WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.280 --> 00:00:02.839 Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today 2 00:00:03.000 --> 00:00:06.839 about a way that you can help support the podcast. If you're not already, 3 00:00:07.200 --> 00:00:10.720 we would really appreciate it if you guys went and reviewed us on Apple 4 00:00:10.800 --> 00:00:15.320 or Spotify. Those reviews really help people find the podcast and help it get 5 00:00:15.320 --> 00:00:18.760 recognized, and you know, if you've been enjoying the show, we really 6 00:00:18.760 --> 00:00:23.839 appreciate your support. Another thing that you can do to support the channel is 7 00:00:23.960 --> 00:00:28.800 to become a Patreon member. So we have Patreon memberships that started just five 8 00:00:28.879 --> 00:00:32.719 dollars a month, and when you sign up, you get access to all 9 00:00:32.759 --> 00:00:36.479 of our episodes add free. That's the big bonus for that. I mean, 10 00:00:36.520 --> 00:00:41.640 we also do some Patreon bonus episodes for our subscribers, But this is 11 00:00:41.679 --> 00:00:47.560 the biggest and best way that you can support the Teamhouse channel and podcast if 12 00:00:47.560 --> 00:00:51.200 you'd like to, and we really appreciate that, So go and check us 13 00:00:51.200 --> 00:00:56.479 out at patreon dot com slash the Teamhouse. Hello everyone, Welcome to another 14 00:00:56.560 --> 00:01:03.719 episode of Eyes on Weekly, reasonably well informed discussion of geopolitical events and about 15 00:01:03.759 --> 00:01:07.519 the time it takes you to drive to work or pt whatever else you get 16 00:01:07.599 --> 00:01:11.920 up to. In about thirty minutes. I'm Andy Milburn, former Marine Infantry 17 00:01:11.959 --> 00:01:18.560 Special Operations officer, former CEO of the Mozart Group, longtime student of modern 18 00:01:18.640 --> 00:01:26.959 war. Not here today is Jason Lyons, who is waiting back surgery. 19 00:01:27.120 --> 00:01:33.599 You know we should do a whole episode D on veterans problems with bags. 20 00:01:33.719 --> 00:01:38.239 No, actually, on second thoughts, let's not do that an entire series. 21 00:01:38.959 --> 00:01:44.959 But anyway, does it delighted obviously to have d who is my who 22 00:01:45.040 --> 00:01:51.280 is our producer and my boss d O over to you? Thanks? Andy, 23 00:01:52.519 --> 00:01:53.760 I appreciate your boss. I don't know about that. I don't think 24 00:01:53.760 --> 00:01:59.480 I'm anybody's boss, to be honest, I just wanted to make up what 25 00:01:59.560 --> 00:02:02.599 do you have for us today? I mean it's the big The big news 26 00:02:02.680 --> 00:02:09.080 is the uh, you know, retaliatory strikes on the IRGC and connected militias 27 00:02:09.080 --> 00:02:14.360 and stuff. It's been pretty busy, so yeah, one hundred percent. 28 00:02:14.479 --> 00:02:16.719 So bring to bring everyone up to speed in case, you know, for 29 00:02:16.759 --> 00:02:22.759 some reason you got horrendously drunk around noon yesterday and slept through the whole thing. 30 00:02:23.240 --> 00:02:30.840 Of the United States conducted reportedly eighty five strikes on four separate targets in 31 00:02:31.520 --> 00:02:38.280 Iraq and Syria, and these figured out here how to no, actually I 32 00:02:38.319 --> 00:02:42.759 figured this out how to share a screen. This is this is an I 33 00:02:42.960 --> 00:02:45.520 sw map. Don't worry, guys, we're not going to get very geeky 34 00:02:45.520 --> 00:02:47.439 in academic hit. But it drives me up the wall and we talk about 35 00:02:47.439 --> 00:02:53.039 places and we don't have a map to point to. This is this pretty 36 00:02:53.039 --> 00:03:00.840 good map of the Iraq Syria Iraq Jordan border. These strikes that it shows 37 00:03:00.840 --> 00:03:07.599 here actually militia strikes on US basis as of late January, and they show 38 00:03:07.879 --> 00:03:14.560 they show strikes according to how many occurred frequency, and you'll see Ala Sartz. 39 00:03:14.680 --> 00:03:19.240 Maybe you remember Alisade was a great rocket magnet back in the day when 40 00:03:19.280 --> 00:03:23.240 we were there and continues continues that tradition. Of course, that's a massive 41 00:03:23.360 --> 00:03:29.599 base. But when you have much smaller bases there like Al Tanf and the 42 00:03:29.639 --> 00:03:35.879 little circle there marked Rookman is actually Tower twenty two, strikes have a much 43 00:03:35.879 --> 00:03:42.360 greater effect. D I'm gonna you can see yeh look, okay, perfect, 44 00:03:42.520 --> 00:03:47.759 all right, So the strikes went in. There's a couple of places 45 00:03:49.000 --> 00:03:52.080 that many of your listeners will be familiar with. All right, And don't 46 00:03:52.080 --> 00:03:55.039 beat me up if I'm not getting in exactly right, but our cime roughly 47 00:03:55.120 --> 00:04:00.759 here. Then across the border in Syria there's a place called Abu Kamal, 48 00:04:01.520 --> 00:04:06.400 both of which have been acting, as you know, kind of bases or 49 00:04:06.439 --> 00:04:12.919 depots for the for the Iranian Back to PMCs, some of you will have 50 00:04:13.080 --> 00:04:19.839 seen on Twitter very traumatic secondary explosions here in our cime. I would offer 51 00:04:19.879 --> 00:04:23.720 this and we'll talk about it, you know, in a moment deeper. 52 00:04:24.480 --> 00:04:29.279 It would have to be very very stupid people who were left in those depots 53 00:04:29.360 --> 00:04:33.040 or those areas you know, the US that they hit commander control facilities there, 54 00:04:33.040 --> 00:04:36.480 but also in the weapons storage deep and that's where you saw the secondary 55 00:04:36.480 --> 00:04:45.600 explosions from. I would offer that whatever was in those warehouses was probably discarded 56 00:04:45.720 --> 00:04:48.240 or deliberately left, maybe because they didn't have time to move it, or 57 00:04:48.319 --> 00:04:54.720 because they wanted to provide just a dramatic show to the United States and hopefully 58 00:04:54.720 --> 00:05:00.439 assuaged some of the bloodlust that is influencing our domestic politics. Knows, but 59 00:05:00.600 --> 00:05:05.079 unlikely that. Oh yeah, so those are two of the strikes. There 60 00:05:05.160 --> 00:05:11.279 was another one up in Dariza. It's still in Darazar Province and the Euphrates 61 00:05:11.360 --> 00:05:15.160 River again. You know, I may get beaten up if this is off 62 00:05:15.399 --> 00:05:20.120 target, but it's it's somewhere around here. And then there's a place called 63 00:05:20.160 --> 00:05:30.279 Akashad in Iraq, very close to the very close to the you know, 64 00:05:30.360 --> 00:05:33.399 the tri border region, roughly where I'm putting my cursor here. Akashad. 65 00:05:33.439 --> 00:05:41.360 That's been a long time Iranian militia staging point. And interestingly enough, you 66 00:05:41.399 --> 00:05:45.759 know this is the heavily Sunni area of Iraq, right and you know, 67 00:05:45.839 --> 00:05:48.519 so the P and C very deliberately have set up fortified areas there and that 68 00:05:48.639 --> 00:05:55.199 is that is what we we have attacked. Heydep. But I've got to 69 00:05:55.240 --> 00:05:58.319 read out this one quote. You know, we do ourselves no favor, 70 00:05:58.959 --> 00:06:03.240 no favors at all globally. How do you think the world's population are going 71 00:06:03.279 --> 00:06:08.920 to react? In many many of our audiences saying they don't give a shit. 72 00:06:08.959 --> 00:06:13.240 But you know, when we talk about the information campaign, we've got 73 00:06:13.240 --> 00:06:19.360 this guy who run a rather up uninspired morning moment this morning, said, 74 00:06:20.000 --> 00:06:25.879 this is Lieutenant General Douglas A. Simms, director of the military's Joint Staff. 75 00:06:26.079 --> 00:06:30.160 All right, that's a primary position. The beauty of the American bomber 76 00:06:30.120 --> 00:06:33.959 is that we can strike anywhere in the world at the time of our choosing. 77 00:06:34.720 --> 00:06:40.600 All right, shapes a doctor strange for rights, you know, comments 78 00:06:40.639 --> 00:06:46.480 slight the beauty. Strangely enough, the world's population is probably not in rapture 79 00:06:46.680 --> 00:06:49.759 about the beauty of the American bomber, and we probably need to be a 80 00:06:49.800 --> 00:06:56.360 little more cognizant about how we portray that, you know. And and it 81 00:06:56.399 --> 00:06:59.959 goes on the usual staff guy by a strikes, targeting, command and control 82 00:07:00.360 --> 00:07:03.199 operations, intelligence centers, weapons facilities, and bunkers, you know, the 83 00:07:03.279 --> 00:07:08.240 usual rundown think about those, right, A key thing. They didn't say 84 00:07:08.319 --> 00:07:12.279 key personnel. Right, they didn't say, hey, we're you know, 85 00:07:12.319 --> 00:07:17.680 we're going after these guys. Yeah, it's interesting and you know because previously 86 00:07:17.720 --> 00:07:24.480 we did when we hit Solmoney and by the way, when we hit Solmany 87 00:07:24.560 --> 00:07:27.959 back in twenty twenty, the guy who was killed with him was a guy 88 00:07:28.040 --> 00:07:32.560 named Mahindas was kind of his warning. He was head of guitar PSBOLLA. 89 00:07:32.839 --> 00:07:35.839 All right, so you see how all this, you know, all of 90 00:07:35.839 --> 00:07:43.759 this comes together, and you will see in today's news a couple of very 91 00:07:44.240 --> 00:07:47.279 in Iraq, you know, some couple of interesting points. Okay, So 92 00:07:47.399 --> 00:07:50.600 first of all, you know that their chart. The head of their armed 93 00:07:50.600 --> 00:07:59.600 forces has come out and made a very a very angry statement about US violation 94 00:07:59.680 --> 00:08:03.399 when he US foundation of the Iraqi sovereignty, and so has the Prime Minister, 95 00:08:05.839 --> 00:08:11.120 saying that the casualties reported casualties from eighty five strikes, which were a 96 00:08:11.160 --> 00:08:15.800 total of sixteen people killed in thirty four I believe wounded. Who knows, 97 00:08:15.920 --> 00:08:18.600 you know, I think six wounded, thirty six. Yeah, In any 98 00:08:18.600 --> 00:08:22.000 case, he's saying the USO's compensation to these people. The US is saying 99 00:08:22.000 --> 00:08:26.639 that they were PMC militia. PMC militia are probably thinking, damn, what 100 00:08:26.680 --> 00:08:30.360 the hell are these guys doing there? Maybe they didn't get the word, 101 00:08:30.680 --> 00:08:37.360 you know, it's right, right collection. But so the Iraqi government is 102 00:08:37.519 --> 00:08:41.720 up in arms. But let's let's look at what's happened a little bit in 103 00:08:41.759 --> 00:08:46.039 the last few days. All right, on the twenty right, the strike 104 00:08:46.080 --> 00:08:50.399 occurred on twenty eight January. All right. Immediately, you know, there 105 00:08:50.399 --> 00:08:54.000 were comments from the administration and we're going to you know, find out who 106 00:08:54.039 --> 00:08:58.960 did this. We're going to strike back. On twenty nine January, a 107 00:08:58.120 --> 00:09:05.039 guy named sorry, that's my dog, that's okay, Yeah, twenty nine 108 00:09:05.159 --> 00:09:09.679 January a guy named Brigadier General Ghani Ishmael Ghani, who is head of Koutzvous, 109 00:09:11.360 --> 00:09:13.279 visits Baghdad. All right, all this is you know, obviously, 110 00:09:13.480 --> 00:09:16.960 what I'm telling you is open source. I'm not going to the day after, 111 00:09:18.279 --> 00:09:22.679 right, the day after the basis day after right, And he meets 112 00:09:22.360 --> 00:09:28.960 with the head of Katab Has Bolla all right, who is also the chairman. 113 00:09:30.720 --> 00:09:35.279 He has an official Iraqi position as chairman of the PMC. Okay, 114 00:09:35.399 --> 00:09:41.159 the popular Militia working two jobs. Man, it's not easy out there with 115 00:09:41.279 --> 00:09:46.159 all right, has Buller all right, remember he still had it, Katab 116 00:09:46.240 --> 00:09:52.399 Has Buller man's three brigades in the Iraqi army. You see how this is 117 00:09:52.440 --> 00:10:01.279 all linked, right, it gets worse. So this guy and I'll remember, 118 00:10:01.639 --> 00:10:05.080 you know, I'll remember this moment. Muhammad Ahwi is his last name, 119 00:10:07.639 --> 00:10:13.759 and he's called al khal all right, Muhammad Ali, remember that name. 120 00:10:13.840 --> 00:10:20.759 Twenty nineteen US embassy was attacked by Popular Mission Militia members PMF members. 121 00:10:20.759 --> 00:10:28.200 They actually overran the compound and they left graffiti. All right, there's photographs 122 00:10:28.200 --> 00:10:31.080 of graffiti, a manga graffiti left. There was this guy's name, Al 123 00:10:31.200 --> 00:10:33.960 Cahl, all right. They were doing it in his name. So now 124 00:10:35.399 --> 00:10:41.039 you know head of Katabas Bala, headed PMC, official position in the Iraqi 125 00:10:41.039 --> 00:10:46.919 government, Iraqi armed Forces actually under the m I. Now you know, 126 00:10:48.000 --> 00:10:52.000 he is meeting with Ghani and so speculating here, all right. Ghani tells 127 00:10:52.039 --> 00:10:56.039 him, hey, not this, shiit off, fellas you're getting you know, 128 00:10:56.080 --> 00:11:00.519 you're gonna get us in trouble to big Satan, you know, or 129 00:11:00.559 --> 00:11:05.679 tone it down or whatever. The next day, right thirty January, Katabisbola 130 00:11:05.799 --> 00:11:09.639 comes out and says, hey, you know we're gonna we're not gonna hit 131 00:11:09.720 --> 00:11:15.679 us targets. Now. It's very subtle and smooth, geopolitical like yeah, 132 00:11:15.879 --> 00:11:18.320 maneuvering. Yeah, all right, so here's a price release. We're not 133 00:11:18.360 --> 00:11:24.279 gonna hit anything anymore, we promise. Yeah, that's that's that's exactly right. 134 00:11:24.200 --> 00:11:30.120 By the way, Jordanian F sixteen's participated in this strike yesterday. Jordanian 135 00:11:30.159 --> 00:11:35.440 government is being noncommittal about that, but yeah they did. You know, 136 00:11:35.519 --> 00:11:39.559 normally these strikes when the Jordanians revolved, are more than symbolic, and you 137 00:11:39.600 --> 00:11:43.519 know they they have struck before in Syria two or three times a right, 138 00:11:43.639 --> 00:11:48.919 not I mean, these are strikes going after Iranian backed smugglers. So you 139 00:11:48.960 --> 00:11:52.559 know, my point is that they're on board too. But but of course 140 00:11:52.639 --> 00:11:58.000 we weren't gonna launch from Jordan, and does make Jordan even more of a 141 00:11:58.039 --> 00:12:01.679 target than already is. That's why you know the B once took off from 142 00:12:03.519 --> 00:12:07.039 from Lake And yes, I saw the two B one the two B one 143 00:12:07.120 --> 00:12:11.399 b's were in on it and a ten fighter and attack aircraft. So there 144 00:12:11.399 --> 00:12:13.360 were a couple of Jordani and F sixteen's, But like I saw that they 145 00:12:13.360 --> 00:12:18.639 were eight tens too. Where those where, like the US assets taken off 146 00:12:18.639 --> 00:12:22.799 from besides the bombers. Wait, did you say that at a tens? 147 00:12:22.080 --> 00:12:26.039 That's what I saw on Twitter yesterday. Yeah, that they were a tens 148 00:12:26.080 --> 00:12:30.279 involved in it. I would be well, that's okay, let's let's get 149 00:12:30.279 --> 00:12:31.679 that out of the listeners. Maybe we can hear it. Update on that, 150 00:12:31.960 --> 00:12:35.679 correct US if I'm wrong. But I did see it that a tens 151 00:12:35.720 --> 00:12:39.519 were in it. But where would those Where would US fighters or attack aircraft 152 00:12:39.679 --> 00:12:48.159 launch from? Well? The UK? Are they all go from the UK? 153 00:12:48.279 --> 00:12:52.320 Okay? I don't know. You know, I'm not my my sources 154 00:12:52.399 --> 00:12:56.879 here. I have to be open source, and I don't know, but 155 00:12:56.960 --> 00:13:01.759 I was tracking ocent Intel, you know, on on Twitter when they took 156 00:13:01.799 --> 00:13:05.679 off from lacoln Heath, but I didn't. Yeah, but it wasn't that 157 00:13:05.759 --> 00:13:09.440 just the b ones? I think the b ones? Yeah? Yeah, 158 00:13:09.480 --> 00:13:13.200 So anyway, it doesn't Yeah, anyway, it doesn't matter. I'm more 159 00:13:13.240 --> 00:13:16.799 interested in what happens at the point and not where the fuck that took off 160 00:13:16.840 --> 00:13:22.080 from and what what happened in the point end. You know, we've got 161 00:13:22.080 --> 00:13:26.440 to say looks, looks I don't want to say symbolic, but again, 162 00:13:28.279 --> 00:13:37.080 you know, eighty five strikes sounds very it sounds like a really concerted effort. 163 00:13:37.159 --> 00:13:41.759 But when you look at all the telegraphing that took place before that, 164 00:13:43.120 --> 00:13:52.320 it would be absolutely amazing if if that delta blow to the Iranian milicious capability. 165 00:13:52.320 --> 00:13:56.039 And this is the point here, d is you know, if we're 166 00:13:56.039 --> 00:14:01.519 not doing something that is really undermining UH adversaries capability. Remember we talked about 167 00:14:01.519 --> 00:14:07.159 this and I said, a comprehensive strike not in Iran, but Iraq Anceria 168 00:14:07.320 --> 00:14:13.720 taking out Okay, that that middle to upper level tier Koon's force guys who 169 00:14:13.720 --> 00:14:18.480 are who are operating outside country. You know that there's all kinds of reasons 170 00:14:18.519 --> 00:14:20.000 why that would be a good move. I'm surprised we didn't do that. 171 00:14:20.080 --> 00:14:26.759 I'm surprised that that we telegraphed this. Okay, the same day, all 172 00:14:26.840 --> 00:14:31.440 right, back to the timeline the same day, you know we're talking about 173 00:14:31.440 --> 00:14:37.960 when Ghani visits. Back that same day again, Kirby talks to the press. 174 00:14:39.200 --> 00:14:46.200 He says that, you know, we're gonna we're going to definitely strike 175 00:14:46.240 --> 00:14:50.759 Iran. It's gonna be I forget the term he used, but a multi 176 00:14:50.919 --> 00:14:56.679 lad something along that attack. It's but it's not gonna be a He didn't 177 00:14:56.720 --> 00:14:58.200 say, come out and say it's not gonna be Iron itself. Although you've, 178 00:14:58.600 --> 00:15:01.919 by the way, you owe me twenty dollars he has. You know 179 00:15:01.120 --> 00:15:05.200 you owe me twenty dollars. Min, we'll get back to this, okay, 180 00:15:05.639 --> 00:15:07.600 Okay, put a pin in that. No, they have not. 181 00:15:07.879 --> 00:15:15.919 Yeah, anyway, the point is the very clearly messaging by omission that they 182 00:15:15.919 --> 00:15:20.519 were not going to strike around itself. Okay. And so when you think 183 00:15:20.559 --> 00:15:22.120 about it, and when you're saying, hey, I'm going to come after 184 00:15:22.120 --> 00:15:24.960 you, I'm going to come after you, I'm going to you know, 185 00:15:24.039 --> 00:15:28.759 really hit your eyr GC dudes, and he keeps saying that, and there's 186 00:15:28.759 --> 00:15:33.080 only a certain number of locations, and you know, the Orenians know that 187 00:15:33.159 --> 00:15:37.279 we know blah blah blah. So it's very hard to avoid the perception that 188 00:15:37.360 --> 00:15:43.000 this is pantomime. I'm not saying it was pantomime. I'm saying that that's 189 00:15:43.039 --> 00:15:48.120 sadly, the perception is right, and that is not what I'm sure the 190 00:15:48.159 --> 00:15:50.480 administration wants the American public to think. So I think, you know, 191 00:15:50.519 --> 00:15:56.399 there's there's a little bit of strategic communication that has to follow this, and 192 00:15:56.600 --> 00:16:03.600 you know in other areas too. You may have seen the report today. 193 00:16:03.639 --> 00:16:08.559 Remember last time you asked me about the uh, the attack, right, 194 00:16:08.600 --> 00:16:12.840 And the reason why I'm talking about this is because it's not to it's not 195 00:16:12.879 --> 00:16:18.559 to get some poor bastard punished who's now struggling with his conscience and you know, 196 00:16:18.600 --> 00:16:22.720 and omission and and and seeing a result in the loss of US life. 197 00:16:23.360 --> 00:16:27.200 By no means am I trying to hauln that guy in front of a 198 00:16:27.360 --> 00:16:32.039 firing squad. But it is important, obviously to you know, to close 199 00:16:32.120 --> 00:16:37.120 any any gaps, and drone and counter drone warfare is so dynamic that you've 200 00:16:37.159 --> 00:16:45.320 constantly got to be closing these gaps and and so that's why this comment that 201 00:16:45.960 --> 00:16:51.759 the the the attack drone came in on the heels of the US drone. 202 00:16:52.840 --> 00:16:57.639 It deserves being dug into sensibly, I'll tell you it doesn't make sense to 203 00:16:57.679 --> 00:17:03.599 me. And again please correct me, guys. But I all our type 204 00:17:03.640 --> 00:17:14.519 three and above drones have our US have what's called an if F transponder. 205 00:17:14.720 --> 00:17:18.759 All right, that's identification friend or foe. It's andy. Let me ask 206 00:17:18.799 --> 00:17:22.039 you real quick. Type three or four. Is that like military grade or 207 00:17:22.079 --> 00:17:26.799 like CIA. No, it's all on size all right, fight one or 208 00:17:26.839 --> 00:17:32.880 two. I kind of think of them as more very tactical drones used by 209 00:17:33.000 --> 00:17:37.160 tactical units. Right. This drone, by all accounts, was a longer 210 00:17:37.279 --> 00:17:44.640 range loi F minission one way drone it you know, because it was rocket 211 00:17:44.680 --> 00:17:48.119 boosted. That's, you know, one of the few things we know about 212 00:17:48.160 --> 00:17:51.720 it. It's likely to have been a shah had one thirty six, but 213 00:17:51.759 --> 00:17:53.200 there are other things that could have been too. It doesn't matter. It's 214 00:17:53.200 --> 00:17:59.559 definitely an Iranian manufacturer. And that I say that because only the Iranians the 215 00:18:00.319 --> 00:18:06.920 only such loiter ammunitions in the hands of militias. Whether that Huthis or whether 216 00:18:06.960 --> 00:18:11.079 that they're PMF in Iraq. The only ones are arena of Iranian manufacturer. 217 00:18:11.079 --> 00:18:15.799 That gets back to my point of intent is almost irrelevant when it comes to 218 00:18:15.839 --> 00:18:19.920 Iran in this case, because Iran has enabled these groups to be able to 219 00:18:19.960 --> 00:18:26.279 strike the United States and so but interestingly enough y and there's points again to 220 00:18:26.480 --> 00:18:36.319 the US administration's keenness not to escalate. There's been very little released about the 221 00:18:36.440 --> 00:18:41.359 drone. It was again one way drone. You know, I mean when 222 00:18:41.920 --> 00:18:48.400 we when we have you know, I've I've seen chemikaze drone wreckage from you 223 00:18:48.440 --> 00:18:52.400 know, big ones like Shahad's all the way down to you know, switchblade 224 00:18:52.400 --> 00:18:57.079 type ones, and they leave wreckage, right, they leave traceable material in 225 00:18:57.119 --> 00:19:00.480 the United States. There's no country in the world that can trace that stuff 226 00:19:00.480 --> 00:19:06.440 better than the United States. And yet very little has been released about this 227 00:19:06.599 --> 00:19:11.920 drone. My speculation here is that is it is indeed Iranian, but the 228 00:19:12.039 --> 00:19:18.039 US is being circumspect about releasing that information because it kind of paints both countries 229 00:19:18.079 --> 00:19:22.319 into a box. Does that make sense, Yeah? Absolutely, yeah. 230 00:19:22.400 --> 00:19:27.400 So getting back anyway to this thing about you know, a drone coming in 231 00:19:27.759 --> 00:19:37.599 by the Shahad coming in behind a US drone doesn't make sense necessarily because you 232 00:19:37.640 --> 00:19:41.440 know, I said most type one of I think Type two drones now have 233 00:19:41.559 --> 00:19:45.480 some kind of IFF transponder. But I may be wrong, and it could 234 00:19:45.519 --> 00:19:51.079 be that this was a primitive security drone, you know, a quad copter, 235 00:19:51.599 --> 00:19:55.240 you know, the US one. There is a task force, task 236 00:19:55.279 --> 00:20:00.359 Force ninety nine that repurposes commercial drones for you military use. You know, 237 00:20:00.400 --> 00:20:03.839 again, this is open sources. There's been interviews done with these guys. 238 00:20:03.839 --> 00:20:08.240 They're based in Ladd and they have something around one hundred drones, none of 239 00:20:08.279 --> 00:20:14.160 which have I f F transponders, and it could maybe it was one of 240 00:20:14.160 --> 00:20:17.160 these drones. My point is this, either this is an important issue. 241 00:20:17.279 --> 00:20:19.119 It's a chink in our armor and we need to fix it. And we're 242 00:20:19.119 --> 00:20:22.200 not going to fix it, if you know, unless we really dig into 243 00:20:22.240 --> 00:20:26.359 it. And I'm sure that the military, the military is onto it. 244 00:20:27.599 --> 00:20:30.400 Well, I mean, if it is indeed the case that it followed in 245 00:20:30.559 --> 00:20:34.359 from a friendly drone, they have to fix it. I mean, we 246 00:20:34.440 --> 00:20:40.039 lost, we lost guys and girls, you know, and and and what 247 00:20:40.079 --> 00:20:44.240 we've gotten some nerves somewhere doing this, like figuring it out, yes, 248 00:20:44.319 --> 00:20:48.400 so, and it's the other interesting thing is and again I mean not being 249 00:20:48.400 --> 00:20:52.440 on the other side of the fence here, so I'm not I'm not laying 250 00:20:52.480 --> 00:20:59.160 I'm not riving pleasure into pulling all this out in the open. It is 251 00:20:59.160 --> 00:21:03.799 painful. But the other thing is that we've got to be we've got to 252 00:21:03.799 --> 00:21:07.400 look hard at our drone defenses. Obviously, at these bases right now. 253 00:21:07.400 --> 00:21:14.759 Typically our drone defenses consist of, you know, a mix of stingers are 254 00:21:14.799 --> 00:21:18.599 either man packed. A stinger is a you know, it's an eighties technology 255 00:21:19.000 --> 00:21:25.440 surface to air man packed missile made famous by US supply of these missiles and 256 00:21:25.480 --> 00:21:29.440 the wood that he did in Afghanistan back in the eighties. Okay, it's 257 00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:32.119 a you know, in its day, it was a very effective weapon. 258 00:21:32.359 --> 00:21:34.920 But you know, bear in mind it's like forty something, it's forty years 259 00:21:34.920 --> 00:21:41.279 old now. When it's mounted on a humby, several of them, mounted 260 00:21:41.319 --> 00:21:45.400 a Humby with you know, fire control system and radar, it's called an 261 00:21:45.440 --> 00:21:48.920 avenger system, all right, and that is typically often what is used in 262 00:21:48.960 --> 00:22:00.559 these bases, and in combined with something that most former most Iraqan and Afghanistan, 263 00:22:00.680 --> 00:22:03.359 that's what you're familiar with, which is called a sea ram. No, 264 00:22:03.440 --> 00:22:06.279 I'm not going to embarrass myself to try and remember what sea ram stands 265 00:22:06.279 --> 00:22:11.480 for. But it's a it's essentially it's essentially a cannon. Right now, 266 00:22:12.960 --> 00:22:18.839 neither the Sea Ram, the Stinger, or the Avenger have ever shot down 267 00:22:19.160 --> 00:22:26.359 a drone in combat on operations. In fact, in fact, the Avenger 268 00:22:26.400 --> 00:22:30.480 hasn't even shot down a drone in you know, in laboratory conditions. And 269 00:22:30.759 --> 00:22:33.160 I'm not an expert at all, and I'm never claimed to be, but 270 00:22:33.200 --> 00:22:37.799 that doesn't seem good. No, it's not good. Okay. So my 271 00:22:37.880 --> 00:22:41.960 point is that you know, we are we're still playing catch up on a 272 00:22:41.160 --> 00:22:47.759 short range of defense. And we do have the Coyote system which I mentioned. 273 00:22:48.400 --> 00:22:52.759 We've got ew systems that are you know, I mean, I'm going 274 00:22:52.799 --> 00:22:56.720 to get into it, but they are they hit and miss effective. But 275 00:22:56.759 --> 00:23:00.440 the problem is that they are easy to adapt against. All right, right, 276 00:23:00.640 --> 00:23:06.119 a system called Coyote which uses drones as counter drone, you know, 277 00:23:06.160 --> 00:23:08.680 the little unmanned systems, and that is you know, again, I'd be 278 00:23:08.720 --> 00:23:14.319 interested to hear from the audience what their opinion is of these things. But 279 00:23:14.720 --> 00:23:19.279 yeah, again, short range air offense, anti drone air offense is a 280 00:23:19.480 --> 00:23:23.880 huge issue for the United States, and we're behind, and we have been 281 00:23:23.960 --> 00:23:29.880 since twenty fifteen when the Islamic State first started using unmanned systems, and everyone 282 00:23:29.920 --> 00:23:33.400 predicated at the time as a matter of time before we started losing people, 283 00:23:33.720 --> 00:23:37.319 all right, And so the attack in Jordan, of course the first the 284 00:23:37.359 --> 00:23:44.400 first time US soldiers have been killed by aviation attacks since April fifteenth, nineteen 285 00:23:44.440 --> 00:23:47.720 fifty three. Yeah, so it was a watershed moment, but it was 286 00:23:48.160 --> 00:23:51.160 it was predictable, and it was long time in coming, and we've got 287 00:23:51.160 --> 00:23:56.240 to fix this, you know, this short range ed offense problem, the 288 00:23:57.160 --> 00:24:03.759 radar that we have there typically you know, the problem is visual acquisition is 289 00:24:03.839 --> 00:24:07.119 really tough with thrums, as we know, especially when you think about it 290 00:24:07.200 --> 00:24:11.079 that you know, the drone came in from the east, launched from Iraq. 291 00:24:12.559 --> 00:24:15.839 It was early in the morning, so it's coming in from behind the 292 00:24:15.880 --> 00:24:18.440 sun, you know. I mean, you're talking about a unit that is 293 00:24:18.480 --> 00:24:22.200 not on a base, that is not on combat footing. You've probably got 294 00:24:22.279 --> 00:24:26.839 dudes gathered around outside the channel hall. It's just fortunate that more people were 295 00:24:26.960 --> 00:24:33.359 not killed, and certainly that's you know that. I'm sure that that has 296 00:24:33.519 --> 00:24:37.920 changed, so visual acquisitions difficult. They did have a radar there. It's 297 00:24:37.960 --> 00:24:41.799 an a n TPS seventy five. It's a uh, it's a phase the 298 00:24:41.880 --> 00:24:45.319 array radar. Okay, I'm not a techie, but a phase array means 299 00:24:45.400 --> 00:24:52.480 you know, it's it can shift focus very quickly. It's a very flexible 300 00:24:52.559 --> 00:24:57.400 system, and it's a very capable system. Again, no one, you 301 00:24:57.440 --> 00:25:02.359 know, no explanation out there why it didn't pick up on this drone. 302 00:25:02.400 --> 00:25:06.119 And again maybe it did and was a mistaken for a friendly one thing. 303 00:25:06.160 --> 00:25:07.880 Of course. You know, I've read in the papers about you know, 304 00:25:08.160 --> 00:25:14.480 the Jordan's requested patriots, which it has, and you know, the there's 305 00:25:14.519 --> 00:25:19.799 the insinuation there that if we had had patriots there then it or you know, 306 00:25:21.039 --> 00:25:23.000 if this was a bit of a patriot range, it wouldn't have happened. 307 00:25:23.039 --> 00:25:27.920 Well maybe maybe not. You know, the patriots are very effective system, 308 00:25:29.160 --> 00:25:33.839 but they also cost three to four million dollars a projectile, right, 309 00:25:33.119 --> 00:25:38.079 and you've got a drone that cost a few thousand dollars. Not exactly, 310 00:25:38.119 --> 00:25:41.200 it cost good. It's not a good match. Also, it kind of 311 00:25:41.200 --> 00:25:47.680 seems like this base was more of a staging base. So it was I 312 00:25:47.720 --> 00:25:52.480 mean, I feel like the security is probably way tighter at bases that like 313 00:25:52.599 --> 00:25:57.720 Jaysuck launches out of, or CI launches out like places like that, compared 314 00:25:57.759 --> 00:26:04.640 to like a staging base at Hell's like support. Yeah, yeah, yeah 315 00:26:04.680 --> 00:26:10.599 exactly, And and and my it gets in my comment last time, I 316 00:26:10.759 --> 00:26:17.359 think about the fact that, yes, going ahead, we are probably going 317 00:26:17.400 --> 00:26:25.240 to see these patterns of small special operations based units. You know, we 318 00:26:25.319 --> 00:26:30.319 used to call them soft forwards. But but the vulnerability is that these small 319 00:26:30.480 --> 00:26:38.200 groups, who are light and flexible and highly trained and well equipped, have 320 00:26:38.960 --> 00:26:44.960 to rely on a larger conventional force, all right, a larger conventional footprint 321 00:26:45.079 --> 00:26:48.559 until we can figure a way around that. We're going to have this vulnerability, 322 00:26:48.559 --> 00:26:51.119 and we need to focus on that because these guys are going to be 323 00:26:51.160 --> 00:26:53.640 the primary target. Why would our enemies go over after the you know, 324 00:26:53.680 --> 00:27:00.799 the hard targets right right getting back to you know, the signaling though, 325 00:27:02.640 --> 00:27:06.920 I mean, you know, twenty nine January, John Kirby talks about the 326 00:27:06.960 --> 00:27:11.839 teared approach, multiple operations and types of targets, and then and then one 327 00:27:11.960 --> 00:27:17.759 February CBS comes out and talks about yeah, it's going to be attacked on 328 00:27:17.839 --> 00:27:25.440 the Iranian BacT militias in Syria and Iraq. So I mean we just couldn't 329 00:27:25.440 --> 00:27:26.960 have been. I mean we did everything but give them, you know, 330 00:27:27.039 --> 00:27:32.440 give them the coordinates. Right. Yeah. So my question for that was, 331 00:27:33.240 --> 00:27:38.680 did we do that on purpose to see where these i IRGC assets went 332 00:27:40.079 --> 00:27:44.720 and like track them there. We spoke about this before we started recording. 333 00:27:45.119 --> 00:27:48.480 I feel like, was it like on purpose or was it like just to 334 00:27:48.640 --> 00:27:55.920 like have them save face, avoid escalation, avoid a lot of human casualties. 335 00:27:56.279 --> 00:27:59.359 I mean it's a great point, and so I yeah, definitely on 336 00:27:59.440 --> 00:28:02.960 purpose, I would say, rather than you know, I think it's rather 337 00:28:03.000 --> 00:28:11.200 political reasons. I think there are unstated red line simplicit red lines, I 338 00:28:11.240 --> 00:28:12.759 hate to use that term, but on both sides here, on both sides 339 00:28:12.799 --> 00:28:22.640 are trying to calibrate their reactions to deter or coerce the other side without tripping 340 00:28:22.640 --> 00:28:26.160 those red lines. All right, So it's this kind of KABOOKI dance, 341 00:28:26.319 --> 00:28:34.400 right, But I don't think it was for intelligence reasons. I think, 342 00:28:34.720 --> 00:28:41.720 and you know, if we want to trace these guys and follow the ants 343 00:28:41.799 --> 00:28:45.559 back to the nest, it's best not to hit them and have them execute 344 00:28:45.599 --> 00:28:49.759 a contingency plan. It's best just to follow them, you know, keep 345 00:28:49.799 --> 00:28:53.839 an eye on them, established pattern of life across the board, be more 346 00:28:53.920 --> 00:28:59.279 circumspect, and then hit them when it's really going to hit them, and 347 00:28:57.599 --> 00:29:07.599 make it such that we are taking a capability off the board here right the 348 00:29:07.119 --> 00:29:15.880 the it does surprise me that we telegraphed it because because it would have been 349 00:29:17.119 --> 00:29:26.319 within the rules, within the unspoken rules of the game. That's literally he 350 00:29:26.480 --> 00:29:33.680 suspects our landscapers have been Russian. Yeah, but I mean it would have 351 00:29:33.680 --> 00:29:37.279 been within the unspoken rules of the game to kill Kud's force guys in Iraq 352 00:29:37.319 --> 00:29:41.559 and Syria, as long as it wasn't in Iran itself, right, right, 353 00:29:41.079 --> 00:29:45.039 that would have been legitimate. So why warn them, you know. 354 00:29:45.119 --> 00:29:49.160 Indeed, on on you know, of two or three days at the end 355 00:29:49.160 --> 00:30:00.480 of January, the Iranians very publicly pulled out they are IRGC operatives from Syria 356 00:30:02.160 --> 00:30:07.519 and Iran, to include a prominent guy in Syria. You know, they 357 00:30:07.519 --> 00:30:11.559 even named him, or he was named, and the Iranians allowed him to 358 00:30:11.640 --> 00:30:15.240 be named. I mean, yeah, that's unprecedented, you know, to 359 00:30:15.319 --> 00:30:18.920 announce it that way and pull them out, and ostensibly, you know, 360 00:30:18.000 --> 00:30:22.720 that was to avoid the Iranians strikes the Uranians have I mean, I'm sorry, 361 00:30:22.720 --> 00:30:27.680 it's Raelies. Israelis have killed IRGC dudes some of these two occasions in 362 00:30:27.720 --> 00:30:32.240 Syria in the last two weeks. So, you know, essensibly it was, 363 00:30:32.319 --> 00:30:33.720 Hey, this is happening, We're going to pull our guys back. 364 00:30:34.240 --> 00:30:40.839 But I can't help wondering if there wasn't another audience, maybe the United States. 365 00:30:41.480 --> 00:30:44.880 Hey guys, we're all clear. Yeah, yeah, go ahead, 366 00:30:44.960 --> 00:30:48.359 we're out. Yeah. The next thing, you know, it's kind of 367 00:30:48.400 --> 00:30:53.880 this crazy it's this weird dance. Yeah. Uh, that kind of makes 368 00:30:53.880 --> 00:30:57.519 no sense to a lot of people. And I understand not trying to escalate 369 00:30:57.559 --> 00:31:03.480 it to like where it's a full fledged regional war, but you know, 370 00:31:03.640 --> 00:31:07.319 it's this weird dance that like a layman person is just just like what why 371 00:31:07.400 --> 00:31:10.960 that doesn't even make sense to like let them know what's going, Like, 372 00:31:11.279 --> 00:31:15.359 what's the point. It's just like a show? Well and his the here's 373 00:31:15.400 --> 00:31:25.079 the challenge now, the I you know, the strikes against the PMC and 374 00:31:25.559 --> 00:31:32.440 the kinetic side of this is almost not worth watching. Right. One hopes 375 00:31:33.279 --> 00:31:38.880 I believe that there is a comprehensive campaign being launched, and the kinetic part 376 00:31:40.039 --> 00:31:45.039 is the kind of the least effective but most visible tip of the iceberg right 377 00:31:45.200 --> 00:31:49.400 right in that campaign involves a lot of stuff in the cyber dimension, cyber 378 00:31:49.440 --> 00:31:56.720 domain. We saw some kind of throw aside, throwaway comments by the Pentagon 379 00:31:56.759 --> 00:32:00.559 that they are doing cyber stuff, and I would imagine that they're doing the 380 00:32:00.680 --> 00:32:04.920 cyber domain is hurting Iran far more than can I hope, so, because 381 00:32:04.920 --> 00:32:07.240 that's a but, I mean, there is that there are you know, 382 00:32:07.279 --> 00:32:15.880 they'll be going after proxy operatives, tracking them with the view probably to taking 383 00:32:15.920 --> 00:32:22.160 them off the playing board, doubtless. Doubtless they are you know, gathering 384 00:32:22.200 --> 00:32:27.359 intel targeting data on coods, forced guys. So there's a lot of you 385 00:32:27.400 --> 00:32:30.880 know a lot of things going on financial. No, we're not just talking 386 00:32:30.920 --> 00:32:35.359 sanctions. They're talking about the Frasery Department really going after in a kind of 387 00:32:35.400 --> 00:32:40.440 forensic financial analysis of these groups to take them out things that the US can 388 00:32:40.519 --> 00:32:44.960 do, you know very well, and hope that all of this is indeed 389 00:32:45.039 --> 00:32:50.759 happening behind the scenes. But that doesn't really make for a good headline, 390 00:32:51.519 --> 00:32:55.559 No, it doesn't exactly. And there is another but there's also you know, 391 00:32:55.640 --> 00:33:01.000 there's another wild card here, need that uh that I know everyone's worried 392 00:33:01.039 --> 00:33:07.640 about the US side and the Iranians too, and that is that those are 393 00:33:07.680 --> 00:33:15.799 these these militia all right, primarily we're talking about the Iranian fact or not 394 00:33:15.160 --> 00:33:22.519 we should I should stop saying that just the uh, the Shia militia in 395 00:33:22.519 --> 00:33:27.640 in Iran, many which are Iranian BacT But the point is Iranian fact does 396 00:33:27.759 --> 00:33:31.200 not secure loyalty in return. You know, Dan himself, the head of 397 00:33:31.240 --> 00:33:36.119 Kuzvals, has said this, and I don't think he's not being completely disingenuous. 398 00:33:36.319 --> 00:33:40.599 Sure, you know, these the these guys, they don't even they're 399 00:33:40.599 --> 00:33:46.440 not even a lot of them aligned the greatest cent religiously with the Republic of 400 00:33:46.519 --> 00:33:50.519 Iran. That's the thing too, it's like a dangerous game they're playing, 401 00:33:50.559 --> 00:33:54.839 right because they'll send them money and weapons, but like, yeah, and 402 00:33:54.920 --> 00:33:59.319 they're not they're not in the command of control for the most part. So 403 00:33:59.400 --> 00:34:04.440 like these guys are basically independent operators that can do whatever they want and inflame 404 00:34:05.279 --> 00:34:08.800 tensions in a region that's already like on fire. Yeah, you know, 405 00:34:09.159 --> 00:34:16.559 absolutely, And so although katab has Bulla and Iran are kind of doing a 406 00:34:16.639 --> 00:34:24.199 disinformation campaign or launching disinformation campaign or information campaign to distance themselves from the attack. 407 00:34:24.920 --> 00:34:34.440 Are the militias in Iran are being very bellicose. And there's one and 408 00:34:34.719 --> 00:34:37.280 I remember its name in a moment, but it's got his baller rolled up 409 00:34:37.320 --> 00:34:42.800 in its title too. But it's a large goods force backed militia, doesn't 410 00:34:42.840 --> 00:34:49.079 have the same headlines as Katari, is buller and has every all the capability 411 00:34:49.119 --> 00:34:53.800 to strike and hurt US forces. So I am concerned about that. I'm 412 00:34:53.840 --> 00:35:00.000 concerned that, yes, we may be relying on Iran to be a rash 413 00:35:00.280 --> 00:35:06.079 acta and that maybe Iran's intention, but within Iran, but first of all, 414 00:35:06.079 --> 00:35:09.280 we can't treat Iran as being homogeneous. You know. Then maybe Somewmaranian 415 00:35:09.360 --> 00:35:15.480 official Submaranean parts of the administration are worried about US response, some aren't. 416 00:35:15.599 --> 00:35:19.519 And one this to Escaline, that's kind of crazy because you would think, 417 00:35:19.559 --> 00:35:22.800 like these guys at the end of the day, their main goal is like 418 00:35:23.119 --> 00:35:28.679 regime security, right Like you would think like I want to stay in power, 419 00:35:28.719 --> 00:35:31.599 I want to still be the you know, whether it's the the animal, 420 00:35:32.079 --> 00:35:38.280 the thing is the I don't think that I don't. It's a long 421 00:35:38.440 --> 00:35:46.239 jump from the from the type of resistance we've seen in Iran to an actual 422 00:35:46.239 --> 00:35:51.760 overthrow of the regime. Sure, and you know, honestly, the stuff 423 00:35:51.840 --> 00:35:57.599 like this going on in the United States being drums and is tending to unite 424 00:35:57.599 --> 00:36:01.760 the Iranian population behind the the regime. You know, like I commented last 425 00:36:01.760 --> 00:36:07.440 time, but but our biggest concern, our greatest concern are you know, 426 00:36:07.480 --> 00:36:14.719 what these militia groups do next. And you know, we we can be 427 00:36:14.760 --> 00:36:17.119 confident that the US will have a calibrated response, but it's going to make 428 00:36:17.199 --> 00:36:23.239 things dicey for US troops seas for some period of time. And I haven't 429 00:36:23.280 --> 00:36:28.239 even mentioned what's happening in the Red seat. So this morning, yeah, 430 00:36:28.280 --> 00:36:30.320 I was just gonna I was gonna mention that too. Yeah, So, 431 00:36:30.679 --> 00:36:37.480 you know, I mean, the US Navy is there is fighting a you 432 00:36:37.519 --> 00:36:40.159 know, I not not nearly as casualty intensive on our side, but it's 433 00:36:40.199 --> 00:36:45.119 fighting almost guat a canal type scenario. I mean, not quite a canal 434 00:36:46.280 --> 00:36:54.559 Okinawa, the scenario you know, where the US Fleet was was during the 435 00:36:54.599 --> 00:37:00.679 first part of that campaign more under attack from the Japanese UH than the Marines, 436 00:37:00.679 --> 00:37:08.719 who were Ashore and the and the US Navy is certainly doing stirling work 437 00:37:08.800 --> 00:37:14.559 out there. But here's an interesting point, all right, the to this, 438 00:37:15.639 --> 00:37:22.400 the ships like the USS Karneie have become I'm saying household names, but 439 00:37:22.480 --> 00:37:25.639 you know, awarded combat action ribbon blah blah blah. You know, this 440 00:37:25.679 --> 00:37:34.119 is like every sailor's dream. But in all seriousness, the concern is this 441 00:37:34.400 --> 00:37:40.320 that previously the Hoothies have very clearly been attacking merchant ships under the thin disguise 442 00:37:40.440 --> 00:37:45.679 that these ships were heading for Israel. In fact, they've attacked forty ships 443 00:37:45.719 --> 00:37:49.679 since seven October, and not one of those was heading for Israel. Well 444 00:37:49.679 --> 00:37:53.079 not one was Israeli owned, So you know it's obviously a very thin veneer 445 00:37:53.239 --> 00:38:00.400 of an excuse. But these latest attacks, the SYNCOM hasn't come out and 446 00:38:00.480 --> 00:38:07.920 said this may may have been aimed at US ships, the drone attacks. 447 00:38:07.960 --> 00:38:12.840 So that's a concern because you know, as much as we may try and 448 00:38:13.239 --> 00:38:16.079 de escalate, you watch the US Navy ship be hit by you know, 449 00:38:16.119 --> 00:38:22.239 a drone, and I mean we we definitely are on the conveyor belt then 450 00:38:22.960 --> 00:38:27.519 more, and that's you know, that's not inconceivable. All right, ships 451 00:38:27.559 --> 00:38:34.519 you know, defenses fail, there's the possibility of a swarm attack. But 452 00:38:34.559 --> 00:38:38.320 in any case, you know, this morning, this is from Sencom Twitter, 453 00:38:38.559 --> 00:38:43.000 February second approximate. Blah blah blah. US Cannee and Gage shot down 454 00:38:43.280 --> 00:38:49.800 one un manned aerial Victory aerial vehicle over the Gulf Bayden. This is the 455 00:38:49.800 --> 00:38:55.400 one that that that I think sant Com his suspecting was aimed actually at the 456 00:38:55.480 --> 00:39:00.559 Kanne who has been a big time name and shooting these things down. So 457 00:39:00.440 --> 00:39:06.920 uh, and and those attacks in the Gulf in the Red seat continue and 458 00:39:07.039 --> 00:39:10.360 haven't made a couple of targets, you know, three weeks of US and 459 00:39:10.400 --> 00:39:14.119 British attacks into into Yemen. I mean you can see, I was just 460 00:39:14.159 --> 00:39:16.079 gonna say that, like, didn't we hit them recently? Like yesterday we 461 00:39:16.119 --> 00:39:20.119 had a couple of such a game of whack them all there. Yeah, 462 00:39:21.360 --> 00:39:23.280 you know what, I think that we did it. We did it specifically 463 00:39:23.400 --> 00:39:30.559 yesterday after we hit UH targets in Syria and Iraq. It's just like, 464 00:39:30.639 --> 00:39:34.559 hey, we could hit you anywhere anytime, it doesn't matter. We can 465 00:39:34.599 --> 00:39:45.719 do multiple times, you know, Richie, Okay, this is you can 466 00:39:45.719 --> 00:39:52.480 take a dog out of Ukraine, but you contact the Ukraine. Yeah, 467 00:39:52.519 --> 00:39:59.079 absolutely. Date. So wait, there's something else I wanted to talk about 468 00:39:59.119 --> 00:40:06.159 before before we before we got off. No, I have to save it 469 00:40:06.199 --> 00:40:08.440 for I have to Oh yeah, yeah, here's the thing. So very 470 00:40:08.440 --> 00:40:17.320 interestingly Iran Iran seems to be if you looked behind the scenes, Iran and 471 00:40:17.400 --> 00:40:22.719 Jordan seemed to be trying to de escalate each other. Okay, there isn't 472 00:40:22.760 --> 00:40:29.599 a lot of chest banging. Jordan has struck targets that are Iranian, mostly 473 00:40:29.760 --> 00:40:35.239 linked with smugglers. Iran now has struck into into Jordan. There's no love 474 00:40:35.400 --> 00:40:39.960 lost obviously between the two countries. But but Iran, for one, we 475 00:40:40.039 --> 00:40:47.719 see Iran is having some problems in the West Bank by all accounts, okay, 476 00:40:49.239 --> 00:40:53.519 as far as getting just getting resistance up and running there in the same 477 00:40:53.559 --> 00:41:00.239 way that Hamas was and Gaza, Iran's access to the West Bank, it 478 00:41:00.280 --> 00:41:05.480 wouldn't have to rely on Jordanian territory. They would never get official Jordanian permission, 479 00:41:05.519 --> 00:41:09.360 but right they don't. They probably don't want to bring attention to smuggling 480 00:41:09.440 --> 00:41:15.119 routes right and out of out of Jordan, or ratchet up detention there because 481 00:41:15.159 --> 00:41:21.960 it's it's going to interfere with our operations going ahead. D I think that's 482 00:41:21.960 --> 00:41:28.480 pretty much it for I got one more question, and my dogging is I 483 00:41:28.559 --> 00:41:34.000 have one more question. Yeah. Uh, would we or any other modern 484 00:41:34.039 --> 00:41:40.840 military be able to move assets without the all centers finding out? Very much? 485 00:41:42.159 --> 00:41:46.800 I think very much unlikely. Okay, even when we move now, 486 00:41:46.880 --> 00:41:53.239 you know, we move the National Mission Force, it's it uh, thanks, 487 00:41:53.320 --> 00:41:57.840 you know, I mean, and I know Jack's very Yeah, you've 488 00:41:57.840 --> 00:42:02.000 got things like you've got the scent and Jack right, I mean yes, 489 00:42:02.440 --> 00:42:07.719 but in all seriousness, so you know, tactically, operationally, strategically, 490 00:42:08.639 --> 00:42:14.639 it's a transparent battlefield that includes all routes to and from the fit of operation. 491 00:42:15.280 --> 00:42:17.320 Yes, we have to rely that everything that we do, every move 492 00:42:17.440 --> 00:42:22.920 is seen. And that might have been the part of the rationale behind us 493 00:42:22.920 --> 00:42:27.400 telegraphing this so openly, the fact that we're not going to be able to 494 00:42:27.440 --> 00:42:31.000 disguise where they're going. Let's cut out the ambiguity, Somner some things we're 495 00:42:31.000 --> 00:42:36.760 going after and run right, right, So what's well, Michael, what's 496 00:42:36.840 --> 00:42:40.440 next? How long will these strikes last? Oh? Hey great, yeah, 497 00:42:40.440 --> 00:42:43.840 you're already only twenty bucks. I don't I don't want to take more 498 00:42:43.840 --> 00:42:45.000 of you. Yeah, so let's not bet on it, you know, 499 00:42:45.119 --> 00:42:51.800 I mean so, so we'll see strikes from days to weeks, all right, 500 00:42:52.280 --> 00:42:57.360 typically and then kind of a leveling off, ratchet down, and then 501 00:42:57.360 --> 00:43:01.159 they'll spike whenever there is another, you know, another act of propogation, 502 00:43:04.559 --> 00:43:07.920 as I said. But but the connecting file under the scenes, out of 503 00:43:08.079 --> 00:43:12.119 you know, the media is not seeing a lot of This is a bunch 504 00:43:12.119 --> 00:43:17.199 of stuff happening in a campaign plan below the level of arm conflict, right 505 00:43:17.320 --> 00:43:24.000 right, include cyber includes some special operations stuff, colvert stuff like yeah, 506 00:43:24.000 --> 00:43:29.360 a lot of the stuff that that I mentioned. So that is that is 507 00:43:29.400 --> 00:43:32.760 what I imagine is going on. Again, this is all speculation. All 508 00:43:32.880 --> 00:43:38.760 my sources are open source. Yeah. Yeah. Andy doesn't spill the tea 509 00:43:39.440 --> 00:43:45.559 in public, he tells me a private No, I'm kidding, I'm kidding. 510 00:43:45.559 --> 00:43:50.440 I'm kidding my security clearance ship. Yeah, I'm totally joking. Sorry, 511 00:43:50.440 --> 00:43:54.320 we'll cut that out. It's fine, don't about it. Uh, 512 00:43:54.559 --> 00:43:59.760 all right, I'm good. You want to yeah, yeah, I mean 513 00:44:00.559 --> 00:44:05.079 yeah, I'll do it. You go ahead, because all right, that 514 00:44:05.239 --> 00:44:08.280 was eyes on. Don't forget to like and subscribe if you're listening on audio. 515 00:44:08.840 --> 00:44:13.199 Don't forget to rate and review it. If you have any questions, 516 00:44:13.320 --> 00:44:16.000 you can either go to our Patreon or you can email us at the Teamhouse 517 00:44:16.039 --> 00:44:23.000 Podcast at gmail dot com. Anything else, that's it. Don't forget to 518 00:44:23.159 --> 00:44:29.800 tell your friends. Yeah hey, also yeah, please get the word out 519 00:44:29.920 --> 00:44:34.400 and thanks again. We'll see you next time. See you, guys,