WEBVTT

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The good and the information economy as
a rod. The world is teeming with

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innovation as new business models reinvent every
industry. Inside Analysis is your source of

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information and insight about how to make
the most of this exciting new era.

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Learn more at Inside Analysis dot Inside
analysis dot com. And now here's your

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host, Eric Kavanaugh. Keep each
other, we have some all right,

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lady and gentlemen, Hello and welcome
back once again, so the only coast

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to coast radio show all about the
information economy. It's time for Inside Analysis.

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Your truly is here with a very
special guest. Che a problem that

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never goes away and never will go
away. It's always going to be a

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challenge. It's changing by the day. We're talking to Archer goes it called

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bright if it's b R I T
i v E. Security. It's one

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of these issues that only a handful
of people at the company ever really care

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about it. And my British business
partner one time cracked a joke. He

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said, there's only one person who
has about scape goat, meaning the person

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who was in charge of security just
gets blamed when something goes wrong. And

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they've like us, they do the
same kind of stuff. But one of

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the more clever comments I've heard about. I think this is very, very

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true. I'm sure you'll agree with
this, is that security is not a

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thing. It's not one object.
It's not a technology, it's not a

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process. It's a whole amalgam of
education, of protocols, of technologies,

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of observability, and just paying attention. You have to pay attention all the

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time, but this stuff. And
I can tell you, folks, in

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the last four or five months,
I've had my corporate debit card hacked twice,

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which is annoying. Once is okay, because that way I can see

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and remember all the stupid things I've
signed up for. You get all the

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emails that, oh, your credit
card was declined, like, yeah,

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I know, because it got hacked, and I didn't really want to go

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back to you guys. And luckily
the legislators around the country here in America

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at least, have done some good
work in not allowing these organizations to keep

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hammering you with late fees after it
goes away. These days, you just

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don't get your service anymore and it
goes away. But nonetheless, the secure

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issue is to not be important,
so you always need this cocktail of technologies,

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processes, and then even still you're
going to get hacks sooner or later.

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So what's your path to remediation?
But if you choice words or tell

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us a bit about yourself and Bright
Eve and how you got into the space

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and what you folks are doing.
Yeah, thank you, thanks for having

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me here. I got into security, and back then it was more about

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network security or it security as they
call it. It's certainly involved quite a

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bit since then, it's become you
know, arguably even at board level here

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that you know that we see today, you know, hacks or attacks just

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network breach to steal some data to
one. Cyber warfare or cyber crime and

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ransomware is one that is so lucrative
these days for the criminals and so disruptive

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for many companies in the industries.
Right, So it's a very different world

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today that we live in. Before
this company, before Bright I've I've been

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in a space mostly from consulting and
services industry in that industry and started ten

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years ago in identity and access banishment
services space event truly which led you know,

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excitive that can brentifically problem in a
space or cloud public cloud technologies and

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building a product to the market that
helps reduce the security risks and the market

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that helps reduce the security risks and
vulnerabilities that are preventing businesses from adopting and

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expanding their public clouds consumption or their
clouds adoption. Right, well, let's

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let's talk about how you do that, because there are lots and lots of

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ways, and I do like that
you're focused on identity management because, let's

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face it, if you're trying to
log into a system, the system is

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trying to understand, okay, are
you the person that you say you are?

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And historically that's been largely done by
passwords, which of course is a

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pain because you have to remember the
passwords, and a lot of people use

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the same password for everything, and
that, of course is putting yourself in

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jeopardy because then folks can hack in
and do all kind of stuff. And

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you know, it was my business
partner, doctor Robin Blore, who years

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ago taught me that this whole crime
network is not just individuals. In fact,

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the whole narrative around the guy in
the hoodie being the one who's going

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in and hacking your system is very
disingenuous. It's not a guy in a

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hoodie. Sometimes it is, but
usually there's this whole industry involved. There

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are people who specialize in getting access
or people who specialize and exploiting that access,

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and then we'll just kind of sell
their access to other players. And

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then you have cases like the Colonial
Pipeline, which some folks may recall a

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while back before the Russian invasion of
Ukraine took down the East Coast's ability to

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get gas to gas stations. And
you know, when I saw that,

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I thought to myself, this is
an active war. This is not just

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some ransomware. And the government has
never come out and said that, but

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I believe it was an active war. And it goes to show you how

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vulnerable we all East Coast, and
that will be a very significant inconvenience and

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in fact put people in jeopardy,
right ambulances, things that can't get gasoline.

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That's a pretty big problem. So
it's not just individuals. I mean,

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to your point, there is cyber
warfare that goes on state sponsored actors,

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and I think the folks at Google
and Facebook and Yahoo and these other

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big organizations certainly work very hard to
stop all that. But maybe tell us

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about your role and how you fit
into this bigger picture. What do you

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do to enable identity management that you
can then sort of provide to all these

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cloud providers. Yeah, that's that's
very very good background, just kind of

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how you've illustrated like the state of
the world really and I why identity was

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so important and why we decided to
really invest in building in technology. There's

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a very important thing to talk about
here. With the clouds technologies and adoption

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of public cloud, there was a
huge change in paradigm shifts really in the

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in the world of you know,
security and identity. Specifically back in when

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everything all the critical itasis when the
day to data center from outside in so

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there was a perimeter aside from the
world of course, but there was a

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perimeter security network you know, firewalls
and ideas and so one, and identities

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existed inside the firewall. With public
cloud, that was a complete opposite.

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They essentially became the first and last
line of defense when we could clouds infrastructure

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and applications. It's fun that became
the first and biggest secure elements to protect.

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And what that means from like examples
should give of course Azure and GCP

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and AVS. They all have pretty
robust security controls and identity models. The

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challenges for any organization that operates across
different technologies and they also operate top of

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the of the cloud providers infrastructure to
build their own security and controls across the

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different providers, and they're not uniform. Azure security is very different than AVS

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and it's very different from DCPPE when
it comes to how they protect the identity

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and how they protect the access.
That's why Right came to market with a

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solution that works across the cloud providers. Another very important thing that we did,

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and this was something that we saw
as we were entering the market,

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we saw a huge issue what we
call these overprivileged access. So a lot

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of times organizations with intention to bring
us and lookt to support their businesses and

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growth, we really had to do
things from secure amppoint in a way that

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we're not ideal, like giving a
lot of access to users assuming they're going

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to need that or they may be
needed at some point but no longer needed

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later. That created this exposure risk, exposure when access existed but nobody needed

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it. Well. Of course,
attackers love that situation. That's why you

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started seeing breach after breaching Capital One
was one of the earliest, like clouds

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privileged access breaches that we came to
the problem that we noticed early on how

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the current access or the traditional access
model didn't really translate well to cloud.

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What I mean by that is when
you give somebody access with assumption they needed

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twenty four by seven, an access
always sits there and the only thing that

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prevents somebody else to gain access is
a login name and password. It's a

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terrible security and it's a very vulnerable
security. So we decided to change that

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with Brighter. We really kind of
invented the new to eliminate everything when the

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user doesn't need that access. So
when it comes to human users, none

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of us can sit in front of
a computer at twenty four by seven by

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sixty five, right, We can
do our job for an hours, but

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after that we don't need that access. So what Brighter does is automatically grants

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that access when the user needs but
also removes automatically when that access is no

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longer needed until the next time the
user needs it. That's a massive reduction

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of the risk exposure and then attacks
surface. Yeah, well, and I

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know for sure that one of the
things that you could do to better secure

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your environment is to identify where someone
logs in, what office are they in,

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are they in a different office than
they normally are in, and that

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would be in a profile around the
user. So the identity management of Chuck,

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let's say, is that he dials
in from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. That's

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where he works. And if he
goes traveling somewhere, you know, wouldn't

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it be great to know that he's
traveling. And of course these banks have

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systems they don't always work very well
when they say, hey, are you

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going to be traveling and you say, yes, we'll be traveling to Austria

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next week. So if my credit
card comes across in Austria, it's me,

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So don't block me out when I'm
trying to log into my systems from

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Austria. Well that's a nice way
to do it, but it's expensive,

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it's a bit time intensive. But
these days it seems to me it should

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be relatively place to identify the pattern
of what is normal, And the normal

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pattern for Chuck would be he logs
in at nine am, he logs out

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at five pm, kind of deal. And if he logs in at two

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o'clock in the morning, well,
maybe you kick in an extra security loop

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to say, hmm, are you
really you? And of course people know

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these captures. The captures drive me
completely bonkers. I hate it, especially

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on my phone because I'm like,
I just give up. I'm like,

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I won't go in. I don't
care, I'm not going to go Is

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this a bike? Is this a
bike? Is? Okay, it's very

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annoying. But the point I'm making
here is that you can build a profile

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around the user and then understand who
that person is and when they're doing things

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like they normally do, you still
have security, but at least it's a

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lower level of security when they're doing
things they're not normally doing. That's when

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you kick in a higher level of
security. Is not about right, and

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you're correct that technology today has come
a long way and being able to actually

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do that and do it with a
minimal disruption to your point catches and years

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ago, I think you know,
to expand on that little bit, right,

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I think yes, there's a lot
of opportunity to improve that both from

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super standpoint. So one of the
things that we're doing along those lines,

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when you look at a pretty significant
a number of years for a bit of

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automotors, that's one. These folks
just have to do a lot of different

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things during the day, and there's
definitely it's not a very static, sort

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of a linear pattern of work,
so they jump around a lot of doing

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this here and something else there.
What we do, what we try to

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do is gather activity across you know, during the day, across the environments

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that the data from the from the
patternston point. Over time, let's say,

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you know, over let's say ninety
days, the normal pattern for this

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type of user has been x,
y, and z. Why that's important

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is because we could also detect when
something goes completely right. That allows us

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to kick off triggers to say something
is not looking and feeling right, so

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the security teams can quickly take a
look and understand is it normal? Could

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they could be a legitimate instance of
that situation, but we'd rather verify that

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than let it go right. So
that helps us also enhance you know,

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the model, because that also helps
the data, same data, and that

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is analyzing the data helps us understand
what next time next patch or users,

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what is the normal pattern of access
they shouldn't So we can make those grants

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very easily and get people with Basically, if I understand it, you're I

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mean, security has to sit in
between systems, right, So into a

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cloud environment that may have of twenty
different applications. And I have developer friends

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and they tell me that the biggest
pain in their job just then logging back

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into that system. People in the
consumer world, Now you have all these

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different protocols. Oh, it's got
to be ten characters and a special character.

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It can't be two characters side by
side, like you know, two

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characters in a row. All this
these goofy sort of bespoke rules that mean

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you have to come up with different
passwords. None of course Google allows you

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to do that password management feature,
and there a system and that's what I

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use. But of course if someone
hacks into that, now they've got access

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to all your stuff. I mean, these security issues the sword cuts both

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ways, because both ways. I
thought about the Kiva. They're like,

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oh, KEYVAP, that's great unless
someone gets your key going like this till

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they find your goal. And it's
like some of these security measures wind up

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being security risks. Essentially. How
do you balance that out? And how

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do you sit in between particular clients
You're out of their environment they're moving to

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us about that quickly. Yeah,
And early in my career in the security

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space, somebody said this and it
really stuck in my head. The best

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security is invisible security, so the
end user can't see there. It's been

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very hard to actually get get to
that stage. But I think we're getting

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getting definitely we're moving in the right
direction. We're not quite there realizing.

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I'm realizing we're up in our first
break. So after you're listening to the

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seven eighty three. Welcome back to
Inside Analysis. Here's your piet. Okay,

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folks, back here Inside Analysis or
true the air kabanomic art for goes

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in of brightest br ti D.
We're talking all about security, getting access

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to systems, how annoying security can
be, but how important it is because

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when someone gets in, especially with
ransomware, and they hold all your stuff

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hostage. Like I said, the
Coloney pipeline shows you how much can be

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held hostage. Major hospitals have been
held hostage by these things, and that's

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a real problem. But arc you
were talking a moment ago about how the

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ideal security is invisible security, which
you know out of the covers can be

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very powerful these days because you can
test all kinds of things. Right,

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where is this person? What device
is it? I mean to me,

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that's one of the key characteristics,
right, is like, is this the

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device that the person normally used so
much focused on these mobile devices these days?

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And there it is because there's a
signature. There's an IP addressed and

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there's the unique signature of that device. I'm using that device and it's me.

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It's at a run that Okay,
that's probably a good a good person

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too, as and how you folks
do it? Yeah, so how do

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you approach this? As certainly a
combination of different things, and it doesn't

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something you mentioned, right, So
instead of constantly being destructive and forcing the

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user to re authentic it or prove
to the system who they are, we

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use data. We use some things
that we can gather without you in fear

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activity in the system that helps us
be fairly confident that we're still they still

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the legitimate user. There's also systems
that we gather the outside of, right

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that we gather that from. So
like the authentication service provider, which could

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be anything from Microsoft Dactor or to
Actor or whatnot, they do have data

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that that is very valuable. We
also gather our own that helps us prove

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and validating the user. Ultimately,
though I think there's definitely enough awareness already

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even in the end user, you
know, communities that security is important.

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So if you are going to if
we are going to essentrally enforce certain security

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rules along the break along the process, that we do it in a way

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that they understand why this is important, especially in communities like developers, right,

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because they deal with a lot of
very sensitive infrastructure and data. So

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we do we do have some control
in the place that are when the when,

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the time, and the trigger is
there we need to enforce. So

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one of them would be to let's
say, have them re reauthenticate or step

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up authenticated call to put that they're
still roles to make it at least disruptive

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and allow them to do their job. I would have to think that the

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vast majority of breach incidents occur upon
logging in. Other words, if someone's

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logged in already, you know,
usually they're gonna be working. I suppose

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they lock away at log out that
kind of thing and then come up to

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their main I mean, that does
happen, but I'm just guessing that the

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vast majority of breaches are at logging
lime a fresh hold breach? Is that,

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right, Kennily, I don't know
what the stats are truly about that,

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but that is definitely a a very
likely scenario. It's a good guess.

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Yeah, it's it's you know,
when once the users in the session,

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right, that that's now an active
you know session that if packer was

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able to you know, used to
be as type of tackle the man in

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the middle. So if that was
the scenario, then yeah, the legitimate

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user wouldn't even know somebody else is
piggybacking from that session. Right. I

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think there's another very concerning type of
attacks is when the human users, not

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even us, not even involved.
Example, again, when it comes to

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cloud technologies, there's there's a lot
that's already you know, visible and accessible

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to epis and attackers who would love
to just exploit that rather than trying to

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a user session, right, And
that's what we also have again as an

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industry, we're playing a catch up
game here trying to protect these non interactive

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you know, doors and access points
into cloud data and cloud applications. So,

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for example, how broader does that
is we have this constant of non

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human you know or synthetic or machine
identity used in calling that we allow the

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customers to define any process, any
technology that requires access to their infrastructure and

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data to authenticate much like human being
and provide like validation that who who as

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a non human identity machine identity who
it is or functionality, what API,

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what service they can access before they
allow that? Right, So this again

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adds another component of security here that
instead of just assuming whoever's access an API

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is legitimate, trust and verify.
Yeah, I love the trust and verify

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thing. And you pick up a
really good point about API access and just

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machines machine conversation time constantly twenty four
seven a new security thread or relatives mimicking

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machine security thread or a relatively new
security threat of people mimicking machine behavior in

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order to get behind an API,
grabs some information, pull it back out.

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It looks normal. It looks like
the normal call that goes from into

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it quick books to my bank for
example, back and forth. I mean,

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those are the really precious connections to
infiltrate, right is when you're going

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from one place to another. And
I mean I remember, I think the

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target breach came in through an HVAC
system or something through an IoT system.

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So it's like, wow, it
wasn't some you, it was the machine

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to machine conversation that was co opted. And that's just as dangerous as any

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human log in, right exactly.
Yeah, that was an excellent example.

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You know the problem is again legacy
type of mindset and approaches don't work when

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it comes to cloud. What I
mean, for example, to detect the

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user human user breach, typically security
would review the human login attempts. They

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wouldn't necessarily look at API log in
attempts. Right, So it's a fundamental

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issue. Is there enough visibility?
Is there enough data that's being sort of

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you know, filtered and reviewed through
security processes to detect all possible access points.

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Arguably most organizations miss that, you
know, miss something. That's that's

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why breaches keep happening, right,
Yeah, and that as we suggest,

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that can be all that's necessary to
get into a system. What should in

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terms of the API management stuff,
how do you how do you solve for

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that? I mean, does your
technology have a sort of pattern recognition component

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where you can watch normal behavior for
a period of time and say, okay,

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this looks normal. Then once you
define normal, you can define what

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is abnormal. I think the type
of use are approachdizing to try to standardize

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and make it similar to the human
interactive model, where security controls can be

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enforced kind of more as a matter
of you know, a guard rail or

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a gay or security control upon the
time of that access. Right, So,

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like as I was describing that process
that's going, API has to prove

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and validate, you know, and
be sort of on the white list before

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they re allow when it comes to
really defining patterns for the non like the

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human activity, and yeah, it's
it's one of these one of the most

335
00:26:53.599 --> 00:26:59.079
complex problems that well, so let's
talk about the multi cloud side are a

336
00:26:59.200 --> 00:27:02.279
useful bit of functionality. I can
tell you from a this perspective because I

337
00:27:02.319 --> 00:27:06.279
don't want to have to care about
the difference between as your and GCP and

338
00:27:06.359 --> 00:27:10.039
Amazon Web services. You folks can
care about that, and you folks can

339
00:27:10.119 --> 00:27:14.799
care about adhering to their protocols,
which I'm guessing they update on some relatively

340
00:27:14.920 --> 00:27:18.039
frequent basis so you stay on top
of. But of course, with IS,

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ideally you don't want to have to
decorate APIs, right, they're APIs

342
00:27:19.920 --> 00:27:22.279
that you want them to stay the
same such that everyone can use it the

343
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same way they were using it.
But in terms of these different class sort

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00:27:26.119 --> 00:27:29.599
of that can say okay, this
is for as your, that can say

345
00:27:29.680 --> 00:27:33.480
okay, this is for your so
use this functionality, this is for GCP,

346
00:27:33.599 --> 00:27:36.480
use that functionality. How does that
work. Yeah, that's a great

347
00:27:36.519 --> 00:27:40.359
point actually that a lot of people
don't even think about the whole ongoing you

348
00:27:40.440 --> 00:27:42.359
know, ongoing aspect of how do
you maintain how do you keep up with

349
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a very dynamic world of you know, cloud technology and APIs. So so

350
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that's that's actually one of the inherent
benefits of what bide of offers that we

351
00:27:52.279 --> 00:28:00.519
are we maintain that we are a
constantly monitoring and you know, detecting changes

352
00:28:00.920 --> 00:28:06.839
and the key functionality that that right
of itself relies on, I say it's

353
00:28:06.960 --> 00:28:12.000
GCP or azure or whatever functionality that
our system depends on to function. That's

354
00:28:12.039 --> 00:28:17.079
our job. That's what comes with
the value of right that the customers don't

355
00:28:17.319 --> 00:28:21.799
don't have to you know, worry
about that that you know individually, they

356
00:28:21.799 --> 00:28:26.079
don't need to monitor because we do. And that's part of our little bit

357
00:28:26.119 --> 00:28:30.480
of our ip of how we do
that so we never we never becomes or

358
00:28:30.920 --> 00:28:34.039
the point of destruction for the customer
right right now, that's important. So

359
00:28:34.519 --> 00:28:41.079
basically you are solving for the security
challenge across these cloud environments for companies that

360
00:28:41.160 --> 00:28:44.400
have people using a AWS for one
thing, using as you were, for

361
00:28:44.480 --> 00:28:48.759
something else and you just have your
profile for the users and then you just

362
00:28:48.920 --> 00:28:51.160
map that to the new environment.
Basically, it's that right, and you

363
00:28:51.240 --> 00:28:52.839
work for the correct do all the
three major ones? Is that right?

364
00:28:53.680 --> 00:28:57.000
Actually we do more than that.
We do for major ones, including Oracle

365
00:28:57.039 --> 00:29:03.680
cloud infrastructure okay, and there's a
couple of dozen non infrastructure clouds like Snowflake

366
00:29:03.759 --> 00:29:08.599
Service now opposite sixty five it's one
mm. That's a full time job.

367
00:29:08.680 --> 00:29:12.279
Man. How big is your company? How many people? We are?

368
00:29:15.200 --> 00:29:22.400
Soort for fifty full time team members, but yeah, we're growing fast and

369
00:29:22.039 --> 00:29:27.559
it is what I'm in more than
that. What percentage are actual developers and

370
00:29:27.720 --> 00:29:30.720
engineers? Like, out of fifty
people, what percentage are people who are

371
00:29:30.839 --> 00:29:37.240
coders or engineers or people of that
technical nature? Eighty eight percent? Yeah,

372
00:29:37.519 --> 00:29:40.680
that sounds about right, because you
can't you can't stay on top of

373
00:29:40.720 --> 00:29:42.720
everything. I mean, these each
one of these environments keeps changing. They

374
00:29:42.720 --> 00:29:45.279
have updates all the time, and
you have to stay on top of that

375
00:29:45.400 --> 00:29:49.039
stuff. Uh, it's and it's
changing rapidly these days. It seems to

376
00:29:49.079 --> 00:29:52.799
be. How concerned we got a
couple minutes up there, How concerned are

377
00:29:52.839 --> 00:29:59.000
you about quantum computing and quantum going
mainstream, which IBM I guess indicates should

378
00:29:59.000 --> 00:30:02.359
be happening in two to five years
or so. Because one of the concerns

379
00:30:02.440 --> 00:30:06.559
I've heard is tactics you can put
in place to rebuff those sorts of attacks,

380
00:30:07.039 --> 00:30:08.480
like you know, distributed to knowledge
service tax things of this nature.

381
00:30:08.480 --> 00:30:11.880
There are things you can put a
place to you know, throttle those things,

382
00:30:11.000 --> 00:30:15.079
but it'll be a very signifant risk
that's coming down the pike. What

383
00:30:15.160 --> 00:30:18.799
are your thoughts about quantum. I'll
be very quick, So I think it's

384
00:30:18.920 --> 00:30:23.000
revolutionary for sure, right, but
I also know the reaching the attacks happen

385
00:30:23.079 --> 00:30:30.000
because it's very basic and because of
very basic issues and like not following security

386
00:30:30.079 --> 00:30:33.519
hygiene more than not having strong enough
encryption in place. So I think as

387
00:30:33.519 --> 00:30:37.200
an industry we need to get our
act together first of all to eliminate like

388
00:30:37.359 --> 00:30:42.480
these easy paths and for attackers to
get in. But with quantum, I

389
00:30:42.559 --> 00:30:47.599
think it's also the benefit of having
better technology for security as well, so

390
00:30:48.039 --> 00:30:52.039
there's a leverage property then we will
also have better defense, right, So

391
00:30:52.240 --> 00:30:55.440
it goes both ways. Basically,
the good guys, bad guys get it.

392
00:30:56.480 --> 00:30:59.640
Yeah, it is you know that
we're talking to someone's account and make

393
00:30:59.680 --> 00:31:03.039
the money away. And our most
recent attack on my debit card, it

394
00:31:03.160 --> 00:31:07.119
made it look like it was Google
ads, like we were just buying Google

395
00:31:07.200 --> 00:31:08.440
ads, and lucky for me,
we don't buy Google ads. So I'm

396
00:31:08.440 --> 00:31:11.519
like, hmm, that's interesting.
I have a whole bunch of And they

397
00:31:11.559 --> 00:31:14.400
started small, and they started ranting
up. It was lighty dollars forty three.

398
00:31:14.839 --> 00:31:17.400
Why am I broke again? I
know, I'm not that foolish,

399
00:31:17.440 --> 00:31:19.119
and yeah, because I was hacked
again. It's the end user to have

400
00:31:19.200 --> 00:31:22.599
these experiences because you think, shouldn't
the banks beyond this kind of stuff?

401
00:31:22.599 --> 00:31:26.640
Shouldn't the banks be watching for these
kinds of things? And if you get

402
00:31:26.680 --> 00:31:30.359
into the system back and forth,
well you have to have some identity somewhere

403
00:31:30.880 --> 00:31:33.640
that can be trapped and managed,
right, I mean, I just kind

404
00:31:33.680 --> 00:31:37.400
of fact that these guys aren't infiltrating
banking systems because there has to be a

405
00:31:37.480 --> 00:31:40.720
signature of where they came from.
I mean, I know in the security

406
00:31:40.759 --> 00:31:42.079
were a lot of times to use
proxies to kind of bounce around the game

407
00:31:42.160 --> 00:31:45.039
from you out. I mean,
you're grabbing all kinds of metadata of what

408
00:31:45.240 --> 00:31:48.799
system it was on, what the
operating system was, what the browser was,

409
00:31:48.880 --> 00:31:52.200
what the looks captured. I'm kind
of surprised we don't have more success

410
00:31:52.279 --> 00:31:53.400
or maybe we do and I just
don't hear about it. What are your

411
00:31:53.440 --> 00:32:00.160
closing thoughts on the dative security in
this worlds of problem? And certainly a

412
00:32:00.200 --> 00:32:04.039
long way you know again, twenty
years been a long enough times for me

413
00:32:04.160 --> 00:32:07.279
to see that, I, you
know, security's job. There was an

414
00:32:07.319 --> 00:32:12.559
interesting you know how made earlier.
Is security being a scapegoat? Right?

415
00:32:12.680 --> 00:32:16.119
It's it's it's a very tough job
to have because they always scurity versus you

416
00:32:16.200 --> 00:32:22.400
know, a business, you know, priorities and jens especially interfere or anything

417
00:32:22.599 --> 00:32:25.000
that's important for the business, right, so and we trade offs. I

418
00:32:25.079 --> 00:32:30.160
think it. I think you know, as an industry, you know,

419
00:32:30.240 --> 00:32:32.799
as the practitioners out there in the
field, you know, make decisions and

420
00:32:34.640 --> 00:32:37.279
sometimes, hopefully most of the times
are the right decisions. Sometimes they're not.

421
00:32:37.440 --> 00:32:43.640
And you see outcome do you see
uh consequences from the vendor community.

422
00:32:43.680 --> 00:32:49.640
I think we are really making some
really big, you know, headways into

423
00:32:50.599 --> 00:32:54.480
bringing technologies to to the practitioners,
to the uses of the world to actually

424
00:32:55.039 --> 00:33:01.640
make that balance or decision easier.
Where Sey doesn't have to cost productivity,

425
00:33:01.680 --> 00:33:06.920
security doesn't have to cost the business
a Jildian so one that's I think as

426
00:33:06.960 --> 00:33:08.839
an industry we're making a big,
big step towards right. I feel like

427
00:33:09.000 --> 00:33:14.079
that that's for the next decade or
so. This would be a huge should

428
00:33:14.200 --> 00:33:19.599
be a huge factor in how the
how we improve them overall posture of the

429
00:33:19.720 --> 00:33:22.599
industry and the security. Well,
that sounds good, Art, Well,

430
00:33:22.640 --> 00:33:24.000
thank you so much for your time. Folkos with talking to Art Progosti and

431
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Welcome back to Inside Analysis. Here's your

472
00:36:47.039 --> 00:37:00.400
host, Eric Tabanaugh. Okay,
so back you're on Analysis tucking all things

473
00:37:00.599 --> 00:37:07.039
identity management these days, identity resolution. Who are we out of the systems

474
00:37:07.079 --> 00:37:09.199
we use? Know who we are
and validated issue. We were just talking

475
00:37:09.239 --> 00:37:14.400
to Art from right to all about
that and I was reminded of some cults

476
00:37:14.440 --> 00:37:16.400
are doing and something that we're actually
working on. So a little special treat

477
00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:21.159
for our avid listeners to give you
a stick preview of something that we've been

478
00:37:21.239 --> 00:37:23.880
working on here at Inside Analysis,
at the Blur Group with some of our

479
00:37:24.119 --> 00:37:30.800
partners. And the example I wanted
to give Sean Brem from Crowdpoint Technologies and

480
00:37:30.960 --> 00:37:35.880
what they've built so federated idea is
at the heart of their mission. What

481
00:37:35.960 --> 00:37:40.760
they've really built is a ecosystem,
an e commerce ecosystem that's based upon a

482
00:37:40.800 --> 00:37:45.679
blockchain and proprietary blockchain that they've built
which also doubles as a database, so

483
00:37:45.800 --> 00:37:51.920
it's low blockchain style data structure.
But they've done some very clever things in

484
00:37:51.960 --> 00:37:55.679
that regard. But I find really
compelling about their approach is the fact that

485
00:37:55.760 --> 00:38:01.760
there are focused on giving values or
for the data of theirs that is used

486
00:38:01.800 --> 00:38:06.559
to train algorithms. So if you
look at all the hubbub, for example,

487
00:38:06.599 --> 00:38:08.760
in these lawsuits that have been filed, what did they basically alleged?

488
00:38:08.800 --> 00:38:13.960
They say that open ai went out
and scraped all kinds of content, including

489
00:38:14.039 --> 00:38:17.920
copyrighted content, and they use all
that material to build out their model,

490
00:38:17.960 --> 00:38:23.119
their generative AI model. Well,
it's a good argument. If I've used

491
00:38:23.360 --> 00:38:29.920
someone's copyrighted material to train my engine, which I then made money from,

492
00:38:30.079 --> 00:38:32.800
well shouldn't the people who's come piece
of that? How these things work.

493
00:38:34.360 --> 00:38:37.079
I did see just the other day
that there was a judgment rendered in a

494
00:38:37.159 --> 00:38:44.199
court somewhere in the US that basically
said gen AI generated content cannot be copyrighted.

495
00:38:44.920 --> 00:38:50.039
Now, how they would know what
engine generated the content in the first

496
00:38:50.079 --> 00:38:52.800
place is beyond me, and I
think that's frankly an open question. But

497
00:38:52.880 --> 00:38:57.039
at least a standard has now been
set. So what does that mean,

498
00:38:57.199 --> 00:38:59.800
Well, it means that there's going
to have to be some more work to

499
00:38:59.840 --> 00:39:04.920
be done. I heard that open
Ai also truncated their sniffing engine, their

500
00:39:04.960 --> 00:39:08.920
engine that would determine whether or not
content was created by an open Ai engine

501
00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:14.639
or a chat GPT, which also
is interesting. Obviously they see the lawsuits

502
00:39:14.679 --> 00:39:16.599
coming. Now there's something going to
happen here. So what does this all

503
00:39:16.679 --> 00:39:20.559
mean. Well, I can tell
you that these large language models, these

504
00:39:20.599 --> 00:39:25.440
foundational models, are absolutely amazing.
They are spectacularly powerful, very very interesting

505
00:39:25.719 --> 00:39:29.440
about the trust side of things,
of the fact that this is going on.

506
00:39:29.800 --> 00:39:34.679
Getting back to Federated ID that vin
and their idea is the engine and

507
00:39:34.800 --> 00:39:38.119
their idea is that they're going to
pay attention to when your data is used

508
00:39:38.159 --> 00:39:42.880
for something and then pay you for
that small amounts of money first pennies,

509
00:39:43.000 --> 00:39:46.000
then dimes and dollars down the road. Is at least how the theory goes.

510
00:39:46.800 --> 00:39:51.960
So that helps solve the identity resolution
problem at least in their world.

511
00:39:52.480 --> 00:39:54.079
But what we're going to do here, and this is how I'm going to

512
00:39:54.119 --> 00:39:58.880
fuse these topics together here at the
end of our show today, is we're

513
00:39:59.039 --> 00:40:02.880
creating something that we're calling the rubric, and the rubric is going to use

514
00:40:02.960 --> 00:40:09.599
a large language model as its text
generation tool or engine. But the moorings,

515
00:40:09.719 --> 00:40:14.360
the anchors of truth, the embeddings, if you will, those are

516
00:40:14.440 --> 00:40:16.719
going to come from trusted experts.
And so what we're going to do is

517
00:40:16.840 --> 00:40:22.760
you could publish your papers or your
works, your articles, research reports,

518
00:40:22.800 --> 00:40:28.840
etc. Then use them and other
reports, other trusted reports as the anchors

519
00:40:28.880 --> 00:40:32.679
of truth for the rubric to help
folcake decisions about which analytic tool to use,

520
00:40:32.880 --> 00:40:36.320
how to use, can be used
in conjunction with it. How could

521
00:40:36.320 --> 00:40:39.440
you build a stack basically what does
they look like? And we're planning on

522
00:40:39.519 --> 00:40:44.559
building that out right now. So
it actually uses a technology that I've already

523
00:40:44.599 --> 00:40:49.159
had built called media lens, and
media lens I built it. It's a

524
00:40:49.400 --> 00:40:52.599
lens with a Z. It runs
inside open source dot right now, inside

525
00:40:52.679 --> 00:40:57.559
hyphen open source, and it uses
that right now. What I wanted was

526
00:40:57.639 --> 00:41:00.920
an engine that I could use to
spin up a high focused the stream of

527
00:41:00.719 --> 00:41:04.920
that would be useful for a research
or so. I wanted to stay on

528
00:41:05.000 --> 00:41:07.679
top of the open source community.
So that's where we've targeted first. And

529
00:41:07.920 --> 00:41:12.039
all I did was went out and
found all these different folk and source technologies

530
00:41:12.079 --> 00:41:15.360
who follow their handles. Media lens
tracked the different handles that I've given them

531
00:41:15.480 --> 00:41:20.880
to watch out for. And then
what it'll do is it'll grab any URL

532
00:41:21.360 --> 00:41:25.639
that is shared by these folks with
hashtags like open source or MEO or Apache

533
00:41:25.840 --> 00:41:30.800
or the other terms, the key
terms that are associated with that particular industry,

534
00:41:31.440 --> 00:41:36.119
and that publishes them as pending posts
in my environment, and that I

535
00:41:36.199 --> 00:41:38.760
can choose to post them or not. And every time I post, what

536
00:41:38.840 --> 00:41:45.320
I'm essentially doing is built lake and
so do help that will sort of pin

537
00:41:45.480 --> 00:41:50.760
downs of truth. That will sort
of pin down the truth and allow the

538
00:41:50.880 --> 00:41:57.880
generative AI functionality to spin appropriate words
around the concepts that the prompt delivers.

539
00:41:58.519 --> 00:42:00.519
So what are we talking about?
I mean, really, if you think

540
00:42:00.519 --> 00:42:05.239
about Siri and these other engines that
are now currently used for these purposes,

541
00:42:05.679 --> 00:42:09.039
they're valuable. They can sort of
find information for you, but they're not

542
00:42:09.159 --> 00:42:15.000
really trusted experts in a particular domain. And one reason for that is because

543
00:42:15.039 --> 00:42:19.480
it would be a big thing to
chew off, to bite off, if

544
00:42:19.519 --> 00:42:22.119
you will, for the current engine. So right now, Siri is just

545
00:42:22.280 --> 00:42:27.079
kind of pointing you to different things
on the web or giving you information that

546
00:42:27.280 --> 00:42:30.480
is readily available, like the weather
or what time of meeting is things of

547
00:42:30.559 --> 00:42:36.119
that nature. But when you start
getting into really dense areas of content,

548
00:42:36.400 --> 00:42:39.800
like in trade press around analytics,
for example, well you're going to need

549
00:42:39.920 --> 00:42:44.480
more than that, and that's what
we're focused on. So we're focused on

550
00:42:44.599 --> 00:42:50.679
finding the right experts to provide their
materials in a trusted fashion, and then

551
00:42:50.800 --> 00:42:55.760
whenever that material gets used via the
rubric by a paying client, the people

552
00:42:55.840 --> 00:43:01.159
whose insights were used in that immediate
it's sort of real time mind meld,

553
00:43:01.639 --> 00:43:05.960
they will get rewarded with credits.
Now, it's going to take a while

554
00:43:06.039 --> 00:43:07.440
to build this thing up, but
the point is we're going to try to

555
00:43:07.519 --> 00:43:13.880
create a center of gravity around the
topic of analytics because there's a finite number

556
00:43:13.880 --> 00:43:16.559
of vendors or a finite number of
people who focus on this, and we're

557
00:43:16.599 --> 00:43:20.480
looking for help to do that.
So, like I say, if you're

558
00:43:20.519 --> 00:43:23.000
hearing this and you think it sounds
like a good idea, send me email

559
00:43:23.159 --> 00:43:28.480
info at DM radio dot biz or
info at inside Analysis dot com. Both

560
00:43:28.559 --> 00:43:31.440
of those come directly to me,
and we'll be curious to talk to you

561
00:43:31.519 --> 00:43:35.800
and maybe show you a preview of
this thing. But the idea is that

562
00:43:36.320 --> 00:43:38.480
you really, right now folks are
paying lots and lots of money for Gardner

563
00:43:38.559 --> 00:43:43.159
and Forrester and some of these other
consultants or Boston Consulting Group. A lot

564
00:43:43.199 --> 00:43:45.880
of very smart people at these companies, but it's hard to get access to

565
00:43:46.000 --> 00:43:50.039
these people. And they are just
finite human beings, so they don't know

566
00:43:50.239 --> 00:43:54.320
everything, but they know a lot
about a particular domain for example. Well,

567
00:43:54.800 --> 00:44:00.880
if you think about the power of
these foundational models to piece together vectors

568
00:44:00.920 --> 00:44:06.079
of information from multiple sources, if
you get to a critical mass of embeddings,

569
00:44:06.280 --> 00:44:08.719
and this is the key, you
need a critical massive embeddings from trusted

570
00:44:08.840 --> 00:44:15.559
sources, then all of a sudden
you have a very interesting intelligent chat bond.

571
00:44:15.920 --> 00:44:20.039
Another very important thing to understand.
It's a lot of times some technologies

572
00:44:20.079 --> 00:44:23.920
don't work together so well and some
do so Knowing which technologies work well in

573
00:44:24.000 --> 00:44:30.159
which environments also very useful stuff.
Just best practices, I mean, knowing

574
00:44:30.280 --> 00:44:35.039
how to go about setting up a
sequel statement to find certain pieces of information.

575
00:44:35.159 --> 00:44:37.159
I mean a lot of people know
that a lot of people on a

576
00:44:37.199 --> 00:44:40.239
sequel, but nonetheless a lot of
people don't. And we're at this very

577
00:44:40.320 --> 00:44:45.800
out in the world. So our
rubric is going to be built out as

578
00:44:45.000 --> 00:44:50.639
an assistant to help folks understand enterprise
technology, get out of the weeds,

579
00:44:50.760 --> 00:44:57.360
do do some playing around and get
some better answers faster and less expensively.

580
00:44:57.960 --> 00:45:00.519
Right, Because if you bring together
all these our minds and get good content

581
00:45:00.599 --> 00:45:05.440
from people who know what they're talking
about, and find ways to wait those

582
00:45:05.679 --> 00:45:08.800
scores, to wait the information and
to align it to topically, And that's

583
00:45:08.800 --> 00:45:13.199
what these settings do. I mean, just to kind of cap it off

584
00:45:13.280 --> 00:45:19.519
here, embeddings are mathematical representations of
text strengths. That's really what they boiled

585
00:45:19.559 --> 00:45:22.199
down to. And what the folks
did building these large language models is,

586
00:45:22.280 --> 00:45:29.480
you know, they did some amazing
work at information text. So they turn

587
00:45:29.559 --> 00:45:34.800
it into numbers such that you can
do statistical analysis more easily in fine patterns

588
00:45:35.280 --> 00:45:37.800
in data. Okay, this word
is used in this context. It's also

589
00:45:37.920 --> 00:45:39.920
used in that context. When does
it mean this? When does it mean

590
00:45:40.039 --> 00:45:45.679
that? These are the kinds of
solutions that these large language models can provide.

591
00:45:45.079 --> 00:45:50.239
They can give you really good information
about what should be in a certain

592
00:45:50.440 --> 00:45:53.360
context and what should not. But
the key again is the embeddings. The

593
00:45:53.400 --> 00:45:58.480
embeddings allow you to get certain closer
to the truth. Just wanted to tease

594
00:45:58.559 --> 00:46:01.320
that fun stuff to you. Folks. Hop onlineside analysis dot com. You

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sure to join us each week on
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games on campus, great analysis from
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Join me, Larry Smith and my
buddies Mike Kegley and Brad Sturdy for Big

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Sports Radio every Friday at three right
here on CACAA. With sixty years of

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fascinating facts, This is the man
from yesterday and back in time too,

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this time in nineteen seventy, Janie
Choplin, just twenty seven, is found

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deceased in the bedroom of her Hollywood
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friends became concerned when they didn't hear
from her read It's just another word fall,

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nothing left, nothing, Nothing on
a eight three and from October of

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Spencer for higher and this one webster
Mom Now my mother, I do oh

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because I was making breakfast. No, because you're ruining. And also from

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this time in nineteen eighty five,
what a sound moving up the charts.

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It's a Norwegian band called Aha would
take on Me. MTV has given this

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video a lot of play and it's
part of its success. With Moore at

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Tri City Shopping Center in Redlands is serving

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up some really cool ice cream at
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other delights from Seas Candies. Moms
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cool off and relax while they get
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with retailers who care about you.
Shop at the Tri City Center in Redlands

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and see why they call it the
mall with a heart. In the world

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of work, what two occupations might
seem to have the very least in common?

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How about long haul truck drivers and
school librarians. Yes, an odd

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pairing, but solidarity forever. Start
with truckers. The job is literally a

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grueling hall. You're wrangling a massive
eighteen wheelers, some five hundred miles a

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day for two three weeks straight,
putting up with traffic jams, stormers,

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bad roads, lunatic drivers, helter
skelter scheduling, truck stop food, sleeping

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in the truck, and battling fatigue
aches, you're bladder and loneliness. Trucking

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used to be a good union job
with decent pay in conditions until the deregulation

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craze four decades ago brought in Wall
Street profiteers and fast buck hustlers who turned

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the industry into anti union exploiters.
As a result, the yearly quit rate

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for drivers is almost a hundred percent. But rather than retaining drivers by upping

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pay and stopping their tortuous treatment,
the corporate bosses have rushed to Washington,

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demanding access to an even cheaper pool
of low wage workers teenagers. Yes,

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put an eighteen year old on that
eighteen wheeler and keep them profits rolling.

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And here's another good job suddenly turned
ugly. School librarian. Yes. While

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student enrollments rise and the need for
these nurtures of our society's literacy is greater

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than ever, their quit rate is
soaring, not because of pay or long

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hours, but because of raw right
wing politics. These dedicated, invaluable educators

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are literally being abused by demogogic goop
politicians and their extremest partisans who've launched an

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anti librarian crusade, including book banning
and witch hunting. Come on, how

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twisted are you to pick on librarians? This is Jemai Tour saying, forget

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the law of supply and demand.
Today's job market is being ruled by greedmeisters

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and political lunatics. Tahibow Tea Club's
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of tea is forty nine ninety five, which includes shipping. To order,

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please visit Tihebow Tea Club dot com. Tihebow is spelled T light tom A

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h E E B L boy.
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did you know here at KCA eight
ten fifty am that we developed an

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app for all your Android devices.
We're talking about your smartphone, your tablets,

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you name it. You have an
Android format. You can take KCAA

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stream, and even our podcast.
Go to KCAA Express dot com. That's

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ka Express dot com, KCAA Express
dot com. Space station crew members deny

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00:55:13.239 --> 00:55:16.679
throwing things at Sweden. It's the
Onion Radio News. This is Doyle Redland

698
00:55:16.719 --> 00:55:23.719
reporting. International Space Station Commander Jenndy
Padalka stated firmly today that neither heat nor

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his crew members had anything to do
with pelting the nation of Sweden with water

700
00:55:29.320 --> 00:55:34.920
filled condoms. Padalka insists that any
number of orbiting space vessels could have dropped

701
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the indecent payloads on the Scandinavian country. We are always too busy with really

702
00:55:40.599 --> 00:55:46.960
experiments. Why is nobody pointing a
finger at China? The Swedish King is

703
00:55:47.039 --> 00:55:52.159
willing to let the whole matter drop
if someone will apologize for throwing a half

704
00:55:52.239 --> 00:55:57.440
full Budweiser tall Boy that left a
mile wide crater in his yard. Doyle

705
00:55:57.480 --> 00:56:00.800
Redland or The Onion Radio News.
Every Wednesday at three pm, It's The

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Uncommon Sense Democrat with host Eric Bowman. I love when his people talk about

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how old do Biden is, but
he's just a couple of years behind it.

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You'll get the best political commentary and
stuff like this. Don't good night,

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Join us for the Uncommon sense Democrat
every Wednesday at three pm on the

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stations that leave no listener behind KCAA
ten fifty am man one oh six point

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five f M. It's a bird, it's a broom. No, it's

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our super Roth, go online to
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tired of the same world conversations that
everyone keeps talking about want to hear something

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new, fun and exciting. Listen
to Whatever Works here on CACAA every Sunday

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00:57:43.719 --> 00:57:47.039
at seven pm. We have amazing
guests with interesting and unique topics. We

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do giveaways, and we have sponsorship
opportunities. It's more than just a show,

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it's a lifestyle. You can also
find us on CACA radio dot com

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or our website CACA Whatever Works dot
Com to find upcoming and previous episodes.

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Do you like to thank all the
KCA listeners for supporting our show? NBC

731
00:58:13.039 --> 00:58:15.519
News Radio, I'm Chris Garraggio.
Former President Trump is expected to be in

732
00:58:15.519 --> 00:58:19.920
New York City tomorrow for his civil
fraud trial. Opening statements are set for

733
00:58:19.960 --> 00:58:22.519
ten am. In the case brought
on by New York Attorney General Letitia James.

734
00:58:22.840 --> 00:58:27.559
She accused Trump and his family of
inflating his net worth by saying his

735
00:58:27.639 --> 00:58:31.159
real estate portfolio was worth more than
it was, which James said gave Trump

736
00:58:31.239 --> 00:58:36.679
better terms than he deserved from lenders
and insurers. Last week, the judge

737
00:58:36.760 --> 00:58:42.719
overseeing this case ruled that Trump had
indeed been overvaluing his properties and is liable

738
00:58:42.800 --> 00:58:46.840
for fraud. One House Republican is
already criticizing Florida Congressman Matt Gates's plans to

739
00:58:46.920 --> 00:58:52.039
oust Kevin McCarthy as speaker. By
putting this motion of vacate on the floor,

740
00:58:52.239 --> 00:58:55.440
he's going to delay the ability to
complete that work over the next forty

741
00:58:55.519 --> 00:59:00.480
five days. Appearing on ABC's This
Week, New York Congressman Mike Lawler referred

742
00:59:00.519 --> 00:59:05.039
to Gates's intentions as a diatribe of
delusional thinking. Lawler, who is considered

743
00:59:05.159 --> 00:59:08.760
a centrist Republican, said bills need
bipartisan support in a divided government. Gates

744
00:59:08.800 --> 00:59:13.519
announced earlier today that he plans to
make a motion this week to have McCarthy

745
00:59:13.599 --> 00:59:16.840
removed as how speaker. This comes
after a government shutdown was avoided yesterday with

746
00:59:16.960 --> 00:59:22.000
a forty five day stop gap bill
that passed with Democratic support. More than

747
00:59:22.119 --> 00:59:24.920
seventy five thousand Kaiser permanent day workers
are gearing up for what would be the

748
00:59:25.000 --> 00:59:30.559
biggest healthcare strike in US history.
Unions representing the workers notified the company more

749
00:59:30.599 --> 00:59:34.400
than a week ago that they could
launch a three day strike this coming Wednesday,

750
00:59:34.559 --> 00:59:37.719
October fourth. Negotiations on pay,
outsourcing, and staffing are stalled.

751
00:59:38.079 --> 00:59:43.840
The strike would affet Kaiser hospitals and
clinics in California, Oregon, Washington State,

752
00:59:43.920 --> 00:59:47.679
Colorado, Virginia, and Washington DC. A pair of college football programs

753
00:59:47.960 --> 00:59:52.000
swapped spots in the top five of
the latest College Football Coach's Pole. Georgia,

754
00:59:52.199 --> 00:59:55.800
Michigan and Ohio State are once again
the top three teams, followed by

755
00:59:55.960 --> 01:00:00.000
Texas up a spot as number four, in Florida State down a spot to

756
01:00:00.119 --> 01:00:04.960
number five. Penn State, USC, Washington, Oregon, and Alabama round

757
01:00:05.000 --> 01:00:07.400
out the rest of the top ten. I'm Chris Garraggio, NBC News Radio,

758
01:00:07.519 --> 01:00:08.360
Philistina, KC