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In your ears, in your eyes
boundless communication. Eighty- nine seven welcome

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to this special edition of Neura.
On a very special date, on the

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forty- second anniversary of the Malvinas
era, it seemed appropriate in Neura to

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give a place to the people who
were and lived in their own flesh,

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which was the Malvinas conflict, which
was the personal heroes of Malvinas, a

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conflict that lasted seventy- four days, a conflict that left six hundred and

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forty- nine Argentines dead. The
compatriots are also one hundred and forty-

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one years of British occupation of the
Falkland Islands, and we thought it appropriate

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to give them the place in this
environment to tell their stories, We are

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together with Brigadier Ernesto Rubén Ureta,
who was a pilot during the Falklands War,

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and also along with the comodero GuillermoÁngel Martínez, who was also a

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pilot during the marine conflict. So
welcome both of you to Neura and it

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' s an honor to have you
here. Thank you very much, Nicholas,

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good night. Very grateful for this
invitation that we have received so that

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we can share not only with you, Nicholas, but with what Malvina was,

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how we live it and, at
the same time, pay a well

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- deserved tribute to all those who
also fought the same with us, but

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well they could have the fate of
losing their lives in combat, which is,

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as I always say, for a
soldier of the best way to win.

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The sky is true. Therefore,
this one in this, in these

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talks that we do, we always
repeat and honor without ceasing those memories of

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our comrades who fell fighting, not
only the six hundred and forty- nine

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men who lost their lives during the
war of all forces, but in particular

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the fifty- five men of the
air force who lost their lives in combat

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and particularly the eight men of the
squadron to four c to whom we belonged

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and there we were doing our duty. Okay. I believe the Brigadier is

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thought of the best words. I
would add and, in addition to thanking

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you for the invitation, the importance
that every year a new one must be

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commemorated, a new anniversary of the
pregnancy of Malvins, because, just as

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we were speaking previously you were very
young or you were not born. I

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think that for those of us who
participate and are already great, at least

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my personal opinion, the most important
thing we can do is to convey our

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experience and that the new generations learn
that it is Malvina, that it was

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Malvina I, in my childhood,
my teachers taught us that there were some

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islands that were called Malvinas and that
they were ours, but they were played

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by the English good, the generations, the new generations, they have to

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learn that the islands, if they
are ours, is part of our territory,

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that there was a conflict, as
Adier said, that there were many

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people who offered the most expensive that
we can have in our life and that

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it is a goal that we cannot
give up generation after generation, as we

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come through this life. We must
continue to insist that we be returned in

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the territory that belongs to us,
for peaceful life, for diplomatic life,

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for the lives of negotiation, wherever
it may be. But you have to

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make a goal that we can'
t give up. I want to tell

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all the listeners we were talking a
little bit earlier here with Ernesto and Guillermo

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and the very nice truth in having
come this presentation they make. One gets

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a little chicken skin and they'
re also going to be telling us a

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little bit about their anecdotes that lived
before the conflict, previously, when they

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met that I' m interested in
knowing if they already had family, who

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was waiting for them at home.
What happened during the conflict and what happened

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after the conflict? How you lived
it. I think it' s a

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very valuable space for them to count. I thank you for knowing the word.

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That' s good. I got
to Brey and yesterday I knew him

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from before, because he was stationed
in the Fifth Brigade when I was doing

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the combat pilot course. And what
I' m going to say is not

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an obsequence, but let' s
say it was a guy I wanted to

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look like was a guy who with
character, with demand and good already what

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we were talking about. I don' t want to mention it, but

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he told you something about an attitude, an action that he did on the

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30th of May and that for me
is admirable, just as he did Joseph

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Vázquez, true, this good one. I am born in the province of

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Santa Fe, in Cañada de Gómez. I don' t have any military

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relatives. How does it get to
the air force? How I came by

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force. I always liked to read
a lot and my father, who was

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a trade clerk, didn' t
have any money left. We weren'

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t a rich family. But only
having finished the primary did I know that

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progress was going through the educational issue. Then I bought books. None of

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the books he bought me were about
World War II, and well he devoured

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me and I wanted to do like
the pilots of the raft or the German

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force. And that' s how
I was being secondary. This one you

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remembered the whole time I wasn'
t in what I did. They were

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crazy, but I had no idea. He gave our ways. Many times

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there are circumstances that may not be
difficult to understand. But then, when

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time goes by, you can analyze
it. It happened that at the school

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where I was doing high school,
I had a partner whose brother had done

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the same school as us, but
had entered two years earlier and had entered

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the injury school. So my partner' s name was Romulo Guerrini and this

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gentleman' s name is Luis Guerrini. Then Luis was the path that led

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me into the school of beaming.
Well, four years passed the aviation school.

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It' s four years. They
do in Cordoba. It' s

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done in Cordoba. He' s
on his way to Carlos Paz. It

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' s the last facility and it' s four years of cadets. My

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promotion started flying in the third year, but if not before it was four

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pure years of infantry cadet. Let' s say nothing to do with plane

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and then that if the course of
military dor ok, ernesto you also previously

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had that step. Yeah, sure, yeah. I joined aviation school in

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the' 70s. I graduated four
years later, in seventy- three,

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already with four years of cadet,
and in seventy- four I took the

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course of military aviator, which is
what you are already given the insignia of

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military aviator brief. And after that, everyone who did the courses, some

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chose to go to transport aviation,
another helicopter aviation and others. In my

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case, it was chosen and apart
from choosing good, more or less,

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I gave up the conditions to go
to home school to qualify me as a

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combat pilot, home pilot, why
hunt them and not another. Because why

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he hunts them down, why you
chose the houses now and not the trap

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transport anymore. The flight is free
that the planes where we were flying only

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the pilot is called mono planes put
on a single pilot suddenly the activity.

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The different wholesalers that are made at
home school, let' s say,

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caught me more, that' s
not true. That' s why,

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perhaps because you want to be more
gripped, although what transport aviation is and

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the helicopter version. In the Falklands
conflict, they demonstrated all the claws they

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had, and so they did many
missions as important as the one we were

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doing. But anyway, back then, at twenty- three years old,

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I chose to take the home pilot
course that is done at the Fourth Air

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Brigade in Mendoza Ok and that in
which year you finished the school. Seventy

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- three years ago, I graduated
as an Air Force officer. Seventy-

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four years later, I graduated as
a military aviator and in seventy- five

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years as a home pilot. Then
the time comes for the conflict. You

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had several hours and you were hunting
well. Yes, yes, yes,

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because after doing the home school,
this one was assigned to the Fifth Air

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Brigade, where the planes were at
four bs ky Ho not true and there

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I did for a year all the
qualification to be cap pilot three suitable for

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combat, as is the designation that
we have after surrendering all the conditions for

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a year flying in the four B. And after five years, plus six

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years I was flying, I was
flying the four B until the end of

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the eighty- one, when there
was a change of destination, as we

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all have, and I was destined
to the Fourth Air Brigade and within the

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Fourth BRIGADERA to fly the plane to
four C. Two thousand and four Cs.

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It was the plane. It'
s the same, it' s

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the same plane that was four Bs, with some newer things technologically, a

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little bit more advanced and at the
time of the conflict you were handling that

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B. I was talking because just
the end of the eighty- one I

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left the Fifth Brigade. I stopped
flying to four Bs. In January,

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the first day of February, I
started flying to four six in March.

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Well, this one hit me at
the start of the conflict, flying four

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Cs to four Cs. And you, William of the Four C. When

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you started getting in touch. Well, I finished the aviator course at aviation

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school in March of the eighties.
I left in December of the seventy-

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nine east and there we immediately went. I was assigned to the fourth brigade

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to do the combat plot course.
We arrived and after three days we started

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the course. I finished it in
December of the eighties and let' s

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say after the end of the course, I was selected to stay in the

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fourth brigade to fly to four Cs. This one starts the course. I

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believe that in March April there was
a slight delay to start the course,

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because the squadrons of combat deployed every
month to the Gallego River. So I

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think either by February or March,
the four- seal squadron. He had

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to spend a month in the Gallego
River, and that' s why he

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was late. I started flying on
May 8, 1980, and I finished

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the course in December 1980. And
all this in you guys still didn'

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t know each other at the time. I didn' t know him on

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my flight only four that he was
in Reyno and well it was actually not

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good. We all know each other. We always exchange activities or meetings,

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war exercises, it' s not
true, all exercises and we' re

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always in touch. We have not
known since, but we started working together

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that year eighty- two senses in
February when I arrived at the Fourth Brega

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or February eighty- two and within
a few months this conflict broke out.

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You, from within the forces,
saw it as imminent or not at all.

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I spent fifteen days in Rio Gallegos
from March 15th to March 30th.

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Gallegos River. Then it was a
unit of the area force that had no

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planes, but that, given its
position after the problem we had with Chile,

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every month deployed a squadron of fighter
planes. I got four on the

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squadron. Sele played from 15 March
to 15 April and we split for 15

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days each. I was there on
the 15th of March to the 30th of

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March and returned to Mendoza on the
30th and did the normal training activity,

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but I never suspected that two days
later they were going to recover Malvina Island.

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What' s more, I was
single. He lived at the casino.

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I had shared my room with a
partner of mine the previous year who

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had an accident and died, and
then a new officer came to the unit

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that year. I' ve known
him for two years. He had been

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a cadet, his alternate friend,
let' s say at the beam school.

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Then he comes and tells me I
had a room with private bathroom of

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some comforts or everyone who made single
who is in the air force at that

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time. At that time, then
you tell me you have some problem that

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I am going to live with you
I say no, but it really worked

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out very well because I felt very
lonely in the room to remember the one

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next to me was my partner who
was no longer there. There was a

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moment that affected me, but this
guy had the habit, that he programmed

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his radio equipment to ring with the
alarm clock and hooked up a station that

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was starting to pass news. And
on April 2 I woke up with the

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march of Malvinas and I say what
happens Rubén, not on the radio and

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good, and that we have recovered
in the Malvinas Islands another sea. Well,

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there, well, I got up, introduced myself to the squadron,

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arrived errestus and the officers who were
married living in the city and well,

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it was a terrible mess. Not
you. You heard about it on the

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radio, too. Arrest. Yeah, yeah, yeah, already that year

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I was living in the city of
Mendoza I was and I' m married

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to Elvira. I had two boys
and one on the way. And like

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every morning, every day of work, I was a Friday, it was

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April, it was Friday except for
seven and a half or so of home

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for the start time of activities in
the brigade. It was 8: 00

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in the morning. I grab it, I prepare to march to the author

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radio that I and going out to
the city, going to the brigade,

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that is a little far from the
city, where the airport of Mendoza is.

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There he began to listen, they
recovered to the islands, the alarm

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went on. Sure, then well, for half an hour' s journey

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until we got to the Unit listening
to everything and we started to meet with

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them who were there, the other
officers older than I the squadron chief,

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and well, they started falling orders, directives of instructions, that that that

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was received by the boss of the
painting and that was where it came to

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us. I was supposed to give
first lieutenant at the time and just listen

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and take orders and prepare and chat
and well, it changed the work environment

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a lot. It changed the working
environment a lot at that time to start

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working and to make plans, notes
and thoughts already for real case. While

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I left home and when, because
that was April 2, we just April

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11, the squadron deployed. He
went begging to Puerto San Julián. There

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' s the San Julián military air
base. It was created in the city

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of Puerto San Julián in Santa Cruz
for this time the other half of the

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squadron were in Río Gallego, true
and also understanding the same. But we,

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in those days of two to eleven
April, when the deployment was already

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ordered, were just telling my Lady
Este what happened. Of course, worried

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about Mrs No problem, nothing'
s going to happen. We have to

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go because we have to say respond
and sustain the recovery of the islands that

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Argentina had already made and of course
in England it was not going to cross.

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But neither can we leave them alone
there those who recovered the islands.

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So I tell you the problem is
all right and we' re gone.

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00:18:00,079 --> 00:18:03,640
I left this one all to all
the boys. I know I' m

207
00:18:03,720 --> 00:18:06,960
desperate today You had kids at the
time, too. Claro was two two

208
00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:11,440
of five years old, Franco and
Laura, and there was one on the

209
00:18:11,720 --> 00:18:15,119
way that was born on July nine
of the eighty- two, named Sandra.

210
00:18:15,240 --> 00:18:19,480
We put Sandra Soledad on him.
Now that you' re reflecting,

211
00:18:21,000 --> 00:18:27,799
but it wasn' t so little
related to Malvina. Sandra Soledad Llama was

212
00:18:27,799 --> 00:18:32,680
born on July 9, which was
about twenty days after I returned from San

213
00:18:32,720 --> 00:18:41,359
Julián and well, there my lady
stayed, of course, worried. One

214
00:18:41,440 --> 00:18:47,480
of a sudden when that good came
up we go and as a home pilot,

215
00:18:48,680 --> 00:18:53,640
we are pilots of the armed force, one says come on we have

216
00:18:53,720 --> 00:18:56,240
to recover the islands are ours.
We have no doubt. People had already

217
00:18:56,279 --> 00:19:00,680
landed there, we had already had
a dead man there in the acronym that

218
00:19:00,759 --> 00:19:04,480
Chinese, this Caramba, this one
we' re going to mobilize. We

219
00:19:04,480 --> 00:19:08,079
have to be clear and we'
re kind of excited. Actually, our

220
00:19:08,079 --> 00:19:14,359
time came for that. We enter
an armed force, in particular us,

221
00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:18,519
the air force. So, man, there' s mine. This is

222
00:19:18,519 --> 00:19:23,079
it. We' re good,
we were good, I was good at

223
00:19:23,119 --> 00:19:25,279
all times I felt prepared at that
time. Yeah. Yeah, yeah,

224
00:19:25,400 --> 00:19:29,480
yeah, yeah, we had really
good training. This not only me,

225
00:19:29,519 --> 00:19:33,160
who already had on the other plane
very similar to eight hundred hours, but

226
00:19:33,200 --> 00:19:37,599
all the instruction that we were giving
to comrades der there in Reynolds, in

227
00:19:37,680 --> 00:19:45,640
the Fifth Brigade, I was giving
him this instruction, being chief of squadron,

228
00:19:45,640 --> 00:19:49,000
officer instructor. Then we saw him
well prepared and they, even at

229
00:19:49,039 --> 00:19:53,359
one year, had no more than
that course of qualification to be pilot of

230
00:19:53,359 --> 00:19:59,720
combat forgiveness pilot stage three on the
plane to four c. Because fighter pilot

231
00:19:59,799 --> 00:20:00,119
' s already gone. That'
s when he did the school of calsa.

232
00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:07,200
True we knew they were in good
condition and well, they proved it

233
00:20:07,200 --> 00:20:12,839
well. It' s not true, of course, and at that moment

234
00:20:12,839 --> 00:20:17,279
they' re both deployed. In
Puerto San Julián, A Puerto San Julián,

235
00:20:17,359 --> 00:20:26,519
when air force departures began. From
Puerto San Julián there was an own

236
00:20:26,759 --> 00:20:30,359
comment from the air force. It
wasn' t an air force million attacking

237
00:20:30,559 --> 00:20:34,240
naval targets. It wasn' t
a million air force to attack a fleet

238
00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:38,759
and well, and of course,
the second fleet in the world isn'

239
00:20:38,839 --> 00:20:45,680
t true of England, but just
to attack a fleet we had to fly

240
00:20:45,759 --> 00:20:48,680
over the sea, and the flight
over the sea is very different from flying

241
00:20:48,680 --> 00:20:52,200
on the ground. We prepare ourselves
at all times, since we first boarded

242
00:20:52,319 --> 00:20:57,319
a plane, to do the training
as a pilot, always doing maneuvers on

243
00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:03,279
the ground, just like the terrain
where you have different elevations of hill,

244
00:21:03,359 --> 00:21:07,559
mountain, tree antennas. It gives
you a reference to how high we can

245
00:21:07,640 --> 00:21:12,119
fly, while flying over the sea, you have no reference to see whether

246
00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:17,279
how high or how low. I
am true, then we had to do

247
00:21:17,359 --> 00:21:22,599
that during the month of April,
prepare to make an attack that was not

248
00:21:22,599 --> 00:21:26,240
our mission, the mission of the
false was not the attack, but we

249
00:21:26,240 --> 00:21:30,599
had to make this comment very interesting
and that month was enough for you or

250
00:21:30,680 --> 00:21:33,559
in one and I reach at least
we believe it is. I encourage myself

251
00:21:33,599 --> 00:21:37,920
to say yes because during all the
missions we went out of combat there was

252
00:21:37,079 --> 00:21:41,599
no one who would crash the water
as is the risk of flying over the

253
00:21:41,640 --> 00:21:45,720
sea and not realizing how low we
are and suddenly the water would hit you

254
00:21:45,720 --> 00:21:51,240
in all the missions. The people
who lost their lives were in combat maneuver

255
00:21:51,240 --> 00:21:56,119
for having been flying over the sea
and lacking training. We did it throughout

256
00:21:56,160 --> 00:22:03,240
the month of opening different exit back
low, because also worth saying the technology

257
00:22:03,279 --> 00:22:08,400
that our planes had was not comparable
to the technology that naval aviation and the

258
00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:14,559
fleet of sea had. Naval aviation, I say English, and the sea

259
00:22:14,640 --> 00:22:19,200
fleet. They have a lot of
instruments to detect us, so that if

260
00:22:19,240 --> 00:22:22,319
we detect it, they evade us. We didn' t have any of

261
00:22:22,319 --> 00:22:26,000
that. What is called there is
today and we have it in today'

262
00:22:26,039 --> 00:22:32,079
s planes. The alarming radar that
tells you if a plane wants to attack

263
00:22:32,119 --> 00:22:34,720
you, it' s not true. Or if a piece of artillery is

264
00:22:34,759 --> 00:22:38,599
about to launch a missile or something
is an instrument that alerts you, then

265
00:22:38,759 --> 00:22:42,119
you know what you can do.
In this case. We didn' t

266
00:22:42,119 --> 00:22:49,079
have anything. We also did not
have equipment to prevent the impact of missiles,

267
00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:55,039
as they are called the flair,
that is an incandescent light, where

268
00:22:55,079 --> 00:23:00,440
the missile that comes to impart to
you you will remove that incandescent light the

269
00:23:00,559 --> 00:23:06,200
flair and goes to that certain light
because it attracts it the heat of health

270
00:23:06,240 --> 00:23:12,519
or some metallic magnetic tapes or without
foil, paper as metallic, where the

271
00:23:12,640 --> 00:23:15,759
missile is also attracted. We didn' t have any of that, that

272
00:23:17,319 --> 00:23:22,400
is, we had no way of
avoiding a missile impact that could come to

273
00:23:22,400 --> 00:23:25,240
us or even find out. Of
course, but in the same way,

274
00:23:25,559 --> 00:23:30,480
they had to leave, of course
they acted, of course you made a

275
00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:33,640
correction before entering. Hence the difference
between missions and departures. Of course it

276
00:23:33,720 --> 00:23:37,359
' s important to differentiate him.
We had about eighty- seven outings in

277
00:23:37,359 --> 00:23:44,279
our eighty- seven combat squadron and
we already called the outing of combat from

278
00:23:44,319 --> 00:23:47,319
May 1, because the departures during
the month of April were mostly training,

279
00:23:47,440 --> 00:23:51,799
or we made overflights, on the
islands as to raise the spirits of all

280
00:23:51,839 --> 00:23:55,599
the people who were deployed from the
three Marine Army and Air Force forces.

281
00:23:59,599 --> 00:24:03,200
Gendarmerie personnel had also been deployed there, and their work was also important.

282
00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:11,559
But that was mostly isolation. The
combat exit began on May 1st, when

283
00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:17,519
the people of Porto Argentine Island received
the bombing of the Vulcans on May 1st

284
00:24:17,519 --> 00:24:22,440
at forty. Then from there,
ready, let' s go more to

285
00:24:22,480 --> 00:24:27,279
the fight. Well, then there
was almost a month in which it was

286
00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:33,599
prep. Okay, Guillermo You participated. You told me of different departures and

287
00:24:33,599 --> 00:24:40,799
also of some missions that remained in
history. One of these was the attack

288
00:24:40,839 --> 00:24:48,000
of a British ship on the Islands. Yes, the first departure is the

289
00:24:48,079 --> 00:24:55,000
day on the grounds of May 1st
and I mention it, because it'

290
00:24:55,039 --> 00:25:02,000
s a little anecdotal. This is
also to give an idea of what was

291
00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:06,480
happening at the time. I think
it was the twenty- eightth of March,

292
00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:08,880
twenty- ninth of April. Sorry. It was a weekend and we

293
00:25:08,960 --> 00:25:12,839
took off with what was my squadron
boss, the first Mansote tooth, partner

294
00:25:14,079 --> 00:25:18,000
of lurigadier at six in the morning, completely at night, a wolf'

295
00:25:18,079 --> 00:25:25,559
s mouth from the airport there from
San Julián. Well, our mission was

296
00:25:26,039 --> 00:25:33,119
to go to the Falkland Islands without
resupply. Practically in height we were going

297
00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:41,160
with missiles, Shaffrir missiles similar to
side winder b. We have to be

298
00:25:41,200 --> 00:25:45,440
in touch with the radar and so, as Rider said, then making contact

299
00:25:45,799 --> 00:25:49,960
with the crazy ok is a pilot
air force officer who guides air force aircraft

300
00:25:51,000 --> 00:25:53,880
when they attack ground targets, say, support the army, for example,

301
00:25:55,319 --> 00:26:00,720
then that person guides you. Then
we went out to me and we were

302
00:26:00,759 --> 00:26:07,079
already in the middle of the Atlantic
and I started to see it still did

303
00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:11,400
not dawn towards the north, towards
Buenos Aires. To my left were two

304
00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:17,599
very remarkable columns, but there were
about twenty lights such a thing, all

305
00:26:18,200 --> 00:26:22,680
dots separated and were two columns.
I say how strange, because in the

306
00:26:22,680 --> 00:26:26,640
south, in the area of the
Magellan Canal is made in Magellan there are

307
00:26:26,680 --> 00:26:30,440
oil wells that many times if you
are flying, even if it is covered

308
00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:36,759
with newness, you notice all the
fire of what the gases of the distillation

309
00:26:36,799 --> 00:26:40,319
of the oil actually burn, I
say, but at this point, here

310
00:26:40,359 --> 00:26:42,960
in the middle of the ocean,
there may be platforms so that they are

311
00:26:42,960 --> 00:26:47,279
so aligned. All she did,
but the embroiderment was the radio silence.

312
00:26:47,279 --> 00:26:51,640
So I shut my mouth. We
arrived, we made contact with the roder,

313
00:26:52,039 --> 00:26:56,519
we did our homework there What means
radio silence. Don' t talk,

314
00:26:56,960 --> 00:27:00,240
don' t talk during, because
I could have told my guide,

315
00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:06,160
you see the lights and that would
have been a radio broadcast. They,

316
00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:11,440
the English, could have taken this
radio silence. He stayed on every exit.

317
00:27:11,200 --> 00:27:15,720
We, if we always maintained,
even when we were going to resupply

318
00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:22,039
in flight, there was virtually no
talk. But the question is to finish

319
00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:27,960
this anecdotal part, we finished another
task we came back to land and Mansoti

320
00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:33,279
tells me he saw what was there
north of our route when we went to

321
00:27:33,559 --> 00:27:37,119
the islands more. I mean,
yes, I didn' t want to

322
00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:40,880
break his radio silence. I say
what was the fleet of that and of

323
00:27:41,039 --> 00:27:44,000
course it was the fruit. I
was already arriving at the fleet in the

324
00:27:44,079 --> 00:27:48,240
area of operations. I already believe
that that day or the next day was

325
00:27:48,319 --> 00:27:52,920
determined the exclusion zone And well,
then came the first of May and the

326
00:27:53,039 --> 00:27:59,640
medical actions, as the Brigadier said
of cinema and the topic that prepres me

327
00:27:59,759 --> 00:28:07,119
of the frigate frigate possible broken frigate
more, is a mission in which I

328
00:28:07,160 --> 00:28:11,599
participated on the twenty- fourth of
May. On May 24th, 24 days

329
00:28:11,599 --> 00:28:15,359
were gone. It had already been
or had already been on other missions.

330
00:28:15,720 --> 00:28:22,720
He had gone out on the twenty- first day along with Mansotti and López,

331
00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:25,920
Captain Harmonio. I think he was
on another squadron, too. I

332
00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:30,680
don' t know if you don' t participate in another one, too,

333
00:28:30,680 --> 00:28:32,519
but in another squadron. The point
is that that day I had a

334
00:28:32,559 --> 00:28:37,519
flaw and I turned back. But
that day Manzot and Lopez were shot down.

335
00:28:37,880 --> 00:28:41,640
They continued on the mission and they
were shot down. I went out

336
00:28:41,720 --> 00:28:45,200
again. In the twenty- four, as I tell you, we were

337
00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:49,799
three planes. The squadron chief was
First Lieutenant Vazquez. Then I fell into

338
00:28:49,880 --> 00:28:55,240
the attack on the invincible. I
was number two and number three was Lieutenant

339
00:28:55,279 --> 00:29:00,240
Bono. It was from the pre- mine promotion. Well, at the

340
00:29:00,319 --> 00:29:04,640
time I was an instructor at home
school. But as we had already begun

341
00:29:04,720 --> 00:29:10,160
to have casualties, he had been
brought in because he had stopped flying in

342
00:29:10,279 --> 00:29:14,079
December of the eighty- one,
so it had been a short time since

343
00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:17,880
he had stopped flying. He was
quickly rehabilitated. The point is, well,

344
00:29:18,880 --> 00:29:21,680
we take off. We went to
the resupplyer all in silence. We

345
00:29:22,119 --> 00:29:29,000
resupplyed, followed a number of minutes
to that level, about seven thousand meters,

346
00:29:29,279 --> 00:29:33,079
and then began to make a descent
that was made taking into account the

347
00:29:33,119 --> 00:29:38,039
radar coverage of some ship that they
could put to the west of the islands

348
00:29:38,119 --> 00:29:47,440
to detect the arrival of our planes. Well, there was a squadron that

349
00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:52,599
preceded us. We were in complete
radio silence at one point I think he

350
00:29:52,799 --> 00:30:06,440
was intercepted. Well, they obviously
broke the formation nerves or let' s

351
00:30:06,480 --> 00:30:11,759
say it wasn' t a situation
of being very calm, because you were

352
00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:15,920
hearing that the question where you were
going was pretty complicated. Well, what

353
00:30:15,960 --> 00:30:18,640
do you think about that moment?
I didn' t think anything. You

354
00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:26,799
know that, even if it seemed
illogical, right, at least in my

355
00:30:26,799 --> 00:30:33,000
case, I was so committed to
flying the plane and following it to my

356
00:30:33,839 --> 00:30:40,000
guide that you were actually running.
No. No, no, no,

357
00:30:38,200 --> 00:30:40,359
no? Don' t you?
Don' t you? No. You

358
00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:44,799
were thinking if I get hit,
if I get knocked down, what a

359
00:30:44,839 --> 00:30:47,079
mess that might be, you think
about it before or after you get out.

360
00:30:47,119 --> 00:30:48,920
But once you' re there you' re doing the mission, at

361
00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:52,279
least in my case, no,
no, I wasn' t thinking that.

362
00:30:52,079 --> 00:30:59,200
But we were very close, very
close to the ground with the ground,

363
00:30:59,880 --> 00:31:03,200
with foothills. So Vásquet was still
rasante, stuck to the floor and

364
00:31:03,240 --> 00:31:10,279
in a moment we got to the
north of the beginning of the Strait of

365
00:31:10,319 --> 00:31:12,039
San Carlos and to the right.
We went like this with a group like

366
00:31:12,119 --> 00:31:19,559
this as if we had gone to
Puerto Argentina and in a moment we found

367
00:31:19,559 --> 00:31:22,359
ourselves in the Strait of San Carlos
and to the right. The whole fleet

368
00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,680
there you go that breaks on the
right, one we follow. I already,

369
00:31:26,799 --> 00:31:33,000
he lost it directly. I saw
the first thing I saw were what

370
00:31:33,119 --> 00:31:37,640
I said, pompons, explosions of
artillery before aerial, which are small clouds,

371
00:31:38,359 --> 00:31:45,759
gray or so and then also after
before there were all or you were

372
00:31:45,319 --> 00:31:51,359
three, we were three and the
fleet How many ships you foreign exchange,

373
00:31:51,599 --> 00:31:56,240
how many you saw. I don' t know that I remember at least

374
00:31:56,400 --> 00:32:01,640
there were six or seven. I
remember perfectly that on the west of the

375
00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:06,400
strait was what was the hospital ship, which was a very large ship,

376
00:32:07,480 --> 00:32:12,680
but there were also on the grey
ships, the warships in the middle and

377
00:32:12,759 --> 00:32:16,519
there were ships and small boats approaching
the coast, where the landing had already

378
00:32:16,519 --> 00:32:20,400
been made on the twenty- one, that is, there was a movement.

379
00:32:20,599 --> 00:32:25,160
I still don' t know if
they were on the ground or they

380
00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:28,519
weren' t rooting in the beach
head that they had started making the twenty

381
00:32:28,519 --> 00:32:32,559
- one. Truth is good.
I didn' t see a boat there

382
00:32:32,599 --> 00:32:36,759
Grey, which was relatively close to
the coast, and I went there.

383
00:32:37,279 --> 00:32:39,279
I didn' t see Vásquez anymore
and I didn' t see Bono anymore.

384
00:32:39,839 --> 00:32:45,160
The point is that when I saved
I see in the right rearview mirror

385
00:32:45,200 --> 00:32:53,039
an explosion a red flare and I
see Vázquez coming forward from me a little

386
00:32:53,079 --> 00:32:59,920
lower than me and doing like a
trail that I thought was humun stuff.

387
00:33:00,359 --> 00:33:06,799
So and behind me, a little
higher up, I see fertilizer and well,

388
00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:10,599
I lost a lot. The trail
was very greyish and very thick.

389
00:33:12,759 --> 00:33:17,039
I thought it was an engine problem
that had hit him, because the two

390
00:33:17,160 --> 00:33:23,960
planes that we arrived later came back, had artillery impact everywhere. Of course

391
00:33:24,079 --> 00:33:28,680
you guys weren' t looking to
meet the flotation then. We were going

392
00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:32,640
to attack, rob yes, because
already the landing of them began on the

393
00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:37,920
21st of May and could attack it
correctly. Yes, yes, what you

394
00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:42,119
mention about the frigate arroll I don' t know if it was the rock

395
00:33:42,119 --> 00:33:47,559
frigate, because I don' t
remember or any distinctive mark that is attributed

396
00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:53,640
to both the English and some source
who have investigated from Argentina looking for coincidences,

397
00:33:53,759 --> 00:33:59,160
they say it may be the frigate
of I know that the frigate was

398
00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:02,319
attacked several times, not only on
the 24th of May. The point is

399
00:34:02,359 --> 00:34:10,199
to say to finish this story,
we go out and vásquez sees the loss

400
00:34:10,239 --> 00:34:15,679
we had of fuel. He asks
Bonos if he had a problem and tells

401
00:34:15,679 --> 00:34:19,760
us no. Don' t worry, that' s a waste of groceries.

402
00:34:20,119 --> 00:34:23,639
Let' s go to the resupplyer. We had to go for the

403
00:34:23,639 --> 00:34:28,320
resupplier. Bono tells you I don' t have a problem. All the

404
00:34:28,400 --> 00:34:34,960
normal motor instruments don' t go
up because the packs will be waiting for

405
00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:38,719
us on the island of Great Malvina
and there they will intercept us. Let

406
00:34:38,840 --> 00:34:43,880
' s keep going a little further, how many meters of the floor were

407
00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:47,079
there, there the first part and
continue along the canal and then we start

408
00:34:47,239 --> 00:34:51,440
heading west past the floor on the
island. And besides, as the Brigadier

409
00:34:51,480 --> 00:34:58,079
said, flying scratching over the earth, we have experience in the sea.

410
00:34:58,360 --> 00:35:04,480
The feeling and perspective I have is
that you' re thinking you' re

411
00:35:04,480 --> 00:35:07,159
close, but you' re actually
getting tall. So, well, the

412
00:35:07,239 --> 00:35:13,320
planes had some instrument that ours had. There was an altimeter radius that measured

413
00:35:13,360 --> 00:35:16,280
the distance or height between the plane
and the water, and that allowed us

414
00:35:16,320 --> 00:35:22,519
to fly maybe lower, because you
have no reference, as the Brigadier said.

415
00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:27,159
True, the question is that well, about half the island, we

416
00:35:27,159 --> 00:35:32,280
started to climb and when we were
about five thousand meters away, Vasquez I

417
00:35:32,360 --> 00:35:38,159
had him up front to the left
and Bono had him down back to the

418
00:35:38,239 --> 00:35:45,599
left. I was to the right
of God two and I see the plane

419
00:35:45,639 --> 00:35:52,360
of one place a turn to the
left, a downward spiral and then ends

420
00:35:52,480 --> 00:35:55,280
up impacting on the sea. Obviously, when I saw that he started going

421
00:35:55,320 --> 00:35:59,920
down, I broke radio silence.
I told Vázquez that I told Bono we

422
00:36:00,239 --> 00:36:05,239
called him Turkish, I tell him
the Turk is going down. Turkish,

423
00:36:05,320 --> 00:36:09,719
Ejectate, Turcoyectate. There was no
answer. What I remember is the impact

424
00:36:09,800 --> 00:36:16,920
on the plane' s sea.
Vasquet immediately passed the coordinates of the position.

425
00:36:17,159 --> 00:36:21,679
Others had a navigation team called OMEGA. It' s similar to what

426
00:36:21,920 --> 00:36:27,400
you have today' s GPS.
He passed it to the six hundred and

427
00:36:27,480 --> 00:36:30,880
thirty to launch the search and rescue
issue, because maybe we also thought he

428
00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:37,199
might have injected himself. But not
good. I, many years later,

429
00:36:37,400 --> 00:36:47,800
met rescue search pilots, Commodore Longar. I think there was also the Commodore

430
00:36:47,960 --> 00:36:52,280
Major Shame, who were helicopter pilots, who were searching and rescuing and went

431
00:36:52,280 --> 00:36:55,719
looking for that area. This I
learned from them, from the account of

432
00:36:55,760 --> 00:37:00,559
it, that they went to look
for him and found nothing really and why

433
00:37:00,639 --> 00:37:05,480
you think he fell lost consciousness.
I believe, as I told you,

434
00:37:05,679 --> 00:37:10,199
the planes had artillery and rifle strikes, their rifles, whatever I think he

435
00:37:10,239 --> 00:37:21,719
is. After the attack he replied
that the plane had no problem, we

436
00:37:21,880 --> 00:37:24,800
did more than three minutes until we
started the ascent another the rest, we

437
00:37:24,840 --> 00:37:30,599
got to five thousand meters up and
he kept flying the plane And by the

438
00:37:30,719 --> 00:37:32,559
attitude that takes the plane, that
is, it gives the impression that the

439
00:37:32,679 --> 00:37:37,360
plane was left unchecked. I figure
it might have had an impact on a

440
00:37:37,440 --> 00:37:43,760
small weapon that bled out, lost
consciousness, and lost control of the plane.

441
00:37:45,519 --> 00:37:52,360
That' s very possible. Me
after the mission. After the mission,

442
00:37:52,639 --> 00:37:58,960
but I didn' t realize the
mission. The planes have an instrument

443
00:37:59,000 --> 00:38:02,760
called a getometer, which measures the
amount of g one places and I remember

444
00:38:02,760 --> 00:38:09,320
that I had two negative Gs that
to put them two gen negatives. Sure,

445
00:38:09,559 --> 00:38:14,239
when I saw that instrument once we
had already gotten there and everything else,

446
00:38:14,800 --> 00:38:17,159
I don' t know if six
or seven positive Gs had gone from

447
00:38:17,199 --> 00:38:22,400
G to the plane, but pretty
ugly. You want to explain that it

448
00:38:22,719 --> 00:38:25,000
' s the G' s brief
forgiveness. The G are the claims of

449
00:38:25,039 --> 00:38:30,920
gravity. We are subject to the
gravity of planet earth. Right. A

450
00:38:31,119 --> 00:38:37,960
G is a value with which the
one the one an object falls to the

451
00:38:38,199 --> 00:38:43,880
earth, right. Seven Gs are
seven times more true. Sure, you

452
00:38:43,960 --> 00:38:49,519
put tremendous pressure, of course.
Yeah. That' s why combat pilots

453
00:38:49,719 --> 00:38:54,000
are carrying an antiquated team that does
what it does is keep your blood from

454
00:38:54,119 --> 00:38:59,079
getting out of the brain, don' t lose visions, etcetera, etcetera,

455
00:38:59,719 --> 00:39:04,760
that can withstand that accelerations true this
up to three four g maybe without

456
00:39:04,800 --> 00:39:09,679
equipment you can hold it, but
it becomes more difficult. This one and

457
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:17,320
I remember that we were carrying some
sailing cards and a map and in the

458
00:39:17,440 --> 00:39:23,199
cabin flew everything when we went rasante
and arrived to the island, this basketball

459
00:39:23,199 --> 00:39:27,119
followed the undulations on the ground and
of course I formed it, I had

460
00:39:27,199 --> 00:39:30,400
to be above it and did move
the lever whatever was necessary. So,

461
00:39:30,519 --> 00:39:37,639
well, that was kind of an
experience, really the greatest experience. That

462
00:39:37,840 --> 00:39:44,320
is the experience was the leadership that
left me East Vázquez and that later ends

463
00:39:44,440 --> 00:39:49,840
when he volunteered to do the mission
of the invincible along with the v adier

464
00:39:49,960 --> 00:39:57,039
This that. They had this family
and volunteered for a mission they knew,

465
00:39:57,239 --> 00:40:02,760
in which we lost fifty percent of
the crew. We' re just gonna

466
00:40:02,760 --> 00:40:07,880
stop by and talk about it at
what point. I imagine different exits throughout

467
00:40:08,119 --> 00:40:13,599
the entire conflict, but there is
one in which this how it is warn

468
00:40:14,239 --> 00:40:19,880
you that there is the possibility of
taking out an aircraft carrier if until that

469
00:40:19,960 --> 00:40:25,960
moment we were designating, they were
designating, we did not come because I

470
00:40:27,039 --> 00:40:29,039
was first lieutenant, that is,
that I gave no order. He was

471
00:40:29,119 --> 00:40:32,880
no longer in service, but the
crews were designated according to the activity he

472
00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:37,440
had done the day before. For
starters, our activity, I mean,

473
00:40:37,679 --> 00:40:44,639
I was ready, you can call
it shift to get out. If they

474
00:40:44,719 --> 00:40:47,880
ordered a mission from the noon of
one day to the noon of the other

475
00:40:49,239 --> 00:40:53,880
day, except the night, just
as our material was not fit for a

476
00:40:53,880 --> 00:41:00,320
night attack, because we did not
have the necessary instruments for that. It

477
00:41:00,360 --> 00:41:05,440
was from noon until dark we went
to the city, we returned early the

478
00:41:05,519 --> 00:41:12,719
next morning until noon. Well,
and in those days, I had appointed

479
00:41:13,199 --> 00:41:19,119
who could ever touch him the next
day. We changed, but in particular

480
00:41:19,119 --> 00:41:23,639
by the 29th of May, which
was the opportunity twenty- seven, twenty

481
00:41:23,920 --> 00:41:29,639
- six out there in May of
that entire week prior to the twenty-

482
00:41:29,760 --> 00:41:36,159
nine on the radar of Puerto Argentino, radar of the Air Force that was

483
00:41:36,320 --> 00:41:42,119
on the islands, began to observe
a possible location of one of the two

484
00:41:42,159 --> 00:41:44,880
aircraft carriers that were in the conflict
of Hermes and the invincible. The only

485
00:41:45,000 --> 00:41:50,519
two aircraft carriers and with the radar
the radar detection that gives the plane in

486
00:41:51,079 --> 00:42:00,880
flight from a certain height, observed
that the planes appeared the harriers that we

487
00:42:00,960 --> 00:42:06,000
call them pact. But that combat
area patrol is made up of two planes.

488
00:42:06,880 --> 00:42:14,320
Harriers coming over the island made attacks
on the mission they ordered. They

489
00:42:14,320 --> 00:42:20,440
observed that these planes appeared from a
sector located to the east of the islands

490
00:42:20,480 --> 00:42:27,599
of Port of Argentina about 200 km. They appeared on the radar screen of

491
00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:31,800
the air force radar. They flew
half an hour as long as the fuel

492
00:42:31,880 --> 00:42:37,119
was given and returned to the same
place. Then it was the observation that

493
00:42:37,199 --> 00:42:44,239
allowed them to claim that there were
about a hundred miles one hundred eighty km,

494
00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:47,599
two hundred kilometers east. There'
s got to be an aircraft carrier

495
00:42:47,639 --> 00:42:52,079
from where the enemy planes were taking
off and leaving. Then they pass the

496
00:42:52,159 --> 00:42:57,159
position to the command of the South
Are Force that was located. That commando

497
00:42:57,760 --> 00:43:02,960
led by Li at the time was
Briar than Crespo. He was then the

498
00:43:04,039 --> 00:43:07,480
chief general briidad of the Air Force. Now that the Biriar Crespo has passed

499
00:43:08,000 --> 00:43:14,559
away with his task force, he
determined that I order my mission to attack

500
00:43:14,639 --> 00:43:20,079
that runway, that aircraft carrier.
Well, that' s how it was

501
00:43:20,159 --> 00:43:25,519
ordered, analyzed and determined that the
planes we could do it could be the

502
00:43:25,639 --> 00:43:30,920
four Bs or the four Cs flying. I was flying because they have the

503
00:43:30,239 --> 00:43:36,199
ability to supply fuel during the flight
and, therefore, long extend this significantly

504
00:43:36,840 --> 00:43:43,880
the scope of the planes the clear
autonomy this, the four- Qs of

505
00:43:45,519 --> 00:43:47,960
the navy and the super will have
love also have the possibility to load fuel

506
00:43:47,960 --> 00:43:52,679
in good, but within the air
force. It was determined from the four

507
00:43:52,880 --> 00:43:58,960
C because one of the small differences
with the B to four B is the

508
00:43:59,000 --> 00:44:05,159
availability of an oxygen for the pilot. We were always flying with more oxygen

509
00:44:04,559 --> 00:44:09,039
than in the four B manual is
five hours, in the four ses is

510
00:44:09,159 --> 00:44:13,719
ten hours. And I say about
Manuel because at the time of first speaking

511
00:44:13,760 --> 00:44:20,159
he has already spent many years of
the plane in use natural wear of the

512
00:44:20,199 --> 00:44:24,840
equipment and also the adrenaline that one
has that suddenly consumes much more combo oxygen

513
00:44:25,000 --> 00:44:30,000
breathing so agitated than if it goes
on a normal flight of clear transfer,

514
00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:30,880
then well they go to the four
six. From there, well, the

515
00:44:30,960 --> 00:44:37,239
quadrant chief ordered him to arrange a
squadron of four planes, this one with

516
00:44:37,280 --> 00:44:40,719
a reserve one to a fifth they
sent the reservation to do that mission and

517
00:44:40,800 --> 00:44:49,360
well, we met the oldest officers
of the most experienced let' s say

518
00:44:49,440 --> 00:44:57,360
that we were flying a long time
ago from the plane so that well I

519
00:44:57,760 --> 00:45:01,400
know that I asked that whoever could
offer to fulfill that mission I saw at

520
00:45:01,519 --> 00:45:06,440
risk that although, for me the
whole mission we were going out on was

521
00:45:07,519 --> 00:45:12,400
a shooting there in San Carlos,
what a difference there could be, But

522
00:45:12,440 --> 00:45:14,039
well, right, the carrier is
always more defended with its frigates. What

523
00:45:14,119 --> 00:45:20,519
do they do defense with different types
of artillery and missile defense, missile also,

524
00:45:20,639 --> 00:45:23,880
but good to the carrier who could
be. And well, with the

525
00:45:23,960 --> 00:45:30,679
first thirty Vazquez and I offered to
want to fulfill the mission. That'

526
00:45:30,719 --> 00:45:35,519
s incredible, that will knowing that
people were waiting for you at home.

527
00:45:36,960 --> 00:45:39,480
Well, yes, actually, the
scarce people were waiting for us from the

528
00:45:39,559 --> 00:45:44,000
day we deployed on April 11th,
starting on May 1st, with more reason,

529
00:45:44,719 --> 00:45:51,360
when we already started the actual combat
missions. We communicated every day with

530
00:45:51,360 --> 00:45:54,679
the family, every day we talked
to my lady, everyone talked to their

531
00:45:55,039 --> 00:46:01,800
relative every night and then, well, of course, they were worried,

532
00:46:02,159 --> 00:46:09,239
true, but in a certain way, I might self question that I might

533
00:46:09,599 --> 00:46:15,159
have been a little selfish because I
didn' t remember much about the family

534
00:46:15,199 --> 00:46:22,360
at the time of flying, of
being active. So, when it was

535
00:46:22,599 --> 00:46:29,280
really up to us to fulfill our
promise to defend our homeland until I lost

536
00:46:29,280 --> 00:46:31,280
my life, I said this one, as I said earlier, I want

537
00:46:31,280 --> 00:46:37,000
to do it. It feels good
to do it despite the risk. I

538
00:46:37,039 --> 00:46:42,000
knew here we were going to the
fight, we knew what we were exposed

539
00:46:42,079 --> 00:46:46,840
to, I knew I had a
Chico family already when I became a boyfriend

540
00:46:46,840 --> 00:46:52,480
with my lady. And now,
my lady. I was clear. It

541
00:46:52,599 --> 00:46:58,719
was also clear to my lady what
I was in the force for and what

542
00:46:58,760 --> 00:47:02,679
were the risks still kind of pass
the activity of combat, training, combat.

543
00:47:04,119 --> 00:47:09,159
We have also had many deaths from
different accidents during the training, that

544
00:47:09,199 --> 00:47:15,159
is, that my lady was already
with a knowledge which was, of course,

545
00:47:15,599 --> 00:47:20,320
that she was now during the war, the risk was greater, but

546
00:47:20,360 --> 00:47:24,239
well, so I decided and in
each of the missions at night we talked.

547
00:47:24,360 --> 00:47:27,239
Yes, yes, today was good
that he was going out and I

548
00:47:27,280 --> 00:47:31,400
told him how clear and I tell
you all of a sudden it may have

549
00:47:31,440 --> 00:47:36,159
been a little bit of sight for
my passion, for the vision of the

550
00:47:36,639 --> 00:47:39,280
house and the mission to attack the
carrier comes out from the south, because

551
00:47:39,280 --> 00:47:43,119
it goes out from the south.
Well, because the location of that ship,

552
00:47:43,480 --> 00:47:49,280
of that runway, of that aircraft
carrier represented a very wide turn.

553
00:47:50,360 --> 00:47:53,159
Therefore, the supply in flight was
very necessary that it was made with two

554
00:47:53,360 --> 00:48:00,800
airplanes Hercules almost one hundred thirty that
are the Hercules of six hundred thirty that

555
00:48:00,880 --> 00:48:05,239
for transport of personnel, loads what
it did and the coffee carries a large

556
00:48:05,280 --> 00:48:09,440
tank of fuel inside to pass us
fuels to the planes with home. These

557
00:48:09,480 --> 00:48:14,599
planes that you didn' t have
because of the radio silence, you didn

558
00:48:14,639 --> 00:48:15,599
' t communicate with them, you
had to see any of the missions.

559
00:48:15,679 --> 00:48:21,159
We never communicated until now the moment
we made the attack and how I found

560
00:48:21,239 --> 00:48:25,960
them. I mean, I was
reminded because we had an instrument that is

561
00:48:25,960 --> 00:48:29,840
already obsolete. It doesn' t
exist anymore. I created an omega navigator

562
00:48:29,960 --> 00:48:35,719
where we put it, the geographic
coordinates where that plane was going to be

563
00:48:35,719 --> 00:48:39,360
at that point, as well as
the coordinates where the aircraft carrier was going

564
00:48:39,440 --> 00:48:42,840
to be, the coordinates where the
bay was going to be, where we

565
00:48:42,840 --> 00:48:44,719
were going to attack. Just and
that' s what you were programming.

566
00:48:44,880 --> 00:48:46,039
It' s not like I gave
them to them We didn' t get

567
00:48:46,039 --> 00:48:47,840
them out. They gave us the
position, that' s not true.

568
00:48:49,480 --> 00:48:52,719
The position of the carrier. It
was actually a midpoint where the radar was

569
00:48:52,800 --> 00:48:57,000
watching and that' s where it
comes out. Then they pulled a midpoint,

570
00:48:57,280 --> 00:49:01,599
then they set those coordinates. We
were going to that place the issue

571
00:49:02,360 --> 00:49:09,079
that this attack on the carrier had
to be done also with the super Understand

572
00:49:09,119 --> 00:49:15,119
planes, which are airplanes of the
Argentine Navy of naval aviation, that are

573
00:49:15,840 --> 00:49:20,840
manufactured in France for that objective,
to make attacks to open sea to ships

574
00:49:20,960 --> 00:49:27,039
why, because it has a radar
besides having an exo set missile manufactured for

575
00:49:27,320 --> 00:49:34,719
that, manufactured together with the plane
the plane super Understand more exoet By that

576
00:49:34,719 --> 00:49:38,320
moment, the naval edition for the
two of April had received five planes that

577
00:49:38,400 --> 00:49:43,800
was newly new, recently purchased even
with a little lack of experience. They

578
00:49:43,800 --> 00:49:49,079
had just made their adaptation in France, but they were already completing it here.

579
00:49:49,079 --> 00:49:53,079
In Argentina, they had received five
aircraft and five missiles. When the

580
00:49:53,199 --> 00:49:58,079
islands were recovered on April 2,
France suspended the delivery of both the aircraft

581
00:49:58,199 --> 00:50:00,280
and the missiles, that is to
say, it grabbed the opening in the

582
00:50:00,280 --> 00:50:07,679
naval aviation. With five super entendars
and five ex- sets they had already

583
00:50:07,760 --> 00:50:12,199
released four left only one. That' s why the main plane to accomplish

584
00:50:12,239 --> 00:50:15,719
this mission was the super understand,
but it had only one misid although two

585
00:50:15,800 --> 00:50:21,679
planes flew, because the second missile- free plane served to do electronic detection

586
00:50:21,719 --> 00:50:27,440
of the ship we were going to
attack. But since there was only one

587
00:50:27,440 --> 00:50:31,320
omissile, it is that the air
force arranged that they would be the planes

588
00:50:31,440 --> 00:50:37,079
of the air force to throw their
bombs, bombs that are designed to attack

589
00:50:37,159 --> 00:50:40,159
the ground, because you did not
go with missiles, went with bombs,

590
00:50:40,519 --> 00:50:46,239
with bombs and cannons of twenty millimetres, cannons We threw cannons, bombs by

591
00:50:46,239 --> 00:50:49,360
gravity, of course we threw it
away. We just had to do it.

592
00:50:49,440 --> 00:50:53,000
Just as I mentioned in the beginning, we did not have the preparation

593
00:50:53,039 --> 00:50:57,639
or the weapon system to make that
kind of attack. We had him to

594
00:50:57,679 --> 00:51:01,079
pull a lead on the ground,
to attack a boomk, an important position

595
00:51:01,079 --> 00:51:06,760
on the ground where we were passing
up or we could also attack in a

596
00:51:06,760 --> 00:51:09,840
dive. But here it was a
matter of being scratched so that we wouldn

597
00:51:09,920 --> 00:51:14,960
' t be detected by the defense
radars and be able to get to the

598
00:51:15,039 --> 00:51:15,199
ship quickly, but we had to
pass it over the ship. There was

599
00:51:15,320 --> 00:51:22,400
no other way this missile is pulled
in this case from the aircraft carrier they

600
00:51:22,480 --> 00:51:28,079
threw it forty kilometers away and without
really having it in sight the plane if

601
00:51:28,079 --> 00:51:30,400
they did not detect it electronically.
And when the exo SET is launched,

602
00:51:30,639 --> 00:51:36,360
you throw the four. We are
still behind the exo ET that in principle

603
00:51:36,400 --> 00:51:40,320
the EXOETH of the missile left a
trail of white smoke. It was a

604
00:51:40,320 --> 00:51:45,079
matter of following the borrowed forms.
The officer who launched the michl of the

605
00:51:45,079 --> 00:51:51,639
Supertendar naval aviation told us twenty miles
is about thirty- six kilometers. Twenty

606
00:51:51,760 --> 00:51:55,320
miles forward at the bow was already
a matter of keeping the course and flying

607
00:51:55,360 --> 00:51:59,519
to fly until we started to see
it at low altitude and in low radius

608
00:51:59,599 --> 00:52:07,360
silence about thirty meters down. Then
we have observed with different details that this

609
00:52:07,400 --> 00:52:10,079
one already told you. We were
flying between fifteen and twenty meters high at

610
00:52:10,199 --> 00:52:15,400
about nine hundred kilometers per hour,
because from the time of the final approach

611
00:52:15,480 --> 00:52:21,960
we were going to seven hundred and
fifty eight hundred when the missile was launched

612
00:52:21,960 --> 00:52:25,079
full power, more than the planes
and we arrived near the nine hundred kilometers.

613
00:52:25,280 --> 00:52:29,800
How long were they until they met
the man who launched the missile.

614
00:52:29,920 --> 00:52:34,679
We were an hour, a minute, ten, minutes, fifteen, one

615
00:52:34,840 --> 00:52:37,480
minute comes early. That' s
not true. We will have arrived fifty

616
00:52:37,519 --> 00:52:45,679
seconds after the missile. The impact
of the missile because the aircraft carrier activates

617
00:52:45,719 --> 00:52:49,079
the defense from the launch of the
missile, which they realize is what I

618
00:52:49,159 --> 00:52:52,440
was telling you at the beginning.
We don' t have any instruments to

619
00:52:52,480 --> 00:52:57,440
tell us my booth when they'
re throwing some weapons at me. They

620
00:52:57,480 --> 00:53:00,800
did have it, that is,
when they launched the missile. That'

621
00:53:00,840 --> 00:53:06,320
s where they realized we were really
attacking him. They deploy all their missile

622
00:53:06,519 --> 00:53:14,800
artillery and defense tube artillery. They
activate all that. Then we got there

623
00:53:14,800 --> 00:53:19,119
and we had to go upstairs,
as in all the missions that William was

624
00:53:19,239 --> 00:53:22,039
telling about you had to happen.
We had no other way. It'

625
00:53:22,639 --> 00:53:24,599
s not a weapon that flies alone
and carries and you turn around. The

626
00:53:24,679 --> 00:53:31,639
super tendar has that ease, that
possibility of launching the missile without getting to

627
00:53:31,639 --> 00:53:38,039
see it directly, simply because it
detected it electronically launch missile and turns and

628
00:53:38,079 --> 00:53:44,760
we follow the four planes. There
was Vázquez and Castillo on my left here

629
00:53:44,840 --> 00:53:51,400
was me and Commodore Gerardo Guillermo Isac
is on my right. Isaac is William

630
00:53:51,559 --> 00:53:57,119
' s companion. Also with the
same experience they had made the habilitation in

631
00:53:57,159 --> 00:54:01,119
the four c in the same period, that is, also a man of

632
00:54:01,119 --> 00:54:07,000
that time, a young man of
twenty- three years, also carrying out

633
00:54:07,079 --> 00:54:10,679
the missions that were ordered to him. So it was then that well they

634
00:54:10,679 --> 00:54:17,000
launched missis, we followed the four
planes and suddenly we began to see a

635
00:54:17,440 --> 00:54:22,480
column of smoke coming from a large
ship forward on the horizon. Evidently,

636
00:54:22,760 --> 00:54:28,400
the missile had impacted and was causing
that smoke, that fire, that damage.

637
00:54:30,920 --> 00:54:34,519
Seeing the missile, he' s
looking now and the smoke column.

638
00:54:34,679 --> 00:54:37,519
That' s where we had to
go outside. Whatever was a little big.

639
00:54:37,119 --> 00:54:44,480
Then it grew bigger and bigger.
I see Vázquez here, my promo.

640
00:54:45,000 --> 00:54:51,239
He is a friend of mine with
my lady We are brine of his

641
00:54:51,360 --> 00:54:53,159
youngest son, who was born on
March 11 of that year of eighty-

642
00:54:53,159 --> 00:54:58,000
two. I see that Vasquez'
s plane suddenly blows a piece of sheet

643
00:54:58,039 --> 00:55:02,079
from the left side of the plane, a big sheet in the middle.

644
00:55:02,159 --> 00:55:07,840
He stared at it because I had
to settle down to pass over the ship

645
00:55:07,880 --> 00:55:12,599
without crashing and everything had to happen
simultaneously, that is, if you were

646
00:55:12,719 --> 00:55:15,559
late there you could knock it down, you had to get the surprise and

647
00:55:15,639 --> 00:55:19,039
spend everything together. That' s
how I was settling in. I see

648
00:55:19,039 --> 00:55:22,079
him staring at me, and there
he just blew his tail off, and

649
00:55:22,119 --> 00:55:27,119
the plane starts to take this inclination
until I' m staying there because he

650
00:55:27,159 --> 00:55:30,960
' s disarming, losing his speed. My plane was fine and there I

651
00:55:31,000 --> 00:55:36,559
see it with this position already very
low, twenty meters above the water,

652
00:55:37,519 --> 00:55:39,760
and I already had to return because
I stayed behind the plane, the Vásquez,

653
00:55:40,639 --> 00:55:45,800
and there well, shot down Vázquez, you saw me in front right

654
00:55:45,800 --> 00:55:51,280
away. That' s where we
start. We began to see the humitos

655
00:55:51,320 --> 00:55:57,559
of the tube anti- aircraft artillery
that they launch because they launch ammunition that

656
00:55:57,599 --> 00:56:00,840
runs a certain distance and explodes alone. If it doesn' t hit anything,

657
00:56:00,159 --> 00:56:04,159
it explodes alone. We' ve
seen it many times in the war

658
00:56:04,440 --> 00:56:07,199
- to- war movie. See
you later. That' s real.

659
00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:10,840
We haven' t seen everything and
to me they were all missiles that threw

660
00:56:10,840 --> 00:56:14,119
me. I don' t know, I was trying to dodge it,

661
00:56:14,440 --> 00:56:16,320
but it was nothing. It was
a matter of getting shorter, shorter,

662
00:56:16,559 --> 00:56:22,960
because it was the defense we had
to fly low. And already with the

663
00:56:23,039 --> 00:56:29,280
view there it has come very close
to the carrier. It was an aircraft

664
00:56:29,280 --> 00:56:32,199
carrier Evidently, I want to throw
in the cannon and my cannons got stuck.

665
00:56:34,400 --> 00:56:37,440
I had to lift the plane a
little because if I didn' t

666
00:56:37,440 --> 00:56:40,599
throw the bomb, the bomb was
going to hit short, like saying before

667
00:56:40,719 --> 00:56:43,880
the aircraft carrier in the water.
I picked up the plane a little bit.

668
00:56:44,480 --> 00:56:49,239
I dropped the bomb. I'
m sure the aim, the instrument

669
00:56:49,320 --> 00:56:52,840
that tells me where they' re
going to hit the bomb, was well

670
00:56:52,840 --> 00:56:55,079
positioned on the aircraft carrier. I
throw the bombs and again I have to

671
00:56:55,119 --> 00:56:59,079
jump again because I was hit by
the aircraft carrier. I was bumping into

672
00:56:59,079 --> 00:57:01,960
it. There' s a white
button here on the left, which is

673
00:57:04,360 --> 00:57:07,960
the radome for the missile launch.
If you give that you have the aircraft

674
00:57:08,440 --> 00:57:12,199
carrier invincible, you don' t
have my sheath the herms. That'

675
00:57:12,199 --> 00:57:15,039
s why, after the landing,
I identify the name of that white bowl.

676
00:57:15,159 --> 00:57:21,239
I had a really big time here
I didn' t happen to jump

677
00:57:21,280 --> 00:57:27,760
the plane and I left I'
m doing the morning, I' m

678
00:57:27,840 --> 00:57:30,719
starting to call the numerals We,
the guide, the gang leader is going

679
00:57:30,840 --> 00:57:36,400
to be number one, number two
was a castle, number three was a

680
00:57:36,440 --> 00:57:37,400
me and number four isaac I started
calling them on the radio and no one

681
00:57:37,400 --> 00:57:43,599
answered me. I come back alone, morning and empty as I know and

682
00:57:43,800 --> 00:57:47,159
set course well closed turn of a
north course. I had to go out

683
00:57:47,519 --> 00:57:52,559
here and turn one hundred and twenty- thirty degrees to the left, for

684
00:57:52,639 --> 00:57:55,280
which I make a very closed turn, always glued to the water. True,

685
00:57:55,679 --> 00:58:00,920
and there I tried to see if
I could see anything from the aircraft

686
00:58:00,960 --> 00:58:05,079
carrier before the attack, you could
see the column of black smoke after the

687
00:58:05,079 --> 00:58:09,039
attack. I can already see when
I make that turn a whole cloud of

688
00:58:09,039 --> 00:58:15,280
gray smoke, a cloud, just
a column. That' s why I

689
00:58:15,400 --> 00:58:22,559
say the bombs hit and exploded to
all this what Commodore Isaac Gerardo says.

690
00:58:24,320 --> 00:58:30,119
He also saw him shot down to
Vasquez, who already saw him impact.

691
00:58:30,239 --> 00:58:32,639
He came further to the right and
a little further back and saw him hit

692
00:58:32,760 --> 00:58:37,159
in the water and at the time
Isaac was going to throw his bombs and

693
00:58:37,159 --> 00:58:44,039
his cannons, he could throw away
the two hundred shells he had of twenty

694
00:58:44,079 --> 00:58:47,159
millimetres that he threw at him as
he packed more to annoy the gunmen who

695
00:58:47,239 --> 00:58:51,599
are throwing you. He dumped him
and then dropped the bombs. But instantly,

696
00:58:51,679 --> 00:58:54,039
before the bomb was dropped, Castillo' s plane that was here about

697
00:58:54,079 --> 00:59:00,360
five meters away, let' s
say, disintegrates instantly. Obviously, Castillo

698
00:59:00,400 --> 00:59:05,119
has to have hit the anti-
aircraft artillery, the one we saw explode

699
00:59:05,159 --> 00:59:10,559
up here explodes it Inflasí, the
plane is not true instantly, nor did

700
00:59:10,559 --> 00:59:17,599
you find out that the impact was
coming with the water. Castle was instantaneous,

701
00:59:19,119 --> 00:59:23,880
as Isaac Bueno commented, and he
threw his bomb and already had to

702
00:59:24,039 --> 00:59:28,880
pass through the right side, because
it was not enough to lift, as

703
00:59:29,760 --> 00:59:34,559
we came low, on the right
side, passed, made maneuvers and set

704
00:59:34,599 --> 00:59:37,840
course at the same time that he
called the four. Going out some more,

705
00:59:37,199 --> 00:59:39,320
he came out and no one answered. No one was answering. He

706
00:59:39,360 --> 00:59:45,039
also assumed he wasn' t coming
back alone. But well, on that

707
00:59:45,280 --> 00:59:49,119
escape route we both had the same
walk to continue being helped by the Omega

708
00:59:49,199 --> 00:59:52,639
browser that told us where we had
to go on either side. I just

709
00:59:52,679 --> 00:59:58,159
suddenly see a plane up ahead.
I also in a moment, looking through

710
00:59:58,239 --> 01:00:00,880
the mirrors that we have rearview mirrors
in the cabin to see if anyone came

711
01:00:00,880 --> 01:00:06,320
to attack you or something, I
see a plane behind me to the right

712
01:00:06,360 --> 01:00:09,360
that I don' t know why, but I said you see isaac because

713
01:00:09,400 --> 01:00:15,079
it always came to my right in
my head and said the four and well,

714
01:00:15,360 --> 01:00:16,039
loosen the power a little bit,
not much, because it had to

715
01:00:16,039 --> 01:00:19,920
be fast escape. He caught up
with me, too, and that'

716
01:00:19,920 --> 01:00:22,400
s good. I' ll do
the ok to see if it' s

717
01:00:22,440 --> 01:00:27,039
all right, or we couldn'
t talk yet, not because we didn

718
01:00:27,039 --> 01:00:30,079
' t want to. We couldn' t talk because until the launch of

719
01:00:30,159 --> 01:00:32,039
the missile, no one spoke to
the Hercules, the Super Standard or between

720
01:00:32,119 --> 01:00:38,760
us Radio Silence. I give him
the signal if he was okay and he

721
01:00:38,880 --> 01:00:43,639
answers me well and it turns out
that he observed that my sleeve was orange,

722
01:00:43,840 --> 01:00:47,800
which is the anti- exposure suit, in case we fell into the

723
01:00:47,880 --> 01:00:54,199
water to last five more minutes with
the cold water of the South and I

724
01:00:54,199 --> 01:01:00,000
also gave him the orange sleeve,
it turns out that we both had the

725
01:01:00,119 --> 01:01:04,920
same orange team and the others,
Pilot, Vasquez and Castillo, had another

726
01:01:04,960 --> 01:01:07,280
kind of color in their anti-
exposure suit. Then there isaac always says

727
01:01:07,800 --> 01:01:10,440
there I realized more than good.
I' ll be right back. He

728
01:01:10,480 --> 01:01:16,159
realized who had been fixed. Vázquez
y Castilla, first lieutenant José Daniel Vázquez

729
01:01:16,519 --> 01:01:22,039
Captain post bite, the first lieutenant
to eat Jesús Castillo Captain postmorden. That

730
01:01:22,119 --> 01:01:25,920
' s how we always made the
return stretch at a distance of about 200

731
01:01:25,920 --> 01:01:31,440
km. We also took height and
headed to make the third supply in flight,

732
01:01:32,320 --> 01:01:37,639
because, that is, to be
able to arrive with good fuel to

733
01:01:37,719 --> 01:01:42,199
the landing to fly lower, because
the plane lower, with a consumption more

734
01:01:42,199 --> 01:01:45,760
fuel than being in height, the
weather was bad. We had to make

735
01:01:45,800 --> 01:01:50,239
an entrance for instruments. We were
nervous. I had the numeral formed that

736
01:01:50,719 --> 01:01:57,400
was also with his stress situation,
so I asked Hercules for fuel and then

737
01:01:57,559 --> 01:02:04,280
go down under the cape and arrive
as a visual to the landing. To

738
01:02:04,360 --> 01:02:09,840
all this during the resupply one of
the pilots of the twelve one hundred and

739
01:02:09,840 --> 01:02:14,480
thirty who were there asks me the
report before eliminating the flight that is called,

740
01:02:14,840 --> 01:02:19,719
and there I can confirm that we
had attacked a carrier, that the

741
01:02:19,719 --> 01:02:25,079
imisil had impacted, that they had
knocked down number one and two of the

742
01:02:25,079 --> 01:02:30,280
crews probed the indicative. We always
have the crew when you come out an

743
01:02:30,320 --> 01:02:37,239
indicative you don' t go as
you go that as a Breta probe that

744
01:02:37,440 --> 01:02:39,480
probe one and two had been shot
down and good and that we returned probe

745
01:02:39,480 --> 01:02:44,800
three and four. So we landed
after the landing, they take us to

746
01:02:45,280 --> 01:02:49,880
a room where they show us the
profiles of the different planes so much and

747
01:02:49,920 --> 01:02:52,159
as long as I were well separated, not to listen to what the other

748
01:02:52,199 --> 01:02:58,239
one says, not to copy you
let' s say and as always say

749
01:02:58,239 --> 01:03:00,239
those who listened to us who questioned
us, is that the two exactly the

750
01:03:00,239 --> 01:03:06,519
same. We saw We declared the
same thing and the Carrier already I can

751
01:03:06,559 --> 01:03:12,239
confirm that the name of the Carrier
is invincible precisely because of that white bolcha

752
01:03:12,239 --> 01:03:15,920
that the Hermes does not have,
besides the superstructure of the Herme, much

753
01:03:16,000 --> 01:03:19,199
smaller that stands out from the track
the Carrier. While the photo is much

754
01:03:19,239 --> 01:03:22,519
wider, I don' t know
what each one' s design is like.

755
01:03:22,119 --> 01:03:27,800
So we can confirm that on the
30th of May, at fourteen fourteen

756
01:03:27,960 --> 01:03:35,280
fifteen, the carrier is invincible.
It was hit by missilex ozet the last

757
01:03:35,320 --> 01:03:39,519
that there were six bombs of two
hundred and fifty kilos twenty- millimeter cannons.

758
01:03:39,599 --> 01:03:45,679
And with that it' s a
situation that England will always deny,

759
01:03:46,719 --> 01:03:52,360
because it deposes to accept that an
air force not prepared for the attack on

760
01:03:52,440 --> 01:03:55,599
a fleet, let' s say
we can arrive. And we arrived because

761
01:03:55,639 --> 01:04:01,920
we achieved the surprise by making a
great rodeo approaching that point where the aircraft

762
01:04:01,960 --> 01:04:08,800
carrier is from the mid southeast as
from the rear, place that there did

763
01:04:08,840 --> 01:04:15,400
not prohibit and did not have the
entire defensive circle of the carrier have had

764
01:04:15,400 --> 01:04:17,239
it beyond the west, towards the
side of the islands. It' s

765
01:04:17,320 --> 01:04:23,800
amazing this story that for you are
anecdotes and for the rest of the country

766
01:04:23,800 --> 01:04:27,400
it' s history. It'
s history of what conflict was. I

767
01:04:27,400 --> 01:04:31,360
thank you very much for coming to
Neura, mainly direct, because it is

768
01:04:31,800 --> 01:04:34,960
yes I want to say. Finally, not because it gave me a sin

769
01:04:35,000 --> 01:04:42,719
not to comment on it that all
the activity that we helicopter transport combat pilots

770
01:04:42,800 --> 01:04:47,519
do is because we work the air
force. The concept of the use of

771
01:04:47,519 --> 01:04:50,920
the air force is by weapon system. What does that mean? It'

772
01:04:50,960 --> 01:04:57,559
s a system where the planes are, there' s the pilots, but

773
01:04:57,639 --> 01:05:00,719
also as important as the pilots are
the personal mechanics who fix you the plane,

774
01:05:01,239 --> 01:05:04,039
which runs it, which repairs it. We came with the damaged planes

775
01:05:05,719 --> 01:05:11,800
at any hour of the night.
There are also all the personnel who did

776
01:05:11,880 --> 01:05:15,800
the security of the bases, because
the bases could have been the object of

777
01:05:15,800 --> 01:05:23,360
some commando blow then all night the
unofficial soldiers were doing the security, the

778
01:05:23,440 --> 01:05:27,960
custody of our planes and also the
custody of where we slept, truth,

779
01:05:28,880 --> 01:05:32,199
we slept very comfortable, we saw
warm during the night to be in condition

780
01:05:32,239 --> 01:05:36,920
the next day, while the mechanics, the official non- commissioned officers,

781
01:05:38,599 --> 01:05:42,960
which is called the maintenance staff and
the logistics personnel, was at the base

782
01:05:42,960 --> 01:05:46,199
of the twenty- four hours,
practically eating at the base as it could

783
01:05:46,280 --> 01:05:51,119
with cold or whatever, in tents
they slept yes, in a certain place,

784
01:05:51,360 --> 01:05:54,639
in the city, but there were
others who stayed to work all night.

785
01:05:56,960 --> 01:06:02,400
That is why I cannot fail to
mention how important the involvement of personnel,

786
01:06:02,719 --> 01:06:08,760
technicians and logistics in air force bases
is. The air force works not

787
01:06:08,880 --> 01:06:14,960
because I pulled the bomb and hit
so that I would drop the bomb and

788
01:06:15,440 --> 01:06:19,320
hit I had my previous training for
the plane to fly. There' s

789
01:06:19,480 --> 01:06:25,920
all that chain of people who prepare
food for us worry about how I'

790
01:06:26,000 --> 01:06:26,920
m going to sleep, how I' m going to be. The other

791
01:06:27,000 --> 01:06:30,079
day I get fixed the plane makes
the guards. There are countless activities.

792
01:06:30,719 --> 01:06:35,679
That' s why the air force
operates, not by the pilot or the

793
01:06:35,679 --> 01:06:39,920
plane. It' s all over
the gun system, which is a complex

794
01:06:39,960 --> 01:06:45,159
of people who broke everything, had
their cold, had their damage, their

795
01:06:45,280 --> 01:06:49,840
blows, their wounds. Working in
the cold at night. I tell you,

796
01:06:50,079 --> 01:06:56,119
I take out all those people'
s hats that allow the plane to

797
01:06:56,320 --> 01:06:58,519
fly and let me see it without
them. The plane doesn' t fly.

798
01:06:59,519 --> 01:07:02,039
Okay. I am very grateful for
the truth that it was an anecdote

799
01:07:02,119 --> 01:07:06,320
that mobilizes me. I imagine the
people who are listening to us are also

800
01:07:06,360 --> 01:07:10,280
truly amazing. What for you is
an anecdote I repeat to you, for

801
01:07:10,280 --> 01:07:12,800
the rest of that story is what
happens in our country, what has happened,

802
01:07:13,119 --> 01:07:15,039
so I thank you very much for
that. It is a story that

803
01:07:16,599 --> 01:07:20,920
we should not really forget, because
there were six hundred and forty- nine,

804
01:07:21,360 --> 01:07:25,840
but in particular fifty- five,
the air force, which were given,

805
01:07:26,000 --> 01:07:29,440
everything they had, they gave it. His life was given and well,

806
01:07:29,559 --> 01:07:33,039
the islands. We don' t
have it today. It' s

807
01:07:33,480 --> 01:07:39,400
property, it' s Argentine sovereignty, but there are other occupants, there

808
01:07:39,480 --> 01:07:41,079
are other tenants who don' t
want to pay for it. I really

809
01:07:41,559 --> 01:07:45,639
appreciate the rent. Obriayer, Guillermo, I' m equally grateful for everything

810
01:07:45,639 --> 01:07:49,159
you told me. Very important.
The truth is, I can imagine images

811
01:07:49,360 --> 01:07:51,400
of you who used to remember her. You' re gonna remember her your

812
01:07:51,480 --> 01:07:55,800
whole life today. That' s
really the way it is. Thank you

813
01:07:56,159 --> 01:07:59,440
very much. Me and So.
We' re going to a two-

814
01:07:59,519 --> 01:08:06,079
minute batch and we' re back
on this Malvinas special. Eighty moments of

815
01:08:08,000 --> 01:08:16,960
nerve closure. There' s your
system connected. We are again in Neura,

816
01:08:17,640 --> 01:08:24,199
in this special on the Falklands,
this April 2nd and we were just

817
01:08:24,600 --> 01:08:28,199
together with Ernesto and Guillermo, two
air force home pilots during the conflict,

818
01:08:28,600 --> 01:08:32,560
and now we are together with Colonel
Carlos Daniel Esteban welcome Carlos to the floor

819
01:08:32,560 --> 01:08:35,199
of Neura. Thank you good night, thank you very much, for the

820
01:08:35,199 --> 01:08:43,039
invitation. It is truly a pleasure
to have you here knowing that, in

821
01:08:43,079 --> 01:08:45,880
addition to the conflict having taken place
in the water, in the air,

822
01:08:45,960 --> 01:08:53,640
it was also done on earth and
you were on the islands, you were

823
01:08:53,680 --> 01:08:59,680
running a company inside the islands and
you had combats inside the island with the

824
01:08:59,680 --> 01:09:04,439
enemy. I wanted to start by
consulting you about the Marvinas conflict. You

825
01:09:04,479 --> 01:09:10,720
know I found it very interesting that
you studied a pre- conflict career.

826
01:09:11,039 --> 01:09:15,199
Then I would like to know how
you arrived in the army after studying political

827
01:09:15,239 --> 01:09:19,720
science and international relations and what you
understood of what was Malvinas with that already

828
01:09:20,159 --> 01:09:25,720
professional profile of the study of international
relations. Yeah, it was a little

829
01:09:25,760 --> 01:09:28,600
backwards. I first received myself at
the Military College of the Nation. As

830
01:09:28,720 --> 01:09:32,039
under Cdiente I made the journey with
the frigate of freedom and there you can

831
01:09:32,520 --> 01:09:36,600
see that all the armies of the
world and the marines, especially that we

832
01:09:36,640 --> 01:09:45,000
had visited, had their officers studying
at universities to give him a broader holistic

833
01:09:45,039 --> 01:09:50,199
view of geopolitics, history, sociology, etcetera. Then there was the illusion

834
01:09:50,279 --> 01:09:58,159
if I could have time with my
work of studying at a university and I

835
01:09:58,239 --> 01:10:01,880
was passionate about the issue of politics, international relations, etcetera. So,

836
01:10:02,920 --> 01:10:09,520
in Cordoba, what I did was
I enrolled in Catholic and in five years

837
01:10:09,600 --> 01:10:14,439
I was able to receive a degree
in political science and international relations. So

838
01:10:14,479 --> 01:10:17,760
it was the other way around and
when he got to Falklands. Of course

839
01:10:17,800 --> 01:10:21,439
everything he had learned at university,
which is a good university, obviously they

840
01:10:21,439 --> 01:10:29,119
know it in a certain nationalist style
and with the priests running that school,

841
01:10:29,319 --> 01:10:33,640
they gave it great importance Malvina and
attached importance to the professors of international law,

842
01:10:34,279 --> 01:10:38,640
what at that time was called the
International Law of War, which was

843
01:10:38,640 --> 01:10:44,000
later mutating and was called International Law
of Armed Conflicts or International Humanitarian Law.

844
01:10:46,159 --> 01:10:48,920
The name changed, but the essence
was the same, that is, what

845
01:10:48,960 --> 01:10:53,479
war is done with combatants, what
is done in war when you have an

846
01:10:53,640 --> 01:10:57,800
enemy in detention, which is done
in war in combat, for example,

847
01:10:58,239 --> 01:11:03,119
you can throw at paratroopers who have
the candle displayed. What happens when a

848
01:11:03,199 --> 01:11:08,199
pilot falls into the water All the
things that happened to us in the operations

849
01:11:08,560 --> 01:11:12,439
after not and well, and there
with an excellent teacher that we had,

850
01:11:13,439 --> 01:11:17,239
that is I came to the war
with a different formation to the rest for

851
01:11:17,239 --> 01:11:20,439
having studied this matter that was called
International Law of War. Very interesting this

852
01:11:20,479 --> 01:11:25,920
and you, at the time of
being in the army, of having that

853
01:11:25,920 --> 01:11:31,680
preparation, felt that you knew better
what your task was. Not my homework.

854
01:11:32,720 --> 01:11:36,199
I made it like the rest of
the officers who were as good as

855
01:11:36,319 --> 01:11:40,880
it could have been. What I
had was a different view, broader than

856
01:11:41,000 --> 01:11:45,960
what you necessarily got from the university. If you don' t have it,

857
01:11:46,359 --> 01:11:48,800
you don' t pass any of
the subjects, that is, not

858
01:11:48,800 --> 01:11:54,239
an approach. It is only military
or specific or technical of each problem,

859
01:11:55,000 --> 01:12:00,159
but a more solistic vision that serves
to be good diagnoses, to interpret situations

860
01:12:00,159 --> 01:12:02,960
and then, well, you have
to solve. At present, I have

861
01:12:03,039 --> 01:12:08,840
to deal with the problem you have
and you, when the javer had a

862
01:12:08,920 --> 01:12:15,800
few years already as an army officer, at the time of launching or carrying

863
01:12:15,840 --> 01:12:16,760
out the rosary operation of the invasion
of the islands. Yes, of course,

864
01:12:16,960 --> 01:12:20,399
I received myself at the age of
nineteen and at the time of the

865
01:12:20,640 --> 01:12:27,039
conflict I was twenty- eight,
at the time of coffee, you were

866
01:12:27,119 --> 01:12:28,640
twenty- eight and you were part
of the landing of the islands. You

867
01:12:28,680 --> 01:12:30,119
got that two from opening up to
the islands or you got here a few

868
01:12:30,119 --> 01:12:33,640
days later. Of course not,
we shouldn' t have arrived one.

869
01:12:33,840 --> 01:12:39,079
What happens is that there was a
very strong storm, in particular the helicopter

870
01:12:39,159 --> 01:12:44,800
that I had to do the landing
with started hitting inside the hangar. They

871
01:12:44,880 --> 01:12:48,119
cut off the slings and started hitting
inside the hangar. From idizar, then

872
01:12:48,199 --> 01:12:50,840
we had to do ultivo, but
it took a whole day. Then the

873
01:12:50,880 --> 01:12:58,119
landing was day two. My company
that had selected her, the regiment chief,

874
01:12:58,199 --> 01:13:00,600
the lieutenant with that on the link
was the only army company that landed

875
01:13:00,680 --> 01:13:05,119
with the sailors' infantry, that
is, we complemented the marine infantry in

876
01:13:05,119 --> 01:13:11,159
what had been called Operation Blue and
then went on to be called Operation Rosary.

877
01:13:12,640 --> 01:13:15,399
So if we participate in the landing, no doubt and at that moment

878
01:13:15,760 --> 01:13:26,520
on landing, how they were received
by the colonial administration in Malvinas, how

879
01:13:26,560 --> 01:13:32,119
they were received by the population.
Well, we were expecting first the buzzer

880
01:13:32,520 --> 01:13:36,640
contaminant gave a herring before we landed
that was very clear, very clear fulfill

881
01:13:36,680 --> 01:13:43,039
the mission, but in an incruent
way, that is, not to cause

882
01:13:43,239 --> 01:13:45,119
unnecessary damage either to the military forces
or to the civilian population. So that

883
01:13:45,159 --> 01:13:49,039
was very clear. You had to
achieve the objectives that had been imposed on

884
01:13:49,079 --> 01:13:55,680
you in our case at the beginning
of the airport, but in an incursive

885
01:13:55,760 --> 01:13:59,600
way, because you thought of post- war, true or thought of post

886
01:14:00,039 --> 01:14:03,840
- operations, not to complicate things
more than necessary, in particular with the

887
01:14:03,840 --> 01:14:10,720
civilian population, that that impact later
on the international world. That' s

888
01:14:10,720 --> 01:14:19,119
not true. Well, then we
landed waiting for something harder because they had

889
01:14:19,159 --> 01:14:23,760
some mines laid on the beaches,
etcetera. And there were seventy- one,

890
01:14:24,119 --> 01:14:29,159
seventy- two later we reached seventy- seven royals marins who were providing

891
01:14:29,199 --> 01:14:35,399
security and did not defend themselves and
went all and gathered in the governor'

892
01:14:35,520 --> 01:14:43,840
s house, where then there is
the incident with Captain Kakino and Lieutenant Garcia

893
01:14:43,960 --> 01:14:49,319
Quiroga, etc. I mean,
there was no violent reaction to our landing.

894
01:14:49,760 --> 01:14:55,720
It was an order of rex hund
the governor very clear that he considered

895
01:14:55,760 --> 01:14:59,720
that the forces were so superior that
they landed that the only thing that was

896
01:14:59,800 --> 01:15:01,000
going to provoke a mount where they
lost them and they were not going to

897
01:15:01,000 --> 01:15:09,479
stop. Nues to, landing came
with vehicles, came with important forces of

898
01:15:09,039 --> 01:15:14,159
the marine infantry of army. Then
I think it was for that moment.

899
01:15:14,720 --> 01:15:21,239
I think it was a logical reaction
of the ambassador to say do not fight

900
01:15:21,279 --> 01:15:28,319
how many people landed in Malvinas,
how much was the total number of personnel

901
01:15:28,560 --> 01:15:34,079
at first and during itself count not
counting the crews of the ships about six

902
01:15:34,079 --> 01:15:36,800
hundred people. Those are the ones
who entered the island on the first day,

903
01:15:38,079 --> 01:15:42,359
the first day and then left,
that is, the BM one and

904
01:15:42,399 --> 01:15:46,600
the BM two later withdrew. Once
they controlled the situation, they withdrew and

905
01:15:46,960 --> 01:15:50,600
left the infantry regiment twenty. My
company stayed and then came over from the

906
01:15:50,680 --> 01:15:58,199
25th infantry regiment, which was supposed
to give security to the airport. And

907
01:15:58,359 --> 01:16:02,520
within what was the operations within Malvinas
there are other enclaves, other small towns,

908
01:16:03,079 --> 01:16:09,239
so to speak, within Madrid.
I was mayor of two. You

909
01:16:09,279 --> 01:16:12,960
were a quartermaster at the age of
twenty- eight I appointed myself a quartermaster.

910
01:16:13,479 --> 01:16:15,039
I didn' t like the names
they had. They were called Darwin

911
01:16:15,119 --> 01:16:20,439
Gus Green and then I put it
all in Puerto Santiago. He was the

912
01:16:20,760 --> 01:16:29,399
only officer who had a son.
My son had the name Let' s

913
01:16:29,479 --> 01:16:34,279
say a Hispanic origin. When we
had been in Santiago de Compostela, they

914
01:16:34,359 --> 01:16:41,880
told the whole legend or story of
c on how they find Santiago with an

915
01:16:41,920 --> 01:16:45,279
illuminated star that theirs of the earth
ended and there was Santiago. So I

916
01:16:45,359 --> 01:16:46,439
said if I have a son,
I' m going to put him in

917
01:16:46,439 --> 01:16:53,720
Santiago. So we all called Puerto
Santiago and took care of the two villages.

918
01:16:55,800 --> 01:16:59,199
There was Mr Heardcastle, who was
the fockla manager at Land Company and

919
01:16:59,159 --> 01:17:05,079
there was Mr Gos who did very
good negotiations, very good. I never

920
01:17:05,159 --> 01:17:13,439
shared what was done in Puerto Argentina. I mean, for me, they

921
01:17:13,520 --> 01:17:18,000
were a hostile population that was going
to respect us out of fear, out

922
01:17:18,000 --> 01:17:23,800
of fear, out of deterrence,
but in the event a fleet approached or

923
01:17:23,840 --> 01:17:27,760
forces approached, enemies, they were
going to respond to them and not to

924
01:17:27,760 --> 01:17:31,640
us. So the truth is,
I' ve been applying very tough measures

925
01:17:31,720 --> 01:17:34,399
since the operational, but not with
them. It' s more years after

926
01:17:34,439 --> 01:17:39,560
Mr Harcaster kept sending me against me
I was a commander in the 11th Brigade.

927
01:17:40,279 --> 01:17:45,560
He kept sending me greetings, etc, because he understood that I had

928
01:17:45,560 --> 01:17:48,000
a mission to fulfill, but that
we did so that they did not suffer

929
01:17:48,920 --> 01:17:54,560
harsher consequences. Of what is necessary
in a war. No. Then,

930
01:17:54,640 --> 01:17:57,960
for example, he cared for his
sheep. I told you to look,

931
01:17:59,319 --> 01:18:01,279
I tell you the pounds of meat
I need and you bring them to me.

932
01:18:01,840 --> 01:18:04,479
The same in the amount of fish
and I give you other things that

933
01:18:04,560 --> 01:18:09,880
I have at the troop ranch so
that your population is well and you lack

934
01:18:09,920 --> 01:18:14,479
nothing. The water tank, for
example, was common. Imagine that if

935
01:18:14,520 --> 01:18:19,880
I let them handle it without controlling
it, they could throw out any Swedishance

936
01:18:19,920 --> 01:18:27,439
and my soldiers were inoperative for any
kind of war action. Then what else.

937
01:18:28,159 --> 01:18:30,279
I told him. I need vehicles, I requisitioned all the vehicles,

938
01:18:30,399 --> 01:18:33,640
and I signed him, I signed
documents for him. If that' s

939
01:18:34,039 --> 01:18:41,119
all, I' m intent,
I' m intent, then, but

940
01:18:41,159 --> 01:18:43,319
I always requisition signing both that and
the supermarket or all radio. Radio was

941
01:18:43,399 --> 01:18:48,119
the most important thing. I got
a hundred and ten radii from the Kelpers,

942
01:18:48,199 --> 01:18:53,079
the biggest one is already ufl five
hundred. I' ll take them

943
01:18:53,159 --> 01:18:57,000
later to San Carlos when they send
me to San Carlos, and it'

944
01:18:57,039 --> 01:19:00,000
s the one that allows me to
give the early warning of the landing and

945
01:19:00,000 --> 01:19:01,239
that I can act. And that
had been requisitioned how. I do,

946
01:19:01,319 --> 01:19:08,279
yeah, why. Because the radios
that have a normal army company don'

947
01:19:08,399 --> 01:19:13,720
t have the necessary range to be
able to handle themselves in what was the

948
01:19:13,800 --> 01:19:15,279
tera network, that' s a
hundred kilometers to one side a hundred kilometers.

949
01:19:16,119 --> 01:19:19,760
Instead, I did, and I
had a very good advice from Lieutenant

950
01:19:19,760 --> 01:19:27,079
Vazquez, who was the head of
communications in my company, and he tells

951
01:19:27,119 --> 01:19:30,079
me we have to take this one
and that' s why I took that

952
01:19:30,079 --> 01:19:36,199
radio. So Munition, Armament,
vehicles and radios were requisitioned. Everything was

953
01:19:36,279 --> 01:19:41,680
very important so they' re not
communicating with the fleet permanently and telling him

954
01:19:41,680 --> 01:19:45,439
what we were doing. Enough with
having the satellites watching what we were doing

955
01:19:45,520 --> 01:19:51,560
and how long it took from the
rosary operation until they began to receive fire

956
01:19:51,640 --> 01:19:57,359
from the British fleet. How long
it took until they started arriving Well,

957
01:19:58,079 --> 01:20:05,920
we were giving security in Puerto Santiago, Darling Gugren and we had a rotation

958
01:20:06,000 --> 01:20:12,239
system. One section was doing maintenance, the other section was training. The

959
01:20:12,319 --> 01:20:15,279
soldiers had 45 days of training.
They were just new. He tracked my

960
01:20:15,319 --> 01:20:24,840
partner were all new and the other
section was giving security. That' s

961
01:20:24,880 --> 01:20:28,920
how we were until the first of
May. On the first of May the

962
01:20:29,039 --> 01:20:33,039
12th regiment, which was the Mercedes
task force, was already entering and had

963
01:20:33,079 --> 01:20:40,159
been instructed to strengthen the defense of
the two villages. And I didn'

964
01:20:40,159 --> 01:20:44,239
t know if there was any intelligence
on the night before that it was very

965
01:20:44,239 --> 01:20:48,159
likely that at four o' clock
in the morning there would be an air

966
01:20:48,199 --> 01:20:49,960
strike in Puerto Argentino and at eight
o' clock in Darwing Guogreen. Then

967
01:20:50,520 --> 01:20:54,960
there' s what we did.
We met with the I had excellent officers,

968
01:20:55,039 --> 01:21:00,840
we met with steves, with this
centurion, with kings and we said

969
01:21:00,319 --> 01:21:06,199
good chance of zero ground attack.
Then let' s get the troops out

970
01:21:06,279 --> 01:21:11,439
of where they are and put them
on the cliffs of the coast, because

971
01:21:11,439 --> 01:21:14,239
we had no air defense. Then
came the subtendant bragin and with air defense.

972
01:21:14,920 --> 01:21:17,000
So when the attack occurs, this
is what you say when the first

973
01:21:17,079 --> 01:21:21,960
attack was. The first attack was
in Puerto Argentino, at four o'

974
01:21:21,960 --> 01:21:28,039
clock, in Darwin Guslin, at
eight o' clock on the morning of

975
01:21:28,039 --> 01:21:35,760
May 1. We were attacked there
with belugas and bombs of two hundred and

976
01:21:35,800 --> 01:21:42,239
fifty pounds and five hundred pounds.
We had zero down. So that went

977
01:21:42,319 --> 01:21:45,960
very well for the soldiers, because
it says good. Our bosses demand us,

978
01:21:46,000 --> 01:21:49,079
but they take care of us.
They made a situational assessment. They

979
01:21:49,119 --> 01:21:54,000
saw that they did not, and
there we discovered a great mistake that we

980
01:21:54,239 --> 01:22:00,720
had made, that was not to
have made the wells to the positions caps

981
01:22:00,720 --> 01:22:03,840
belugas. Then the velugas, in
addition to bursting and throwing the shards down

982
01:22:04,039 --> 01:22:09,319
into the well. Nothing happened,
because there was no one. The penalty

983
01:22:09,399 --> 01:22:13,600
was that it was what impacted our
soldiers, that the air force, like

984
01:22:14,560 --> 01:22:17,399
Doro Wilson Pedoso had said that all
planes had to be at six o'

985
01:22:17,399 --> 01:22:24,680
clock outside different mechanical, personal issues, etcetera. With the attack there were

986
01:22:24,720 --> 01:22:29,039
all planes to take off. That' s why almost all the pucaras were

987
01:22:29,079 --> 01:22:31,680
destroyed and Hooki' s lieutenant died, plus ten more soldiers. So that

988
01:22:31,720 --> 01:22:36,680
was the first attack that was important, because everyone saw the number of soldiers

989
01:22:36,720 --> 01:22:43,720
who died and buried them and the
climate was already war and then, at

990
01:22:43,760 --> 01:22:47,199
that time they knew that the British
fleet was near and that a possible landing

991
01:22:47,239 --> 01:22:55,479
could be neighbored. Yeah, that' s how we said we were getting

992
01:22:55,479 --> 01:22:57,840
news because we were listening to radio. It is true that the fleet was

993
01:22:57,840 --> 01:23:02,840
advancing. They say the first victim
in the war is the lie. It

994
01:23:02,880 --> 01:23:05,279
' s the truth, forgiveness,
the first victim of war, the truth.

995
01:23:05,359 --> 01:23:10,920
And no. The soldiers are wrong, they' re broken, they

996
01:23:10,960 --> 01:23:13,239
' re not going to land,
they' re afraid. This thing you

997
01:23:13,239 --> 01:23:17,159
' re telling me. Radios,
radios broadcast by good people from English Argentina,

998
01:23:17,319 --> 01:23:20,840
were heard. They knew what was
going on in the war for listening

999
01:23:20,880 --> 01:23:26,520
to those media. Yes and good
and intelligence reports. Intelligence worked very well.

1000
01:23:26,800 --> 01:23:32,279
There were good reports then, but
it was clear that one how rare

1001
01:23:32,319 --> 01:23:39,159
that people who came from being in
Norway training in ships, move a lot,

1002
01:23:39,439 --> 01:23:44,479
are decomposed, do not want to
land. Well, it' s

1003
01:23:44,600 --> 01:23:53,279
a previous preparation that usually makes any
enemy who wants to make the rival south

1004
01:23:53,279 --> 01:23:56,600
love that they are wrong, that
they are not strong, that they are

1005
01:23:56,640 --> 01:23:59,239
with little desire to enter combat,
things that was not so, which was

1006
01:23:59,439 --> 01:24:02,680
not so at all and you had
to alert the landing in San Carlos.

1007
01:24:02,800 --> 01:24:09,039
Of course well, we were still
in Darwinbus green O, which is about

1008
01:24:09,119 --> 01:24:15,359
a hundred kilometers south west of San
Carlos. What happened was that on 9

1009
01:24:15,439 --> 01:24:23,439
May, an English frigate sank the
island of the States ship, which was

1010
01:24:23,560 --> 01:24:27,920
a logistics vessel, had weapons,
and all the personnel, all the crew,

1011
01:24:28,239 --> 01:24:31,119
died, and two people were saved, just the captain and another member

1012
01:24:31,239 --> 01:24:36,239
of the crew. When they sink
into islands of the states that were more

1013
01:24:36,239 --> 01:24:42,880
or less in the middle of the
San Carlos Canal. Command says good.

1014
01:24:43,199 --> 01:24:46,319
In the south, in Bia Fox
we have people, but in the north

1015
01:24:46,319 --> 01:24:49,600
we don' t. Then let' s set up a combat team and

1016
01:24:49,640 --> 01:24:55,359
let him go north. Or there
when Esteban' s company says good it

1017
01:24:55,439 --> 01:25:00,000
goes for the north mouth and we
have to give him a reinforcement of armaments,

1018
01:25:00,319 --> 01:25:04,439
because my company was an assault company. We had armed it with the

1019
01:25:04,439 --> 01:25:10,520
three best sections of the regiment and
the company with light weapons only because it

1020
01:25:10,560 --> 01:25:15,960
was for landing. The order was
to disembark, we stopped the Royal Marines

1021
01:25:16,000 --> 01:25:20,239
and after three days we returned and
she was a month old and they continued.

1022
01:25:20,359 --> 01:25:25,960
Sure, but when they give the
order for the operation, it'

1023
01:25:25,960 --> 01:25:30,319
s not true. Rosario. It
was for three days and we turned and

1024
01:25:30,880 --> 01:25:35,520
then came the square, got dinner, presented battle and came the improvisations.

1025
01:25:35,720 --> 01:25:41,960
That' s the truth, that
is, the rosary operation was perfectly planned

1026
01:25:42,079 --> 01:25:48,039
and brilliantly executed up there. Then
the improvisations began, because it was never

1027
01:25:48,119 --> 01:25:51,800
thought of before this could happen.
In other words, there has not been

1028
01:25:51,880 --> 01:25:57,039
a single commander in the wars of
the world who can win a battle on

1029
01:25:57,039 --> 01:26:00,479
an island when the maritime domain is
enemy and it is clear that the control

1030
01:26:00,520 --> 01:26:02,840
of hand was to be of them, already with the two connkero who had

1031
01:26:02,960 --> 01:26:05,760
them turning on the day three and
four of opening around the islands. And

1032
01:26:05,800 --> 01:26:11,560
when you have aircraft carriers, which
is what the Brigadier and the Commodore pointed

1033
01:26:11,600 --> 01:26:15,319
out very well, above, you
have air superiority, that is, you

1034
01:26:15,520 --> 01:26:18,159
intend to win a battle on an
island with maritime superiority and enemy aerial superiority.

1035
01:26:18,840 --> 01:26:25,359
Then they fail this landing they go
to others they need more reinforcement with

1036
01:26:25,399 --> 01:26:30,640
what they would have killed us most
by starvation, that is, they prevented

1037
01:26:30,640 --> 01:26:32,159
everything from coming, that we have
no more ammunition, that you have no

1038
01:26:32,239 --> 01:26:36,000
more food and that they were achieving
at the end of the operations, you

1039
01:26:36,560 --> 01:26:41,000
think it was a total error of
entry that is to say. First,

1040
01:26:41,319 --> 01:26:45,439
I do not want to discuss the
political decision to regain sovereignty over the islands.

1041
01:26:45,520 --> 01:26:48,159
From all that you know of the
150 years, the unfulfilled negotiations,

1042
01:26:49,359 --> 01:26:59,199
all the UN resolutions that had been
ignored by Britain. I don' t

1043
01:26:59,199 --> 01:27:04,399
want to discuss that. But the
perfect plan was to land, stop the

1044
01:27:04,520 --> 01:27:11,800
Royal Marines, send them off,
send them to the mainland. Then there

1045
01:27:11,920 --> 01:27:15,560
was a police force and diplomatic negotiations
continued, with the model bl la Bunde

1046
01:27:15,680 --> 01:27:20,399
terr and with the model of taking. But diplomatic negotiations continued. But to

1047
01:27:21,439 --> 01:27:29,560
face a NATO power with its main
ally in favor that can do nothing else,

1048
01:27:29,840 --> 01:27:31,279
could not do anything else of America
at that time, because in all

1049
01:27:31,279 --> 01:27:39,720
wars, England has helped them and
is always with them. Then he gave

1050
01:27:39,880 --> 01:27:44,880
them the missiles there' s Winder
that allowed him to win any fight to

1051
01:27:44,960 --> 01:27:46,399
go Air, it' s not
true. He gave her satellite information,

1052
01:27:46,600 --> 01:27:54,359
gave her the island ascent and cut
the logistics in half and, in addition

1053
01:27:54,399 --> 01:28:02,359
to that, intelligence. So,
and an assumption of our planning that said

1054
01:28:03,800 --> 01:28:11,800
America will maintain complacent neutrality, that
didn' t happen. The English aren

1055
01:28:11,920 --> 01:28:15,560
' t coming. The English came
although we will be able to defend the

1056
01:28:15,640 --> 01:28:20,319
islands with this fundamental strategic error,
which is to believe that you can win

1057
01:28:20,439 --> 01:28:26,439
a battle within an island when maritime
domination is enemy. It' s impossible.

1058
01:28:26,640 --> 01:28:30,479
And the other thing, which was
a very big mistake to have a

1059
01:28:30,600 --> 01:28:36,760
strategic insistence that they were going to
land with a Pyrrhic victory in front of

1060
01:28:38,760 --> 01:28:43,760
Puerto Argentina, when the tip leistmo
of the strategic training and tactics of an

1061
01:28:43,840 --> 01:28:48,039
English officer is the plans leader heart, enter with interior lines, make the

1062
01:28:48,079 --> 01:28:50,520
enemy change front, etc. Well, but you knew about this was also

1063
01:28:50,600 --> 01:28:58,359
known by the people who were in
decision- making. Let' s say

1064
01:28:58,520 --> 01:29:04,880
the generals who were driving the same
training that I had after, that is,

1065
01:29:04,880 --> 01:29:08,199
discarding the discard they knew. It' s not the English' way

1066
01:29:09,239 --> 01:29:13,239
of operating, et cetera, but
sometimes it happens. It is not true

1067
01:29:13,279 --> 01:29:18,079
that I call them stubbornness. In
medicine, it' s called therapeutic stubbornness.

1068
01:29:18,199 --> 01:29:21,840
And here I call it strategic engagement. You have conceived that they are

1069
01:29:21,880 --> 01:29:26,800
going to land this way, because
this is the shortest way and because here

1070
01:29:26,800 --> 01:29:31,039
we are. Then you play there
and you put all the defense, you

1071
01:29:31,119 --> 01:29:33,920
aim, the guns, do the
field study, everything in that place and

1072
01:29:34,000 --> 01:29:40,399
the enemy. I' m not
going to the place where you' re

1073
01:29:40,399 --> 01:29:43,239
the strongest. I' m going
to the place where you' re weaker.

1074
01:29:44,239 --> 01:29:46,359
That is why San Carlos appears,
that, however, the intelligence had

1075
01:29:46,439 --> 01:29:51,239
been very clear in a report that
I still have said first place of disembarkation,

1076
01:29:51,399 --> 01:29:57,680
Argentine Port. He was induced,
so the generals thought, obviously,

1077
01:29:58,199 --> 01:30:03,000
second place, San Carlos. This
is the double how Dogliorie Doglioli' s

1078
01:30:03,199 --> 01:30:09,720
was one of the smartest men on
the island and he had them put in

1079
01:30:10,119 --> 01:30:15,279
second place here, because because you
saw that if there was a weapon they

1080
01:30:15,319 --> 01:30:19,960
were afraid of, it was the
MM thirty- nine the exot and there

1081
01:30:20,039 --> 01:30:26,960
they were practically protected, because the
MM thirty- nine still did not sail

1082
01:30:27,800 --> 01:30:31,079
following the current missiles. If following
the surface of the earth, then the

1083
01:30:31,199 --> 01:30:35,479
heights and vessels were eaten, which
were all protected, except that the missile

1084
01:30:35,560 --> 01:30:42,199
entered through the north mouth of the
strait. So we, when we went

1085
01:30:42,239 --> 01:30:45,680
there we were already clear that it
was a possibility of disembarkation and commando still

1086
01:30:45,760 --> 01:30:51,079
thought that it was going to be
in Argentina with a victory and rich,

1087
01:30:51,199 --> 01:30:56,000
if they had it, not and
how the news came to you personally,

1088
01:30:57,199 --> 01:31:02,680
this insinuation or the alert that they
were doing a landing operation. Well,

1089
01:31:03,319 --> 01:31:09,319
we, in Puerto de San Carlos, applied the same methodology that we called

1090
01:31:10,359 --> 01:31:14,640
this plan B that is or zeta
plan depends on what we wanted to talk

1091
01:31:14,760 --> 01:31:19,000
about on the radio, which was
to have absolute control of the population.

1092
01:31:19,840 --> 01:31:26,439
We seized his weapons, the radios
he was in that was fundamental. We

1093
01:31:27,399 --> 01:31:31,199
did a modest operation of veil and
tactical deception, that is, do things

1094
01:31:31,239 --> 01:31:39,479
so that the enemy thinks that you
are not there modest because the surfaces you

1095
01:31:39,479 --> 01:31:44,640
do not have, it is not
tucumán that you have this woods and mountains

1096
01:31:44,640 --> 01:31:48,279
here you see everything, then you
have to move very carefully, be well

1097
01:31:48,399 --> 01:31:51,279
masked, have positions prepared. We
let people continue to make normal lives,

1098
01:31:51,399 --> 01:31:59,239
to bring their cattle back, to
keep the chimneys smoking and talking on the

1099
01:31:59,319 --> 01:32:03,079
radio as little as possible and,
of course, to get the radio out

1100
01:32:03,199 --> 01:32:06,119
of the islanders who were going to
communicate with the fleet. So this is

1101
01:32:08,079 --> 01:32:14,520
how they found us on the landing
to such an extent that they made a

1102
01:32:14,520 --> 01:32:18,640
terrible mistake, incredible for such professional
forces that it is to land in broad

1103
01:32:18,680 --> 01:32:24,159
daylight without having eliminated us during the
night with a commando operation, having to

1104
01:32:26,439 --> 01:32:30,239
endure our fires and, above all, the fire of the air force after

1105
01:32:30,279 --> 01:32:38,840
having discovered the landing. So really
good. This later cost him some English

1106
01:32:38,920 --> 01:32:44,680
generals his career because he never disembarks
like that. You have to first make

1107
01:32:44,760 --> 01:32:47,479
sure that you don' t go
to anyone and do it overnight with commando

1108
01:32:47,560 --> 01:32:54,359
operations and then just the first helicopter
that we would know this was a siking

1109
01:32:54,399 --> 01:32:58,560
with chinguillo or it came with ammunition
with stocked. They were already totally convinced

1110
01:32:58,600 --> 01:33:00,720
that you weren' t there.
It' s amazing and you guys were

1111
01:33:00,720 --> 01:33:05,680
how many. We were in total
sixty- two, but we had twenty

1112
01:33:05,880 --> 01:33:10,880
- one at the tip, which
was the height, two thirty- four,

1113
01:33:11,079 --> 01:33:14,359
because we had a problem with communications. The radio is that I tell

1114
01:33:14,439 --> 01:33:17,920
you, the one that allowed transmitting
from that ship was a five hundred yasufl

1115
01:33:18,079 --> 01:33:23,720
that needed one hundred and ten balls
to be able to operate and one hundred

1116
01:33:23,760 --> 01:33:28,680
and ten bowl We had only in
Puerto San Carlos, at the height two

1117
01:33:28,800 --> 01:33:31,560
thirty- four, where there was
distance so that the heavy weapons could throw,

1118
01:33:31,560 --> 01:33:33,640
because we were given three missions.
Give the early warning in case of

1119
01:33:33,720 --> 01:33:41,079
a landing. It was possible to
prevent the passage of any ship through the

1120
01:33:41,119 --> 01:33:45,399
north mouth of the roof. It
was not possible because we were given two

1121
01:33:45,439 --> 01:33:49,960
mortars eighty- one and two canons
without recoil. Imagine that the first breath

1122
01:33:50,039 --> 01:33:56,039
of fire, which sees a frigate
sweeps away all the positions and the third

1123
01:33:56,119 --> 01:34:00,600
million that it was possible to keep
under control the population of Ponte de San

1124
01:34:00,600 --> 01:34:03,760
Carlos. So we, who were
taking steps for all that and were separated

1125
01:34:03,840 --> 01:34:10,039
with twenty- one men and forty- one because the radio is and we

1126
01:34:10,119 --> 01:34:13,600
were relieved, because the truth was
that life at the tip was hard,

1127
01:34:14,039 --> 01:34:17,159
cold duber and much wind and lack
of supply and has no way of covering.

1128
01:34:17,760 --> 01:34:20,079
And we were caught in the second
relay, that is, the first

1129
01:34:20,479 --> 01:34:26,640
relay was stationed and then in the
second relay with the second lieutenant kings.

1130
01:34:26,880 --> 01:34:34,119
There' s the landing and there' s the anecdote that four helicopters are

1131
01:34:34,319 --> 01:34:38,239
breaking down or they' re destroying
it, too. The issue is that,

1132
01:34:38,399 --> 01:34:46,680
i e, fal rifles are tremendously
powerful against helicopters when they are close

1133
01:34:46,800 --> 01:34:53,640
because they are aluminum, or say, drill the engine or affect hydraulic systems,

1134
01:34:53,720 --> 01:34:57,439
lectico systems or hit the pilot.
They went through the four helicopters.

1135
01:34:57,439 --> 01:35:00,800
All these things happened that I tell
you or some lost control, others the

1136
01:35:00,840 --> 01:35:06,239
pilot died, others were all holed
in and they had to, without setting

1137
01:35:06,279 --> 01:35:12,800
that fire, land them. So
what happened was that, not thinking we

1138
01:35:12,920 --> 01:35:18,560
were there, they got too close
and we opened fire with them being new

1139
01:35:18,640 --> 01:35:25,039
soldiers. Forty- one soldiers spent
a charger on the helicopter, which is

1140
01:35:25,119 --> 01:35:30,319
later called fire discipline in the infantry. Not too bad fire discipline, because

1141
01:35:30,479 --> 01:35:32,319
we didn' t spend all the
ammunition coming down helicopters. But then I

1142
01:35:32,880 --> 01:35:36,439
was clear, we had to keep
fighting and I had six hundred shots in

1143
01:35:36,560 --> 01:35:40,399
my backpack, that' s all. That was it, and they were

1144
01:35:40,439 --> 01:35:42,640
all shooting at the helicopters at the
same time. Yes, because they were

1145
01:35:42,680 --> 01:35:46,600
the first to come clear and what
happened next, how many British were landing

1146
01:35:46,680 --> 01:35:54,439
at that time and six thousand more
were sixty- six sixty- two against

1147
01:35:54,439 --> 01:35:57,159
six. Zero exactly, that'
s it. That is why, if

1148
01:35:57,640 --> 01:36:00,840
there is one important thing and it
is not my month the merit of the

1149
01:36:00,920 --> 01:36:05,960
formation of the Argentine army and of
what we thought at that time, there

1150
01:36:06,039 --> 01:36:11,039
was no possibility of surrender. It
didn' t exist, I mean,

1151
01:36:11,199 --> 01:36:13,640
I wouldn' t have been allowed. I would not have allowed it for

1152
01:36:13,880 --> 01:36:17,520
us to surrender at that time was
not prepared for the Argentine army, which

1153
01:36:17,600 --> 01:36:23,399
brought the glories of its entire history
to surrender because it is a landing of

1154
01:36:23,399 --> 01:36:25,039
one hundred zero men. That'
s why we' re in combat.

1155
01:36:25,239 --> 01:36:29,159
We were lucky after we were able
to get rid of the air force attack.

1156
01:36:29,760 --> 01:36:34,039
But here' s what we say. They have rewarded the company and

1157
01:36:34,600 --> 01:36:39,520
all the officers who have been decorated, because it is a clear situation for

1158
01:36:39,640 --> 01:36:45,159
a surrender and yet it did not
happen then. That is why that company

1159
01:36:45,239 --> 01:36:50,800
has had so much recognition, its
flag is decorated, etcetera, for what

1160
01:36:50,800 --> 01:36:56,560
it made at that time decisions of
the bosses. If I say, we

1161
01:36:56,600 --> 01:36:59,279
have to go into combat. That' s why I, when I cut

1162
01:36:59,319 --> 01:37:04,840
off communications with the General standing by, tell him my General is landing all

1163
01:37:05,159 --> 01:37:09,600
this in this place. I cut
communications and proceed to defend the place.

1164
01:37:10,039 --> 01:37:15,439
I didn' t think of anything
else and then, well, the fight

1165
01:37:15,479 --> 01:37:18,199
went off. We were having these
little successes of seeing the helicopters fall.

1166
01:37:19,119 --> 01:37:27,079
The enemy commander who says what'
s ahead because the helicopters fell off and

1167
01:37:27,279 --> 01:37:30,279
they were the ones who had to
direct the artillery fire. Then the artillery

1168
01:37:30,319 --> 01:37:36,000
did not throw, but without success, because it was the helicopters, the

1169
01:37:36,079 --> 01:37:43,760
gazettes that had to direct the fire. So there was no other posity left

1170
01:37:43,880 --> 01:37:45,199
for them than to slow down the
advance. And that' s what saves

1171
01:37:45,279 --> 01:37:50,039
us the most. First it appeared
there was in clip and then the attack

1172
01:37:50,079 --> 01:37:55,800
of the force and there they make
a retreat to where, an organized reply.

1173
01:37:55,880 --> 01:38:00,239
Well, I decided it wasn'
t for Dargon Guog Green, because

1174
01:38:00,319 --> 01:38:04,039
it was clear that the mass was
landing on that course. That is to

1175
01:38:05,000 --> 01:38:09,479
say, we who were going to
meet the fleet again, not with that

1176
01:38:09,479 --> 01:38:14,439
of the frame that it gave on
the landing ok then I said to Puerto

1177
01:38:14,600 --> 01:38:19,560
Argentina and it was heading eighty-
one degrees and we started a march to

1178
01:38:19,640 --> 01:38:21,319
Puerto Argentino with how many soldiers you
counted there at that time. Forty-

1179
01:38:21,439 --> 01:38:25,960
two. Forty- two or two
sides return to Argentina' s port through

1180
01:38:26,000 --> 01:38:29,239
the middle of the island. It' s a very hard march. However,

1181
01:38:29,399 --> 01:38:32,319
I tell you that it was harder
than the combat, because they were

1182
01:38:32,359 --> 01:38:36,760
initially later transformed into seventy kilometers,
but they were a hundred kilometers that we

1183
01:38:36,840 --> 01:38:41,560
had to arrive with borseguías that were
in bad water conditions, that we had

1184
01:38:41,560 --> 01:38:45,159
to pass the mob, that we
would say they were magines that you were

1185
01:38:45,239 --> 01:38:49,000
sinking very cold, had started to
snow already to last. Then it was

1186
01:38:49,119 --> 01:38:54,279
necessary to leave to be warm,
to see that the soldiers do not affect

1187
01:38:54,279 --> 01:38:57,920
their legs, to get some food. That' s why we stopped in

1188
01:38:57,960 --> 01:39:02,039
two rooms that were abandoned and there
they stopped a little bit of preparing some

1189
01:39:02,119 --> 01:39:10,600
hot food and ate, we had
finished dinner and we got the English helicopters

1190
01:39:10,920 --> 01:39:15,960
that flew over us and I don' t know or didn' t see

1191
01:39:15,000 --> 01:39:16,000
us or they said we' re
not going to have the same problem as

1192
01:39:16,000 --> 01:39:19,439
jazz. There are many who are
there in comparison to having two groups of

1193
01:39:19,479 --> 01:39:27,279
shooters coming so they didn' t
attack us and they left and then I

1194
01:39:27,319 --> 01:39:30,319
said good. At this point we
started the march again until we arrived at

1195
01:39:30,399 --> 01:39:33,399
a town called Douglas Paadock, and
there we did, for having communications open

1196
01:39:33,479 --> 01:39:41,520
and we warned him. In addition, I sent two non- commissioned officers,

1197
01:39:41,960 --> 01:39:44,399
first with a tractor and then with
a horse to arrive. I made

1198
01:39:44,720 --> 01:39:49,039
a written report and sent it to
General Menéndez. It' s an envelope

1199
01:39:49,119 --> 01:39:55,199
and how many days it took between
San Carlos, three days, three days

1200
01:39:55,199 --> 01:39:58,600
and three nights. Three days and
three nights, marching in the cold five

1201
01:39:58,640 --> 01:40:04,239
meals. The fight began on the
twenty- first and we twenty- five

1202
01:40:04,960 --> 01:40:10,680
made a formation by the first homeland
government with the Kelpers watching in this locality

1203
01:40:10,760 --> 01:40:16,279
that I tell you Dougla Spado with
the Kelpers looking at us and I gave

1204
01:40:16,399 --> 01:40:19,039
a herring, trying to motivate and
transmit patriotism to the soldiers. But we

1205
01:40:19,119 --> 01:40:27,520
' d seen what was landing,
so we knew it was coming. And

1206
01:40:27,640 --> 01:40:33,399
then the war continued. Operations continued, we arrived, we were sent eight

1207
01:40:33,479 --> 01:40:38,199
helicopters to Dugla Spadock. From there
they took us to Puerto Argentino. And

1208
01:40:38,279 --> 01:40:43,279
in Puerto Argentino I asked to give
back Wingubrin Ocia to Puerto Santiago, because

1209
01:40:44,119 --> 01:40:47,039
there was the lieutenant. Esteves,
with a section he had also stayed centurion

1210
01:40:47,079 --> 01:40:53,199
gomez and in turn, well,
I had fractions of the 12th regiment who

1211
01:40:53,319 --> 01:40:58,520
had to go back to their people
and I wanted to be with the rest

1212
01:40:58,640 --> 01:41:00,319
of my company, although I knew
that there to make the fights harder.

1213
01:41:00,359 --> 01:41:05,319
It was obvious, because the mass
had taken that course. Then they wanted

1214
01:41:05,399 --> 01:41:11,279
how they got the operation. We
attacked the weakest garrison that Darwingku Green was

1215
01:41:12,520 --> 01:41:17,960
and we also advanced from San Carlos
to Puerto Argentino so that they were clear

1216
01:41:18,239 --> 01:41:24,560
to make him change face to face
what I called them the strategic commitment of

1217
01:41:24,640 --> 01:41:32,319
wanting to defend or prepare for a
defense in Puerto Argentino. They force you

1218
01:41:32,399 --> 01:41:34,399
to change your face if they appear
to you. On the other hand,

1219
01:41:34,640 --> 01:41:40,640
the artillery, the entire logistics side, must be turned around. The soldiers

1220
01:41:40,680 --> 01:41:44,359
who have their marked firing range finished
a well and that well is no longer

1221
01:41:44,439 --> 01:41:46,760
full of water and is no better
than going to another. So let'

1222
01:41:47,000 --> 01:41:53,279
s say what they achieved, which
was a great tactical advantage, by waging

1223
01:41:53,359 --> 01:41:58,239
that the enemy has to change its
face and that' s the end of

1224
01:41:58,319 --> 01:42:00,560
the strategic insistence with which they were
going to land in Port. But it

1225
01:42:00,640 --> 01:42:04,680
was too late. It was already
late, and in Puerto Santiago they took

1226
01:42:04,760 --> 01:42:09,119
place and the toughest fights, you
told me, were hard and had a

1227
01:42:09,239 --> 01:42:14,000
very good performance in the 12th regiment. Also our company, with the sub

1228
01:42:15,119 --> 01:42:20,159
- Lieutenant Gómez centurion section. We
could not do much, when we arrived

1229
01:42:20,199 --> 01:42:24,359
that was almost the day of the
army, it was the 28th of May.

1230
01:42:25,359 --> 01:42:28,600
The lieutenant with the piachi who was
in charge, he tells me to

1231
01:42:28,640 --> 01:42:33,039
look. We' re out of
ammo. People very bad food. The

1232
01:42:33,079 --> 01:42:38,560
enemy has incredible coordination, incredible fire
support. He throws sixty later, eighty

1233
01:42:38,560 --> 01:42:41,720
and one was with one hundred and
twenty later he throws with artillery and if

1234
01:42:41,800 --> 01:42:44,880
he lacks anything, a Harry comes
and throws it at you. He throws

1235
01:42:44,960 --> 01:42:49,479
it at you where he couldn'
t. They couldn' t operate the

1236
01:42:49,479 --> 01:42:59,279
heavy weapons, so the situation was
complicated. Turns out an officer, a

1237
01:42:59,359 --> 01:43:03,239
non- commissioned officer who had arrested
him, was sent by the English to

1238
01:43:03,279 --> 01:43:10,359
tell the Chief of Regiment that they
want to talk to him, telling you

1239
01:43:10,359 --> 01:43:12,920
they' re inside the city.
This is a violation. We are going

1240
01:43:12,960 --> 01:43:18,520
to denounce the Commission in Geneva and
I propose that it send a cease-

1241
01:43:19,039 --> 01:43:21,399
fire and we continue to negotiate.
And that' s where the lieutenant'

1242
01:43:21,439 --> 01:43:30,239
s foot there orders General Menéndez'
s permission and orders the cease- fire

1243
01:43:30,319 --> 01:43:35,600
at that time that they take as
a prisoner. Yes, it was all

1244
01:43:35,680 --> 01:43:44,680
euphemistically taken away. Not first,
well, we stopped pulling. Then the

1245
01:43:44,800 --> 01:43:47,880
officers will not hand over the weapons
the soldiers and then it was the officers

1246
01:43:47,960 --> 01:43:54,720
also hand over the weapons and then
put us in a prison camp. He

1247
01:43:54,760 --> 01:43:58,239
' s got a lot of experience, I mean, he' s got

1248
01:43:58,239 --> 01:44:00,680
a lot of war experience. They
know how to handle things. They know

1249
01:44:00,600 --> 01:44:04,680
that once you have already lost the
will to fight, it is not necessary

1250
01:44:05,640 --> 01:44:13,279
to continue or offend you, torturing
you or weakening you because it leads to

1251
01:44:13,279 --> 01:44:15,680
a worse enemy. You tortured them. No, no, not at all.

1252
01:44:16,399 --> 01:44:19,680
I was questioned and nothing. It
was a hit on the table,

1253
01:44:19,800 --> 01:44:24,960
because he was worried if the parachute
brigade was going to jump or not.

1254
01:44:25,039 --> 01:44:27,239
As they knew this was parachute it
is. He said good, but the

1255
01:44:27,319 --> 01:44:32,399
brigade jumps or doesn' t jump
anything and they really were very respectful of

1256
01:44:32,439 --> 01:44:38,199
the Geneva Convention. They do not
study it much, but in the regulations

1257
01:44:38,279 --> 01:44:43,560
they have actions that are clearly in
respect of what the Commission of Geneva establishes

1258
01:44:43,640 --> 01:44:46,079
to tend the wounded, to give
blood to the one who is more to

1259
01:44:46,159 --> 01:44:54,279
attend first, to the one that
is more complicated, surgically, no matter

1260
01:44:55,560 --> 01:44:59,159
how much this enemy is, until
later, when we were prisoners, until

1261
01:45:00,359 --> 01:45:02,640
putting out a salary you saw because
it corresponds, it is true, by

1262
01:45:02,720 --> 01:45:10,199
the Commission of Geneva garn I then
opened the canteen so that you spent everything

1263
01:45:10,199 --> 01:45:10,600
quickly and closed a lot to return
to the continent, to return to Argentina.

1264
01:45:11,239 --> 01:45:18,199
We were lucky because already, played
as it was, we arrived by

1265
01:45:18,680 --> 01:45:27,960
helicopter to Puerto San Carlos. Again
they did as a helicopter rotation system and

1266
01:45:28,079 --> 01:45:33,079
took us all and there came a
ship called Nordland hool. In Norland Hool

1267
01:45:33,119 --> 01:45:39,600
we were boarded and went to Puerto
Carrasco, in Uruguay and arrived the day

1268
01:45:39,640 --> 01:45:45,079
the Pope was here, on June
13. The 14th fell in Puerto Argentina.

1269
01:45:46,119 --> 01:45:54,119
Impressive this that you tell me and
I want to ask you about how

1270
01:45:54,159 --> 01:45:59,000
the deal on the continent was with
veterans at that immediate moment of the return.

1271
01:45:59,319 --> 01:46:02,840
Of course, well, we have
to understand each other. It is

1272
01:46:03,760 --> 01:46:10,920
true that neither society nor the remaining
military commanders on the continent were prepared for

1273
01:46:11,079 --> 01:46:15,520
defeat. There was a sort of
triumphalism that had been sold through the media.

1274
01:46:16,840 --> 01:46:20,960
Let' s go to the phrase
that the first victim in the war

1275
01:46:21,039 --> 01:46:27,880
is the truth. Very successful actions
had been painted, things that had happened

1276
01:46:27,920 --> 01:46:30,479
in the tactical plane. But,
like here, there' s one thing

1277
01:46:30,479 --> 01:46:34,520
clear. Tactics can' t solve
the mistakes of strategy, and I'

1278
01:46:34,600 --> 01:46:41,079
ve already marked your mistakes. He
has tried falsely by saying that the United

1279
01:46:41,159 --> 01:46:45,199
States maintained a complacent neutrality. England
will not react militarily. If you react,

1280
01:46:45,560 --> 01:46:50,479
we will be able to defend the
islands and then the strategic mistake of

1281
01:46:50,560 --> 01:46:55,039
saying I will win when the sea
rise, that enemy on an island is

1282
01:46:55,039 --> 01:47:00,920
impossible. Things that happened on the
board that I give so far, I

1283
01:47:00,000 --> 01:47:03,199
give no more good support to that
kind of thing. We' re here.

1284
01:47:03,600 --> 01:47:11,760
We arrived and, in particular,
our company had a fairly acceptable reception

1285
01:47:13,239 --> 01:47:19,920
because we were first taken to the
non- commissioned officers' school Sergeant Cabral

1286
01:47:19,920 --> 01:47:23,600
and there we were given. We
had very bad clothes, borseguis, all

1287
01:47:23,720 --> 01:47:29,279
good food that we could cut off, hair, hygiene, etcetera. So

1288
01:47:29,319 --> 01:47:36,279
the military regiment was logical. The
logic is not to allow us to make

1289
01:47:36,319 --> 01:47:40,319
contact so that we talk too much. Two or three reports were made to

1290
01:47:40,399 --> 01:47:44,479
me about what had happened in San
Carlos and then we left for our town.

1291
01:47:45,159 --> 01:47:49,600
Our people were branches in the province
of Chubut and there the truth that

1292
01:47:49,720 --> 01:47:54,920
the reception of the population was majestic. There' s the footage, Verita

1293
01:47:55,000 --> 01:47:58,640
Paja' s quartermaster, who handled
all that. We were greeted with one

1294
01:47:58,640 --> 01:48:01,560
aspect, with one affection, with
the band playing I mean, I don

1295
01:48:01,560 --> 01:48:03,840
' t have, I don'
t have complaints. Although it is true

1296
01:48:04,479 --> 01:48:10,479
that afterwards it depends on the places
where it has been. Veterans were not

1297
01:48:10,560 --> 01:48:14,880
received as they should be because they
were people who did the best they could

1298
01:48:15,000 --> 01:48:18,920
with what they had. There was
no more, there was no more food,

1299
01:48:19,039 --> 01:48:23,560
there was no more ammunition. Then
they did what they could and six

1300
01:48:23,640 --> 01:48:26,239
hundred and forty- nine people had
died. So, but well, this

1301
01:48:27,039 --> 01:48:31,640
is a process of demalvinization. A
little bit from politics, a little bit

1302
01:48:32,640 --> 01:48:36,039
from people who had been more interested
in the world than what was going on

1303
01:48:36,720 --> 01:48:42,319
on the island. But the truth
is that the soldier has to be prepared

1304
01:48:42,439 --> 01:48:50,079
for that he cannot live from the
post- war honors he fought, I

1305
01:48:50,159 --> 01:48:54,840
gave the best he had. He
saw the companions is dying and he comes

1306
01:48:54,840 --> 01:49:00,279
back, and good if the people
recognize him. Or the grenadiers of San

1307
01:49:00,880 --> 01:49:06,119
Martín. After the fight of San
Carlos went to the North and when they

1308
01:49:08,680 --> 01:49:15,039
returned they ended up seven in a
harapose state arriving and that' s why

1309
01:49:15,119 --> 01:49:18,079
today is when the relief of the
tomb of the tinge finance is made seven.

1310
01:49:18,560 --> 01:49:21,479
They stayed seven. Nothing more.
I' m talking about the San

1311
01:49:21,479 --> 01:49:25,479
Martín grenadiers. I ask you now
a question that I am asking you from

1312
01:49:25,640 --> 01:49:30,119
the civilian world, which perhaps we
do not understand some issues within what is

1313
01:49:30,159 --> 01:49:35,479
strictly military family, which is what
happened with the issue of the promotions of

1314
01:49:35,600 --> 01:49:41,039
the Malvinas war veterans, especially the
army, because, in that sense,

1315
01:49:41,119 --> 01:49:45,920
the army was in that sense something
that, to the vision of a civilian

1316
01:49:45,960 --> 01:49:48,439
as I repeat to you, attracts
the attention that it has not been reached,

1317
01:49:49,359 --> 01:49:54,439
for example, generals, what opinion, what vision you have on it,

1318
01:49:56,119 --> 01:49:59,199
why you think it happened good.
There are different, different circumstances.

1319
01:49:59,239 --> 01:50:00,520
It' s not true and if
you ask me, in my case,

1320
01:50:02,239 --> 01:50:09,560
I had the bad luck of going
as a second commander of a general in

1321
01:50:09,680 --> 01:50:17,159
the 11th brigade of Galicians who had
made corruption, I had to denounce and

1322
01:50:17,319 --> 01:50:21,600
that I knew that had happened.
He was the governor and then the governor

1323
01:50:21,720 --> 01:50:28,279
was president and made him chief of
the army. Then it was obvious that

1324
01:50:29,239 --> 01:50:31,279
I wasn' t going to be
promoted. So that' s my case.

1325
01:50:31,840 --> 01:50:39,760
Others came from the war and they
talked too much, so people said,

1326
01:50:40,039 --> 01:50:46,279
but well, the truth is I
answer what it means to talk too

1327
01:50:46,359 --> 01:50:53,039
much and let' s say tell
glories where there were none, or tell

1328
01:50:53,079 --> 01:50:56,520
successful personal stories that people said,
but the truth is I don' t

1329
01:50:56,520 --> 01:51:00,920
understand why they didn' t win
the war. Those people were said to

1330
01:51:00,000 --> 01:51:04,640
be marginalized a little bit by that
kind of thing. And then it also

1331
01:51:04,800 --> 01:51:09,640
doesn' t mean that everyone who
went to war deserved to be a general.

1332
01:51:09,680 --> 01:51:11,399
That' s why I did it. It was in the war and

1333
01:51:11,479 --> 01:51:16,079
there were very good people and it
was also generated as a division those who

1334
01:51:16,159 --> 01:51:20,840
went and lost and we who stayed
and did not lose. But in general,

1335
01:51:20,920 --> 01:51:28,279
they are more personal stories than a
decision to tell why there were many

1336
01:51:29,560 --> 01:51:32,520
who returned from the islands and ascended. I mean, and I' m

1337
01:51:32,600 --> 01:51:36,079
telling you, my case was bad
luck, that I was hit by a

1338
01:51:36,159 --> 01:51:39,640
bad commander and that he was on
top of the army chief. I want

1339
01:51:39,640 --> 01:51:43,720
to ask you one last question.
I am very pleased that you are currently

1340
01:51:44,079 --> 01:51:48,600
Secretary of Science and Technology at the
National Defence University. Exactly how Malvinas is

1341
01:51:49,720 --> 01:51:55,720
taught, how involved it is in
the educational process of people who specialize in

1342
01:51:56,199 --> 01:52:03,359
Malvinas defense and the experience of the
bethos. Well, the question is very

1343
01:52:03,439 --> 01:52:08,560
interesting and I tell you that great
efforts are being made to ensure that at

1344
01:52:08,680 --> 01:52:15,760
all levels of education, the elections
learned in Malvinas are incorporated into the curricula

1345
01:52:15,800 --> 01:52:23,199
of each of the programs in the
military school, the Naval School, the

1346
01:52:23,239 --> 01:52:30,199
Air Force School, the defence degree, the defence judiciary, the defense doctorate.

1347
01:52:33,079 --> 01:52:38,399
The knowledge of Malvinas, all that
was learned, the need for joint

1348
01:52:38,520 --> 01:52:48,439
planning, the need for knowledge of
armaments, the management of personnel, the

1349
01:52:48,560 --> 01:52:54,920
true attitudes of leadership, are transmitted
and we have many, we have many

1350
01:52:55,199 --> 01:53:02,079
veterans who are teachers of the different
forces, of different hierarchies that in the

1351
01:53:02,279 --> 01:53:06,920
different courses are transmitting what they saw, what they learned, what they had

1352
01:53:08,720 --> 01:53:15,000
taught and served us and we are
transmitting it in all the courses. I

1353
01:53:15,039 --> 01:53:18,039
mean, Malvina suey is present and
I don' t even tell you what

1354
01:53:18,039 --> 01:53:23,680
it means. Of course, the
international law of armed conflicts, because there

1355
01:53:24,600 --> 01:53:29,359
was a great fallacy there. The
great failings of the armed forces were the

1356
01:53:29,479 --> 01:53:34,399
lack of joint training and ignorance of
the law of war, because it was

1357
01:53:34,479 --> 01:53:41,800
not common. Our soldiers didn'
t know. I had problems because the

1358
01:53:41,920 --> 01:53:45,840
soldiers threw pilots who were in the
water swimming and I totally prohibited you by

1359
01:53:45,960 --> 01:53:48,560
the Commission, but if they had
45 days of instruction, it was impossible.

1360
01:53:49,520 --> 01:53:55,520
Impossible. I thank you very much
for the United Port and I am

1361
01:53:55,560 --> 01:53:59,720
always passionate about people who try to
meet malvine and who give a little place

1362
01:54:00,399 --> 01:54:05,640
to veterans. And I give you
the last idea for me now and Malvina

1363
01:54:05,720 --> 01:54:11,079
' s historical vision has to be
overcome, is it a vision for the

1364
01:54:11,079 --> 01:54:15,199
future? And what is the vision
for the future? It is an element

1365
01:54:15,279 --> 01:54:21,199
of union of the Argentine people or
notice that we have good Boca river che

1366
01:54:24,239 --> 01:54:28,039
Leford in the United States, Trump
seea tram No or the U Tanzi the

1367
01:54:28,119 --> 01:54:31,600
or such no And here we have
a cause that has no opposition. Malvinas

1368
01:54:31,720 --> 01:54:36,840
has no opposition, that is,
there is no Argentine, except there is

1369
01:54:36,920 --> 01:54:42,079
always some Anglophile who suddenly, but
there is no Argentine who does not say

1370
01:54:42,079 --> 01:54:46,119
I, in our land we have
to do our best to recover this value

1371
01:54:46,119 --> 01:54:51,760
diplomatically. Or what veterans did well
was an attempt failed, but we have

1372
01:54:51,960 --> 01:54:56,760
set an example to the world that
we are willing to die for that cause.

1373
01:54:57,640 --> 01:55:00,560
So I think we have to look
at it as a union ele for

1374
01:55:00,640 --> 01:55:06,560
the future and say there go the
Argentines united by this cade not to generate

1375
01:55:06,680 --> 01:55:11,399
silly diets that serve us at all, having this opportunity that there is no

1376
01:55:11,520 --> 01:55:16,119
Argentine here who opposes working for malvinas
and recognizing what was done for Malvinas.

1377
01:55:18,520 --> 01:55:23,079
I thank you so much for these
words. I agree that the general population

1378
01:55:23,199 --> 01:55:30,800
has a general insinuation of the population
on the same horizon. It must be

1379
01:55:30,800 --> 01:55:34,600
capitalized, as you rightly say,
it must be transformed into a tool of

1380
01:55:34,600 --> 01:55:40,439
unity. It is truly a pleasure
to have had you here as well as

1381
01:55:40,840 --> 01:55:42,840
Alcomodoro' s Brigadier who came in
the first hour. I thank all the

1382
01:55:42,880 --> 01:55:48,880
people who were listening to these two
hours a little extended special programming on April

1383
01:55:49,439 --> 01:55:56,359
2. I' ll fire you. I also thank Neura very much for

1384
01:55:56,399 --> 01:56:01,039
giving this space, to make known
the ideas, the experiences, the anecdotes

1385
01:56:01,039 --> 01:56:09,159
of these veterans. And a special
thank you to Tronco, who is the

1386
01:56:09,239 --> 01:56:10,880
one who devised this goodbye