1 00:00:17,719 --> 00:00:21,679 We're back with another edition of the Federalist Radio Hour. I'm staff writer Sean 2 00:00:21,760 --> 00:00:25,879 Fleetwood. As always, you can email the show at radio at the Federalist 3 00:00:26,039 --> 00:00:31,039 dot com, follow us on Twitter at FDRLST. Make sure to subscribe wherever 4 00:00:31,079 --> 00:00:34,799 you download your podcasts into the premium version on our website. Today, I'm 5 00:00:34,840 --> 00:00:38,439 joined by Sean Mierski. Shawn as a lawyer in US foreign policy scholar who 6 00:00:38,439 --> 00:00:43,880 has worked on national security issues across multiple US presidential administrations. He currently practices 7 00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:48,679 national security, foreign relations, and appellate law at Arnold and Porter Case Scholar 8 00:00:49,159 --> 00:00:53,679 LP and is also a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. 9 00:00:53,880 --> 00:00:57,039 And today he's here to talk to us about his brand new upcoming book, 10 00:00:57,159 --> 00:01:00,799 We May Dominate the World, Ambition, Anxiety, and the at the American 11 00:01:00,799 --> 00:01:03,319 Colossus. Sean Miski, Welcome to the program. Pleasure to be here, 12 00:01:03,439 --> 00:01:07,159 Thank you for having me. Yeah. Absolutely, And so before we kind 13 00:01:07,159 --> 00:01:10,120 of delve into the contents of the book, can you just kind of give 14 00:01:10,120 --> 00:01:11,879 our readers a bit of your background, you know, how you got interested 15 00:01:11,920 --> 00:01:15,480 in foreign policy and then kind of dovetail into what made you want to write 16 00:01:15,480 --> 00:01:19,280 this book. Yeah, So the thing that originally got me, I think, 17 00:01:19,359 --> 00:01:25,120 interested in foreign policy was actually the rise of China became obvious to me 18 00:01:25,359 --> 00:01:29,439 fairly early on. And this is not a particularly original insight, but that 19 00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:33,760 China's rise would be sort of the defining event of the twenty first century, 20 00:01:33,840 --> 00:01:37,560 or at least that there's good money to be placed on that bet. And 21 00:01:37,599 --> 00:01:40,079 so, you know, for a long time I've kind of been interested in 22 00:01:40,719 --> 00:01:46,959 China and East Asian security affairs, and it sort of occurred to me that 23 00:01:47,000 --> 00:01:51,359 the really important question, or at least one of the kind of really important 24 00:01:51,400 --> 00:01:55,000 questions, was whether China was going to rise peacefully or whether it was going 25 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:59,319 to rise in an aggressive and expansionist way. And the historical record has never 26 00:01:59,359 --> 00:02:02,480 been good that question. Rising powers tend to be aggressive an expansionist, by 27 00:02:02,480 --> 00:02:06,879 which I mean they tend to pick fights with other great powers. They tend 28 00:02:06,920 --> 00:02:10,560 to bully and otherwise metal in the affairs of their neighbors, and in general, 29 00:02:10,599 --> 00:02:14,400 they tend to make a nuisance of themselves as they try and dominate greater 30 00:02:14,439 --> 00:02:17,280 and greater slices at the world. And so, and I don't think China's 31 00:02:17,319 --> 00:02:22,240 really departing, so far from that path, but we're obviously we still got 32 00:02:22,319 --> 00:02:25,400 kind of a ways to go. And so that sort of question is what 33 00:02:25,479 --> 00:02:29,879 originally led me to the book, because I thought it would be interesting to 34 00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:32,919 look at the United States and its own rise to power and to see, 35 00:02:34,159 --> 00:02:38,000 you know, first how much did we buck that particular trend and to the 36 00:02:38,000 --> 00:02:43,000 extent we didn't exactly why you did we act the way we did, because 37 00:02:43,039 --> 00:02:46,680 I've never really heard a good, sort of compelling explanation as to why all 38 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:49,680 rising powers act this way. And so I thought I would write just a 39 00:02:49,680 --> 00:02:53,599 short article looking at the history of the United States, and then I started 40 00:02:53,599 --> 00:02:55,000 getting into it, and I started digging into the archives, and you know, 41 00:02:55,039 --> 00:02:59,560 eight years later, here we are and ends up being so much more 42 00:02:59,639 --> 00:03:02,879 of a kind of, in my opinion, thrilling but also kind of detailed 43 00:03:02,879 --> 00:03:08,080 and complex story that I had initially anticipated. But yeah, that's the that's 44 00:03:08,120 --> 00:03:13,800 the answer. Yeah. One of the most fascinating aspects of the book was 45 00:03:13,840 --> 00:03:16,719 that the area of foreign policy US forign policy that you delved into gave so 46 00:03:16,840 --> 00:03:21,039 much of the foreign policy discussions we hear today or you know, based on 47 00:03:21,080 --> 00:03:23,840 the post World War two era, you know, the United states that world 48 00:03:23,919 --> 00:03:28,080 Hedgeman were the leading power. But you know, we're talking about discussions like 49 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:30,719 with Ukraine, and we're still talking about World War Two. But there's so 50 00:03:30,840 --> 00:03:35,400 much US foreign policy that's right for discussion, and specifically you tackle the really 51 00:03:35,400 --> 00:03:39,240 the post Civil War era up until the early World War two years. But 52 00:03:39,360 --> 00:03:44,120 I think a good place to start our discussion if you could describe for audience 53 00:03:44,199 --> 00:03:47,919 the Monroe doctrine and the main principles that that had obviously came before the Civil 54 00:03:47,919 --> 00:03:52,280 War, but I think it's so important in understanding the events that you later 55 00:03:52,319 --> 00:03:57,599 detail later on in the book. Yeah, and so listeners will remember, 56 00:03:57,599 --> 00:04:00,520 of course the Monroe Doctrine from their you know, Apstra classes as the sort 57 00:04:00,520 --> 00:04:08,199 of dusty dogma that you know, barely matters anymore at lease. That's that's 58 00:04:08,280 --> 00:04:12,680 the kind of wishful thinking. But you know, the basic idea was that 59 00:04:12,719 --> 00:04:17,040 in the late eighteen tens early eighteen twenties, Latin America gained its independence from 60 00:04:17,079 --> 00:04:21,720 Portugal in Spain. And this was from the US perspective, this revolutionary see 61 00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:26,560 change in our strategic position, because it meant that instead of being surrounded by 62 00:04:26,560 --> 00:04:30,399 hostile great powers, we were now in a hemisphere where there were a few 63 00:04:30,560 --> 00:04:33,680 outposts left of the European Great Powers, but beyond that we were just surrounded 64 00:04:33,720 --> 00:04:36,399 by neighbors that were, you know, always going to be weaker than us 65 00:04:36,399 --> 00:04:41,360 and would never present a direct security threat. And from the US perspective, 66 00:04:41,360 --> 00:04:45,560 this was great because if the US could just clear the remaining European Great powers 67 00:04:45,600 --> 00:04:49,480 out of the hemisphere and essentially, you know, enforce us dividing line between 68 00:04:49,480 --> 00:04:54,959 the old World and the New, it could guarantee itself permanent security, you 69 00:04:55,000 --> 00:04:57,959 know, by virtue of essentially having two very big moats on either side of 70 00:04:57,959 --> 00:05:00,560 it. And so in eighteen twenty three, in response to the threat of 71 00:05:00,680 --> 00:05:08,240 Europe coming back into recolonize Latin America, President Monroe declares essentially that from here 72 00:05:08,240 --> 00:05:11,759 on out there's going to be the separation. The United States promises not to 73 00:05:11,839 --> 00:05:15,720 meddle in European affairs, and in exchange, however, European Great Powers cannot 74 00:05:15,920 --> 00:05:19,519 recolonize any part of the Western Hemisphere, and in general, they can't try 75 00:05:19,519 --> 00:05:26,040 and take over any of the independent Latin American powers and try and you know, 76 00:05:26,639 --> 00:05:29,839 install authoritarian forms of government. And so, in effect, the Monroe 77 00:05:29,920 --> 00:05:32,600 doctrine ends up as this sort of giant keep out sign in the middle of 78 00:05:32,639 --> 00:05:36,680 the Atlantic Ocean. The problem is that in eighteen twenty three the US has 79 00:05:36,720 --> 00:05:41,639 basically like no power to enforce this, and so over the next few decades 80 00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:45,759 it's you know, very much honored in the breach. It could have been, 81 00:05:45,759 --> 00:05:47,480 I think, much worse than it was, but Great Britain also had 82 00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:53,399 vested interest in not having the other great powers come across the ocean, and 83 00:05:53,439 --> 00:05:57,759 so for the most part we had managed to escape by relatively okay. But 84 00:05:57,879 --> 00:06:00,839 then things kind of go south during the Civil War. Yeah, that was 85 00:06:00,839 --> 00:06:04,360 actually leads into my next question, which is this conflict during the Civil War 86 00:06:04,439 --> 00:06:10,160 years and the years after that involves the US and France and France's intervention in 87 00:06:10,199 --> 00:06:13,839 Mexico, which is something I didn't even know happened before I read the book. 88 00:06:13,959 --> 00:06:15,759 So could you talk to our audience a bit about that conflict in how 89 00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:20,639 the outcomes kind of shaped the world affairs and the years to come. Absolutely, 90 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:24,360 and to be frank, before I started getting into this, I didn't 91 00:06:24,360 --> 00:06:28,160 really know this history either, and I was actually astonished by that fact because 92 00:06:28,199 --> 00:06:30,600 once you sort of stepped back and look at it, you're like, oh 93 00:06:30,639 --> 00:06:33,360 my god, this is so important, you know. But I think when 94 00:06:33,720 --> 00:06:36,839 you're you know, in US history classes in high school and middle school, 95 00:06:38,040 --> 00:06:41,120 the focus understandably is on the Civil War itself and sort of what's going on 96 00:06:41,160 --> 00:06:44,720 domestically right the North and the South there at each other's throats. You learn 97 00:06:44,720 --> 00:06:48,000 all about the battles of Gettysburg and Antietam, but there's a lot happening at 98 00:06:48,000 --> 00:06:53,319 the international level as well, and in particular for the European capitals. This 99 00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:59,879 Civil War inside the United States was a phenomenal opportunity for them to basically rever 100 00:07:00,319 --> 00:07:03,399 sort of the tide of their ebbing influence in the Western hemisphere and to sort 101 00:07:03,399 --> 00:07:06,639 of come back in a big way. And you see that in a few 102 00:07:08,360 --> 00:07:11,680 plots here and there, But the one that really stands out is the French 103 00:07:11,759 --> 00:07:17,399 invasion and occupation of Mexico. And so in late eighteen sixty one into early 104 00:07:17,399 --> 00:07:23,639 eighteen sixty two, the French launched this massive expedition into Mexico and within a 105 00:07:23,639 --> 00:07:27,319 few years they essentially conquer almost the entire country. I think at their peak 106 00:07:27,680 --> 00:07:33,480 they're controlling something like seven eighths of Mexican territory, and they import this Austrian 107 00:07:33,639 --> 00:07:38,000 prince to be the new Emperor of Mexico, and so they essentially set up 108 00:07:38,040 --> 00:07:43,800 this kind of puppet state right on the US border. And the remarkable thing 109 00:07:43,839 --> 00:07:47,600 beyond the mere fact that that happened is how violently the United States reacted against 110 00:07:47,600 --> 00:07:53,160 that. Even before the Civil War ended in eighteen sixty four, there was 111 00:07:53,439 --> 00:07:58,199 incredibly serious talk in both the North and the South of actually calling a pause 112 00:07:58,279 --> 00:08:01,920 on the Civil War so that the North and Side can jointly invade Mexico and 113 00:08:01,040 --> 00:08:05,399 kick the French out and then presumably either restart the war or come to some 114 00:08:05,439 --> 00:08:11,120 sort of negotiated settlement. And this seems just like absolutely fantastical from everything we 115 00:08:11,160 --> 00:08:13,600 know about the Civil War, but I think it really sort of emphasizes how 116 00:08:13,720 --> 00:08:18,319 much Americans were ticked off by this happening and how frankly concerned they were. 117 00:08:18,839 --> 00:08:22,639 And so it shouldn't come as too much of a surprise that three months after 118 00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:26,800 the Civil War does end in the North Winds, the Union has sent fifty 119 00:08:26,800 --> 00:08:30,959 thousand soldiers down to the Rio Grande under General Sheridan, who's at this point 120 00:08:31,040 --> 00:08:35,200 General Grant's right hand man and General Sheridan is basically sending letters to Washington saying 121 00:08:35,279 --> 00:08:37,759 we're ready to invade, just give us the order, and you should give 122 00:08:37,840 --> 00:08:41,360 us the order, and General Grant agrees. I mean, this is the 123 00:08:41,600 --> 00:08:43,759 commander of the Union forces and he's telling the President, you need to invade 124 00:08:43,759 --> 00:08:48,279 Mexico right now to kick the French out. And as I talk about in 125 00:08:48,320 --> 00:08:52,320 the book, it's a really close call that prevents us from not actually going 126 00:08:52,360 --> 00:08:56,759 into Mexico. Instead, we end up launching this massive proxy war against the 127 00:08:56,759 --> 00:09:01,120 French where we're arming Mexican sending kind of COVID expedition across the border, and 128 00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:05,360 eventually the French end up leaving with their tail behind their legs in eighteen sixty 129 00:09:05,399 --> 00:09:11,399 seven. But the whole episode sort of really reinforces for Americans that this threat 130 00:09:11,440 --> 00:09:13,960 from the European powers is not some sort of abstract, you know, thing 131 00:09:15,000 --> 00:09:16,799 that they no longer that they don't need to worry about, and soad it's 132 00:09:16,799 --> 00:09:22,279 a very real concern that they have to constantly be vigilant about. Yeah, 133 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:24,200 And in the kind of decades ensuing as you cover in the book, with 134 00:09:24,240 --> 00:09:30,679 these various instances in Latin American countries like Venezuela and Panama. It really seems 135 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:35,559 like almost the unintended consequence of the Monroe doctrine of asserting yourself as kind of 136 00:09:35,600 --> 00:09:37,720 like, you know, the leading power of the Western hemisphere is that you 137 00:09:37,799 --> 00:09:41,600 kind of have to be the policeman in a sense where you have to enforce, 138 00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:45,960 you know, and make sure that these European powers are intervening in these 139 00:09:46,000 --> 00:09:50,600 crises, and that you yourself have to get involved in these crises sometimes to 140 00:09:50,759 --> 00:09:56,480 prevent that. Is that something that you kind of notice throughout your research analyzing 141 00:09:56,519 --> 00:09:58,879 these various events. Yeah, I mean, so one of the things that 142 00:10:00,440 --> 00:10:03,919 you know, I think to the extent Americans know much about this period, 143 00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:07,039 there's a sense that we did not we're not on our best behavior when it 144 00:10:07,080 --> 00:10:09,919 came to our neighbors, and that is you know, understating it considerably, 145 00:10:09,960 --> 00:10:13,720 I think. But one of the things that sort of surprised me in my 146 00:10:13,799 --> 00:10:18,679 research was oftentimes how reluctant the United States was to be doing much of what 147 00:10:18,720 --> 00:10:24,039 it was doing. And there are tons of exceptions to that, so I'm 148 00:10:24,080 --> 00:10:28,440 generalizing at a very high level, but there is this sort of sense that, 149 00:10:28,559 --> 00:10:31,600 you know, the US was kind of on this crusading imperialist spirit, 150 00:10:31,639 --> 00:10:35,039 where we were sort of clabboring our neighbors, you know, for the fun 151 00:10:35,080 --> 00:10:39,200 of it. And I just don't think that's really consistent with sort of the 152 00:10:39,600 --> 00:10:41,759 records that you know. And it's not just public speeches and things like that, 153 00:10:41,799 --> 00:10:46,480 but a lot of these policymakers, in their letters to their families or 154 00:10:46,519 --> 00:10:50,600 in their diaries are really sort of ringing their hands over what they're kind of 155 00:10:50,639 --> 00:10:54,159 being forced to do, at least in their view. And the basic problem 156 00:10:54,240 --> 00:10:58,960 that the United States is encountering is the problem that was sort of exemplified by 157 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:03,720 the way France invade Mexico, which is a lot of the United States as 158 00:11:03,759 --> 00:11:11,080 neighbors are at this point incredibly unstable politically in the sense that they have constant 159 00:11:11,120 --> 00:11:13,960 civil wars and revolutions, and economically in the sense that they've ranked up these 160 00:11:15,000 --> 00:11:20,559 absolutely massive debts to European banks and sometimes directly to European states. And this 161 00:11:20,639 --> 00:11:26,600 sort of instability, this weakness creates a problem. Well, it creates a 162 00:11:26,639 --> 00:11:31,039 temptation, frankly, for European powers to intervene, and it makes these neighbors 163 00:11:31,080 --> 00:11:35,919 an easy target for European intervention, and so in the book, I call 164 00:11:35,960 --> 00:11:39,840 it the problem of order. But basically, the US is very concerned that 165 00:11:39,919 --> 00:11:43,720 these vulnerabilities in its neighborhood are not just vulnerabilities for those states, but they're 166 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:50,240 vulnerabilities for everyone. And so the US basically concludes that in order to safeguard 167 00:11:50,240 --> 00:11:52,759 its own security and to prevent europe great powers from coming into the hemisphere, 168 00:11:54,039 --> 00:11:58,080 it needs to start stabilizing and strengthening its neighbors to the point where they can 169 00:11:58,080 --> 00:12:00,759 at least stand up on their own two feet in a way that makes it 170 00:12:00,840 --> 00:12:03,480 much more difficult for Europe to get involved. The problem is that the US 171 00:12:03,679 --> 00:12:07,279 doesn't really figure out a great way to do it. It starts by trying 172 00:12:07,279 --> 00:12:13,240 to do it indirectly through you know, diplomacy and trade, by lowering tariffs 173 00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:18,919 and the hope that you know, an increase of commerce will increase, you 174 00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:22,879 know, the kind of wealth and prosperity of these societies, and that will 175 00:12:22,919 --> 00:12:26,960 in turn help stabilize them. But for various reasons, that doesn't really work, 176 00:12:26,480 --> 00:12:31,919 and the US eventually starts moving on to kind of more aggressive stabilization measures 177 00:12:31,919 --> 00:12:35,679 than involves sort of tinkering with the internal sovereignties of these nations, and again 178 00:12:35,720 --> 00:12:37,799 it sort of starts out I don't want to say benignly, but it starts 179 00:12:37,799 --> 00:12:41,320 out in else in a much more minor way than where it concludes, which 180 00:12:41,360 --> 00:12:45,879 is, by the eight end of the nineteen tens, the US is occupying 181 00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:50,120 two entire nations parts of three more just I mean, really really invasive sort 182 00:12:50,120 --> 00:12:58,759 of breaches of its neighbor's sovereignty. The Washed Out on Wall Street podcast with 183 00:12:58,879 --> 00:13:03,559 Chris Markowski Day Chris helps unpack the connection between politics and the economy and how 184 00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:07,639 it affects your wallet. Is America not number one anymore? Sometimes it takes 185 00:13:07,639 --> 00:13:11,159 admitting we have a problem to'll be able to fix it. Between parental rights 186 00:13:11,159 --> 00:13:13,919 over their children or the government paying big tech for your private info, how 187 00:13:13,919 --> 00:13:18,120 can we right our wrongs to go back to being the shiny city on the 188 00:13:18,200 --> 00:13:20,080 hill. Whether it's happening in DC or down on Wall Street, it's affecting 189 00:13:20,120 --> 00:13:24,240 you financially. Be informed. Check out the Watchdout on Wall Street podcast with 190 00:13:24,320 --> 00:13:31,720 Chris Markowski on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcast. Yeah, 191 00:13:31,759 --> 00:13:33,360 and I think one of the ones that you tackle is kind of the 192 00:13:33,440 --> 00:13:37,039 US dynamic with the Philippines, which is you know, we don't necessarily want 193 00:13:37,039 --> 00:13:41,080 to get involved in the Philippines, you know what's our interest there, but 194 00:13:41,240 --> 00:13:43,840 you know the fact that other European powers are eyeing it that if you know, 195 00:13:43,919 --> 00:13:48,279 a Britain or a Germany or whoever controls it, then that's going to 196 00:13:48,320 --> 00:13:52,120 affect us in our national security. You know. I hate to skive around 197 00:13:52,159 --> 00:13:54,960 so much that there's so much in this book to cover, but I was 198 00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:58,320 hoping you could explain how all of these concepts that we've been talking about kind 199 00:13:58,320 --> 00:14:01,720 of tie into the idea of the was about corollary and kind of expand on 200 00:14:01,759 --> 00:14:07,120 how the terms defined in the Monroe Doctrine were further carried out under that. 201 00:14:07,320 --> 00:14:13,840 So the Monroe Doctrine in its original sort of phrasing was purely defensive in the 202 00:14:13,879 --> 00:14:18,960 sense that it stated to Europe that the United States had a security interest in 203 00:14:18,039 --> 00:14:24,200 keeping Latin America independent. It didn't say anything about any responsibilities of the United 204 00:14:24,240 --> 00:14:28,200 States itself would take on, and it didn't, you know, really do 205 00:14:28,279 --> 00:14:33,960 anything other than forbid Europe from doing certain things. And so the Roosevelt Corollary 206 00:14:33,519 --> 00:14:39,279 was declared in late nineteen oh four and first executed in nineteen oh five, 207 00:14:39,840 --> 00:14:45,200 and to set the scene, the Dominican Republic was one of the nations I've 208 00:14:45,200 --> 00:14:48,639 mentioned that you know, was really just sort of falling apart during the eighteen 209 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:54,840 nineties that had ragged up these enormous debts under this rather fiscally irresponsible dictator. 210 00:14:54,159 --> 00:14:56,840 The dictator ends up being assassinated at the end of the decade, and the 211 00:14:56,879 --> 00:15:01,360 country plunges into just years and years of civil war, and the Europe's Great 212 00:15:01,360 --> 00:15:07,200 Powers are getting increasingly unhappy about the situation. And this all essentially comes to 213 00:15:07,240 --> 00:15:09,200 head at the end of nineteen oh four, where several great Powers approach the 214 00:15:09,240 --> 00:15:13,720 State Department and say, either you you know, put the do something about 215 00:15:13,759 --> 00:15:20,879 the situation, or we will. And what Roosevelt realizes is that at this 216 00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:26,639 point Latin American states almost their only at least a lot of them at least 217 00:15:26,840 --> 00:15:31,919 almost their only source of revenue is from customs on trade, so basically taxing 218 00:15:31,960 --> 00:15:35,279 traders comes into and out of ports. There's no income taxes, there's nothing 219 00:15:35,320 --> 00:15:37,759 like that, so it's all basically just taxing trade, which means that if 220 00:15:37,799 --> 00:15:41,679 you want to, if you're owed money and you want to forcibly take that 221 00:15:41,720 --> 00:15:46,519 money, what you do is you seize the custom houses of these nations and 222 00:15:46,559 --> 00:15:50,360 you basically administer them, and you cut you cut yourself a share of the 223 00:15:50,440 --> 00:15:56,559 profits coming in until you're dead is satisfied, and Roosevelt realizes if he doesn't 224 00:15:56,639 --> 00:16:00,799 prevent you know, europe great powers from acting, what is eventually going to 225 00:16:00,840 --> 00:16:03,399 happen is they're going to come in, They're going to seize these custom houses, 226 00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:07,320 and they're going to establish themselves permanently in the Dominican Republic. And for 227 00:16:07,360 --> 00:16:11,919 obvious reasons, this is not something that the US wants to do. And 228 00:16:11,960 --> 00:16:15,360 so Roosevelt declares what ends up being known as the Roosevelt corollary, which is 229 00:16:17,039 --> 00:16:22,279 that in cases where you either have what he refers to as chronic wrongdoing, 230 00:16:22,360 --> 00:16:26,879 which is nations that are just affirmatively, you know, ignoring their obligations under 231 00:16:26,879 --> 00:16:32,039 international law and really aggravating the European powers in a way that might lead them 232 00:16:32,039 --> 00:16:37,200 to come in, or in cases where essentially there's anarchy in the state has 233 00:16:37,240 --> 00:16:41,879 just collapsed, the United States has this obligation to be an international policeman, 234 00:16:41,879 --> 00:16:45,080 where it basically has the obligation to sort of come in and restore order in 235 00:16:45,240 --> 00:16:49,759 order to prevent the European powers from coming out. And the reasoning is, 236 00:16:49,879 --> 00:16:53,759 you know, at least to Roosevelt's mind, fairly obvious and indisputable, which 237 00:16:53,799 --> 00:16:56,679 is, look, somebody's going to do this. It's either going to be 238 00:16:56,720 --> 00:16:59,919 us or it's going to be the European powers. And we don't want to 239 00:17:00,159 --> 00:17:03,960 be the European power, so it has to be us. And and that 240 00:17:04,079 --> 00:17:08,119 of course is compelling in its own way, but it leads to this sort 241 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:11,359 of slide into more and more interventionism in a way that I think even Theodore 242 00:17:11,440 --> 00:17:15,039 Roosevelt would have been very surprised by. Yeah, and then we get into 243 00:17:15,039 --> 00:17:18,839 the Taft administration where we have this concept of you know, dollar diplomacy. 244 00:17:19,160 --> 00:17:22,200 Could you talk about, you know, what is dollar diplomacy and how the 245 00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:26,759 Taft administration kind of used it to shape US foreign policy in Latin America. 246 00:17:26,920 --> 00:17:32,960 Sure, so, as I mentioned, so Theodore Roosevelt, he ends up 247 00:17:33,119 --> 00:17:37,200 using his quarrel only once in the Dominican Republic itself. And then, you 248 00:17:37,200 --> 00:17:42,680 know, a month or two after he gives this address, he approaches the 249 00:17:42,680 --> 00:17:48,039 Dominican president and says, would you like American forces to take over the custom 250 00:17:48,079 --> 00:17:52,720 houses and administer them on your behalf. And the Dominican president is thrilled. 251 00:17:52,759 --> 00:17:56,759 He's actually been kind of pushing annexation from last year. I mean, he 252 00:17:56,839 --> 00:18:00,559 really wants much more US involvement. And so when when rose Will asks in 253 00:18:00,680 --> 00:18:03,880 this, this is not exactly shot in the dark, and so the United 254 00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:07,480 States ends up taking over and administering the Dominican custom houses. And the basic 255 00:18:07,559 --> 00:18:12,720 deal is that the US forces, you know, protect the custom houses. 256 00:18:12,720 --> 00:18:17,319 They can collect the revenue, and a percentage of the revenue I think it's 257 00:18:17,319 --> 00:18:21,240 a little over fifty percent goes to the European creditors and the other creditors of 258 00:18:21,279 --> 00:18:25,480 the Dominican Republic, and the remaining percentage goes to the Dominican government for its 259 00:18:25,519 --> 00:18:30,680 sort of internal expenses. And the idea behind these custom houses or this what's 260 00:18:30,720 --> 00:18:36,359 called a customs receivership is that number one, a lot of these civil wars 261 00:18:36,359 --> 00:18:38,920 and revolutions in these countries are being fought over the custom houses in the sense 262 00:18:38,920 --> 00:18:41,119 that that's where all the money is and that's where all the loot is. 263 00:18:41,200 --> 00:18:45,319 And so the idea is, if you just set up US marines in front 264 00:18:45,319 --> 00:18:48,599 of them, the revolutionaries and rebels won't be able to get to them, 265 00:18:48,799 --> 00:18:53,000 and that'll dry up revolution and rebellion, and so it'll stabilize these countries just 266 00:18:53,039 --> 00:18:57,799 by taking the biggest treasure house off the table. The other dynamic is that 267 00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:03,240 Americans early, so the rose of all administration things, are going to be 268 00:19:03,359 --> 00:19:07,599 much less corrupt administrators of these custom houses, and they'll be much better at 269 00:19:07,640 --> 00:19:11,000 doing it kind of bureaucratically, and so as a result, will just collect 270 00:19:11,039 --> 00:19:15,759 more revenue and this will create more prosperity, which intern will create more peace, 271 00:19:15,759 --> 00:19:18,759 which intern will create more prosperity. And so there's this kind of hope 272 00:19:18,799 --> 00:19:25,279 that there's going to be this mutually reinforcing stabilizing cycle, and it kind of 273 00:19:25,319 --> 00:19:29,480 seems to work at first in the Dominican Republic. So this customs receivership goes 274 00:19:29,480 --> 00:19:33,559 into effect in nineteen o five, and from about that year to nineteen eleven, 275 00:19:33,640 --> 00:19:37,440 the Dominican Republic actually is doing relatively well compared to its recent history. 276 00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:44,319 Customs revenue sore, so that even though the Dominican government's only receiving less than 277 00:19:44,359 --> 00:19:48,079 half of the actual revenues coming in through the custom houses, it's still getting 278 00:19:48,119 --> 00:19:51,200 more money than it used to before when it was receiving a one hundred percent 279 00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:55,240 of the revenues, and so things seem to be going relatively well. There's 280 00:19:55,279 --> 00:19:57,000 a lot less revolution, there's a lot less rebellion, each of them is 281 00:19:57,039 --> 00:20:02,960 less anemic than there is more anemic last And so by the time the Taft 282 00:20:02,960 --> 00:20:06,519 administration comes into nineteen o nine, they've concluded, Aha, this is the 283 00:20:06,559 --> 00:20:10,599 silver bullet. We just need to force all these other countries into this same 284 00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:15,039 sort of customs receivership. And so the Taft administration kind of takes that insight 285 00:20:15,119 --> 00:20:19,839 and more broadly takes the insight that financial stability is the kind of foundation for 286 00:20:19,920 --> 00:20:25,960 political stability and tries to enforce that across the region. And it does own 287 00:20:26,000 --> 00:20:29,960 a much more systematic and much less at Hogway than Roosevelt ever did. And 288 00:20:30,000 --> 00:20:33,319 I think that's where things start to go really really wrong. For one thing, 289 00:20:33,359 --> 00:20:37,680 it turns out that these custom houses are not, these customs receiverships are 290 00:20:37,680 --> 00:20:40,640 not the silver bullet. It just turns out that the Dominican president at the 291 00:20:40,640 --> 00:20:44,119 time was actually just a very competent ruler, relatively speaking, and that a 292 00:20:44,200 --> 00:20:47,440 large part of the reason things worked out was because he was doing a relatively 293 00:20:47,559 --> 00:20:52,519 good job at kind of keeping a firm handle on everything. But the one 294 00:20:52,559 --> 00:20:56,880 thing that the one thing that Taft also does is and this is another key 295 00:20:56,880 --> 00:21:02,559 part of Dollar diplomacy, is he basically tries to refinance all the European debts 296 00:21:02,599 --> 00:21:06,880 in the region through American banks. And the idea is, basically, let's 297 00:21:06,880 --> 00:21:08,599 say you have a nation like Honduras, who at the beginning of the Taft 298 00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:14,960 administration owes something like one hundred and twenty million dollars in debt to European bankers 299 00:21:15,680 --> 00:21:19,720 on annual revenues of something like three million. Right, it's just not even 300 00:21:21,119 --> 00:21:25,880 conceivable that the Hunters will ever be able to repay this. And what Americans 301 00:21:26,039 --> 00:21:29,720 do, or with the State Department's kind of active encouragement, as they sort 302 00:21:29,759 --> 00:21:32,960 of come in and they try and mop up these loans, refinance them, 303 00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:36,720 consolidate them, cut them down to size, and do it through American banks. 304 00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:38,839 The idea being you remove europe stake from the region. As a result, 305 00:21:38,839 --> 00:21:44,079 you won't need to worry about Europeans intervening anymore. And so this whole 306 00:21:44,160 --> 00:21:48,440 kind of program of these customs receiverships, this flushing of europe loans out of 307 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:52,480 the region. All this ends up becoming known as Dollar diplomacy, but it 308 00:21:52,519 --> 00:21:56,599 doesn't really work. By the end of the Taft administration, the region's kind 309 00:21:56,599 --> 00:22:00,960 of more unstable than ever. The Dominican Republican nineteen eleven, the competent leader 310 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:06,400 that I mentioned earlier gets assassinated, and the country just you know, drops 311 00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:10,720 into civil war. By the end of by I think is summer in nineteen 312 00:22:10,799 --> 00:22:15,839 twelve, the Dominican Republic has essentially now racked up so much debt as a 313 00:22:15,880 --> 00:22:18,960 result of like the one year of civil war that it's basically right back to 314 00:22:18,960 --> 00:22:23,000 where it started at nineteen oh five. And so the main lesson that both 315 00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:27,759 the Taft administration and especially the Wilson administration take away from this is we're just 316 00:22:27,839 --> 00:22:33,240 not going hard enough. If we only take control of more of these nations 317 00:22:33,240 --> 00:22:36,599 internal affairs, will be able to finally solve the problems that have been sort 318 00:22:36,599 --> 00:22:40,000 of be doubling us. Yeah. I think in the book you write something 319 00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,720 to the effect of Latin America you breathe a sigh of relief when the Wilson 320 00:22:42,759 --> 00:22:48,400 administration came to power, and then you know, the common you know notion 321 00:22:48,440 --> 00:22:49,680 among you know at least I was taught in school was that, you know, 322 00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:53,480 Woodrow Wilson was an isolationist. But you write, as you write in 323 00:22:53,480 --> 00:22:57,039 the book, that's not necessarily the case because you kind of expand upon what 324 00:22:57,079 --> 00:23:03,000 happened during the Wilson administration with regards to Latin America. Yeah, so Woodrow 325 00:23:03,039 --> 00:23:07,279 Wilson is the first Democratic president elected since eighteen ninety two, and so it's 326 00:23:07,319 --> 00:23:11,400 been a long time, twenty years since the White House has seen a Democrat, 327 00:23:11,519 --> 00:23:18,160 and Republicans by this point have our reputation as being the more more kind 328 00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:22,599 of imperialistic party. The anti imperialists, as they're kind of call themselves, 329 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:29,519 are predominantly Democrats and sort of you know, involved as the Democratic Party. 330 00:23:29,680 --> 00:23:33,880 A large part of that is frankly, just racism. That racism correlated strongly 331 00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:37,599 with anti imperialism, because the sort of understanding was the more you get involved 332 00:23:37,599 --> 00:23:41,160 in the quote unquote tropics, you know, the more that this kind of 333 00:23:41,200 --> 00:23:45,599 creates racial problems. And so Southerners in particular tend to be very sort of 334 00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:51,200 isolationist at least in terms of their principles. Might be the wrong word, 335 00:23:51,240 --> 00:23:55,160 but at least in certain in terms of their inclination, and so when Woodrow 336 00:23:55,200 --> 00:24:00,480 Wilson gets elected, there's this like palpable sense that things are going to change. 337 00:24:00,519 --> 00:24:03,519 And that's true not only because of who Democrats are. It's also true 338 00:24:03,519 --> 00:24:07,319 because he himself, while he's running his campaign, makes clear that he's opposed 339 00:24:07,319 --> 00:24:14,519 to all these interventions. He appoints William Jennings Brian of Cross of Gold fame 340 00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:18,599 as his Secretary of State, and Brian is probably the periods you know, 341 00:24:18,720 --> 00:24:23,119 anti imperialist Parxlans. This is his issue. He's always cared about this, 342 00:24:23,720 --> 00:24:30,400 and those expectations are not only not born out, but are just so so 343 00:24:30,440 --> 00:24:33,160 far from the mark that it really is incredible because the Wilson administration ends up 344 00:24:33,200 --> 00:24:38,480 being the high peak the culmination of American interventionism. And there's a few different 345 00:24:38,519 --> 00:24:42,160 reasons for that. Part of it is that Wilson comes in and he is 346 00:24:42,240 --> 00:24:47,359 so convinced that he knows what he's doing, and that the problem up until 347 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:51,880 this point has been bad intentions on the part of his predecessors that he essentially 348 00:24:52,119 --> 00:24:55,279 says, well, everything's going to turn out fine if I do more or 349 00:24:55,359 --> 00:24:57,119 less the same thing as my predecessors, because I'm going to be doing it 350 00:24:57,160 --> 00:25:00,279 for a good reason, whereas they obviously were doing it for corrupt reasons. 351 00:25:00,519 --> 00:25:03,920 And the problem is that that is just not true. And so when he 352 00:25:03,960 --> 00:25:07,839 does the same thing, he gets the same results, only he's i think, 353 00:25:07,880 --> 00:25:11,000 unable to admit when he's making mistakes, and it's when it's leading him 354 00:25:11,000 --> 00:25:15,759 further and further into these interventions because he's so convinced again that kind of good 355 00:25:15,759 --> 00:25:19,319 intentions are going to be all that matters. Part of the problem, too, 356 00:25:19,400 --> 00:25:22,519 is that right after Wilson gets elected, World War One starts. And 357 00:25:22,599 --> 00:25:26,200 on the one hand, that's a good thing from the perspective of the US's 358 00:25:26,319 --> 00:25:32,160 strategic situation, because it means that the US doesn't really need to worry about 359 00:25:32,160 --> 00:25:34,799 the new of these European great powers suddenly attacking in Latin America. Right It's 360 00:25:34,799 --> 00:25:38,160 not like France and Germany really has the forces to spare for that. But 361 00:25:38,279 --> 00:25:45,279 on the other hand, it really sets up this major concern that after the 362 00:25:45,319 --> 00:25:47,839 war, and Americans for the most part believe this is going to be a 363 00:25:47,880 --> 00:25:51,759 short war, but that after the war, whichever power wins or loses is 364 00:25:51,799 --> 00:25:55,319 going to try and basically kind of either makeup for its loss or kind of 365 00:25:55,839 --> 00:26:00,599 you know, build on its moment winning momentum by going into Latin amer America. 366 00:26:00,680 --> 00:26:03,680 And I think there's good reason for the US to kind of have that 367 00:26:03,759 --> 00:26:07,279 in mind, but it becomes sort of a really a driving force in the 368 00:26:07,279 --> 00:26:12,079 way that American policymakers start thinking about the region, and so their attitude becomes, 369 00:26:12,119 --> 00:26:15,039 we need to basically get the region in order. We need to stabilize 370 00:26:15,039 --> 00:26:18,839 it while we can, because if it's not fully ready to go by the 371 00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:23,880 time World War One finishes, we're gonna be seeing major trouble. And so 372 00:26:25,039 --> 00:26:27,359 Wilson ends up responding to threats as they come up much more kind of I 373 00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:33,559 think aggressively than previous presidents. And you see this everything from his multiple interventions 374 00:26:33,559 --> 00:26:37,720 in Mexico. He occupies Haiti, he occupies the Dominican Republic, he occupies 375 00:26:37,759 --> 00:26:41,920 Panama, he occupies Cuba, he occupies Nicaraguay at this point is already a 376 00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:45,240 little occupied, so he doesn't get too much blamed for that, but he 377 00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:49,000 you know, I mean, and he also annex is the Danish West Indies, 378 00:26:49,079 --> 00:26:52,960 which becomes the US Virgin Islands. And each of these things I think 379 00:26:52,960 --> 00:26:56,759 you can really link to if not a direct European threat, then at least 380 00:26:56,799 --> 00:27:00,759 hovering in the background this sense that you US needs to kind of get a 381 00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:06,359 hemisphere into order before things really go stile after the war. Yeah, and 382 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:08,559 that you know idea that you know, Europe eventually, you know, becomes 383 00:27:08,599 --> 00:27:12,720 the centerfold for the most part, you know, during World War Two with 384 00:27:12,839 --> 00:27:17,799 the battle against Hitler and the Nazis, and then obviously the Pacific opens up 385 00:27:17,839 --> 00:27:21,599 with war with Japan. Um. You know, as we look back on 386 00:27:21,680 --> 00:27:23,799 foreign policy, you know, the United States, you know, through these 387 00:27:23,839 --> 00:27:27,839 decades has become you know, the leading superpower in the world. You know, 388 00:27:27,960 --> 00:27:32,400 looking back at some of these events, you know, do you see 389 00:27:32,559 --> 00:27:37,240 kind of similarities in how the United States handled those events and how we handled 390 00:27:37,279 --> 00:27:42,079 some recent foreign policy related events. Absolutely. I mean, for one thing, 391 00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:45,599 I have a chapter in the book where I sort of step back and 392 00:27:45,680 --> 00:27:49,240 look at the US interventions, and you know, I think a huge part 393 00:27:49,319 --> 00:27:52,680 of what the US was trying to do was nation builled by force. Right. 394 00:27:53,279 --> 00:27:57,559 Um, the US wanted these saw these massive political and economic problems in 395 00:27:57,599 --> 00:28:02,119 these nations, and it wanted to kind help stabilize them and set them up 396 00:28:02,119 --> 00:28:04,319 as sort of independent states and that's not that different from what we're you know, 397 00:28:04,440 --> 00:28:08,279 we're trying to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it's not that different 398 00:28:08,279 --> 00:28:12,000 in terms of results as to how you know, those two nations ended up 399 00:28:12,039 --> 00:28:15,720 turning out. And I talk in the book a lot, you know about 400 00:28:15,720 --> 00:28:21,759 a lot of the different reasons. I think part of it stems from basic 401 00:28:22,759 --> 00:28:26,200 problems that in theory can be remedied, and so American policy makers are often 402 00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:30,480 ignorant. They don't really know much about the political ecosystems that they're trying to 403 00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:33,880 get involved in. They're looking for sort of silver bullet solutions without realizing how 404 00:28:33,920 --> 00:28:37,000 one thing can affect another thing. And if you pull this thread, oftentimes 405 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:42,359 it'll affect something all the way over here. And those sorts of problems I 406 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:47,440 think in theory can be fixed, although I would say the fact that we 407 00:28:47,559 --> 00:28:52,480 seem to continually make those mistakes suggest that perhaps even if these problems are fixable 408 00:28:52,599 --> 00:28:56,039 in theory, in practice they don't seem to be, and that should be 409 00:28:56,039 --> 00:28:59,799 something that policy makers should account for. But I also just point at some 410 00:28:59,880 --> 00:29:03,759 of the reasons why there are kind of more structural reasons why it's very, 411 00:29:03,839 --> 00:29:08,119 very difficult to stabilize the society from the outside, even if you're doing everything 412 00:29:08,119 --> 00:29:12,359 exactly right. And so part of the reason is that if you want to 413 00:29:12,359 --> 00:29:18,279 have these sustainable institutions, political institutions that can hold up in a nation, 414 00:29:18,079 --> 00:29:22,160 they need to have internal legitimacy. And whenever you're kind of imposing them from 415 00:29:22,160 --> 00:29:27,720 the outside, not only are you depriving local people of that legitimacy, but 416 00:29:27,759 --> 00:29:33,759 you're also oftentimes destroying what few institutions they do have that are kind of serving 417 00:29:33,799 --> 00:29:37,400 that function. And so in kind of looking at the sweep of these interventions, 418 00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:40,799 you know, one of the main takeaways is not necessarily that it can't 419 00:29:40,839 --> 00:29:44,960 be done, but that nation building is incredibly difficult and incredibly hard to do. 420 00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:48,839 But then the other kind of lesson of the book, and in some 421 00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:52,880 ways the more important lesson is sort of the one that I started with, 422 00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:56,160 which is why is it the Rising power send to be aggressive an expansionist? 423 00:29:56,039 --> 00:30:00,880 The book is obviously there a discussion so far as I think supported it was 424 00:30:00,920 --> 00:30:04,720 not an exception to this rule. It was quite aggressive, It was quite 425 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:11,359 expansionist, But I think the reasons why it acted that way are not exactly 426 00:30:11,400 --> 00:30:15,799 what conventional wisdom would suggest and paradoxically that I think the US was often acting 427 00:30:15,839 --> 00:30:22,440 from a sort of defensive impulse. And I think that that's important to understand 428 00:30:22,480 --> 00:30:25,400 as we look at the rising powers of today, or at least the kind 429 00:30:25,440 --> 00:30:29,200 of other great powers of today, so Russia and China and then obviously to 430 00:30:29,240 --> 00:30:34,160 a lesser extent or on and sort of understanding what might lead those nations to 431 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:40,079 be aggressive is important, even if the kind of answer might be one that 432 00:30:40,240 --> 00:30:44,400 is, you know, not necessarily kind of consistent with what we think about 433 00:30:44,440 --> 00:30:48,880 when we think about what drives you powers to be aggressive and expansionist. Yeah, 434 00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:52,079 that actually ties into my next question. You know, you mentioned China. 435 00:30:52,240 --> 00:30:55,880 You know, early on in our conversation you talked about how they are, 436 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,480 you know, this growing power. They very clearly have regional and global 437 00:30:59,519 --> 00:31:03,279 ambition that they're trying to achieve, and you note this in the book that 438 00:31:03,359 --> 00:31:06,839 they are you know, they have all the characteristics of arising power, but 439 00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:10,519 they're not exactly following the same track as the United States. Because you expand 440 00:31:10,599 --> 00:31:18,200 upon that point, So I would say that they're not. They're rising obviously 441 00:31:18,200 --> 00:31:21,799 in a very different world, right, And so you know, for one 442 00:31:21,839 --> 00:31:26,039 thing, we have nuclear weapons, which present their own kind of problems and 443 00:31:26,119 --> 00:31:30,000 perils, but also inject an element of stability through you know, mutually assured 444 00:31:30,079 --> 00:31:33,720 destruction and the fact that great powers with nuclear weapons tend not to want to 445 00:31:33,759 --> 00:31:37,799 go to war with each other for obvious reasons. China's also, it's rise 446 00:31:37,960 --> 00:31:42,279 has in large part been historically unique and so far as it's been fueled almost 447 00:31:42,279 --> 00:31:48,319 exclusively by trade as opposed to by conquest, and that's very, very unusual. 448 00:31:48,359 --> 00:31:52,160 I mean, even the United States, you know, Secretary of State 449 00:31:52,160 --> 00:31:53,920 Canto Leasa Rice, because this great vote where she says, you know, 450 00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:57,559 people say that the United States was isolationists, But if we are isolationists, 451 00:31:57,599 --> 00:32:00,640 how did we get so big? And you know, the point is we 452 00:32:00,640 --> 00:32:05,119 started out as thirteen original colonies and we ended up the size of a continent. 453 00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:08,440 And so even the US, in large part it's rise was a function 454 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:14,279 I think of conquest and kind of you know expansion. China is sort of 455 00:32:14,319 --> 00:32:17,559 unusual and that it comes out of, you know, kind of the turbulence 456 00:32:17,599 --> 00:32:22,680 of the first half of the twentieth century, and it ends up becoming powerful 457 00:32:22,680 --> 00:32:28,000 by integrating itself into the trade architecture that the United States set up after World 458 00:32:28,000 --> 00:32:30,559 War Two, and a large part of that is, you know, they're 459 00:32:30,599 --> 00:32:34,240 not exactly playing by the rules and things like that, but it's not the 460 00:32:34,279 --> 00:32:38,359 same sort of aggressive kind of impulse of conquest that you sometimes see with a 461 00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:42,960 lot of other rising powers. And so talking to Chinese scholars, what you 462 00:32:43,000 --> 00:32:45,039 often hear is, while China is different from other rising powers, it's not 463 00:32:45,119 --> 00:32:51,640 going to be aggressive an expansionist. It's not gonna it's not going to try 464 00:32:51,680 --> 00:32:53,680 and become a hegemond, it's not going to try and dominate its neighbors because 465 00:32:53,720 --> 00:32:58,200 we're just different, right. And the point that I make at the end 466 00:32:58,240 --> 00:33:00,640 of the book is that, yes, there are those differences, but this 467 00:33:01,119 --> 00:33:05,880 kind of example of the United States suggests that they might not matter very much 468 00:33:06,559 --> 00:33:08,000 because the United States was also different in its own way. I mean, 469 00:33:08,519 --> 00:33:12,319 it's trite, I think to say that, you know, the United States 470 00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:15,079 is exceptionalists and exceptional power, but I think there's a lot of truth to 471 00:33:15,119 --> 00:33:19,279 that in certain ways. And certainly that's the way that Americans saw themselves at 472 00:33:19,319 --> 00:33:23,319 this period. As I mentioned before, one of the surprises in the research 473 00:33:24,000 --> 00:33:29,960 was how much American policymakers, as they were taking these steps, were really 474 00:33:30,119 --> 00:33:34,039 regretting them and sort of seeing them as a last resort that they had been 475 00:33:34,119 --> 00:33:37,720 driven to. And so it's not like Wilson or taft A rose of alt 476 00:33:37,960 --> 00:33:43,400 didn't you care about other nations sovereignty, It didn't support classical liberal values, 477 00:33:43,559 --> 00:33:47,440 didn't you know, oppose intervention on principle. It's just that none of those 478 00:33:47,440 --> 00:33:51,559 things were important enough when it came down to it, because they thought that 479 00:33:51,599 --> 00:33:54,519 they faced sort of security imperatives. And my point in the end of the 480 00:33:54,559 --> 00:33:59,759 book is when I talk about China, is that there's reason to think that 481 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:04,119 is going to face those exact same security imperatives, and that it will react 482 00:34:04,200 --> 00:34:07,559 equally aggressively and expansionally if it expansively, if it comes down to it. 483 00:34:07,880 --> 00:34:12,320 And so you know, my caution is that on the one hand, you 484 00:34:12,360 --> 00:34:15,199 know, history and ever repeats itself exactly, but it does tend to rhyme, 485 00:34:15,239 --> 00:34:17,519 and sort of looking at these lessons of kind of how other powers rose 486 00:34:17,559 --> 00:34:22,519 and the reasons why they did it helps shed light on the mechanics and dynamics 487 00:34:22,519 --> 00:34:25,519 that might also be a play in our own age. Absolutely, and I 488 00:34:25,559 --> 00:34:29,360 think that's a good place to leave it. If people want to order the 489 00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:30,239 book, where can they go to get it? And if they want to 490 00:34:30,280 --> 00:34:32,880 find you and more of your work, where can they go? So the 491 00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:37,480 book is available anywhere books are sold. I'm not sure I open this episode 492 00:34:37,519 --> 00:34:39,840 is airing, but it's coming out on June twenty seventh, but you should 493 00:34:39,880 --> 00:34:45,719 pre order today if it's this episodes getting aired before then. And then as 494 00:34:45,760 --> 00:34:51,199 far as my work, I published a variety of publications and so there's I 495 00:34:51,239 --> 00:34:53,760 guess no one a good spot for that, but yeah, just keep an 496 00:34:53,760 --> 00:34:57,480 eye on in general, I suppose awesome. Well, thank you so much 497 00:34:57,480 --> 00:35:00,559 again for joining us, and thank you our listeners for joining us as well. 498 00:35:00,760 --> 00:35:02,760 You've been listening to another edition of the Federal's Radio Hour. I'm Sean 499 00:35:02,840 --> 00:35:06,719 Fleetwood. We'll be back with more, and until then, be lovers of 500 00:35:06,760 --> 00:35:16,559 freedom and anxious for the Freddy. I heard the fame by the reason, 501 00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:22,000 and then it faded away