WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.160 --> 00:00:09.560 Behind the information economy as a ride. The world is teeming with innovation as 2 00:00:09.640 --> 00:00:14.919 new business models reinvenist. Inside analysisation and insight about how to make the most 3 00:00:15.000 --> 00:00:20.000 of this exciting new era. Learn more at side Analysis dot Inside analysis dot 4 00:00:20.079 --> 00:00:28.519 com. And now here's your host, Eric, Keep welcome to each other, 5 00:00:34.759 --> 00:01:26.000 help chosen to teach. It's all right, lit and gentleman and low 6 00:01:26.040 --> 00:01:30.359 and welcome back. Once again it's the only coast to coast radio show all 7 00:01:30.400 --> 00:01:34.640 about the information economy. It's time for inside Analysis. Your truly is here 8 00:01:34.680 --> 00:01:38.519 with a very special guest. We're going to talk about securities, a problem 9 00:01:38.519 --> 00:01:41.719 that never goes away. It never will go away. It's always going to 10 00:01:41.760 --> 00:01:45.120 be a challenge. It's changing by the day. We're talking to. Our 11 00:01:45.359 --> 00:01:49.120 Pergosian is a company called bright If it's b R I T I V E. 12 00:01:49.599 --> 00:01:53.040 And alright, I'm gonna tell you security. It's one of these issues 13 00:01:53.079 --> 00:01:57.239 that only a handful of people at the company ever really care about it. 14 00:01:57.560 --> 00:02:00.879 And my British business partner one time cracked joke. He said, there's only 15 00:02:00.959 --> 00:02:07.879 one person who has about security and his name is scape Goat, meaning the 16 00:02:07.000 --> 00:02:10.319 person who was in charge of security just gets blamed when something goes wrong and 17 00:02:10.360 --> 00:02:14.479 they fire that person and get another person. But usually they do the same 18 00:02:14.520 --> 00:02:17.599 kind of stuff. But one of the more clever comments I've heard about security 19 00:02:17.599 --> 00:02:20.680 of this is very, very true. I'm sure you'll agree with this, 20 00:02:20.759 --> 00:02:23.199 is that security is not a thing. It's not one object. It's not 21 00:02:23.280 --> 00:02:28.719 a technology, it's not a process. It's a whole amalgam of education, 22 00:02:29.000 --> 00:02:34.400 of protocols, of technologies, of observability, and just paying attention. You 23 00:02:34.479 --> 00:02:37.439 have to pay attention all the time. But this stuff, and I can 24 00:02:37.479 --> 00:02:39.319 tell you, folks, in the last four or five months, I've had 25 00:02:39.360 --> 00:02:44.319 my corporate debit card hacked twice, which is annoying. Once is okay, 26 00:02:44.360 --> 00:02:46.439 because that way I can see and remember all the stupid things I signed up 27 00:02:46.439 --> 00:02:51.080 for. You get all the emails that, oh, your credit card was 28 00:02:51.159 --> 00:02:53.800 declined, like, yeah, I know, because it got hacked and I 29 00:02:53.840 --> 00:02:58.159 didn't when they want to go back to you guys. And luckily the legislators 30 00:02:58.199 --> 00:03:00.599 around the country here in America at least, have done some good work in 31 00:03:01.159 --> 00:03:07.199 not allowing these organizations to keep hammering you with late fees after it goes away. 32 00:03:07.280 --> 00:03:09.039 These days, you just don't get your service anymore it goes away. 33 00:03:09.560 --> 00:03:14.879 But nonetheless, the security issue is so important it's never gonna not important, 34 00:03:14.879 --> 00:03:19.879 So you always need this cocktail of technologies and processes. And then even still 35 00:03:19.919 --> 00:03:23.280 you're going to get hacked sooner or later. So what's your path to remediation? 36 00:03:23.319 --> 00:03:25.639 There are lots of things to consider here, but a few choice words 37 00:03:25.759 --> 00:03:30.199 or tell us a bit about yourself and Bright and how you get into the 38 00:03:30.240 --> 00:03:34.960 space and what you folks are doing. Yeah, thank ar, thanks for 39 00:03:35.000 --> 00:03:39.639 having me here. Just about twenty years ago, and back then it was 40 00:03:39.639 --> 00:03:45.080 more about the IT security as they call it. It's certainly involved quite a 41 00:03:45.639 --> 00:03:50.879 you know, arguably even a board level issue that you know that we see 42 00:03:50.919 --> 00:03:57.680 today. But you know, hacks or attacks have gone from just a network 43 00:03:57.719 --> 00:04:03.400 breach to steal some data to for one, cyber warfare or cyber crime, 44 00:04:03.560 --> 00:04:11.520 and ransomware is one that is so lucrative these days for the criminals and so 45 00:04:11.680 --> 00:04:15.439 disruptive for many companies in the industries. Right, So it's a very different 46 00:04:15.759 --> 00:04:23.160 world today that we live in. My past experience before this company, before 47 00:04:23.199 --> 00:04:29.879 Brighter, I've been in a space mostly from this industry, in that industry, 48 00:04:29.920 --> 00:04:35.680 and I started also another company about ten years ago in identity and access 49 00:04:35.680 --> 00:04:42.240 Spanish mansers space, but eventually which led to you know, uh in specifically 50 00:04:42.279 --> 00:04:48.439 focusing on a problem in the clouds, you know space or cloud public cloud 51 00:04:49.560 --> 00:04:57.879 technologies and building a product to the market that helps reduce the suiting risks and 52 00:04:57.959 --> 00:05:08.160 vulnerabilities that are preventing businesses from adopting and expanding their public clouds consumption or the 53 00:05:10.360 --> 00:05:15.040 clouds adoption. Right, well, let's let's talk about how you do that, 54 00:05:15.120 --> 00:05:16.399 because there are lots and lots of ways, and I do like that 55 00:05:16.399 --> 00:05:20.519 you're focused on identity management because let's face it, if you're trying to log 56 00:05:20.560 --> 00:05:24.360 into a system, the system is trying to understand, okay, are you 57 00:05:24.399 --> 00:05:28.480 the person that you say you are? And historically that's been largely done by 58 00:05:28.519 --> 00:05:31.439 passwords, which of course is a pain because you have to remember the passwords 59 00:05:31.439 --> 00:05:35.399 and for everything, and that of course is putting yourself in jeopardy because then 60 00:05:35.439 --> 00:05:39.480 folks can hack in and do all kinds of stuff. And you know, 61 00:05:39.759 --> 00:05:43.319 it was my business partner, doctor Robin Blore, who years ago taught me 62 00:05:44.000 --> 00:05:47.759 that this whole crime network is not just individuals. In fact, the whole 63 00:05:47.879 --> 00:05:51.319 narrative around the guy in the hoodie being the one who's going in and hacking 64 00:05:51.319 --> 00:05:55.519 your systems. It's it's not a guy in a hoodie. Sometimes it is, 65 00:05:55.560 --> 00:05:59.680 but usually there's this whole industry involved. There are people who specialize in 66 00:05:59.720 --> 00:06:02.800 getting accets or people who specialize in exploiting that access, and it will just 67 00:06:02.879 --> 00:06:08.199 kind of sell their access to other players. And then you have cases like 68 00:06:08.279 --> 00:06:13.319 the Colonial pipeline, which some folks may recall a while back before the Russian 69 00:06:13.319 --> 00:06:17.800 invasion of Ukraine took down the East coast's ability to get gas to gas stations. 70 00:06:18.360 --> 00:06:21.120 And you know, when I saw that, I thought to myself, 71 00:06:21.120 --> 00:06:26.040 this is an active war. This is not just some ransomware. And the 72 00:06:26.279 --> 00:06:29.480 government has never come out and said, but I believe it was an active 73 00:06:29.480 --> 00:06:31.920 war. And it goes to show you how vulnerable if you did the math 74 00:06:31.959 --> 00:06:35.240 and fig eyes, we can shut down distribution on the East Coast and that 75 00:06:35.279 --> 00:06:40.839 will be a very significant inconvenience on in fact, put people in jeopardy, 76 00:06:40.959 --> 00:06:44.639 right, ambulances, things that can't get gasoline. That's a pretty big problem. 77 00:06:44.720 --> 00:06:47.560 So it's not just individuals. I mean to your boson state sponsored addors, 78 00:06:47.920 --> 00:06:51.000 and I think the folks at Google and Facebook and Yahoo and these other 79 00:06:51.040 --> 00:06:56.800 big organizations certainly worked very hard to stop all that. But maybe tell us 80 00:06:56.839 --> 00:07:00.959 about what do you to enable identity manage that you can then sort of provide 81 00:07:01.000 --> 00:07:09.759 to all these cloud providers. That's that's very very good background, just kind 82 00:07:09.800 --> 00:07:15.600 of how you've illustrated like the state of the world really and for us, 83 00:07:15.360 --> 00:07:20.439 why identity was so important and why we decided to really invest in building in 84 00:07:20.519 --> 00:07:26.839 technology. There's a very important thing to talk about here. With the clouds 85 00:07:27.199 --> 00:07:33.000 technologies and adoption of public Cloud, it was a huge change in paradigm shifts 86 00:07:33.000 --> 00:07:38.959 really in the in the world of you know, security and identity. Specifically 87 00:07:39.199 --> 00:07:44.399 back in when everything all the critical know it assets were in the data center, 88 00:07:44.920 --> 00:07:47.959 the security monitor perimeter aside from the walls, of course, but there 89 00:07:48.040 --> 00:07:54.680 was a perimeter security network, you know, firewalls, and and identities existed 90 00:07:54.759 --> 00:08:01.560 inside the firewall. With public cloud, that was a complete pop Identity essentially 91 00:08:01.639 --> 00:08:05.800 became the first and last line of defense when comes through durin applications front. 92 00:08:07.519 --> 00:08:16.439 That's why identity for us became the first and biggest security elements to protect from. 93 00:08:16.360 --> 00:08:22.600 Like examples you gave, of course, asual GCP pretty robust security controls 94 00:08:22.600 --> 00:08:28.560 and identity models. The challenges for any organization that operates across different technologies and 95 00:08:30.600 --> 00:08:35.440 they also operate on top of the of the cloud providers infrastructure, they have 96 00:08:35.519 --> 00:08:41.279 to build them security and control and security model that goes across the different providers, 97 00:08:41.720 --> 00:08:46.480 and they're not uniform. AZUAL security is very different from GDCP, especially 98 00:08:46.480 --> 00:08:50.840 when it comes to how they pretended that. That's why right of came to 99 00:08:50.919 --> 00:08:56.919 market with a solution that works across the providers. Another very important thing that 100 00:08:56.960 --> 00:09:00.279 we did, and this was something that we saw as we're entering them market, 101 00:09:00.519 --> 00:09:07.679 saw a huge issue with what we cause overprivileged access. So a lot 102 00:09:07.720 --> 00:09:15.720 of times organizations with intention products to market to support their businesses and growth, 103 00:09:16.320 --> 00:09:22.159 we really had to do from security standpoint in a way that we're not ideal, 104 00:09:22.480 --> 00:09:26.919 like giving a lot of access to users assuming they're going to need that, 105 00:09:28.200 --> 00:09:31.200 or they may be needed at some point but no longer needed later. 106 00:09:31.840 --> 00:09:37.759 That created this exposure risk, exposure when access existed but nobody needed it. 107 00:09:37.039 --> 00:09:41.120 Well. Of course, attackers love that situation. That's why you started seeing 108 00:09:41.799 --> 00:09:48.440 breach after Breach in Capital one was one of the earliest like clouds privileged access 109 00:09:48.440 --> 00:09:52.639 breaches that we came to know about, and that speaks to one problem that 110 00:09:54.360 --> 00:10:00.279 we noticed early on how the current access or the traditional access model did didn't 111 00:10:00.279 --> 00:10:03.600 really translate well to cloud. What I mean by that is when you give 112 00:10:03.639 --> 00:10:09.399 somebody access with assumption they needed twenty four by seven, that access always sits 113 00:10:09.519 --> 00:10:15.360 there and the only thing that prevents somebody else to gain access is a login 114 00:10:15.480 --> 00:10:20.360 name and password. It's a terrible security and it's a very vulnerable security to 115 00:10:20.440 --> 00:10:26.639 protect. So we decided to change that with bred It. We really kind 116 00:10:26.679 --> 00:10:33.039 of invented the newer and better way to do it to eliminate everything when the 117 00:10:33.200 --> 00:10:39.200 user doesn't need that access. So when it comes to human users, kine 118 00:10:39.200 --> 00:10:41.080 of us can sit in front of a computer twenty four by seven by three 119 00:10:41.200 --> 00:10:46.600 sixty five, right, we can do our job at certain hours, but 120 00:10:46.720 --> 00:10:50.519 after that we don't need that access. So what bright it does is automatically 121 00:10:50.399 --> 00:10:56.440 grants that access when the user needs but also removes automatically when that access all 122 00:10:56.480 --> 00:11:01.000 over needed until the next time the user needs it. That's a massive reduction 123 00:11:01.039 --> 00:11:05.960 of the risk exposure and then attack surface. Yeah, well you would mentioned 124 00:11:05.960 --> 00:11:09.080 something that's interesting. You talked about the models, the security models that these 125 00:11:09.120 --> 00:11:15.120 different providers have, and I know for sure that one of the things that 126 00:11:15.200 --> 00:11:20.000 you could do to better secure your environment is to identify where someone logs in, 127 00:11:20.200 --> 00:11:22.720 what office are they in, are they in a different office than they 128 00:11:22.720 --> 00:11:26.919 normally are in, and that would be in a profile around the user. 129 00:11:26.039 --> 00:11:31.519 So the identity management of Chuck, let's say, is that he dials in 130 00:11:31.639 --> 00:11:35.840 from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. That's where he works. And if he goes traveling 131 00:11:35.960 --> 00:11:37.879 somewhere, you know, wouldn't it be great to know that he's traveling. 132 00:11:37.879 --> 00:11:41.600 And of course these banks have systems they don't always work very well, but 133 00:11:41.720 --> 00:11:45.039 they say, hey, are you going to be traveling and you say, 134 00:11:45.120 --> 00:11:48.320 yes, I'll be traveling to Austria next week. So if my credit card 135 00:11:48.320 --> 00:11:50.639 comes across in Austria, it's me, So don't block me out when I'm 136 00:11:50.639 --> 00:11:56.320 trying to log into my systems from Austria. Well that's a nice way to 137 00:11:56.399 --> 00:12:01.080 do it, but it's expensive, it's a bit time intense. But these 138 00:12:01.159 --> 00:12:05.240 days it seems to me it should be relatively easy if you have the right 139 00:12:05.279 --> 00:12:09.240 technology in place to identify the pattern of what is normal, and the normal 140 00:12:09.279 --> 00:12:13.200 pattern for Chuck would be he logs in at nine am, he logs out 141 00:12:13.200 --> 00:12:16.399 at five pm kind of deal. And if he logs in at two o'clock 142 00:12:16.399 --> 00:12:18.519 in the morning, oh well, maybe you kick in an extra security loop 143 00:12:18.559 --> 00:12:22.759 to say, hmm, are you really you? And of course people know 144 00:12:22.840 --> 00:12:26.320 these captures. The captors drive me completely bonkers. I hate it, especially 145 00:12:26.320 --> 00:12:28.879 on my phone, because I'm like, I just give up. I'm like, 146 00:12:28.919 --> 00:12:31.559 I won't go in. I don't care, I'm not going to go 147 00:12:31.720 --> 00:12:33.600 Is this a bike? Is this a bike? Is? Okay? It's 148 00:12:33.679 --> 00:12:37.639 very annoying. But the point I'm making here is that you can build a 149 00:12:37.679 --> 00:12:41.840 profile around the user and then understand who that person is, and when they're 150 00:12:41.879 --> 00:12:45.360 doing things like they normally do, you still have security, but at least 151 00:12:45.360 --> 00:12:48.240 it's a lower level of security. When they're doing things they're not normally doing, 152 00:12:48.279 --> 00:12:50.919 that's when you kick in a higher level of security is out about right? 153 00:12:50.759 --> 00:12:54.480 That's harder to say, right, And you're correct that technology today has 154 00:12:54.519 --> 00:12:58.639 come a long way and being able to actually do that and do it with 155 00:13:00.120 --> 00:13:03.360 minimal disruption. To your point, captures were invented in what twenty years ago? 156 00:13:07.320 --> 00:13:09.480 I think, uh, you know, to expand on that little bit, 157 00:13:09.519 --> 00:13:13.919 right, I think, yes, there's a lot of opportunity to improve 158 00:13:15.000 --> 00:13:18.799 that both from security and end users experience standpoint. So one of the things 159 00:13:18.840 --> 00:13:28.279 that we're doing along those lines, when you look at a pretty significant a 160 00:13:28.360 --> 00:13:33.919 number of users pro pride or involves cloud developers, develops engineers, it's one 161 00:13:35.840 --> 00:13:39.360 these folks just have to do a lot of different things during the day, 162 00:13:39.440 --> 00:13:45.159 and there's definitely it's not a very static, sort of a linear pattern of 163 00:13:45.200 --> 00:13:48.720 work, so they jump around a lot of doing this here and something else 164 00:13:48.759 --> 00:13:52.799 there. What we do, what we try to do is gather activity across 165 00:13:54.360 --> 00:13:58.240 you know, during the day, across the environments that they were in and 166 00:13:58.320 --> 00:14:03.519 doing whatever or an engineer could do with standing up a storage you know, 167 00:14:03.240 --> 00:14:09.159 or compute instance or whatnot. So we can actually look at that data from 168 00:14:09.200 --> 00:14:13.360 the from the pattern standpoint over time and say, you know, over let's 169 00:14:13.360 --> 00:14:16.039 say ninety days, the normal pattern for this type of user has been X, 170 00:14:16.159 --> 00:14:22.000 Y, and Z. Why that's important is because we could also detect 171 00:14:22.039 --> 00:14:26.519 when something goes completely in a different direction one day, right, So that 172 00:14:26.639 --> 00:14:31.720 allows us to kick off alerts and triggers to say something is not looking and 173 00:14:31.960 --> 00:14:37.440 feeling right, so the security teams can quickly take a look and understand is 174 00:14:37.480 --> 00:14:41.519 it normal? Could they could be a legitimate instance of that situation, but 175 00:14:41.879 --> 00:14:46.519 we'd rather verify that than let it go right. So that helps us also 176 00:14:46.879 --> 00:14:52.399 enhance, you know, the model of like what we should give to home 177 00:14:54.159 --> 00:14:58.159 because that also helps the data, same data. Analys Analyzing the data helps 178 00:14:58.240 --> 00:15:03.039 us understand what next time, next patch of users, what is the normal 179 00:15:03.200 --> 00:15:07.919 pattern of access they shouldn't so we can make those grants very easily and get 180 00:15:07.960 --> 00:15:11.960 people what they need immediately. But basically, if I understand it, you're 181 00:15:13.000 --> 00:15:16.200 I mean security has to sit in between systems, right, So someone is 182 00:15:16.200 --> 00:15:20.919 on the outside, they're trying to get in to a cloud environment that may 183 00:15:20.960 --> 00:15:24.360 have eight, ten, twelve, twenty different applications. And you know, 184 00:15:24.399 --> 00:15:28.519 you made a good point about developers. I have developer friends and they tell 185 00:15:28.559 --> 00:15:33.240 me that the biggest pain in their job is just logging back into the system. 186 00:15:33.320 --> 00:15:35.799 Logging back into that system. People in the consumer world, now you 187 00:15:35.799 --> 00:15:39.039 have all these different protocols. Oh, it's got to be ten characters and 188 00:15:39.080 --> 00:15:43.159 a special character. It can't be two characters side by side, like you 189 00:15:43.159 --> 00:15:46.759 know, two characters and row all this these goofy sort of bespoke rules that 190 00:15:46.840 --> 00:15:50.759 may not have to come up with different passwords. Then of course Google allows 191 00:15:50.799 --> 00:15:54.960 you to do that password management feature in their system, and that's what I 192 00:15:54.120 --> 00:15:56.799 use. But of course as someone hacks into that, now they've got access 193 00:15:56.840 --> 00:16:00.639 to all your stuff. I mean, these security issues. The sword cuts 194 00:16:00.639 --> 00:16:04.039 both ways, right, the old adage every sword cuts both ways. I 195 00:16:04.080 --> 00:16:07.759 always thought about the key fop. I'm like, oh, key fop, 196 00:16:07.840 --> 00:16:10.960 that's great, unless someone gets your key fop and they can walk through the 197 00:16:10.960 --> 00:16:14.000 parking lot just going like this till they find your car getting a drive away. 198 00:16:14.120 --> 00:16:18.399 So it's like some of these security measures wind up being security risks essentially. 199 00:16:18.679 --> 00:16:22.600 How do you balance that out and how do you sit in between? 200 00:16:22.759 --> 00:16:26.919 So when you actually deploy to a particular client, you're sitting sort of in 201 00:16:26.960 --> 00:16:30.879 a layer outside of their environment. But can you also get in to track 202 00:16:30.960 --> 00:16:36.360 what they're moving? Tell us about that quickly. Yeah. Early in my 203 00:16:36.440 --> 00:16:41.039 career in the security space, somebody said this and it really stuck in my 204 00:16:41.039 --> 00:16:45.120 head. The best security is invisible security, so the end user can't see 205 00:16:45.519 --> 00:16:49.559 there. It's been very hard to actually get get to that stage. But 206 00:16:49.679 --> 00:16:52.759 I think we're getting we're moving in the right direction. We're not quite there. 207 00:16:53.519 --> 00:16:56.120 I'm realizing. I'm realizing we're up in our first break. So stand 208 00:16:56.120 --> 00:17:07.160 by all that thought will be right back. You're listening to the incident out. 209 00:17:07.599 --> 00:17:12.119 Can you IRA stand up to the next financial crisis that our top economists 210 00:17:12.119 --> 00:17:17.720 are saying is at our doorsteps? By allocating a percentage of your IRA into 211 00:17:17.839 --> 00:17:22.920 physical gold and silver with a tax free rollover, you can diversifilings from turbulent 212 00:17:22.960 --> 00:17:27.400 markets and economic downturns by putting your IRA back on the gold standard. 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That's 244 00:20:08.160 --> 00:20:12.519 eight hundred two nine eight fifty seven eighty three game to a halt. It's 245 00:20:12.519 --> 00:20:18.279 shown a spotlight on the importance of CPR readiness. Now, with youth sports 246 00:20:18.319 --> 00:20:22.720 in full swing, the American Heart Association is rounding parents and coaches to be 247 00:20:22.839 --> 00:20:26.319 ready in an emergency. To be ready, learn hands only CPR. It's 248 00:20:26.319 --> 00:20:30.640 a skill anyone can learn in minutes. Just visit Heart dot org slash hands 249 00:20:30.680 --> 00:20:40.279 only CPR hands only. CPR is NASH supported. Welcome back to inside Analysis. 250 00:20:40.799 --> 00:20:48.119 Here's your host, Eric Tavanaughture. Okay, folks, back in front 251 00:20:48.119 --> 00:20:53.480 analysis or truly air Kavanami part forgoes then of bright I br tibe. We're 252 00:20:53.519 --> 00:20:57.400 talking all about security, getting access to systems, how annoying security can be, 253 00:20:57.480 --> 00:21:02.039 but how important it is because when someone gets in, especially with ransomware, 254 00:21:02.039 --> 00:21:03.200 and they hold all your stuff hostage. Like I said, the Colonel 255 00:21:03.279 --> 00:21:07.640 pipeline shows you how much can be held hostage. Major hospitals have been held 256 00:21:07.680 --> 00:21:11.880 hostage by these things, and that's a real problem. But argue, we're 257 00:21:11.920 --> 00:21:17.039 talking a moment ago about how the ideal security is invisible security, which you 258 00:21:17.119 --> 00:21:19.200 know under the covers can be very powerful these days because you can test all 259 00:21:19.279 --> 00:21:22.839 kinds of things. Right where is this person? What device is it? 260 00:21:22.119 --> 00:21:25.440 I mean to me, that's one of the key characteristics, right, is 261 00:21:25.480 --> 00:21:27.799 like is this the device that the person normally uses? I think that's why 262 00:21:29.200 --> 00:21:32.759 you see so much focused on mobile devices these days. And there it is 263 00:21:33.480 --> 00:21:37.240 because there's a signature, there's an IP addressed and there's the unique signature of 264 00:21:37.279 --> 00:21:40.319 that device. I'm using that device and it's with me, it's a run 265 00:21:40.400 --> 00:21:44.480 that. Okay, that's probably good a good person to grant access too. 266 00:21:44.480 --> 00:21:48.559 But tell us more about this invisible serre and hydro. Yeah, so how 267 00:21:48.559 --> 00:21:55.559 will you approach this as certainly, so instead of constantly being destructive and forcing 268 00:21:55.559 --> 00:22:00.240 the user to re authenticated or prove to the system who they are, use 269 00:22:00.359 --> 00:22:03.599 data. We use some things that we can gather without being you know, 270 00:22:03.680 --> 00:22:07.559 interfering with the user and their activity in the system. That helps us be 271 00:22:08.079 --> 00:22:14.799 fairly confident that we're still assistant the legitimate user. There's also systems that we 272 00:22:14.920 --> 00:22:18.799 gather the outside of right that we gather that from. So like the authentication 273 00:22:18.880 --> 00:22:23.240 service provider, which could be anything from Microsoft, Gator to Actor or whatnot, 274 00:22:23.759 --> 00:22:29.000 they do have data that that is very valuable. We also gather some 275 00:22:29.079 --> 00:22:33.839 of our own this proof and validating the user. Ultimately, though, I 276 00:22:33.880 --> 00:22:42.559 think there's definitely enough awareness already even in the end user communities that security is 277 00:22:42.640 --> 00:22:47.839 very important. So if you are going to if we are going to essentrally 278 00:22:48.200 --> 00:22:52.960 enforce certain security rules along the boy of the process, that we do it 279 00:22:52.960 --> 00:22:56.599 in a way that they understand why this is important, especially in communities like 280 00:22:56.720 --> 00:23:00.920 developers. Right A lot of very sensitive infrastructure and data. So we do 281 00:23:00.039 --> 00:23:04.720 we do have some control in the place that or when, the when, 282 00:23:04.759 --> 00:23:10.000 the time and the trigger is there we need to enforce. So one of 283 00:23:10.000 --> 00:23:15.960 them would be to, let's say, have them re authenticate or step up 284 00:23:15.039 --> 00:23:19.440 authenticated as we call it, to to prove that they are still us. 285 00:23:21.640 --> 00:23:26.359 Ultimately, the goal is to make it at least job I would occur upon 286 00:23:26.519 --> 00:23:29.359 log and in other words, on log and in other words, if someone's 287 00:23:29.400 --> 00:23:32.920 logged and already you know, usually they're gonna be working. I suppose they 288 00:23:32.920 --> 00:23:34.400 could walk away and not log out that kind of thing, and then someone 289 00:23:34.400 --> 00:23:37.680 could come up to their machine. I mean, that does happen, But 290 00:23:37.880 --> 00:23:41.720 I'm just guessing that the vast majority of breaches are at log in time, 291 00:23:41.200 --> 00:23:45.720 A fresh cold breach, Is that right, cannily, I don't know what 292 00:23:45.799 --> 00:23:53.119 the stats are truly about that, but that is definitely a very likely scenario. 293 00:23:53.160 --> 00:23:56.359 It's a good guess. Yeah, it's it's you know, when what's 294 00:23:56.400 --> 00:24:00.640 the users inter session, right that that's now an active you know session that 295 00:24:02.000 --> 00:24:06.480 attacker was able to you know, used to be this type of attack called 296 00:24:06.559 --> 00:24:11.519 man in the middle. So if that was at the scenario, then yeah, 297 00:24:11.359 --> 00:24:17.680 the legitimate user wouldn't even know somebody else's piggyback attacks. Is the interactive 298 00:24:17.759 --> 00:24:22.200 user human users not even uh, it's not even involved. For example, 299 00:24:22.559 --> 00:24:26.599 again, when it comes to cloud technology, there's there's a lot that's already 300 00:24:26.559 --> 00:24:32.400 uh, you know, visible and accessible to attackers who would love to just 301 00:24:32.559 --> 00:24:37.079 exploit that rather than trying to exploit a user's session. Right, And that's 302 00:24:37.079 --> 00:24:41.400 where we also have again as an industry, we're playing a catch up game 303 00:24:41.480 --> 00:24:47.599 here trying to protect these non interactive you know, doors and access points into 304 00:24:47.839 --> 00:24:51.960 cloud data and cloud applications. So, for example, how Brider does that 305 00:24:52.079 --> 00:24:56.880 is we have this constant of non human you know or synthetic or machine identity 306 00:24:56.000 --> 00:25:00.680 used the call it that we allow the custom us to define any process, 307 00:25:00.720 --> 00:25:07.640 any technology that requires access to their infrastructure and data to authenticate much like a 308 00:25:07.720 --> 00:25:14.440 human being and provide the validation that who who they as as a non human 309 00:25:14.440 --> 00:25:18.200 identity of machine identity, who it is and or functionality? What API, 310 00:25:18.279 --> 00:25:21.640 what service they can access before they allow that? Right. So this again 311 00:25:21.680 --> 00:25:26.359 adds another component of security here that instead of just assuming whoever's access an API 312 00:25:26.480 --> 00:25:32.319 that is legitimate, trust and verify. Yeah, I love the trust and 313 00:25:32.400 --> 00:25:34.680 verify thing. And you pick up a really good point about API access and 314 00:25:34.720 --> 00:25:38.920 just machine to machine conversations, right, which happen all the time constantly, 315 00:25:40.359 --> 00:25:44.480 and these APIs are hit twenty four to seven. So is that a new 316 00:25:44.559 --> 00:25:48.920 security threat or a relatively new security threat of people mimicking machine behavior in order 317 00:25:48.920 --> 00:25:52.480 to get behind an API grabs some information. Look back out, it looks 318 00:25:52.519 --> 00:25:56.720 normal, It looks like the normal call it goes from, for example, 319 00:25:56.759 --> 00:26:00.240 back and forth. I mean, those are the really precious connections to full 320 00:26:00.279 --> 00:26:02.480 trade, right, is when you're going from one place to another. And 321 00:26:02.720 --> 00:26:04.720 I mean I remember, I think the target breach came in through an HVAC 322 00:26:04.799 --> 00:26:08.559 system or something through an IoT system. So it's like, wow, it 323 00:26:08.720 --> 00:26:14.599 wasn't some user, it was the machine to machine conversation that was cooptable. 324 00:26:15.160 --> 00:26:18.640 You know. The album is again legacy type of mindset and approaches or what 325 00:26:18.720 --> 00:26:25.079 I mean. For example, to detect the user human user breach, typically 326 00:26:25.079 --> 00:26:30.640 security would review the human logging attempts. They wouldn't necessarily look at API logg 327 00:26:30.680 --> 00:26:34.960 in attempts, right, So it's a fundamental issue. Is there enough visibility? 328 00:26:36.039 --> 00:26:40.599 Is there enough data? That's being sort of you know, filtered and 329 00:26:41.480 --> 00:26:47.720 reviewed through security processes to detect all possible access points. Arguably most organizations miss 330 00:26:47.799 --> 00:26:49.759 that, you know, miss something. That's that's why breaches keep happening, 331 00:26:51.039 --> 00:26:55.079 right Yeah, and that as we suggest that can be all that's necessary to 332 00:26:55.119 --> 00:26:59.000 get into a system. What should in terms of the API management stuff, 333 00:26:59.039 --> 00:27:00.400 how do you how do you solve for that? I mean, does your 334 00:27:00.440 --> 00:27:04.880 technology have a sort of pattern recognition too much normal behavior for a period of 335 00:27:04.920 --> 00:27:08.200 time and say okay, this looks normal. Then once you define normal, 336 00:27:08.279 --> 00:27:12.359 you can define what is abnormal? Is that kind of how your security technology 337 00:27:12.400 --> 00:27:18.359 works. I certainly don't want to sound like we can do anything, and 338 00:27:18.759 --> 00:27:22.319 I think the uh, you know, the API type of use case is 339 00:27:22.519 --> 00:27:29.640 it's fair to say our approach has been similar to the model where its security 340 00:27:29.960 --> 00:27:33.880 kind of more as a matter of you know, a guard rate or two 341 00:27:34.079 --> 00:27:38.720 control upon time of that access. Right. So like as I'm describing that 342 00:27:38.839 --> 00:27:44.359 that they you know and be sort of one the white list before they re 343 00:27:44.480 --> 00:27:49.440 allow when it comes to it really utterns for the non human interactive that I 344 00:27:49.440 --> 00:27:53.519 would say it's kind of more of a next next stage problem. It's just 345 00:27:53.559 --> 00:28:00.359 because it's so much more complex and tracking like the human activity and yeah, 346 00:28:00.440 --> 00:28:04.880 it's it's it's one of these one of the most complex prostl Yeah, and 347 00:28:04.880 --> 00:28:07.799 well, so let's talk about the multi cloud side of the equator. A 348 00:28:07.880 --> 00:28:11.079 useful bit of functionality, I can tell you from a business perspective, because 349 00:28:11.160 --> 00:28:15.359 I don't want to have to care about the difference between Azure and GCP and 350 00:28:15.440 --> 00:28:19.160 Amazon Web Services. You folks can care about that, and you folks can 351 00:28:19.200 --> 00:28:25.079 care about adhering to their protocols, which I'm guessing they update on some relatively 352 00:28:25.200 --> 00:28:27.880 frequent basis, so you have to stay on top of how their protocols change. 353 00:28:29.079 --> 00:28:32.240 But of course with well again with APIs, ideally you don't want to 354 00:28:32.240 --> 00:28:34.319 have to deprecate APIs, right, they're APIs that you want them to stay 355 00:28:34.359 --> 00:28:37.000 the same such that everyone can use it the same way they were using it. 356 00:28:37.359 --> 00:28:41.000 But in terms of these different cloud environments, how do you tackle that? 357 00:28:41.079 --> 00:28:44.079 I mean, do you have sort of a layer of abstraction that can 358 00:28:44.200 --> 00:28:47.640 say, Okay, this is for Azure, so use this functionality, this 359 00:28:47.720 --> 00:28:49.839 is for GCP, use that functionality. How does that work? Yeah, 360 00:28:49.839 --> 00:28:53.079 that's a great point. Actually that's not for any when you know, ongoing 361 00:28:53.119 --> 00:28:56.720 aspect of how do you maintain how do you keep up with a very dynamic 362 00:28:56.759 --> 00:29:02.880 world of cloud technology and APIs so, so that's that's actually one of the 363 00:29:02.920 --> 00:29:07.519 inherent benefits of what right of offers that we are we maintain that we are 364 00:29:07.680 --> 00:29:17.599 constantly monitoring and you know, detecting changes and the key functionality that that right 365 00:29:17.640 --> 00:29:22.200 of itself relies on, I say it's GCP or Azure or whatever functionality that 366 00:29:22.319 --> 00:29:26.519 our system depends on to function. That's our job. That's what comes with 367 00:29:26.599 --> 00:29:32.119 the value of righting that the customers don't don't have to you know, worry 368 00:29:32.119 --> 00:29:36.359 about that that because we don't part of our limited our ip of how we 369 00:29:36.440 --> 00:29:41.000 do that, so we we never we never becomes or the point of destruction 370 00:29:41.119 --> 00:29:45.880 for the customer right right now, that's important. So basically you are solving 371 00:29:45.880 --> 00:29:51.200 for the security challenge across these cloud environments for companies that have people using for 372 00:29:51.359 --> 00:29:55.079 the correct to all the three major ones, is that right actually do more 373 00:29:55.119 --> 00:29:59.559 than that we do for major ones including Oracle Cloud infrastructure. Okay, and 374 00:30:00.079 --> 00:30:04.640 there's just a couple of dozen non infrastructure clouds likes of Snowflakes service now opposite 375 00:30:04.720 --> 00:30:08.519 sixty five it's one. Mmm, that's a full time job. Man. 376 00:30:08.519 --> 00:30:15.119 How big is your company? How many people? We are? Fifty? 377 00:30:15.880 --> 00:30:21.160 So for fifty full tigers. But yeah, we're growing fast, and uh 378 00:30:21.440 --> 00:30:26.000 it is what I'm in more than that. What percentage are actual developers and 379 00:30:26.119 --> 00:30:30.160 engineers? Like, out of fifty people, what percentage are people who are 380 00:30:30.240 --> 00:30:34.839 coders or engineers or people of that technical nature? Eight eight percent? Yeah, 381 00:30:34.839 --> 00:30:37.920 that's that sounds about right, because you can't you can't stay on top 382 00:30:37.920 --> 00:30:41.839 of everything. I mean, these each one of these environments keeps changing. 383 00:30:41.880 --> 00:30:44.440 They have updates all the time, and you have to stay on top of 384 00:30:44.480 --> 00:30:48.319 that stuff. Uh it's and it's changing rapidly these days. It seems to 385 00:30:48.319 --> 00:30:51.039 me, how concerned we got a couple minutes luf there, How concerned are 386 00:30:51.079 --> 00:30:56.039 you about quantum computing and quantum going mainstream? Which IBM, I guess indicating 387 00:30:56.279 --> 00:31:00.960 the concerns I've heard is that with quantum computing, all traditional encryption goes out 388 00:31:02.000 --> 00:31:07.039 the window and wind updating myself. Well, there's still are tactics you can 389 00:31:07.079 --> 00:31:10.680 put in place who rebuff those sorts of attacks, like just to you know, 390 00:31:10.759 --> 00:31:14.559 throttle those things. But overall, it does seem to be a very 391 00:31:14.599 --> 00:31:17.839 significant risk that's coming down the pike. What are your thoughts about quantum and 392 00:31:18.039 --> 00:31:21.519 what we do about it. I'll be very great. So I think it's 393 00:31:21.640 --> 00:31:25.920 revolutionary for sure, right, and it's going to definitely have deep impact on 394 00:31:26.000 --> 00:31:30.759 security. But I also know a lot of times the breaching the attacks happen 395 00:31:30.839 --> 00:31:36.839 because of very basic issues and like the following security hygiene more than not having 396 00:31:36.880 --> 00:31:40.160 strong enough encryption in place. So I think as an industry we need to 397 00:31:40.160 --> 00:31:45.359 get our act together first of all to eliminate like these easy paths and for 398 00:31:45.480 --> 00:31:48.200 attackers to get in. But with quantum, I think it's also the benefit 399 00:31:48.240 --> 00:31:52.880 of having better technology for security as well, so the leverage property, then 400 00:31:52.960 --> 00:31:56.920 we will also have better defense, right, So it goes both ways. 401 00:31:56.960 --> 00:32:01.000 Basically, the good guys, bad guys get it. Yeah, it is. 402 00:32:01.039 --> 00:32:05.200 You know that we're talking about a cash list society. Every one's talking 403 00:32:05.200 --> 00:32:07.079 about a cashlest society. Day. I'm not gonna lie. That does consented 404 00:32:07.160 --> 00:32:10.119 dollars, but you can also hack into someone's account and make the money go 405 00:32:10.160 --> 00:32:15.920 away. And our most recent hack on my debit card Google ads. Lucky 406 00:32:15.920 --> 00:32:17.039 for me, we don't that's interesting to have a whole bunch of And they 407 00:32:17.079 --> 00:32:21.440 started small and they started ramping up. It was like twenty dollars, seventy 408 00:32:21.480 --> 00:32:22.960 dollars, forty two dollars, one hundred and fifty dollars. On my Wait 409 00:32:22.960 --> 00:32:25.799 a minute, why why am I broke again? I know I'm not that 410 00:32:25.839 --> 00:32:30.279 foolish, and yeah, because I was hacked again. And just you know, 411 00:32:30.759 --> 00:32:34.599 it frustrates the end user to have these experiences because you think, shouldn't 412 00:32:34.599 --> 00:32:37.720 the banks beyond this kind of stuff? Shouldn't the banks be watching for these 413 00:32:37.799 --> 00:32:40.079 kinds of things. And if you get into the system where you can be 414 00:32:40.160 --> 00:32:44.160 in the banking world transferring money back and forth, well you have to have 415 00:32:44.240 --> 00:32:46.920 some identity somewhere that can be trapped and managed, right, I mean, 416 00:32:47.160 --> 00:32:52.279 I just I'm kind of fascinated at how affected these bad guys are at infiltrating 417 00:32:52.359 --> 00:32:54.880 banking systems because there has to be a signature of where they came from, 418 00:32:55.359 --> 00:32:58.160 right, I mean, I know in the security were a lot of times 419 00:32:58.160 --> 00:33:00.440 they use proxies to kind of bounce around some play it's the place, so 420 00:33:00.519 --> 00:33:02.599 you can't tell where they came from. But when you're pulling money out, 421 00:33:02.640 --> 00:33:07.119 I mean, you're grabbing all kinds of metadata of what system was on, 422 00:33:07.160 --> 00:33:08.960 what the operating system was, what the browser was, what the location was, 423 00:33:09.000 --> 00:33:13.480 all that stuff gets captured. I'm kind of surprised we don't have more 424 00:33:13.480 --> 00:33:15.039 success or maybe we do and I just don't hear about it. What are 425 00:33:15.079 --> 00:33:20.000 your closing thoughts on just the state of security in this world and why it's 426 00:33:20.039 --> 00:33:23.079 still such a problem. Yeah, and certainly the industry has come a long 427 00:33:23.119 --> 00:33:27.519 way, you know, in twenty years, been long enough times for me 428 00:33:27.599 --> 00:33:31.319 to see that. I really still think that, you know, security's job. 429 00:33:31.960 --> 00:33:37.960 There was an interesting you know how many made alias about security being scapegoat 430 00:33:38.039 --> 00:33:42.039 right. It's it's it's a very tough job to have because they always have 431 00:33:42.200 --> 00:33:47.400 to balance security versus you know, a business, you know, priorities and 432 00:33:47.440 --> 00:33:53.039 objectives and especially interfering anything that's important for the business right so right, and 433 00:33:53.079 --> 00:33:58.400 there there's inevitably trade offs. Inevitably, it's always it always comes down to 434 00:33:58.440 --> 00:34:01.559 trade offs, I think it. You know, as an industry, you 435 00:34:01.599 --> 00:34:06.079 know, as the practitioners out there in the feel you know, make decisions 436 00:34:06.160 --> 00:34:09.519 and sometimes hopefully most of the times, whether the right decisions. Sometimes they're 437 00:34:09.559 --> 00:34:15.960 not. And you see outcome news, see the consequences from the vendor community. 438 00:34:15.000 --> 00:34:21.440 I think we are really making some really big, you know, head 439 00:34:21.519 --> 00:34:27.239 raisings and bringing technologies to the practitioners, to the siss of the world to 440 00:34:27.400 --> 00:34:34.599 actually make that balance or decision easier where security doesn't have to cost productivity, 441 00:34:34.599 --> 00:34:37.559 security doesn't have to cost the business, agility and so on. That's I 442 00:34:37.559 --> 00:34:40.400 think as an industry we're making a big, big step towards right. I 443 00:34:40.440 --> 00:34:44.480 feel like that that's for the next ticketute or so. This would be a 444 00:34:44.559 --> 00:34:50.239 huge should be a huge factor in how the how we prove them overall posture 445 00:34:51.079 --> 00:34:53.440 of the industry and the security. Well that sounds good. 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It's a skill anyone can learn in minutes. Just visit Heart dot 495 00:38:40.760 --> 00:38:47.719 org slash hands only CPR. Hands only CPR is nationally supported by an elevant 496 00:38:49.679 --> 00:39:07.119 Welcome back to Inside Analysis, here's your host, Eric Kavanaugh absolutely okay bolts 497 00:39:07.119 --> 00:39:12.559 back here on Inside Analysis talking all things identity management these days, identity resolution, 498 00:39:13.320 --> 00:39:15.360 Who are we out of the systems we use know who we are and 499 00:39:15.440 --> 00:39:19.719 validate us. Obviously, it's a very huge issue. We were just talking 500 00:39:19.719 --> 00:39:22.840 to Art from bright to all about that and I was reminded of some other 501 00:39:22.880 --> 00:39:27.599 approaches that some folks are doing and something that we're actually working on. So 502 00:39:27.679 --> 00:39:30.239 a little special treat for our avid listeners, I'm going to give you a 503 00:39:30.280 --> 00:39:35.639 stick preview of something that we've been working on here at Inside Analysis of the 504 00:39:35.639 --> 00:39:38.519 Blur group with some of our partners. And the example I wanted to get 505 00:39:38.559 --> 00:39:44.559 first of all was my good buddy Sean Brem from Crowdpoint Technologies and what they've 506 00:39:44.599 --> 00:39:49.480 built so federated ID is at the heart of their mission. What they've really 507 00:39:49.519 --> 00:39:54.639 built is a ecosystem, an e commerce ecosystem that's based upon a blockchain and 508 00:39:54.679 --> 00:40:00.400 proprietary blockchain that they've built, which also doubles as a database. It's not 509 00:40:00.480 --> 00:40:06.400 just the traditional slow blockchain style data structure, but they've done some very clever 510 00:40:06.440 --> 00:40:10.400 things in that regard. But what I find really compelling about their approach is 511 00:40:10.440 --> 00:40:16.159 the fact that there are focused on giving value back to the end user for 512 00:40:16.239 --> 00:40:21.480 the data of theirs that is used to train algorithms. So if you look 513 00:40:21.519 --> 00:40:24.400 at all the hubbub around open ai, for example, and these lawsuits that 514 00:40:24.400 --> 00:40:29.159 have been filed, what did they basically alleged? They say that open ai 515 00:40:29.239 --> 00:40:32.920 went out and scraped all kinds of content, including copyrighted content, and they 516 00:40:34.079 --> 00:40:37.800 use all that material to build out their model, their generative AI model. 517 00:40:38.280 --> 00:40:45.760 Well, it's a good argument if I've used someone's copyrighted material to train my 518 00:40:45.920 --> 00:40:50.599 engine, which I then make money from, while shouldn't they whose content was 519 00:40:50.719 --> 00:40:53.760 used get some piece of that action? And that's traditionally how these things work. 520 00:40:54.239 --> 00:40:58.920 I did see just the other day that there was a judgment rendered in 521 00:40:59.000 --> 00:41:04.440 a court somewhere in the US that basically said gen ai generated content cannot be 522 00:41:04.559 --> 00:41:09.679 copyrighted. Now, how they would know what engine generated the cons places beyond 523 00:41:09.719 --> 00:41:14.440 me, and I think that's frankly an open question. But at least a 524 00:41:14.559 --> 00:41:16.840 standard has now been set. So what does that mean, Well, it 525 00:41:16.880 --> 00:41:20.360 means that there's going to have to be some more work to be done. 526 00:41:20.480 --> 00:41:25.039 I heard that open ai also truncated their sniffing engine. Their engine would determine 527 00:41:25.079 --> 00:41:30.880 whether or not content was created by an open AI engine or a chat GPT 528 00:41:30.159 --> 00:41:35.519 or something like that, which also is interesting. Obviously, they see the 529 00:41:35.559 --> 00:41:38.039 lawsuits coming and they know there's something going to happen here. So what does 530 00:41:38.039 --> 00:41:42.199 this all mean? Well, I can tell you that these large language models, 531 00:41:42.239 --> 00:41:46.679 these foundational models, are absolutely amazing. They are spectacularly powerful, very 532 00:41:46.760 --> 00:41:52.000 very interesting. Yes, we are worried about the trust side of things, 533 00:41:52.000 --> 00:41:54.599 but nonetheless we have to be respectful of the fact that this is going to 534 00:41:54.719 --> 00:41:58.199 change how business gets done. So what does that all mean? Well, 535 00:41:58.800 --> 00:42:04.760 getting back to federated I that was crowdping's vision and their idea is that they're 536 00:42:04.800 --> 00:42:07.639 going to pay attention to when your data is used for something and then pay 537 00:42:07.679 --> 00:42:13.119 you for that small amounts of money first pennies, then dimes and dollars down 538 00:42:13.199 --> 00:42:16.280 the road, is at least how the theory goes. So that helps solve 539 00:42:16.320 --> 00:42:22.000 the identity resolution problem at least in their world. But what we're going to 540 00:42:22.039 --> 00:42:24.039 do here, and this is how I'm going to fuse these topics together here 541 00:42:24.039 --> 00:42:30.360 at the end of our show today the rubric and the Rubric is going to 542 00:42:30.480 --> 00:42:36.639 use a large language model as its text generation tool or engine. But the 543 00:42:36.679 --> 00:42:39.960 moorings, the anchors of truth, the embeddings, if you will, Those 544 00:42:40.000 --> 00:42:44.280 are going to come from trusted experts. And so we're going to do is 545 00:42:44.280 --> 00:42:46.119 reach out to folks and if you're into this, send me an email and 546 00:42:46.280 --> 00:42:51.239 though at inside analysis dot com. If you're an expert in analytics in particular, 547 00:42:51.599 --> 00:42:53.599 these are the folks we're looking to talk to. First, you could 548 00:42:53.599 --> 00:42:59.280 publish your papers or your works, your articles, research reports, etc. 549 00:43:00.280 --> 00:43:05.719 In this system that will then use them and other reports, other trusted reports 550 00:43:05.760 --> 00:43:09.679 as the anchors of truth for the rubric to help folks make decisions about which 551 00:43:09.679 --> 00:43:14.440 analytic tool to use, how to use it, what other tools can be 552 00:43:14.519 --> 00:43:16.039 used in conjunction with it, How could you build a stack? Basically, 553 00:43:16.079 --> 00:43:21.880 what does the modern analytics stack look like? And we're planning on building that 554 00:43:21.880 --> 00:43:25.039 out right now. So it actually uses a technology that I've already had built 555 00:43:25.360 --> 00:43:30.679 called media lens, and media lens I built it. It's a lens with 556 00:43:30.719 --> 00:43:36.280 a Z. It runs a site inside openside hyphen open source dot org and 557 00:43:36.679 --> 00:43:38.880 it uses that right now. What I wanted was an engine that I could 558 00:43:39.000 --> 00:43:44.840 use to spin up a highly focused stream of content that would be useful for 559 00:43:44.880 --> 00:43:47.280 a researcher. So I wanted to stay on top of the open source community. 560 00:43:47.519 --> 00:43:51.880 So that's where we've targeted first. And all I did was went out 561 00:43:51.880 --> 00:43:54.920 and found all these different folks who tweet about open source technologies, who follow 562 00:43:54.960 --> 00:44:00.360 their handles, media lens tracks that they tracked the different handles that I've given 563 00:44:00.360 --> 00:44:05.519 them to watch out for. And then what it'll do is it'll grab any 564 00:44:05.760 --> 00:44:10.440 URL that is shared by these folks with hashtags like open source or drammio or 565 00:44:10.480 --> 00:44:15.639 apache or the other terms, the key terms that are associated with that particular 566 00:44:15.760 --> 00:44:21.480 industry, and that publishes them as pending posts in my environment, and then 567 00:44:21.519 --> 00:44:24.159 I can choose to post them or not. And every time I post, 568 00:44:24.280 --> 00:44:30.480 what I'm essentially doing is building out my content lake. And so this is 569 00:44:30.519 --> 00:44:35.559 where we're going to use the engine to help find these anchors of truth that 570 00:44:35.679 --> 00:44:42.440 will sort of pin down the truth and allow the generative AI functionality to spin 571 00:44:42.559 --> 00:44:46.760 appropriate words around the concepts that the prompt delivers. So what are we talking 572 00:44:46.800 --> 00:44:50.440 about? I mean, really, if you think about Siri and these other 573 00:44:50.519 --> 00:44:55.079 engines for these purposes, they're valuable. They can sort of find information for 574 00:44:55.119 --> 00:45:00.920 you, but they're not really trusted experts in a particular domain. And one 575 00:45:00.039 --> 00:45:04.440 reason for that is because it would be chew off to bite off, if 576 00:45:04.440 --> 00:45:07.280 you will, for the current engine. So right now, series kind of 577 00:45:07.280 --> 00:45:12.519 pointing you to different things on the web or giving you information that is readily 578 00:45:12.519 --> 00:45:15.360 available, like the weather or what time of meeting is, things of that 579 00:45:15.440 --> 00:45:20.039 nature. But when you start getting into really dense and in trade press, 580 00:45:20.119 --> 00:45:22.840 for example, well you're going to need more than that, and that's what 581 00:45:22.880 --> 00:45:28.320 we're focused on. So we're focused on finding the right experts to provide their 582 00:45:28.400 --> 00:45:34.760 materials in a trusted fashion, and then whenever that material gets used via the 583 00:45:34.840 --> 00:45:40.039 rubric by a paying client, the people whose insights were used in that immediate 584 00:45:40.199 --> 00:45:45.960 sort of real time mind meld, they will get rewarded with credits. Now, 585 00:45:45.000 --> 00:45:47.280 it's going to take a while to build this thing up, but the 586 00:45:47.360 --> 00:45:52.320 point is we're going to try to create a center of gravity around the topic 587 00:45:52.440 --> 00:45:55.400 of analytics because there's a finite number of vendors or a finite number of people 588 00:45:55.400 --> 00:46:00.559 who focus on this, and we're looking for help to do that. So, 589 00:46:00.679 --> 00:46:01.639 like I say, if you're hearing this and you think it sounds like 590 00:46:01.639 --> 00:46:07.880 a good idea, send me email info at dm radio dot biz or info 591 00:46:07.920 --> 00:46:10.960 at inside Analysis dot com. Both of those come directly to me, and 592 00:46:12.039 --> 00:46:15.039 we'll be curious to talk to you and maybe show you a preview of this 593 00:46:15.119 --> 00:46:17.840 thing. But the idea is that you really right now, folks are paying 594 00:46:17.840 --> 00:46:22.639 lots and lots of money for Gardner and Forrester and some of these other consultants 595 00:46:22.679 --> 00:46:25.199 or Boston Consulting Group. A lot of very smart people at these companies, 596 00:46:25.400 --> 00:46:29.559 but it's hard to get access to these people. And they just finite human 597 00:46:29.599 --> 00:46:31.920 beings, so they don't know everything, but they know a lot about a 598 00:46:31.960 --> 00:46:37.039 particular domain for example. Well, if you think about the power of these 599 00:46:37.079 --> 00:46:44.440 foundational models to piece together vectors of information from multiple sources, if you get 600 00:46:44.440 --> 00:46:46.800 to a critical mass of embeddings, and this is the key, you need 601 00:46:46.840 --> 00:46:52.519 a critical massive embeddings from trusted sources, then all of a sudden you have 602 00:46:52.559 --> 00:46:59.920 a very interesting, intelligent chatbot that you can counsel to find out information about 603 00:47:00.079 --> 00:47:04.960 big decisions like which technology should we buy, like which technologies work well with 604 00:47:05.039 --> 00:47:07.800 the other. That's another very important thing to understand. It's a lot of 605 00:47:07.840 --> 00:47:13.639 times some technologies don't work together so well, and some do so knowing which 606 00:47:13.639 --> 00:47:17.639 technologies work well in which environments also very useful stuff. There's best practices, 607 00:47:17.719 --> 00:47:22.440 I mean, knowing how to go about setting up a sequel statement to find 608 00:47:22.519 --> 00:47:25.360 certain pieces of information. I mean a lot of people know that, a 609 00:47:25.360 --> 00:47:30.519 lot of people understand sequel, but nonetheless a lot of people don't. And 610 00:47:30.639 --> 00:47:35.239 we're a very interesting phase right now in the world. So are built out 611 00:47:35.280 --> 00:47:39.000 as assistant to help folks understand enterprise technology, get out of the weeds, 612 00:47:39.079 --> 00:47:46.000 do some better answer faster and less expensively. Right, Because if you bring 613 00:47:46.079 --> 00:47:50.679 together all these smart minds and get good content from people who know what they're 614 00:47:50.719 --> 00:47:54.880 talking about, and find to wait those scores, to wait the information and 615 00:47:54.960 --> 00:48:00.519 to align it topically. And that's what these embeddings do. I mean to 616 00:48:00.599 --> 00:48:04.800 kind of cap it off here, embeddings are taxed straight down to And what 617 00:48:04.880 --> 00:48:07.880 the folks did building these large language models is, you know, they did 618 00:48:07.920 --> 00:48:15.519 some amazing work at being able to vectorize information text, so they put it 619 00:48:15.559 --> 00:48:21.159 into numbers such that you could do statistical analysis more easily in fine patterns in 620 00:48:21.280 --> 00:48:22.920 data. Okay, this word is used in this context. It's also used 621 00:48:22.920 --> 00:48:27.039 in that context. When does it mean this? When does it mean that 622 00:48:27.440 --> 00:48:31.039 these are the kinds of solutions that these large language models can provide. They 623 00:48:31.039 --> 00:48:36.920 can give you really good information about what should be in a certain context and 624 00:48:37.000 --> 00:48:39.960 what should not. But the key again is the embeddings. The embeddings that 625 00:48:40.039 --> 00:48:44.360 you get to get closer and closer to the truth. So I just wanted 626 00:48:44.400 --> 00:48:47.679 to tease that fun stuff to you folks online to asialysis dot com, sending 627 00:48:47.760 --> 00:48:52.639 emails dot com. You want to get involved and reha some fun solutions and 628 00:48:52.880 --> 00:49:10.039 different products. M I'm Elizabeth Powers. 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That's eight one eight 666 00:53:04.239 --> 00:53:10.760 six one zero eight zero eight eight Tebot Club dot com The Tri City Shopping 667 00:53:10.800 --> 00:53:15.320 Center in Redlands is serving up some really cool ice cream at Lamicho Akana. 668 00:53:15.599 --> 00:53:20.800 Then get your chocolates and other delights from Seas Candies. Moms and future moms 669 00:53:20.800 --> 00:53:23.360 who visit the mall can cool off and relax while they get treated like royalty 670 00:53:23.360 --> 00:53:29.000 at Shiny Nails or Francis Nails and then pampered at Texture Hair. The Tri 671 00:53:29.119 --> 00:53:31.599 City Center is filled with retailers who care about you. Shop at the Tri 672 00:53:31.719 --> 00:53:36.440 City Center in Redlands and see why they call it the mall with a heart 673 00:53:38.960 --> 00:53:45.960 with sixty years of fascinating facts. This is the man from yesterday, back 674 00:53:46.000 --> 00:53:50.320 in time, from this time. In nineteen eighty seven, treasure hunters have 675 00:53:50.360 --> 00:53:55.599 found the Titanic's legendary safe and planned to open it during a live TV broadcast. 676 00:53:55.800 --> 00:54:00.960 The Titanic's safe was found on the ocean floor to an half miles below 677 00:54:00.000 --> 00:54:05.559 the surface at the Titanic site. It'll be opened on live TV broadcast in 678 00:54:05.639 --> 00:54:08.599 October here in nineteen eighty seven. Tonight, we will show you for the 679 00:54:08.639 --> 00:54:13.119 first time artifacts which have been lost to the world for more than seventy five 680 00:54:13.199 --> 00:54:16.440 years. We will reveal new evidence which could explain why the Titanic went down, 681 00:54:16.519 --> 00:54:22.000 and we will open the recovered safe and police and discover what surprises they 682 00:54:22.039 --> 00:54:24.880 contain. 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Then get your chocolates and other delights from Sees Candies. Moms and 692 00:55:20.320 --> 00:55:22.800 future moms who visit the mall can cool off and relax while they get treated 693 00:55:22.880 --> 00:55:28.159 like royalty at Shiny Nails or Francis Nails and then pampered at Texture Hair. 694 00:55:28.800 --> 00:55:31.519 The Tri City Center is filled with retailers who care about you. Shop at 695 00:55:31.519 --> 00:55:36.119 the Tri City Center in Redlands and see why they call it the Mall with 696 00:55:36.199 --> 00:55:43.280 a Heart. Every Wednesday at three pm, it's The Uncommon Sense Democrat with 697 00:55:43.360 --> 00:55:46.320 host Eric Bounmt. I love when his people talk about how old Joe Biden 698 00:55:46.440 --> 00:55:50.719 is, but he's just a couple of years behind it. You'll get the 699 00:55:50.760 --> 00:56:01.000 best political commentary and stuff like this. Good night. Join us for the 700 00:56:01.079 --> 00:56:06.519 Uncommon Sense Democrat every Wednesday at three pm on the stations that leave no listener 701 00:56:06.559 --> 00:56:12.920 behind kc AA ten fifty am Man one oh six point five. Bobila here 702 00:56:13.000 --> 00:56:16.519 with my home improvement tip of the day. Gas powered fireplaces have been showing 703 00:56:16.599 --> 00:56:20.480 up in more and more homes in the past few years. They're clean, 704 00:56:20.679 --> 00:56:23.079 easy to use, and add a nice ambiance to the home. However, 705 00:56:23.119 --> 00:56:28.000 at one drawback is the noises they sometimes make. If you hear a popping 706 00:56:28.039 --> 00:56:30.960 noise when the burner's on, it may signal small leaks around joints in the 707 00:56:31.000 --> 00:56:36.360 burner assembly. To test for leaks, first turn off the burner and once 708 00:56:36.400 --> 00:56:39.480 the ceramic logs have cooled off, remove them from the firebox. Next, 709 00:56:39.760 --> 00:56:44.000 mix a bit of liquid detergent with water and pour it into a spray bottle. 710 00:56:44.519 --> 00:56:47.639 Turn the now exposed burner assembly back on and look for any small bursts 711 00:56:47.639 --> 00:56:51.920 of flame that may be popping around the joints. If you don't see any, 712 00:56:52.079 --> 00:56:54.960 try spraying a little detergent makes on the various joints and fittings in the 713 00:56:55.000 --> 00:56:59.760 burner assembly. If you see bubbles, you found the leak. If you 714 00:57:00.039 --> 00:57:01.800 can't find a leak, or the leak you find appears to be a hole 715 00:57:01.840 --> 00:57:06.199 in the assembly itself, you'll want to call in a pro. Get more 716 00:57:06.199 --> 00:57:08.760 info at bob Vila dot com and right here at home. But need Bob 717 00:57:08.840 --> 00:57:22.800 Viva. 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Doctor Pruett 733 00:58:37.119 --> 00:58:40.119 listens to your medical questions and he takes your concerns seriously. So tune into 734 00:58:40.159 --> 00:58:45.199 doctor Sean Pruett each Monday afternoon at one pm right here on casey AA Radio 735 00:58:45.480 --> 00:58:50.079 ten fifty am and one oh six point five FM, the station that leaves 736 00:58:50.119 --> 00:58:54.599 no listener behind. Killistina KCAA Lamolinda at one oh six point five FM, 737 00:58:54.719 --> 00:59:01.800 K two ninety three CF Marino Valley, NBC News Radio. I'm Tammy Trehillo. 738 00:59:02.280 --> 00:59:07.480 Extreme flooding is leaving tens of thousands stranded at a music and arts festival 739 00:59:07.519 --> 00:59:12.480 in Nevada. One attendee of Burning Man describes the scene the alkali dust here. 740 00:59:13.000 --> 00:59:15.559 Once it gets wet, it turns into the cakiest, stickiest mud, 741 00:59:16.199 --> 00:59:20.559 And it has just been impossible to get around when people's cars are getting stuck 742 00:59:20.599 --> 00:59:22.320 in the roads, and like I mean, people are like trying to leave 743 00:59:22.360 --> 00:59:25.800 it. A few people are getting out. Organizers first told the crowd Friday 744 00:59:25.800 --> 00:59:30.000 to shelter in place and conserve food and water. Authorities closed nearby roads in 745 00:59:30.039 --> 00:59:34.960 Nevada's Black Rock Desert and are keeping anyone from entering or leaving the event. 746 00:59:35.480 --> 00:59:38.599 Some attendees have left by foot, hiking multiple miles to an accessible road. 747 00:59:38.880 --> 00:59:43.440 At least one person has died. More rain is in the forecast. The 748 00:59:43.480 --> 00:59:46.320 festival is set to wrap up tomorrow. Millions of Americans are on the go 749 00:59:46.480 --> 00:59:51.239 over this Labor Day weekend. Experts predict it will be one of the busiest 750 00:59:51.280 --> 00:59:54.639 travel weekends of the year across the US. The FAA says Atlanta, Los 751 00:59:54.639 --> 00:59:59.599 Angeles, and Denver are among the busiest airports. Triple A says compared to 752 00:59:59.679 --> 01:00:02.360 last year, bookings for flights, hotels, rental cars, and cruises are 753 01:00:02.360 --> 01:00:07.920 all up by four percent. Former Vice President Mike Pence says nobody's buying by 754 01:00:07.000 --> 01:00:08.519 gnomics, while a top y