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All right, welcome to the Rojas
Reports Live. It looks like we've got

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some people in here already joining us. Thank you all so much for being

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here. And uh, we've got
a great guest again. We've got Adam

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Keyhoe. He's not related to Donald
Keyhoe. If you're aware of who Donald

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is is, all of us UFO
nerds know Donald Keyhoe well worked with not

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nicap too early. My brain is
not taking him. But anyway, one

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of the early military UFO organizations that
was very, very influential when the Condon

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Report and when the Air Force stopped
doing everything. But you're not related to

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Donald Keyjo anyway. I almost wish
I was, you know, it would

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be so much fun. But yeah, unfortunately, no different spelling of the

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name. That's the biggest question I
get when they're like, I saw you

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at Adam. Is he related to
Donald? So? But Adam have a

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PhD and information science and I know
you have a big interest in policy when

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it comes to defense, and that's
something you write quite a bit about,

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right, Yeah, absolutely, So
for the last couple of months, really

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I've been writing intensively about kind of
policy issues around UAP. So you know,

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I came into this field kind of
interested to try to think through all

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of the different possible implications. Right, So there's a number of possibilities.

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You know, some of these things
could be foreign adversaries and there's a whole

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set of policy issues there. There
could be mistaken observations and that's important as

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well. And there's a few of
these cases that are really truly strange,

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and it doesn't seem like there's much
of an organized policy response. So it's

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kind of fascinating to look at as
a problem kind of at the intersection of

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technology and intelligence and government, kind
of all of these things all at once,

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and it's sort of a new puzzle. I mean, it's it's we're

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getting insight into an area of research
that the military has been into secretively and

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have successfully really kept the public and
apparently Congress in the dark. And so,

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you know, which kind of for
the conspiracy theorists, you know,

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there was something there and we don't
know we don't know the extent of the

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research that has been done by the
military in this area. Uh, and

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we're just beginning to learn that sort
of thing, and that'll probably be a

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lot of what we talk about,
is that there seems to be even though

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we know that they've taken up seriously
now, there's still a lot of secrecy

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around what they've done, and they
don't seem to want to change that level

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of transparency at all. I mean, what we've been getting lately is that

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things will remain classified in their research
in these areas. It seems like,

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does that seem accurate? Yeah,
I think it does. I mean,

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I think this is an incredibly difficult
intelligence problem because in order to really look

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at this, you have to look
at the very edge of your knowledge and

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capabilities. So you've got to simultaneously
assess, what are the you know,

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the best capabilities of our rivals and
adversaries and even our peers. What are

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our own, you know, best
capabilities. Is it a possibility that we've

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someone has an experimental platform that is
in the wrong place at the wrong time.

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And then even if you're looking at
the most prosaic thing, which is

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that it's a case of mistaken observation
or whatever, that very quickly gets into

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vulnerabilities and the sensor layers you know, of the military, of where there

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might be problems with radar, where
there might be problems in training, et

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cetera. So all of that is
really sensitive stuff, and if you have

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to look at it all together,
your your decompartmenting information, you're bringing information

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that normally would just be in separate
parts of the government together, and that's

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always a cause for you know,
extreme concern, because if that program,

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you know, is has penetrated in
any meaningful way, then that's essentially a

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treasure trove for a foreign intelligence service. So before we even get into any

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of the sort of stranger implications of
some of these cases, you know,

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the kind of more conspiratorial stuff,
there's actually like good reason, even if

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you were only thinking about drones and
planes and you know, radar glitches,

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to be really really concerned about this
stuff and to keep it fairly secretive.

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But as you say, the remarkable
thing is that in the last year,

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amazingly, you know, we're seeing
this public discourse about it. We're seeing

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the Senate Intelligence Committee writing this really
amazing request to basically say, you know,

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we demand more or less a report
on this. A public report I'm

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classified in a relatively short period of
time as sort of stunning given all of

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the different you know, intelligence equities
involved. But you know, nonetheless,

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here we are m so two things
a little bit of business person and then

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we'll get back into this conversation.
I do want to let people know that

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I have made this change where now
the Rojas Reports live the live interviews like

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this one, anybody can join and
then after the interview, after a couple

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hours, I will make it so
just the subscribers can join, and you

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could see there's a joint button here
on open minds where you can join and

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subscribe to the archives. Just do
that one. I have the Rojas Reports

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live option there. But like I
said, you know, I'm gonna not

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charge for joining for live anymore.
So just so you know, so welcome

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and hopefully you can keep joining me. And part of the reason I'm doing

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this is because Rojas Reports is a
moving target and that I never know when

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I'm going to get my guests,
and so it's kind of short noticed when

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I'm going to have people pop in
here. But some of you, like

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Mark and Rodrigo and Renee and Dirk, you seem to be able to be

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available practically anytime and pop into any
of these live streams that I pop up,

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and you're very welcome, thank you
for being here. The other thing

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I do want to mention is just
getting back to our conversation here, is

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that I was able to watch The
Phenomenon, which is a great documentary.

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I highly highly recommend it. I
know you'll really love it, Adam,

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if you haven't gotten a screener yet, I have not. And what's great

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about it is that it reviews the
history, which will bore maybe some of

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the you know, older UFO nerds, but they do it in a great

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way, a very credible way,
and then come into you know, then

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bring it into the current affairs through
the presidents, into Clinton and Podesta,

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and then we have you know,
interviews with Chris Mellan, Harry Reid,

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great interviews, by the way,
and it really demonstrates this truth which is

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and it doesn't include Jimmy Carter.
And I do want to mention that as

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I did post an article from Open
Minds magazine written by my buddy Antonio Juneez

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about Jimmy Carter. When Jimmy Carter
tried to get NASA to do UFO research,

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and we'll talk about that. That
was excluded from Phenomena, but all

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this other was and it does show
that this is not necessarily an issue,

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that is not something that the military
has always been struggling with but instead kind

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of more of a pr issue,
at least from the surface. The things

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that we know about is, you
know, how do they deal with this

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and how do they deal with the
public on this matter? And that's what's

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great is that it really combines things
to show that what is going on now

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is really a continuation of what went
on in the forties and fifties, in

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the sixties. It's just a new
way of dealing with it. And kind

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of this new openness that was mirrors
what we had in the beginning. And

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I don't think that's a problem.
And I think that that maybe all we

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were left with in the end,
in that back then we knew there was

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an issue. There were UAPs,
there were things being seen by the public,

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by law enforcement, by the military, and it was okay, and

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the military is trying to figure out
what it was. It seems like that

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was where we've returned to, which
isn't necessarily a bad thing, but of

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course it does post some problems for
the military. Yeah, I mean,

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I think one of the key differences
is just that the strategic environment has really

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changed. So, you know,
twenty or thirty years ago, we were,

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you know, largely in this bipolar
world where bipolar in terms of the

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power dynamic between the United States and
the Soviet Union, and I think there

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was higher comments in the kind of
technological supremacy of the United States, and

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today we're in a much more multipolar
world where you know, countries like China,

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russ are increasingly capable in different ways. And I think also with the

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proliferation of drone technology too, there's
a certain anxiety that you know, the

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skies are becoming a little stranger,
a little bit more accessible. You know,

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it's not just the B fifty two
that you're concerned about, right,

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it's it's it's drones and all of
these sort of strange new technologies and so

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on. So I think that it
is it is a slightly different environment.

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And then I think the other new
thing in the equation is something like TTSA,

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which has a few people with you
know, really significant government backgrounds kind

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of coming in and adding their weight
and experience to it, which seems to

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be a new aspect of the dynamic. But you're right, I mean,

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there's a long history and not just
of people being interested in the subject,

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but also the government having varying levels
of response to it, and and varying

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levels of congressional interest and even executive
branch interest in the case of Jimmy Carter.

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So yeah, there's a sick there's
a cyclical aspect many of these things.

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I think that Jimmy Carter story is
a very interesting one and important one

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also in that it shows, you
know, Jimmy Carter wanted openness, much

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like Harry Reid into this topic,
so he approached NASA, and I think

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that's where the similarities are. This
politician kind of inspired or you know,

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started program, and how the military
and NASA reacted what they told Jimmy Carter

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obviously. You know, what Antonio
was able to demonstrate in the article is

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that the Air Force behind the scenes
was pushing for NASA to not do it.

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They're like, you know, this
isn't work. That just don't do

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it, go away and get out
of it. And they did, and

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they did highlight the issue, which
is a legitimate issue, is that,

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you know, if we don't do
it, the UFO conspiracy people are going

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to be mad at us and claim
that we're just covering things up. If

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we do do it, then we're
going to start to run into problems with

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the scientists that we work with in
the scientific community, and that's the problem.

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So why do it at all,
because that just creates just so much

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problems We're already I think an organization
NASA has always had resource issues. You

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know, they've always been, you
know, tasked with doing things that are

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just they they don't have the budget
or demand power to do. And that's

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kind of politics. Yeah, if
I could have just add a little bit

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of context to that, I mean
to zoom out from that story a little

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bit. So there's the moment where
Carter talks about UFOs on the trail and

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then commits to looking at them.
But if you go back just a couple

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of years, there's something called the
Church Committee in the Senate, and that

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was actually the precursor of the moment
of the modern It's essentially the Senate Intelligence

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Committee, the permanent sort of select
intelligence committee. So what the Church Committee

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was doing really was looking at intelligence
abuses. So this is a period when

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things like mk Ultra were coming to
light and all of these other sorts of

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the really dark corners of the intelligence
world. And you know, it's been

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a little while since I've looked at
this, but I want to say that

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was maybe around seventy six or so, so just just before kind of the

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Carter era. So that was a
moment in American life where I think people

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were looking at the intelligence services in
a slightly different way and had a slightly

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different sort of perspective on government and
maybe a lack of trust in government as

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a whole. The other interesting thing
that was happening at the time was that,

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you know, the defense contractor giant
Lockheed Martin and its earlier form,

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was in some financial trouble and at
one point was sort of quasi nationalized almost,

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So that was a moment for the
whole security apparatus to be pretty uncertain,

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and there were a lot of people, i think professionals in the national

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security world that were concerned about what
Carter would do. You know that he

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would overturn basically the way the way
that things were done. And it's fascinating

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to go back and take a look
at Carter's speech to the CI eight when

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he was shortly after he was inaugurated, because he's he does it in this

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sort of gentle Carter way, but
it's it's a really challenging speech basically saying

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that, you know, there has
to be reformed, so you know,

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it's it's fascinating that there was a
whole moment of questioning and reform, a

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sort of spirit of reform, and
yeah, this issue just kind of ran

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into the brick wall, you know. Nonetheless, mm hmm. And I'd

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recommend people read that article. I
think it's a really important part of everything

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going on. But I think it's
probably some insight into what's been happening in

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the background that we haven't seen.
Also that in other words, there are

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probably strong forces in the background completely
opposed to transparency in this arena and pushing

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there using their weight in ways that
we don't see. One of the big

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mysteries you've brought up that we,
I think a lot of us has talked

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about is the absence of Air Force
at involvement with any of what's been going

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on. There's been very little.
They've spoken to one issue where they said

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they thought something that was in the
drone, you know, in other words,

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saying there one case was Detroit unidentified. They also investigated the F eighteen

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Flair videos to make sure that they
were not you know, released unlawfully or

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in a manner that they shouldn't have
been. That's it, though, that's

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all we've heard. They really haven't
gotten involved at all on the surface,

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but you know, who knows what
sort of movement's been going on in the

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background. Yeah, and the interesting
thing is if you look at the kinds

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of if you look at Christopher mellins
a wish list, so to speak.

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He's written a few pieces now and
he's got one where he really just kind

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of enumerates a bunch of different platforms
and capabilities, and many of them are

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Air Force capabilities explicitly. So you
know, it seems as if on the

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inside there's a desire to tap into
data sets and expertise that might be in

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the Air Force. And what we
don't know is how cooperative the Air Force

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has been with that interest, if
they're outright blocking it, or if maybe

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at this point they're cooperative. It's
so quiet, there's kind of no way

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to go, no way to know. But yeah, as you point out

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in that silence, it's sort of
a strange silence because clearly this is the

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domain that they're tasked with, is
protecting our airspace, So you would expect

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to see some leadership. To me, just as someone who kind of watches

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the inter branch rivalries and those sorts
of issues from a policy perspective. It's

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surprising because they risk ceding leadership to
the Navy, which has always been one

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of their chief rivals. So it's
sort of not a good look for them

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in a way that the go to
place for all of these things is always

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OW and I. You know,
why is that the case? And you

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know, I think down the road
there might be some budgetary considerations with that

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if O and I proves itself to
be the most innovative, But it's also

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recruiting because you know the young person
that's interest and STEM and you know,

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programming and all, you know,
all these sort of technological things. You

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know, it might be Oh and
I has the more exciting story to tell

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right now in terms of the work
that they do than the Air Force does.

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So that bright kid is maybe going
to think about a career in the

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Navy instead of the Air Force.
So yeah, So one of the pieces

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I wrote was sort of pointing that
out and saying, hey, this is

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an opportunity actually to take some take
the leadership rings and really contribute. Yeah,

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that is one aspect of this whole
thing. That is supposedly what got

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tommed Along's foot in the door in
that he approached the military. He says,

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you know, to tell them,
hey, you're not looking good to

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the kids. You know, if
you really want to attract the younger people,

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I think you really got to tackle
some of these areas they're interested in,

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like UFOs. Unfortunately, that doesn't
seem to be have been picked up.

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I think that's a great opportunity for
TTSA, the entertainment side, to

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maybe work with the military to kind
of, you know, sex up how

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they're seen. That hasn't happened.
But I agree with you that is a

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good angle, and maybe the Navy
thought that was a good angle. I

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know in my experience, even some
of the NASA PR or some of the

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other science publicists people I've worked with, like that angle. You know,

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they're not afraid to go to the
UFO route and use that as something to

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get people interested in. The scientists, of course, are much more hesitant

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to do so. But it's a
good angle. The issue is, it

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seems as though the Navy has now
started to change its tune a bit as

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far as transparency, because the last
couple of you know, at least one

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of the messages I think by glass
El, the Swedish researcher got was from

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the Navy, and the Navy even
was speaking to how a lot of their

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findings will be classified, and they
even you know, put in this mention

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of questioning whether Aleisonder was part of
a hip again, which is so weird

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because that's an established, i think, a pretty well established fact with first

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hand you know, witnesses, people
who would know, like Harry Reid who

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started for the people who worked on
the program. So it's almost like they're

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they're in their tune now and that
I'm a little that the trend part of

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this thing is is maybe getting in
the mix. Yeah, it's certainly possible.

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I mean, I think an important
thing to remember always with government in

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the military is that it's never monolithic. You know, people have different ideas

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attitudes, and there often are kind
of wrestling matches in the background, if

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you will, about whose ideas are
going to prevail. And so you know,

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we may be seeing some shift in
that where people who maybe prefer a

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quieter approach are are getting a little
bit more of their way. It's very

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very difficult to say, I think
overall though, I mean, you know,

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in the last few weeks and months, yes, it does seem like

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there may be a bit of a
shift, but I think overall it's still

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in a fairly unprecedented place in terms
of you know, they have this request

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to from the Senate Intelligence Committee,
you know, the D and I,

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it seems, is going to have
to the Director of National Intelligence is going

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to have to speak on this issue. Another thing that I pointed out in

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that Air Force piece that does apply
here too. There is a curious thing

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if you compared Christopher Mellon's blueprint with
what ended up actually in the official language.

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So Melan I think had a like
an eighteen month timeline. It was

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considerably longer than the short timeline in
the Senate Intelligence Committee. And a lot

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of people have asked you, is
that enough time actually to do this job?

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And it makes me wonder that if
there's a hearing someday, there's going

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to be a D and I that's
you know, sitting in front of them,

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and if he or she doesn't have
an adequate answer, the next question

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is going to be why who's holding
things up right? Why aren't we able

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to solve this problem? That we
know has been around at least sixteen years

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if we just look at limits,
and that puts some pressure because you don't

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want to be the person left holding
the bag of holding things up, so

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because you're going to get some uncomfortable
questions from the Senate, and that has

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massive ramifications in terms of the budget
and so on. So you're right in

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that, like publicly and we as
researchers and journalists and and interested citizens,

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we may be getting less, but
there's still an overall kind of chessboard that

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points to there being increased pressure that
I think there's going to have to be

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some sort of a response to,
right, And I think that at least

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the public side of things. Rodrigo
brings up a great point here. He

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says, I'm very impressed with the
fact that the UFO issue hasn't become more

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politicized, actually, and I think
that's at the crux, and that's what

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I'm trying to argue right now,
is that I think that politician nobody really

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knows the strength of the UFO lobby
and the effect that it may or may

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not have. And I think that's
kind of the biggest issue in that do

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they have to play politics to this
or not. And do they see the

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needle move at all when they do
make comments or not. I'm guessing not.

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So. For instance, with Marco
Rubio answered that question about you know,

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the way he did about all of
this, saying that, you know,

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I kind of hope they are aliens
because it's scary if it's Russian or

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Chinese. You know. Did he
get a big response to that answer or

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not. I'm guessing no. But
that's the sort of thing that are you

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know, people who feel like they're
UFO activists, which I feel like a

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lot of the UFO community does,
needs to make their voices heard because I

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think that there's a lot of people
that you know, a lot of UFO

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articles do really well in mainstream media. That shows there's people interested in reading

293
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this story doesn't, but it doesn't
necessarily mean that they're interested in, you

294
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know, petitioning more transparency in this
arena. We could get to a point

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where the military says, okay,
we take UAP seriously. We're now telling

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you this is a real phenomena.
So there's something happening here, but we've

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got it covered. We can't share
with you everything we've discovered, but we've

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got it covered, end the story. I mean, that's the scenario I'm

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guessing that we're headed towards, and
without the public a strong public response,

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it's probably where we're going to go. Yeah, I think I think that's

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a distinct possibility. I think you're
right that there's While these things are popular,

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you know, the stories get a
lot of clicks and views and so

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on, that doesn't mean there's a
UFO vote out there. You know that

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a politicians really got to wrangle with. And the other thing to consider too

305
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is we may be in just about
the noisiest and most chaotic political environment in

306
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modern memory. I mean, twenty
twenty is as a heck of a year.

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So if you're trying to register whether
UFOs make a dent in the twenty

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other things, it's hard to know
that. So yeah, I mean I'm

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also a bit skeptical, you know, of the idea that there's going to

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be a meaningful grassroots movement that's able
to really pressure individual politicians. I think

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that can happen. I think a
better strategy is to point out the obvious

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seriousness of the issue. So,
for example, in past statements, you

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know, the Pentagon spokesperson has said
they're trying to avoid a strategic surprise.

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So to me, when I hear
a phrase like strategic surprise, that's a

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that's a primal scream in national security
terms, because what that means is,

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all of a sudden, one day, we wake up and we find out

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someone has a game changing technology and
we missed it. And that means that

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you know, billions of dollars of
intelligence funding alone just to catch our rivals

319
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when they're developing new things didn't work. And then also we don't have that

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capability that someone else does. So
again, before you even get into the

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kind of stranger aspect aspects of some
of these cases, you know, we

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should be really concerned that we've got
a potential strategic surprise scenario that's been left

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open for sixteen years. That's a
very long time to be surprised. So

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I think that, you know,
the better argument to make is, you

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know, not so much that there's
a there's a huge vote out there that

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you know, demands to get the
truth, but rather like this is an

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incredibly serious issue. It appears there's
been no discernible policy, We have no

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real idea what the heck is going
on. So you know, it's it's

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incumbent to to get some kind of
a response at least just to kind of

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to know that that that strategic surprise
is off the table. So yeah,

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I mean, I think there's going
to have to be a multiplicity of angles.

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But yes, I agree with you
that the THEUFO vote, it's it's

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always important. I don't want to
discount it because I mean, it can

334
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make an impact, but I think
that that alone is not necessarily going to

335
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get the job done. And yeah, I mean I think it's essentially,

336
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you know, what we've got as
an admission of what we already knew,

337
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but at least it is public and
out there, and you know, we

338
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all know, and it makes sense
that there would be these weird desks,

339
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you know, people and intelligence agencies
that are working on cases that are strange,

340
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that are anomalists, you know,
which are the kind of the cross

341
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section of science where science comes into
research these sort of things. And I

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think that, you know, it's
just we're moving to a world hopefully where

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it's at least okay to admit that. Yeah, but it's what we need

344
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to force. I think that it's
a harder sell and you know what we

345
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all want, and I think even
I'm guessing what Chris Mellan was driving was

346
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also to have a portion where they're
also sharing with the public at least somewhat

347
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findings and giving an update. Yeah. Absolutely, I mean I wrote a

348
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piece a while back about understanding that
that UFO or UAP are not one thing.

349
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There are at least four different things, right, So you know,

350
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UFO or UAP, as it's often
said, is just means it's something you

351
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can't identify in the sky. It's
unidentified, right, So it's it's categorically

352
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not a thing in of itself,
it's something else. So it could be

353
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a natural phenomenon that's just you know, a mistaken observation. It could be

354
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an experimental aircraft, for example,
one of ours. It could be a

355
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foreign adversary, or there's that fourth
category that everyone gets excited about, that

356
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it could be something truly strange and
exotic. And so to me, the

357
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question is, well, what's the
distribution, right, So how we know

358
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that at least some percentage of sightings
are just people not understanding what they're seeing.

359
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No one's going to claim that's everything
necessarily, but it's certainly not nothing.

360
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So you kind of go down the
list, and I think you have

361
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to have some comfort in being able
to examine these different possibilities and really see

362
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what they are, especially because of
the kind of drone proliferation and everything else

363
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that we discussed previously. We just
don't have the luxury of living in a

364
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world where it's just planes. You
know, we have new satellite technologies,

365
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all these new things. So yeah, I think it's it's incumbent on us

366
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to be able to have a mature
conversation when we see something in the sky

367
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we can't identify, to figure it
out, as opposed to lapsing into the

368
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you know, into the uncomfortable jokes
and you know, all the rest of

369
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it. M So somebody asking,
we'll ask why are they called UAP and

370
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not UFOs anymore, which is a
great question. I think what a lot

371
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of people don't realize UFOs, who
a lot of the public unfortunately, means

372
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aliens or alien spacecraft, and that's
not what it means. I mean unidentified

373
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flying objects. It was actually a
term coined by the military because they were

374
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using flying saucer, which obviously has
some other connotations with it and assumptions.

375
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But now even though we moved to
UFO for that reason. With all the

376
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baggage that the term UFO has,
scientists and serious researchers have migrated to this

377
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term UAP. I know that Nick
Pope says they've been using it in the

378
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UK for quite a while, but
I think it was actually started by night

379
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not NIGHTCAP, another group, NARCAP, another organization led by doctor Richard Haynes,

380
00:28:27.400 --> 00:28:32.799
who was investigating pilot UFO cases.
But anyways, it was kind of

381
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a more acceptable term for the scientific
community. I think it. To me,

382
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it was always kind of silly when
you have to explain what's the UAP,

383
00:28:40.799 --> 00:28:45.200
You're gonna have to say a UFO. But I've learned from experience that

384
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the scientific community, if you use
the term UFO, a lot of people

385
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will just turn off. So you've
got to use this term UAP, and

386
00:28:52.240 --> 00:28:56.599
so that's kind of where we've evolved
to. Yeah, I mean, I

387
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think I think that's exactly right.
I mean, I think the problem is

388
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that over time, whatever the new
acronym is, it becomes just as laden

389
00:29:03.720 --> 00:29:06.680
with the baggage as the old acronym. There's just a little bit of a

390
00:29:06.759 --> 00:29:10.440
momentary pause as someone figures out what
it actually means, where you've got an

391
00:29:10.440 --> 00:29:15.839
opportunity, you know, to get
through some of that accumulated stigma and everything

392
00:29:15.839 --> 00:29:18.920
else. But I mean, I
certainly can't speak for the scientific community,

393
00:29:18.920 --> 00:29:22.279
but like I'm scientifically trained, to
me, it is silly too. I

394
00:29:22.319 --> 00:29:25.400
look at it, as you know, clearly these are acronyms for essentially the

395
00:29:25.440 --> 00:29:29.960
same thing, something in the sky
we can't identify, you know. So

396
00:29:29.960 --> 00:29:33.079
so let's let's move on beyond that. But I think there's always these kind

397
00:29:33.119 --> 00:29:37.680
of pr repackaging and reimagining of the
thing to try to get around the taboo.

398
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M So, in this new world
where UAPs are acceptable, where it's

399
00:29:42.640 --> 00:29:47.920
you know, it's it's out there, that the US is looking into the

400
00:29:48.000 --> 00:29:52.920
matter and takes the matter seriously,
I think what interesting as far as a

401
00:29:52.960 --> 00:29:59.680
result, is that at least now
we have another country, another Secretary of

402
00:29:59.680 --> 00:30:03.680
Defence in Japan, you know,
a strong, strong ally and a strong

403
00:30:03.720 --> 00:30:10.200
world power now also saying Okay,
the US takes it seriously, We're going

404
00:30:10.279 --> 00:30:14.720
to take it seriously to and I've
instructed you know, our military, our

405
00:30:15.839 --> 00:30:22.240
security defense forces on how to deal
with UAP. However, and this is

406
00:30:22.279 --> 00:30:26.880
a weird however, and I really
doubt it to be honest, however,

407
00:30:26.960 --> 00:30:33.119
we've never had a UAP experience,
but we'll definitely keep an eye out and

408
00:30:33.160 --> 00:30:36.559
we'll let you know if we do. So it's great that they're taking it

409
00:30:36.599 --> 00:30:41.519
seriously in this manner. It's very
peculiar because I don't think I've ever heard

410
00:30:41.640 --> 00:30:48.240
a government military say they've never had
a UAP situation. Many many governments have

411
00:30:48.279 --> 00:30:52.160
said they've had many, if not, you know, they've had some,

412
00:30:52.240 --> 00:30:56.160
if not many. What do you
make of that? Boy, It is

413
00:30:56.200 --> 00:31:00.240
a really really complicated context. So
the first thing to to kind of take

414
00:31:00.279 --> 00:31:04.839
a bigger picture view right of Japan. So unknown things in the sky are

415
00:31:04.839 --> 00:31:10.240
a really big deal in Japan for
a lot of reasons. So in the

416
00:31:10.319 --> 00:31:14.680
nineties, for example, there were
a series of North Korean missile tests that

417
00:31:14.759 --> 00:31:18.839
were just completely shocked the country.
It ended up instigating a huge number of

418
00:31:18.839 --> 00:31:23.759
intelligence and military reforms. It was
this kind of wake up call that they're

419
00:31:23.759 --> 00:31:30.119
in a somewhat vulnerable position and can
be potentially attacked. And today the issue

420
00:31:30.440 --> 00:31:34.240
is mostly aerial incursions from China.
So I think last year there was somewhere

421
00:31:34.240 --> 00:31:37.039
in the order of about a thousand
aerial incursions a little bit less than that

422
00:31:37.279 --> 00:31:41.119
in twenty nineteen. I would say
twenty twenty is about on track for that.

423
00:31:41.839 --> 00:31:45.640
So this issue of like really knowing
what's in the sky and what's going

424
00:31:45.640 --> 00:31:49.319
on is not just a fun kind
of like UFO thing, it's a survival

425
00:31:49.359 --> 00:31:53.839
imperative and the issue has come up
several times at very high level. So

426
00:31:53.920 --> 00:32:00.000
interestingly, in two thousand and seven
and twenty fifteen, the parliament in Japan,

427
00:32:00.079 --> 00:32:04.480
the Diet, actually formally raised this
question of what is the UFO policy,

428
00:32:04.759 --> 00:32:07.599
you know, as Japan ever encountered
UFOs, and both times someone at

429
00:32:07.599 --> 00:32:12.519
a ministerial level, so for us, like a cabinet level official actually had

430
00:32:12.559 --> 00:32:15.920
to answer this question. And yes, the answer was sort of strange.

431
00:32:15.920 --> 00:32:20.880
It was, no, we haven't
experienced any. But in the two thousand

432
00:32:20.880 --> 00:32:22.640
and seven case they also said there
were no grounds to dismiss it either,

433
00:32:22.839 --> 00:32:28.119
so the door was kind of left
open. And then I think in subsequent

434
00:32:28.400 --> 00:32:31.519
years it's become a little bit more
of no, there hasn't been, you

435
00:32:31.519 --> 00:32:37.960
know, any particular UAP or UFO
encounter, but you know, but the

436
00:32:37.000 --> 00:32:40.799
government is looking at it. And
then recently what changed was the Minister of

437
00:32:40.799 --> 00:32:46.559
Defense Kono in twenty twenty essentially pointed
to the Pentagon video releases and said,

438
00:32:46.960 --> 00:32:50.960
you know, he actually even said, I personally don't believe in UFOs,

439
00:32:50.960 --> 00:32:53.920
but the DD has released this video, so I'm paraphrasing now, but I'd

440
00:32:53.960 --> 00:32:57.720
like to talk to them and understand
what they make of it, what the

441
00:32:58.079 --> 00:33:01.480
analysis is. And from there the
question turned to just what the heck do

442
00:33:01.519 --> 00:33:07.319
you do if you encounter UFO because
the normal protocols would be, you know,

443
00:33:07.359 --> 00:33:09.240
if there's something coming into your airspace, which literally this is almost a

444
00:33:09.359 --> 00:33:15.000
daily occurrence that an aircraft aggressively flies
into their airspace, you know, you

445
00:33:15.000 --> 00:33:17.799
you call it on radio, and
then there's an escalation of things. You

446
00:33:17.799 --> 00:33:21.480
know, you may shoot tracer rounds
at it or whatever and try to force

447
00:33:21.519 --> 00:33:23.480
it to land. Well should you
do that with the UFO? And it

448
00:33:23.519 --> 00:33:29.000
sounds like a sort of silly question, but that that has become precisely you

449
00:33:29.039 --> 00:33:31.759
know, the issue, and so
yeah, a few weeks ago, I

450
00:33:31.759 --> 00:33:37.480
mean rather famously now it got to
the point where Minister Kono actually spoke to

451
00:33:37.720 --> 00:33:42.599
Secretary of Defense esper In Guam on
this question. And we don't quite know

452
00:33:42.680 --> 00:33:45.559
exactly what the nature of that conversation
was. But it seems that the outcome

453
00:33:45.559 --> 00:33:51.200
in Japan is a new policy to
you know, sort of photograph take as

454
00:33:51.200 --> 00:33:55.279
many records as possible, sort of
similar in similarly mirroring the UAPTF in some

455
00:33:55.359 --> 00:34:01.279
respects. So, yeah, it's
an incredibly strange story in terms of trying

456
00:34:01.279 --> 00:34:05.960
to understand where does this interest come
from, you know, where where is

457
00:34:06.000 --> 00:34:10.159
it all going. But it's been
really really fascinating to watch MM and it

458
00:34:10.280 --> 00:34:15.199
makes sense that they would want to
partner with the United States, at least

459
00:34:15.360 --> 00:34:21.239
in the conversation on the military side, which we've talked quite a bit about,

460
00:34:21.400 --> 00:34:29.119
which is to identify technologies and you
know that are emerging technologies that are

461
00:34:29.199 --> 00:34:35.599
being used like drones for these incursions, and no doubt they would want some

462
00:34:35.679 --> 00:34:38.840
help with that as much help that
as they can get, especially like you

463
00:34:38.880 --> 00:34:45.760
said here in their prequarious situation where
they're having these you know, rather heated

464
00:34:45.159 --> 00:34:51.360
kind of encounters with China. Yeah, I mean, Japan in general is

465
00:34:51.400 --> 00:34:54.519
in a sort of at a strategic
crossroads of trying to figure out, you

466
00:34:54.559 --> 00:34:58.800
know, do they try to keep
to the alliance with the United States,

467
00:34:58.840 --> 00:35:04.840
which has been fankly shaky in the
last few years, just with a general

468
00:35:04.960 --> 00:35:10.599
kind of retrenchment of just international interests. I guess in the United States,

469
00:35:10.639 --> 00:35:14.760
there's really no polite way to put
it. Do they try to go it

470
00:35:14.800 --> 00:35:16.840
on their own? There are massive
problems. It's important to remember too,

471
00:35:16.880 --> 00:35:22.159
that the Constitution of Japan is kind
of unique. In that Article nine says

472
00:35:22.239 --> 00:35:27.599
that Japan pretty much forever renounces war
as a means to settle international disputes,

473
00:35:28.400 --> 00:35:32.960
and that it can't constitutionally cannot develop
a military that's capable of conducting wars.

474
00:35:32.760 --> 00:35:37.719
It's intentionally supposed to be a self
defense only kind of construct. Now over

475
00:35:37.760 --> 00:35:45.000
the years that has changed, and
it's become murky as to whether or not

476
00:35:45.000 --> 00:35:49.880
there's really an adherence to that.
That's always a live, really serious domestic

477
00:35:50.239 --> 00:35:54.280
conversation in Japan about whether Japan should
maybe even someday change that and actually have

478
00:35:54.320 --> 00:35:59.639
a military again. So, you
know, did get back to the strategic

479
00:35:59.760 --> 00:36:02.199
question. If they're not going to
be with the United States and they're going

480
00:36:02.199 --> 00:36:06.199
to try to stand on their own, they need to like change the constitution,

481
00:36:06.480 --> 00:36:09.519
triple the defense budget. They need
to develop all these capabilities that frankly

482
00:36:09.559 --> 00:36:14.239
they really don't have. The third
option, which is alarming to consider,

483
00:36:14.280 --> 00:36:17.960
but stranger things have happened, would
be realigning with China, and in fact,

484
00:36:19.039 --> 00:36:23.119
there was actually some concern about that. After the United States withdrew from

485
00:36:23.440 --> 00:36:32.760
TPP the Transpacific Trade Agreement, Prime
Minister Abe at the time actually okayed participation

486
00:36:34.039 --> 00:36:38.199
in a large Chinese logistics program,
sort of signaling it was sort of a

487
00:36:38.239 --> 00:36:42.000
warning shot basically to say that,
you know, if the United States isn't

488
00:36:42.039 --> 00:36:46.199
serious about the alliance, well maybe
Japan will will shift the equation. So

489
00:36:46.880 --> 00:36:50.679
and all of that is going to
be in the mind of Esper and Cono

490
00:36:50.719 --> 00:36:53.480
in a conversation like that in Guam. They're going to be thinking primarily about

491
00:36:53.519 --> 00:36:57.559
the balance of power in East Asia, you know, not about UFOs.

492
00:36:58.320 --> 00:37:00.719
UFOs are going to be sort of
a side issue. And what I and

493
00:37:00.719 --> 00:37:04.119
I think many other people have been
trying to figure out is, well,

494
00:37:04.320 --> 00:37:07.480
why exactly is it that Kno knows
that you know, twice in recent history

495
00:37:07.559 --> 00:37:12.360
someone in his position has been asked
about UFOs in parliament, and so he

496
00:37:12.400 --> 00:37:15.199
ought to have an answer that could
be a reason why another answer might be

497
00:37:15.239 --> 00:37:20.679
as we talked about before, you
know, a good UFO program has to

498
00:37:20.719 --> 00:37:22.960
look at foreign capabilities. Maybe it's
a way to try to better understand China's

499
00:37:22.960 --> 00:37:27.480
capabilities. You know, we don't
know, but but there's some sort of

500
00:37:27.480 --> 00:37:31.679
a strategic calculus there. And I'm
just waiting for a good reporter out there

501
00:37:31.719 --> 00:37:36.519
to find out a little more about
what happened in that conversation. Mm hmm.

502
00:37:37.960 --> 00:37:42.840
Mcwest has come a people in the
chatter saying they noticed that you've gotten

503
00:37:43.039 --> 00:37:47.320
to some Twitter debates with him.
Mickwest is a I guess a former or

504
00:37:47.360 --> 00:37:53.840
maybe even current game He makes games, video games so successful there, and

505
00:37:53.880 --> 00:38:00.559
he's also kind of a skeptic and
that he's been doing his and I don't

506
00:38:00.559 --> 00:38:04.320
mean this to put him down,
but it's amateur, you know, kind

507
00:38:04.360 --> 00:38:09.760
of investigation into the Flear videos,
of which she's not convinced that they're that

508
00:38:10.400 --> 00:38:15.079
strange. I guess people are wondering, what do you make of your conversations

509
00:38:15.079 --> 00:38:20.559
with him? Well, it's a
great question, so believe it or not.

510
00:38:20.679 --> 00:38:23.199
Mick was probably one of the first
people I actually talked to, you

511
00:38:23.199 --> 00:38:27.599
know, on Skype when I was
investigating all of this stuff starting out,

512
00:38:27.920 --> 00:38:30.639
and we had a great conversation.
I personally like Mick. At times it

513
00:38:30.679 --> 00:38:36.400
may seem like our conversations are pretty
sharp elbowed, but I think the reason

514
00:38:36.440 --> 00:38:38.760
for that is we both kind of
come from an intellectual tradition that when you're

515
00:38:38.760 --> 00:38:43.719
debating, you need to be really
clear, and you're maybe less concerned about

516
00:38:43.760 --> 00:38:45.800
hurting the other person's feelings as you
are about kind of laying out what the

517
00:38:45.840 --> 00:38:51.199
logic is. So I think that
you know, mixed general approach of trying

518
00:38:51.199 --> 00:38:55.280
to take independent pieces of evidence and
to ask questions of them is fine.

519
00:38:55.320 --> 00:39:00.480
It's actually it's a useful way of
trying to interrogate, you know, the

520
00:39:00.559 --> 00:39:05.360
data that we have available to us. There are some places where I kind

521
00:39:05.400 --> 00:39:10.920
of depart from him in terms of
his general approach. So I think for

522
00:39:12.079 --> 00:39:16.159
my case, mixed analysis gets a
little bit shaky when he is trying to

523
00:39:16.280 --> 00:39:20.119
kind of say, well, what
if the object was smaller than it seemed

524
00:39:20.119 --> 00:39:22.559
to be, how would that impact
the perception of the pilots. Well,

525
00:39:22.639 --> 00:39:27.039
unless there's a particular reason to think
that was the case, some evidence that

526
00:39:27.119 --> 00:39:29.800
tells you that, then well what
if it was? You know, what

527
00:39:29.840 --> 00:39:32.199
if? Right? You can you
can sort of drown in what if questions

528
00:39:32.239 --> 00:39:36.599
and I have the same response to
the questions about you know, radar glitches

529
00:39:36.639 --> 00:39:38.679
and so on. I think we
can actually look into that question. You

530
00:39:38.679 --> 00:39:40.880
know, if there were glitches,
is there any evidence that there was,

531
00:39:40.920 --> 00:39:44.960
and there's you could build a theory
of the case of what the bug would

532
00:39:45.000 --> 00:39:47.360
look like, and kind of,
you know, try try to see if

533
00:39:47.400 --> 00:39:51.760
you can find anything to corroborate that. I think instead, what's happening is

534
00:39:51.760 --> 00:39:54.760
is Mick is he often describes it
this way. He's constructing a list of

535
00:39:54.800 --> 00:39:59.960
possible explanations, and he's trying and
he's evaluating how likely each one is,

536
00:40:00.800 --> 00:40:02.960
and clearly, in his mind,
something that's physics defying, you know,

537
00:40:04.400 --> 00:40:07.639
really unknown is at the absolute bottom
of the list. No debate with that.

538
00:40:08.000 --> 00:40:10.679
The problem though, is that when
you use that to kind of say,

539
00:40:10.719 --> 00:40:15.000
well, it couldn't possibly have been
this, and so therefore, you

540
00:40:15.039 --> 00:40:21.320
know, an incredibly unlikely series of
events is more likely than this infinitesimally likely

541
00:40:21.400 --> 00:40:23.880
exotic craft thing. So there's some
some issues in the logic there where I

542
00:40:23.880 --> 00:40:27.239
think you have to be a little
bit more attentive to the record itself.

543
00:40:27.320 --> 00:40:30.760
But anyway, I hope that answers
it. They're they're long discussions. I

544
00:40:30.800 --> 00:40:35.239
know they're exhausting sometimes to watch,
but but I will say this, they

545
00:40:35.360 --> 00:40:38.639
help it. I am sure you
do. I sometimes do too. But

546
00:40:39.079 --> 00:40:44.559
as as migraine inducing as they can
sometimes be, they help you to understand

547
00:40:44.599 --> 00:40:47.000
the record better. They help you
to understand exactly what the live questions are.

548
00:40:47.039 --> 00:40:52.199
I wrote my first FOYA based on
a conversation with Mick because it became

549
00:40:52.280 --> 00:40:54.400
very clear there was a, you
know, particular piece of evidence that if

550
00:40:54.440 --> 00:40:58.360
we had it, it would really
be important. So, you know,

551
00:40:58.440 --> 00:41:02.119
I think that I would recommend the
UFO community look at Mick as an ally

552
00:41:02.199 --> 00:41:07.480
in disguise, because he is going
to fight your arguments as hard as he

553
00:41:07.519 --> 00:41:10.960
possibly can, and it's it's going
to help you get to know the case

554
00:41:10.960 --> 00:41:15.599
better. So yeah, I agree
with that aspect of it. And in

555
00:41:15.639 --> 00:41:21.519
that sense that's where debate can become
helpful. But it also can waste your

556
00:41:21.559 --> 00:41:25.679
time, I think, and that's
one of the biggest problems that I think

557
00:41:25.719 --> 00:41:30.679
that unfortunately, And you know,
I think it's great that he gets the

558
00:41:30.719 --> 00:41:36.719
attention that I'm sure he's loving,
but I think it's completely wasting so many

559
00:41:36.760 --> 00:41:39.239
people's times. I mean, I
think he needs to create a list of

560
00:41:39.320 --> 00:41:45.480
questions for the experts. The problem
with when you're examining something that you have

561
00:41:45.599 --> 00:41:50.280
very low expertise on, you don't
know what you don't know, and it's

562
00:41:50.360 --> 00:41:57.239
especially frustrating when then you argue with
the experts against what their expert opinion when

563
00:41:57.960 --> 00:42:02.239
you don't have that expertise. That's
gets me really frustrating. Yeah, yeah,

564
00:42:02.239 --> 00:42:06.079
I can. I can definitely understand
that. I think those issues come

565
00:42:06.159 --> 00:42:08.800
up, you know, frankly,
epistemic humility. You know, admitting what

566
00:42:08.880 --> 00:42:14.039
we don't know is a big issue. I think for many researchers from different

567
00:42:14.119 --> 00:42:16.400
traditions. I can say that as
someone you know, coming from an academic

568
00:42:16.480 --> 00:42:22.360
discipline, you find that among you
know, researchers is not just journalists and

569
00:42:22.840 --> 00:42:27.039
people like Mick who are just really
passionately interested in this. So you do

570
00:42:27.119 --> 00:42:29.960
have to check that. Yeah,
I mean, my, my, my

571
00:42:30.079 --> 00:42:34.480
only real complaint with Mick is that
sometimes when I've asked him about the implications

572
00:42:34.480 --> 00:42:37.480
of his beliefs of well, what
does it tell us about our defense readiness

573
00:42:37.480 --> 00:42:43.960
for example, or the state of
you know, the military. If this

574
00:42:44.239 --> 00:42:46.960
very easily resolved thing has not been
resolved for sixteen years and it has turned

575
00:42:46.960 --> 00:42:52.960
into multimillion dollar programs, and that's
something that you know, typically when I

576
00:42:52.960 --> 00:42:55.079
bring that up, people will say
something like, well, you know,

577
00:42:55.119 --> 00:43:00.320
the defense world spends so much money. What's a few million dollars. Well,

578
00:43:00.719 --> 00:43:02.559
if you do the math, it's
many many school lunches. You know,

579
00:43:02.599 --> 00:43:06.360
money is money, right, So
just because it's a small percentage of

580
00:43:06.400 --> 00:43:08.599
the budget doesn't mean that those resources. If Mick is right, and this

581
00:43:08.719 --> 00:43:13.119
is all, you know, a
fool's errand that could have been used elsewhere.

582
00:43:13.480 --> 00:43:15.519
Because what Mick tends to do is
to say, no, I think

583
00:43:15.559 --> 00:43:17.800
the military is very smart and they
sort of understand all of these issues,

584
00:43:17.840 --> 00:43:22.199
and they in fact agree with me, and it's just kind of silly civilians.

585
00:43:22.239 --> 00:43:24.760
I think he said at one point
that are interjecting themselves. I just

586
00:43:24.800 --> 00:43:29.639
don't think there's any factual basis for
that. I think I think that you

587
00:43:29.719 --> 00:43:32.360
have to really kind of reconcile with
the implications of your views. So but

588
00:43:32.400 --> 00:43:35.480
I think what he's trying to do
is he's more interested in the debate,

589
00:43:35.519 --> 00:43:37.760
right, I mean, he wants
to, you know, to kind of

590
00:43:37.760 --> 00:43:40.599
get into the fray. Intellectually,
I think he's a little less concerned about

591
00:43:40.599 --> 00:43:43.519
the policy side of that, and
frankly that's fine. I mean, he

592
00:43:43.519 --> 00:43:45.360
doesn't need to be worried about that
in order to make, you know,

593
00:43:45.440 --> 00:43:49.800
some kind of a contribution. The
last thing maybe i'll say about Mick West

594
00:43:49.800 --> 00:43:52.840
and about kind of the exhausting aspect
of it is, you know, I

595
00:43:52.880 --> 00:43:58.320
started writing about this subject this year
in the late spring, so for me,

596
00:43:58.360 --> 00:44:00.079
a lot of this is new.
So you know, the benefit I

597
00:44:00.119 --> 00:44:02.800
get from the debate is it's a
way for me to learn the case.

598
00:44:04.039 --> 00:44:08.039
Really for some others who have gone
through countless iterations of this, particularly the

599
00:44:08.079 --> 00:44:10.960
military witnesses, I don't blame them. It is a waste of their time.

600
00:44:13.159 --> 00:44:15.199
But you know, from time to
time, you know, Mick and

601
00:44:15.199 --> 00:44:20.440
I do like to have our conversation
so speaking, Yeah, definitely, and

602
00:44:20.480 --> 00:44:23.719
you don't want to infer into a
debate with someone like without knowing your stuff

603
00:44:23.880 --> 00:44:28.880
or like you said, I agree, that's definitely a good way to get

604
00:44:28.960 --> 00:44:34.440
catch up to speed on definitely the
minutiae regarding yeah, all of this which

605
00:44:34.480 --> 00:44:37.519
is important to understand. Yeah,
it's an opportunity to learn. It really

606
00:44:37.519 --> 00:44:40.320
sincerely mean that it's an opportunity to
learn. And if you take it from

607
00:44:40.320 --> 00:44:44.320
that perspective, I think I think
it actually can be a useful thing.

608
00:44:44.360 --> 00:44:46.000
The key is just not, you
know, in any kind of debate,

609
00:44:46.079 --> 00:44:50.960
is getting really emotionally involved can be
you know, can be destructive as frustrating

610
00:44:50.960 --> 00:44:55.840
as all this stuff is. H
So, uh, the next I mean,

611
00:44:55.960 --> 00:45:00.159
where we move on, I think
is which interesting and which interesting is?

612
00:45:00.239 --> 00:45:02.840
You know, you're talking about how
he talked about the silly civilians that

613
00:45:02.920 --> 00:45:07.679
are kind of coming in, But
that's really not the focus of what's so

614
00:45:07.800 --> 00:45:14.559
interesting about what's going on because it
is a government military, uh sort of

615
00:45:14.679 --> 00:45:21.599
interaction that we are observing that we're
we're watching here with the Navy coming out

616
00:45:21.639 --> 00:45:23.559
and saying this is a real thing, that we're paying attention to, the

617
00:45:23.599 --> 00:45:30.239
Air Force saying essentially no comment,
the Senate getting involved in saying, hey,

618
00:45:30.639 --> 00:45:32.199
this is a real thing. Then
let us in on what the heck's

619
00:45:32.239 --> 00:45:37.320
going on here and create a central, you know, location for this information

620
00:45:37.400 --> 00:45:44.119
to be examined. All of which
and and it kind of that last point

621
00:45:44.679 --> 00:45:52.639
being a pretty uh, you know, important evolution of and to you know,

622
00:45:53.079 --> 00:45:59.519
just that feed alone in being able
to move past the stigma and to

623
00:45:59.719 --> 00:46:05.599
at least established an organization to look
at unknowns, even if you're looking at

624
00:46:05.599 --> 00:46:08.000
it from the perspective of kind of
what we've heard the Press Office kind of

625
00:46:08.679 --> 00:46:13.559
spin it as is that we're looking
at drones and other technologies. That's an

626
00:46:13.559 --> 00:46:17.519
important step. I mean, that's
a good thing to have happen. But

627
00:46:17.639 --> 00:46:22.400
the next step is the Knimmets cases. So you know, Nimets is a

628
00:46:22.400 --> 00:46:28.639
case where they're admitting that this is
an unidentified despite all of their best efforts

629
00:46:28.719 --> 00:46:35.960
and their analysis which we haven't seen
by their experts as to why they think

630
00:46:35.960 --> 00:46:38.960
those videos demonstrate, you know,
there's unidentified And I'm sure they take into

631
00:46:39.000 --> 00:46:46.320
account radar data and witness testimony and
other things like in that executive summary that

632
00:46:46.360 --> 00:46:52.719
we've seen, and we'll get to
that. But so where do we go

633
00:46:52.800 --> 00:46:59.360
from here? Is what happens?
I think to those unidentified those cases like

634
00:46:59.440 --> 00:47:01.519
the Knimts, where does that data
go? What's going to happen with that

635
00:47:01.679 --> 00:47:07.480
data? Really? I think the
only mention of what may happen. Roger

636
00:47:07.559 --> 00:47:12.280
Glassel essentially asked that of Susan Goff. I guess that's how you say it.

637
00:47:12.320 --> 00:47:19.079
But the DoD p IO and she
says it'll remain classifying essentially, and

638
00:47:19.159 --> 00:47:22.559
I think that's kind of the crux
of the issue really what it comes down

639
00:47:22.639 --> 00:47:27.360
to. And even in Phenomenon,
which I got to see a screener,

640
00:47:27.519 --> 00:47:30.639
great film by James Fox. I
can't wait for everybody to see. It's

641
00:47:30.639 --> 00:47:35.039
coming out October sixth, Chris Mellen
makes the point that you know, these

642
00:47:35.039 --> 00:47:37.719
are the interesting things, These are
what we want to look at. This

643
00:47:37.880 --> 00:47:42.440
is what really the message should be. Which is interesting to hear this from

644
00:47:42.559 --> 00:47:45.320
him is that he feels the most
important thing in all of this is that

645
00:47:46.079 --> 00:47:52.679
these unidentified are happening. We have
a true, genuine mystery here and that's

646
00:47:52.719 --> 00:47:58.639
the point. But that mystery,
where does it go? In other words,

647
00:47:58.679 --> 00:48:00.960
Okay, we've got this UAP group, they're going to look for potential

648
00:48:01.719 --> 00:48:07.760
threats, and but what happened to
the Nimitz cases? Yeah, that's a

649
00:48:08.119 --> 00:48:12.599
well boy, there's so many aspects
of that to look at, right of

650
00:48:12.760 --> 00:48:15.719
So what happens to a case like
nimics in terms of public awareness of it

651
00:48:15.760 --> 00:48:20.360
is always going to be problematic because
I mean, even today there are many

652
00:48:20.360 --> 00:48:23.880
people that assert that you know,
there's there's data sets produced by radar and

653
00:48:23.920 --> 00:48:28.039
other kinds of instruments, that would
back up, you know, witnesses,

654
00:48:28.039 --> 00:48:32.000
but we don't have access to them. We're basically it's almost impossible to get

655
00:48:32.039 --> 00:48:36.719
access to those data sets because they
reveal, you know, key things about

656
00:48:36.760 --> 00:48:39.599
our collections capabilities, even though this
event happened a long time ago. So

657
00:48:40.239 --> 00:48:43.400
those kinds of limits are always going
to be there, right, So we

658
00:48:43.400 --> 00:48:45.320
shouldn't expect that we're going to get
the you know, the radar data or

659
00:48:45.679 --> 00:48:50.480
something of that nature. But at
the same time, I think that there

660
00:48:50.519 --> 00:48:53.400
are ways to make productions of data
that are responsible but that are also helpful.

661
00:48:53.719 --> 00:48:55.480
So, for example, at the
moment, I don't think any of

662
00:48:55.599 --> 00:49:00.039
us know how many incidents have there
been, how many of these cases have

663
00:49:00.159 --> 00:49:05.960
even been examined. We don't have
a kind of a statistical account that you

664
00:49:06.039 --> 00:49:07.920
very easily could do. You could
write up a report that would have tables

665
00:49:07.960 --> 00:49:12.760
that would tell you absolutely nothing about
our radar capabilities or anything else, or

666
00:49:12.760 --> 00:49:15.599
even where these things happened, but
it would least give us a sense of

667
00:49:15.639 --> 00:49:17.360
the order of magnitude. You know, are we talking about something that happens

668
00:49:17.360 --> 00:49:21.280
once a year, once every five
years, or once a month. It'd

669
00:49:21.320 --> 00:49:24.480
be really helpful to know that are
we seeing an increase in the number of

670
00:49:24.519 --> 00:49:28.239
these things or a decrease or is
it flat? We don't know any of

671
00:49:28.280 --> 00:49:30.840
that right now, so I think
from a policy perspective, I mean,

672
00:49:30.880 --> 00:49:36.199
we don't have that basic information that
would tell us how significant of an issue

673
00:49:36.360 --> 00:49:38.519
is this really? Just how much
is it happening? And I think that

674
00:49:38.519 --> 00:49:43.239
those sorts of things could actually very
easily be addressed in a way that's completely

675
00:49:43.320 --> 00:49:45.679
respectful of security concerns. So to
me, that would be the first step,

676
00:49:45.960 --> 00:49:49.440
and then I think from there we
just have to see what the data

677
00:49:49.480 --> 00:49:52.639
actually is. And you know,
if we are seeing a lot of incidents

678
00:49:52.639 --> 00:49:57.480
and they're increasing and you know,
the military is struggling to make sense of

679
00:49:57.480 --> 00:50:00.760
them. While that might be an
argument that the scientific community, the wider

680
00:50:00.800 --> 00:50:04.000
scientific community needs to be more involved
in this issue than they have been.

681
00:50:04.639 --> 00:50:07.719
So we'll have to proceed carefully bit
by bit, But I don't think anyone

682
00:50:07.760 --> 00:50:10.760
should be looking for you know,
we're gonna get the high resolution videos in

683
00:50:10.800 --> 00:50:15.320
the radar anytime soon. I think
we've got to to start a little bit

684
00:50:15.320 --> 00:50:20.199
more slowly. But the good news
is is that I think it's very possible

685
00:50:20.199 --> 00:50:25.360
to make those steps. MM hmm. Now you know, this document that

686
00:50:25.400 --> 00:50:30.679
we you know, we're kind of
tweeting about recently and we've been talking about

687
00:50:30.199 --> 00:50:35.000
that was leaked by George Knapp doesn't
seem to get a whole lot of attention.

688
00:50:35.079 --> 00:50:37.199
When it came out, I immediately
jumped on it and wrote a couple

689
00:50:37.199 --> 00:50:43.400
of articles about it because I thought
it was extremely important and weird, and

690
00:50:43.639 --> 00:50:52.280
that we have this alleged summary,
you know, of the Knimit situation that

691
00:50:52.440 --> 00:50:57.079
was leaked by George Knapp. He
didn't give us much except to say that

692
00:50:57.159 --> 00:51:04.000
it was written by the military for
the military. Essentially, everyone assumed it

693
00:51:04.079 --> 00:51:07.079
was created by Bass and I could
understand that because I did too. When

694
00:51:07.079 --> 00:51:13.159
you read it, it reads more
like a non military person wrote it,

695
00:51:13.639 --> 00:51:19.559
and some of the speculation in it
is pretty astounding. It we should probably

696
00:51:19.559 --> 00:51:22.639
explain that aside from the content of
the document, it's the formatting of it

697
00:51:22.679 --> 00:51:25.159
too. So the formatting doesn't it
doesn't match any kind of of a formal

698
00:51:25.400 --> 00:51:31.079
US government product. And yes,
there's there's use of particular acronyms that don't

699
00:51:31.079 --> 00:51:35.920
appear, you know, in the
Pentagon Dictionary and so on, which normally

700
00:51:36.000 --> 00:51:37.440
you know in a formal product.
They are quite careful to make sure that

701
00:51:37.480 --> 00:51:40.840
the vocabulary, you know, matches
and all that. So before you even

702
00:51:40.880 --> 00:51:45.320
get into the rather incredible account that
you're reading, just the way the document

703
00:51:45.360 --> 00:51:49.679
looks tells you this isn't a regular, you know, military document. Mm

704
00:51:49.719 --> 00:51:54.559
hmm. But Loui Alessandro at least
is confirmed to me that it was military,

705
00:51:54.880 --> 00:51:59.920
written by the military for the military. Uh. And he gave me

706
00:52:00.119 --> 00:52:05.079
the perception that it definitely it was
not Bass, you know, I asked

707
00:52:05.119 --> 00:52:07.960
Leslie Kane. She told me,
I'm not sure who wrote it, but

708
00:52:07.119 --> 00:52:12.559
she saw it was part of the
information she saw when she helped write the

709
00:52:12.559 --> 00:52:15.960
New York Times article. And then
later she made a comment that it was

710
00:52:16.000 --> 00:52:21.679
part of the Bass files, so
it was something they had just not necessarily

711
00:52:21.760 --> 00:52:25.760
something they wrote. And then Tim
McMillan, another investigator who's got some incredible

712
00:52:25.840 --> 00:52:31.079
sources, says he's been told it
wasn't It wasn't an OENI document, So

713
00:52:31.119 --> 00:52:35.760
it was written by intelligence, which
it does read to me more like an

714
00:52:35.760 --> 00:52:42.760
intelligence document than the military document.
But what it gives us is some interesting

715
00:52:43.000 --> 00:52:49.199
insight into I guess the thought process
of whoever wrote it, whether that be

716
00:52:49.320 --> 00:52:54.480
intelligence, that you know, they
were speculating along the lines of that,

717
00:52:54.880 --> 00:53:00.199
you know, perhaps this object came
out of a larger object that was out

718
00:53:00.239 --> 00:53:05.880
of the water or under the water. I mean, some really strange,

719
00:53:06.000 --> 00:53:12.960
kind of really out there kind of
of possibilities that they were considering. I

720
00:53:13.000 --> 00:53:17.280
mean, it's an interesting document,
it is, and as one I mean,

721
00:53:17.639 --> 00:53:20.960
not to bring mack up again,
but one that I'm very familiar with

722
00:53:21.039 --> 00:53:24.079
because when you start to talk about
the details of what happened, it's one

723
00:53:24.079 --> 00:53:28.280
of the few documents that we have
where you can actually go through it and

724
00:53:28.360 --> 00:53:34.239
kind of understand blow by blow and
see a more kind of raw account from

725
00:53:34.320 --> 00:53:37.719
the pilots. You know, exactly
what they saw and when and so on.

726
00:53:37.800 --> 00:53:42.679
And also it does a nice job
of describing some of the different technological

727
00:53:42.679 --> 00:53:45.800
platforms that were involved, so the
different radar systems and things like that.

728
00:53:45.199 --> 00:53:49.320
So that's how I'm familiar with.
It is just one of the better accounts

729
00:53:49.320 --> 00:53:52.880
that we have. So I think
two other things maybe to mention about it

730
00:53:52.920 --> 00:53:57.159
is that it seemed it was written
about five years after the event as far

731
00:53:57.199 --> 00:54:00.440
as we know, I think around
two thousand and nine. And yes,

732
00:54:00.440 --> 00:54:04.400
as Tim Tim McMillan said, in
his best understanding is that it was written

733
00:54:04.440 --> 00:54:07.519
by an o NI analyst, but
an unofficial capacity, so that kind of

734
00:54:07.519 --> 00:54:13.480
explains why it is not an official
looking document. However, it was apparently

735
00:54:13.519 --> 00:54:19.719
some sort of a preliminary attempt to
try to understand understand this incident. But

736
00:54:19.800 --> 00:54:22.559
yeah, I mean, it's it's
remarkable because it does assess that these were

737
00:54:22.559 --> 00:54:27.159
physically real objects, you know,
they were not optical illusions or hologram systems

738
00:54:27.280 --> 00:54:31.239
or advanced countermeasures or many of the
other things that come up. And then

739
00:54:31.239 --> 00:54:35.320
as you say, yes, it
makes some pretty interesting claims about the relationship

740
00:54:35.320 --> 00:54:37.119
between some of the things in the
water and the things that we're flying.

741
00:54:38.519 --> 00:54:43.079
Yeah, it's it's it's a it's
a it's a pretty incredible document to me.

742
00:54:43.159 --> 00:54:49.400
What I find interesting is that that
that apparently this process started with such

743
00:54:49.400 --> 00:54:53.400
an unofficial document that that was ever
involved in the process in the first place,

744
00:54:54.159 --> 00:54:57.719
and that may speak to the kind
of condition that the you know,

745
00:54:57.760 --> 00:55:00.559
the UA p u FO program was
at the time, that there really wasn't

746
00:55:00.559 --> 00:55:04.440
a well funded effort to really,
you know, formally study this, but

747
00:55:04.519 --> 00:55:07.280
rather someone kind of did their best
to put together an analysis and kind of

748
00:55:07.280 --> 00:55:13.079
make the case that it was important
that that itself is pretty striking to me.

749
00:55:14.159 --> 00:55:17.880
Yeah, so there is somebody who's
Kevin Childress, who I know has

750
00:55:17.880 --> 00:55:22.760
been around the UFO community for a
very long time. He says he worked

751
00:55:22.760 --> 00:55:28.239
as a DOE Special Agent Department of
Energy, and he said this is he's

752
00:55:28.280 --> 00:55:31.280
not surprised by this, the way
the document looks at all. He says,

753
00:55:31.400 --> 00:55:37.880
it's a standard deductive prose format used
for investigation reports. Yeah, it

754
00:55:37.960 --> 00:55:40.800
absolutely is. And I mean when
I look at it, you see you

755
00:55:40.800 --> 00:55:45.199
know it's got it's got kind of
an executive summary type format where you've got

756
00:55:45.239 --> 00:55:47.519
key assessments on the front page.
I mean, that's very much in line

757
00:55:47.559 --> 00:55:52.679
with what an intelligence product does you
know, into your comment before about speculation,

758
00:55:52.800 --> 00:55:55.679
well, you know, oftentimes intelligence
requires looking at things that you can't

759
00:55:55.760 --> 00:56:00.039
draw definitive conclusions, but nonetheless you
have to be able to at least make

760
00:56:00.119 --> 00:56:05.880
some working assumptions about what's going on. So to me, it was very

761
00:56:05.960 --> 00:56:07.239
much in keeping with that. It's
just the first question was, well,

762
00:56:07.280 --> 00:56:10.039
it's not formal, and we knew
that Bass was involved, so it's sort

763
00:56:10.039 --> 00:56:16.280
of plausible that perhaps a Basque contractor
had written the document originally. But yeah,

764
00:56:16.280 --> 00:56:20.599
I mean this is an example where
the online discussion actually when I think

765
00:56:20.639 --> 00:56:23.480
several researchers pulled their insights, it
seems the picture has shifted a bit now

766
00:56:23.519 --> 00:56:30.880
that it's more definitively you know,
an O and I product. The informality

767
00:56:30.039 --> 00:56:35.400
of it is really interesting too,
because I think the you know, if

768
00:56:35.400 --> 00:56:43.119
you look at the narrative and what
happened with Nimtz, it was informal,

769
00:56:43.239 --> 00:56:51.199
the entire thing was, and it
kind of speaks to what Colonel John Alexander,

770
00:56:51.639 --> 00:56:58.639
who as an insider very Intelligence had
his own informal investigation regarding UFOs and

771
00:56:58.719 --> 00:57:07.119
UFO cover reps. Conclusion was that
government or military is extremely inept and unable

772
00:57:07.280 --> 00:57:13.920
to deal with this issue. And
he's just kind of claimed that we've bungled

773
00:57:13.920 --> 00:57:19.320
it and we ignore it. And
if you examine the KNIMT situation, given

774
00:57:19.360 --> 00:57:24.280
that document or witness testimony, that's
kind of what we have here. Kevin

775
00:57:24.400 --> 00:57:30.320
Day, a radar operator in charge
supervisor, you know, is seeing these

776
00:57:30.360 --> 00:57:36.400
anomalies for several days, and only
after several days finally he says, can

777
00:57:36.440 --> 00:57:38.960
I get somebody to go take a
look at these? They say, okay,

778
00:57:39.400 --> 00:57:44.559
and he's able to scramble, you
know, get Fravor and the rest

779
00:57:44.599 --> 00:57:50.320
of the guys scrambled, and they
have the tic tac situation occur. Fraverer

780
00:57:50.400 --> 00:57:53.360
gets back, another guy Underwood,
I guess, says I'm gonna go get

781
00:57:53.400 --> 00:57:57.039
that thing on camera, and they're
like, yeah, right, he does.

782
00:57:59.320 --> 00:58:04.559
And then this documents written up in
an informal matter, and I think

783
00:58:04.599 --> 00:58:08.119
that, you know, Brian Bender
with Political has been making the argument this

784
00:58:08.679 --> 00:58:15.639
whole a tip program is not as
big as you guys think. It's very

785
00:58:15.679 --> 00:58:20.920
it was, and he's right,
this is something foisted upon the Pentagon by

786
00:58:20.960 --> 00:58:24.119
Harry Reid. It's not something they
wanted to do on themselves. So all

787
00:58:24.159 --> 00:58:30.280
of this is almost informal, and
in my experience looking at this topic,

788
00:58:30.639 --> 00:58:34.280
there's a history of that. In
fact, all the Bigelow group, Eric

789
00:58:34.400 --> 00:58:38.719
Davis how put off, they've all
been trying to get the government in there

790
00:58:39.079 --> 00:58:44.199
to look at these things more seriously, and in order to do that,

791
00:58:44.360 --> 00:58:50.000
have a lot of these informal kind
of where interested parties in the government are

792
00:58:50.039 --> 00:58:55.400
doing this, taking it upon themselves
to really look into these things as much

793
00:58:55.400 --> 00:59:00.079
as they can, but not part
of some kind of formal organ manner.

794
00:59:00.760 --> 00:59:07.039
And you know, to me,
that's pretty insightful into how the military has

795
00:59:07.079 --> 00:59:09.159
been dealing with all of this.
Yeah, and you know, it sounds

796
00:59:09.159 --> 00:59:14.360
strange because I think we tend to
have this idea of American military power.

797
00:59:14.400 --> 00:59:17.119
Intelligence power is absolute, absolute,
you know, it's the best funded military

798
00:59:17.119 --> 00:59:21.599
in the world, and it has
exquisite capabilities to be sure it does.

799
00:59:21.880 --> 00:59:24.519
However, it gets a lot of
things wrong, you know, or it

800
00:59:24.519 --> 00:59:28.280
fails to pay attention to important things. I mean, we have had,

801
00:59:28.480 --> 00:59:32.440
you know, significant intelligence failures in
regular sorts of issues. So it's not

802
00:59:32.559 --> 00:59:37.159
at all surprising that in something strange
and something that could be frankly harmful to

803
00:59:37.199 --> 00:59:42.159
someone's career, Yeah, that there
would be a lack of attention to it.

804
00:59:42.719 --> 00:59:45.719
And I agree that there are a
lot of troubling signs that that has

805
00:59:45.719 --> 00:59:47.679
been the case, that this has
never been really handled all that formally,

806
00:59:47.679 --> 00:59:51.519
at least as far as we've been
able to see. And that brings up

807
00:59:51.519 --> 00:59:53.679
the question we were talking about earlier, of the pressure and the kind of

808
00:59:53.719 --> 00:59:58.639
questions that need to be raised.
So it's not me saying that there's an

809
00:59:58.679 --> 01:00:02.400
issue of strategic surprise. It was
Depententon spokesperson saying, this whole program is

810
01:00:02.440 --> 01:00:07.480
designed to prevent strategic surprise. Okay, if we're talking about strategic survive,

811
01:00:07.559 --> 01:00:14.159
we're talking about an existential threat potentially
from a military perspective. So it just

812
01:00:14.320 --> 01:00:19.239
certainly does not follow that the way
that you treat a potential existential matter is

813
01:00:19.239 --> 01:00:22.039
with a couple of intelligence people,
and you know, it has no real

814
01:00:22.079 --> 01:00:28.039
clear reporting mechanism and no real strategy, no real metrics that It's just not

815
01:00:28.079 --> 01:00:30.960
how you handle a matter like that. And I think that that's something that

816
01:00:31.039 --> 01:00:34.719
we have to keep in mind as
we're going forward, is keep the perspective

817
01:00:34.760 --> 01:00:37.760
on this of if this really is
something truly unknown, it's it's actually important

818
01:00:37.800 --> 01:00:40.159
to get to the bottom of it. It's not just a fun kind of

819
01:00:40.199 --> 01:00:45.440
navel gazing thing, and the policy
has to be, you know, commensurately

820
01:00:45.719 --> 01:00:50.039
serious, and hopefully we'll see that. I mean, it seems like what's

821
01:00:50.039 --> 01:00:53.159
happening now is at least an attempt
to do that, and it remains to

822
01:00:53.159 --> 01:00:55.920
be seen, you know, how
robust and how long lived that attempt's going

823
01:00:55.960 --> 01:00:59.719
to be. But I think a
lot of that on us, and I

824
01:00:59.760 --> 01:01:02.840
think we've talked about this before,
but I think this is why this has

825
01:01:02.880 --> 01:01:07.559
gotten so far, and I do
want to speak to this. Kevin Childress

826
01:01:07.599 --> 01:01:12.320
to the guy who worked with DOE, says, you would only be allowed

827
01:01:12.320 --> 01:01:15.960
to investigate if it's in the scope
of your responsibility. Agents don't have free

828
01:01:15.960 --> 01:01:22.599
reign to investigate whatever they want.
True, however, Elizondo said, you

829
01:01:22.599 --> 01:01:27.880
know, it was something he was
given permission to look at. Not only

830
01:01:27.920 --> 01:01:30.400
that when it comes to O and
I intelligence, just to the point you

831
01:01:30.639 --> 01:01:36.440
just made, that would justify their
involvement in that they're examining, you know,

832
01:01:36.840 --> 01:01:44.000
a potential threat an unidentified object.
The concern was that there weren't mechanisms

833
01:01:44.000 --> 01:01:49.119
in place where Kevin Day shouldn't have
to after day five or six, you

834
01:01:49.159 --> 01:01:52.280
know, say hey, can we
scramble something to look at this. There

835
01:01:52.280 --> 01:01:55.239
should have been procedures in place at
day one. We have this unknown we

836
01:01:55.320 --> 01:01:59.559
need to check these out. Yeah. Well, and getting back to the

837
01:01:59.719 --> 01:02:01.719
to the Japanese question, which is, you know, they're regularly dealing with

838
01:02:01.840 --> 01:02:06.159
aircraft trying to come into their territory, and they have those protocols about how

839
01:02:06.159 --> 01:02:07.960
they respond to get on the radio, and eventually, if it goes bad

840
01:02:08.079 --> 01:02:14.079
enough long enough, you start shooting
at it. So it raises the question

841
01:02:14.159 --> 01:02:17.159
of, well, what should the
rules of engagement ben for Commander Fraber in

842
01:02:17.199 --> 01:02:21.159
that situation. I mean, he
was in a situation where he was met

843
01:02:21.199 --> 01:02:23.199
with something he could not identify,
and he, you know, under his

844
01:02:23.239 --> 01:02:25.719
own wherewithal, made the decision to
try to get a better look at it.

845
01:02:27.159 --> 01:02:29.920
But you know, maybe there ought
to be some parameters on what you

846
01:02:29.920 --> 01:02:31.960
should do. I mean, maybe
you shouldn't maneuver too violently, or maybe

847
01:02:32.000 --> 01:02:36.000
you shouldn't you know, do anything
that may be threatening. I mean,

848
01:02:36.360 --> 01:02:39.280
it sounds a little funny discussing it, but I mean apparently it's a live

849
01:02:39.360 --> 01:02:44.599
question because it happened, you know, and these are all issues that have

850
01:02:44.679 --> 01:02:47.760
to be worked out. And one
of my really growing concerns the longer that

851
01:02:47.800 --> 01:02:52.639
I've looked at this is that the
taboo and the stigma interferes with those conversations,

852
01:02:52.679 --> 01:02:57.400
that it just sort of shuts down
the thinking because everyone gets stuck at

853
01:02:57.400 --> 01:03:00.760
the level of well is this real, is it alien, or is you

854
01:03:00.760 --> 01:03:06.199
know whatever, and that makes you
gloss over a bunch of really important technical

855
01:03:06.280 --> 01:03:09.840
questions about what what do you do
when you're confronted with that situation? Because

856
01:03:09.880 --> 01:03:13.320
there are you know, there's a
lot of details you have to work through,

857
01:03:13.320 --> 01:03:15.400
and if you're always stuck at is
it aliens, you're never going to

858
01:03:15.400 --> 01:03:20.639
to kind of get to those.
So I'm hoping the longer this goes,

859
01:03:20.679 --> 01:03:23.559
too, the more the community too
is looking at things like drones and becoming

860
01:03:23.559 --> 01:03:25.800
more familiar with it. We're kind
of, I think, all getting an

861
01:03:25.920 --> 01:03:30.440
education in this defense space and realizing, well, it's not as easy as

862
01:03:30.480 --> 01:03:34.760
just aliens, you know, or
whatever, right because for instance, you

863
01:03:34.760 --> 01:03:38.360
know this situation, it could be
drones, and I would guess that is

864
01:03:38.400 --> 01:03:42.440
a lot of the thinking of like
the Senate Intelligence Committee and some of the

865
01:03:42.480 --> 01:03:46.320
other higher ups. They're thinking,
Okay, what if those were weaponized drones

866
01:03:46.400 --> 01:03:52.400
that they were encountering and nimit,
then we totally bungled that situation. We

867
01:03:52.440 --> 01:03:57.480
would we left ourselves open to damage. And of course now we have just

868
01:03:57.519 --> 01:04:01.039
in the last few days, I
ran flying a drone over the limits and

869
01:04:01.119 --> 01:04:09.159
getting pictures of it. So what
if that drone was weaponized? I think,

870
01:04:09.599 --> 01:04:13.159
you know, we've considered drones to
be toys for so long, and

871
01:04:13.239 --> 01:04:18.159
even these incursions over these nuclear facilities, we've considered them to be toys that

872
01:04:18.320 --> 01:04:27.199
now people this effort is really pushing
people towards considering, Hey, we need

873
01:04:27.239 --> 01:04:30.840
to take these all seriously. Yeah, you got a bad time to have

874
01:04:30.840 --> 01:04:34.840
a UFO. Stigma or taboo is
when a weird drone is flying over a

875
01:04:34.920 --> 01:04:39.079
nuclear power plant and a guard says, I don't want to report it or

876
01:04:39.079 --> 01:04:41.360
I don't want to deal with it
because I'm going to seem like I'm talking

877
01:04:41.400 --> 01:04:45.000
about UFOs because it's just in twenty
twenty, you know, we're we're living

878
01:04:45.000 --> 01:04:48.159
in a different world where that could
actually be something quite serious that needs to

879
01:04:48.159 --> 01:04:51.199
be dealt with. And I mean, I think there's there's plenty of evidence

880
01:04:51.199 --> 01:04:55.719
that those issues have been you know, have been looked at, but I'm

881
01:04:55.760 --> 01:04:59.440
not sure they've gone as far as
perhaps they could have, given the taboo.

882
01:04:59.440 --> 01:05:01.880
And it's an extra dreamely and important, important stream of reporting about that

883
01:05:01.880 --> 01:05:08.039
that I think is actually really underappreciated. Yeah. So, and and I

884
01:05:08.039 --> 01:05:11.360
guess that kind of comes around too, is the future of this Where is

885
01:05:11.360 --> 01:05:15.119
this headed? And I guess you
know that'll that's where we'll end up here.

886
01:05:15.320 --> 01:05:19.199
UH will end it because I would
like your opinion and uh advice for

887
01:05:19.320 --> 01:05:24.679
people which is that, you know, that's the big hole. That is

888
01:05:24.719 --> 01:05:29.440
the big hole that the military keeps
looking at that no doubts and intelligence takes

889
01:05:29.440 --> 01:05:33.360
seriously. The big hole is are
we using this? Is this taboo keeping

890
01:05:33.440 --> 01:05:39.079
us from taking a serious look at
UA, at drones and other potential technologies

891
01:05:39.320 --> 01:05:42.960
we're not aware of, and are
we leaving ourselves open? I think that's

892
01:05:42.960 --> 01:05:46.519
what sold this UAP task for us
and and all of this to happen.

893
01:05:47.079 --> 01:05:53.159
The big question is if it does
happen, and if they do fill that

894
01:05:53.239 --> 01:05:56.440
hole, thank goodness, because we're
all going to be safer for that.

895
01:05:57.960 --> 01:06:01.639
Our military people will all be safer
for that. But where does it go

896
01:06:01.719 --> 01:06:09.320
from here? What if we have
an interest in some transparent parency regarding the

897
01:06:09.360 --> 01:06:14.000
research of real unidentified Are those going
to go in a trash bin? Or

898
01:06:14.039 --> 01:06:17.199
what's going to happen to those who's
going to look at them? You know,

899
01:06:17.920 --> 01:06:21.000
where do we go from here?
Especially if we are interested in these

900
01:06:21.039 --> 01:06:28.599
true unknowns that could pose and Chris
Mellen makes this point in Phenomena could pose

901
01:06:28.719 --> 01:06:31.840
the giant scientific breakthrough. Yeah,
I mean that's the thing is that if

902
01:06:31.880 --> 01:06:35.840
there really is something you know,
truly exotic and usual going on here,

903
01:06:35.880 --> 01:06:40.880
it's it's the biggest story you know. Ever, essentially it's it's incredibly important.

904
01:06:41.360 --> 01:06:43.679
So you know, at the at
a minimum, there would be a

905
01:06:43.679 --> 01:06:47.000
tremendous kind of opportunity cost for not
pursuing something so remarkable if there's reason to

906
01:06:47.000 --> 01:06:50.159
think that it's it's really there and
it's going on. So I think there's

907
01:06:50.159 --> 01:06:53.599
a couple of different answers. I
think. I think at one level that's

908
01:06:53.599 --> 01:06:57.280
what we talked about earlier in terms
of setting up pressure for there to be

909
01:06:57.400 --> 01:07:00.639
reports that are maybe conservative in the
information that they give out that many people

910
01:07:00.679 --> 01:07:03.320
in the community would like to see
pictures and so on. Instead you're going

911
01:07:03.360 --> 01:07:08.360
to get statistical tables. But I
can tell you that kind of coming from

912
01:07:08.360 --> 01:07:12.239
the scientific community in a little bit
more kind of policy circles that will actually

913
01:07:12.280 --> 01:07:15.000
do more in a way because it
will give you a picture that you can

914
01:07:15.039 --> 01:07:18.960
then point to and say, this
is happening a a certain amount of regularity

915
01:07:19.119 --> 01:07:23.400
with a certain sort of trend.
These are true unknowns, and we can

916
01:07:23.440 --> 01:07:28.400
kind of quantify a little bit of
just what the issue actually is. And

917
01:07:28.440 --> 01:07:30.400
then also it makes it easier to
make the argument of well, if the

918
01:07:30.440 --> 01:07:33.800
military hasn't solved a case like this
in sixteen years, what's to make us

919
01:07:33.800 --> 01:07:36.960
think they're going to solve it in
the next three or five. Something isn't

920
01:07:38.000 --> 01:07:41.800
happening, and that something might be, for example, a relationship with a

921
01:07:41.840 --> 01:07:45.960
broader scientific community. It kind of
gives an inroad to start making those arguments

922
01:07:45.960 --> 01:07:48.079
of hey, if you want to
solve this, and really you must solve

923
01:07:48.119 --> 01:07:51.880
it. Given the strategic environment that
we're in, you're going to need to

924
01:07:51.920 --> 01:07:55.800
bring in more people, and yes, it's going to be difficult for you

925
01:07:55.840 --> 01:08:00.280
to do that, but there's ways
to go about it. So that's one

926
01:08:00.400 --> 01:08:03.360
is this is becoming, you know, it seems an international issue in the

927
01:08:03.400 --> 01:08:08.719
sense that at least the Japanese are
looking at it. We've heard some comments

928
01:08:08.760 --> 01:08:12.320
from from Muel Zondo, you know, mostly on social media, but nonetheless

929
01:08:12.320 --> 01:08:16.199
saying that an international strategy is something
that TTSA is considering. It remains to

930
01:08:16.199 --> 01:08:19.920
be seen exactly what that would look
like. But if we start to head

931
01:08:19.920 --> 01:08:24.560
into a world where there's a little
bit more cooperation on these issues, and

932
01:08:24.560 --> 01:08:29.399
that's probably a whole other hour or
two that we could do, that has

933
01:08:29.439 --> 01:08:33.279
a potential too for shifting the dynamic
because it no longer becomes just an American

934
01:08:33.319 --> 01:08:38.680
security issue, but it becomes kind
of a broader issue. So I think

935
01:08:38.720 --> 01:08:42.800
there's you know, there's multiple moving
pieces here. And again, just for

936
01:08:42.880 --> 01:08:45.560
context, it's like, we're,
what thirty nine days from the election,

937
01:08:45.079 --> 01:08:48.439
and so you know the question of
who's going to sit in the Director of

938
01:08:48.520 --> 01:08:55.800
National Intelligence chair is very much an
open question, let alone Secretary of Defense

939
01:08:55.840 --> 01:08:59.960
and all the rest. So there's
a huge amount of kind of like political

940
01:09:00.399 --> 01:09:03.000
calculation that's going to happen in the
next I don't know, forty to fifty

941
01:09:03.079 --> 01:09:08.640
days that's going to really have a
major bearing on all of this stuff too.

942
01:09:08.760 --> 01:09:12.079
So it kind of makes sense that
things are a little murky, I

943
01:09:12.119 --> 01:09:19.600
think at the moment. And I
would say it's murky too what effect any

944
01:09:19.840 --> 01:09:26.199
administration change will have. We don't
know how friendly or unfriendly you know,

945
01:09:26.439 --> 01:09:30.920
any administration is towards this. Childress
has another question I think that you might

946
01:09:30.960 --> 01:09:35.319
find interesting or a comment. He
says, my personal opinion is decades of

947
01:09:35.399 --> 01:09:45.600
deception or perhaps ineptitude, have created
massive systemic problems that pervade government and commerce

948
01:09:45.720 --> 01:09:50.439
beyond UFO, And I added the
neptitude he says decades of deception, but

949
01:09:50.600 --> 01:10:00.000
yet it is this issue systemic.
Maybe that's why major campaigns like melons orness

950
01:10:00.119 --> 01:10:06.640
theory. Yeah, I think I
don't know that I would necessarily say deception

951
01:10:06.920 --> 01:10:12.399
exactly, but I think that's basically
right and that there are some systemic issues.

952
01:10:12.720 --> 01:10:15.600
So in fact, one of the
projects I've been working on I've been

953
01:10:15.680 --> 01:10:18.319
kind of doing an experiment to see
is I've been kind of reviewing books from

954
01:10:18.399 --> 01:10:23.039
national security literature and history that have
nothing to do with UFOs but yet talk

955
01:10:23.079 --> 01:10:26.119
about UFOs. So, for example, I was looking at the Iraq War

956
01:10:26.199 --> 01:10:30.119
and the intelligence issues there, and
it's just seeing because you see many of

957
01:10:30.159 --> 01:10:33.239
the similar kinds of problems of something
that's been overlooked or it hasn't been taken

958
01:10:33.279 --> 01:10:36.000
seriously, and then all of a
sudden it becomes a major problem, and

959
01:10:36.039 --> 01:10:40.920
there's a kind of scramble to come
up with an appropriate response. And normally

960
01:10:40.960 --> 01:10:43.720
you would think, you know,
there's surely there must be rooms full of

961
01:10:43.760 --> 01:10:47.439
people who work on you know,
Iraqi security issues all day long. Well

962
01:10:47.800 --> 01:10:53.239
maybe, but maybe not right,
So the history is inevitably more complicated.

963
01:10:53.520 --> 01:10:56.000
So actually, yeah, I do
think there's some evidence that there's there's all

964
01:10:56.079 --> 01:10:59.239
kinds of areas that have been neglected, you know, particularly in the technology

965
01:10:59.239 --> 01:11:02.399
space. I guess just to button
this one up, I would recommend reading

966
01:11:02.640 --> 01:11:06.359
Christian Brose's The Kill Chain. It's
got kind of a rough title, but

967
01:11:06.560 --> 01:11:11.520
it's well worth your read. So
it's from a former senior staffer kind of

968
01:11:11.560 --> 01:11:15.439
like a melon sort of figure,
but in the Senate Armed Services Committee,

969
01:11:15.800 --> 01:11:19.520
and he wrote an analysis of basically
everything that's wrong and kind of defense policy

970
01:11:19.520 --> 01:11:23.640
making right now. It's a scary
read. It's an extremely scary read.

971
01:11:24.159 --> 01:11:27.560
So yeah, in short, yeah, there's some reasons I think to be

972
01:11:27.680 --> 01:11:31.439
concerned in more than one policy area
at the moment. M m yeah.

973
01:11:31.479 --> 01:11:35.920
And it's kind of funny. It
just brings me back to John Alexander's point,

974
01:11:36.039 --> 01:11:42.520
because he's like, he's shocked that
people are not open to the idea

975
01:11:43.159 --> 01:11:50.640
that our military can be really kind
of inept in this arena whereas you know,

976
01:11:51.000 --> 01:11:56.319
most people are given a given that
the government a mess and everything,

977
01:11:57.279 --> 01:12:00.319
but they can't buy it when it
comes to UFOs, they think their mastermind.

978
01:12:01.079 --> 01:12:05.319
Except right, we live in this
head spinning contradiction. And I mean,

979
01:12:05.319 --> 01:12:09.439
I think the reason is because there's
something to that contradiction, like sometimes

980
01:12:09.479 --> 01:12:13.359
at the policy level things go cartoonishly
wrong, where it's almost you can't believe

981
01:12:13.439 --> 01:12:15.479
how it's sort of stupid the decision
making is. But then on the other

982
01:12:15.600 --> 01:12:18.560
on the other hand, there are
also plenty of capabilities that are truly I

983
01:12:18.600 --> 01:12:25.079
mean they call it sometimes exquisite capabilities, meaning that they're so technologically complex,

984
01:12:25.199 --> 01:12:29.000
so advanced that they're they're kind of
mind boggling too. So we live in

985
01:12:29.000 --> 01:12:32.159
that contradiction as a country where we're
capable of doing profound things and we're also

986
01:12:32.239 --> 01:12:36.319
capable of shooting ourselves in the foot. You know, we do both regularly,

987
01:12:36.800 --> 01:12:40.880
and I think when it comes to
the UFO issue, we're left asking,

988
01:12:40.920 --> 01:12:44.039
well, which is it. You
know, did someone mastermind the best

989
01:12:44.439 --> 01:12:48.159
cover up of all time? Or
or we kind of clueless here, that's

990
01:12:48.520 --> 01:12:55.000
the question. Mm hmmm, Well
great, I think we're pretty much out

991
01:12:55.000 --> 01:12:58.760
of time. So glad to have
you back. I would say, I

992
01:12:59.439 --> 01:13:01.960
hopefully will have you back again in
the future because I love our conversations.

993
01:13:02.479 --> 01:13:09.439
I think that it's I'm very happy
that you're now writing about and focusing on

994
01:13:09.479 --> 01:13:14.640
this topic because your insights are very
helpful. Thank you so much. Thank

995
01:13:14.640 --> 01:13:16.560
you. I appreciate that these are
These are always great. So, yeah,

996
01:13:16.560 --> 01:13:19.119
this is awesome. I look forward
to doing more. Yeah, so

997
01:13:19.159 --> 01:13:24.119
we'll have more row Host reports coming
up, and you know, I'm definitely

998
01:13:24.119 --> 01:13:30.319
going to be sticking to more of
the policy more breaking down government and science

999
01:13:30.960 --> 01:13:35.520
and the institutions, the mainstream institutions, and how not only how they are

1000
01:13:35.560 --> 01:13:42.159
affected by all of this, but
how you know, those interested in moving

1001
01:13:42.239 --> 01:13:45.960
the ball forward, how they do
so. So for example, you know

1002
01:13:46.600 --> 01:13:50.600
there's there's people like Nick Pope who
have worked in government. I'll be interviewing

1003
01:13:50.720 --> 01:13:58.359
him next week and we'll be talking
similar sort of topics and he has insight

1004
01:13:58.399 --> 01:14:02.039
from the mod also have in a
couple of weeks Kevin Kanouth, and I

1005
01:14:02.039 --> 01:14:08.399
think that's a really important conversation because
he's a physics physicist. How does you

1006
01:14:08.439 --> 01:14:12.039
know, how do we get this
the scientific community to take this more seriously

1007
01:14:12.399 --> 01:14:15.319
and the question that you and I
were just talking about, how do we

1008
01:14:15.479 --> 01:14:18.359
get science, How do we get
the data like the Nimtz case that the

1009
01:14:18.520 --> 01:14:25.439
real unidentified into the hands of scientists
and what scientists to do what with it?

1010
01:14:25.800 --> 01:14:28.800
Those sort of things, which is
kind of where I think many of

1011
01:14:28.880 --> 01:14:32.920
us would like all of this to
evolve to so those sort of discussions that

1012
01:14:32.960 --> 01:14:35.680
will have so Kevin will be in
a couple of weeks and then about three

1013
01:14:35.680 --> 01:14:42.279
weeks will have James Fox, whose
filmed The Phenomenon, launches on October sixth,

1014
01:14:42.760 --> 01:14:46.960
and I highly, highly highly recommend
everybody watch it. It puts together

1015
01:14:47.520 --> 01:14:55.159
a very compelling argument for for this
phenomenon. So it's got a good title,

1016
01:14:55.600 --> 01:14:59.600
but I think it's going to be
especially eye opening for those people who

1017
01:14:59.600 --> 01:15:02.399
are really getting interested in this topic
now to show that, you know,

1018
01:15:02.520 --> 01:15:11.920
there's a rich history of military interest
and involvement in this field and witnessing things

1019
01:15:12.359 --> 01:15:16.319
and demonstrates kind of how they've been
tackling that over the years. So stay

1020
01:15:16.399 --> 01:15:19.680
tuned to the Rowhast reports. Like
I said, live versions like this one

1021
01:15:19.920 --> 01:15:25.000
will be open for everybody, and
then it will go into the archives,

1022
01:15:25.520 --> 01:15:28.600
which you just have to push that
join button to see. And then of

1023
01:15:28.640 --> 01:15:32.439
course if you join on Patreon as
the audio level, you'll get those as

1024
01:15:32.479 --> 01:15:40.319
an audio also. So thank you
again, Adam, and until next time,

1025
01:15:40.800 --> 01:15:44.039
we'll talk to you later. All
right, thanks, thanks everybody.

1026
01:15:44.880 --> 01:15:47.079
Let me play one of my cool
outro videos. Here now Here we go