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Perceive process perform three P. The
perceived process performed three P model for ad

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M offers a simple, practical and
systematic approach that can be used during all

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phases of flight. To use it, the pilot will perceive the given set

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of circumstances for a flight process by
evaluating their impact on flight safety, perform

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by implementing the best course of action. In the first step, the goal

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is to develop situational awareness by perceiving
hazards, which are present events, objects,

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or circumstances that could contribute to an
undesired future event. In this step,

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the pilot will systematically identify and list
hazards associated with all aspects of the

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flight pilot, aircraft environment, and
external pressures. It is important to consider

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how individual hazards might combine. Consider, for example, the hazard that arises

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when a new instrument of pilot with
no experience in actual instrument conditions wants to

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make a cross country flight to an
airport with low ceilings in order to attend

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an important business meeting. In the
second step, the goal is to process

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this information to determine whether the identifying
hazards constitute risk, which is defined as

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the future impact of a hazard that
is not controlled or eliminated. The degree

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of risk posed by a given hazard
can be measured in terms of exposure,

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number of people or resources affected,
severity, extent of possible loss, and

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probability the likelihood that a hazard will
cause a loss. If the hazard is

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low ceilings, for example, the
level of risk depends on a number of

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other factors, such as pilot training
and experience, aircraft equipment and fuel capacity,

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and others. In a third step, the goal is to perform by

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taking action to eliminate hazards or mitigate
risk, and then continuously evaluate the outcome

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of this action. With the example
of low ceilings at destination, for instance,

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the pilot can perform good adm by
selecting a suitable alternate, knowing where

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to find good weather, and carrying
sufficient fuel to reach it. This course

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of action would mitigate the risk.
The pilot also has the option to eliminate

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it entirely by waiting for better weather. Once the pilot has completed the three

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p decision process and selected a course
of action, the process begins anew because

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now the set of circumstances brought about
by the course of action requires analysis.

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The decision making process is a continuous
loop of perceiving, processing, and performing.

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With practice and consistent use, running
through the three P cycle can become

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a habit that is as smooth,
continuous, and automatic as a well honed

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instrument scan. This basic set of
practical risk management tools can be used to

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improve risk management. The three P
model has been expanded to include the care

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and Team models, which offers pilots
another way to assess and reduce risks associated

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with flying. Perceive process, perform
with care and team. Most flight training

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activities take place in the time critical
timeframe for risk management. Figure seventeen DASH

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eight and seventeen DASH nine combine the
six steps of risk management into an easy

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to remember three P model from practical
risk management Perceive process, Perform with the

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care and Team models. Pilots can
help perceive hazards by using the PAVED checklist

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of pilot, aircraft, environment and
external pressures. They can process hazards by

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using the care checklist of consequences,
alternatives, reality, external factors. Finally,

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pilots can perform risk management by using
the team choice list of transfer,

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eliminate, accept, or mitigate.
These concepts are relatively new in the general

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aviation training world, but have been
shown to be extraordinarily useful in lowering accident

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rates in the world of air carriers
forming good safety habits. While a three

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P model is similar to other methods, there are two good reasons to use

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the three P model. First,
the three P model gives pilots a structured,

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efficient, and systematic way to identify
hazards, assess risk, and implement

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effective risk controls. Second, practicing
risk management needs to be as automatic and

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general aviation flying as basic aircraft control
as is true for other flying skills.

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Risk management thinking habits are best developed
through repetition and consistent adherence to specific procedures.

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The ODA loop Colonel John Boyd,
United States Air Forces Retired, coined

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the term and developed the concept of
the OODA loop Observation, Orientation, decision

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action. The ideas, words and
phrases contained in Boyd's briefings have penetrated not

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only the United States military services,
but the business community and worldwide academia.

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The ODA loop is now used as
a standard description of decision making cycles.

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The loop is an interlaced decision model
which provides immediate feedback through the decision making

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process. For SRM purposes, an
abbreviated version of the concept referred to Figure

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seventeen ten provides an easily understood tool
for the pilot. The first node of

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the loop, observe reflects the need
for situational awareness. A pilot must be

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aware of those things around him or
her that may impact the flight. Continuous

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monitoring of aircraft controls, whether,
etc. Provides a constant reference point by

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which the pilot knows his or her
starting point on the loop, which permits

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the ability to immediately move to the
next step orient The second node of the

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loop focuses the pilot's attention on one
or more discrepancies in the flight. For

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example, there is a low oil
pressure reading. The pilot is aware of

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this deviation and considers available options in
view of potential hazards to continued flight.

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The pilot then moves to the third
node decide, in which he or she

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makes a positive determination about a specific
effect. That decision is made based on

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experience and knowledge of potential results and
to take that particular action will produce the

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desired result. The pilot then acts
on that decision, making a physical input

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to cause the aircraft to react in
the desired fashion. Once the loop has

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been completed, the pilot is once
again in the observed position. The assessment

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of the resulting action is added to
the previously perceived aspects of the flight to

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further define the flight's progress. The
advantage of the OODA loop model is that

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it may be cumulative, as well
as having the potential of allowing for multiple

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progressions to occur at any given point
in the flight. The decide model,

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using the acronym d ec ide the
six step process decide model is another continuous

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loop process that provides the pilot with
a logical way of making decisions. Refer

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to Figure seventeen DASH eleven. Decide
means to detect, estimate, choose a

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course of action, identify solutions,
do the necessary actions, and evaluate the

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effects of the actions. First,
consider a recent accident involving a Piper Apache

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PA twenty three. The aircraft was
substantially damaged during impact with terrain at a

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local airport in Alabama. The certificated
Airline Transport Pilot ATP received minor injuries and

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00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:28,519
the certificated private pilot was not injured. The private pilot was receiving a check

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ride from the ATP, who was
also a designated examiner for a commercial pilot

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certificate with a multi engine rating.
After performing air work at altitude, they

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returned to the airport and the private
pilot performed a single engine approach to a

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full stop landing. He then taxied
back for takeoff, performed a short field

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takeoff, and then joined the traffic
pattern to return for another landing. During

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the approach for the second landing,
the ATP simulated a right engine failure by

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reducing power on the right engine to
zero thrust. This caused the aircraft to

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yaw right. The procedure to identify
the failed engine is a two step process.

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First, bring power to maximum controllable
on both engines. Because the left

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engine is the only engine delivering thrust, the yaw increases to the right,

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00:09:18,080 --> 00:09:24,799
which necessitates application of additional left rudder. The failed engine is the sign that

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requires no rudder pressure in this case
the right engine. Second, having identified

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the failed right engine, the procedure
is to feather the right engine and a

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just power to maintain descent angle to
a landing. However, in this case,

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the pilot feathered the left engine because
he assumed the engine failure was a

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left engine failure. During twin engine
training. The left engine out is emphasized

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more than the right engine because the
left engine on most light twins is the

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critical engine. This is due to
multi engine airplanes being subject to p factor

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as our single engine airplanes. The
descending propeller blade of each engine will produce

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greater thrust than the ascending blade when
the airplane is operated under power and at

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positive angles of attack. The descending
propeller blade of the right engine is also

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a greater distance from the center of
gravity and therefore has a longer moment arm

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than the descending propeller blade of the
left engine. As a result, failure

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of the left engine will result in
the most asymmetrical thrust adverse yol because the

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right engine will be providing the remaining
thrust. Many twins are designed with a

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counter rotating right engine. With this
design, the degree of asymmetrical thrust is

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the same with either engine inoperative.
Neither engine is more critical than the other.

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Since the pilot never executed the first
step of identifying which engine failed,

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he feathered the left engine and set
the right engine at zero thrust. This

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essentially restricted the aircraft to a controlled
glide. Upon realizing that he was not

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going to make the runway, the
pilot increased power to both engines, causing

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an enormous yaw to the left.
The left propeller was feathered, whereupon the

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aircraft started to turn left. In
desperation, the instructor closed both rottles and

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the aircraft hit the ground and was
substantially damaged. This case is interesting because

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it highlights two particular issues. First, taking action without forethought can be just

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as dangerous as taking no action at
all. In this case, the pilot's

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actions were incorrect, yet there was
sufficient time to take the necessary steps to

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analyze the simulated emergency. The second
and more subtle issue is the decisions made

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under pressure are sometimes executed based on
limited experience, and the actions taken may

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be incorrect, incomplete, or insufficient
to handle the situation. Detect the problem.

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Problem detection is the first step in
the decision making process. It begins

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with recognizing a change occurred or an
expected change did not occur. A problem

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is perceived first by the senses,
and then it is distinguished through insight and

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experience. These same abilities, as
well as an objective analysis of all available

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information, are used to determine the
nature and severity of the problem. One

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critical error made during the decision making
process is incorrectly detecting the problem. In

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the example above, the change that
occurred was a yaw estimate the need to

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react. In the inng and out
example, the aircraft yawed right, the

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00:12:46,320 --> 00:12:50,440
pilot was on final approach, and
the problem warranted a prompt solution. In

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many cases, overreaction and fixation excludes
a safe outcome. For example, what

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00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:01,720
if the cabin door of a Mooney
sub opened in flight while the aircraft climbed

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00:13:01,759 --> 00:13:07,559
through fifteen hundred feet on a clear, sunny day. The sudden opening would

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00:13:07,559 --> 00:13:11,559
be alarming, but the perceived hazard
the open door presents is quickly and effectively

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00:13:11,559 --> 00:13:16,919
assessed as minor. In fact,
the door's opening would not impact save flight

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00:13:18,240 --> 00:13:22,519
and could almost be disregarded. Most
likely, a pilot would return to the

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airport to secure the door after landing. The pilot flying on a clear day,

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00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:31,360
faced with this minor problem, may
rank the open door as a low

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00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:37,200
risk. What about the pilot on
an IFR climb out in IMC conditions with

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00:13:37,399 --> 00:13:41,320
light intermittent turbulence in rain, who
is receiving an ammended clearance from air Traffic

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00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:48,360
Control ATC The open cabin door now
becomes a higher risk factor. The problem

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00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:52,399
is not changed, but the perception
of risk a pilot assigns it changes.

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00:13:52,480 --> 00:13:58,639
Because of the multitude of ongoing tasks
and the environment. Experience, discipline,

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00:13:58,679 --> 00:14:05,159
awareness, and knowledge will influence how
a pilot ranks a problem choose a course

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00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:11,039
of action. After the problem has
been identified and its impact estimated, the

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00:14:11,159 --> 00:14:16,960
pilot must determine the desirable outcome and
choose a course of action. In the

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00:14:18,000 --> 00:14:22,639
case of the multi engine pilot,
given the simulated failed engine, the desired

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00:14:22,639 --> 00:14:31,000
objective is to safely land the airplane. Identify solutions. The pilot formulates a

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00:14:31,080 --> 00:14:35,840
plan that will take him or her
to the objective. Sometimes there may be

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00:14:35,919 --> 00:14:41,000
only one course of action available.
In the case of the engine failure already

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00:14:41,039 --> 00:14:45,840
at five hundred feet or below,
the pilot solves the problem by identifying one

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00:14:45,919 --> 00:14:50,919
or more solutions that lead to a
successful outcome. It is important for the

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00:14:50,960 --> 00:14:54,799
pilot not to become fixated on the
process to the exclusion of making a decision

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00:14:56,399 --> 00:15:03,240
due the necessary actions. Once pathways
to resolution are identified, the pilot selects

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00:15:03,240 --> 00:15:09,159
the most suitable one for the situation. The multi engine pilot given a simulated

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00:15:09,200 --> 00:15:15,399
failed engine must now safely land the
aircraft, evaluate the effect of the action.

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00:15:16,600 --> 00:15:20,200
Finally, after implementing a solution,
evaluate the decision to see if it

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00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:26,320
was correct. If the action taken
does not provide the desired results, the

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00:15:26,399 --> 00:15:31,519
process may have to be repeated.
End of Part four of Chapter seventeen.