Perceive process perform three P. The perceived process performed three P model for ad
M offers a simple, practical and systematic approach that can be used during all
phases of flight. To use it, the pilot will perceive the given set
of circumstances for a flight process by evaluating their impact on flight safety, perform
by implementing the best course of action. In the first step, the goal
is to develop situational awareness by perceiving hazards, which are present events, objects,
or circumstances that could contribute to an undesired future event. In this step,
the pilot will systematically identify and list hazards associated with all aspects of the
flight pilot, aircraft environment, and external pressures. It is important to consider
how individual hazards might combine. Consider, for example, the hazard that arises
when a new instrument of pilot with no experience in actual instrument conditions wants to
make a cross country flight to an airport with low ceilings in order to attend
an important business meeting. In the second step, the goal is to process
this information to determine whether the identifying hazards constitute risk, which is defined as
the future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or eliminated. The degree
of risk posed by a given hazard can be measured in terms of exposure,
number of people or resources affected, severity, extent of possible loss, and
probability the likelihood that a hazard will cause a loss. If the hazard is
low ceilings, for example, the level of risk depends on a number of
other factors, such as pilot training and experience, aircraft equipment and fuel capacity,
and others. In a third step, the goal is to perform by
taking action to eliminate hazards or mitigate risk, and then continuously evaluate the outcome
of this action. With the example of low ceilings at destination, for instance,
the pilot can perform good adm by selecting a suitable alternate, knowing where
to find good weather, and carrying sufficient fuel to reach it. This course
of action would mitigate the risk. The pilot also has the option to eliminate
it entirely by waiting for better weather. Once the pilot has completed the three
p decision process and selected a course of action, the process begins anew because
now the set of circumstances brought about by the course of action requires analysis.
The decision making process is a continuous loop of perceiving, processing, and performing.
With practice and consistent use, running through the three P cycle can become
a habit that is as smooth, continuous, and automatic as a well honed
instrument scan. This basic set of practical risk management tools can be used to
improve risk management. The three P model has been expanded to include the care
and Team models, which offers pilots another way to assess and reduce risks associated
with flying. Perceive process, perform with care and team. Most flight training
activities take place in the time critical timeframe for risk management. Figure seventeen DASH
eight and seventeen DASH nine combine the six steps of risk management into an easy
to remember three P model from practical risk management Perceive process, Perform with the
care and Team models. Pilots can help perceive hazards by using the PAVED checklist
of pilot, aircraft, environment and external pressures. They can process hazards by
using the care checklist of consequences, alternatives, reality, external factors. Finally,
pilots can perform risk management by using the team choice list of transfer,
eliminate, accept, or mitigate. These concepts are relatively new in the general
aviation training world, but have been shown to be extraordinarily useful in lowering accident
rates in the world of air carriers forming good safety habits. While a three
P model is similar to other methods, there are two good reasons to use
the three P model. First, the three P model gives pilots a structured,
efficient, and systematic way to identify hazards, assess risk, and implement
effective risk controls. Second, practicing risk management needs to be as automatic and
general aviation flying as basic aircraft control as is true for other flying skills.
Risk management thinking habits are best developed through repetition and consistent adherence to specific procedures.
The ODA loop Colonel John Boyd, United States Air Forces Retired, coined
the term and developed the concept of the OODA loop Observation, Orientation, decision
action. The ideas, words and phrases contained in Boyd's briefings have penetrated not
only the United States military services, but the business community and worldwide academia.
The ODA loop is now used as a standard description of decision making cycles.
The loop is an interlaced decision model which provides immediate feedback through the decision making
process. For SRM purposes, an abbreviated version of the concept referred to Figure
seventeen ten provides an easily understood tool for the pilot. The first node of
the loop, observe reflects the need for situational awareness. A pilot must be
aware of those things around him or her that may impact the flight. Continuous
monitoring of aircraft controls, whether, etc. Provides a constant reference point by
which the pilot knows his or her starting point on the loop, which permits
the ability to immediately move to the next step orient The second node of the
loop focuses the pilot's attention on one or more discrepancies in the flight. For
example, there is a low oil pressure reading. The pilot is aware of
this deviation and considers available options in view of potential hazards to continued flight.
The pilot then moves to the third node decide, in which he or she
makes a positive determination about a specific effect. That decision is made based on
experience and knowledge of potential results and to take that particular action will produce the
desired result. The pilot then acts on that decision, making a physical input
to cause the aircraft to react in the desired fashion. Once the loop has
been completed, the pilot is once again in the observed position. The assessment
of the resulting action is added to the previously perceived aspects of the flight to
further define the flight's progress. The advantage of the OODA loop model is that
it may be cumulative, as well as having the potential of allowing for multiple
progressions to occur at any given point in the flight. The decide model,
using the acronym d ec ide the six step process decide model is another continuous
loop process that provides the pilot with a logical way of making decisions. Refer
to Figure seventeen DASH eleven. Decide means to detect, estimate, choose a
course of action, identify solutions, do the necessary actions, and evaluate the
effects of the actions. First, consider a recent accident involving a Piper Apache
PA twenty three. The aircraft was substantially damaged during impact with terrain at a
local airport in Alabama. The certificated Airline Transport Pilot ATP received minor injuries and
the certificated private pilot was not injured. The private pilot was receiving a check
ride from the ATP, who was also a designated examiner for a commercial pilot
certificate with a multi engine rating. After performing air work at altitude, they
returned to the airport and the private pilot performed a single engine approach to a
full stop landing. He then taxied back for takeoff, performed a short field
takeoff, and then joined the traffic pattern to return for another landing. During
the approach for the second landing, the ATP simulated a right engine failure by
reducing power on the right engine to zero thrust. This caused the aircraft to
yaw right. The procedure to identify the failed engine is a two step process.
First, bring power to maximum controllable on both engines. Because the left
engine is the only engine delivering thrust, the yaw increases to the right,
which necessitates application of additional left rudder. The failed engine is the sign that
requires no rudder pressure in this case the right engine. Second, having identified
the failed right engine, the procedure is to feather the right engine and a
just power to maintain descent angle to a landing. However, in this case,
the pilot feathered the left engine because he assumed the engine failure was a
left engine failure. During twin engine training. The left engine out is emphasized
more than the right engine because the left engine on most light twins is the
critical engine. This is due to multi engine airplanes being subject to p factor
as our single engine airplanes. The descending propeller blade of each engine will produce
greater thrust than the ascending blade when the airplane is operated under power and at
positive angles of attack. The descending propeller blade of the right engine is also
a greater distance from the center of gravity and therefore has a longer moment arm
than the descending propeller blade of the left engine. As a result, failure
of the left engine will result in the most asymmetrical thrust adverse yol because the
right engine will be providing the remaining thrust. Many twins are designed with a
counter rotating right engine. With this design, the degree of asymmetrical thrust is
the same with either engine inoperative. Neither engine is more critical than the other.
Since the pilot never executed the first step of identifying which engine failed,
he feathered the left engine and set the right engine at zero thrust. This
essentially restricted the aircraft to a controlled glide. Upon realizing that he was not
going to make the runway, the pilot increased power to both engines, causing
an enormous yaw to the left. The left propeller was feathered, whereupon the
aircraft started to turn left. In desperation, the instructor closed both rottles and
the aircraft hit the ground and was substantially damaged. This case is interesting because
it highlights two particular issues. First, taking action without forethought can be just
as dangerous as taking no action at all. In this case, the pilot's
actions were incorrect, yet there was sufficient time to take the necessary steps to
analyze the simulated emergency. The second and more subtle issue is the decisions made
under pressure are sometimes executed based on limited experience, and the actions taken may
be incorrect, incomplete, or insufficient to handle the situation. Detect the problem.
Problem detection is the first step in the decision making process. It begins
with recognizing a change occurred or an expected change did not occur. A problem
is perceived first by the senses, and then it is distinguished through insight and
experience. These same abilities, as well as an objective analysis of all available
information, are used to determine the nature and severity of the problem. One
critical error made during the decision making process is incorrectly detecting the problem. In
the example above, the change that occurred was a yaw estimate the need to
react. In the inng and out example, the aircraft yawed right, the
pilot was on final approach, and the problem warranted a prompt solution. In
many cases, overreaction and fixation excludes a safe outcome. For example, what
if the cabin door of a Mooney sub opened in flight while the aircraft climbed
through fifteen hundred feet on a clear, sunny day. The sudden opening would
be alarming, but the perceived hazard the open door presents is quickly and effectively
assessed as minor. In fact, the door's opening would not impact save flight
and could almost be disregarded. Most likely, a pilot would return to the
airport to secure the door after landing. The pilot flying on a clear day,
faced with this minor problem, may rank the open door as a low
risk. What about the pilot on an IFR climb out in IMC conditions with
light intermittent turbulence in rain, who is receiving an ammended clearance from air Traffic
Control ATC The open cabin door now becomes a higher risk factor. The problem
is not changed, but the perception of risk a pilot assigns it changes.
Because of the multitude of ongoing tasks and the environment. Experience, discipline,
awareness, and knowledge will influence how a pilot ranks a problem choose a course
of action. After the problem has been identified and its impact estimated, the
pilot must determine the desirable outcome and choose a course of action. In the
case of the multi engine pilot, given the simulated failed engine, the desired
objective is to safely land the airplane. Identify solutions. The pilot formulates a
plan that will take him or her to the objective. Sometimes there may be
only one course of action available. In the case of the engine failure already
at five hundred feet or below, the pilot solves the problem by identifying one
or more solutions that lead to a successful outcome. It is important for the
pilot not to become fixated on the process to the exclusion of making a decision
due the necessary actions. Once pathways to resolution are identified, the pilot selects
the most suitable one for the situation. The multi engine pilot given a simulated
failed engine must now safely land the aircraft, evaluate the effect of the action.
Finally, after implementing a solution, evaluate the decision to see if it
was correct. If the action taken does not provide the desired results, the
process may have to be repeated. End of Part four of Chapter seventeen.