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So it's approached to try and identify
fakes, which is what a lot of

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other companies do. And then you
can't identify gray market because that batch will

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come in stolen, but it'll identified
as real because they are real, or

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something that's expired will be identified as
real even though it's expired. You're listening

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00:00:17,320 --> 00:00:23,079
to Carrie Lets's Financial Survival Network where
you get valuable information you just can't find

6
00:00:23,120 --> 00:00:29,199
anywhere else to thrive in today's trying
times. You need the Financial Survival Network

7
00:00:29,519 --> 00:00:34,399
now more than ever. Go to
Financial Survival Network dot com and get your

8
00:00:34,520 --> 00:00:44,560
free newsletter and gift. Financial Survival
Network now more than ever. Welcome.

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00:00:45,000 --> 00:00:49,240
You aren't listening to watching the Financial
Survival Network. I'm your host, Carrie

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Lets. Well, we've got a
new technology that I personally find fascinating.

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I'd love to tell you the ticker
symbol and where to buy it, but

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you can't now because it's private.
But it's definitely a company that you need

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to keep track of, keep watching
for. And the CEO is with us,

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Roy Ganzariski. The name of the
company is Alphaeum and right, great

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to have you on. So if
I have it right, you've got a

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basic process that enables authentication verification of
items without putting on a without it putting

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an etching a serial number, anything
else. It can be uploaded to the

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blockchain as well. Why did you
elaborate on that for me and explain why

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it's so important and why the potentials
there for investors? Hi, Kerry,

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Yeah, you're absolutely writing. Thanks
for having me on ALKI on basically fingerprints

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items. If you think and you
ever watched CSI or any one of those

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cool spy movies or police movies where
they find a fingerprint of someone and they

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want to identify it is, they'll
compare it to the database and find the

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bad guy, if you will,
by comparing fingerprints, so they don't need

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a driver's license, a passport,
a badge. The fingerprint is all you

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need to identify irrefutably that person.
We have done the same thing for items.

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What we found is that every item
has inherently a type of fingerprint.

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We call it a feature print that
we have developed a way to identify and

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codify. With just a camera,
industrial camera, iPhone, a regular standard

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off the shelf camera, we can
take a picture of an item. Our

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software, our AI algorithms will then
identify on that specific item. It's unique

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fingerprint codified into what we call a
feature print, and store it. And

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then one day you, your customer, your supplier, whoever it is,

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can take another picture of that item
and will create again that feature print,

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compare the two and be able to
tell you is that in fact or what

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is that in fact specific item.
So if you think of the proverberal can

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of coke or black cat, we
won't just tell you that's a can of

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coke or a black cat like many
software systems will do. We will tell

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you that is can of coke number
one seven seven dashed three that came off

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of that machine on this date,
and this is your black cat. So

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unique identification per item, no need
to add anything to it, like you

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said, no barcodes, no stickers, no tags, nothing, just a

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picture. Hey, maybe my dry
cleaner could use that because I'm keep it

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track of stuff, right, So
we actually do things like collectible jerseys and

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stuff like that as well, because
yeah, they may be misplaced, right,

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And so therefore if a dry cleaner
use the process for every I mean,

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I guess it'd be hard if there's
a wrinkle or something in the shirt.

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But maybe it can figure all that
out or were the way the labels

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are fixed. It's amazing how many
unique identifier identifiers there are, whether it's

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your retina, your ear, your
face, like Apple matches your face yep.

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So so you could take a picture
of my face and basically say this

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is so and so, and then
they could search it in any database,

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whether it's TSA or wherever, going
into a government building. So we don't

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do people. We only do items. And the key there is, if

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you think of it, all the
counterfeits and the gray market stuff that goes

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on. Now I'm not talking about
the Louis Beaton bag that you buy on

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the corner of Canal Street, right, those are counterfeits. The person selling

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them tells you it's fake. You
buy them for fifty bucks. You know

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their faith and Louis Betan doesn't think
they lost a customer, right. I

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mean, it's still bad for the
brand, it's bad financially, it's illegal,

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But we're talking more of when you
go and buy a five thousand dollars

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Louis Beaton bag thinking it's real.
The persons selling you think it's real,

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but it actually isn't because somewhere in
the supply chain, there were swapped.

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We're talking about brake pads for cars
that are fake medicine that is expired,

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taken off the shelf by some bad
guy, changed the date and now selling

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it as if it's not expired.
We're talking like really bad actors doing bad

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things, and we'd eliminate all of
that by taking a picture. So this

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could be a very anti Chinese piece
of technology, because let's face it,

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we all know that the majority of
counterfeits emanate from China. Maybe I won't

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get a visit to go. Yeah, it'll be enemy number one. Yeah,

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that's right. I see if you
try to go, I see a

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re education camp in your future.
Well that's it's kind of exciting. So

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you've you just went through your a
round. You've been around since twenty seventeen.

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You told me pre call and BMW
is the lead investor. That's right,

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right, So what was it to
BMW saw in this technology that made

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him pony up substantial funds? I
mean, if you think of how both

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supply chain manufacturing, what's called manufacturing
four point zero, and of course counterfeit

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gray market items work, they'll impact
the automotive industry automotive parts as they go

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through the supply chain can't always be
marked. If they can, it's usually

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with stickers or things like that that
fall off can be scratched, and then

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the part is subtly unused. And
you can imagine that automobile makers as well

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as others like transportation, DoD luxury
goods want to know what parts they have

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and that they're the right parts that
they're being that they're installing. And on

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the flip side of that, the
counterfeit gray market side. The automobile industry

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is a forty five billion dollars a
year counterfeit industry, meaning brake pads,

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air bags, seat belts, and
then of course wheels. Other things are

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counterfeited on a regular basis and brought
in here to the United States. I'm

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not talking about, you know,
fakes in Africa, in Eastern Europe.

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We're talking here in the US.
Even tremendous amounts of counterfeit parts for cars.

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So that's why someone like BMW is
interested in technology like ours that basically

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eliminates that and becomes the last technology
you ever need, because there's not about

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we have the next cool sticker,
the next hologram, the next additive.

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This is really about not needing anything
but a picture of the item itself.

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Or what if you try to like
alter a part or something like that,

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is it going to come up as
a counterfeit then no, Actually, the

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technology is very robust. That's why
it took us about five years to really

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develop into a point where we have
no false positives in production, meaning I

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will never tell you that a fake
part is real by mistake. I will

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never tell you that Part A is
actually part B by mistake. No false

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positives. And so to do that, we've gotten to a point that you

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can scratch up the item will still
identify it. We can take a flat

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piece of sheet metal then turn it
into a part for up a car or

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playing something else and still identify after
ex gone through the stamping machine. And

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so this system is fairly robust to
change wearing, tear, etc. So

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counterfeit parts in the aviation into tree
a big, big problemtually, Like counterfeit

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fasteners, Yeah, that's right,
a million to them. How long would

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they take it to scan a million
airplane fasteners? And not while at all?

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I mean you think of it.
The easiest way to do it is

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within the production line, so where
these fasteners are made, instead of trying

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to do something special at the end
of that production line or before shipping,

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wherever that fastener is that you know
is the original fastener, you take an

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image of it. It could be
fully automated if you have an industrial camera

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sitting on top of the production line. As the fasteners go by, you

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take a picture of every single one
of them. Then when the manufacturer gets

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those fasteners, either in receiving or
literally as a technician is about to install

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them, they could take a picture
of them with their phone. It'll tell

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them, yeah, this is in
fact an authentic fastener. It'll even tell

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them this is fastener number one,
two, five dash eight that came from

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00:08:54,000 --> 00:08:56,840
this supplier and arrived on this date
into your bloating dock. If they can

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go down to that detail. And
so if somebody hijacked a load of fasteners

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and then they go to sell them
and the manufacturer basically or the distributor reported

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this batch stolen, right, then
you'd instantly know they were stolen right exactly.

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So that's the beauty of what we
do so as approached to try and

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identify fakes, which is what a
lot of other companies do, and then

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you can't identify gray market because that
batch will come in stolen, but it

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will identified as real because they are
real, or something that's expired will be

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identified as real even though it's expired, because we focus on identifying the original

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with all the associated data. We
will tell you, yeah, that's a

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real faster but by the way,
it was supposed to be delivered to this

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company, not to you, or
it was just reported stolen, or it's

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expired. And let's say it's medicine. So we can actually not only tell

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you if it's fake or not,
but tell you if it's gray market,

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tell you if it's about to be
used incorrectly. Maybe it's a real fastener

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that you have legally, you're about
to install it on the wrong body aircraft

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and you did it by mistake because
they're so similar. So we can even

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avoid human error based on misidentification.
Well, that's really amazing. How did

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you conceive it this? How'd you
come up with the idea of right?

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So our two founders are two mathematician
founders are geniuses and very experienced when it

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comes to optical AI or machine vision. If you've ever seen kind of movies

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of the mail room and thousands of
letters go through this conveyor belt, and

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something's reading these envelopes and packages and
sorting it through the country. These guys

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did that in nineteen ninety four,
and so they know how to take pictures

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of things, apply to really advanced
mathematics to it to solving problem. It

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was mail before, and then they
spun out or sold that company and created

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00:10:45,919 --> 00:10:50,879
a Litheon which basically does very similar
thing, but in a complete different sense.

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It takes a picture of something,
applies really advanced mathematics to it to

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00:10:54,840 --> 00:10:58,279
solve a big problem. In this
case counterfeits gray market traceability, so they

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could do this or money too,
right, and then you could track money,

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00:11:01,679 --> 00:11:07,759
so we do it money, point
baseball cards, shoes, art,

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00:11:07,799 --> 00:11:11,360
and then of course breakpads, medicine, so he could be the full gamut

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00:11:11,360 --> 00:11:15,519
of any physical item. What do
you think the most useful application, most

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important application of this technology is going
to be roy I think it's going to

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be medicine, car plane parts,
things that basically the consequence I'm getting it

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00:11:24,519 --> 00:11:30,240
wrong, our lives right there.
Today, for example, uld have been

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00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:37,519
caught HIV pills, fake condoms,
fake all sorts of vaccine, fake breakpads.

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00:11:37,559 --> 00:11:41,799
We talked about fate. When you
get those wrong, or when those

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00:11:41,840 --> 00:11:46,120
fakes go in your car, in
your body and they're wrong, you can

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00:11:46,200 --> 00:11:48,679
die. And so to me,
that's the most important mission we're on is

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00:11:48,720 --> 00:11:54,240
solving those interesting, very very interesting, and I see the applications are many

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fault and literally industries all over,
especially Rolex watches, things like that you

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00:12:01,919 --> 00:12:07,039
can authenticate I guess you can authenticate
the Rolex, but then they could replace

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00:12:07,080 --> 00:12:11,080
the insides of it. So actually
interesting lean up when we deal with a

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00:12:11,240 --> 00:12:16,080
luxury goods and watch items exactly like
that. They identified the watch in four

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00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:20,279
places, so well they'll take images
of outside, front and back and the

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inner movement and so no, you
can't even replace the chain and try to

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00:12:24,799 --> 00:12:28,840
trick the system. The system will
actually say, for example, the watch

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00:12:28,960 --> 00:12:31,879
is real, but the movement inside
is not. Or the watch and movement

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00:12:31,879 --> 00:12:35,480
are real, but someone's replaced your
bracelet. We can catch all of that

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00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:41,519
again with photo. It's amazing,
it's pretty cool stuff. Vacations. Yeah,

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00:12:41,600 --> 00:12:45,360
this is going to be a global
standard. I assume you've got substantial

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00:12:46,200 --> 00:12:50,360
intellectual property associated with this too.
We do. We have literally tens of

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00:12:50,480 --> 00:12:56,200
patents. Over forty five patents already
approved around the technology. And so while

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00:12:56,240 --> 00:13:00,120
there may be a lot of copycats
out there of our tech, are the

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00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:03,440
patterns around our technology or substantial?
All Right, So give us an idea

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00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:07,679
when you expect this company might go
public. I hope we can talk about

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00:13:07,720 --> 00:13:09,399
that in the next twenty four months. That's the kind of the goal is

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00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:13,519
to grow rapidly. But first of
all, the focus is solve the problems.

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00:13:13,759 --> 00:13:16,960
Then IPO etc. Will come later, right, Yeah, and you've

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got revenue now right? Yeah?
We do. Yeah. We have customers

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00:13:20,279 --> 00:13:26,159
in both Europe and here in North
America in five distinct segments that we work

181
00:13:26,159 --> 00:13:30,840
in. Luxury goods collectibles, arts
is one. Transportation, so car parks,

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00:13:30,879 --> 00:13:35,120
playing parts is the second, DoD
or DoD related suppliers is the third,

183
00:13:35,519 --> 00:13:39,840
Pharma and medicine or medical is the
fourth, and then precious metals,

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gold, silver, et cetera is
the fifth. It's really cool. Hey,

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00:13:43,080 --> 00:13:48,039
well it sounds pretty amazing. I
hope you'll come back on when you're

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00:13:48,039 --> 00:13:52,240
ready to do your IPO. Because
you're privately held, I can't ask you

187
00:13:52,279 --> 00:13:58,080
a lot of questions stand but BMW
is a lead investor can you tell us

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00:13:58,080 --> 00:14:03,759
whether they're using technology yet? I
can't tell you, but they are lead

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00:14:03,759 --> 00:14:07,200
investment. Okay, well we'll leave
it at that. Hey, people want

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00:14:07,240 --> 00:14:11,600
to find out more about you,
Roy the company. Where do you go?

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00:14:11,000 --> 00:14:15,720
How do we connect with you?
You can go on our website www.

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00:14:15,840 --> 00:14:20,120
Dot elethion dot com. You can
also follow us on LinkedIn, or

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00:14:20,200 --> 00:14:22,600
just send us an email at info
at eltheon dot com and we'll be happy

194
00:14:22,639 --> 00:14:26,559
to answer a weegain. Great,
great, Well, we really appreciate you

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00:14:26,639 --> 00:14:31,240
coming on the show. We'll have
a link to Elthion dot com in the

196
00:14:31,240 --> 00:14:35,440
show notes to this interview on Financial
Survival Network dot com. Make sure when

197
00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:39,120
you're at the site you go sign
up for your free newsletter. Roy.

198
00:14:39,519 --> 00:14:43,320
Great luck on This sounds really exciting
and we'll look forward to the next interview.

199
00:14:43,559 --> 00:14:46,759
Thank you, Carrie, I appreciate
it. Thanks for listening to Carrie

200
00:14:46,840 --> 00:14:54,000
Lets's Financial Survival Network, your solution
to today's trying times. For the latest,

201
00:14:54,080 --> 00:15:00,720
go to Financial Survival Network dot com. Financial Survival Network now or than ever,