In your ears, in your eyes boundless communication. Eighty- nine seven welcome
to this special edition of Neura. On a very special date, on the
forty- second anniversary of the Malvinas era, it seemed appropriate in Neura to
give a place to the people who were and lived in their own flesh,
which was the Malvinas conflict, which was the personal heroes of Malvinas, a
conflict that lasted seventy- four days, a conflict that left six hundred and
forty- nine Argentines dead. The compatriots are also one hundred and forty-
one years of British occupation of the Falkland Islands, and we thought it appropriate
to give them the place in this environment to tell their stories, We are
together with Brigadier Ernesto Rubén Ureta, who was a pilot during the Falklands War,
and also along with the comodero GuillermoÁngel Martínez, who was also a
pilot during the marine conflict. So welcome both of you to Neura and it
' s an honor to have you here. Thank you very much, Nicholas,
good night. Very grateful for this invitation that we have received so that
we can share not only with you, Nicholas, but with what Malvina was,
how we live it and, at the same time, pay a well
- deserved tribute to all those who also fought the same with us, but
well they could have the fate of losing their lives in combat, which is,
as I always say, for a soldier of the best way to win.
The sky is true. Therefore, this one in this, in these
talks that we do, we always repeat and honor without ceasing those memories of
our comrades who fell fighting, not only the six hundred and forty- nine
men who lost their lives during the war of all forces, but in particular
the fifty- five men of the air force who lost their lives in combat
and particularly the eight men of the squadron to four c to whom we belonged
and there we were doing our duty. Okay. I believe the Brigadier is
thought of the best words. I would add and, in addition to thanking
you for the invitation, the importance that every year a new one must be
commemorated, a new anniversary of the pregnancy of Malvins, because, just as
we were speaking previously you were very young or you were not born. I
think that for those of us who participate and are already great, at least
my personal opinion, the most important thing we can do is to convey our
experience and that the new generations learn that it is Malvina, that it was
Malvina I, in my childhood, my teachers taught us that there were some
islands that were called Malvinas and that they were ours, but they were played
by the English good, the generations, the new generations, they have to
learn that the islands, if they are ours, is part of our territory,
that there was a conflict, as Adier said, that there were many
people who offered the most expensive that we can have in our life and that
it is a goal that we cannot give up generation after generation, as we
come through this life. We must continue to insist that we be returned in
the territory that belongs to us, for peaceful life, for diplomatic life,
for the lives of negotiation, wherever it may be. But you have to
make a goal that we can' t give up. I want to tell
all the listeners we were talking a little bit earlier here with Ernesto and Guillermo
and the very nice truth in having come this presentation they make. One gets
a little chicken skin and they' re also going to be telling us a
little bit about their anecdotes that lived before the conflict, previously, when they
met that I' m interested in knowing if they already had family, who
was waiting for them at home. What happened during the conflict and what happened
after the conflict? How you lived it. I think it' s a
very valuable space for them to count. I thank you for knowing the word.
That' s good. I got to Brey and yesterday I knew him
from before, because he was stationed in the Fifth Brigade when I was doing
the combat pilot course. And what I' m going to say is not
an obsequence, but let' s say it was a guy I wanted to
look like was a guy who with character, with demand and good already what
we were talking about. I don' t want to mention it, but
he told you something about an attitude, an action that he did on the
30th of May and that for me is admirable, just as he did Joseph
Vázquez, true, this good one. I am born in the province of
Santa Fe, in Cañada de Gómez. I don' t have any military
relatives. How does it get to the air force? How I came by
force. I always liked to read a lot and my father, who was
a trade clerk, didn' t have any money left. We weren'
t a rich family. But only having finished the primary did I know that
progress was going through the educational issue. Then I bought books. None of
the books he bought me were about World War II, and well he devoured
me and I wanted to do like the pilots of the raft or the German
force. And that' s how I was being secondary. This one you
remembered the whole time I wasn' t in what I did. They were
crazy, but I had no idea. He gave our ways. Many times
there are circumstances that may not be difficult to understand. But then, when
time goes by, you can analyze it. It happened that at the school
where I was doing high school, I had a partner whose brother had done
the same school as us, but had entered two years earlier and had entered
the injury school. So my partner' s name was Romulo Guerrini and this
gentleman' s name is Luis Guerrini. Then Luis was the path that led
me into the school of beaming. Well, four years passed the aviation school.
It' s four years. They do in Cordoba. It' s
done in Cordoba. He' s on his way to Carlos Paz. It
' s the last facility and it' s four years of cadets. My
promotion started flying in the third year, but if not before it was four
pure years of infantry cadet. Let' s say nothing to do with plane
and then that if the course of military dor ok, ernesto you also previously
had that step. Yeah, sure, yeah. I joined aviation school in
the' 70s. I graduated four years later, in seventy- three,
already with four years of cadet, and in seventy- four I took the
course of military aviator, which is what you are already given the insignia of
military aviator brief. And after that, everyone who did the courses, some
chose to go to transport aviation, another helicopter aviation and others. In my
case, it was chosen and apart from choosing good, more or less,
I gave up the conditions to go to home school to qualify me as a
combat pilot, home pilot, why hunt them and not another. Because why
he hunts them down, why you chose the houses now and not the trap
transport anymore. The flight is free that the planes where we were flying only
the pilot is called mono planes put on a single pilot suddenly the activity.
The different wholesalers that are made at home school, let' s say,
caught me more, that' s not true. That' s why,
perhaps because you want to be more gripped, although what transport aviation is and
the helicopter version. In the Falklands conflict, they demonstrated all the claws they
had, and so they did many missions as important as the one we were
doing. But anyway, back then, at twenty- three years old,
I chose to take the home pilot course that is done at the Fourth Air
Brigade in Mendoza Ok and that in which year you finished the school. Seventy
- three years ago, I graduated as an Air Force officer. Seventy-
four years later, I graduated as a military aviator and in seventy- five
years as a home pilot. Then the time comes for the conflict. You
had several hours and you were hunting well. Yes, yes, yes,
because after doing the home school, this one was assigned to the Fifth Air
Brigade, where the planes were at four bs ky Ho not true and there
I did for a year all the qualification to be cap pilot three suitable for
combat, as is the designation that we have after surrendering all the conditions for
a year flying in the four B. And after five years, plus six
years I was flying, I was flying the four B until the end of
the eighty- one, when there was a change of destination, as we
all have, and I was destined to the Fourth Air Brigade and within the
Fourth BRIGADERA to fly the plane to four C. Two thousand and four Cs.
It was the plane. It' s the same, it' s
the same plane that was four Bs, with some newer things technologically, a
little bit more advanced and at the time of the conflict you were handling that
B. I was talking because just the end of the eighty- one I
left the Fifth Brigade. I stopped flying to four Bs. In January,
the first day of February, I started flying to four six in March.
Well, this one hit me at the start of the conflict, flying four
Cs to four Cs. And you, William of the Four C. When
you started getting in touch. Well, I finished the aviator course at aviation
school in March of the eighties. I left in December of the seventy-
nine east and there we immediately went. I was assigned to the fourth brigade
to do the combat plot course. We arrived and after three days we started
the course. I finished it in December of the eighties and let' s
say after the end of the course, I was selected to stay in the
fourth brigade to fly to four Cs. This one starts the course. I
believe that in March April there was a slight delay to start the course,
because the squadrons of combat deployed every month to the Gallego River. So I
think either by February or March, the four- seal squadron. He had
to spend a month in the Gallego River, and that' s why he
was late. I started flying on May 8, 1980, and I finished
the course in December 1980. And all this in you guys still didn'
t know each other at the time. I didn' t know him on
my flight only four that he was in Reyno and well it was actually not
good. We all know each other. We always exchange activities or meetings,
war exercises, it' s not true, all exercises and we' re
always in touch. We have not known since, but we started working together
that year eighty- two senses in February when I arrived at the Fourth Brega
or February eighty- two and within a few months this conflict broke out.
You, from within the forces, saw it as imminent or not at all.
I spent fifteen days in Rio Gallegos from March 15th to March 30th.
Gallegos River. Then it was a unit of the area force that had no
planes, but that, given its position after the problem we had with Chile,
every month deployed a squadron of fighter planes. I got four on the
squadron. Sele played from 15 March to 15 April and we split for 15
days each. I was there on the 15th of March to the 30th of
March and returned to Mendoza on the 30th and did the normal training activity,
but I never suspected that two days later they were going to recover Malvina Island.
What' s more, I was single. He lived at the casino.
I had shared my room with a partner of mine the previous year who
had an accident and died, and then a new officer came to the unit
that year. I' ve known him for two years. He had been
a cadet, his alternate friend, let' s say at the beam school.
Then he comes and tells me I had a room with private bathroom of
some comforts or everyone who made single who is in the air force at that
time. At that time, then you tell me you have some problem that
I am going to live with you I say no, but it really worked
out very well because I felt very lonely in the room to remember the one
next to me was my partner who was no longer there. There was a
moment that affected me, but this guy had the habit, that he programmed
his radio equipment to ring with the alarm clock and hooked up a station that
was starting to pass news. And on April 2 I woke up with the
march of Malvinas and I say what happens Rubén, not on the radio and
good, and that we have recovered in the Malvinas Islands another sea. Well,
there, well, I got up, introduced myself to the squadron,
arrived errestus and the officers who were married living in the city and well,
it was a terrible mess. Not you. You heard about it on the
radio, too. Arrest. Yeah, yeah, yeah, already that year
I was living in the city of Mendoza I was and I' m married
to Elvira. I had two boys and one on the way. And like
every morning, every day of work, I was a Friday, it was
April, it was Friday except for seven and a half or so of home
for the start time of activities in the brigade. It was 8: 00
in the morning. I grab it, I prepare to march to the author
radio that I and going out to the city, going to the brigade,
that is a little far from the city, where the airport of Mendoza is.
There he began to listen, they recovered to the islands, the alarm
went on. Sure, then well, for half an hour' s journey
until we got to the Unit listening to everything and we started to meet with
them who were there, the other officers older than I the squadron chief,
and well, they started falling orders, directives of instructions, that that that
was received by the boss of the painting and that was where it came to
us. I was supposed to give first lieutenant at the time and just listen
and take orders and prepare and chat and well, it changed the work environment
a lot. It changed the working environment a lot at that time to start
working and to make plans, notes and thoughts already for real case. While
I left home and when, because that was April 2, we just April
11, the squadron deployed. He went begging to Puerto San Julián. There
' s the San Julián military air base. It was created in the city
of Puerto San Julián in Santa Cruz for this time the other half of the
squadron were in Río Gallego, true and also understanding the same. But we,
in those days of two to eleven April, when the deployment was already
ordered, were just telling my Lady Este what happened. Of course, worried
about Mrs No problem, nothing' s going to happen. We have to
go because we have to say respond and sustain the recovery of the islands that
Argentina had already made and of course in England it was not going to cross.
But neither can we leave them alone there those who recovered the islands.
So I tell you the problem is all right and we' re gone.
I left this one all to all the boys. I know I' m
desperate today You had kids at the time, too. Claro was two two
of five years old, Franco and Laura, and there was one on the
way that was born on July nine of the eighty- two, named Sandra.
We put Sandra Soledad on him. Now that you' re reflecting,
but it wasn' t so little related to Malvina. Sandra Soledad Llama was
born on July 9, which was about twenty days after I returned from San
Julián and well, there my lady stayed, of course, worried. One
of a sudden when that good came up we go and as a home pilot,
we are pilots of the armed force, one says come on we have
to recover the islands are ours. We have no doubt. People had already
landed there, we had already had a dead man there in the acronym that
Chinese, this Caramba, this one we' re going to mobilize. We
have to be clear and we' re kind of excited. Actually, our
time came for that. We enter an armed force, in particular us,
the air force. So, man, there' s mine. This is
it. We' re good, we were good, I was good at
all times I felt prepared at that time. Yeah. Yeah, yeah,
yeah, yeah, we had really good training. This not only me,
who already had on the other plane very similar to eight hundred hours, but
all the instruction that we were giving to comrades der there in Reynolds, in
the Fifth Brigade, I was giving him this instruction, being chief of squadron,
officer instructor. Then we saw him well prepared and they, even at
one year, had no more than that course of qualification to be pilot of
combat forgiveness pilot stage three on the plane to four c. Because fighter pilot
' s already gone. That' s when he did the school of calsa.
True we knew they were in good condition and well, they proved it
well. It' s not true, of course, and at that moment
they' re both deployed. In Puerto San Julián, A Puerto San Julián,
when air force departures began. From Puerto San Julián there was an own
comment from the air force. It wasn' t an air force million attacking
naval targets. It wasn' t a million air force to attack a fleet
and well, and of course, the second fleet in the world isn'
t true of England, but just to attack a fleet we had to fly
over the sea, and the flight over the sea is very different from flying
on the ground. We prepare ourselves at all times, since we first boarded
a plane, to do the training as a pilot, always doing maneuvers on
the ground, just like the terrain where you have different elevations of hill,
mountain, tree antennas. It gives you a reference to how high we can
fly, while flying over the sea, you have no reference to see whether
how high or how low. I am true, then we had to do
that during the month of April, prepare to make an attack that was not
our mission, the mission of the false was not the attack, but we
had to make this comment very interesting and that month was enough for you or
in one and I reach at least we believe it is. I encourage myself
to say yes because during all the missions we went out of combat there was
no one who would crash the water as is the risk of flying over the
sea and not realizing how low we are and suddenly the water would hit you
in all the missions. The people who lost their lives were in combat maneuver
for having been flying over the sea and lacking training. We did it throughout
the month of opening different exit back low, because also worth saying the technology
that our planes had was not comparable to the technology that naval aviation and the
fleet of sea had. Naval aviation, I say English, and the sea
fleet. They have a lot of instruments to detect us, so that if
we detect it, they evade us. We didn' t have any of
that. What is called there is today and we have it in today'
s planes. The alarming radar that tells you if a plane wants to attack
you, it' s not true. Or if a piece of artillery is
about to launch a missile or something is an instrument that alerts you, then
you know what you can do. In this case. We didn' t
have anything. We also did not have equipment to prevent the impact of missiles,
as they are called the flair, that is an incandescent light, where
the missile that comes to impart to you you will remove that incandescent light the
flair and goes to that certain light because it attracts it the heat of health
or some metallic magnetic tapes or without foil, paper as metallic, where the
missile is also attracted. We didn' t have any of that, that
is, we had no way of avoiding a missile impact that could come to
us or even find out. Of course, but in the same way,
they had to leave, of course they acted, of course you made a
correction before entering. Hence the difference between missions and departures. Of course it
' s important to differentiate him. We had about eighty- seven outings in
our eighty- seven combat squadron and we already called the outing of combat from
May 1, because the departures during the month of April were mostly training,
or we made overflights, on the islands as to raise the spirits of all
the people who were deployed from the three Marine Army and Air Force forces.
Gendarmerie personnel had also been deployed there, and their work was also important.
But that was mostly isolation. The combat exit began on May 1st, when
the people of Porto Argentine Island received the bombing of the Vulcans on May 1st
at forty. Then from there, ready, let' s go more to
the fight. Well, then there was almost a month in which it was
prep. Okay, Guillermo You participated. You told me of different departures and
also of some missions that remained in history. One of these was the attack
of a British ship on the Islands. Yes, the first departure is the
day on the grounds of May 1st and I mention it, because it'
s a little anecdotal. This is also to give an idea of what was
happening at the time. I think it was the twenty- eightth of March,
twenty- ninth of April. Sorry. It was a weekend and we
took off with what was my squadron boss, the first Mansote tooth, partner
of lurigadier at six in the morning, completely at night, a wolf'
s mouth from the airport there from San Julián. Well, our mission was
to go to the Falkland Islands without resupply. Practically in height we were going
with missiles, Shaffrir missiles similar to side winder b. We have to be
in touch with the radar and so, as Rider said, then making contact
with the crazy ok is a pilot air force officer who guides air force aircraft
when they attack ground targets, say, support the army, for example,
then that person guides you. Then we went out to me and we were
already in the middle of the Atlantic and I started to see it still did
not dawn towards the north, towards Buenos Aires. To my left were two
very remarkable columns, but there were about twenty lights such a thing, all
dots separated and were two columns. I say how strange, because in the
south, in the area of the Magellan Canal is made in Magellan there are
oil wells that many times if you are flying, even if it is covered
with newness, you notice all the fire of what the gases of the distillation
of the oil actually burn, I say, but at this point, here
in the middle of the ocean, there may be platforms so that they are
so aligned. All she did, but the embroiderment was the radio silence.
So I shut my mouth. We arrived, we made contact with the roder,
we did our homework there What means radio silence. Don' t talk,
don' t talk during, because I could have told my guide,
you see the lights and that would have been a radio broadcast. They,
the English, could have taken this radio silence. He stayed on every exit.
We, if we always maintained, even when we were going to resupply
in flight, there was virtually no talk. But the question is to finish
this anecdotal part, we finished another task we came back to land and Mansoti
tells me he saw what was there north of our route when we went to
the islands more. I mean, yes, I didn' t want to
break his radio silence. I say what was the fleet of that and of
course it was the fruit. I was already arriving at the fleet in the
area of operations. I already believe that that day or the next day was
determined the exclusion zone And well, then came the first of May and the
medical actions, as the Brigadier said of cinema and the topic that prepres me
of the frigate frigate possible broken frigate more, is a mission in which I
participated on the twenty- fourth of May. On May 24th, 24 days
were gone. It had already been or had already been on other missions.
He had gone out on the twenty- first day along with Mansotti and López,
Captain Harmonio. I think he was on another squadron, too. I
don' t know if you don' t participate in another one, too,
but in another squadron. The point is that that day I had a
flaw and I turned back. But that day Manzot and Lopez were shot down.
They continued on the mission and they were shot down. I went out
again. In the twenty- four, as I tell you, we were
three planes. The squadron chief was First Lieutenant Vazquez. Then I fell into
the attack on the invincible. I was number two and number three was Lieutenant
Bono. It was from the pre- mine promotion. Well, at the
time I was an instructor at home school. But as we had already begun
to have casualties, he had been brought in because he had stopped flying in
December of the eighty- one, so it had been a short time since
he had stopped flying. He was quickly rehabilitated. The point is, well,
we take off. We went to the resupplyer all in silence. We
resupplyed, followed a number of minutes to that level, about seven thousand meters,
and then began to make a descent that was made taking into account the
radar coverage of some ship that they could put to the west of the islands
to detect the arrival of our planes. Well, there was a squadron that
preceded us. We were in complete radio silence at one point I think he
was intercepted. Well, they obviously broke the formation nerves or let' s
say it wasn' t a situation of being very calm, because you were
hearing that the question where you were going was pretty complicated. Well, what
do you think about that moment? I didn' t think anything. You
know that, even if it seemed illogical, right, at least in my
case, I was so committed to flying the plane and following it to my
guide that you were actually running. No. No, no, no,
no? Don' t you? Don' t you? No. You
were thinking if I get hit, if I get knocked down, what a
mess that might be, you think about it before or after you get out.
But once you' re there you' re doing the mission, at
least in my case, no, no, I wasn' t thinking that.
But we were very close, very close to the ground with the ground,
with foothills. So Vásquet was still rasante, stuck to the floor and
in a moment we got to the north of the beginning of the Strait of
San Carlos and to the right. We went like this with a group like
this as if we had gone to Puerto Argentina and in a moment we found
ourselves in the Strait of San Carlos and to the right. The whole fleet
there you go that breaks on the right, one we follow. I already,
he lost it directly. I saw the first thing I saw were what
I said, pompons, explosions of artillery before aerial, which are small clouds,
gray or so and then also after before there were all or you were
three, we were three and the fleet How many ships you foreign exchange,
how many you saw. I don' t know that I remember at least
there were six or seven. I remember perfectly that on the west of the
strait was what was the hospital ship, which was a very large ship,
but there were also on the grey ships, the warships in the middle and
there were ships and small boats approaching the coast, where the landing had already
been made on the twenty- one, that is, there was a movement.
I still don' t know if they were on the ground or they
weren' t rooting in the beach head that they had started making the twenty
- one. Truth is good. I didn' t see a boat there
Grey, which was relatively close to the coast, and I went there.
I didn' t see Vásquez anymore and I didn' t see Bono anymore.
The point is that when I saved I see in the right rearview mirror
an explosion a red flare and I see Vázquez coming forward from me a little
lower than me and doing like a trail that I thought was humun stuff.
So and behind me, a little higher up, I see fertilizer and well,
I lost a lot. The trail was very greyish and very thick.
I thought it was an engine problem that had hit him, because the two
planes that we arrived later came back, had artillery impact everywhere. Of course
you guys weren' t looking to meet the flotation then. We were going
to attack, rob yes, because already the landing of them began on the
21st of May and could attack it correctly. Yes, yes, what you
mention about the frigate arroll I don' t know if it was the rock
frigate, because I don' t remember or any distinctive mark that is attributed
to both the English and some source who have investigated from Argentina looking for coincidences,
they say it may be the frigate of I know that the frigate was
attacked several times, not only on the 24th of May. The point is
to say to finish this story, we go out and vásquez sees the loss
we had of fuel. He asks Bonos if he had a problem and tells
us no. Don' t worry, that' s a waste of groceries.
Let' s go to the resupplyer. We had to go for the
resupplier. Bono tells you I don' t have a problem. All the
normal motor instruments don' t go up because the packs will be waiting for
us on the island of Great Malvina and there they will intercept us. Let
' s keep going a little further, how many meters of the floor were
there, there the first part and continue along the canal and then we start
heading west past the floor on the island. And besides, as the Brigadier
said, flying scratching over the earth, we have experience in the sea.
The feeling and perspective I have is that you' re thinking you' re
close, but you' re actually getting tall. So, well, the
planes had some instrument that ours had. There was an altimeter radius that measured
the distance or height between the plane and the water, and that allowed us
to fly maybe lower, because you have no reference, as the Brigadier said.
True, the question is that well, about half the island, we
started to climb and when we were about five thousand meters away, Vasquez I
had him up front to the left and Bono had him down back to the
left. I was to the right of God two and I see the plane
of one place a turn to the left, a downward spiral and then ends
up impacting on the sea. Obviously, when I saw that he started going
down, I broke radio silence. I told Vázquez that I told Bono we
called him Turkish, I tell him the Turk is going down. Turkish,
Ejectate, Turcoyectate. There was no answer. What I remember is the impact
on the plane' s sea. Vasquet immediately passed the coordinates of the position.
Others had a navigation team called OMEGA. It' s similar to what
you have today' s GPS. He passed it to the six hundred and
thirty to launch the search and rescue issue, because maybe we also thought he
might have injected himself. But not good. I, many years later,
met rescue search pilots, Commodore Longar. I think there was also the Commodore
Major Shame, who were helicopter pilots, who were searching and rescuing and went
looking for that area. This I learned from them, from the account of
it, that they went to look for him and found nothing really and why
you think he fell lost consciousness. I believe, as I told you,
the planes had artillery and rifle strikes, their rifles, whatever I think he
is. After the attack he replied that the plane had no problem, we
did more than three minutes until we started the ascent another the rest, we
got to five thousand meters up and he kept flying the plane And by the
attitude that takes the plane, that is, it gives the impression that the
plane was left unchecked. I figure it might have had an impact on a
small weapon that bled out, lost consciousness, and lost control of the plane.
That' s very possible. Me after the mission. After the mission,
but I didn' t realize the mission. The planes have an instrument
called a getometer, which measures the amount of g one places and I remember
that I had two negative Gs that to put them two gen negatives. Sure,
when I saw that instrument once we had already gotten there and everything else,
I don' t know if six or seven positive Gs had gone from
G to the plane, but pretty ugly. You want to explain that it
' s the G' s brief forgiveness. The G are the claims of
gravity. We are subject to the gravity of planet earth. Right. A
G is a value with which the one the one an object falls to the
earth, right. Seven Gs are seven times more true. Sure, you
put tremendous pressure, of course. Yeah. That' s why combat pilots
are carrying an antiquated team that does what it does is keep your blood from
getting out of the brain, don' t lose visions, etcetera, etcetera,
that can withstand that accelerations true this up to three four g maybe without
equipment you can hold it, but it becomes more difficult. This one and
I remember that we were carrying some sailing cards and a map and in the
cabin flew everything when we went rasante and arrived to the island, this basketball
followed the undulations on the ground and of course I formed it, I had
to be above it and did move the lever whatever was necessary. So,
well, that was kind of an experience, really the greatest experience. That
is the experience was the leadership that left me East Vázquez and that later ends
when he volunteered to do the mission of the invincible along with the v adier
This that. They had this family and volunteered for a mission they knew,
in which we lost fifty percent of the crew. We' re just gonna
stop by and talk about it at what point. I imagine different exits throughout
the entire conflict, but there is one in which this how it is warn
you that there is the possibility of taking out an aircraft carrier if until that
moment we were designating, they were designating, we did not come because I
was first lieutenant, that is, that I gave no order. He was
no longer in service, but the crews were designated according to the activity he
had done the day before. For starters, our activity, I mean,
I was ready, you can call it shift to get out. If they
ordered a mission from the noon of one day to the noon of the other
day, except the night, just as our material was not fit for a
night attack, because we did not have the necessary instruments for that. It
was from noon until dark we went to the city, we returned early the
next morning until noon. Well, and in those days, I had appointed
who could ever touch him the next day. We changed, but in particular
by the 29th of May, which was the opportunity twenty- seven, twenty
- six out there in May of that entire week prior to the twenty-
nine on the radar of Puerto Argentino, radar of the Air Force that was
on the islands, began to observe a possible location of one of the two
aircraft carriers that were in the conflict of Hermes and the invincible. The only
two aircraft carriers and with the radar the radar detection that gives the plane in
flight from a certain height, observed that the planes appeared the harriers that we
call them pact. But that combat area patrol is made up of two planes.
Harriers coming over the island made attacks on the mission they ordered. They
observed that these planes appeared from a sector located to the east of the islands
of Port of Argentina about 200 km. They appeared on the radar screen of
the air force radar. They flew half an hour as long as the fuel
was given and returned to the same place. Then it was the observation that
allowed them to claim that there were about a hundred miles one hundred eighty km,
two hundred kilometers east. There' s got to be an aircraft carrier
from where the enemy planes were taking off and leaving. Then they pass the
position to the command of the South Are Force that was located. That commando
led by Li at the time was Briar than Crespo. He was then the
chief general briidad of the Air Force. Now that the Biriar Crespo has passed
away with his task force, he determined that I order my mission to attack
that runway, that aircraft carrier. Well, that' s how it was
ordered, analyzed and determined that the planes we could do it could be the
four Bs or the four Cs flying. I was flying because they have the
ability to supply fuel during the flight and, therefore, long extend this significantly
the scope of the planes the clear autonomy this, the four- Qs of
the navy and the super will have love also have the possibility to load fuel
in good, but within the air force. It was determined from the four
C because one of the small differences with the B to four B is the
availability of an oxygen for the pilot. We were always flying with more oxygen
than in the four B manual is five hours, in the four ses is
ten hours. And I say about Manuel because at the time of first speaking
he has already spent many years of the plane in use natural wear of the
equipment and also the adrenaline that one has that suddenly consumes much more combo oxygen
breathing so agitated than if it goes on a normal flight of clear transfer,
then well they go to the four six. From there, well, the
quadrant chief ordered him to arrange a squadron of four planes, this one with
a reserve one to a fifth they sent the reservation to do that mission and
well, we met the oldest officers of the most experienced let' s say
that we were flying a long time ago from the plane so that well I
know that I asked that whoever could offer to fulfill that mission I saw at
risk that although, for me the whole mission we were going out on was
a shooting there in San Carlos, what a difference there could be, But
well, right, the carrier is always more defended with its frigates. What
do they do defense with different types of artillery and missile defense, missile also,
but good to the carrier who could be. And well, with the
first thirty Vazquez and I offered to want to fulfill the mission. That'
s incredible, that will knowing that people were waiting for you at home.
Well, yes, actually, the scarce people were waiting for us from the
day we deployed on April 11th, starting on May 1st, with more reason,
when we already started the actual combat missions. We communicated every day with
the family, every day we talked to my lady, everyone talked to their
relative every night and then, well, of course, they were worried,
true, but in a certain way, I might self question that I might
have been a little selfish because I didn' t remember much about the family
at the time of flying, of being active. So, when it was
really up to us to fulfill our promise to defend our homeland until I lost
my life, I said this one, as I said earlier, I want
to do it. It feels good to do it despite the risk. I
knew here we were going to the fight, we knew what we were exposed
to, I knew I had a Chico family already when I became a boyfriend
with my lady. And now, my lady. I was clear. It
was also clear to my lady what I was in the force for and what
were the risks still kind of pass the activity of combat, training, combat.
We have also had many deaths from different accidents during the training, that
is, that my lady was already with a knowledge which was, of course,
that she was now during the war, the risk was greater, but
well, so I decided and in each of the missions at night we talked.
Yes, yes, today was good that he was going out and I
told him how clear and I tell you all of a sudden it may have
been a little bit of sight for my passion, for the vision of the
house and the mission to attack the carrier comes out from the south, because
it goes out from the south. Well, because the location of that ship,
of that runway, of that aircraft carrier represented a very wide turn.
Therefore, the supply in flight was very necessary that it was made with two
airplanes Hercules almost one hundred thirty that are the Hercules of six hundred thirty that
for transport of personnel, loads what it did and the coffee carries a large
tank of fuel inside to pass us fuels to the planes with home. These
planes that you didn' t have because of the radio silence, you didn
' t communicate with them, you had to see any of the missions.
We never communicated until now the moment we made the attack and how I found
them. I mean, I was reminded because we had an instrument that is
already obsolete. It doesn' t exist anymore. I created an omega navigator
where we put it, the geographic coordinates where that plane was going to be
at that point, as well as the coordinates where the aircraft carrier was going
to be, the coordinates where the bay was going to be, where we
were going to attack. Just and that' s what you were programming.
It' s not like I gave them to them We didn' t get
them out. They gave us the position, that' s not true.
The position of the carrier. It was actually a midpoint where the radar was
watching and that' s where it comes out. Then they pulled a midpoint,
then they set those coordinates. We were going to that place the issue
that this attack on the carrier had to be done also with the super Understand
planes, which are airplanes of the Argentine Navy of naval aviation, that are
manufactured in France for that objective, to make attacks to open sea to ships
why, because it has a radar besides having an exo set missile manufactured for
that, manufactured together with the plane the plane super Understand more exoet By that
moment, the naval edition for the two of April had received five planes that
was newly new, recently purchased even with a little lack of experience. They
had just made their adaptation in France, but they were already completing it here.
In Argentina, they had received five aircraft and five missiles. When the
islands were recovered on April 2, France suspended the delivery of both the aircraft
and the missiles, that is to say, it grabbed the opening in the
naval aviation. With five super entendars and five ex- sets they had already
released four left only one. That' s why the main plane to accomplish
this mission was the super understand, but it had only one misid although two
planes flew, because the second missile- free plane served to do electronic detection
of the ship we were going to attack. But since there was only one
omissile, it is that the air force arranged that they would be the planes
of the air force to throw their bombs, bombs that are designed to attack
the ground, because you did not go with missiles, went with bombs,
with bombs and cannons of twenty millimetres, cannons We threw cannons, bombs by
gravity, of course we threw it away. We just had to do it.
Just as I mentioned in the beginning, we did not have the preparation
or the weapon system to make that kind of attack. We had him to
pull a lead on the ground, to attack a boomk, an important position
on the ground where we were passing up or we could also attack in a
dive. But here it was a matter of being scratched so that we wouldn
' t be detected by the defense radars and be able to get to the
ship quickly, but we had to pass it over the ship. There was
no other way this missile is pulled in this case from the aircraft carrier they
threw it forty kilometers away and without really having it in sight the plane if
they did not detect it electronically. And when the exo SET is launched,
you throw the four. We are still behind the exo ET that in principle
the EXOETH of the missile left a trail of white smoke. It was a
matter of following the borrowed forms. The officer who launched the michl of the
Supertendar naval aviation told us twenty miles is about thirty- six kilometers. Twenty
miles forward at the bow was already a matter of keeping the course and flying
to fly until we started to see it at low altitude and in low radius
silence about thirty meters down. Then we have observed with different details that this
one already told you. We were flying between fifteen and twenty meters high at
about nine hundred kilometers per hour, because from the time of the final approach
we were going to seven hundred and fifty eight hundred when the missile was launched
full power, more than the planes and we arrived near the nine hundred kilometers.
How long were they until they met the man who launched the missile.
We were an hour, a minute, ten, minutes, fifteen, one
minute comes early. That' s not true. We will have arrived fifty
seconds after the missile. The impact of the missile because the aircraft carrier activates
the defense from the launch of the missile, which they realize is what I
was telling you at the beginning. We don' t have any instruments to
tell us my booth when they' re throwing some weapons at me. They
did have it, that is, when they launched the missile. That'
s where they realized we were really attacking him. They deploy all their missile
artillery and defense tube artillery. They activate all that. Then we got there
and we had to go upstairs, as in all the missions that William was
telling about you had to happen. We had no other way. It'
s not a weapon that flies alone and carries and you turn around. The
super tendar has that ease, that possibility of launching the missile without getting to
see it directly, simply because it detected it electronically launch missile and turns and
we follow the four planes. There was Vázquez and Castillo on my left here
was me and Commodore Gerardo Guillermo Isac is on my right. Isaac is William
' s companion. Also with the same experience they had made the habilitation in
the four c in the same period, that is, also a man of
that time, a young man of twenty- three years, also carrying out
the missions that were ordered to him. So it was then that well they
launched missis, we followed the four planes and suddenly we began to see a
column of smoke coming from a large ship forward on the horizon. Evidently,
the missile had impacted and was causing that smoke, that fire, that damage.
Seeing the missile, he' s looking now and the smoke column.
That' s where we had to go outside. Whatever was a little big.
Then it grew bigger and bigger. I see Vázquez here, my promo.
He is a friend of mine with my lady We are brine of his
youngest son, who was born on March 11 of that year of eighty-
two. I see that Vasquez' s plane suddenly blows a piece of sheet
from the left side of the plane, a big sheet in the middle.
He stared at it because I had to settle down to pass over the ship
without crashing and everything had to happen simultaneously, that is, if you were
late there you could knock it down, you had to get the surprise and
spend everything together. That' s how I was settling in. I see
him staring at me, and there he just blew his tail off, and
the plane starts to take this inclination until I' m staying there because he
' s disarming, losing his speed. My plane was fine and there I
see it with this position already very low, twenty meters above the water,
and I already had to return because I stayed behind the plane, the Vásquez,
and there well, shot down Vázquez, you saw me in front right
away. That' s where we start. We began to see the humitos
of the tube anti- aircraft artillery that they launch because they launch ammunition that
runs a certain distance and explodes alone. If it doesn' t hit anything,
it explodes alone. We' ve seen it many times in the war
- to- war movie. See you later. That' s real.
We haven' t seen everything and to me they were all missiles that threw
me. I don' t know, I was trying to dodge it,
but it was nothing. It was a matter of getting shorter, shorter,
because it was the defense we had to fly low. And already with the
view there it has come very close to the carrier. It was an aircraft
carrier Evidently, I want to throw in the cannon and my cannons got stuck.
I had to lift the plane a little because if I didn' t
throw the bomb, the bomb was going to hit short, like saying before
the aircraft carrier in the water. I picked up the plane a little bit.
I dropped the bomb. I' m sure the aim, the instrument
that tells me where they' re going to hit the bomb, was well
positioned on the aircraft carrier. I throw the bombs and again I have to
jump again because I was hit by the aircraft carrier. I was bumping into
it. There' s a white button here on the left, which is
the radome for the missile launch. If you give that you have the aircraft
carrier invincible, you don' t have my sheath the herms. That'
s why, after the landing, I identify the name of that white bowl.
I had a really big time here I didn' t happen to jump
the plane and I left I' m doing the morning, I' m
starting to call the numerals We, the guide, the gang leader is going
to be number one, number two was a castle, number three was a
me and number four isaac I started calling them on the radio and no one
answered me. I come back alone, morning and empty as I know and
set course well closed turn of a north course. I had to go out
here and turn one hundred and twenty- thirty degrees to the left, for
which I make a very closed turn, always glued to the water. True,
and there I tried to see if I could see anything from the aircraft
carrier before the attack, you could see the column of black smoke after the
attack. I can already see when I make that turn a whole cloud of
gray smoke, a cloud, just a column. That' s why I
say the bombs hit and exploded to all this what Commodore Isaac Gerardo says.
He also saw him shot down to Vasquez, who already saw him impact.
He came further to the right and a little further back and saw him hit
in the water and at the time Isaac was going to throw his bombs and
his cannons, he could throw away the two hundred shells he had of twenty
millimetres that he threw at him as he packed more to annoy the gunmen who
are throwing you. He dumped him and then dropped the bombs. But instantly,
before the bomb was dropped, Castillo' s plane that was here about
five meters away, let' s say, disintegrates instantly. Obviously, Castillo
has to have hit the anti- aircraft artillery, the one we saw explode
up here explodes it Inflasí, the plane is not true instantly, nor did
you find out that the impact was coming with the water. Castle was instantaneous,
as Isaac Bueno commented, and he threw his bomb and already had to
pass through the right side, because it was not enough to lift, as
we came low, on the right side, passed, made maneuvers and set
course at the same time that he called the four. Going out some more,
he came out and no one answered. No one was answering. He
also assumed he wasn' t coming back alone. But well, on that
escape route we both had the same walk to continue being helped by the Omega
browser that told us where we had to go on either side. I just
suddenly see a plane up ahead. I also in a moment, looking through
the mirrors that we have rearview mirrors in the cabin to see if anyone came
to attack you or something, I see a plane behind me to the right
that I don' t know why, but I said you see isaac because
it always came to my right in my head and said the four and well,
loosen the power a little bit, not much, because it had to
be fast escape. He caught up with me, too, and that'
s good. I' ll do the ok to see if it' s
all right, or we couldn' t talk yet, not because we didn
' t want to. We couldn' t talk because until the launch of
the missile, no one spoke to the Hercules, the Super Standard or between
us Radio Silence. I give him the signal if he was okay and he
answers me well and it turns out that he observed that my sleeve was orange,
which is the anti- exposure suit, in case we fell into the
water to last five more minutes with the cold water of the South and I
also gave him the orange sleeve, it turns out that we both had the
same orange team and the others, Pilot, Vasquez and Castillo, had another
kind of color in their anti- exposure suit. Then there isaac always says
there I realized more than good. I' ll be right back. He
realized who had been fixed. Vázquez y Castilla, first lieutenant José Daniel Vázquez
Captain post bite, the first lieutenant to eat Jesús Castillo Captain postmorden. That
' s how we always made the return stretch at a distance of about 200
km. We also took height and headed to make the third supply in flight,
because, that is, to be able to arrive with good fuel to
the landing to fly lower, because the plane lower, with a consumption more
fuel than being in height, the weather was bad. We had to make
an entrance for instruments. We were nervous. I had the numeral formed that
was also with his stress situation, so I asked Hercules for fuel and then
go down under the cape and arrive as a visual to the landing. To
all this during the resupply one of the pilots of the twelve one hundred and
thirty who were there asks me the report before eliminating the flight that is called,
and there I can confirm that we had attacked a carrier, that the
imisil had impacted, that they had knocked down number one and two of the
crews probed the indicative. We always have the crew when you come out an
indicative you don' t go as you go that as a Breta probe that
probe one and two had been shot down and good and that we returned probe
three and four. So we landed after the landing, they take us to
a room where they show us the profiles of the different planes so much and
as long as I were well separated, not to listen to what the other
one says, not to copy you let' s say and as always say
those who listened to us who questioned us, is that the two exactly the
same. We saw We declared the same thing and the Carrier already I can
confirm that the name of the Carrier is invincible precisely because of that white bolcha
that the Hermes does not have, besides the superstructure of the Herme, much
smaller that stands out from the track the Carrier. While the photo is much
wider, I don' t know what each one' s design is like.
So we can confirm that on the 30th of May, at fourteen fourteen
fifteen, the carrier is invincible. It was hit by missilex ozet the last
that there were six bombs of two hundred and fifty kilos twenty- millimeter cannons.
And with that it' s a situation that England will always deny,
because it deposes to accept that an air force not prepared for the attack on
a fleet, let' s say we can arrive. And we arrived because
we achieved the surprise by making a great rodeo approaching that point where the aircraft
carrier is from the mid southeast as from the rear, place that there did
not prohibit and did not have the entire defensive circle of the carrier have had
it beyond the west, towards the side of the islands. It' s
amazing this story that for you are anecdotes and for the rest of the country
it' s history. It' s history of what conflict was. I
thank you very much for coming to Neura, mainly direct, because it is
yes I want to say. Finally, not because it gave me a sin
not to comment on it that all the activity that we helicopter transport combat pilots
do is because we work the air force. The concept of the use of
the air force is by weapon system. What does that mean? It'
s a system where the planes are, there' s the pilots, but
also as important as the pilots are the personal mechanics who fix you the plane,
which runs it, which repairs it. We came with the damaged planes
at any hour of the night. There are also all the personnel who did
the security of the bases, because the bases could have been the object of
some commando blow then all night the unofficial soldiers were doing the security, the
custody of our planes and also the custody of where we slept, truth,
we slept very comfortable, we saw warm during the night to be in condition
the next day, while the mechanics, the official non- commissioned officers,
which is called the maintenance staff and the logistics personnel, was at the base
of the twenty- four hours, practically eating at the base as it could
with cold or whatever, in tents they slept yes, in a certain place,
in the city, but there were others who stayed to work all night.
That is why I cannot fail to mention how important the involvement of personnel,
technicians and logistics in air force bases is. The air force works not
because I pulled the bomb and hit so that I would drop the bomb and
hit I had my previous training for the plane to fly. There' s
all that chain of people who prepare food for us worry about how I'
m going to sleep, how I' m going to be. The other
day I get fixed the plane makes the guards. There are countless activities.
That' s why the air force operates, not by the pilot or the
plane. It' s all over the gun system, which is a complex
of people who broke everything, had their cold, had their damage, their
blows, their wounds. Working in the cold at night. I tell you,
I take out all those people' s hats that allow the plane to
fly and let me see it without them. The plane doesn' t fly.
Okay. I am very grateful for the truth that it was an anecdote
that mobilizes me. I imagine the people who are listening to us are also
truly amazing. What for you is an anecdote I repeat to you, for
the rest of that story is what happens in our country, what has happened,
so I thank you very much for that. It is a story that
we should not really forget, because there were six hundred and forty- nine,
but in particular fifty- five, the air force, which were given,
everything they had, they gave it. His life was given and well,
the islands. We don' t have it today. It' s
property, it' s Argentine sovereignty, but there are other occupants, there
are other tenants who don' t want to pay for it. I really
appreciate the rent. Obriayer, Guillermo, I' m equally grateful for everything
you told me. Very important. The truth is, I can imagine images
of you who used to remember her. You' re gonna remember her your
whole life today. That' s really the way it is. Thank you
very much. Me and So. We' re going to a two-
minute batch and we' re back on this Malvinas special. Eighty moments of
nerve closure. There' s your system connected. We are again in Neura,
in this special on the Falklands, this April 2nd and we were just
together with Ernesto and Guillermo, two air force home pilots during the conflict,
and now we are together with Colonel Carlos Daniel Esteban welcome Carlos to the floor
of Neura. Thank you good night, thank you very much, for the
invitation. It is truly a pleasure to have you here knowing that, in
addition to the conflict having taken place in the water, in the air,
it was also done on earth and you were on the islands, you were
running a company inside the islands and you had combats inside the island with the
enemy. I wanted to start by consulting you about the Marvinas conflict. You
know I found it very interesting that you studied a pre- conflict career.
Then I would like to know how you arrived in the army after studying political
science and international relations and what you understood of what was Malvinas with that already
professional profile of the study of international relations. Yeah, it was a little
backwards. I first received myself at the Military College of the Nation. As
under Cdiente I made the journey with the frigate of freedom and there you can
see that all the armies of the world and the marines, especially that we
had visited, had their officers studying at universities to give him a broader holistic
view of geopolitics, history, sociology, etcetera. Then there was the illusion
if I could have time with my work of studying at a university and I
was passionate about the issue of politics, international relations, etcetera. So,
in Cordoba, what I did was I enrolled in Catholic and in five years
I was able to receive a degree in political science and international relations. So
it was the other way around and when he got to Falklands. Of course
everything he had learned at university, which is a good university, obviously they
know it in a certain nationalist style and with the priests running that school,
they gave it great importance Malvina and attached importance to the professors of international law,
what at that time was called the International Law of War, which was
later mutating and was called International Law of Armed Conflicts or International Humanitarian Law.
The name changed, but the essence was the same, that is, what
war is done with combatants, what is done in war when you have an
enemy in detention, which is done in war in combat, for example,
you can throw at paratroopers who have the candle displayed. What happens when a
pilot falls into the water All the things that happened to us in the operations
after not and well, and there with an excellent teacher that we had,
that is I came to the war with a different formation to the rest for
having studied this matter that was called International Law of War. Very interesting this
and you, at the time of being in the army, of having that
preparation, felt that you knew better what your task was. Not my homework.
I made it like the rest of the officers who were as good as
it could have been. What I had was a different view, broader than
what you necessarily got from the university. If you don' t have it,
you don' t pass any of the subjects, that is, not
an approach. It is only military or specific or technical of each problem,
but a more solistic vision that serves to be good diagnoses, to interpret situations
and then, well, you have to solve. At present, I have
to deal with the problem you have and you, when the javer had a
few years already as an army officer, at the time of launching or carrying
out the rosary operation of the invasion of the islands. Yes, of course,
I received myself at the age of nineteen and at the time of the
conflict I was twenty- eight, at the time of coffee, you were
twenty- eight and you were part of the landing of the islands. You
got that two from opening up to the islands or you got here a few
days later. Of course not, we shouldn' t have arrived one.
What happens is that there was a very strong storm, in particular the helicopter
that I had to do the landing with started hitting inside the hangar. They
cut off the slings and started hitting inside the hangar. From idizar, then
we had to do ultivo, but it took a whole day. Then the
landing was day two. My company that had selected her, the regiment chief,
the lieutenant with that on the link was the only army company that landed
with the sailors' infantry, that is, we complemented the marine infantry in
what had been called Operation Blue and then went on to be called Operation Rosary.
So if we participate in the landing, no doubt and at that moment
on landing, how they were received by the colonial administration in Malvinas, how
they were received by the population. Well, we were expecting first the buzzer
contaminant gave a herring before we landed that was very clear, very clear fulfill
the mission, but in an incruent way, that is, not to cause
unnecessary damage either to the military forces or to the civilian population. So that
was very clear. You had to achieve the objectives that had been imposed on
you in our case at the beginning of the airport, but in an incursive
way, because you thought of post- war, true or thought of post
- operations, not to complicate things more than necessary, in particular with the
civilian population, that that impact later on the international world. That' s
not true. Well, then we landed waiting for something harder because they had
some mines laid on the beaches, etcetera. And there were seventy- one,
seventy- two later we reached seventy- seven royals marins who were providing
security and did not defend themselves and went all and gathered in the governor'
s house, where then there is the incident with Captain Kakino and Lieutenant Garcia
Quiroga, etc. I mean, there was no violent reaction to our landing.
It was an order of rex hund the governor very clear that he considered
that the forces were so superior that they landed that the only thing that was
going to provoke a mount where they lost them and they were not going to
stop. Nues to, landing came with vehicles, came with important forces of
the marine infantry of army. Then I think it was for that moment.
I think it was a logical reaction of the ambassador to say do not fight
how many people landed in Malvinas, how much was the total number of personnel
at first and during itself count not counting the crews of the ships about six
hundred people. Those are the ones who entered the island on the first day,
the first day and then left, that is, the BM one and
the BM two later withdrew. Once they controlled the situation, they withdrew and
left the infantry regiment twenty. My company stayed and then came over from the
25th infantry regiment, which was supposed to give security to the airport. And
within what was the operations within Malvinas there are other enclaves, other small towns,
so to speak, within Madrid. I was mayor of two. You
were a quartermaster at the age of twenty- eight I appointed myself a quartermaster.
I didn' t like the names they had. They were called Darwin
Gus Green and then I put it all in Puerto Santiago. He was the
only officer who had a son. My son had the name Let' s
say a Hispanic origin. When we had been in Santiago de Compostela, they
told the whole legend or story of c on how they find Santiago with an
illuminated star that theirs of the earth ended and there was Santiago. So I
said if I have a son, I' m going to put him in
Santiago. So we all called Puerto Santiago and took care of the two villages.
There was Mr Heardcastle, who was the fockla manager at Land Company and
there was Mr Gos who did very good negotiations, very good. I never
shared what was done in Puerto Argentina. I mean, for me, they
were a hostile population that was going to respect us out of fear, out
of fear, out of deterrence, but in the event a fleet approached or
forces approached, enemies, they were going to respond to them and not to
us. So the truth is, I' ve been applying very tough measures
since the operational, but not with them. It' s more years after
Mr Harcaster kept sending me against me I was a commander in the 11th Brigade.
He kept sending me greetings, etc, because he understood that I had
a mission to fulfill, but that we did so that they did not suffer
harsher consequences. Of what is necessary in a war. No. Then,
for example, he cared for his sheep. I told you to look,
I tell you the pounds of meat I need and you bring them to me.
The same in the amount of fish and I give you other things that
I have at the troop ranch so that your population is well and you lack
nothing. The water tank, for example, was common. Imagine that if
I let them handle it without controlling it, they could throw out any Swedishance
and my soldiers were inoperative for any kind of war action. Then what else.
I told him. I need vehicles, I requisitioned all the vehicles,
and I signed him, I signed documents for him. If that' s
all, I' m intent, I' m intent, then, but
I always requisition signing both that and the supermarket or all radio. Radio was
the most important thing. I got a hundred and ten radii from the Kelpers,
the biggest one is already ufl five hundred. I' ll take them
later to San Carlos when they send me to San Carlos, and it'
s the one that allows me to give the early warning of the landing and
that I can act. And that had been requisitioned how. I do,
yeah, why. Because the radios that have a normal army company don'
t have the necessary range to be able to handle themselves in what was the
tera network, that' s a hundred kilometers to one side a hundred kilometers.
Instead, I did, and I had a very good advice from Lieutenant
Vazquez, who was the head of communications in my company, and he tells
me we have to take this one and that' s why I took that
radio. So Munition, Armament, vehicles and radios were requisitioned. Everything was
very important so they' re not communicating with the fleet permanently and telling him
what we were doing. Enough with having the satellites watching what we were doing
and how long it took from the rosary operation until they began to receive fire
from the British fleet. How long it took until they started arriving Well,
we were giving security in Puerto Santiago, Darling Gugren and we had a rotation
system. One section was doing maintenance, the other section was training. The
soldiers had 45 days of training. They were just new. He tracked my
partner were all new and the other section was giving security. That' s
how we were until the first of May. On the first of May the
12th regiment, which was the Mercedes task force, was already entering and had
been instructed to strengthen the defense of the two villages. And I didn'
t know if there was any intelligence on the night before that it was very
likely that at four o' clock in the morning there would be an air
strike in Puerto Argentino and at eight o' clock in Darwing Guogreen. Then
there' s what we did. We met with the I had excellent officers,
we met with steves, with this centurion, with kings and we said
good chance of zero ground attack. Then let' s get the troops out
of where they are and put them on the cliffs of the coast, because
we had no air defense. Then came the subtendant bragin and with air defense.
So when the attack occurs, this is what you say when the first
attack was. The first attack was in Puerto Argentino, at four o'
clock, in Darwin Guslin, at eight o' clock on the morning of
May 1. We were attacked there with belugas and bombs of two hundred and
fifty pounds and five hundred pounds. We had zero down. So that went
very well for the soldiers, because it says good. Our bosses demand us,
but they take care of us. They made a situational assessment. They
saw that they did not, and there we discovered a great mistake that we
had made, that was not to have made the wells to the positions caps
belugas. Then the velugas, in addition to bursting and throwing the shards down
into the well. Nothing happened, because there was no one. The penalty
was that it was what impacted our soldiers, that the air force, like
Doro Wilson Pedoso had said that all planes had to be at six o'
clock outside different mechanical, personal issues, etcetera. With the attack there were
all planes to take off. That' s why almost all the pucaras were
destroyed and Hooki' s lieutenant died, plus ten more soldiers. So that
was the first attack that was important, because everyone saw the number of soldiers
who died and buried them and the climate was already war and then, at
that time they knew that the British fleet was near and that a possible landing
could be neighbored. Yeah, that' s how we said we were getting
news because we were listening to radio. It is true that the fleet was
advancing. They say the first victim in the war is the lie. It
' s the truth, forgiveness, the first victim of war, the truth.
And no. The soldiers are wrong, they' re broken, they
' re not going to land, they' re afraid. This thing you
' re telling me. Radios, radios broadcast by good people from English Argentina,
were heard. They knew what was going on in the war for listening
to those media. Yes and good and intelligence reports. Intelligence worked very well.
There were good reports then, but it was clear that one how rare
that people who came from being in Norway training in ships, move a lot,
are decomposed, do not want to land. Well, it' s
a previous preparation that usually makes any enemy who wants to make the rival south
love that they are wrong, that they are not strong, that they are
with little desire to enter combat, things that was not so, which was
not so at all and you had to alert the landing in San Carlos.
Of course well, we were still in Darwinbus green O, which is about
a hundred kilometers south west of San Carlos. What happened was that on 9
May, an English frigate sank the island of the States ship, which was
a logistics vessel, had weapons, and all the personnel, all the crew,
died, and two people were saved, just the captain and another member
of the crew. When they sink into islands of the states that were more
or less in the middle of the San Carlos Canal. Command says good.
In the south, in Bia Fox we have people, but in the north
we don' t. Then let' s set up a combat team and
let him go north. Or there when Esteban' s company says good it
goes for the north mouth and we have to give him a reinforcement of armaments,
because my company was an assault company. We had armed it with the
three best sections of the regiment and the company with light weapons only because it
was for landing. The order was to disembark, we stopped the Royal Marines
and after three days we returned and she was a month old and they continued.
Sure, but when they give the order for the operation, it'
s not true. Rosario. It was for three days and we turned and
then came the square, got dinner, presented battle and came the improvisations.
That' s the truth, that is, the rosary operation was perfectly planned
and brilliantly executed up there. Then the improvisations began, because it was never
thought of before this could happen. In other words, there has not been
a single commander in the wars of the world who can win a battle on
an island when the maritime domain is enemy and it is clear that the control
of hand was to be of them, already with the two connkero who had
them turning on the day three and four of opening around the islands. And
when you have aircraft carriers, which is what the Brigadier and the Commodore pointed
out very well, above, you have air superiority, that is, you
intend to win a battle on an island with maritime superiority and enemy aerial superiority.
Then they fail this landing they go to others they need more reinforcement with
what they would have killed us most by starvation, that is, they prevented
everything from coming, that we have no more ammunition, that you have no
more food and that they were achieving at the end of the operations, you
think it was a total error of entry that is to say. First,
I do not want to discuss the political decision to regain sovereignty over the islands.
From all that you know of the 150 years, the unfulfilled negotiations,
all the UN resolutions that had been ignored by Britain. I don' t
want to discuss that. But the perfect plan was to land, stop the
Royal Marines, send them off, send them to the mainland. Then there
was a police force and diplomatic negotiations continued, with the model bl la Bunde
terr and with the model of taking. But diplomatic negotiations continued. But to
face a NATO power with its main ally in favor that can do nothing else,
could not do anything else of America at that time, because in all
wars, England has helped them and is always with them. Then he gave
them the missiles there' s Winder that allowed him to win any fight to
go Air, it' s not true. He gave her satellite information,
gave her the island ascent and cut the logistics in half and, in addition
to that, intelligence. So, and an assumption of our planning that said
America will maintain complacent neutrality, that didn' t happen. The English aren
' t coming. The English came although we will be able to defend the
islands with this fundamental strategic error, which is to believe that you can win
a battle within an island when maritime domination is enemy. It' s impossible.
And the other thing, which was a very big mistake to have a
strategic insistence that they were going to land with a Pyrrhic victory in front of
Puerto Argentina, when the tip leistmo of the strategic training and tactics of an
English officer is the plans leader heart, enter with interior lines, make the
enemy change front, etc. Well, but you knew about this was also
known by the people who were in decision- making. Let' s say
the generals who were driving the same training that I had after, that is,
discarding the discard they knew. It' s not the English' way
of operating, et cetera, but sometimes it happens. It is not true
that I call them stubbornness. In medicine, it' s called therapeutic stubbornness.
And here I call it strategic engagement. You have conceived that they are
going to land this way, because this is the shortest way and because here
we are. Then you play there and you put all the defense, you
aim, the guns, do the field study, everything in that place and
the enemy. I' m not going to the place where you' re
the strongest. I' m going to the place where you' re weaker.
That is why San Carlos appears, that, however, the intelligence had
been very clear in a report that I still have said first place of disembarkation,
Argentine Port. He was induced, so the generals thought, obviously,
second place, San Carlos. This is the double how Dogliorie Doglioli' s
was one of the smartest men on the island and he had them put in
second place here, because because you saw that if there was a weapon they
were afraid of, it was the MM thirty- nine the exot and there
they were practically protected, because the MM thirty- nine still did not sail
following the current missiles. If following the surface of the earth, then the
heights and vessels were eaten, which were all protected, except that the missile
entered through the north mouth of the strait. So we, when we went
there we were already clear that it was a possibility of disembarkation and commando still
thought that it was going to be in Argentina with a victory and rich,
if they had it, not and how the news came to you personally,
this insinuation or the alert that they were doing a landing operation. Well,
we, in Puerto de San Carlos, applied the same methodology that we called
this plan B that is or zeta plan depends on what we wanted to talk
about on the radio, which was to have absolute control of the population.
We seized his weapons, the radios he was in that was fundamental. We
did a modest operation of veil and tactical deception, that is, do things
so that the enemy thinks that you are not there modest because the surfaces you
do not have, it is not tucumán that you have this woods and mountains
here you see everything, then you have to move very carefully, be well
masked, have positions prepared. We let people continue to make normal lives,
to bring their cattle back, to keep the chimneys smoking and talking on the
radio as little as possible and, of course, to get the radio out
of the islanders who were going to communicate with the fleet. So this is
how they found us on the landing to such an extent that they made a
terrible mistake, incredible for such professional forces that it is to land in broad
daylight without having eliminated us during the night with a commando operation, having to
endure our fires and, above all, the fire of the air force after
having discovered the landing. So really good. This later cost him some English
generals his career because he never disembarks like that. You have to first make
sure that you don' t go to anyone and do it overnight with commando
operations and then just the first helicopter that we would know this was a siking
with chinguillo or it came with ammunition with stocked. They were already totally convinced
that you weren' t there. It' s amazing and you guys were
how many. We were in total sixty- two, but we had twenty
- one at the tip, which was the height, two thirty- four,
because we had a problem with communications. The radio is that I tell
you, the one that allowed transmitting from that ship was a five hundred yasufl
that needed one hundred and ten balls to be able to operate and one hundred
and ten bowl We had only in Puerto San Carlos, at the height two
thirty- four, where there was distance so that the heavy weapons could throw,
because we were given three missions. Give the early warning in case of
a landing. It was possible to prevent the passage of any ship through the
north mouth of the roof. It was not possible because we were given two
mortars eighty- one and two canons without recoil. Imagine that the first breath
of fire, which sees a frigate sweeps away all the positions and the third
million that it was possible to keep under control the population of Ponte de San
Carlos. So we, who were taking steps for all that and were separated
with twenty- one men and forty- one because the radio is and we
were relieved, because the truth was that life at the tip was hard,
cold duber and much wind and lack of supply and has no way of covering.
And we were caught in the second relay, that is, the first
relay was stationed and then in the second relay with the second lieutenant kings.
There' s the landing and there' s the anecdote that four helicopters are
breaking down or they' re destroying it, too. The issue is that,
i e, fal rifles are tremendously powerful against helicopters when they are close
because they are aluminum, or say, drill the engine or affect hydraulic systems,
lectico systems or hit the pilot. They went through the four helicopters.
All these things happened that I tell you or some lost control, others the
pilot died, others were all holed in and they had to, without setting
that fire, land them. So what happened was that, not thinking we
were there, they got too close and we opened fire with them being new
soldiers. Forty- one soldiers spent a charger on the helicopter, which is
later called fire discipline in the infantry. Not too bad fire discipline, because
we didn' t spend all the ammunition coming down helicopters. But then I
was clear, we had to keep fighting and I had six hundred shots in
my backpack, that' s all. That was it, and they were
all shooting at the helicopters at the same time. Yes, because they were
the first to come clear and what happened next, how many British were landing
at that time and six thousand more were sixty- six sixty- two against
six. Zero exactly, that' s it. That is why, if
there is one important thing and it is not my month the merit of the
formation of the Argentine army and of what we thought at that time, there
was no possibility of surrender. It didn' t exist, I mean,
I wouldn' t have been allowed. I would not have allowed it for
us to surrender at that time was not prepared for the Argentine army, which
brought the glories of its entire history to surrender because it is a landing of
one hundred zero men. That' s why we' re in combat.
We were lucky after we were able to get rid of the air force attack.
But here' s what we say. They have rewarded the company and
all the officers who have been decorated, because it is a clear situation for
a surrender and yet it did not happen then. That is why that company
has had so much recognition, its flag is decorated, etcetera, for what
it made at that time decisions of the bosses. If I say, we
have to go into combat. That' s why I, when I cut
off communications with the General standing by, tell him my General is landing all
this in this place. I cut communications and proceed to defend the place.
I didn' t think of anything else and then, well, the fight
went off. We were having these little successes of seeing the helicopters fall.
The enemy commander who says what' s ahead because the helicopters fell off and
they were the ones who had to direct the artillery fire. Then the artillery
did not throw, but without success, because it was the helicopters, the
gazettes that had to direct the fire. So there was no other posity left
for them than to slow down the advance. And that' s what saves
us the most. First it appeared there was in clip and then the attack
of the force and there they make a retreat to where, an organized reply.
Well, I decided it wasn' t for Dargon Guog Green, because
it was clear that the mass was landing on that course. That is to
say, we who were going to meet the fleet again, not with that
of the frame that it gave on the landing ok then I said to Puerto
Argentina and it was heading eighty- one degrees and we started a march to
Puerto Argentino with how many soldiers you counted there at that time. Forty-
two. Forty- two or two sides return to Argentina' s port through
the middle of the island. It' s a very hard march. However,
I tell you that it was harder than the combat, because they were
initially later transformed into seventy kilometers, but they were a hundred kilometers that we
had to arrive with borseguías that were in bad water conditions, that we had
to pass the mob, that we would say they were magines that you were
sinking very cold, had started to snow already to last. Then it was
necessary to leave to be warm, to see that the soldiers do not affect
their legs, to get some food. That' s why we stopped in
two rooms that were abandoned and there they stopped a little bit of preparing some
hot food and ate, we had finished dinner and we got the English helicopters
that flew over us and I don' t know or didn' t see
us or they said we' re not going to have the same problem as
jazz. There are many who are there in comparison to having two groups of
shooters coming so they didn' t attack us and they left and then I
said good. At this point we started the march again until we arrived at
a town called Douglas Paadock, and there we did, for having communications open
and we warned him. In addition, I sent two non- commissioned officers,
first with a tractor and then with a horse to arrive. I made
a written report and sent it to General Menéndez. It' s an envelope
and how many days it took between San Carlos, three days, three days
and three nights. Three days and three nights, marching in the cold five
meals. The fight began on the twenty- first and we twenty- five
made a formation by the first homeland government with the Kelpers watching in this locality
that I tell you Dougla Spado with the Kelpers looking at us and I gave
a herring, trying to motivate and transmit patriotism to the soldiers. But we
' d seen what was landing, so we knew it was coming. And
then the war continued. Operations continued, we arrived, we were sent eight
helicopters to Dugla Spadock. From there they took us to Puerto Argentino. And
in Puerto Argentino I asked to give back Wingubrin Ocia to Puerto Santiago, because
there was the lieutenant. Esteves, with a section he had also stayed centurion
gomez and in turn, well, I had fractions of the 12th regiment who
had to go back to their people and I wanted to be with the rest
of my company, although I knew that there to make the fights harder.
It was obvious, because the mass had taken that course. Then they wanted
how they got the operation. We attacked the weakest garrison that Darwingku Green was
and we also advanced from San Carlos to Puerto Argentino so that they were clear
to make him change face to face what I called them the strategic commitment of
wanting to defend or prepare for a defense in Puerto Argentino. They force you
to change your face if they appear to you. On the other hand,
the artillery, the entire logistics side, must be turned around. The soldiers
who have their marked firing range finished a well and that well is no longer
full of water and is no better than going to another. So let'
s say what they achieved, which was a great tactical advantage, by waging
that the enemy has to change its face and that' s the end of
the strategic insistence with which they were going to land in Port. But it
was too late. It was already late, and in Puerto Santiago they took
place and the toughest fights, you told me, were hard and had a
very good performance in the 12th regiment. Also our company, with the sub
- Lieutenant Gómez centurion section. We could not do much, when we arrived
that was almost the day of the army, it was the 28th of May.
The lieutenant with the piachi who was in charge, he tells me to
look. We' re out of ammo. People very bad food. The
enemy has incredible coordination, incredible fire support. He throws sixty later, eighty
and one was with one hundred and twenty later he throws with artillery and if
he lacks anything, a Harry comes and throws it at you. He throws
it at you where he couldn' t. They couldn' t operate the
heavy weapons, so the situation was complicated. Turns out an officer, a
non- commissioned officer who had arrested him, was sent by the English to
tell the Chief of Regiment that they want to talk to him, telling you
they' re inside the city. This is a violation. We are going
to denounce the Commission in Geneva and I propose that it send a cease-
fire and we continue to negotiate. And that' s where the lieutenant'
s foot there orders General Menéndez' s permission and orders the cease- fire
at that time that they take as a prisoner. Yes, it was all
euphemistically taken away. Not first, well, we stopped pulling. Then the
officers will not hand over the weapons the soldiers and then it was the officers
also hand over the weapons and then put us in a prison camp. He
' s got a lot of experience, I mean, he' s got
a lot of war experience. They know how to handle things. They know
that once you have already lost the will to fight, it is not necessary
to continue or offend you, torturing you or weakening you because it leads to
a worse enemy. You tortured them. No, no, not at all.
I was questioned and nothing. It was a hit on the table,
because he was worried if the parachute brigade was going to jump or not.
As they knew this was parachute it is. He said good, but the
brigade jumps or doesn' t jump anything and they really were very respectful of
the Geneva Convention. They do not study it much, but in the regulations
they have actions that are clearly in respect of what the Commission of Geneva establishes
to tend the wounded, to give blood to the one who is more to
attend first, to the one that is more complicated, surgically, no matter
how much this enemy is, until later, when we were prisoners, until
putting out a salary you saw because it corresponds, it is true, by
the Commission of Geneva garn I then opened the canteen so that you spent everything
quickly and closed a lot to return to the continent, to return to Argentina.
We were lucky because already, played as it was, we arrived by
helicopter to Puerto San Carlos. Again they did as a helicopter rotation system and
took us all and there came a ship called Nordland hool. In Norland Hool
we were boarded and went to Puerto Carrasco, in Uruguay and arrived the day
the Pope was here, on June 13. The 14th fell in Puerto Argentina.
Impressive this that you tell me and I want to ask you about how
the deal on the continent was with veterans at that immediate moment of the return.
Of course, well, we have to understand each other. It is
true that neither society nor the remaining military commanders on the continent were prepared for
defeat. There was a sort of triumphalism that had been sold through the media.
Let' s go to the phrase that the first victim in the war
is the truth. Very successful actions had been painted, things that had happened
in the tactical plane. But, like here, there' s one thing
clear. Tactics can' t solve the mistakes of strategy, and I'
ve already marked your mistakes. He has tried falsely by saying that the United
States maintained a complacent neutrality. England will not react militarily. If you react,
we will be able to defend the islands and then the strategic mistake of
saying I will win when the sea rise, that enemy on an island is
impossible. Things that happened on the board that I give so far, I
give no more good support to that kind of thing. We' re here.
We arrived and, in particular, our company had a fairly acceptable reception
because we were first taken to the non- commissioned officers' school Sergeant Cabral
and there we were given. We had very bad clothes, borseguis, all
good food that we could cut off, hair, hygiene, etcetera. So
the military regiment was logical. The logic is not to allow us to make
contact so that we talk too much. Two or three reports were made to
me about what had happened in San Carlos and then we left for our town.
Our people were branches in the province of Chubut and there the truth that
the reception of the population was majestic. There' s the footage, Verita
Paja' s quartermaster, who handled all that. We were greeted with one
aspect, with one affection, with the band playing I mean, I don
' t have, I don' t have complaints. Although it is true
that afterwards it depends on the places where it has been. Veterans were not
received as they should be because they were people who did the best they could
with what they had. There was no more, there was no more food,
there was no more ammunition. Then they did what they could and six
hundred and forty- nine people had died. So, but well, this
is a process of demalvinization. A little bit from politics, a little bit
from people who had been more interested in the world than what was going on
on the island. But the truth is that the soldier has to be prepared
for that he cannot live from the post- war honors he fought, I
gave the best he had. He saw the companions is dying and he comes
back, and good if the people recognize him. Or the grenadiers of San
Martín. After the fight of San Carlos went to the North and when they
returned they ended up seven in a harapose state arriving and that' s why
today is when the relief of the tomb of the tinge finance is made seven.
They stayed seven. Nothing more. I' m talking about the San
Martín grenadiers. I ask you now a question that I am asking you from
the civilian world, which perhaps we do not understand some issues within what is
strictly military family, which is what happened with the issue of the promotions of
the Malvinas war veterans, especially the army, because, in that sense,
the army was in that sense something that, to the vision of a civilian
as I repeat to you, attracts the attention that it has not been reached,
for example, generals, what opinion, what vision you have on it,
why you think it happened good. There are different, different circumstances.
It' s not true and if you ask me, in my case,
I had the bad luck of going as a second commander of a general in
the 11th brigade of Galicians who had made corruption, I had to denounce and
that I knew that had happened. He was the governor and then the governor
was president and made him chief of the army. Then it was obvious that
I wasn' t going to be promoted. So that' s my case.
Others came from the war and they talked too much, so people said,
but well, the truth is I answer what it means to talk too
much and let' s say tell glories where there were none, or tell
successful personal stories that people said, but the truth is I don' t
understand why they didn' t win the war. Those people were said to
be marginalized a little bit by that kind of thing. And then it also
doesn' t mean that everyone who went to war deserved to be a general.
That' s why I did it. It was in the war and
there were very good people and it was also generated as a division those who
went and lost and we who stayed and did not lose. But in general,
they are more personal stories than a decision to tell why there were many
who returned from the islands and ascended. I mean, and I' m
telling you, my case was bad luck, that I was hit by a
bad commander and that he was on top of the army chief. I want
to ask you one last question. I am very pleased that you are currently
Secretary of Science and Technology at the National Defence University. Exactly how Malvinas is
taught, how involved it is in the educational process of people who specialize in
Malvinas defense and the experience of the bethos. Well, the question is very
interesting and I tell you that great efforts are being made to ensure that at
all levels of education, the elections learned in Malvinas are incorporated into the curricula
of each of the programs in the military school, the Naval School, the
Air Force School, the defence degree, the defence judiciary, the defense doctorate.
The knowledge of Malvinas, all that was learned, the need for joint
planning, the need for knowledge of armaments, the management of personnel, the
true attitudes of leadership, are transmitted and we have many, we have many
veterans who are teachers of the different forces, of different hierarchies that in the
different courses are transmitting what they saw, what they learned, what they had
taught and served us and we are transmitting it in all the courses. I
mean, Malvina suey is present and I don' t even tell you what
it means. Of course, the international law of armed conflicts, because there
was a great fallacy there. The great failings of the armed forces were the
lack of joint training and ignorance of the law of war, because it was
not common. Our soldiers didn' t know. I had problems because the
soldiers threw pilots who were in the water swimming and I totally prohibited you by
the Commission, but if they had 45 days of instruction, it was impossible.
Impossible. I thank you very much for the United Port and I am
always passionate about people who try to meet malvine and who give a little place
to veterans. And I give you the last idea for me now and Malvina
' s historical vision has to be overcome, is it a vision for the
future? And what is the vision for the future? It is an element
of union of the Argentine people or notice that we have good Boca river che
Leford in the United States, Trump seea tram No or the U Tanzi the
or such no And here we have a cause that has no opposition. Malvinas
has no opposition, that is, there is no Argentine, except there is
always some Anglophile who suddenly, but there is no Argentine who does not say
I, in our land we have to do our best to recover this value
diplomatically. Or what veterans did well was an attempt failed, but we have
set an example to the world that we are willing to die for that cause.
So I think we have to look at it as a union ele for
the future and say there go the Argentines united by this cade not to generate
silly diets that serve us at all, having this opportunity that there is no
Argentine here who opposes working for malvinas and recognizing what was done for Malvinas.
I thank you so much for these words. I agree that the general population
has a general insinuation of the population on the same horizon. It must be
capitalized, as you rightly say, it must be transformed into a tool of
unity. It is truly a pleasure to have had you here as well as
Alcomodoro' s Brigadier who came in the first hour. I thank all the
people who were listening to these two hours a little extended special programming on April
2. I' ll fire you. I also thank Neura very much for
giving this space, to make known the ideas, the experiences, the anecdotes
of these veterans. And a special thank you to Tronco, who is the
one who devised this goodbye