1 00:00:04,120 --> 00:00:11,359 Welcome to Spycraft, a podcast that tells gripping life and death spy stories and 2 00:00:11,439 --> 00:00:17,160 the amazing devices and operations that made them possible. Now let's get started. 3 00:00:25,960 --> 00:00:31,039 Welcome back everybody. Today, we have a special guest, Michael trot Trott. 4 00:00:31,760 --> 00:00:35,200 He's the author of a book called The Protected. I highly recommend it 5 00:00:35,200 --> 00:00:38,159 if you're looking into getting into the field of executive protection or if you just 6 00:00:38,439 --> 00:00:42,719 want to learn more insight about situational awareness, I recommend it. So who 7 00:00:42,759 --> 00:00:46,159 is he? He began his career as a security specialist in the US Air 8 00:00:46,200 --> 00:00:48,399 Force, serving six of his ten years in Europe, but he was also 9 00:00:48,439 --> 00:00:53,920 assigned to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations the OSI. He was also 10 00:00:53,960 --> 00:00:58,039 a team leader and field supervisor for an operational fifteen man tactically unit in a 11 00:00:58,119 --> 00:01:00,840 conducted bilateral account Counter two. There was some training and joint ops with the 12 00:01:00,880 --> 00:01:07,159 German Special Police and military Special Op units. Between his military and private sector 13 00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:10,480 careers. For many years, he was a special agent for the CIA. 14 00:01:10,799 --> 00:01:12,599 Actually should be a special officer, but we'll go back to that. We'll 15 00:01:12,640 --> 00:01:17,120 ask him in a minute. Assigned to the Protective Security Detail for the CIA 16 00:01:17,200 --> 00:01:22,879 Director and several deputy directors. Concurrently, he supported the agency's clandestine efforts to 17 00:01:22,959 --> 00:01:27,959 provide critical, low prop profile protection and various overseas locations, and conclude his 18 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:34,799 tenure supporting other assets as well other agency directorates. So, without wasting any 19 00:01:34,840 --> 00:01:38,519 more time, make sure to share, subscribe hit I like, but you 20 00:01:38,519 --> 00:01:42,280 know we like it. Let's work to the show. Mister officer, mister 21 00:01:42,359 --> 00:01:49,760 Mike Trott, Welcome sir, Thank you. Doctor Carlos have been called worse. 22 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:53,680 It's that special agent. And I don't want to make this faux pad 23 00:01:53,879 --> 00:01:57,760 many years ago and I wasn't as familiar and I got a tongue lashing to 24 00:01:57,840 --> 00:02:00,799 call it CIA officer an agent. But is there a special agent category? 25 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:06,120 There really is, And thanks for asking for clarifications so some people don't get 26 00:02:06,200 --> 00:02:12,240 confused. In general, yeah, CIA would probably classify the majority of their 27 00:02:12,240 --> 00:02:15,560 field operators as officers. But I have a badge hanging on the wall behind 28 00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:23,919 me that says special agent. And so when you provide protective operations or protective 29 00:02:23,919 --> 00:02:29,120 services for someone like the Director, you are issued an agency badge and that 30 00:02:29,240 --> 00:02:31,800 badge says special agent. So it's a it's a rarity. It's not too 31 00:02:31,800 --> 00:02:37,479 many people that have that distinction or that title, and yeah, you're right. 32 00:02:37,520 --> 00:02:38,520 Some people do the confused they go, oh, you think you're a 33 00:02:38,560 --> 00:02:44,560 special agent. I don't think I was, actually was, but that's just 34 00:02:44,599 --> 00:02:46,719 by the title. Doesn't mean I was out there doing you know, James 35 00:02:46,759 --> 00:02:51,479 Bond special agent stuff, and that's just the title that they used. So 36 00:02:52,080 --> 00:02:54,840 thanks for asking the question. That clarifies it absolutely. You know, it's 37 00:02:54,840 --> 00:03:00,240 always funny that other people think they think CIA and they'll think automatically or an 38 00:03:00,240 --> 00:03:04,960 identity or or Liam Neeson and taken and things of that nature. But even 39 00:03:04,960 --> 00:03:10,159 if you did do that stuff, you wouldn't tell us anyway. Let me 40 00:03:10,159 --> 00:03:15,280 ask you this. It's okay to call you Michael. It is you mentioned 41 00:03:15,280 --> 00:03:20,360 before the interview of human complexities, and I'm seeing one right out of the 42 00:03:20,400 --> 00:03:27,479 gate, which is I'm here to protect the head of the CIA, now, 43 00:03:27,520 --> 00:03:30,759 George Jennet. At that time, that seems to add a little complexity. 44 00:03:30,879 --> 00:03:35,759 If something goes wrong or if he wants me to do something that I 45 00:03:35,800 --> 00:03:39,280 think is not as safe, the risk factors go up. How was that 46 00:03:39,319 --> 00:03:46,919 little juggling act? You know, it is complicated and to do to talk 47 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:50,280 in the book about it quite a bit of human complexes because it's not as 48 00:03:50,319 --> 00:03:53,919 black and water as we want it to be. Working for someone like a 49 00:03:53,039 --> 00:03:58,479 cheminant level official or a CIA director or the CEO of a company with that 50 00:03:58,639 --> 00:04:03,240 fact, it's complicated navigating that, and it's part of it is the relationship 51 00:04:03,319 --> 00:04:08,240 that you build with your principal to where there's a trust factor. At the 52 00:04:08,319 --> 00:04:10,800 end of the day, someone like the director, he still has a job 53 00:04:10,879 --> 00:04:14,080 he has to do, regardless of the risk factors where he acts to where 54 00:04:14,080 --> 00:04:18,439 he needs to travel. I can remember many times Doddie has secretary coming into 55 00:04:18,439 --> 00:04:21,319 the office and saying, hey, you know, George wants to go to 56 00:04:21,639 --> 00:04:26,639 X location and we're like, oh my gosh, it's can we go somewhere 57 00:04:26,680 --> 00:04:30,839 else? But at the same time, he's got a reason why he's got 58 00:04:30,839 --> 00:04:32,439 to go, and you know, eight out of ten times it's the President 59 00:04:32,560 --> 00:04:39,160 directing him to build that location to conduct meetings. So we get it done. 60 00:04:39,319 --> 00:04:43,639 We get it done the safest way we can. Obviously we luck to 61 00:04:43,720 --> 00:04:46,600 kind of going quietly and leave quietly, and there's a reason behind that. 62 00:04:46,720 --> 00:04:48,800 It's just the very nature of what the agency does. It's not a fanfare 63 00:04:48,879 --> 00:04:54,680 trip in this case, the director of the agency is not at a presidential 64 00:04:54,800 --> 00:04:58,920 level, it's not a state department official. We got to stay out of 65 00:04:58,959 --> 00:05:02,000 politics, going in and going out as our preference, which works to our 66 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:05,800 advantage. But it is complicated and there's a lot that goes on behind the 67 00:05:05,839 --> 00:05:10,600 scenes, as you can imagine, to make sure it's done safely and still 68 00:05:10,639 --> 00:05:14,959 allow the director to do the job, probably wishing, you know, don't 69 00:05:14,959 --> 00:05:18,000 we have an espionage issue in the Bahamas somewhere that we can go tackle for 70 00:05:18,040 --> 00:05:23,879 a while. I guess that leads me to my other question. A lot 71 00:05:23,879 --> 00:05:27,639 of people maybe they're getting the idea of if you're familiar with the industry, 72 00:05:27,680 --> 00:05:30,120 you probably understand this already, but there's a lot of prep work that has 73 00:05:30,160 --> 00:05:33,720 to go on here. So if you're going into a particular state or a 74 00:05:33,839 --> 00:05:42,120 nation state that has a high risk environment, how long is the typical preparation 75 00:05:42,360 --> 00:05:46,399 for it, and you have assets over there that start giving you ideas, 76 00:05:46,439 --> 00:05:48,240 Hey, Mike, I gotta be careful with this or that, what's going 77 00:05:48,279 --> 00:05:53,120 on there? Whatever you can share, of course, yeah, well I'll 78 00:05:53,160 --> 00:05:55,720 take it out of the agency and go back into PREVACE secret because it's kind 79 00:05:55,720 --> 00:06:00,199 of actually similar So whether you're in a government organizational with private sector, if 80 00:06:00,240 --> 00:06:03,399 you're working for a high profile CEO and that person needs to go to a 81 00:06:03,439 --> 00:06:08,800 particular country still high risk, you still sort of follow the same methodologies, 82 00:06:09,800 --> 00:06:13,639 and so a lot of that, to your point, is prep work a 83 00:06:13,720 --> 00:06:16,600 trip that might be into high threat area. To be quite honestly, quite 84 00:06:16,600 --> 00:06:20,560 honest, it could take weeks to months, or you might go in twenty 85 00:06:20,560 --> 00:06:26,319 four hours. So it just depends on the nature of the trip. I 86 00:06:26,360 --> 00:06:29,759 can remember many times when at the agency I would have what we call go 87 00:06:29,920 --> 00:06:33,720 bags in the car and many times leaving a shift heading to the house and 88 00:06:33,759 --> 00:06:38,319 I get a call instead of heading home, head to Dallas Airport, we 89 00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:43,560 need you to go X location. So sometimes it works to your events because 90 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:45,920 if you don't know where you're going there, how does anybody else know going 91 00:06:45,959 --> 00:06:48,439 there? So it works to your vantage. It depending on how big the 92 00:06:48,480 --> 00:06:53,480 trip is, how many moving parts, how many people are traveling, you 93 00:06:53,519 --> 00:06:57,040 know, what are the meetings. And again let's take the agency aside, 94 00:06:57,040 --> 00:07:01,959 it's the same in private sector, so it really runs the wide range of 95 00:07:02,480 --> 00:07:05,480 It could be weeks to months, and it could be as less as twenty 96 00:07:05,480 --> 00:07:11,639 four hours. It really depends on the mission and the request. Now we 97 00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:15,160 might as security professionals, work with the executives and say, you know, 98 00:07:15,439 --> 00:07:17,040 let's don't go on forty eight hours. Can we push this back for a 99 00:07:17,120 --> 00:07:21,160 week because we do need to move certain assets into a location. It could 100 00:07:21,199 --> 00:07:25,839 be vehicles, it could be people, it could be other assets as well 101 00:07:25,879 --> 00:07:29,319 as we need to maybe get ground truths what's going on in that location that 102 00:07:29,319 --> 00:07:33,199 we really need to be concerned with. So there's a lot that goes into 103 00:07:33,199 --> 00:07:36,399 it, and there's a lot of specialists that have their you know, their 104 00:07:36,480 --> 00:07:41,079 nuanced capacities of what they do. It's not a matter of just the guys 105 00:07:41,079 --> 00:07:44,079 that you know, jump on a plane and get off. There's there's a 106 00:07:44,120 --> 00:07:46,160 whole lot of people working in the background to make sure these trips go smooth. 107 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:50,680 I don't know if this question is too sensitive or not, but I 108 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:59,480 guess all that's I'll find out. But how important becomes certain individuals in countries 109 00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:03,480 that are higher risk or countries that you may not be as familiar with in 110 00:08:03,480 --> 00:08:09,000 the sense of like a diplomat, a sense of an ambassador attache the FBI, 111 00:08:11,279 --> 00:08:13,959 even in the CIA, we have you have recruiters obviously that go down 112 00:08:15,079 --> 00:08:18,720 and they get to mingle with a lot of people, especially down in the 113 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:22,720 I would you say, boots on the ground environment where they get to meet 114 00:08:22,920 --> 00:08:28,319 area. Do you ever access those individuals, recruiters, ambassadors, diplomats to 115 00:08:28,360 --> 00:08:31,840 see the field politically of it, if you're going to a country that maybe 116 00:08:33,519 --> 00:08:37,360 doesn't look at us the same way, anything like that at all, to 117 00:08:37,360 --> 00:08:41,840 get additional resources, well, for sure, especially in terms of the information. 118 00:08:41,159 --> 00:08:45,080 Let's take the State Department as as a case in point. The State 119 00:08:45,080 --> 00:08:48,759 Department has probably more resources and assets in other countries, and there is a 120 00:08:50,120 --> 00:08:56,240 a process of reciprocating or sharing assets and information. So obviously you take the 121 00:08:56,240 --> 00:09:03,039 State departmental security. You know, your local RSO regional security officer reason when 122 00:09:03,039 --> 00:09:07,799 it's in charge of the security of that particular local embassy or consulate, as 123 00:09:07,840 --> 00:09:11,159 well as the people, whether it's the counselor or well it's the ambassador. 124 00:09:11,279 --> 00:09:16,399 So yes, we do work alongside them all quite often. We share information. 125 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:18,279 We ask them, you know, to your point, what's the boots 126 00:09:18,279 --> 00:09:22,399 on the ground threat right now? That's the risks and sometimes they can provide 127 00:09:22,519 --> 00:09:28,200 you know, human assets to us and then vice versa. You know, 128 00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:31,399 you're probably familiar what happened in BEng Ghazi where it was kind of a shared 129 00:09:31,919 --> 00:09:35,519 scenario where both sides came came together to you know, to fight a local 130 00:09:35,600 --> 00:09:41,480 enemy. Unfortunately, Uh, and the high price was paid on both sides. 131 00:09:41,639 --> 00:09:45,840 So now we do we do tap all those resources. There's very few 132 00:09:46,080 --> 00:09:50,480 resources we may not sort of tap. It really just depends on the mission, 133 00:09:50,600 --> 00:09:56,720 who's traveling, and what's going on currently politically, Uh, in that 134 00:09:56,759 --> 00:10:01,000 particular region. Yeah, the there, I know, it's speaking to one 135 00:10:01,000 --> 00:10:05,919 gentleman who does not name the work a lot. I guess as he puts 136 00:10:05,919 --> 00:10:09,080 it, do you, he uses a lot of unconventional means in the sense 137 00:10:09,080 --> 00:10:11,679 of it. You know, maybe this is unconventional for me. I guess, 138 00:10:13,279 --> 00:10:16,919 uh, where he talks to. He might talk to a homeless person 139 00:10:16,919 --> 00:10:20,960 who's sitting outside, who's been out there a lot, who sees who comes 140 00:10:20,960 --> 00:10:24,399 by all the time, who doesn't come by, Maybe the old lady that 141 00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:28,639 sits outside her balcony every day and then they've noticed her sitting there for five 142 00:10:28,679 --> 00:10:33,799 hours a day? Is that unconventional tactics? Also? You sometimes it is. 143 00:10:33,919 --> 00:10:37,840 And again it goes back to what's what's the miss h for sure. 144 00:10:37,039 --> 00:10:41,600 You know when you start talking about situation awareness again, whether it was at 145 00:10:41,600 --> 00:10:45,360 the agency or whether in my private sector road, you know, one of 146 00:10:45,399 --> 00:10:48,240 things I talk about as soon as I would land in a foreign country and 147 00:10:48,279 --> 00:10:52,440 get to the hotel, honestly starts to sit as you land and excellent airport, 148 00:10:52,840 --> 00:10:56,759 you're already beginning to put your all your senses together, and you're you're 149 00:10:56,799 --> 00:11:01,039 starting to start to put the post together of what it is like in this 150 00:11:01,120 --> 00:11:07,159 particular region, this area everything from weather to smells, to senses, to 151 00:11:07,120 --> 00:11:13,279 access and communication. And if I'm going into a particular country where I should 152 00:11:13,399 --> 00:11:16,039 expect certain accents, but I'm hearing a lot of other different accents that might 153 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:20,759 be of interest to me. Why do we have a lot of other people 154 00:11:20,759 --> 00:11:24,080 from other countries in this particular area. And it could come down to the 155 00:11:24,080 --> 00:11:28,960 hostile surveillance I might expect. But from the time that I get to the 156 00:11:28,000 --> 00:11:33,600 airport or leave the airport to get to the hotel, usually probably nine percent 157 00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:35,879 of the times, so I get into a room, it's change clothes and 158 00:11:35,879 --> 00:11:39,559 get out on the street and let me let me feel the vibe of the 159 00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:43,159 street, let me see what's going on, let me see who else, 160 00:11:43,559 --> 00:11:46,559 who else is around that I may see a couple three hours later, and 161 00:11:46,559 --> 00:11:48,480 I may see the next day or the day after. And what we consider 162 00:11:48,559 --> 00:11:54,519 our advance work. So if I'm traveling in advance of a protectee's traveling to 163 00:11:54,559 --> 00:11:58,039 a certain location, we typically would send one, two or three or maybe 164 00:11:58,039 --> 00:12:03,960 more advanced individuals. And that's both private sector as well in the government. 165 00:12:03,320 --> 00:12:07,960 So we're preparing for that arrival of that principle, and we're trying to understand 166 00:12:07,039 --> 00:12:11,960 all the unknowns. That's the whole purpose of an advance is to take away 167 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:15,759 those unknowns. So we want to know where the hospitals are, We want 168 00:12:15,759 --> 00:12:18,440 know where the routes are, what their alternative routes are, who will be 169 00:12:18,519 --> 00:12:20,840 meeting, what time should we be there. We want to drive those routes 170 00:12:20,879 --> 00:12:24,039 typically the same time, but we're going to be driving those routes when we're 171 00:12:24,039 --> 00:12:28,360 there. Over the principals, traffic patterns change. You know, today we 172 00:12:28,440 --> 00:12:31,440 do rely a lot on technology, and that's great. You know, the 173 00:12:31,519 --> 00:12:41,080 GPS system and our smartphones are just an amazing piece of hardware. But sometimes 174 00:12:41,080 --> 00:12:43,840 we rely a little bit too much on that and you've got to get out 175 00:12:43,799 --> 00:12:48,480 and walk the street and get to fill for it because that smartphone is not 176 00:12:48,519 --> 00:12:50,080 going to tell you everything and you have to get out and see it for 177 00:12:50,159 --> 00:12:56,559 yourself. But definitely definitely aid to us, that's for sure. I think 178 00:12:56,559 --> 00:12:58,440 it hit me because I know at the beginning of your book you were talking 179 00:12:58,519 --> 00:13:03,919 about what was that individual's named her house, and I think it was but 180 00:13:03,039 --> 00:13:09,559 you saw the boy in the bicycle and he kept popping up for you, 181 00:13:09,320 --> 00:13:16,080 and that was really situationally aware because you have something kept standing out to you 182 00:13:16,159 --> 00:13:20,840 a little bit made you think about it and you're like, I can't remember 183 00:13:20,879 --> 00:13:24,080 that. I think you, yeah, satchel or something behind the seat of 184 00:13:24,080 --> 00:13:28,960 those bike or something like that. But that was a pretty good spot for 185 00:13:28,159 --> 00:13:31,919 hair house. And that's not a location. I was not on that particular 186 00:13:31,919 --> 00:13:35,600 detail. I was about fifteen to twenty minutes away. It's not an assassination 187 00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:43,519 because we were with our principal another location, but that particular scenario, the 188 00:13:43,600 --> 00:13:48,240 Red Armu faction was highly believed to be the one that was behind his assassination. 189 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:52,080 They had been surveying that route that he would take his home to work, 190 00:13:52,639 --> 00:13:56,679 probably for weeks, if not months and looking for the right location to 191 00:13:56,799 --> 00:14:03,240 put this this shake charge at a location that had a high level of success, 192 00:14:03,279 --> 00:14:07,840 if you will, And through their probably calculations, they determined that the 193 00:14:07,879 --> 00:14:11,759 bridge that he went across, which is kind of a choke point, if 194 00:14:11,759 --> 00:14:15,360 they could put a bicycle on that bridge and put a satchel behind the bicycle, 195 00:14:15,879 --> 00:14:18,919 it would be at the right height with that for that debt to go 196 00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:24,720 through the car, which it did. So that bicycle was there on and 197 00:14:24,759 --> 00:14:28,679 off for several days in weeks prior to him crossing that bridge, So it 198 00:14:28,799 --> 00:14:33,759 got the probably the surveillance team or the security team familiar with seeing something that 199 00:14:33,879 --> 00:14:37,120 wasn't out of place, and so now they got used to it. Except 200 00:14:37,320 --> 00:14:41,639 for that one particular morning, there had to be something else on that bike 201 00:14:41,720 --> 00:14:45,679 and that was a central charge that blew, but they unfortunately missed that, 202 00:14:45,960 --> 00:14:52,240 and yeah, Alfred, he died because of that. It was an intense 203 00:14:52,240 --> 00:14:56,840 story and it's an amazing just that that's it was really clever, unfortunately, 204 00:14:56,480 --> 00:15:01,960 really clever technique. You get to look at it sort of roadside bombs and 205 00:15:01,960 --> 00:15:03,759 IDs. I mean, obviously it was one of the kind of the catalysts 206 00:15:03,759 --> 00:15:09,240 to where things started to go and the later later eighties and nineties and two 207 00:15:09,279 --> 00:15:13,039 thousands. Of course we saw way too much of that, and I reckon 208 00:15:13,080 --> 00:15:20,039 if we understand from those kinds of tactics, but definitely was a very successful 209 00:15:20,039 --> 00:15:22,720 and almost a nexus for that kind of tactic at that time. Yeah, 210 00:15:22,720 --> 00:15:26,200 we're starting to see it now with the drug cartels done in Mexico. Is 211 00:15:26,279 --> 00:15:28,679 kind of surprising. Over the last few months, I started seeing a lot 212 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:31,320 of Ied attacks, So what are these guys up to? All of a 213 00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:37,320 sudden, It's almost like al Kaita's down there. Very strange stuff going out 214 00:15:37,320 --> 00:15:41,559 over there. But back to you on the the interesting thing about your book 215 00:15:41,559 --> 00:15:43,200 too, I think it is in chapter one. I can't remember. It 216 00:15:43,279 --> 00:15:46,399 was either chapter one or at the intro. You actually went into some of 217 00:15:46,440 --> 00:15:50,360 the history of some of the protectors of centuries ago. I mean you went 218 00:15:50,399 --> 00:15:56,279 to the Samurais way back when, and then you even went to the mysterious 219 00:15:56,279 --> 00:15:58,639 Swiss guards and the Vatican and why are the Swiss at the Vatican? But 220 00:15:58,720 --> 00:16:04,919 that's another mystory for another story, not much my restory. So did you 221 00:16:06,039 --> 00:16:08,639 learn a lot from looking at all these protectors in history as well? Did 222 00:16:08,679 --> 00:16:14,279 you blean some information from those. No, you think we do. I 223 00:16:14,279 --> 00:16:18,360 think all of us do. And probably more than anything, it might get 224 00:16:18,399 --> 00:16:21,519 down to a few tactics. Protactics have kind of changed a little bit of 225 00:16:21,519 --> 00:16:25,240 over here's based on weaponry and technology, But at the end of the day, 226 00:16:25,279 --> 00:16:29,519 it comes down to mindset. I think probably as I did mention. 227 00:16:29,679 --> 00:16:32,480 You know, from the time you could go back, you know, thousands 228 00:16:32,519 --> 00:16:37,039 of years ago to tribes. The very first time that one tribe said that 229 00:16:37,080 --> 00:16:42,360 they were going to harm another tribal leader, you probably had somebody from that 230 00:16:42,440 --> 00:16:45,519 tribe standing up and going, you know, we're not going to let that 231 00:16:45,559 --> 00:16:51,240 happen. And so you started to see the emerging of protecting people or protection, 232 00:16:52,080 --> 00:16:56,480 whether that's by hire, whether it's contract or you're some sort of incentive, 233 00:16:56,840 --> 00:16:59,480 or just for you know, just for the mission of it, that's 234 00:16:59,519 --> 00:17:03,919 what you do. So over the time, you know, while we've evolved 235 00:17:03,039 --> 00:17:10,799 into better equipment and tactics, weaponry, the mindset stills the same. Nothing's 236 00:17:10,880 --> 00:17:15,279 changed there. I mean, your desire to protect someone has to be at 237 00:17:15,319 --> 00:17:18,440 the forefront of your decision to do this kind of work. If your mindset's 238 00:17:18,480 --> 00:17:22,960 not right, it's going to show. It's going to show and you're going 239 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:26,759 to tell, and so is your principle on your mission. We talk about 240 00:17:26,759 --> 00:17:30,000 that all the time in the military or first responders. Mindset is so critical. 241 00:17:30,039 --> 00:17:33,640 I mean, how do you how do you train somebody to put on 242 00:17:33,680 --> 00:17:37,920 a suit money to burning building? And that takes a pretty strong mindset as 243 00:17:37,039 --> 00:17:44,200 environment. So mindset is very important the concept and this line of work, 244 00:17:44,599 --> 00:17:48,880 and I don't know that that has really changed much in the thousands of years 245 00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:52,160 in terms of, you know, understanding whether it's a samurai, that the 246 00:17:52,240 --> 00:17:56,759 commitment to the mission, the training, the time that goes into this. 247 00:17:59,319 --> 00:18:02,759 It can't be just a job. You have to really kind of dedicate your 248 00:18:03,079 --> 00:18:06,680 whole heart, mind, and soul into this kind of work, just as 249 00:18:06,680 --> 00:18:11,039 a police officer does, or a firement or anybody else. I'm a part 250 00:18:11,039 --> 00:18:12,799 of my friends, but you just can't go into half assed. You're gonna 251 00:18:12,839 --> 00:18:17,960 get You're gonna get hurt, killed, You're gonna kill somebody else. We 252 00:18:18,720 --> 00:18:22,599 let me ask you this regard. You made an interesting comment in your book 253 00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:26,400 and I've never thought about it before, maybe because I'm not as familiar with 254 00:18:26,440 --> 00:18:30,640 that area. But technology, we know that technology is advanced. That's not 255 00:18:30,000 --> 00:18:33,039 that's not the surprising part. But you mentioned all the new things that are 256 00:18:33,039 --> 00:18:37,599 coming up in the three D printing, which is kind of really strange. 257 00:18:37,119 --> 00:18:41,640 But you also mentioned that a lot of the EPs of today's world executive protectors 258 00:18:42,160 --> 00:18:48,519 don't move along with technology, which was kind of surprising. Way, why 259 00:18:48,599 --> 00:18:51,839 is that tell us a little bit about that? I think it gets down 260 00:18:51,880 --> 00:18:55,720 to the individual Again. You've got some people that are early adopters to technology, 261 00:18:56,039 --> 00:18:59,319 some are late adoptors, and that's probably the human element to it. 262 00:18:59,400 --> 00:19:03,400 I get probably gets back to the human complexity. Yeah, some people that 263 00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:07,559 just love to sit around play computer games all day long, and some people 264 00:19:07,000 --> 00:19:11,039 use it only as a tool to memes. So it's probably the matter of 265 00:19:11,119 --> 00:19:15,839 the accepting of the technology. Age can definitely be a factor, for sure. 266 00:19:18,519 --> 00:19:22,319 I think, you know, I'm a couple of years away from sixty 267 00:19:22,359 --> 00:19:26,319 myself, and while I feel like I'm an earlier adopter of technology and I 268 00:19:26,440 --> 00:19:30,279 try to stay ahead of as much as I can, butever three or four 269 00:19:30,359 --> 00:19:33,079 years I have to get a new iPhone. I'm like somen of a gun. 270 00:19:33,119 --> 00:19:33,759 You know, here we go again. You know, what is this 271 00:19:33,839 --> 00:19:36,640 doing? How does this work? You just get to a point in time 272 00:19:36,640 --> 00:19:37,880 of your life you're like, just give me my own flip phone back. 273 00:19:40,839 --> 00:19:42,680 So I think it goes back to mindset, you know, what's your mindset 274 00:19:42,960 --> 00:19:48,839 for accepting the technology. But yeah, some of our younger operators are more 275 00:19:48,880 --> 00:19:52,000 in tune to technology operators. That's a new skill set. If you went 276 00:19:52,079 --> 00:19:56,920 back thirty years ago, twenty five years ago, the technology component wasn't as 277 00:19:56,960 --> 00:20:00,960 important to maybe the operator to a degree. You have to be able to 278 00:20:00,960 --> 00:20:07,039 operate a vehicle very effectively, in your weapon effectively, and maybe some communications, 279 00:20:07,519 --> 00:20:11,640 definitely your first aid and your medical response. But beyond that, we 280 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:15,200 didn't have a lot of technology per se that we were using at that time. 281 00:20:15,839 --> 00:20:19,720 We've seen that explosion the last twenty years. That just keeps driving faster 282 00:20:19,759 --> 00:20:23,960 and faster. But what comes with that technology for us to help us do 283 00:20:25,079 --> 00:20:30,440 our job, also aids an adversary to come after us, such as IEDs 284 00:20:30,519 --> 00:20:33,079 and those kinds of things are you know, we talked about the cartel in 285 00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:37,400 Mexico were beginning to use their own levels of drones. You know, Okay, 286 00:20:37,440 --> 00:20:41,559 that gets a little complicated. I'd hate to be out to protecting somebody 287 00:20:41,599 --> 00:20:45,480 that I know that my enemy has a drone capability against me. That's not 288 00:20:45,519 --> 00:20:52,359 going to be fun. So technology is driving changes on both sides. But 289 00:20:52,400 --> 00:20:53,559 to your point, we have to adopt it. We have to be part 290 00:20:53,559 --> 00:20:59,440 of it, and whether it's the operator himself somebody owned, that team needs 291 00:20:59,440 --> 00:21:03,920 to be deep in the technology and understanding how to operate, how to use 292 00:21:03,960 --> 00:21:07,400 it, and then how to disseminate what information is derived from that technology to 293 00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:14,559 helper operators. It's it's only coming fast compurids. That's a great point because 294 00:21:14,599 --> 00:21:18,079 I know I'm aging myself a little bit with this movie with sneakers popped up 295 00:21:18,079 --> 00:21:22,960 in my head, remember that one was and the reason that popped up in 296 00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:26,559 my head because some of the as you mentioned the drug card tales, but 297 00:21:26,599 --> 00:21:29,720 some of the organizations are more sophisticated than others, and they do have teams 298 00:21:30,359 --> 00:21:33,480 and me for me speaking with individuals in this world every so often. You 299 00:21:33,519 --> 00:21:38,480 know, I've learned things about the raspberry pie and the pineapple and how you 300 00:21:38,519 --> 00:21:45,440 can access IP accounts and transmit information secretly nobody knows, and these little handheld 301 00:21:45,920 --> 00:21:49,440 polaroid picture things and those whole sorts of things you can do. That technology 302 00:21:49,480 --> 00:21:56,559 is just wasn't there years ago, there's no way and even putting even little 303 00:21:56,799 --> 00:22:00,759 film and microfish really in small little things and you can contain anywhere. It's 304 00:22:00,799 --> 00:22:04,880 really phenomenal. That makes your job so much more complicated. But at the 305 00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:08,119 same time, I could make it a lot easier if you're embraced it right 306 00:22:10,440 --> 00:22:12,920 can But like I said, those tools are used for both sides. You 307 00:22:12,920 --> 00:22:15,960 know, you look at the Google glasses of Google that came out, you 308 00:22:17,000 --> 00:22:19,000 know, ten years ago, so those are very interesting, but they're also 309 00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:22,200 you know, alous. The question in terms of privacy that I can walk 310 00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:26,680 into a room and just you know, immediately begin filming a video and somebody 311 00:22:27,119 --> 00:22:33,160 without giving them the operation, the the authority to improve that, the fact 312 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:37,880 that the video or recording audio. But I think we're going to begin to 313 00:22:37,920 --> 00:22:41,000 see even more of that. I think a band don't quote me, but 314 00:22:41,039 --> 00:22:44,720 I think there's another company just come out recently with some glasses that have the 315 00:22:44,839 --> 00:22:48,440 same capability. So to your point, you know, you know, privacy 316 00:22:48,519 --> 00:22:52,559 is a big thing that we do for our principles. When we're protecting someone, 317 00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:56,119 we're not just protecting them physically, but we're protecting their privacy as well. 318 00:22:56,839 --> 00:23:03,480 So the fact that you could wear technology g that can easily be concealed 319 00:23:03,519 --> 00:23:10,279 to listen to your conversation or to record video of a conversation. That's that's 320 00:23:10,359 --> 00:23:14,000 problematic. Now we can use that on our side as well for doing our 321 00:23:14,039 --> 00:23:19,759 advanced work and U to be used for positive influencer factors. But the end 322 00:23:21,039 --> 00:23:23,720 definitely can take pretty much anything that we've created for good, as you know, 323 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:27,400 turning it into something bad. And we see it every day. And 324 00:23:27,400 --> 00:23:30,559 you were right about the reband. I think the rebands smart glasses or something 325 00:23:30,640 --> 00:23:34,680 like that, so you can take photos and videos and the whole gadgets on 326 00:23:34,759 --> 00:23:40,279 there. It's insane because it is. I mean, I remember watching stuff 327 00:23:40,279 --> 00:23:44,079 from the old Mission Impossible with Peter Graves and looking at these things, going 328 00:23:44,119 --> 00:23:45,680 wow, this is incredible. And then now it's like you can just buy 329 00:23:45,680 --> 00:23:51,640 it for fifty bucks. You can be Peter Graves if you want it to 330 00:23:51,680 --> 00:23:56,240 be. It's unbelievable. I guess my next question. Your book has a 331 00:23:56,240 --> 00:23:57,720 lot I get that, folks. The book is called The Protected by Michael 332 00:23:57,839 --> 00:24:03,440 Trott. To our Tt, you focus a lot in psychology and I actually 333 00:24:03,440 --> 00:24:07,720 had this conversation with another individual who's in the executive protection space, and he 334 00:24:07,839 --> 00:24:15,680 was talking about you phrase it as learning to live with EP the reluctant executive 335 00:24:17,240 --> 00:24:22,200 and also determining your risk appetite, and that could be challenging sometimes. I 336 00:24:22,240 --> 00:24:25,119 don't know if you ever encountered this in your work, where somebody who may 337 00:24:25,160 --> 00:24:29,000 have a family, sometimes you're going to have to put your body on the 338 00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:33,720 line to be able to protect this individual. And I wonder have you ever 339 00:24:33,759 --> 00:24:37,960 seen it or is there something you work with in the sense of people having 340 00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:41,759 doubts In other words, I got two kids at home. I really want 341 00:24:41,799 --> 00:24:47,799 to end my life here protecting this individual and living in them without a dad, 342 00:24:48,079 --> 00:24:51,319 Or do I actually do what I'm supposed to be doing? Is that 343 00:24:51,759 --> 00:24:56,160 Is that a big challenge? It's a huge challenge, and it really depends 344 00:24:56,200 --> 00:25:00,400 on the kind of work you're doing. If you're talking about high would go 345 00:25:00,440 --> 00:25:03,000 back maybe twenty years, and you know, our most recent wars and conflicts 346 00:25:03,039 --> 00:25:10,160 where you have contractors and you know, military government operators going into high risk 347 00:25:10,200 --> 00:25:15,000 areas, We've lost a lot, I mean, we have lost a lot, 348 00:25:15,039 --> 00:25:18,400 a lot of human treasure there. And these are guys, like you 349 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:21,319 say, guys and gals putting their life on the line for somebody else, 350 00:25:21,559 --> 00:25:26,359 and unfortunately we've lost hundreds and you can expend up to thousands if you're bringing 351 00:25:26,400 --> 00:25:32,319 into our military. So yeah, absolutely. You know, I've got conversations 352 00:25:32,319 --> 00:25:36,200 with a couple of people very close to me who after their tenth, eleventh, 353 00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:38,079 and twelfth trip, you know, the little bit of the uh, 354 00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:41,880 maybe the mentor the dad in me comes out and I'm like, dude, 355 00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:45,799 you're done. You know, why why you why do you keep pushing this. 356 00:25:45,920 --> 00:25:48,359 You've got a couple of young ones at home that they need, they 357 00:25:48,400 --> 00:25:52,799 need you, and you need to be in one piece. And you know, 358 00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:53,920 after you've done five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten 359 00:25:55,000 --> 00:25:57,839 years of this, you've done your time. And so you know, sometimes 360 00:25:57,880 --> 00:26:02,559 you take somebody on the other to have that conversation to wake somebody up to 361 00:26:02,920 --> 00:26:06,559 what they could be, you know, leaving behind. But it gets into 362 00:26:06,559 --> 00:26:10,519 your blood. It's it's an adrenaline, it's a it's a camaraderie, it's 363 00:26:10,599 --> 00:26:15,359 it's something that you just can't you just can't understand until you've done it yourself. 364 00:26:15,440 --> 00:26:21,359 There's there's nothing, there's nothing, there's no stronger sort of you know, 365 00:26:21,359 --> 00:26:23,480 when then doorphins kick in when you land a plane in a certain location 366 00:26:23,559 --> 00:26:26,839 and you know, when you get out, shots start happening, and you 367 00:26:26,880 --> 00:26:30,480 get out with your team and you do your job and you protect somebody a 368 00:26:30,559 --> 00:26:33,440 higher risk for several days or whatever the mission may be, and you get 369 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:37,200 back on a plane and leave. That adrenaline is a rush and some you 370 00:26:37,200 --> 00:26:41,759 know, people really get into that, uh. But also there's a lot 371 00:26:41,799 --> 00:26:47,480 of close calls. You could have lost somebody on that trip, or you 372 00:26:47,519 --> 00:26:48,720 get back to the house when you look at your little one in their eyes 373 00:26:48,759 --> 00:26:52,640 and you go, you know what, this is where I need to be. 374 00:26:52,759 --> 00:26:56,640 So you have that sort of reckoning internally, you know, I wouldn't 375 00:26:56,640 --> 00:27:00,160 want to I wouldn't want to mess this up. So absolutely, I think 376 00:27:00,160 --> 00:27:04,200 you ever operator goes through it at one point in time. But that goes 377 00:27:04,279 --> 00:27:10,079 back to that to what I consider the human complexities of this job. It's 378 00:27:10,279 --> 00:27:14,359 it's not a matter of just saying I'm going to protect somebody or put a 379 00:27:14,400 --> 00:27:18,200 gun hount or drive somebody whatever, whatever your role is. There's a lot 380 00:27:18,240 --> 00:27:22,359 of other moving parts to this and some people last a few months in this 381 00:27:22,480 --> 00:27:26,319 business and some people last decades. It's a human factor. That's what The 382 00:27:26,319 --> 00:27:32,640 interesting thing about the CIA compared to other agencies, and not disparaging any of 383 00:27:32,640 --> 00:27:34,400 the other agencies. They all have their their wonderful qualities as well, but 384 00:27:34,880 --> 00:27:38,000 the CIA has a very unique, I've learned over the years of doing these 385 00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:44,519 interviews, a very unique psychological component, because if you're a recruiter, for 386 00:27:44,519 --> 00:27:48,440 instance, there's a lot of stuff that you're doing which you normally might not 387 00:27:48,559 --> 00:27:51,640 do. There's a lot of lying, there's a lot of deceptions stuff like 388 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:56,519 that with people you like, people you love with there's a lot moving not 389 00:27:56,599 --> 00:28:00,920 going on. And the CIA in general, you also have things they have 390 00:28:00,960 --> 00:28:03,920 to keep quiet. Even if you're not a recruiter, your other types of 391 00:28:03,960 --> 00:28:08,519 cases and things are involved in. It's a very unique world in regards to 392 00:28:08,559 --> 00:28:12,279 psychology. As you mentioned, human complexity that I don't always see. I 393 00:28:12,279 --> 00:28:15,839 mean, every law enforcement has something right. I can't talk about this case 394 00:28:15,920 --> 00:28:21,079 or something like that, but you guys have a lot more, it seems 395 00:28:21,119 --> 00:28:23,799 like from what I have gathered. Let me get this from you, because 396 00:28:23,839 --> 00:28:30,680 you have the unique perspective of having the agency perspective and outside an EP work, 397 00:28:30,720 --> 00:28:37,279 which I've never seen before in regards to that. When I talk to 398 00:28:37,279 --> 00:28:41,000 people in the private sector who do EP they said, the overwhelming majority never 399 00:28:41,079 --> 00:28:44,960 draw their weapon, never have had to use their weapon. For you, 400 00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:48,559 it sounds like was that the same for you in the private sector compared to 401 00:28:48,640 --> 00:28:53,440 the agency or were you just in particular situations where both required something or nothing. 402 00:28:53,480 --> 00:28:56,720 I don't know, it sounds a little different for you. It's really 403 00:28:56,759 --> 00:29:02,119 a situation. And again, you know, I had the unique scenario or 404 00:29:02,119 --> 00:29:06,640 the opportunity transition from because I did what we call PSL protective service operations in 405 00:29:06,640 --> 00:29:11,079 the military. So I was on a detail for by some time protecting a 406 00:29:11,119 --> 00:29:15,839 particular actually three different generals who was under threat from the Red Army faction Terria 407 00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:23,759 script and the same group that assassinated Herrhausen had basically put out a wish list 408 00:29:25,039 --> 00:29:29,440 internally that they wanted to also assassinate our general. And he was in charge 409 00:29:29,519 --> 00:29:33,039 of the largest military community outside of the United States, and it's called the 410 00:29:33,119 --> 00:29:40,599 Kaisenslovan military community in Germany, about seventy five thousand military people. And you 411 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:42,880 have to go back into a little study of the Red Army faction and sort 412 00:29:42,920 --> 00:29:48,759 of their methodology and what they were hoping to accomplish, which they did not, 413 00:29:48,000 --> 00:29:52,880 but looking at seventies and eighties of really assassinating a lot of people who 414 00:29:52,880 --> 00:30:00,079 were political leaders, scientists, bankers, military, app say, individuals, 415 00:30:00,680 --> 00:30:03,920 and it just really was against the system. So when they said that they 416 00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:08,640 wanted to come after our particular general, we took that threat seriously. So 417 00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:15,160 how we're going to operate and handle the protected detail for someone like that might 418 00:30:15,200 --> 00:30:21,119 be different than the CEO for name a company in the US. It's really 419 00:30:21,279 --> 00:30:26,440 you know, doesn't have the same risk level that is known, so you're 420 00:30:26,440 --> 00:30:30,079 going to react. You're going to provide a level of a protection that meets 421 00:30:30,079 --> 00:30:34,960 the risk factors that that individual is facing. So it's different. And you 422 00:30:36,039 --> 00:30:41,079 mentioned, you know, take an ambassador or a high level diplomat or agency 423 00:30:41,319 --> 00:30:47,319 employee in a high risk area. For sure, those guys and gals, 424 00:30:47,359 --> 00:30:51,039 when they're protecting that individual, they may get out of the car with their 425 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:55,279 long rifle slung in a ready position where you're not going to see that. 426 00:30:55,319 --> 00:30:57,559 In the private sector, you know, there have been at times I've been 427 00:30:57,599 --> 00:31:03,200 with a principal down aark alley in a location and guess the handgun was was 428 00:31:03,240 --> 00:31:08,119 out and we were expecting you know, potential Uh, you know potential hazards 429 00:31:08,119 --> 00:31:11,880 if you will. So are you going to walk down the street in New 430 00:31:11,960 --> 00:31:15,920 York LA with your gun out? I would say no, But to day 431 00:31:15,359 --> 00:31:19,039 may they may be different. Uh. It was just in l A a 432 00:31:19,039 --> 00:31:22,480 few days ago for helping out on a function, and you know there was 433 00:31:22,519 --> 00:31:26,960 a shooting just about a half a mile from where we were where somebody was 434 00:31:26,039 --> 00:31:30,839 killed. So you know, it's a situation dependent, that is all I 435 00:31:30,839 --> 00:31:36,039 can say. And it's every scenario is different. Of a protecte is different, 436 00:31:36,079 --> 00:31:40,960 and a mission is different. Threat information is different, and as the 437 00:31:41,039 --> 00:31:48,160 human operators, we're going to respond in kind, uh will adjust as we 438 00:31:48,240 --> 00:31:53,079 need to. And and but you know, to your point, whether it's 439 00:31:53,079 --> 00:31:56,640 private sector, whether it's the government, it really depends on who your principle 440 00:31:56,680 --> 00:32:00,799 is and what your authority is and where you're operating In terms of the weapon 441 00:32:00,240 --> 00:32:06,680 you were talking about in that readiness, I mean flashbacks of gangs and working 442 00:32:06,759 --> 00:32:12,519 Kurt Russell a snake, right, is those were the crazy days back then. 443 00:32:13,200 --> 00:32:15,559 Yeah, we think it's bad now, it was. You know, 444 00:32:15,559 --> 00:32:19,319 people kind of romanticize about you know, two hundred years ago. I'm got 445 00:32:19,359 --> 00:32:22,279 me tell you what I'll take the day, all the way along. Yeah, 446 00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:25,680 that was some tough. That was some tough times back then. Well, 447 00:32:25,759 --> 00:32:29,920 nineteen eighties was even tough. Right, it was like two thousand homicides 448 00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:32,880 a year in New York. I mean, yeah, obviously if it goes 449 00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:37,799 from three hundred to five hundred, you feel it. But I guess that's 450 00:32:37,799 --> 00:32:40,759 whatever's most most recent for you. Let me ask you this question. I 451 00:32:40,759 --> 00:32:45,319 don't know how much work you did in this area, but this is a 452 00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:50,960 question I get a lot at times. It is hotels and airbnbs. I 453 00:32:50,960 --> 00:32:53,400 don't know if you do any work with that high profiles, but a lot 454 00:32:53,400 --> 00:32:57,440 of people ask me to how do you protect yourself in hotels? Every so 455 00:32:57,519 --> 00:33:00,720 often you'll getting news probably once a year, you get the news story of 456 00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:05,559 the show somebody's sticking some kind of wire cable underneath the door to be able 457 00:33:05,599 --> 00:33:09,720 to watch whoever's in the room. Cameras hidden somewhere. Airbnbs, we just 458 00:33:09,720 --> 00:33:14,440 saw the story a couple of months ago, somebody the owner had planted cameras 459 00:33:14,480 --> 00:33:19,319 all over the place. Do you have a standard or a protocol that you 460 00:33:19,799 --> 00:33:22,480 teach individuals or you work with the clients in regards to hotels? And Airbnbs 461 00:33:22,480 --> 00:33:27,799 that can maybe even be applied to civilians. You know, there are certain 462 00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:35,039 what I would consider protocols or practice as best practices. Can you as an 463 00:33:35,079 --> 00:33:37,960 example of Airbnb, if I go rint somebody's house, I don't know who 464 00:33:37,960 --> 00:33:40,759 it is, you've got to know. You can do a cursory check and 465 00:33:40,799 --> 00:33:44,240 look, But are you going to go in and turn over every piece of 466 00:33:44,359 --> 00:33:50,039 furniture. You know, to your point earlier, you can hide cameras today 467 00:33:50,079 --> 00:33:53,680 in such small areas, it's almost it's nearly impossible unless I'm going to bring 468 00:33:53,720 --> 00:33:58,160 in a technical sweep team and spend time sweeping that. Now, if I 469 00:33:58,160 --> 00:34:00,759 have a high level principle, it's going to be staying at a hotel or 470 00:34:00,880 --> 00:34:08,119 a residence and they are of risk in terms of espionage or other factors I 471 00:34:08,119 --> 00:34:12,119 would be concerned with, I will bring in a sweep team and we will 472 00:34:12,159 --> 00:34:16,000 sweep every inch of that hotel room or that house to make sure that there's 473 00:34:16,000 --> 00:34:22,360 no electronic devices that are recording. And we will physically inspect everything that we 474 00:34:22,440 --> 00:34:28,320 possibly can vent spaces, you know, pictures, anything that we can to 475 00:34:28,400 --> 00:34:30,920 determine to make sure that there's nothing there. And I can tell you right 476 00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:37,559 now with the days technology, even with all that, if somebody really wants 477 00:34:37,599 --> 00:34:40,559 to plan a camera somewhere, there's a high degree chance they're going to get 478 00:34:40,559 --> 00:34:45,280 away with it. So you have to know, you know what that looks 479 00:34:45,360 --> 00:34:52,280 like or what that risk is, and then conduct yourself appropriately in those locations. 480 00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:54,000 That would be the other side of that. There's two sides of this, 481 00:34:54,079 --> 00:34:59,480 because we are in a place now where privacy is extremely difficult, whether 482 00:34:59,480 --> 00:35:02,840 it's on line or it's in a hotel. But but yes, can we 483 00:35:02,880 --> 00:35:08,320 go in and visit visually and physically, uh, you know, walk through 484 00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:12,400 the hotel room. They're not huge rooms, and just make sure that it 485 00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:15,559 looks appropriate, nothing is out of place, there's no devices or something that 486 00:35:15,800 --> 00:35:22,159 just doesn't belong. You know. I speak to to some females of travel 487 00:35:22,199 --> 00:35:25,199 and there are devices you can, you know, use to supplement your hotel 488 00:35:25,280 --> 00:35:30,199 security. There's wedges to put under the doors. There's certain things you can 489 00:35:30,280 --> 00:35:37,639 do to give yourself a little extra awareness and a little extra level of protection. 490 00:35:37,840 --> 00:35:42,679 But you know, no one you knowing where your exits are just as 491 00:35:42,719 --> 00:35:45,880 just as important when you leave a hotel room. It may not be the 492 00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:49,960 physical risk, it could be a fire. And so where where am I 493 00:35:50,039 --> 00:35:52,559 exit? Where the stairwells? Do the stairwells come out to the street or 494 00:35:52,599 --> 00:35:57,400 they come out inside the hotel? What floor am I own? How many 495 00:35:57,400 --> 00:35:59,880 floors I got to go down? You may have a preference of staying, 496 00:36:00,800 --> 00:36:04,239 you know, between the third and seventh floor, because in most countries they 497 00:36:04,239 --> 00:36:07,920 don't have far light up trucks that can get up past the seventh ordy floor. 498 00:36:07,039 --> 00:36:10,000 So if you want to go up to that fiftieth floor and have that 499 00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:14,840 great email, well that's fine, but just realize there's a risk that comes 500 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:17,519 with that. So you know, I talk about the risk appetite in the 501 00:36:17,519 --> 00:36:20,920 book, and that's true. You mentioned that it really comes down to, 502 00:36:22,199 --> 00:36:24,440 you know, we've seen a lot more principles that are younger in the last 503 00:36:25,119 --> 00:36:29,079 couple of decades. They're in twenties and thirties, and they're risk takers. 504 00:36:29,119 --> 00:36:32,039 They're they're you know, they're jumpers, base jumpers, their kite surfers or 505 00:36:34,119 --> 00:36:37,599 motorcycles and skied and they're doing all kinds of activities. So if our mission 506 00:36:37,639 --> 00:36:44,559 is to protect them, sometimes it goes beyond just that sort of physical protection 507 00:36:44,679 --> 00:36:49,840 from my threat. Sometimes they're the biggest threats themselves. It's kind of the 508 00:36:49,960 --> 00:36:52,480 risk factors they put themselves into. But at the end of the day, 509 00:36:52,519 --> 00:36:58,159 unlessure the President United States that there's a certain level of mandated protection for him, 510 00:36:58,280 --> 00:37:00,760 just about everybody else can do what they want to. So at the 511 00:37:00,840 --> 00:37:06,760 end of the day, you as a principal or CEO, I personally feel 512 00:37:06,920 --> 00:37:10,079 you are the senior risk officer. You're the one that decides what level of 513 00:37:10,159 --> 00:37:14,960 risk you as a company or you as an individual is willing to take. 514 00:37:15,519 --> 00:37:19,519 And then you have to have a certain level of sort of reasonable expectation of 515 00:37:19,519 --> 00:37:23,199 how people are going to protect you. And you know, at the end 516 00:37:23,199 --> 00:37:28,320 of the day, it's your decision. You know, flying in a helicopter 517 00:37:29,159 --> 00:37:34,039 maybe in areas where there's higher risk and you've only got one pilot and the 518 00:37:34,039 --> 00:37:37,159 weather's not good, but you're pushing your pilot to jump on a helicopter and 519 00:37:37,159 --> 00:37:40,679 take that trip anyway, you just made that decision as the principal, as 520 00:37:40,679 --> 00:37:45,880 a CEO possibly and I would I in my job may say no, this 521 00:37:46,000 --> 00:37:49,639 is not a good time to fly. The weather's not good, and we 522 00:37:49,679 --> 00:37:52,719 don't have two pilots. It's not a twin engine whatever the six situation may 523 00:37:52,840 --> 00:37:55,880 be. But at the end of the day, principles can put undue pressure 524 00:37:55,880 --> 00:38:00,639 on individuals to perform. And that's where we get side is I guess my 525 00:38:00,719 --> 00:38:04,360 last questions? We're ready to wrap up, folks again, It's Mike Trout, 526 00:38:05,039 --> 00:38:07,920 Michael trot t r O T T. The book is called The Protected 527 00:38:07,639 --> 00:38:12,719 I guess my last question would be just dawned on me, But I was 528 00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:15,360 kind of curious to see what your thoughts. Have you ever encountered it? 529 00:38:15,880 --> 00:38:22,079 We know certain there's honey traps, We've seen honey traps before, We've seen 530 00:38:22,159 --> 00:38:27,079 Romeo spies. You have a principal who somebody is making a move on, 531 00:38:28,920 --> 00:38:37,360 how would you might handle that? That's a tough one. Uh, that 532 00:38:37,519 --> 00:38:40,599 is a tough one. You know that A lot of that does come down 533 00:38:40,719 --> 00:38:45,480 to the principle themselves and what they're willing to accept. Uh. And then 534 00:38:45,559 --> 00:38:52,320 what's the risk factor of that principle? Are they a person who is in 535 00:38:52,639 --> 00:38:58,440 possession, whether it's you know, sort of mentally or physically in possession of 536 00:38:58,519 --> 00:39:02,119 classified information or an air information. Doesn't it to be just documentation that could 537 00:39:02,159 --> 00:39:07,079 also be your conversation that's in your head so you know, we'd have to 538 00:39:07,079 --> 00:39:15,320 think about what might be the risk factor of an exploration of someone trying to 539 00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:19,760 exploit that weakness. Uh So, really it just gets down to the situation. 540 00:39:19,840 --> 00:39:24,480 Everything's dependent, you know, if we I have bene scenarios where you 541 00:39:24,599 --> 00:39:30,880 definitely see that coming on and it might be a tap on the shoulder and 542 00:39:31,119 --> 00:39:34,519 sir, you've got a phone call, you know, can you step away 543 00:39:34,559 --> 00:39:37,360 and you may have a conversation with him and go, hey, you know, 544 00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:40,639 just just f yi, this is who this person is. And you 545 00:39:40,679 --> 00:39:44,599 know, you may want to be careful and that's our job. Now. 546 00:39:44,679 --> 00:39:46,480 Some principles may get upset with that, but that's what you've hired me to 547 00:39:46,519 --> 00:39:51,440 do. And there's been more than one time I tapped on a shoulder or 548 00:39:51,440 --> 00:39:55,039 made eye contact and at least let somebody know think, think twice. As 549 00:39:55,559 --> 00:39:59,159 you know, I kind of add this in my books is too as a 550 00:39:59,159 --> 00:40:01,880 as a as a car you know, I grew up as a as a 551 00:40:01,880 --> 00:40:07,320 carpenter apprentice and loved that skill. And I remember my first my first lesson 552 00:40:07,519 --> 00:40:12,400 was, you know, measure twice and cut once. And I kind of 553 00:40:12,400 --> 00:40:16,559 apply that in this business. I think twice, act once, and you 554 00:40:16,599 --> 00:40:20,320 know, fifty percent of the time, if you think about something the second 555 00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:22,920 time, you're like, you know, I've reached a different conclusion of what 556 00:40:22,920 --> 00:40:25,800 I should do. Maybe this is too high a risk. But no, 557 00:40:25,960 --> 00:40:30,719 that's a very it's a touchy subject, but you're one hundred percent spot on. 558 00:40:30,000 --> 00:40:34,119 It doesn't happen out of the curiosity for our listeners. I don't know 559 00:40:34,119 --> 00:40:37,320 if you can even answer this question either for my last one, is you 560 00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:40,239 mentioned something now so you have let's say it was a honeytrapped situation, possibly 561 00:40:40,239 --> 00:40:46,199 that the woman approaches a male principle. Is there well, I wouldn't even 562 00:40:46,199 --> 00:40:51,840 say if you or the agency, but is there someone who has the ability 563 00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:54,400 to, Hey, I'm going to take a snapshot of this person, send 564 00:40:54,440 --> 00:41:00,159 it through the file for facial recognition and we have a hit. Is that 565 00:41:00,199 --> 00:41:02,280 a possibility in today's world? Is that more Hollywood? Still? No, 566 00:41:02,440 --> 00:41:06,840 that's possible. Uh. And there are people who have a history of that, 567 00:41:07,000 --> 00:41:09,840 and whether or not, again it is a sensitive topic, but there 568 00:41:09,840 --> 00:41:14,840 are certain people out there that are that are known for doing that, are 569 00:41:14,920 --> 00:41:20,960 known for trying to exploit a situation. And you may you may even see 570 00:41:20,960 --> 00:41:23,599 somebody and go that faces from here and find out that they have an Instagram 571 00:41:23,639 --> 00:41:29,920 account and they are they have a history of this, and they're really trying 572 00:41:29,960 --> 00:41:36,400 to find their way into somebody's pockets or exploit a situation. So one hundred 573 00:41:36,400 --> 00:41:39,480 percent you could take that, take that opportunity to your point is where technology 574 00:41:39,519 --> 00:41:45,199 comes in a quick photo, send it back to If you have the workings 575 00:41:45,239 --> 00:41:50,079 of a protective intelligence group behind you, they can take that photo, take 576 00:41:50,119 --> 00:41:54,239 that information, take that name, and today, you know, doctor, 577 00:41:54,239 --> 00:41:58,159 you're probably within about five or ten minutes of coming back with some pretty good 578 00:41:58,159 --> 00:42:01,440 information on somebody or you know what, I'll tell you what anything you don't 579 00:42:01,440 --> 00:42:06,719 come back with a face or name that is to hit anywhere. That would 580 00:42:06,719 --> 00:42:12,199 also be a concern in today's world. If you're that kind of person that's 581 00:42:12,239 --> 00:42:15,800 at those kinds of events and you have that kind of lovely face and name 582 00:42:15,320 --> 00:42:21,000 and I can't find anything on about anything about you anywhere, that's going to 583 00:42:21,079 --> 00:42:25,119 be just as much as a concern. That's a great point the active commission 584 00:42:25,159 --> 00:42:30,119 and mission on that one. H Wow, fascinating stuff again, folks. 585 00:42:30,159 --> 00:42:34,679 Michael trot t r O t T. The Protected is the book. Thank 586 00:42:34,719 --> 00:42:37,639 you so much. Michael for doing this the Curls. Thanks for reaching out. 587 00:42:37,639 --> 00:42:42,320 I appreciate it. It's been fun. Thank you, crazy right, 588 00:42:42,440 --> 00:42:45,159 thank you, thank you everyone for listening. Make sure to share a subscribe 589 00:42:45,239 --> 00:42:46,280 hit that I like button. Stay aware out there.