatic 106 00:09:54.879 --> 00:10:05.720 weapons and twenty two millimeter in thirty seven millimeter cannons, I just had so 107 00:10:05.799 --> 00:10:11.519 much firepower that it's like trying to fly through a brainstorm. You just couldn't 108 00:10:11.559 --> 00:10:15.320 miss much of it now, I know the bombers were instructed to stay in 109 00:10:15.320 --> 00:10:18.519 a very tight formation no matter what they were facing. What about as a 110 00:10:18.559 --> 00:10:22.200 fighter, were you pretty restricted in your movement or did you have a little 111 00:10:22.240 --> 00:10:26.519 more freedom on where you could? God, we had much more freedom. 112 00:10:28.279 --> 00:10:31.679 Like you say. Our primary mission was to ask for bombers and we normally 113 00:10:33.519 --> 00:10:37.879 would criss cross above them, and we had someone high and some low, 114 00:10:39.000 --> 00:10:45.519 some medium fighters and we were tried to be up from the bombers so we 115 00:10:45.559 --> 00:10:50.120 didn't have to look into the sun too much for enemy fighters. Gave us 116 00:10:50.159 --> 00:10:54.320 a little bitter chance to pick them up. Now, did you face much 117 00:10:54.440 --> 00:10:58.159 Luftwaffe resistance up there? Not a great deal. But by the time I 118 00:10:58.200 --> 00:11:03.480 was flying, the German Air Force lost quite a few of their leaders in 119 00:11:05.320 --> 00:11:13.039 their training program because of Hitler refused to give the Loofwaff what they really needed 120 00:11:13.240 --> 00:11:18.159 in the number of pilots that were asking to train, and so they were 121 00:11:18.159 --> 00:11:26.799 outnumbered and outclassed because some of the pilots towards the end entered combat with forty 122 00:11:26.840 --> 00:11:31.039 or fifty hours flying, which was as a drop in the bucket. You 123 00:11:31.120 --> 00:11:35.080 really didn't know what you were doing, so they were pretty easy meat to 124 00:11:35.120 --> 00:11:41.919 shoot down when you did in Cornada. Are there any engagements that are particularly 125 00:11:41.960 --> 00:11:48.720 memorable to you. I think the one I remember the most on during the 126 00:11:48.759 --> 00:11:54.440 Battle of the Bulls, just before Christmas. I was flying my squad and 127 00:11:54.519 --> 00:12:01.159 commander's wing and he had the best set of eyes one I've ever phone with, 128 00:12:01.200 --> 00:12:07.639 and he spotted a gaggle of about thirty or forty Emmy one O nine 129 00:12:07.840 --> 00:12:15.080 and we engaged them, and he shot down four and got lowe on ammunition, 130 00:12:15.279 --> 00:12:18.960 so he let me have a shot and I got one. That was 131 00:12:20.440 --> 00:12:28.000 the largest engagement in the longest I was ever involved with now and then then 132 00:12:28.039 --> 00:12:37.960 we encountered jets Is shortly after that, or a month or two after that, 133 00:12:39.039 --> 00:12:43.200 and we chased him all the way back to Prague, Czechoslovakia, and 134 00:12:45.679 --> 00:12:50.320 finally called him in the landing pattern and shot some down and strace up. 135 00:12:50.720 --> 00:12:54.919 That's retired to US Air Force Brigadier General Richard Bond. He's a veteran of 136 00:12:54.960 --> 00:13:00.480 World War Two and the Vietnam War, serving as a fighter pilot in both 137 00:13:00.519 --> 00:13:05.519 conflicts and holding significant leadership roles in Vietnam. When we come back. Will 138 00:13:05.519 --> 00:13:09.559 return to World War Two as General Bond tells us about the overlooked role that 139 00:13:09.679 --> 00:13:15.039 air power played at the Battle of the Bulge and how the end of the 140 00:13:15.080 --> 00:13:20.399 war in Europe immediately had him preparing for more combat. I'm Greg Corumbus and 141 00:13:20.440 --> 00:13:28.279 this is Veterans Chronicles. This is Veterans Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our 142 00:13:28.320 --> 00:13:31.960 guest in this edition is one hundred year old retired US Air Force Brigadier General 143 00:13:33.159 --> 00:13:37.039 Richard Bond, who served in both World War Two and Vietnam. Still to 144 00:13:37.080 --> 00:13:41.879 come the top secret work he did in Europe during the Korean War and his 145 00:13:41.960 --> 00:13:46.559 many different roles in Vietnam and the frustrations that came with them, but General 146 00:13:46.600 --> 00:13:52.360 Bond now continues his story by discussing the frequently overlooked role that air power played 147 00:13:52.759 --> 00:13:56.600 during the Battle of the Bulge. My group and one or two groups that 148 00:13:56.639 --> 00:14:05.639 were designed to land in France try to recover in France to provide wars support 149 00:14:05.720 --> 00:14:09.279 for the army. And of course the weather was bad and we couldn't land 150 00:14:09.320 --> 00:14:16.320 there, but we flew with carried a couple of GI blanks and some cave 151 00:14:16.399 --> 00:14:22.720 ration stuffed in our canopies behind the cockpit so we could have in case we 152 00:14:22.960 --> 00:14:26.639 land we have something to eat and something keep us warmth, and we flew 153 00:14:26.799 --> 00:14:33.120 just a lot every day. We finally got into Belgium, but by then 154 00:14:33.519 --> 00:14:37.879 we didn't engage very much from there. How many missions overall did you fly 155 00:14:37.960 --> 00:14:43.320 in World War two fifty one? We flew? According to combat time? 156 00:14:43.919 --> 00:14:48.720 I think we had to fly three hundred dollars combat time. By then I'd 157 00:14:48.799 --> 00:14:52.919 find three hundred dollars. How did you hear about the end of the war 158 00:14:52.960 --> 00:14:56.799 in Europe? Well, we all listened to it on the Armed Forces network 159 00:14:58.240 --> 00:15:01.360 and then we read about it the next day in the stars of strips. 160 00:15:01.799 --> 00:15:05.960 Now after the war, you volunteered to fight in the Pacific theater? What 161 00:15:07.039 --> 00:15:11.720 were you doing in preparation for that? A number of US had volunteers, 162 00:15:11.720 --> 00:15:16.960 not a large number. About what's botting worth? And we started training in 163 00:15:18.080 --> 00:15:22.679 doing dive bombing, which we hadn't done much of in rocket firing, and 164 00:15:22.279 --> 00:15:28.919 we were going to fly up P fifty one from Angling over to the Far 165 00:15:28.080 --> 00:15:35.919 East. Before we got that kip going, they dropped the atomic bombs in 166 00:15:35.480 --> 00:15:41.480 Japan and then ended that. Where were you when the Japanese surrendered? We 167 00:15:41.600 --> 00:15:46.120 were in still in England. Now sixty years later, actually even a little 168 00:15:46.159 --> 00:15:50.720 more than sixty years later. You decided to write a fact based novel about 169 00:15:50.759 --> 00:15:54.840 the life of a P fifty one pilot in World War Two because you hadn't 170 00:15:54.879 --> 00:16:00.320 read one that told what you saw as the real story. So what did 171 00:16:00.399 --> 00:16:03.200 you have and want to see in a book that other books didn't have. 172 00:16:03.759 --> 00:16:08.080 Well, I wanted to really tell what it felt like and what the combat 173 00:16:08.279 --> 00:16:12.840 was like, and I tried to do that. They spent a lot of 174 00:16:12.919 --> 00:16:21.759 time on it, and I did extensive research. You learned it about the 175 00:16:21.919 --> 00:16:26.559 war because I hadn't learned too much about the overall war other than what I 176 00:16:26.720 --> 00:16:30.080 thought from my cockbit. I knew our losses were high, but I never 177 00:16:30.200 --> 00:16:37.000 realized they were as big as they were in the Army Air Forces in Europe. 178 00:16:37.879 --> 00:16:41.120 And it was quite an eye opener for me, and I enjoyed it, 179 00:16:41.399 --> 00:16:48.440 and I really worked wei on the book, and people who've read it 180 00:16:48.679 --> 00:16:53.519 have told me almost all of them said they felt like they were in the 181 00:16:53.639 --> 00:16:57.399 cockpit with me, which I felt good about. That's what I was trying 182 00:16:57.440 --> 00:17:03.240 to do. Yeah. It's called The Hell Vortex Between Breakfast and Dinner by 183 00:17:03.679 --> 00:17:10.000 General Richard Bond and Sir You then left active service after World War Two to 184 00:17:10.079 --> 00:17:14.880 return to college, but you also joined the Air National Guard. Well, 185 00:17:15.160 --> 00:17:19.119 you were in Iowa, So what did that service involve. We normally flew 186 00:17:21.039 --> 00:17:26.039 not every weekend, but by every other weekend I flew while I was in 187 00:17:26.200 --> 00:17:32.200 college. I normally going to college about forty miles away, so I would 188 00:17:32.240 --> 00:17:37.079 go down my weekend and try to do supplying every weekend P fifty ones. 189 00:17:38.240 --> 00:17:45.480 And then in the summertime we get it. I think there's two weeks active 190 00:17:45.559 --> 00:17:52.079 duty time, extensive air to air and air ground gunner and bombing and that 191 00:17:52.240 --> 00:17:57.359 sort of thing. Pretty good training, and then the rest of the time 192 00:17:57.440 --> 00:18:03.119 it was just a lot of instrument training, night flying a little there, 193 00:18:03.200 --> 00:18:07.000 they are simulated, there, they are combat. While you were in the 194 00:18:07.119 --> 00:18:11.559 National Guard, fighter jets became a reality. So how big of a change 195 00:18:11.680 --> 00:18:15.079 was that. Well, one of the early units to get jets, and 196 00:18:15.200 --> 00:18:19.839 we got the first F eighty four, first model of the F eighty four 197 00:18:21.119 --> 00:18:27.279 that were built, and they were extremely underpowered and full of bugs, and 198 00:18:27.759 --> 00:18:33.519 canopies would blow out, and we had hydraulic leaks and when the summertime, 199 00:18:34.119 --> 00:18:38.880 jets don't perform too well as well as they do in cold weather, and 200 00:18:41.119 --> 00:18:45.920 so I would apply to various spaces in Denver, especially at Lower Field. 201 00:18:45.559 --> 00:18:51.799 I'd have to take off early in the morning or there wasn't enough one way 202 00:18:51.839 --> 00:18:56.400 to get the thing off the ground. And we used to say that the 203 00:18:56.519 --> 00:19:03.160 old, the original F eighty four has had eyes in the nose wheel them. 204 00:19:03.200 --> 00:19:07.599 When they saw the end of the runway, they would send the signal 205 00:19:07.680 --> 00:19:12.680 to lets apply and we'd blow dust off to the end of the run we 206 00:19:14.279 --> 00:19:19.119 found your off the ground. It was good training. In the they weren't 207 00:19:19.160 --> 00:19:23.720 fully equipped. We couldn't fly instruments, send them and that sort of thing. 208 00:19:26.160 --> 00:19:32.039 But as far as just basic flying, jets are much easier to fly 209 00:19:32.279 --> 00:19:37.400 because they don't have torque from the propeller and so you don't have to be 210 00:19:37.599 --> 00:19:45.839 a good coordination as much coordination as you do in a propeller driven airplane where 211 00:19:45.839 --> 00:19:52.200 you have to use it the rudder a lot as well as the step that's 212 00:19:52.240 --> 00:19:56.119 retired US Air Force Brigadier General Richard Bond still to come his role in the 213 00:19:56.240 --> 00:20:03.079 rapidly advancing development of American fighter jets and his critical roles in Vietnam, But 214 00:20:03.240 --> 00:20:07.319 up next. General Bond describes the secret nuclear deterrent he was part of in 215 00:20:07.440 --> 00:20:11.160 Europe while the Korean War raged on the other side of the world. That's 216 00:20:11.279 --> 00:20:18.200 next. I'm Greg Corumbus and this is Veterans Chronicles. This is Veterans Chronicles. 217 00:20:18.440 --> 00:20:22.599 I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in this edition is retired US Air Force 218 00:20:22.640 --> 00:20:27.359 Brigadier General Richard Bond. In just a few minutes we will learn all about 219 00:20:27.519 --> 00:20:33.599 the general's extensive service in Vietnam. But right now, Bond talks about his 220 00:20:33.759 --> 00:20:37.319 top secret nuclear work in Europe while most of the world was focused on the 221 00:20:37.400 --> 00:20:42.680 war in Korea. Well, I was in my guard unit up in Van 222 00:20:42.799 --> 00:20:48.920 Germain, and because of what we'd pulln S eighty four, they were starting 223 00:20:49.759 --> 00:20:59.119 a very highly classified program to equipped fighters with atomic bombs to send to Europe. 224 00:21:00.200 --> 00:21:03.839 We were struggling just to get enough troops into Korea to fight that war, 225 00:21:04.000 --> 00:21:08.279 and the Russian for acting up in Europe at the same time, and 226 00:21:08.960 --> 00:21:17.839 we needed the tearrent force, and SACK had their hands full already the bombers, 227 00:21:18.680 --> 00:21:23.480 so they the most highly classified operation I've ever been in. In fact, 228 00:21:25.480 --> 00:21:27.599 even to this day, there are very few people in or out of 229 00:21:27.680 --> 00:21:37.079 the Air Force that are really aware of this secret, top extremely top secret 230 00:21:37.039 --> 00:21:42.880 fire force. It was formed and we were all volunteers. The wing commander 231 00:21:44.880 --> 00:21:49.240 went around the various spaces seeking volunteers and they only need to tell you was 232 00:21:49.319 --> 00:21:57.160 that it was a very dangerous mission and that was it. And if you 233 00:21:57.240 --> 00:22:02.279 didn't want to go one of those circumstantus, they didn't go. Well, 234 00:22:02.319 --> 00:22:08.319 the guard unit I was in was highly politicized. The wing commander was a 235 00:22:10.319 --> 00:22:15.960 former glider pilot. He didn't know anything about fighters, and it just wasn't 236 00:22:15.880 --> 00:22:22.680 a very happy place to be for fighter pilots. Still, all the most 237 00:22:22.720 --> 00:22:29.359 of my guard squadron of the Fulmer eighty fours, we all volunteered to go 238 00:22:29.519 --> 00:22:33.799 on this mission and we did what exactly did they ask you to do on 239 00:22:33.920 --> 00:22:40.960 the mission? Well, back then they didn't ask if to do anything right 240 00:22:41.000 --> 00:22:48.440 away and then we started flying long range practice, all range missions with cruise 241 00:22:48.559 --> 00:22:55.119 control techniques that would extend the range of the fighters, and we flew to 242 00:22:55.240 --> 00:23:00.960 the maximum. Other units didn't even come close. We would really extended the 243 00:23:02.759 --> 00:23:07.759 range of the fighter. And then we we learned that we had to drop 244 00:23:07.880 --> 00:23:15.160 a bomb, which or deliverer bomb. We had no bombing computers or anything. 245 00:23:15.279 --> 00:23:18.680 So we had to figure out a way to drop this bomb and not 246 00:23:18.799 --> 00:23:26.599 get cremated in the process. And so we ended up using a high altitude 247 00:23:26.720 --> 00:23:34.759 diet bombing technique and with the fairly highest circular air probability of about two thousand 248 00:23:34.880 --> 00:23:40.720 feet. But that was enough with the clear the size of the bomb that 249 00:23:41.400 --> 00:23:47.400 knock out the part that should be going after. And we have got the 250 00:23:47.519 --> 00:23:55.440 shapes of the bombs eventually and were used in the for our cruise control to 251 00:23:55.720 --> 00:24:00.839 these weapons with us, and I had to pick up one of the first 252 00:24:00.960 --> 00:24:06.240 ones and it was so classified that when I was bringing it coming back with 253 00:24:06.319 --> 00:24:11.680 the bomb, I had a special call sign. And when I landed at 254 00:24:11.759 --> 00:24:15.640 these pre planned bases and the waiting let you come into the main part of 255 00:24:15.680 --> 00:24:21.240 the base, they parked me way out. I had with greens put up 256 00:24:21.279 --> 00:24:26.039 to the one could see what was on the aircraft and bought food out to 257 00:24:26.240 --> 00:24:32.440 me and UH and my flight plan and the water and everything for my next 258 00:24:32.720 --> 00:24:38.559 leg of my journey. And and there was I was really impressed. I've 259 00:24:38.599 --> 00:24:45.079 never had been in some uh you know, some fairly secret organizations, but 260 00:24:45.279 --> 00:24:52.359 that was that was by far the most guarded program I've ever been associated with. 261 00:24:53.160 --> 00:25:00.200 And because we had volunteers, we had a lot of experience, much 262 00:25:00.240 --> 00:25:03.880 more experience than the average fider unit. And when we went to Europe, 263 00:25:04.440 --> 00:25:10.440 we flew in the weather conditions that the rest of the units would be grounded 264 00:25:10.559 --> 00:25:14.119 on, but we would still be up flying. How big were the bombs, 265 00:25:14.720 --> 00:25:18.480 Well, they were larger than the ones they dropped on Japan. They 266 00:25:18.480 --> 00:25:21.559 were so low we carried them out of the wing. And then of course 267 00:25:21.599 --> 00:25:26.720 they have sins on the bomb to stabilize the bomb, and that it was 268 00:25:26.759 --> 00:25:33.400 so large, we had to retract the lower films because it would drag on 269 00:25:33.480 --> 00:25:37.119 the ground. We didn't. Then as soon as you got that airborne, 270 00:25:37.200 --> 00:25:44.200 we extended that film that sin from the cocktail. Now, later on in 271 00:25:44.279 --> 00:25:48.519 the nineteen fifties, there you became a flight squadron operations officer, once at 272 00:25:48.559 --> 00:25:53.400 the Air Force Academy and then again in California. Tell me a little bit 273 00:25:53.440 --> 00:26:00.160 about what that job requires and how well it prepared you for laterlyleadership in Vietnam. 274 00:26:00.599 --> 00:26:07.160 Well, I was in Europe. I eventually was reassigned a headquarters Europe 275 00:26:07.279 --> 00:26:14.799 and re spawned and they started something they called the standardization program that so that 276 00:26:15.079 --> 00:26:19.839 light units were using the same procedures and we developed the best procedures, but 277 00:26:21.680 --> 00:26:29.480 through an interchange between units and the job I had. I flew with every 278 00:26:29.559 --> 00:26:38.599 fighter wearing over there and also reported any I was called on to investigate every 279 00:26:40.000 --> 00:26:45.839 accident as soon as it happened, and I had to personally break the four 280 00:26:45.920 --> 00:26:52.039 star general within twenty four hours after the accident. And so I had a 281 00:26:52.319 --> 00:26:57.680 jet assigned to me twenty four hours, seven days a week, and if 282 00:26:57.720 --> 00:27:04.839 they had an accidently took off and before the actually occurred and did a quick 283 00:27:06.680 --> 00:27:11.960 analysis and investigation of it, and then came back briefed the commanding in General. 284 00:27:11.960 --> 00:27:19.960 And then during this period I met all the various wing and group commanders 285 00:27:21.079 --> 00:27:26.359 in Europe fighter lights, and one of them a full crone by the name 286 00:27:26.440 --> 00:27:33.440 of Ben Cassidy, a Watchpoint graduate and a good friend of Robin Holds. 287 00:27:33.079 --> 00:27:38.599 I got acquainted with Ben and he was the assistant commandat of cadets at the 288 00:27:38.680 --> 00:27:44.119 Air Force Academy. So when I vote to you, he requested I come 289 00:27:44.240 --> 00:27:52.720 back there and form a simulated eighty six squadron for the Air training officers who 290 00:27:52.799 --> 00:27:59.680 were acting as young lieutenants who were acting as upper classmen for the cadets because 291 00:27:59.720 --> 00:28:06.599 they they had no upper class and it was just starting. And that's how 292 00:28:06.680 --> 00:28:12.319 I got the title operations there. And then I did that for about a 293 00:28:12.440 --> 00:28:17.359 year, and I really wanted to get back into a regular fighter unit, 294 00:28:17.559 --> 00:28:25.960 and so I finally got reassigned a fighting unit in California and took over the 295 00:28:26.039 --> 00:28:33.319 operations job, assigning and supervising all the pilots and the flight program, and 296 00:28:33.440 --> 00:28:37.799 then I eventually moved up the squading commander. From that job, generally you 297 00:28:38.160 --> 00:28:44.079 were right there with the evolution of the fighter jet from the F eighty four 298 00:28:44.279 --> 00:28:47.880 to the F one hundred, the F one o four and then the one 299 00:28:48.079 --> 00:28:51.240 five, which we spent a lot of time on. What was it like 300 00:28:51.359 --> 00:28:53.920 to be part of that rapid advancement over just a few years. Oh, 301 00:28:55.000 --> 00:28:59.759 it was amazing, It was really amazing. I was in the first trooper 302 00:29:00.759 --> 00:29:06.279 wider squad in at George in California, and that's the one I was the 303 00:29:06.359 --> 00:29:11.440 operations also love and then eventually became the commander. And then while we were 304 00:29:11.559 --> 00:29:17.960 still flying the F one hundreds, the brand new F one hundreds, I 305 00:29:18.160 --> 00:29:23.799 was selected to go to Edwards and participate in the tactical portion of the F 306 00:29:23.920 --> 00:29:30.799 one four test program. And my first side in the F one four was 307 00:29:30.880 --> 00:29:36.559 in January, very cold. You had to retract the gear before you'd see 308 00:29:36.640 --> 00:29:41.720 it three hundred and fifty knots or you damage the gear. And I took 309 00:29:41.799 --> 00:29:45.519 off and I kept pulling the nose up while I was waiting for the gear 310 00:29:45.599 --> 00:29:52.000 handled to keep from exceeding the gear speed limits. And two minutes later, 311 00:29:52.119 --> 00:29:55.440 I was at forty thousand feet and I looked down at the tail of the 312 00:29:55.519 --> 00:30:00.279 runway. It was right below me, and I told myself, and this 313 00:30:00.519 --> 00:30:06.920 is the airplane for me. And that's still one of my one of my 314 00:30:07.079 --> 00:30:11.559 three favorite fighters that I flew. One are the other two. The first 315 00:30:11.640 --> 00:30:14.920 one was at P fifty one and the second one was the F eighty six. 316 00:30:15.599 --> 00:30:18.720 You were also the project officer for the F one O five. What 317 00:30:18.960 --> 00:30:22.680 type of work were you doing with that? Well, we were supervising the 318 00:30:23.079 --> 00:30:29.640 production of it into the Air Force. We had what we call phasey group 319 00:30:29.720 --> 00:30:33.680 meetings that would get together and kind of results and on the problems they were 320 00:30:33.759 --> 00:30:40.319 experiencing in the program. And it was a completely different aircraft. It was 321 00:30:40.400 --> 00:30:45.720 heavy, it was designed for straight level speed, high level speed to deliver 322 00:30:47.000 --> 00:30:52.880 had a bomb bay to deliver a nuclear weapon. It's probably was the fastest 323 00:30:52.920 --> 00:30:57.279 aircraft at low speed at in the world back then, but it didn't like 324 00:30:57.400 --> 00:31:03.119 to change direction very much. It wouldn't turn because of the wing design and 325 00:31:03.240 --> 00:31:07.640 so forth. But high speed it would be without run just about anything. 326 00:31:08.319 --> 00:31:15.079 And there was a great airplane, and it was about the same top speed 327 00:31:15.160 --> 00:31:18.519 as the F one o four, But the F one four should get out 328 00:31:19.839 --> 00:31:26.160 twice the speed of sound and be back before the F one o five ever 329 00:31:26.240 --> 00:31:30.839 got out there. Acceleration was great, but once you got to one o 330 00:31:32.000 --> 00:31:36.440 five, up to mark to it go. Now, after the F one 331 00:31:36.519 --> 00:31:40.039 o five assignment, you were sent to Okinawa, and this is the early 332 00:31:40.319 --> 00:31:45.680 nineteen sixties. Was there already an anticipation at that time that you would be 333 00:31:45.759 --> 00:31:49.559 fighting in Vietnam or did you have a different focus at that time. Well, 334 00:31:49.599 --> 00:31:53.799 before I went, while I was the one O five project, we 335 00:31:53.920 --> 00:32:01.000 were involved in Vietnam, and we'd had vignamese let's come back through the States. 336 00:32:01.079 --> 00:32:06.039 I met several of those and so I knew we were involved in it. 337 00:32:06.359 --> 00:32:13.240 We were forming units to go over there. Con insurgency units. At 338 00:32:13.279 --> 00:32:19.960 first we had converted trainers T twenty eight to give the Veganese Air Force and 339 00:32:21.160 --> 00:32:24.400 for the m the years, and then eventually we gave May once and then 340 00:32:24.920 --> 00:32:31.599 A twenty six and then hugeets. I knew that we were involved there, 341 00:32:31.680 --> 00:32:38.039 and when I was in Okinawa, I eventually took over one oh five squadron 342 00:32:38.119 --> 00:32:45.480 and we would go down temporarily for three to four weeks in fly combat. 343 00:32:45.960 --> 00:32:52.200 But we flew over North Vietnam. We never flew over South Vietnam, and 344 00:32:52.359 --> 00:32:59.720 we did fly missions in Cambodia, but never to my knowledge, never in 345 00:32:59.759 --> 00:33:06.839 s out Naw. Describe some of those missions over North Vietnam on that first 346 00:33:06.960 --> 00:33:09.640 tour to Vietnam. What were those like and what were your goals? We 347 00:33:09.720 --> 00:33:17.119 were moving too slowly, our hands were tied. We had priority targets. 348 00:33:17.200 --> 00:33:24.160 It should have been hit, and we were going after smaller targets. I 349 00:33:24.240 --> 00:33:30.119 had. One time I went up to Illinois, which was highly descended and 350 00:33:30.720 --> 00:33:37.839 more triple A than I even so in Europe concentrations of it. And then 351 00:33:37.920 --> 00:33:43.920 the missiles were added into that, and the missiles drove us down because we 352 00:33:44.079 --> 00:33:49.599 had no warning that we had to fly low and that's where the small arms 353 00:33:50.440 --> 00:33:57.000 and automatic weapons fire can really shoot you down in a hurry. And anyway, 354 00:33:57.039 --> 00:34:00.960 we were this one mission and particular, but there were others dislike it. 355 00:34:01.640 --> 00:34:13.400 We're going after it. Suspected fifty gallon pol site and about sixty to 356 00:34:13.519 --> 00:34:19.000 seventy miles from Camp Airfield, which was loaded with big fighters, and we 357 00:34:19.079 --> 00:34:27.159 should have been attacking that airfield instead of looking for camouflage. Fifty gallon drums 358 00:34:27.199 --> 00:34:31.800 are located in some forest area. Now, I've read comments from you that 359 00:34:32.239 --> 00:34:37.960 the flak and the surface to air missiles and everything else you faced, the 360 00:34:37.000 --> 00:34:42.000 small arms fire. You said it was every bit as intense as flying over 361 00:34:42.119 --> 00:34:45.119 Germany and World War two flying over North Vietnam. Tell me a little bit 362 00:34:45.119 --> 00:34:50.639 about that. Well, with the missile factor, they were even more intense 363 00:34:50.880 --> 00:34:54.800 because the missile was so deadly. If you saw it, you could evade 364 00:34:54.800 --> 00:35:00.719 it. But if you're in time you didn't see it, you probably getting 365 00:35:00.760 --> 00:35:05.960 nailed. So I would say that due to the missile factor, the defenses 366 00:35:06.079 --> 00:35:09.000 were even more intense than they were in Germany. That's retired US Air Force 367 00:35:09.039 --> 00:35:15.119 Brigadier General Richard Bond still ahead. General Bond tells US much more about his 368 00:35:15.239 --> 00:35:20.559 service during the Vietnam War, including his work in Saigon just before it fell 369 00:35:21.440 --> 00:35:25.719 and working at the Air Force version of Top Gun. But up next another 370 00:35:25.840 --> 00:35:31.239 command in Vietnam and even greater frustrations with the very top of the chain of 371 00:35:31.280 --> 00:35:37.039 command. This is Veterans Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in this 372 00:35:37.280 --> 00:35:44.239 edition is retired US Air Force Brigadier General Richard Bond. General Bond now continues 373 00:35:44.320 --> 00:35:49.320 his story with another new command and the political frustrations that came with it. 374 00:35:49.559 --> 00:35:54.760 Well, that's when we started going to up around Honnoi, the High Frid 375 00:35:54.840 --> 00:36:00.559 area. It's really the further north he went, the more the the more 376 00:36:00.599 --> 00:36:04.679 of the missiles. Back then that when I when we first started there in 377 00:36:04.800 --> 00:36:10.119 sixty six, we were just beginning to get some radar homing and warning devices. 378 00:36:10.239 --> 00:36:15.199 They would tell you when they were had they're tracking you on radar, 379 00:36:15.400 --> 00:36:23.280 and what type of radar was tracking, whether it was surveillance or guns or 380 00:36:23.400 --> 00:36:30.280 missiles, and then you could take some evasic action or act accordingly. We 381 00:36:30.360 --> 00:36:37.199 were just not starting to get that. So until we were equipped with that, 382 00:36:37.559 --> 00:36:44.280 we were losing aircraft like crazy, and I lost a lot of my 383 00:36:44.440 --> 00:36:52.000 guys early on through that fact. Then eventually we got They brought in something 384 00:36:52.079 --> 00:36:59.199 they called the wild Weasels, which were equipped with electronic equipment to detect, 385 00:36:59.400 --> 00:37:06.880 and they had armament two missiles that would knock out the sites, and my 386 00:37:07.199 --> 00:37:13.760 one commander signed all in addition to my fighter squadron. They signed all the 387 00:37:13.840 --> 00:37:20.519 wild Weasels to me, So I threw about half my missions with the wild 388 00:37:20.559 --> 00:37:23.400 Weasels and half with a fighter squadron. Let's talk a little bit more about 389 00:37:23.480 --> 00:37:31.519 the frustration of the rules of engagement. You've talked before about seeing the construction 390 00:37:31.719 --> 00:37:36.239 of surface to air missile sites but you weren't allowed to hit them. Then 391 00:37:36.280 --> 00:37:38.440 you were asked to deal with them, but you weren't given the radar jamming 392 00:37:39.000 --> 00:37:47.320 equipment. What was the reaction from commanders above you when you expressed how dangerous 393 00:37:47.360 --> 00:37:52.039 this was for your men. All the military people knew it, but they 394 00:37:52.159 --> 00:37:59.519 weren't calling shots. A shots would be calling by the President and the Secretary. 395 00:38:00.800 --> 00:38:05.440 For example, we'd assigned a target, and if we didn't strike it 396 00:38:06.679 --> 00:38:13.519 on the day that it was approved or that even sometimes at the time, 397 00:38:14.039 --> 00:38:17.599 we couldn't strike it until we've got further approval. It was so restrictive that 398 00:38:17.719 --> 00:38:23.440 it's so unbelievable. There was a period of time over there when you couldn't 399 00:38:23.480 --> 00:38:30.599 attack a target unless they've fired a Q first. It's like giving a government 400 00:38:30.679 --> 00:38:35.679 a first shot at you before you've pulled your weapono back at you. So, 401 00:38:35.840 --> 00:38:39.800 in addition to having the appropriate equipment to keep your pilot safe, how 402 00:38:39.800 --> 00:38:45.360 would you have changed the rules of engagement? Obviously firing first in certain situations. 403 00:38:45.760 --> 00:38:49.440 What other freedoms would you have had the pilots have if you could have, 404 00:38:50.239 --> 00:38:53.840 Well, they should have let the military people have attacked the targets they 405 00:38:53.960 --> 00:39:01.920 had selected as high priority, like we did in I wraped Iraqi War and 406 00:39:02.360 --> 00:39:08.079 knock out their heavy defenses and warning and capability and that sort of thing, 407 00:39:08.239 --> 00:39:13.920 so we could operate a little more freely. And we were never permitted to 408 00:39:14.039 --> 00:39:21.280 do anything like that. Every target backed in was selected by the White House 409 00:39:21.360 --> 00:39:28.039 and the stuck Trade Defense. And that's when Prosidan Johnson bragged about those boys 410 00:39:28.119 --> 00:39:30.639 can't hear the little shithouse over there unless I approved it. What did that 411 00:39:30.760 --> 00:39:35.519 do for morale? I see a quote from you here saying we didn't have 412 00:39:35.679 --> 00:39:38.199 bombs that would do the job. We were still send into high threat areas 413 00:39:38.239 --> 00:39:45.280 to strike useless targets picked by Johnson and McNamara with weapons that in some cases 414 00:39:45.320 --> 00:39:50.280 would do little more than chip paint. So given the fact that you weren't 415 00:39:50.320 --> 00:39:53.960 able to do much damage if you did strike the targets and you were left 416 00:39:54.079 --> 00:40:00.280 vulnerable to the enemy's attacks, what was morale like in your squadron? Well, 417 00:40:00.599 --> 00:40:05.320 it was amazing these young kids. They were first of all, they 418 00:40:05.400 --> 00:40:10.119 were back then. They were hand picked for the one O five program because 419 00:40:10.199 --> 00:40:15.559 it was the most expensive airplane fighter we'd ever procured. I think at the 420 00:40:15.679 --> 00:40:21.719 time. They had to have a great deal of experience to get in there, 421 00:40:21.800 --> 00:40:24.480 and they had to be highly qualified, and it was amazing how well 422 00:40:24.559 --> 00:40:30.000 their morale held up even under these circumstances. We had very few people that 423 00:40:30.840 --> 00:40:36.880 I my squadron only had one case where we had a problem and he really 424 00:40:36.920 --> 00:40:39.960 didn't want to give up, but he just he would get sick to a 425 00:40:40.119 --> 00:40:45.199 stomach when he started on the mission because due to the fear factor. But 426 00:40:45.599 --> 00:40:50.760 they never refused to go. They always went. It's hard to say, 427 00:40:50.840 --> 00:40:53.000 of course, since it didn't happen, But what do you think the war 428 00:40:53.039 --> 00:40:58.440 would have looked like if the US had been able to unleash full air power 429 00:40:59.119 --> 00:41:06.360 just like he did. Nixon unleashed it within thirty six hours in North Vietnamese 430 00:41:06.559 --> 00:41:12.320 came to the peace table talking about Operation Linebacker. That's right. How frustrating 431 00:41:12.440 --> 00:41:16.480 is that sixty years later, fifty years later, Well, it's a frustration 432 00:41:16.719 --> 00:41:20.960 will never leave me. I'll take it to my dying day. Well, 433 00:41:21.039 --> 00:41:24.199 after that tour in Vietnam, you were assigned to Nellis Air Force Base and 434 00:41:24.280 --> 00:41:30.719 the Tactical Fighter Weapons School, which is the air force version of top Gun, 435 00:41:30.840 --> 00:41:32.880 of course, and I think you guys actually had one first I should 436 00:41:32.920 --> 00:41:37.199 point out. But tell me about your assignment there. Oh, I had 437 00:41:37.239 --> 00:41:42.119 a great job there. We were I had trouble responsibilities. One of them 438 00:41:42.320 --> 00:41:52.199 was monitoring the war in Vietnam and reporting the tactics and introducing any new weapons 439 00:41:52.280 --> 00:42:00.039 that E CUISUS and that sort of thing. End of the Vietnam War, 440 00:42:00.880 --> 00:42:05.880 and these pilots would rotate back and fortunate and come back, and we'd brief 441 00:42:06.000 --> 00:42:12.599 the Pentagon so that they could take action on problems much sooner. And then 442 00:42:13.559 --> 00:42:19.960 during the development of the F fifteen and F sixteen, which were great fighters. 443 00:42:20.800 --> 00:42:29.079 I provided young pilots to attend the meetings and give suggestions on bucket configuration 444 00:42:29.320 --> 00:42:35.119 and other things. And we also provided maintenance people to the engineers so that 445 00:42:35.440 --> 00:42:38.800 they could design that the airplane, or when they were designing the airplane, 446 00:42:38.840 --> 00:42:44.280 they would try to make it a little bit easier to maintain, and they're 447 00:42:44.360 --> 00:42:51.480 much easier to fly and control all the various functions without looking around the cocktail. 448 00:42:52.400 --> 00:42:57.880 Now, given all the jet testing that you did, including the F 449 00:42:58.000 --> 00:43:01.119 fifteen and sixteen, like you just said, what are you looking for in 450 00:43:01.280 --> 00:43:05.599 terms of determining, yes, this system is exactly how it should be, 451 00:43:06.280 --> 00:43:09.280 this one needs tweaking, and this one needs a lot of work. How 452 00:43:09.280 --> 00:43:14.599 do you evaluate what the plane needs to improve? The first thing you want 453 00:43:14.639 --> 00:43:17.920 to do is locate the switches so you don't have two or three different places 454 00:43:19.000 --> 00:43:25.599 in the cockpit walk and reach for while you're getting ready to fire your guns, 455 00:43:25.920 --> 00:43:30.360 missiles or whatever. Develop the heads up display so you could get all 456 00:43:30.480 --> 00:43:37.840 this display without looking into the cockpit, or you could do it automatically and 457 00:43:37.960 --> 00:43:42.440 never have to take your eyes off the target or whatever you were shooting at. 458 00:43:43.159 --> 00:43:46.800 And in terms of developing tactics that our fighter pilots could take back to 459 00:43:47.719 --> 00:43:52.760 Vietnam. How did that process work? How did you learn about what the 460 00:43:52.920 --> 00:43:58.119 enemy was doing and then figure out ways to counter them. We reported on 461 00:43:58.599 --> 00:44:04.800 how the were reacting, that our guys were reacting to their change in tactics. 462 00:44:05.400 --> 00:44:09.599 Bill it could train included in their training programs back in the States for 463 00:44:10.360 --> 00:44:16.280 the replacement pilots we were sending overseas. Also, while I was there, 464 00:44:16.360 --> 00:44:24.599 I started producing a tactical Analysis bulletin. Well, we included all these problems 465 00:44:24.679 --> 00:44:30.360 we were finding and the changes in tactics that we were observing in Vietnam and 466 00:44:30.519 --> 00:44:36.719 that sort of thing, and made wide distribution on that, and it was 467 00:44:36.880 --> 00:44:42.480 well received at the Pentagon. They really liked that, And I think I 468 00:44:42.599 --> 00:44:47.079 got my boss at a promotion to major general because of that. He knew 469 00:44:47.119 --> 00:44:52.800 that and he appreciated it very much. Now, your final deployment to Vietnam 470 00:44:52.920 --> 00:45:00.400 was in nineteen seventy four as the deputy Defense at in Saigon, And so 471 00:45:00.559 --> 00:45:04.079 that's a year after the Paris Peace Deal and a year before the fall of 472 00:45:04.159 --> 00:45:08.440 Saigon. What was happening in Saigon at the time you arrived there. All 473 00:45:08.519 --> 00:45:15.679 the military moved out a year earlier. They really evacuated. Back then, 474 00:45:15.880 --> 00:45:22.199 they left all kinds of equipment. I'm not sure we knew exactly what they 475 00:45:22.320 --> 00:45:25.119 had and where it was, and I know in the Air Force we didn't. 476 00:45:25.599 --> 00:45:30.119 I requested when I got there someone to come around and evaluate. The 477 00:45:30.440 --> 00:45:37.000 experts come in and evaluate. And we had given the veg and Age well 478 00:45:37.079 --> 00:45:43.239 over two thousand aircraft, various types. We had no idea how many they 479 00:45:43.320 --> 00:45:46.119 had left or what had happened to him. When we started looking into it, 480 00:45:46.239 --> 00:45:52.920 they'd lost a lot of aircraft and never reported that. The maintenance on 481 00:45:52.039 --> 00:45:55.480 it was. They were never able to maintain their own aircraft. We had 482 00:45:55.519 --> 00:46:01.920 to provide contractors for expensive characters. The Armied had to do the same thing 483 00:46:02.559 --> 00:46:07.800 on theirs. It was just a mess. That's the reason we ended up 484 00:46:07.840 --> 00:46:14.400 there with five hundred thousand Americans because of viet Andes. Tough Vittanese were not 485 00:46:14.559 --> 00:46:17.400 doing the job. They were never capable of it. They didn't have the 486 00:46:17.559 --> 00:46:23.280 desire that the North vit and He's had. We weren't all that well received, 487 00:46:23.400 --> 00:46:30.679 whether they really looked on us as another colonial power. The French had 488 00:46:30.159 --> 00:46:36.519 pretty well go on obviously, and they liked our money. A lot of 489 00:46:36.599 --> 00:46:40.559 them got rich off of the black market. It was just a big mess, 490 00:46:42.519 --> 00:46:46.559 you know. Ho Chi Minh that wanted to align himself with the Americans, 491 00:46:46.840 --> 00:46:52.159 but we and then he did help us, and we did cooperate with 492 00:46:52.280 --> 00:46:58.760 him. But in the final run, we lined up with the French, 493 00:46:58.960 --> 00:47:04.559 and that's how we ended up in Vietnam trying to do something for them that 494 00:47:04.719 --> 00:47:08.119 they couldn't or wouldn't do for themselves. How long did you stay in Saigon? 495 00:47:08.239 --> 00:47:12.519 Were you still there when it fell? No, I got fired. 496 00:47:13.360 --> 00:47:20.039 One of my responsibilities was the evacuation in case that came to play. Of 497 00:47:20.119 --> 00:47:23.760 course, I read that plan and the thing that really caught my eye right 498 00:47:23.880 --> 00:47:30.280 off was that in case we have an evacuation, the Vietnamese military would provide 499 00:47:30.400 --> 00:47:38.679 security for the evacuation. And I couldn't imagine why we would evacuated the South. 500 00:47:38.800 --> 00:47:44.440 Vietnamese still had control of the country, and there were many other flaws 501 00:47:44.519 --> 00:47:50.320 in the program, but the ambassador wouldn't let anyone changed the program. Well, 502 00:47:50.320 --> 00:47:54.440 anyway, I when the thing started falling apart and was obvious what was 503 00:47:54.519 --> 00:48:00.840 going to happen. We had ten thousand in America weekends over there, but 504 00:48:00.840 --> 00:48:04.320 we didn't know where the hell they were. It was scattered all over the 505 00:48:04.440 --> 00:48:08.239 country, and there was no way to develop an evacuation plan. If you 506 00:48:08.280 --> 00:48:12.960 didn't know where you're you're going to have to evacuate the people from. So 507 00:48:13.079 --> 00:48:15.679 I tried to do something about that, and then the ambassador would let us 508 00:48:16.280 --> 00:48:22.840 look into that. So things started going down the tubes. Some of us 509 00:48:22.920 --> 00:48:29.760 started moving people out had helped us, and we're in sensitive jobs and would 510 00:48:30.119 --> 00:48:37.639 obviously be maltreated by the North as probably killed some ammanded up in the Philippines, 511 00:48:37.719 --> 00:48:43.280 and the Philippines got the word of the ambassador over there, complained and 512 00:48:43.400 --> 00:48:51.679 it got back eventually, and that created and then a problem. Then when 513 00:48:52.440 --> 00:48:58.360 later on it was obvious that we needed to uh, everyone was pushing to 514 00:48:59.360 --> 00:49:04.119 to do something about the evacuation, even back in the Pentagon and the State 515 00:49:04.239 --> 00:49:09.079 Department. The ambassador was still in denial. So during this period, the 516 00:49:09.199 --> 00:49:17.000 Marine sent a Colonel Gray down who to look at the situation, and he 517 00:49:17.079 --> 00:49:22.159 and I worked together on it, and he agreed that everything we were trying 518 00:49:22.199 --> 00:49:28.079 to do should be done. And of course he had other ideas additional way 519 00:49:28.119 --> 00:49:32.039 to do this and what it would take. Being an expert in that trio 520 00:49:32.159 --> 00:49:40.519 and for evacuation, We've worked up a message and send out. The Ambassador 521 00:49:40.639 --> 00:49:49.840 had people assigned from the State Department that would monitor every major agency over there, 522 00:49:49.920 --> 00:49:55.480 including our military and our aid people in the CIA and everyone else. 523 00:49:57.400 --> 00:50:05.760 And I asked Colonel Gray to make sure that this person worked in the in 524 00:50:06.000 --> 00:50:12.920 the defense area of their coordinate on this message, because he would decide which 525 00:50:13.039 --> 00:50:17.519 messages the ambassador would have to see and would you have to prove. Evidently 526 00:50:17.639 --> 00:50:23.599 he chose not to send this to the ambassador because they felt the same way 527 00:50:23.639 --> 00:50:29.400 as we did, I guess. But when the Ambassador learned about the message 528 00:50:29.719 --> 00:50:34.239 went out, the thing that we should have a security for the Marine Security 529 00:50:34.280 --> 00:50:39.679 Force come in right away. He asked me to call the Secretary of Defense 530 00:50:39.760 --> 00:50:44.119 and told him he wanted to give it to me until I was ordered to 531 00:50:44.320 --> 00:50:47.719 leave. I think that was around the twelfth of the thirteenth of April, 532 00:50:47.840 --> 00:50:52.199 which was a couple of three weeks before they went down. Now, at 533 00:50:52.199 --> 00:50:55.440 the end of April, of course, is the official withdrawal. What are 534 00:50:55.480 --> 00:51:00.280 you most proud of from your many years of service to our country? Oh, 535 00:51:00.360 --> 00:51:04.400 I don't know. I keep thinking about some of the things I could 536 00:51:04.440 --> 00:51:10.599 have done or could have done. I love my country and I love the 537 00:51:10.679 --> 00:51:16.159 Air Force, but I don't like what I'm hearing about the military now. 538 00:51:17.159 --> 00:51:24.519 I just saw this morning that we're now has a strength comparative strength that we 539 00:51:24.679 --> 00:51:30.440 had right after the arm of Face in World War Two when we were just 540 00:51:31.639 --> 00:51:38.000 let everyone go and we had nothing. I'm really concerned about our military general, 541 00:51:38.360 --> 00:51:40.679 and that'll have to be the last word. Thank you, sir very 542 00:51:40.760 --> 00:51:44.920 much for your time today, and thank you so much for your service to 543 00:51:44.960 --> 00:51:47.360 our country. We truly appreciate it. Well. Thank you, retired to 544 00:51:47.440 --> 00:51:52.320 US Air Force Brigadier General Richard Bond as a veteran of both World War Two 545 00:51:52.519 --> 00:52:07.039 and Vietnam. I'm Greg Corumbus and this is Veterans Chronicles. Hi. This 546 00:52:07.199 --> 00:52:10.760 is Greg Corumbus, and thanks for listening to Veterans Chronicles, a presentation of 547 00:52:10.840 --> 00:52:17.119 the American Veterans Center. For more information, please visit American Veteranscenter dot org. 548 00:52:17.719 --> 00:52:22.599 You can also follow the American Veterans Center on Facebook and on Twitter. 549 00:52:22.840 --> 00:52:29.000 We're at AVC update. Subscribe to the American Veterans Center YouTube channel for full 550 00:52:29.159 --> 00:52:34.480 oral histories and special features, and of course please subscribe to the Veterans Chronicles 551 00:52:34.519 --> 00:52:38.679 podcast wherever you get your podcasts. Thanks again for listening, and please join 552 00:52:38.800 --> 00:52:40.880 us next time for Veterans Chronicles