WEBVTT 1 00:00:36.560 --> 00:00:40.320 Welcome to mid Rats with sal from Commander Salamander, an Eagle one from Eagle 2 00:00:40.399 --> 00:00:45.359 Speak at sear Shure your home for a discussion of national security issues and all 3 00:00:45.399 --> 00:00:50.799 things maritime and the technology. Lso gave us a wave off, so we 4 00:00:50.880 --> 00:00:54.439 went back around and I think we might maybe get a two wire maybe a 5 00:00:54.520 --> 00:00:59.640 three wire today. Hey, welcome aboard everybody to mid Rats. We appreciate 6 00:00:59.640 --> 00:01:03.400 everybody who has followed us close enough to know that we're using a different providers. 7 00:01:03.359 --> 00:01:07.359 This is actually our second start. We started before, and you're not 8 00:01:07.480 --> 00:01:12.200 so illustrious co host here me not my other co host who is just along 9 00:01:12.280 --> 00:01:15.640 for the crazy trade. I forgot to press all the buttons correctly. But 10 00:01:17.120 --> 00:01:23.000 we're learning a new interface that hopefully we'll give everybody a better audio experience. 11 00:01:23.159 --> 00:01:26.000 We will see how it goes. But we appreciate everybody who is joining us 12 00:01:26.159 --> 00:01:32.159 live and if you are with us live the different interface and blog talk radio, 13 00:01:32.239 --> 00:01:34.400 but you do have the ability to join the chat. And we've got 14 00:01:34.760 --> 00:01:42.680 Paul there laughing from the from the tower, laughing at us as we attempt 15 00:01:42.719 --> 00:01:46.560 to make this happen. But we'll get there. So welcome to mid Rats. 16 00:01:47.680 --> 00:01:49.840 Eagle one. I've already said good afternoon once, but it's always better 17 00:01:49.879 --> 00:01:53.079 the second time anyway. Yeah, well, it's nice to hear the music, 18 00:01:53.120 --> 00:01:57.959 as Paul says, and good to talk with you again. Let's it's 19 00:01:59.000 --> 00:02:01.560 all those buttons. Sure that this is new, you know. So it's 20 00:02:01.640 --> 00:02:08.800 like shifting from a Cessna whatever the piper cub to a seven forty seven. 21 00:02:08.840 --> 00:02:14.120 I think as far as controls going from analog to digital, I'm slow, 22 00:02:14.199 --> 00:02:16.680 but trainable, as I like to say. But and the and the pre 23 00:02:16.759 --> 00:02:22.879 show, I talked over a variety of topics. I guess if we wanted 24 00:02:22.879 --> 00:02:25.719 to start depressing and work our way up or down one of the two. 25 00:02:27.520 --> 00:02:31.879 What was near the top of both of our lists today was what was for 26 00:02:31.960 --> 00:02:37.240 the past week of the big news, and it broke out because of its 27 00:02:37.319 --> 00:02:42.280 high profile nature. It broke out of the background noise in the national security 28 00:02:42.280 --> 00:02:47.680 arena. And that was the complete and I think it's an appropriate analogy here 29 00:02:49.000 --> 00:02:53.400 the Dog's Breakfast. That was the gaza here that our good friends in the 30 00:02:53.520 --> 00:02:59.639 US Army saluted smartly and tried to do the best they can. I've had 31 00:02:59.680 --> 00:03:04.560 no fritiques for them, but boy, oh boy, if you look at 32 00:03:04.560 --> 00:03:09.319 something that and not too much time went from not just a tactical but to 33 00:03:09.560 --> 00:03:19.280 a operational and strategic embarrassment, humiliation failure, you know, pick whatever combination. 34 00:03:19.840 --> 00:03:23.120 I think the Gaza peer situation it has a lot of lessons for folks, 35 00:03:23.680 --> 00:03:29.800 but not outside the military. I don't think. Yeah, it's a 36 00:03:31.680 --> 00:03:37.120 it was set up as a public relations thing. Anyway. You know, 37 00:03:37.159 --> 00:03:39.599 we're gonna we're not gonna go through Israel. We're gonna ship this stuff directly 38 00:03:39.639 --> 00:03:44.520 to the gays, the people in Gaza. We're gonna have a peer so 39 00:03:44.560 --> 00:03:50.080 they won't have to pass through Israeli hands. You know, And as with 40 00:03:50.120 --> 00:03:53.039 so many things, somebody didn't tell the people in charge. You know, 41 00:03:53.080 --> 00:03:58.520 if the sea state gets above a couple of feet, this thing is going 42 00:03:58.599 --> 00:04:01.400 to fall apart on us, and you know, you've you've got or maybe 43 00:04:01.400 --> 00:04:05.159 they did say that and that just got blown off by the power, as 44 00:04:05.199 --> 00:04:08.840 would be. But you know, if you're going to do PR, then 45 00:04:08.879 --> 00:04:14.240 it's it's good to do smart PR and no know what you're getting into. 46 00:04:14.280 --> 00:04:15.480 And they could have announced ahead of time. Oh, by the way, 47 00:04:15.879 --> 00:04:19.000 if the sea state gets too high, this thing make fall apart, But 48 00:04:19.199 --> 00:04:26.160 they didn't do that. Well, yeah, embarrassing And many people have said 49 00:04:26.199 --> 00:04:29.279 sort of typical of what when you rush into something announce you're going to do 50 00:04:29.319 --> 00:04:31.560 it during a speech rather than talk it over ahead of time with people. 51 00:04:31.759 --> 00:04:35.079 And as you say, no fault to the army. They've did everything they 52 00:04:35.120 --> 00:04:42.000 could with their slow boats to to Gaza and and they you know, setting 53 00:04:42.000 --> 00:04:46.000 the thing up. And some cargo did pass through there which was immediately seized 54 00:04:46.000 --> 00:04:50.439 by Hamas and used for their own purposes. As much as I love a 55 00:04:50.480 --> 00:04:56.439 good inner service rivalry, I continue to use as analogy. I think it's 56 00:04:56.480 --> 00:05:00.519 one that folks they don't come from the military arena, but they are paying 57 00:05:00.560 --> 00:05:04.439 attention to this because it is a high profile issue. Is the charge of 58 00:05:04.439 --> 00:05:09.959 the Light Brigade. You can't blame the individual troopers on that. They just 59 00:05:10.120 --> 00:05:12.839 look to their leaders and they say, off we go, and they went 60 00:05:13.720 --> 00:05:15.800 did what they were supposed to do. You have to go up the chain 61 00:05:15.879 --> 00:05:20.439 to look for failures. But there are certain fundamentals on these things. That's 62 00:05:20.480 --> 00:05:28.120 always been true. I've seen it written and Paul mentioned it in the chat 63 00:05:28.160 --> 00:05:32.120 room. Jay Loots was designed for use. It was used in Haiti, 64 00:05:32.199 --> 00:05:36.839 which we actually did a mid Rat's about a decade ago the Haiti operation. 65 00:05:36.959 --> 00:05:42.920 It was designed to use in existing ports or something that had a break water. 66 00:05:43.920 --> 00:05:47.079 Most of the listeners here have either been underway or flown over the Mediterraneans. 67 00:05:47.120 --> 00:05:50.040 It's not a small body of water, but even if you're from the 68 00:05:50.079 --> 00:05:55.759 Great Lakes, you have an appreciation that when you have that long of a 69 00:05:55.920 --> 00:06:00.279 reach, waves will build up with even a large thunder storm rather quickly. 70 00:06:01.000 --> 00:06:05.519 And I believe we discussed it a little bit on a mid Rats after this 71 00:06:05.759 --> 00:06:13.240 was announced, that you know, pray for good weather because it's not something 72 00:06:13.399 --> 00:06:18.319 that is ready to be out there in front of what Mother Nature has to 73 00:06:18.360 --> 00:06:25.519 throw at her. And that's what happened. What I really hope that happens. 74 00:06:25.560 --> 00:06:29.480 And we have enough people in Congress that know it. It's part of 75 00:06:29.519 --> 00:06:33.279 their oversight function. They have to find some way to get hold of the 76 00:06:33.360 --> 00:06:42.720 decision brief for this, because I think there is a very important story here 77 00:06:43.560 --> 00:06:47.720 about how commander's intent, higher direction and guidance coming from the pole mill level 78 00:06:49.120 --> 00:06:55.879 response results in different courses of action and somebody selects that course of action and 79 00:06:55.920 --> 00:07:04.199 the assumptions that came with it. The critical capabilities vulnerabilities analysis that went into 80 00:07:04.240 --> 00:07:14.439 that decision and who did what not. Unlike what happened in Kabul, the 81 00:07:14.560 --> 00:07:17.680 classification levels are such in Kabul that I don't know when that's going to happen. 82 00:07:17.680 --> 00:07:25.000 Maybe in twenty years. But this is your standard issue humanitarian assistant disaster 83 00:07:25.160 --> 00:07:32.279 response operation. There's not a lot classified here. So Congress has to do 84 00:07:32.319 --> 00:07:36.800 it behind closed door. That's fine, but there's something very instructive here. 85 00:07:38.000 --> 00:07:44.839 I do not know. And John Conrad and Salamar Cogliano. I haven't seen 86 00:07:44.879 --> 00:07:51.160 anybody nationally or internationally who's covered this better than those two individuals from them on 87 00:07:51.319 --> 00:07:57.079 down and sideways when this was announced. I do not know anybody who has 88 00:07:57.120 --> 00:08:01.160 even done one deployment who looked at that and went that's sustainable. Regardless of 89 00:08:01.160 --> 00:08:07.600 what happened with the with the gear once it got the gear, the supplies, 90 00:08:07.639 --> 00:08:13.399 once it got on the trucks and disappeared into goss, that's a different 91 00:08:13.439 --> 00:08:16.079 topic for somebody at the State Department to deal with. But from a military 92 00:08:16.120 --> 00:08:22.000 point of view, UH, it was not good. Yeah, And I 93 00:08:22.000 --> 00:08:28.519 think I think that there's a CB version the UH, the Elevated Causeway System 94 00:08:28.600 --> 00:08:37.240 or Elkaz, which actually drive piles in place, and it's a little more 95 00:08:37.960 --> 00:08:41.679 robust than this. But my understanding of it is that when the last time 96 00:08:41.720 --> 00:08:45.159 that was used, but they do they do practice with it. I know 97 00:08:45.200 --> 00:08:48.600 they did in twenty sixteen, play with it, and then I think it's 98 00:08:48.600 --> 00:08:52.200 out. I don't know, maybe it's in storage somewhere. Maybe they thought 99 00:08:52.240 --> 00:08:58.200 this was going to be a more rapid way to get some get this this 100 00:08:58.360 --> 00:09:01.759 peer in there. I wanted to move quickly to make sure that the voters 101 00:09:01.759 --> 00:09:09.120 in Michigan or where they're trying to impress with this what acknowledge that the aid 102 00:09:09.279 --> 00:09:15.480 was not being diverted through through Israel, which has Seal Macargulana was pointed out. 103 00:09:15.519 --> 00:09:20.600 They're perfectly good ports in Israel that could have can and could be used 104 00:09:20.600 --> 00:09:28.600 to access the beach and get the goods that have been sent to Gaza down 105 00:09:28.600 --> 00:09:31.399 to where there the intention was to have it go. Yeah, I think 106 00:09:31.440 --> 00:09:37.320 the restraints in the constraints about this would be interesting to see. This is 107 00:09:37.360 --> 00:09:39.960 all written, it's all in paperwork. It better be at least that's the 108 00:09:39.000 --> 00:09:43.919 way it's supposed to be done. But I could I could see very well 109 00:09:45.159 --> 00:09:52.320 where they had a couple of things they had to work around. One no 110 00:09:52.440 --> 00:09:54.879 boots on the ground, and what the CBS could have constructed, you're going 111 00:09:54.960 --> 00:10:00.399 to have to get boots on the ground. Now the beach there is under 112 00:10:00.399 --> 00:10:05.919 the control of Israel and bringing things through the port of Israel. This has 113 00:10:07.000 --> 00:10:09.399 State Department written all over it, where we don't want to be seen as 114 00:10:09.480 --> 00:10:16.279 part working with the Israeli military, so we want to be separate from it, 115 00:10:16.320 --> 00:10:20.480 blah blah blah. And I can see that argument being made and unfortunately 116 00:10:20.480 --> 00:10:24.159 winning the day. The ironic thing is what I've been able to gather maybe 117 00:10:24.159 --> 00:10:28.360 you've seen more details, is they've collected the various floaty bits from the pier 118 00:10:30.200 --> 00:10:35.279 and are moving it over to the port. I think it's ascalon are the 119 00:10:35.320 --> 00:10:41.159 one upcoast from it to be repaired and fixed up. So, whether we 120 00:10:41.200 --> 00:10:43.759 wanted to or not, we're working pretty closely with the Israeli ports just to 121 00:10:43.879 --> 00:10:48.200 get that. I don't know they're going to repair it to try to reinstall 122 00:10:48.240 --> 00:10:50.759 it. Are they just repairing it so they can take it back home. 123 00:10:50.799 --> 00:10:56.000 That would be interesting to watch, but I think we would go from we 124 00:10:56.039 --> 00:11:00.600 would double our paid if we got it repaired, brought it over there, 125 00:11:00.679 --> 00:11:03.039 installed it and the next door and blew it around again. Yeah, this 126 00:11:05.240 --> 00:11:11.000 is a really good lesson to be learned about preparation for war and using There's 127 00:11:11.000 --> 00:11:16.559 a nice article in the current issue, the June issue of Proceedings by I 128 00:11:16.639 --> 00:11:24.559 named Ron Weinberger talking about he's talking about tabletop exercises for wartime acquisition. Because 129 00:11:24.960 --> 00:11:28.919 I'm going to quote from this a little bit. It says, too often 130 00:11:28.960 --> 00:11:35.039 peacetime exercise planners do not completely anticipate the urgency and geographic constraints of wartime scenarios. 131 00:11:35.559 --> 00:11:41.639 US naval commands have not encountered an actual contested logistics environment since nineteen forties. 132 00:11:41.159 --> 00:11:46.600 Because tabletop exercise planners participants lack first hand knowledge in such an environment, 133 00:11:46.000 --> 00:11:50.279 or decision making is based on what they experience in their day to day jobs, 134 00:11:50.519 --> 00:11:54.399 they assume there will be ready means to expedite contracts for additional supply support. 135 00:11:54.919 --> 00:11:58.759 This assumption rests in the belief the Department of Defense could continue to maintain 136 00:11:58.759 --> 00:12:03.879 a mostly underrupted supply line as it does during peace time. And as he 137 00:12:03.960 --> 00:12:09.519 points out, that that's a matter of great concern because that's not necessarily true 138 00:12:09.600 --> 00:12:15.399 that that that's going to work that way. So it's a it's a timely 139 00:12:15.480 --> 00:12:18.879 reminder that we don't train the way we're going to fight, and we can. 140 00:12:20.000 --> 00:12:24.399 It's too easy to assume. I had a marine gunnery started to explain 141 00:12:24.440 --> 00:12:28.200 to me about that. It's too easy to assume that things are going to 142 00:12:28.279 --> 00:12:33.440 go the way you want them to because they've always gone the way one since 143 00:12:33.440 --> 00:12:35.879 you're in your experience, which, as he said, is not we've never 144 00:12:35.919 --> 00:12:43.559 been challenged on this since the nineteen forties. Yeah, it's it's not on 145 00:12:43.679 --> 00:12:50.639 the scale of military operations. This is not not at one of the more 146 00:12:50.679 --> 00:12:56.960 complex levels. But we have failed here too. It's it's disheartening to see 147 00:12:56.600 --> 00:13:03.360 what something like this can not just do to our reputation A lot of being 148 00:13:03.639 --> 00:13:11.960 a superpower, hyperpower, however you want to describe what we are at present. 149 00:13:11.840 --> 00:13:16.399 It has to do with reputation in people's assumptions of your competence, and 150 00:13:16.480 --> 00:13:20.360 we haven't been doing a really great job of that. I think that's one 151 00:13:20.399 --> 00:13:24.000 of the secondary impacts of this. It may not be very well appreciated, 152 00:13:24.480 --> 00:13:28.279 especially by the People's Republic of China. We have their own issues that we'll 153 00:13:28.279 --> 00:13:33.039 talk about later on. I think But another thing that kept in mind to 154 00:13:33.320 --> 00:13:39.240 the top of my mind while watching this is God bless the US Marines. 155 00:13:39.320 --> 00:13:46.200 They've done most of the at least world facing public discussions about what they would 156 00:13:46.240 --> 00:13:54.039 like to do in the Pacific to make it more challenging for an expansive China. 157 00:13:54.159 --> 00:14:00.039 That involves a lot of island, a lot of unimproved airfields, and 158 00:14:00.080 --> 00:14:07.039 as the Russians have taught everybody of your airfield and your seaport is within range 159 00:14:07.240 --> 00:14:11.519 of somebody's rockets, you you might not have use of it for very long. 160 00:14:11.080 --> 00:14:16.840 So this jaylots capability, the capability of seabes already have. It does 161 00:14:16.919 --> 00:14:24.360 beg the question how many of these do we have and where are they useful? 162 00:14:24.159 --> 00:14:28.399 And I think the answer is kind of scary, because there's we don't 163 00:14:28.440 --> 00:14:33.399 have that many, and you've got to do a beach survey in our harbor 164 00:14:33.440 --> 00:14:37.480 survey to know where they might be useful. But we all saw how long 165 00:14:37.519 --> 00:14:41.320 it took our one jay loots to get to the eastern eastern med you know, 166 00:14:41.480 --> 00:14:46.879 leaving the East coast and getting somewhere near Tenian Island. Oh, that 167 00:14:46.919 --> 00:14:52.559 would take a while. Hopefully the Pacific will be nice and peaceful as the 168 00:14:52.639 --> 00:14:56.399 as the name goes. But that that's not a very good assumption. So 169 00:14:56.559 --> 00:15:03.720 how will this inform h I'm not sure. I think there's there's some other 170 00:15:03.919 --> 00:15:09.879 options involving some ships that we haven't bought that might be a better solution than 171 00:15:11.600 --> 00:15:15.879 what we saw. Well, and then I see the army is talking about 172 00:15:16.519 --> 00:15:22.559 getting rid of it's prepositioning stuff ships and you know you've got to go. 173 00:15:24.360 --> 00:15:26.000 You know, all the lessons you could learn from the things that are going 174 00:15:26.000 --> 00:15:31.879 on in the world, why would you do that, especially the capability that 175 00:15:31.960 --> 00:15:39.240 prepositioning stocks used. You can have prepositioning ships in Europe, or you can 176 00:15:39.279 --> 00:15:43.600 have them in the Western Pacific. But we haven't been very good at knowing 177 00:15:45.039 --> 00:15:48.799 when the next medium to larger war is going to break out. So yeah, 178 00:15:50.080 --> 00:15:52.240 I've heard people say, well, we don't need them in your arm 179 00:15:52.399 --> 00:15:54.480 you know, we don't need them here. That's okay. There. They 180 00:15:54.679 --> 00:16:00.000 can get underway and go to West Africa, they can go to Madagascar, 181 00:16:00.480 --> 00:16:07.720 they can find their way to Uruguay. Pick someplace nobody thinks is going to 182 00:16:07.720 --> 00:16:08.879 be a problem that might be a problem at some point that we need to 183 00:16:08.879 --> 00:16:19.879 get some stuff located, especially if we rightfully reposition our global posture, that 184 00:16:22.120 --> 00:16:30.639 we take advantage of our natural comparative advantage, which is at a maritime and 185 00:16:30.679 --> 00:16:37.039 aerospace power and our ground power is kept at a lower state of readiness and 186 00:16:37.159 --> 00:16:41.200 at home, and if we need to go someplace, we can go there 187 00:16:41.279 --> 00:16:48.120 and meet the equipment. It's much better to have that situation than to put 188 00:16:48.200 --> 00:16:53.240 another thirty forty thousand people on Okinawa or something. To do that you have 189 00:16:53.279 --> 00:16:57.000 to It begs the question, Okay, where are the stocks? How long 190 00:16:57.000 --> 00:17:02.320 are they going to have to get in theater? And the maritime prepositioning ships 191 00:17:02.320 --> 00:17:07.480 have always been a nice solution to that problem. Yes they're vulnerable, Yes 192 00:17:07.519 --> 00:17:11.559 the equipments is there for a while, but they had a good exercise back 193 00:17:11.599 --> 00:17:17.640 when I was a little kids as a junior officer during Desert Storm. We've 194 00:17:17.720 --> 00:17:21.799 used them on other occasions too, but it's they're a fraction of what they 195 00:17:21.799 --> 00:17:26.200 were even thirty years ago. To totally get rid of them. How are 196 00:17:26.200 --> 00:17:29.880 they going to meet that capability? I haven't seen that explanation outlined anywhere. 197 00:17:33.160 --> 00:17:38.000 Yeah, I know that the Congress has actually jumped all over this and wants 198 00:17:38.079 --> 00:17:42.480 on charmy to explain how they plan to do this stuff, particularly those Congress 199 00:17:42.480 --> 00:17:48.000 people who were familiar with how difficult it is to move things across the specific 200 00:17:48.200 --> 00:17:52.720 going to hurry. So yeah, I'm sure we'll learn a lot more about 201 00:17:52.759 --> 00:17:56.079 it, but it is kind of one of those things that you know, 202 00:17:56.119 --> 00:18:02.319 what, what were they thinking? Approach? And this sounds cynical, but 203 00:18:02.480 --> 00:18:10.240 it's not. It's just informed by experience. There's also counter indicator analysis, 204 00:18:10.880 --> 00:18:15.119 for instance, and we talked about it more than once over the last decade 205 00:18:15.119 --> 00:18:22.599 and a half. One area of the Army, both institutionally and with its 206 00:18:22.640 --> 00:18:29.799 funding and planning, has starved to death is air defense for a very very 207 00:18:29.880 --> 00:18:33.599 very long time. That's why after Solomoney, when the Iranians threw a bunch 208 00:18:33.599 --> 00:18:38.599 of their ballistic missiles at that base we had in northern Iraq, there were 209 00:18:38.640 --> 00:18:44.960 problems because we didn't have enough air defenise high low density, high demand asset. 210 00:18:45.160 --> 00:18:48.440 That was an attention. So when you look at what the Army is 211 00:18:48.559 --> 00:18:57.559 trying to divest itself of and get rid of, should leave people to go 212 00:18:57.720 --> 00:19:03.119 hold on for a second, let's talk about this, and again it's one 213 00:19:03.160 --> 00:19:06.279 of the things that I don't know what games are being played inside. But 214 00:19:06.319 --> 00:19:12.839 a lot of it has to do with sponsorship, advocacy and the people who 215 00:19:12.839 --> 00:19:19.279 are making decision, how much control and influence they have over the existing bureaucracy, 216 00:19:19.519 --> 00:19:27.119 or the other way around that may not have an informed view of what 217 00:19:27.200 --> 00:19:33.599 resources are needed. Where I fully understand that you can't have everything. We 218 00:19:33.680 --> 00:19:41.799 have limited budgets. I also understand the problem with salami slicing to save money, 219 00:19:41.880 --> 00:19:48.720 but divesting yourself of entire capabilities. I use the US Navy before two 220 00:19:48.759 --> 00:19:52.440 thousand and three in our riverine forces, and we're going back to it. 221 00:19:52.160 --> 00:19:59.359 The minute you leave that gaping capability gap. You need to ask yourself, 222 00:19:59.440 --> 00:20:04.920 well, what are we as a nation going to be tasked to do? 223 00:20:06.680 --> 00:20:10.920 And if anybody jumps up and tells anybody I know exactly what we're going to 224 00:20:10.960 --> 00:20:14.640 do and exactly what's going to meet that need, that person probably shouldn't be 225 00:20:14.640 --> 00:20:18.640 invited to the next meeting because they're either delusional or aligned to you. We 226 00:20:18.799 --> 00:20:22.960 just nobody can see the future. That's why you need flexibility, multi mission 227 00:20:22.960 --> 00:20:29.880 capability. Why has the C one thirty been used for so many different things 228 00:20:29.960 --> 00:20:33.279 over the course of how old is that bird sixty some years old of design. 229 00:20:33.319 --> 00:20:40.640 It's been improved because it's relatively affordable, relatively flexible, and as a 230 00:20:40.680 --> 00:20:45.759 functionable and scalable cargo area you can plug stuff into. As opposed to something 231 00:20:45.799 --> 00:20:52.880 that's very very bespoke and meets a specific narrow requirement, it usually don't work 232 00:20:52.880 --> 00:21:00.279 out roble. Yeah, and it also points out I think back in April 233 00:21:00.559 --> 00:21:04.759 Mackenzy Ecklin had had an article called you go to war with the industrial base 234 00:21:04.839 --> 00:21:11.359 you have? You know it's time to revisit that again, and you know 235 00:21:11.880 --> 00:21:18.480 it's it's why so many people are pushing us as a as a nation to 236 00:21:19.039 --> 00:21:22.559 to gear up again, to get ready to if we have to, not 237 00:21:22.599 --> 00:21:26.480 that we want to, but if we have to to go to war with 238 00:21:26.480 --> 00:21:32.640 with whoever. So it's good to see people who were in the know or 239 00:21:32.960 --> 00:21:37.400 have occupied and will occupy again important positions in the government raising these issues. 240 00:21:40.960 --> 00:21:48.599 Yeah, speaking of predicting the future, it's one of the little snarky comments 241 00:21:47.960 --> 00:21:52.400 that brought up right before the show tease folks that listened to it was a 242 00:21:52.400 --> 00:21:56.279 little phrase that I was trying to get the idea around how I could explain 243 00:21:56.359 --> 00:22:03.400 this wish passing Tomorrowland. One thing that's been a great frustration for me and 244 00:22:03.119 --> 00:22:08.720 you and really everybody has been what has been divulged is happening to the Constellation 245 00:22:08.839 --> 00:22:15.400 class frigate over the course of the last few weeks, where the timeline has 246 00:22:15.440 --> 00:22:19.640 shifted hard to the right. For I've heard three years, eighteen months, 247 00:22:19.960 --> 00:22:23.599 we'll call it between eighteen months to three years. I've been upon what you 248 00:22:23.640 --> 00:22:29.279 read, what you remember, but people, I think I have forgot The 249 00:22:29.319 --> 00:22:34.000 reason why we even have a Constellation class frigate is a response to the utter 250 00:22:34.039 --> 00:22:40.960 and complete failure of the LCS program and to find something that we could build 251 00:22:41.039 --> 00:22:47.359 that was a proven design that would minimize program and design risk. And so 252 00:22:47.400 --> 00:22:51.960 they had a competition. The Italians in the French have been building from for 253 00:22:52.079 --> 00:22:59.079 quite a while and more than one variation and the original concept. In my 254 00:22:59.200 --> 00:23:07.359 world, we would have had higher than eighty five percent commonality because it always 255 00:23:07.720 --> 00:23:08.960 I always saw it as a gap filler. It's like, we need to 256 00:23:08.960 --> 00:23:12.119 get these boats in the water, acknowledge the fact they're not what we would 257 00:23:12.119 --> 00:23:15.000 do if we designed it. But you know what, we haven't, so 258 00:23:15.400 --> 00:23:19.640 build what we have. Accept some of the design limitations at least in flight 259 00:23:19.680 --> 00:23:27.079 one to get holes in the water, and the same we decided to bring 260 00:23:27.079 --> 00:23:30.799 in a new ship, but we didn't bring in a new bureaucracy. So 261 00:23:30.880 --> 00:23:40.960 the same people that gave us LCS zoom Walt CGX also got their hands around 262 00:23:41.680 --> 00:23:51.000 the Constellation class frigate and it is producing the results one would expect, and 263 00:23:51.200 --> 00:23:59.720 one an individual I have great confidence and gave me a little hint at one 264 00:23:59.759 --> 00:24:04.119 of the conversations he had with the folks up in DC who were involved in 265 00:24:04.160 --> 00:24:10.839 the However many miles it is from DC to where they're building the Constellation frigate 266 00:24:11.920 --> 00:24:18.680 up in Fincantara Yards on the Great Lakes. I think harrymy Miles screwdriver that 267 00:24:18.880 --> 00:24:29.920 is was quote the design is not ready for tomorrow's fight unquote. We heard 268 00:24:29.960 --> 00:24:34.640 that when they decided they were in decommission the sprew cans early over a quarter 269 00:24:34.720 --> 00:24:41.440 century ago. That argument still has purchased. It's very disheartening to see what 270 00:24:41.480 --> 00:24:48.000 they've done to what should have been a fairly straightforward operation to put a general 271 00:24:48.000 --> 00:24:52.039 purpose frigate in the water with an American as opposed to an Italian or French 272 00:24:52.079 --> 00:25:00.119 flag on. Yeah, I think the description was that the I remember exactly 273 00:25:00.160 --> 00:25:04.000 how it was phrase that they're trying to design this thing on the fly, 274 00:25:04.240 --> 00:25:11.160 so there is no there is no set plan, and there's here's a GA 275 00:25:11.319 --> 00:25:15.839 quote for it. The Navy's decision to approve the construction with incomplete elements of 276 00:25:15.880 --> 00:25:22.000 the ship design, including information gaps related to structural piping, ventilation, and 277 00:25:22.039 --> 00:25:27.960 other systems, and the underestimation of adapting a foreign design to meet Navy requirements 278 00:25:29.240 --> 00:25:33.839 have driven this weight growth. Resolving this weight growth as another dimension to shipbuilders 279 00:25:34.440 --> 00:25:41.319 ongoing design activities, further diminishing the predictability of these already schedule challenged efforts. 280 00:25:41.559 --> 00:25:47.720 You know, I think you've talked about the twenties when we had we would 281 00:25:47.720 --> 00:25:49.759 build a cruiser, then we would play with it for a while, and 282 00:25:49.759 --> 00:25:53.319 then we would make changes in the in the next iteration of that same class, 283 00:25:53.839 --> 00:25:57.000 you know, and we just that's if you have the luxury of time. 284 00:25:57.039 --> 00:26:00.480 We don't have the luxury of time. We've we've you know, either 285 00:26:00.599 --> 00:26:04.039 go with what the design was and if you don't like it when you get 286 00:26:04.039 --> 00:26:07.880 it, and then you can modify it later on. But you know, 287 00:26:07.920 --> 00:26:12.880 we need ships now, not not the ships you know five years from now 288 00:26:12.920 --> 00:26:19.359 that maybe will be better than what is currently available. It drives me nuts 289 00:26:19.400 --> 00:26:27.319 in anybody in this situation with the Constellation senior leadership, whether civilian or uniform, 290 00:26:27.920 --> 00:26:33.519 they had somebody on the table throw out the you know, wish casting 291 00:26:33.559 --> 00:26:40.960 Tomorrowland like they knew exactly what the fight tomorrow was and their vision was worth 292 00:26:41.200 --> 00:26:48.960 risking an entire program that is trying to meet a different requirement that it should 293 00:26:48.960 --> 00:26:52.400 have been invited to leave and not brought back, because that is exactly the 294 00:26:52.839 --> 00:27:00.960 bureaucratic goo that's being put on the floor that has stopped us from compily building 295 00:27:02.160 --> 00:27:07.519 a ship since we restarted the Arly Burke line, and we had to restart 296 00:27:07.559 --> 00:27:14.000 it because everybody bought off on those that thought they could wish cast Tomorrowland into 297 00:27:14.039 --> 00:27:22.720 being. And here we are at in twenty twenty four and well, all 298 00:27:22.799 --> 00:27:26.839 we have our burks, and Burks are doing great. But that's not the 299 00:27:26.880 --> 00:27:30.559 way it's supposed to work. It would be as if we were still building 300 00:27:30.599 --> 00:27:34.079 Ford Stack destroyers that we started building in twenty seventeen and went to World War 301 00:27:34.160 --> 00:27:38.960 Two, and the way that works, well, even the Chinese, the 302 00:27:40.000 --> 00:27:45.160 first ships the Chinese have built are now twenty years old, fifteen years old. 303 00:27:45.240 --> 00:27:48.079 Yeah, I mean they're not. They're not tomorrow's fleet either, but 304 00:27:48.480 --> 00:27:51.599 they're not. We're not having to fight tomorrow's fleet today. We're having to 305 00:27:51.640 --> 00:27:56.839 fight a fleet that already exists, and all your edderships are capable of dealing 306 00:27:56.240 --> 00:28:02.880 with them, and you know to who Otherwise you're going to build a bunch 307 00:28:02.880 --> 00:28:06.599 of these the what the original intent of the lcs was, We're gonna have 308 00:28:06.640 --> 00:28:10.119 all these empty spaces we will fill with the weapons of tomorrow. Well that's 309 00:28:10.200 --> 00:28:14.880 great, but unless you're going to build a ship the size of an LPD 310 00:28:15.200 --> 00:28:18.000 with a bunch of empty spaces in it, you're really barking up the wrong 311 00:28:18.039 --> 00:28:21.880 treet because you cannot predict what we're going to need. So, you know, 312 00:28:22.119 --> 00:28:23.720 arm arm with what you got, Go with what you got, build 313 00:28:23.759 --> 00:28:29.960 as many as you can and do iterations. I mean, the the Fletcher 314 00:28:30.400 --> 00:28:34.119 I think I put this down somewhere. The Fletcher class destroyers became the the 315 00:28:34.440 --> 00:28:37.480 I can remember the next class, then the next ones became the after that 316 00:28:37.599 --> 00:28:45.160 became the Gearing class. Well, those ships, the Gearings lasted into well 317 00:28:45.200 --> 00:28:49.000 the late the late the late seventies, for the US, and then a 318 00:28:49.000 --> 00:28:53.799 lot of them got sold to the places like Taiwan and they've lasted there for 319 00:28:53.839 --> 00:29:00.160 another ten or fifteen years. So and the Fig sevens, which you know 320 00:29:00.200 --> 00:29:04.559 a lot of people found to be undesirable for a lot of reasons. Yeah, 321 00:29:04.559 --> 00:29:08.559 they're not class destroyed, but they were capable of escorts that could have 322 00:29:08.559 --> 00:29:14.039 been upgraded with with the proper weapons systems had they needed to be. I 323 00:29:14.079 --> 00:29:18.319 mean a big dropback with them was that they were single screw and a lot 324 00:29:18.359 --> 00:29:22.960 of people didn't like that. But so it goes so and they work, 325 00:29:23.680 --> 00:29:26.920 you know, quite fine. And this is it's not an industry problem. 326 00:29:27.279 --> 00:29:33.359 Is this is a navy problem, whether uniformed or civilian. And the bureaucracy 327 00:29:33.559 --> 00:29:38.400 and the processes we have to build ships, and you know, the whole 328 00:29:38.440 --> 00:29:42.759 idea that we needed all these extra spaces and we need two different engine rooms 329 00:29:42.799 --> 00:29:48.240 acknowledged. Fine. Again going back to my regional prayer, it's like, 330 00:29:48.319 --> 00:29:51.200 okay, great, do that in flight too. Just like with the Fig 331 00:29:51.240 --> 00:29:53.519 seven we had the short version and we had the long version. As you 332 00:29:53.559 --> 00:29:57.079 know, the good idea fairy wanted to do some corrections and put some things 333 00:29:57.079 --> 00:30:02.400 in there. But the first thing is got to be get the good in 334 00:30:02.440 --> 00:30:07.400 the water and then bring in your good ideas for improvements in flight two, 335 00:30:07.200 --> 00:30:15.119 just like the flight one Arley Burks didn't have in Barkilos. But we fix 336 00:30:15.200 --> 00:30:19.640 that with other flights trying to well, we don't have to explain what's happening. 337 00:30:19.720 --> 00:30:26.759 Just look at the Constellation class program today. That's what happens when you 338 00:30:26.960 --> 00:30:34.759 have a bureaucracy that feels that the Navy should serve it as opposed to it 339 00:30:34.920 --> 00:30:38.200 serving the Navy. But at the end of the day, if the problems 340 00:30:38.200 --> 00:30:45.319 of the Constellation for it, this is the present and the prior CNO's failure, 341 00:30:47.200 --> 00:30:51.759 they should have driven this horse a little bit more. You can throw 342 00:30:51.839 --> 00:30:56.559 the second now on it as well. But these were two folks, more 343 00:30:56.599 --> 00:31:00.119 than anybody else, should have had the surface picture in hand, and they 344 00:31:00.160 --> 00:31:07.240 can't even literally can't even build a frigate that somebody else has. Well, 345 00:31:07.400 --> 00:31:14.640 you know you I'm not sure the CNO other other than maybe setting the general 346 00:31:14.680 --> 00:31:18.359 policy line, because I've never you know, the CNO is not directly in 347 00:31:18.440 --> 00:31:22.799 charge of anything as far as I can tell it involving the actual Navy. 348 00:31:22.839 --> 00:31:26.559 But navc somebody in NAVC decided that you know, yeah, this is this 349 00:31:26.640 --> 00:31:32.160 is fine, but it doesn't meet NAVS US Navy standards for and you can 350 00:31:32.200 --> 00:31:33.680 say X, Y and z and so we've got to do this and that 351 00:31:33.759 --> 00:31:37.759 and the other and and that's pretty much how you you've turned a horse into 352 00:31:37.799 --> 00:31:41.680 a camel. I mean, it's just uh, you know, it's the 353 00:31:41.680 --> 00:31:45.279 way it goes. Mark, you're looking at the wait expectation. It's a 354 00:31:45.279 --> 00:31:52.799 horse into a hippopotamus. I saw something the other day about how fast hippopotamus 355 00:31:52.920 --> 00:31:57.039 is. Hippopotami are I don't I don't think those things are quick. I 356 00:31:57.079 --> 00:32:00.480 don't think I want to want to be chased by one that there's much risk 357 00:32:00.519 --> 00:32:05.160 of that. Yeah, they're like an NFL linebacker. They're big and heavy, 358 00:32:05.200 --> 00:32:10.880 but man they're fast. Yeah. I got you know, you mentioned 359 00:32:10.920 --> 00:32:15.119 talk about talk about some Let's talk about some more fun things. Let's talk 360 00:32:15.119 --> 00:32:21.079 about how whipped out of shape the Chinese are about the Asian NATO. I 361 00:32:21.119 --> 00:32:22.319 was about to say, we need to tear things up here before he goes 362 00:32:22.359 --> 00:32:29.039 all worked up. I have absolutely and I got a former mid Rats guest, 363 00:32:29.079 --> 00:32:31.359 and if you don't follow him on X, make sure zach Odah, 364 00:32:31.799 --> 00:32:39.680 he put me onto the This little quote here about the the Shangri La dialogue 365 00:32:39.680 --> 00:32:45.920 in Singapore is where this all came out of. Is the deputy Chief of 366 00:32:45.960 --> 00:32:50.839 the Joint Staff Department of China Central Military Committee. Only a communist come up 367 00:32:50.880 --> 00:32:55.599 with the title that long Uh and my Mandarin speakers will laugh at my pronunciation. 368 00:32:55.640 --> 00:33:01.240 But Lieutenant General Jing Xieng Feng maybe, and there's also Admiral Dong Jong 369 00:33:01.480 --> 00:33:07.599 was there. He's their Minister of National Defense. Evidently, the good Lieutenant 370 00:33:07.680 --> 00:33:15.119 General Jeg Fang had quite an issue with Asian NATO, and the Zach made 371 00:33:15.119 --> 00:33:20.599 a great point about it. Just as this unquoting Zach here quote, just 372 00:33:20.759 --> 00:33:27.279 as PLA is clearly communicating its threats to the world, it's also communicating its 373 00:33:27.319 --> 00:33:35.519 insecurities. So with this type of public breathing problems because of Asian NATO, 374 00:33:36.559 --> 00:33:40.640 I think that's something we need to run with. Given second guessing, yeah, 375 00:33:40.640 --> 00:33:44.480 they can have Cambodia, but look all around, we don't have to 376 00:33:44.519 --> 00:33:49.279 have an official organization. But just like in Ukraine you have NAFO. It's 377 00:33:49.319 --> 00:33:51.759 not a real organization, but it's kind of fun to play with because it 378 00:33:51.759 --> 00:33:55.640 irritates people you want to irritate the North Atlantic Fellows Organization. For those in 379 00:33:55.640 --> 00:34:01.880 ourn't aware, this whole Asian NATO is a great opportunity for change to maybe 380 00:34:02.000 --> 00:34:08.280 get under the skin of the People's Republic of China's uh PR apparatus, as 381 00:34:08.280 --> 00:34:15.039 opposed to then usually get in under ours. Yeah, it's you know, 382 00:34:15.320 --> 00:34:19.519 I don't think that. I mean, the Chinese are mad about everything. 383 00:34:19.519 --> 00:34:25.159 They're mad that the Philippines has finally staked out a serious claim to stuff in 384 00:34:25.199 --> 00:34:30.239 its own uh and it's exclusive economic zone. So they're you know, they're 385 00:34:30.239 --> 00:34:35.920 engaging in the typical thuggery. You know, we're going to prevent you from 386 00:34:35.960 --> 00:34:38.360 from doing anything in this space that belongs to you. And how dare you 387 00:34:38.360 --> 00:34:42.880 know you're the ones causing all the problems. If you didn't complain about our 388 00:34:42.920 --> 00:34:45.920 overreach, we wouldn't have a problem at all. I mean, they are 389 00:34:45.960 --> 00:34:52.840 so good at blaming the victim. And and you know, they're they're Ministry 390 00:34:52.840 --> 00:34:55.519 of nonsense. Whoever puts out some of this junk they put out because they're 391 00:34:55.559 --> 00:35:00.920 astonishing, they're they're you know, the global time and all that stuff. 392 00:35:00.960 --> 00:35:02.719 It is. It is if you if you have a good sense of humor. 393 00:35:02.840 --> 00:35:06.280 It's pretty funny. But you can see that. You know, as 394 00:35:06.320 --> 00:35:08.960 long as they repeat these lies and these misstatements, and the more they repeat 395 00:35:09.000 --> 00:35:13.400 it and nobody stands up every single time and says, no, it's just 396 00:35:13.440 --> 00:35:16.039 not true. You know, then they're going to get away with it. 397 00:35:16.079 --> 00:35:22.159 You know. It's it's a salami slice and overwhelm you with nonsense approach to 398 00:35:22.239 --> 00:35:28.440 things. Yeah, but I'm having a thorough enjoyment of it. And the 399 00:35:28.880 --> 00:35:34.280 Shangra Law dialogue. Also, we just name an aircraft carrier Shanger Log and 400 00:35:34.280 --> 00:35:37.920 it's such a great name for an aircraft carrier. But again maybe in a 401 00:35:37.920 --> 00:35:40.599 perfect world that doesn't exist, we could we could do that, but that 402 00:35:42.960 --> 00:35:45.760 there was a lot of news to come out of the Shangra La dialogue that 403 00:35:45.920 --> 00:35:52.039 I want to chew one. And the timing I think is auspicious. I 404 00:35:52.199 --> 00:35:58.719 got a higher profile than other Shanger Law dialogues. I think Admiral Paro I 405 00:35:58.719 --> 00:36:06.760 getting that right. He there's a real interesting panel discussion that he was on 406 00:36:06.920 --> 00:36:12.079 that I want to try to get hold of that has him laughing at one 407 00:36:12.119 --> 00:36:19.480 of the questions from a PRC Brigadier. That's the right approach. We should 408 00:36:19.519 --> 00:36:25.239 be the happy, confident warrior out there, and I'll give him a BZ 409 00:36:25.519 --> 00:36:30.599 for his performance on that panel. He looked calm, He looked confident. 410 00:36:30.400 --> 00:36:34.920 He responded, well, which is what you want in that theater. So 411 00:36:35.320 --> 00:36:38.639 if folks haven't taken some time, you can go on YouTube or x or 412 00:36:38.639 --> 00:36:43.719 wherever. There's some video clips out there from the Shankrala dialogue. One that's 413 00:36:43.760 --> 00:36:46.760 kind of funny about looking for a man in uniform that was actually put out 414 00:36:46.800 --> 00:36:52.519 by a single instortment. That's okay, good sense humor. The public affairs 415 00:36:52.519 --> 00:36:58.199 folks in charge of the shankra La dialogue, they should they should give a 416 00:36:58.239 --> 00:37:00.639 little seminar on how to get the word out out. I just noticed it 417 00:37:00.639 --> 00:37:05.519 more than I had in the previous years. Yeah, they've done a really 418 00:37:05.519 --> 00:37:14.119 good job. And I'm sitting there looking at this Global Times tweet. I 419 00:37:14.119 --> 00:37:17.360 guess it is where we're going now an X. You know, Chinese Defense 420 00:37:17.400 --> 00:37:22.079 Minister Dong Jun like in the South China Sea to a well managed city, 421 00:37:22.119 --> 00:37:27.199 He questioned actions of a certain countries trespassing into a house in the city and 422 00:37:27.199 --> 00:37:30.280 not allowing the order to react. Isn't this building? What kind of freedom 423 00:37:30.320 --> 00:37:36.159 of navigation is this, he asked. You know it's well managed because we 424 00:37:36.280 --> 00:37:40.360 run it. But the minute the Filipinos decided that they want to get some 425 00:37:40.400 --> 00:37:45.599 of their turf back as was granted to them in the twenty sixteen award, 426 00:37:45.760 --> 00:37:50.679 you know, yes, confirming that China overreached. The Chinese don't want to 427 00:37:50.679 --> 00:37:57.239 hear that no, and that arbitration ward doesn't count. It's like a squad 428 00:37:57.280 --> 00:38:00.840 or all of a sudden claiming war, wonderful house and yard they have, 429 00:38:01.039 --> 00:38:07.159 and is upset at the person who actually owns the house, who's trying to 430 00:38:07.159 --> 00:38:12.480 do something with it. It's just audacious, I think, is the word. 431 00:38:12.559 --> 00:38:17.320 But that's what they want the world to do. They want the world 432 00:38:17.480 --> 00:38:22.440 to listen to their lie. Know they're being lied to, but accept the 433 00:38:22.519 --> 00:38:28.000 lie is if as if it's the truth, and to go with it. 434 00:38:28.239 --> 00:38:32.239 That's what a bully does. That's what Imperial China did to their neighbors hundreds 435 00:38:32.239 --> 00:38:37.559 of years ago, and then the centuries before that. So there's a tradition 436 00:38:37.679 --> 00:38:42.559 here that I think, and I'm making a huge presumption here that to the 437 00:38:42.679 --> 00:38:52.920 Asian ear is even more direct. I think that it isn't even to our 438 00:38:52.960 --> 00:38:59.679 ears because especially the Vietnamese they have and the Japanese they have a long history 439 00:38:59.719 --> 00:39:07.639 with with Chinese in various uh waxing and waning phases over the years. Yeah, 440 00:39:08.280 --> 00:39:10.679 you know, they've got they've got to worry because it is the big 441 00:39:10.960 --> 00:39:16.239 the big dog in the neighborhood, and they worry that all the that the 442 00:39:16.280 --> 00:39:27.039 big dog US will not come to their assistance should the Chinese really exercise uh 443 00:39:27.880 --> 00:39:30.559 the force that they could do. I mean, they're they're looking back to 444 00:39:30.639 --> 00:39:38.400 days of the Japanese uh East Asia uh coper cooperative sphere what it's called, 445 00:39:38.639 --> 00:39:45.920 that prosperity sphere. Yeah, that's the one, you know, and we 446 00:39:45.000 --> 00:39:51.400 all know how that that started out. So uh, they're they're they're willing 447 00:39:51.480 --> 00:39:54.760 to play as long as they know they've got support from the from the West 448 00:39:55.000 --> 00:40:00.639 and especially from the US. And I'm afraid the US is not necessarily and 449 00:40:00.199 --> 00:40:06.840 staking out the as firmly that the commitments that we that we will make to 450 00:40:06.920 --> 00:40:09.920 the area and to the countries in the region. But you know, we're 451 00:40:09.920 --> 00:40:14.159 making we're making some of the right steps. I think aucus is right step. 452 00:40:14.199 --> 00:40:17.800 I think the reaffirmation the relationship with the Philippines is good the recent exercise 453 00:40:17.840 --> 00:40:25.119 of the Philippines, the effort to help Taiwan arm itself, the things working 454 00:40:25.159 --> 00:40:30.519 with Japan, working with Singapore. You know, all that, all that 455 00:40:30.599 --> 00:40:35.480 is good stuff. So it's not like we've totally abandoned the area, but 456 00:40:35.519 --> 00:40:39.199 we we really need to have a force capable of responding, and we're we 457 00:40:39.280 --> 00:40:45.440 are short. So you know, we see the the aircraft carrier Eisenhower being 458 00:40:45.480 --> 00:40:51.320 extended on its deployment again. Uh, you know, because we don't have 459 00:40:51.480 --> 00:40:54.519 enough, we don't have enough carriers, we don't have the assets we need 460 00:40:54.400 --> 00:40:59.960 to do all the things we're trying to do around the world. And yeah, 461 00:41:00.079 --> 00:41:07.559 uh that is that just you know, you begin to see these domino's 462 00:41:07.639 --> 00:41:09.199 fall. You know, you have to extend a carrier, and it's not 463 00:41:09.239 --> 00:41:13.679 the first time we've extended a carrier out in that area. But I'm sure 464 00:41:13.719 --> 00:41:20.559 the people and under on the Eyesenhower and the supporting ships are going, oh 465 00:41:20.639 --> 00:41:23.800 man, not again. We can't have steak and lobster every every couple of 466 00:41:23.800 --> 00:41:29.199 months. Yeah, it's not just that the carrier is obviously her embarked air 467 00:41:29.239 --> 00:41:35.840 wing, but they've also extended her one cruiser, the Philippine Sea and two 468 00:41:35.960 --> 00:41:40.440 arly burks, the the Gravelly and the Mason. And I'm sure there are 469 00:41:40.440 --> 00:41:45.440 some auxiliary ships that are supporting them that either are just in the rotation. 470 00:41:45.719 --> 00:41:47.320 I haven't seen anything about them being extended. Well, but you've got to 471 00:41:47.360 --> 00:41:52.159 keep the beans and bullets moving. But again you said, right, there's 472 00:41:52.320 --> 00:41:59.440 there's just again, there's not enough carriers out there. Uh. The it's 473 00:41:59.440 --> 00:42:01.760 a greatest gushion and we're both taking part in it. You know, you're 474 00:42:01.760 --> 00:42:05.960 sitting in a panel or salon or having a cigar with a bunch of folks 475 00:42:06.440 --> 00:42:12.199 to talk about you know, the carrier is obsolete and the big ships are 476 00:42:12.480 --> 00:42:16.679 too big and too expensive, and you can have these academic arguments, but 477 00:42:16.800 --> 00:42:22.639 at the end of the day, when things actually happen in the real world, 478 00:42:22.119 --> 00:42:30.039 where's the carrier, where's the amphibious the expeditionary strike groups? Where are 479 00:42:30.079 --> 00:42:32.800 the aircraft? How do we get them there? How can we not leave? 480 00:42:32.840 --> 00:42:37.199 And that's even against in the Red Sea is a reminder, this isn't 481 00:42:37.239 --> 00:42:44.000 even a fourth rate naval power. This is a Yemen's in a civil war. 482 00:42:44.039 --> 00:42:47.960 And the houthis are for the old Cold warriors. Roughly what used to 483 00:42:49.000 --> 00:42:59.159 be North Yemen, and they've managed to impact everything from global trade to US 484 00:42:59.159 --> 00:43:05.079 carrier strike groups. It's it's amazing. But you know, we just we 485 00:43:05.079 --> 00:43:08.280 don't. We don't have a much until we get to the point that things 486 00:43:08.320 --> 00:43:13.280 happen in the world and people go yes, in the carrier home, it's 487 00:43:13.320 --> 00:43:15.840 not a big deal, then maybe the carrier is not that useful of an 488 00:43:15.880 --> 00:43:21.000 argument. But it goes back to again that that Tomorrowland wish casting. You 489 00:43:21.000 --> 00:43:25.360 know, yes to these theories and these possibilities of why carriers are are not 490 00:43:25.559 --> 00:43:30.440 obsolete in this vignette and that vignette, But when you look at the fact 491 00:43:30.480 --> 00:43:37.360 that nobody has the perfect visibility of the future of what the carrier does have, 492 00:43:37.400 --> 00:43:40.039 which is why every nation that can is building them, trying to build 493 00:43:40.079 --> 00:43:44.960 more or to keep the ones they already have. There's nothing else on the 494 00:43:45.000 --> 00:43:52.280 planet that substitutes for and until there's a way to project national will in an 495 00:43:52.320 --> 00:43:55.960 effective way on a global basis than you can with a carrier all of its 496 00:43:57.039 --> 00:44:04.840 vulnerabilities and limitations aside the capabilities it brings to the table. I just do 497 00:44:04.960 --> 00:44:12.559 not see a replacement for it that survives first contact with history. Yeah, 498 00:44:12.639 --> 00:44:16.480 it's and given that it takes time to work up a carrier air wing to 499 00:44:17.079 --> 00:44:22.840 you know, allow it to work effectively with the carrier itself. I mean, 500 00:44:22.920 --> 00:44:27.960 you know that's that's not a not one of those things where you know, 501 00:44:28.000 --> 00:44:29.840 you get a bunch of kids together and say, okay, we're going 502 00:44:29.920 --> 00:44:31.400 to put on a play and we'll do it in the barn. You know, 503 00:44:31.440 --> 00:44:36.599 it takes months. It takes time to get the air crews ready, 504 00:44:36.639 --> 00:44:38.840 it takes time to get the equipment ready. It takes time to get them 505 00:44:38.840 --> 00:44:44.519 all to work together smoothly. And it's not a process that is done overnight. 506 00:44:44.760 --> 00:44:49.280 It has it's it isn't. And that's another reason to you know, 507 00:44:49.280 --> 00:44:52.960 if you have more carriers, you can have more people going through that process 508 00:44:52.599 --> 00:44:58.639 and have a readier force if you need it now. The other side of 509 00:44:58.679 --> 00:45:02.360 this is that the presence of the carrier in the Red Sea area has not 510 00:45:02.480 --> 00:45:07.880 done what we'd hoped it would do by itself. It is, it is 511 00:45:07.079 --> 00:45:12.679 not stop the Hoothies from attagging ships. It has not. It may have 512 00:45:12.719 --> 00:45:15.280 diminished their capacity a little bit, but the Hoothies are still doing it. 513 00:45:15.280 --> 00:45:21.800 They're still hitting ships with with these missiles and stuff, and in the same. 514 00:45:22.039 --> 00:45:24.559 At the same time, the Somali pirates seemed to be acting up again. 515 00:45:25.119 --> 00:45:31.760 You know, it is it is a sign that the the Western military 516 00:45:32.199 --> 00:45:38.480 either we are too shy about about going in and doing you know, I 517 00:45:38.599 --> 00:45:43.480 hate to put troops in the ground, but sometimes a punityveck tradition to take 518 00:45:43.519 --> 00:45:47.079 out some of these hooty things might be just with the doctor ordered. How 519 00:45:47.079 --> 00:45:51.679 do you do that? Well, unless you're going to go with the airborne 520 00:45:51.760 --> 00:45:53.760 core and and have a way to get them back out once you get them 521 00:45:53.760 --> 00:45:57.199 in, I'm not I'm not quite sure what you do, which is probably 522 00:45:57.239 --> 00:46:00.079 why we haven't done that. But you know, I think other people are 523 00:46:00.079 --> 00:46:05.480 looking at the profits being made by the commercial carriers that are going around Africa 524 00:46:05.519 --> 00:46:07.880 now and they're going, well, you know, whose interest are we acting 525 00:46:08.400 --> 00:46:13.039 and is it working? And that is always a question for military ops, 526 00:46:13.440 --> 00:46:17.199 is what we're doing stopping what we came to stop? Yeah, if you 527 00:46:17.639 --> 00:46:24.719 define as your purpose is you don't want to normalize threatening global seilings, which 528 00:46:24.719 --> 00:46:28.559 is what the World Navy used to do, and then we took over that 529 00:46:28.639 --> 00:46:36.079 responsibility from them. Primarily though other people will help, as I've mentioned on 530 00:46:36.119 --> 00:46:38.920 other venues and here I mean, we have a few thousand years record of 531 00:46:39.639 --> 00:46:45.000 what it takes to get rid of hiracy, and they're not stealing goods. 532 00:46:45.039 --> 00:46:51.440 Well, they did take a ship, but this is in I think a 533 00:46:51.519 --> 00:46:55.639 broad definition of hiracy. You do, like you said, you've got to 534 00:46:55.679 --> 00:47:01.280 go to shore now. I think it's a poison pill argument that I've had 535 00:47:01.280 --> 00:47:05.679 thrown at me more than once saying well, you know, you're gonna have 536 00:47:05.679 --> 00:47:08.639 to deploy one hundred thousand troops and we're gonna have to occupy for six years. 537 00:47:08.760 --> 00:47:15.519 Like, no, you don't. I don't think the present leadership would 538 00:47:15.519 --> 00:47:22.039 ever propose this. But a punitive expedition where you know where this is operating, 539 00:47:22.119 --> 00:47:30.400 You go in there and you in summary break things and kill people and 540 00:47:30.400 --> 00:47:36.760 say, okay, so you're not going to be firing rockets from this area 541 00:47:37.159 --> 00:47:42.199 anymore. We're leaving now. If you keep doing this, we will go 542 00:47:42.280 --> 00:47:50.480 to your next location and do the same thing. Would that be effective maybe, 543 00:47:50.920 --> 00:47:52.920 But what we're doing right now is not effective unless our hope is, 544 00:47:53.400 --> 00:48:00.559 because they are an Iranian proxy, that we have a plan to somehow starve 545 00:48:00.639 --> 00:48:06.039 them so they have inventory X and eventually they'll run out of it. And 546 00:48:06.079 --> 00:48:08.119 they can't replace it, then the problem kind of solves itself, more or 547 00:48:08.199 --> 00:48:15.639 less. But I think that assumes a little bit un causal analysis, where 548 00:48:16.440 --> 00:48:21.760 they have more than one way to get equipment and capabilities, and right now 549 00:48:21.800 --> 00:48:27.280 it is quite useful to the Iranians. Maybe the decision has been made that 550 00:48:27.360 --> 00:48:34.039 we are comfortable with the existing situation in the Red Sea that it's not worth 551 00:48:34.079 --> 00:48:37.760 doing a punitive exhibition or doing anything more than we already have. If so, 552 00:48:37.960 --> 00:48:43.519 we have another situation kind of like we have in the Balkans, where 553 00:48:43.760 --> 00:48:50.320 you're going to have forces permanently stationed there because nobody ever solved the underlying problem 554 00:48:50.360 --> 00:48:57.639 because they're content with a slow, bubbling threat that requires external military forces to 555 00:48:57.679 --> 00:49:00.679 be there. That's not optimal, but at least for now, that seems 556 00:49:00.679 --> 00:49:07.800 to be the way that we're heading. Yeah, and has a course of 557 00:49:07.840 --> 00:49:13.000 the will never go away. It's just, you know, these people didn't 558 00:49:13.079 --> 00:49:15.679 like each other in thirteen eighty nine, and they don't like each other now, 559 00:49:15.800 --> 00:49:24.239 so it's it's a mess. I like it. Well, go ahead, 560 00:49:24.960 --> 00:49:30.679 no, no, you're fine. Well, you know the the the 561 00:49:30.840 --> 00:49:37.400 question is, at what point does the US say, okay, we're you 562 00:49:37.440 --> 00:49:43.400 know, Egypt at your Suez Canal, you know you've got to do something. 563 00:49:44.039 --> 00:49:46.800 You're you're the one losing millions of dollars by not having shipping go through. 564 00:49:47.559 --> 00:49:52.119 Uh, you know, you've got to act. All the other countries 565 00:49:52.159 --> 00:49:54.199 that are on the Suez Canal that make any money out of it need to 566 00:49:54.320 --> 00:50:00.360 need to do something. You know, the Saudis have been fighting the these 567 00:50:00.360 --> 00:50:04.559 for a long time, but you know that as long as we're doing the 568 00:50:04.559 --> 00:50:07.880 work, they don't have any real reason to step forward. But you know, 569 00:50:07.920 --> 00:50:14.800 it's got to be in their economic and societal interests to take on these 570 00:50:15.039 --> 00:50:20.280 these rogue organizations, these non state actors and and do something about it. 571 00:50:20.360 --> 00:50:23.000 And you know if they're afraid to do it, because well that would be 572 00:50:23.079 --> 00:50:29.440 giving aid to the to the Israelis and and the you know, we you 573 00:50:29.480 --> 00:50:32.199 know that has has usually not been a problem in the long run, where 574 00:50:32.239 --> 00:50:37.480 Jordan's and Egypt have actually been cooperative in a lot of ways with the Israelis. 575 00:50:37.480 --> 00:50:40.360 And we've seen some from the the accords that were signed during the Trump 576 00:50:40.400 --> 00:50:44.840 administration, we've seen some other Arab states going, you know, we can 577 00:50:44.880 --> 00:50:52.800 live with Israel. But there is the other the the regional power the Iran 578 00:50:52.920 --> 00:50:57.320 who is not happy with any of this stuff. So you know that's you've 579 00:50:57.400 --> 00:51:00.239 hit it on the end. How do we stop or ran from continuous either 580 00:51:00.320 --> 00:51:06.559 Huthis and the Hamas and Hezbollah and the things that they're doing in Syria? 581 00:51:06.920 --> 00:51:09.199 You know, so because you know, you know what they want. They 582 00:51:09.239 --> 00:51:15.559 want to port in the med and they see if they can get that through 583 00:51:15.880 --> 00:51:22.159 Lebanon or someplace, they'll be, they'll be, they'll be interested in keeping 584 00:51:22.199 --> 00:51:29.880 it. I don't think the it's a novel theory of international relations and power 585 00:51:30.000 --> 00:51:37.119 politics that you can somehow take this regime and make them be a good faith 586 00:51:37.239 --> 00:51:42.800 actor on the national scene, on the international scene. They have no history 587 00:51:42.840 --> 00:51:46.800 of wanting to do that, They have no motivation or incentive to do that. 588 00:51:49.199 --> 00:51:52.719 But there are enough people who have bought into this that have levers of 589 00:51:52.760 --> 00:51:58.280 power right now that they Iran's in a pretty good spot really with this, 590 00:51:58.719 --> 00:52:04.119 with this group of folks that aren't interested in countering them, but turning them. 591 00:52:04.159 --> 00:52:10.360 But I don't think the Iranian government is interested in being turned. No. 592 00:52:10.880 --> 00:52:15.000 I've got you know, they've got what's the old Bob Dylan song, 593 00:52:15.400 --> 00:52:20.480 They've got God on their side, because you know, they represent one UH 594 00:52:21.199 --> 00:52:27.239 group of the Islamic faith and they you know, anybody who doesn't see things 595 00:52:27.280 --> 00:52:30.880 the way they do is a is it is it just is it much of 596 00:52:30.920 --> 00:52:34.800 an infidel as a Christian or a Jew? And you know that, you 597 00:52:34.880 --> 00:52:37.599 know the Quran says you should be able to take those people out or enslave 598 00:52:37.679 --> 00:52:43.920 them. So it is a It is a challenge because we're not just talking 599 00:52:44.320 --> 00:52:50.880 society and modern government. We're talking UH, a religion that forms the basis 600 00:52:50.920 --> 00:52:58.559 for a lifestyle and controls their polities. I don't think we'd be doing our 601 00:52:58.880 --> 00:53:01.199 doing our guests service here, not because we don't want to be. We 602 00:53:01.239 --> 00:53:05.239 don't want to be the naval enquirer, so to speak. But there is 603 00:53:05.440 --> 00:53:07.639 one issue you and I talked about in the pre show that I don't I 604 00:53:07.719 --> 00:53:13.280 want to give us enough time to talk about because it's kind of a spoiler 605 00:53:13.320 --> 00:53:15.039 alert, not spoil alert. But you know, next week we're having Craig 606 00:53:15.119 --> 00:53:28.880 Whitlock onn to discuss our unending crisis known as fat Leonard and along those same 607 00:53:29.119 --> 00:53:31.480 veins, I'm still trying to get my head around it. And again, 608 00:53:31.840 --> 00:53:38.519 all caveats apply about he hasn't been been found guilty yet. However, the 609 00:53:38.760 --> 00:53:47.559 immediate past Vice Chief of Naval Operations was arrested last week. Or looks like 610 00:53:47.960 --> 00:53:54.320 just good old fashioned corruption and bribery, which I don't think that the Chinese 611 00:53:54.400 --> 00:53:59.360 threw at us at the Shangri Law dialogue card, probably because they have their 612 00:53:59.400 --> 00:54:06.039 own challenges working on. But as this story develops, it's what caught me. 613 00:54:06.239 --> 00:54:09.559 For those that don't know, you can find out online. Go look 614 00:54:09.599 --> 00:54:13.719 at what. I don't know how many years he was on active duty thirty 615 00:54:13.760 --> 00:54:17.760 five years. Thirty five year active duty, retired four star admiral makes and 616 00:54:17.840 --> 00:54:23.440 retirement pay. Evidently that's not enough for some people that while he was an 617 00:54:23.480 --> 00:54:30.599 active duty he was already working his retirement gig in the Department of Justice. 618 00:54:30.039 --> 00:54:36.320 I'd be interesting who was the whistleblower on it. But it's bad to see. 619 00:54:36.480 --> 00:54:39.679 But it's also good to see because that will have a lot of other 620 00:54:39.719 --> 00:54:45.840 people who might find themselves in similar situations looking at their post retirement gig, 621 00:54:45.639 --> 00:54:51.360 who they're talking to, and what they're taking while they're on active duty. 622 00:54:51.519 --> 00:54:54.480 It's going to be an educational thing to watch. You have more of a 623 00:54:54.599 --> 00:54:59.800 legal mind than I do. What kind of caught your attention on the announcement 624 00:55:00.119 --> 00:55:05.719 that well that he got charged and it's a it is a bribery. I 625 00:55:05.800 --> 00:55:09.000 think one of the allegations is bribery. And as you say, we don't 626 00:55:09.079 --> 00:55:13.880 know, you know it is. It is alleged, and he's been arrested, 627 00:55:14.000 --> 00:55:16.440 and that doesn't mean much more than that it's alleged and he's been arrested. 628 00:55:17.000 --> 00:55:21.639 But we've you know, we've seen a from Fat Leonard and before. 629 00:55:22.199 --> 00:55:27.119 We've seen a number of cases in which active duty people have sold secrets to 630 00:55:27.400 --> 00:55:30.440 the bad guys, done us major harm. I mean, it's and just 631 00:55:30.599 --> 00:55:39.079 recently a chief petty officer got eighteen years for attempting to sell secrets to a 632 00:55:39.159 --> 00:55:45.239 foreign government. I mean it is I guess there's some amount of money that 633 00:55:45.639 --> 00:55:51.199 will corrupt some people. But yeah, you know, we know these It 634 00:55:51.360 --> 00:55:53.760 is frightening to see, especially if you were around when some of the things 635 00:55:53.840 --> 00:56:01.920 happened back in the the day, when our our technology, at our crypto 636 00:56:02.000 --> 00:56:07.679 stuff was compromised. I mean, those those are bad times. Yeah, 637 00:56:07.719 --> 00:56:13.440 that that was, and for a very long time after that we had to 638 00:56:13.559 --> 00:56:19.719 still we still used a lot of the cryptocryptment that the Russians had the design 639 00:56:19.840 --> 00:56:22.760 for simply because we didn't have any replacements for it, and we just hope 640 00:56:22.760 --> 00:56:28.679 that the new code of the day. But you look it back was that 641 00:56:28.760 --> 00:56:32.760 the K Y seven was one of them. Punch Card technology is not that 642 00:56:32.960 --> 00:56:37.280 hard to crack once you have the design of the machine in place, if 643 00:56:37.280 --> 00:56:44.000 you're willing to replicate it. But it does it does serve as a good 644 00:56:44.119 --> 00:56:52.519 reminder that whether it's petty corruption where people are taking stock options and one hundred 645 00:56:52.559 --> 00:56:58.639 thousand dollars payments from civilian companies that they have a way of steering business to 646 00:56:59.159 --> 00:57:05.840 or it's some by selling stuff they squirrel out of the skiff for money to 647 00:57:05.960 --> 00:57:09.639 buy vacations with, or something that there's a reason why we do have some 648 00:57:09.800 --> 00:57:16.760 of our rather irritating regulations and security procedures. But at the end of the 649 00:57:16.880 --> 00:57:22.119 day, it's what's between somebody's ear that's going to determine whether for ideology, 650 00:57:23.960 --> 00:57:32.119 sociopathy, or the desire to have more money is going to lead somebody you 651 00:57:32.239 --> 00:57:37.679 work with to do something. And I think especially with the case it went 652 00:57:37.719 --> 00:57:44.480 to doj about the former Vice Cno and again this will come out in court. 653 00:57:44.639 --> 00:57:50.840 I'm sure it is how they found out about it. But people, 654 00:57:51.559 --> 00:57:55.840 if you're suspicious that somebody around you is involved in something like that or might 655 00:57:55.920 --> 00:58:00.559 be a security risks, I'm in a place to look the other way. 656 00:58:02.000 --> 00:58:07.880 But at the end of the day, if you do look the other way, 657 00:58:07.159 --> 00:58:12.039 or if you don't mention it to somebody, like we saw with Walker 658 00:58:12.280 --> 00:58:16.320 and that aspiring that you mentioned from a few decades ago, in case of 659 00:58:16.480 --> 00:58:23.719 war comes, that's going to cost lives and even could risk not just operations, 660 00:58:23.800 --> 00:58:30.239 but the course of an entire conflict, and especially when it comes to 661 00:58:30.840 --> 00:58:36.719 some of the penetrations to people Republic of China have already made both directly and 662 00:58:36.800 --> 00:58:44.320 indirectly with our armed forces. And it wasn't involving us, but it did 663 00:58:44.440 --> 00:58:49.199 involve some people I indirectly knew in the Estonian military. There was a great 664 00:58:49.280 --> 00:58:57.719 article in The Atlantic out about how one of their artillery officers basically was a 665 00:58:57.840 --> 00:59:02.840 victim of a hunt trup and that is one of the oldest plays in the 666 00:59:02.920 --> 00:59:07.840 book. And Fat Leonard, you know, that was part of the equation 667 00:59:08.039 --> 00:59:14.480 too, is once you've done some things that wouldn't like the Aviator say how 668 00:59:14.519 --> 00:59:17.480 would this read? And the Mishap Report, how would this read on the 669 00:59:17.559 --> 00:59:22.159 cover of Navy Times. Once you do something I got don't read too well, 670 00:59:22.320 --> 00:59:27.320 people have a way to push you in a variety of directions. I 671 00:59:27.400 --> 00:59:30.039 think we still have pretty good training on it. But human beings are human 672 00:59:30.119 --> 00:59:34.519 beings, and these things will happen on a regular basis. Yeah, all 673 00:59:34.599 --> 00:59:37.199 you can do is try and you know, do the the old day, 674 00:59:37.280 --> 00:59:42.039 we have the Personal Reliability Program and stuff, were a lot of things that 675 00:59:42.119 --> 00:59:44.559 you know, if you were living beyond your means and stuff, people would 676 00:59:44.599 --> 00:59:50.199 come and ask you questions. But here we go. We've we've finished our 677 00:59:50.239 --> 00:59:54.320 first hour on Riverside. I hope people have been listening and enjoying what I 678 00:59:54.519 --> 00:59:59.400 think has improved audio quality. I guess we'll find out we get some feedback. 679 01:00:00.519 --> 01:00:02.320 Yep, and it's it's been a great hour. And again join us 680 01:00:02.400 --> 01:00:07.079 next week everybody where we will be talking to mister Whitlock about his book on 681 01:00:07.360 --> 01:00:12.840 fat Leonard. It's the gift that keeps on giving. So until then, 682 01:00:13.039 --> 01:00:29.800 I hope everybody has a great Navy Day. Cheers Mike, my lonely want 683 01:00:29.960 --> 01:00:38.920 to marry me and a friend of be codili for you being to blame on 684 01:00:39.400 --> 01:00:54.039 me folding you. It's a long way. It's a long way. It's 685 01:00:54.159 --> 01:01:07.480 a long way. It's I know, dor pick on it. Farewell, 686 01:01:07.760 --> 01:01:15.079 listen, not well. It's a long long way to sip away. It's 687 01:01:15.320 --> 01:01:16.480 but my, my,