WEBVTT 1 00:00:29.800 --> 00:00:33.560 Welcome to mid Rats with sal from Commander Salamander, an Eagle one from Eagle 2 00:00:33.640 --> 00:00:38.560 Speak at seer Shure your home for a discussion of national security issues and all 3 00:00:38.600 --> 00:00:42.640 things maritime. And good day everybody. We appreciate you joining us for a 4 00:00:42.799 --> 00:00:47.359 pre record of mid Rats. So you won't hear my usual alter call inviting 5 00:00:47.399 --> 00:00:50.880 people to come down to the chat room or to call in even but that's 6 00:00:50.920 --> 00:00:55.439 okay because we've got more than enough to fill up the next hour and I 7 00:00:55.439 --> 00:00:58.840 would like to do this. Obviously you're getting the podcast, maybe you just 8 00:00:58.840 --> 00:01:02.200 are following the link, but i'd like to make invitation. If you don't 9 00:01:02.240 --> 00:01:06.200 already subscribe to the mid Rats podcast, you can go over to iTunes, 10 00:01:06.519 --> 00:01:10.200 Spotify, wherever you get your podcasts. You can find us right there and 11 00:01:10.239 --> 00:01:14.159 go ahead and subscribe. You can't beat the price. It's zero, as 12 00:01:14.159 --> 00:01:17.079 you get what you're pay for. But that way the mid Grats podcast to 13 00:01:17.159 --> 00:01:22.239 be ready for you when it works better for your schedule. And for today, 14 00:01:22.280 --> 00:01:26.840 we're going to look at something that we share as Americans, a common 15 00:01:26.879 --> 00:01:34.400 heritage with the Royal Navy that goes back before our Family Disagreement, otherwise known 16 00:01:34.439 --> 00:01:38.760 as the American Revolution, and a lot of what we see not just on 17 00:01:38.799 --> 00:01:46.200 how we operate, but how are politicians look at their military and how our 18 00:01:46.239 --> 00:01:51.959 military industrial complexes support the Navy and support the national fens have a lot in 19 00:01:52.000 --> 00:01:57.480 common. There's a lot of cross polonization book through both official and unofficial exchanges, 20 00:01:57.840 --> 00:02:02.400 and in some ways, a lot of the challenges that the Royal Navy 21 00:02:04.040 --> 00:02:12.039 and the British government finds in trying to explain and support and to deploy and 22 00:02:12.080 --> 00:02:17.719 to sustain their military is in some ways a smaller microcosm of what there is 23 00:02:17.759 --> 00:02:21.719 on the American side. And just like a lot of the challenges you see 24 00:02:21.759 --> 00:02:28.000 on the American side can be big ugly warnings or perhaps big inspirations to the 25 00:02:28.039 --> 00:02:30.960 British as well, and you can see that happen in real time. And 26 00:02:31.000 --> 00:02:35.599 as we we've had our own before, we've got a great guest to look 27 00:02:35.639 --> 00:02:38.599 at some of that interactions and also some of the challenges that we're looking at 28 00:02:38.639 --> 00:02:43.879 here going into the third year of the largest land war Europe. Scene has 29 00:02:43.919 --> 00:02:49.319 a little bit of a nautical flavor, but these things are influencing industry and 30 00:02:49.439 --> 00:02:53.639 any new spending that's going to become online, whether it's in the UK on 31 00:02:53.759 --> 00:02:58.000 the continent with our allies there are here in North America, and our guest 32 00:02:58.080 --> 00:03:02.240 is going to be now Doctor Emma Salisbury. Emma recently completed her PhD at 33 00:03:02.240 --> 00:03:07.919 Burbick College, University of London with a research focusing on the history of US 34 00:03:07.919 --> 00:03:15.840 Military Industrial Complex, Associate Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy and an Associate Fellow 35 00:03:15.879 --> 00:03:21.080 at the UK Ministry of Defenses Development Concepts and Doctrine Center, and in her 36 00:03:21.120 --> 00:03:24.840 spare time, she's an associate our assistant editor over at War on the Rocks. 37 00:03:25.080 --> 00:03:29.520 Emma, welcome back to mid Raps. Thanks so much for having me 38 00:03:29.560 --> 00:03:34.919 back Soil. It's pleasure and we appreciate your unflappability during our a little bit 39 00:03:34.919 --> 00:03:38.360 of a technical issue. We've got a pretty quick turnaround that, so we 40 00:03:38.400 --> 00:03:43.039 would expect nothing less. And to kick off the show, I know we've 41 00:03:43.120 --> 00:03:47.560 got listeners quite who already have their PhDs, some that are thinking about getting 42 00:03:47.599 --> 00:03:51.800 it, and some that are in the process of it. And here you 43 00:03:51.919 --> 00:03:54.680 are, just a couple of months after finishing up your PhD. So I 44 00:03:54.759 --> 00:04:00.439 just wanted to a say congratulations. We're really glad to to see not just 45 00:04:00.599 --> 00:04:04.039 you've been able to complete that, but the doors that's going to open for 46 00:04:04.120 --> 00:04:10.599 you to be part of the conversation and the decisions that a lot of people 47 00:04:10.639 --> 00:04:13.919 are going to be making down the road into helping to add to the intellectual 48 00:04:13.919 --> 00:04:18.160 capital. But besides all that apple waxing, how's it feel to be a 49 00:04:18.160 --> 00:04:24.680 newly minted PhD. It's really bizarre. Actually, it's because I was doing 50 00:04:24.680 --> 00:04:30.319 it part time, so it took me five and a bit years to finish, 51 00:04:30.360 --> 00:04:33.240 so it sort of felt like I was never going to finish, like 52 00:04:33.319 --> 00:04:39.399 it was an endless Sissyphian task that I would just con seem myself in for 53 00:04:39.439 --> 00:04:44.079 a decade. So to actually finish it and be told that it was fine 54 00:04:44.120 --> 00:04:49.000 and I'd passed was unbelievable. And so it took me a couple of weeks 55 00:04:49.000 --> 00:04:55.279 to kind of get used to it almost and then to see the title doctor 56 00:04:55.360 --> 00:04:58.600 in front of my name, like, I'm still just really excited about it 57 00:04:58.600 --> 00:05:03.199 when appreciate. So, yeah, it's a really bizarre feeling. And it 58 00:05:03.279 --> 00:05:09.519 was really odd getting to the point where I didn't have to constantly think about 59 00:05:09.519 --> 00:05:14.040 my thesis every time. If I wasn't doing something on it, I felt 60 00:05:14.120 --> 00:05:16.680 very guilty, so it's really nice to be kind of freed from that. 61 00:05:17.360 --> 00:05:21.079 I do have some corrections to do before I can submit it and publish it, 62 00:05:21.480 --> 00:05:25.160 but the end is in sight and I have the title, so it 63 00:05:25.199 --> 00:05:33.879 feels pretty good. How did you manage to choose this topic that you for 64 00:05:33.959 --> 00:05:38.600 your PhD? And how does that lead it into what we need to talk 65 00:05:38.639 --> 00:05:45.839 to you about today with the problems with the shipbuilding and other assets. Originally 66 00:05:46.279 --> 00:05:51.120 was interested in the meeting point of the military and technology, especially kind of 67 00:05:51.120 --> 00:05:59.160 emerging technologies, and how those technologies would translate into military usage, how that 68 00:05:59.240 --> 00:06:03.319 process worked. So looking at that, I came across, obviously the idea 69 00:06:03.360 --> 00:06:09.319 of the military industrial complex, because that's how this works. And I realized 70 00:06:09.439 --> 00:06:16.639 that nobody had written an actual academic piece on what the military industrial complex is 71 00:06:17.360 --> 00:06:21.279 and how it works and how it's changed over time. I just kind of 72 00:06:21.319 --> 00:06:25.519 assumed that had been written somewhere, and it actually hadn't, so I thought, 73 00:06:25.560 --> 00:06:29.000 oh, okay, I guess i'll write that then. So I did, 74 00:06:29.240 --> 00:06:35.000 and I wanted to make it quite joint, because obviously the complex works 75 00:06:35.600 --> 00:06:42.519 similarly but differently through each of the services. So I had a case study 76 00:06:42.720 --> 00:06:46.839 from the Air Force, from the Army some more joint stuff, and from 77 00:06:46.879 --> 00:06:54.519 the Navy, which was the literal combat ship. And I decided to publish 78 00:06:54.639 --> 00:06:59.639 that case study in War and the Rocks, and I think you especially sell 79 00:06:59.720 --> 00:07:03.399 It grew with me on how much I dumped on the lcs during that piece, 80 00:07:04.480 --> 00:07:08.480 and that kind of led into the more naval side of things. I 81 00:07:08.519 --> 00:07:13.439 really sort of started diving down into shipbuilding in the defense industrial base and just 82 00:07:13.480 --> 00:07:16.639 found it all utterly fascinating. So that's kind of how I got through the 83 00:07:16.680 --> 00:07:19.279 thread of all of this to come out the other side of nable list. 84 00:07:21.600 --> 00:07:26.000 And I think, what's so, I guess, lack of a better phrase, 85 00:07:26.040 --> 00:07:30.959 refreshing to the topic is a lot of times in the defense arena because 86 00:07:30.040 --> 00:07:34.240 it's let's be honest here, I think we're all afflicted by it in one 87 00:07:34.240 --> 00:07:40.920 way or another. It's high technology, it's flashy, it's it's sexy, 88 00:07:41.040 --> 00:07:46.040 it's good looking. People like to talk about strategy and tactics and find some 89 00:07:46.160 --> 00:07:49.519 way, for some reason to weave in a mahan or a cloth of its 90 00:07:49.560 --> 00:07:56.879 into any discussion. However, when you actually look at, you know, 91 00:07:56.920 --> 00:08:01.439 behind the parades and what you see peer side. There is a very complicated 92 00:08:03.519 --> 00:08:13.279 and in many ways fragile network of artisans i e. Labor. If anybody 93 00:08:13.360 --> 00:08:16.600 has looked at some what's required to weld on nuclear reactors, which is I 94 00:08:16.680 --> 00:08:20.120 know is a big part in both the US Navy and the Royal Navy. 95 00:08:20.480 --> 00:08:26.240 That's that's art as much as it is a trade, unions, management, 96 00:08:26.839 --> 00:08:37.639 shareholders, constituencies, and also some some national assets that you know, for 97 00:08:37.679 --> 00:08:41.960 instance, in the UK it's it's some of your shipyards in Scotland, whether 98 00:08:41.000 --> 00:08:45.320 here, it's in the US it's the infrastructure that we have in Novak and 99 00:08:45.399 --> 00:08:52.440 San Diego that is almost irreplaceable. But it's it's a challenge sometimes to get 100 00:08:52.480 --> 00:08:56.240 people to want to get into that type of nudge work when it comes to 101 00:08:58.360 --> 00:09:03.600 the topic of your defense industrial race and shipbuilders and the supply change and everything 102 00:09:03.600 --> 00:09:07.279 else. And of course again your PhD. I know you you had a 103 00:09:07.360 --> 00:09:13.879 chance to talk to a lot of people inside this part of the defense arena, 104 00:09:13.960 --> 00:09:20.720 so to speak. What were some of the whether positive surprises or disappointments 105 00:09:20.799 --> 00:09:26.000 you found in talking to everybody, whether they're from politicians down to people who 106 00:09:26.080 --> 00:09:33.240 work in the industry. While you were researching your dissertation, I think the 107 00:09:33.240 --> 00:09:37.720 biggest thing that came across from me is that there are quite a lot of 108 00:09:37.720 --> 00:09:43.039 people who see the military industrial complex as some kind of conspiracy. You know, 109 00:09:43.080 --> 00:09:46.840 it's this kind of men in cigar smoke filled rooms passing big bags of 110 00:09:46.919 --> 00:09:52.600 money to each other and you know, making sure wars last longer so we 111 00:09:52.600 --> 00:09:54.639 can all buy more guns and all that sort of thing. And it's just 112 00:09:54.720 --> 00:10:01.799 that it's absolutely not true. Everybody in the minute industrial complex has their own 113 00:10:01.840 --> 00:10:05.600 incentives, whether that's a profit motive, getting re elected, keeping your job, 114 00:10:07.440 --> 00:10:13.159 whatever that might be. But ultimately everybody does want to defend the nation 115 00:10:13.159 --> 00:10:18.799 at the crux of it. And what I think is we need to understand 116 00:10:18.799 --> 00:10:26.240 the military industrial complex better in order to improve some of the areas where those 117 00:10:26.240 --> 00:10:31.279 incentives maybe cross pollinate in a way that is detrimental to national security. But 118 00:10:31.399 --> 00:10:37.000 none of that is deliberate. Nobody is trying to undermine the security of America 119 00:10:37.200 --> 00:10:41.759 or the UK or anywhere else deliberately just to make more money out of war. 120 00:10:41.879 --> 00:10:48.360 Like that just doesn't exist. So it's it's a network of people acting 121 00:10:48.000 --> 00:10:54.159 in their own interests, but also in the interest of the nation and this, 122 00:10:52.879 --> 00:10:56.000 you know, this is the structure we've got. This is how we 123 00:10:56.120 --> 00:11:01.879 defend our countries. We're not going to change it. We're not going to 124 00:11:01.919 --> 00:11:05.759 build something else. We'll have to work with what we've got. So in 125 00:11:05.919 --> 00:11:09.440 order to make it work better to get the outcomes that we want, to 126 00:11:09.440 --> 00:11:15.039 get the capabilities that our militaries need, we need to understand how those incentives 127 00:11:15.039 --> 00:11:20.480 all work together and then be able to improve things, tweak things, nowhere, 128 00:11:20.480 --> 00:11:22.440 to push, nowhere to press, and just make everything work a bit 129 00:11:22.440 --> 00:11:28.919 more smoothly. So it isn't some kind of terrible imperialist conspiracy, but it 130 00:11:28.919 --> 00:11:33.759 does need a bit of fixing. Well. One of the things I think 131 00:11:33.759 --> 00:11:41.840 you identified in some of your writings is that the problem with shipbuilding is that 132 00:11:41.159 --> 00:11:46.320 you have to have I think you said it was a long term demand signal. 133 00:11:46.600 --> 00:11:54.080 Talk a little bit about why that is important in national shipbuilding strategies and 134 00:11:54.759 --> 00:11:58.080 what the problem is when you don't have that, and we certainly don't have 135 00:11:58.159 --> 00:12:01.559 that very often our country. We seem to pop from one thing to another. 136 00:12:03.799 --> 00:12:05.159 Yeah, we don't in the UK either, If that makes you feel 137 00:12:05.200 --> 00:12:11.840 better. Yeah, So, if you're going to have ships built by private 138 00:12:11.840 --> 00:12:16.080 companies, then they are going to respond to the demand signal of their client. 139 00:12:16.919 --> 00:12:20.159 And in this market, you have one client and that client is your 140 00:12:20.240 --> 00:12:26.120 navy. So what decisions the navy makes in terms of shipbuilding have a very 141 00:12:26.159 --> 00:12:33.519 direct impact on those companies. So for the companies to be able to plan 142 00:12:33.720 --> 00:12:37.200 long term, how many workers do you need, how much space do you 143 00:12:37.240 --> 00:12:39.919 need, how many of each type of machine do you need, how many 144 00:12:41.080 --> 00:12:45.279 raw materials do you need? All of this stuff, you cannot plan that 145 00:12:45.600 --> 00:12:50.480 effectively without a long term demand signal. If you know that you're going to 146 00:12:50.519 --> 00:12:54.720 be building two submarines a year every year for the next ten years, you 147 00:12:54.759 --> 00:13:01.039 can plan for that, whereas if you're building one this year and then it 148 00:13:01.159 --> 00:13:03.080 might be to next year, but we're not going to tell you for a 149 00:13:03.120 --> 00:13:05.840 couple of months, and then you're going to have to spin it up really 150 00:13:05.919 --> 00:13:09.559 quickly because we decided that we wanted to, and then the next year we're 151 00:13:09.559 --> 00:13:16.200 not building any and it just throws off the entire planning signal. And I 152 00:13:16.240 --> 00:13:20.759 can understand why industry gets really really annoyed with this kind of thing, because 153 00:13:22.039 --> 00:13:26.440 just imagine having all of these different plans thrown at you and then it's even 154 00:13:26.480 --> 00:13:31.480 not changing between administrations, it's within administration, so you don't even have four 155 00:13:31.559 --> 00:13:37.480 years of calm. It can change year on year. And if Congress won't 156 00:13:37.559 --> 00:13:43.000 fund something, that's a different matter. So there's just no ability for these 157 00:13:43.000 --> 00:13:46.799 companies to be able to properly invest in their facilities, in their workforce. 158 00:13:48.320 --> 00:13:52.759 They're doing the best, I think, but be able to have much more 159 00:13:52.759 --> 00:13:56.320 long term plan I think would really help settle things down and enable those companies 160 00:13:56.799 --> 00:14:01.440 to be able to invest in the right way to ensure that the Navy gets 161 00:14:01.440 --> 00:14:07.360 what it needs over the longer term. You know, obviously I mentioned in 162 00:14:07.360 --> 00:14:09.559 the intro. You know, we're in our third year of the Russia Ukrainian 163 00:14:09.639 --> 00:14:16.799 War, and one of the positive outputs you unless you're a Ukrainian or Russian, 164 00:14:16.840 --> 00:14:22.360 I guess, is the fact that it's woken up a lot of our 165 00:14:22.559 --> 00:14:30.960 NATO allies. The UK had always been within reasonable history above that two percent 166 00:14:31.039 --> 00:14:37.120 benchmark, and you wrote a little bit ago about the president concern. The 167 00:14:37.159 --> 00:14:43.240 present Conservative Prime Minister in his government have looked at a proposal to go up 168 00:14:43.279 --> 00:14:48.159 to two and a half percent of GDP over in the UK by twenty thirty. 169 00:14:48.559 --> 00:14:54.000 That's seventy five pounds over six years, And when reading through it, 170 00:14:54.000 --> 00:14:58.120 it looked as if there's what we like to call the in the States, 171 00:14:58.159 --> 00:15:03.480 which I think is really important for what you just mentioned before about letting an 172 00:15:03.480 --> 00:15:07.759 industry be able to predict things. And I've had a couple of offline interesting 173 00:15:07.799 --> 00:15:13.480 conversations with people that seapower should not be a partisan issue. It should be 174 00:15:13.519 --> 00:15:20.559 a bipartisan issue, because your supply chain doesn't care what color the flower on 175 00:15:20.600 --> 00:15:24.879 your lapel is. And it looked as if there might be in the UK 176 00:15:26.639 --> 00:15:33.080 a congealing around what we would call a bipartisan consensus between the conservative and labor 177 00:15:33.120 --> 00:15:37.240 parties, especially if there is, as happens in democratic systems, there's a 178 00:15:37.360 --> 00:15:43.600 change of parties. Is that assumptional mind right, that there's slowly a congealing 179 00:15:43.639 --> 00:15:50.519 consensus about that increase and if they are going to see that increase up to 180 00:15:50.679 --> 00:15:58.080 twenty thirty, is the land centric experience of the Russio Ukrainian War going to 181 00:15:58.120 --> 00:16:03.320 distract from some of the maritime requirements that a lot of people had been worried 182 00:16:03.320 --> 00:16:08.279 about for a while. I definitely think you're right that there is a convergence 183 00:16:08.360 --> 00:16:14.759 between the Conservative and Labor parties on defense very much because of Ukraine. And 184 00:16:15.879 --> 00:16:18.080 I mean if you look at the Labor Party, for example, the current 185 00:16:18.159 --> 00:16:23.559 leader, Kirs Starmer has always been very strong in defense. The previous leader, 186 00:16:23.679 --> 00:16:27.440 Jeremy Corbyn, that was more of a problem because he didn't want us 187 00:16:27.480 --> 00:16:33.159 to have outnekly deterrent. You know, he was very much further on the 188 00:16:33.240 --> 00:16:38.440 left. So all of the kind of Corbin era time of the Labor government 189 00:16:38.919 --> 00:16:45.320 of Labor opposition has rather tainted the Labor brand when it comes to defense. 190 00:16:45.399 --> 00:16:49.559 But I think Starmer has pulled it back and he's him and his defense team 191 00:16:49.639 --> 00:16:55.360 is saying some very sensible things, which gives me some hope as we're likely 192 00:16:55.480 --> 00:17:00.320 to have a Labor government after the general election. That gives me slightly fewer 193 00:17:00.320 --> 00:17:07.480 sleepless nights. So Starmer hasn't yet committed to the two point five percent on 194 00:17:07.519 --> 00:17:11.559 a timeline. He's just said, you know, when resources permit, we'll 195 00:17:11.640 --> 00:17:15.400 do that, which is a bit more vague than I would like. But 196 00:17:15.559 --> 00:17:21.200 any kind of increase I think is very important in terms of the land maritime 197 00:17:21.279 --> 00:17:27.279 question. I think despite the fact that the Ukraine Russia conflict is a land 198 00:17:27.319 --> 00:17:33.200 war. Britain has always been a maritime power, and you know, the 199 00:17:33.279 --> 00:17:37.799 Royal Navy is our senior service, and I think there is recognition that a 200 00:17:37.839 --> 00:17:42.119 lot of the missions that we expect from our armed forces are going to be 201 00:17:42.160 --> 00:17:49.759 predominantly naval. So, whether that's present humanitarian missions and so when in peacetime 202 00:17:51.559 --> 00:17:55.640 or from a more conflict perspective, the Royal Navy is always going to be 203 00:17:55.640 --> 00:17:59.759 at the heart of our armed forces. So I think any extra investment in 204 00:18:00.079 --> 00:18:04.920 our armed forces will be very strongly for the Royal Navy, I balanced with 205 00:18:06.039 --> 00:18:10.960 the Air Force and with the Army. So I don't think that Ukraine has 206 00:18:11.000 --> 00:18:17.079 made us shift further away from maritime towards lamb power. I think it's actually 207 00:18:17.680 --> 00:18:22.200 made it very clear to us that our strength is in the maritime arena and 208 00:18:22.240 --> 00:18:30.599 that's where we should be focusing our resources. Did your did your research point 209 00:18:32.160 --> 00:18:37.559 to in the in the direction at all of what the effect of unmanned uh 210 00:18:37.880 --> 00:18:47.079 surface vessels and and and under water under sea vessels and unmanned aircraft, the 211 00:18:47.079 --> 00:18:49.920 effect that that's going to have on the development of our navies. I mean, 212 00:18:49.920 --> 00:18:55.359 I saw the offses just came up with this ghost shirk huge uv. 213 00:18:56.200 --> 00:19:00.680 You know, we're it's just going to detract from building more ship ships or 214 00:19:00.759 --> 00:19:07.720 is this a way to get more bang for the buck by having these these 215 00:19:07.759 --> 00:19:12.839 types of things be friendly wingmen so to speak. For the current navies, 216 00:19:15.839 --> 00:19:19.839 I think it's definitely going to be a yes and kind of situation. The 217 00:19:19.920 --> 00:19:26.319 technology for uncrewed vehicles. I don't think it's going to advance to the level 218 00:19:26.359 --> 00:19:32.400 where we can have no crewed vessels whatsoever for a good while yet, So 219 00:19:32.440 --> 00:19:37.960 I think we're going to have quite a substantial period of the loyal wingman type 220 00:19:37.799 --> 00:19:44.000 relationship between the crewed vessels and the young Creed. Or you'll have a Creed 221 00:19:44.119 --> 00:19:49.079 vessel that as part of its capability, can launch unmanned surface vessels around the 222 00:19:49.119 --> 00:19:53.680 sea or something from itself, or you might have some kind of mothership situation, 223 00:19:55.400 --> 00:20:00.079 but that will all be woven into kind of the wider fleet operations of 224 00:20:00.559 --> 00:20:03.920 the more traditional crewed vessels. So I don't think we're going to see the 225 00:20:03.000 --> 00:20:08.079 end of destroyers of frigates or aircraft carriers anytime seen. And I don't think 226 00:20:08.119 --> 00:20:15.839 we're going to see a lot of those capabilities being autonomized or made uncrewed for 227 00:20:15.880 --> 00:20:18.920 a while. I think we're going to see that coming in where it's most 228 00:20:19.039 --> 00:20:26.039 useful, so that will be surveillance, reconnaissance, mind, countermeasures, you 229 00:20:26.039 --> 00:20:30.960 know, all of those tasks where the uncrewed option makes sense, and that 230 00:20:30.000 --> 00:20:34.160 will give us all a chance to really kind of get those technologies right and 231 00:20:34.240 --> 00:20:38.920 have a test bed for how they weave into maritime operations and then we can 232 00:20:40.000 --> 00:20:42.200 kind of build from there. So I think in the next fifty years or 233 00:20:42.240 --> 00:20:47.279 so you're not going to see too much of a change in terms of the 234 00:20:47.319 --> 00:20:52.279 surface vessels themselves. I think there will just be additional fleet members who will 235 00:20:52.759 --> 00:21:03.559 be uncrewed vessels. There's a little better range experience, our experiments you can 236 00:21:03.599 --> 00:21:07.000 do than actual rural world when people are taking shots at you. And as 237 00:21:08.039 --> 00:21:15.200 everybody's come to expect, when there's there's trouble around, the UK is usually 238 00:21:15.200 --> 00:21:21.480 there in the mix doing some good stuff what relatively caveat free so to speak. 239 00:21:22.039 --> 00:21:26.559 And like the US Navy, the Royal Navy has had some recent experience 240 00:21:26.160 --> 00:21:34.319 with defending themselves and others in the Red Sea over the course of the last 241 00:21:34.319 --> 00:21:42.039 few months against the at the low end, we've got the slow drones, 242 00:21:42.119 --> 00:21:47.680 the flying lawnmowers as I call them, and then you have your standard issue 243 00:21:47.720 --> 00:21:51.839 anti ship cruise missiles and the new kid in town, the anti ship ballistic 244 00:21:51.920 --> 00:21:56.759 missile. And when you fold that, which is first person experience with secondhand 245 00:21:56.839 --> 00:22:00.000 experience with what we've seen a little bit in the Black Sea recently, how 246 00:22:00.119 --> 00:22:07.240 is this starting to shape the conversation in the UK like we've kind of seen 247 00:22:07.319 --> 00:22:11.880 here and some of the self reflection on some of the assumptions and decisions that 248 00:22:11.920 --> 00:22:17.119 have been made in the recent past that either were the right decisions or were 249 00:22:17.240 --> 00:22:23.440 perhaps not quite seeing the future as clearly as they had hoped. I think 250 00:22:23.519 --> 00:22:29.480 the Red Sea experience has, on the one hand, been good for the 251 00:22:29.559 --> 00:22:33.880 Royal Navy in terms of the fact that our ships that have been there have 252 00:22:33.839 --> 00:22:37.880 shot down everything that the Houthis have thrown at them, as the US Navy 253 00:22:37.920 --> 00:22:41.880 have, as the French have, as the Germans have. So I think 254 00:22:41.960 --> 00:22:47.160 that shows that what we have works, which is really actually quite reassuring, 255 00:22:47.920 --> 00:22:49.799 because you never know, as you say, until somebody's throwing things at you, 256 00:22:51.079 --> 00:22:56.200 whether your defenses actually work. I think it's also highlighted the importance of 257 00:22:56.279 --> 00:23:04.400 having a real good mix of capabilities because you can't anticipate who you're going to 258 00:23:04.440 --> 00:23:10.240 be fighting next, and I'm not sure anybody in the Royal Navy would have 259 00:23:10.279 --> 00:23:14.960 anticipated the heath he's doing this two years ago, three years ago, five 260 00:23:15.039 --> 00:23:18.480 years ago. So to be able to have the capabilities that can respond to 261 00:23:18.559 --> 00:23:23.759 something like this is very important and I think reinforces the need for us to 262 00:23:23.799 --> 00:23:29.240 plan this going forward, so we keep this great mix of capabilities so we 263 00:23:29.319 --> 00:23:33.000 can do anything from a near peer conflict all the way down to piracy mission 264 00:23:33.039 --> 00:23:37.440 anti piracy missions of the Horn of Africa. And there has to be that 265 00:23:37.559 --> 00:23:41.799 mix of capabilities all the way along that spectrum to be able to respond to 266 00:23:41.839 --> 00:23:45.519 something like this, and the Royal Navy was able to respond very quickly because 267 00:23:45.559 --> 00:23:52.680 of our quick ability to deploy, So again that reinforces the importance of having 268 00:23:53.079 --> 00:23:56.799 everything in the right place to be able to go when we need to. 269 00:23:59.559 --> 00:24:02.559 One of them problems, I see that the way we do things is in 270 00:24:02.599 --> 00:24:07.920 our procurement systems, and I gather that the Royal Navy's procurement system is not 271 00:24:07.960 --> 00:24:11.400 a whole heck a lot better than the US Navy system. How much of 272 00:24:11.400 --> 00:24:15.720 a challenge is that for getting things done. You know, do we suffer 273 00:24:15.759 --> 00:24:19.640 from paralysis by analysis? Is it just too fragmented and we really need to 274 00:24:19.640 --> 00:24:27.640 have better systems in both countries. I think it's it's partially this long term 275 00:24:27.759 --> 00:24:36.519 ism problem, because it's very easy for one administration to you know, even 276 00:24:36.519 --> 00:24:41.160 if they had the best shipbuilding plan you've ever seen in your life, another 277 00:24:41.200 --> 00:24:42.799 administration could come in and say, nope, we're ripping that up, We're 278 00:24:42.799 --> 00:24:48.279 starting again. And I think there's very much a political incentive to do things 279 00:24:48.319 --> 00:24:55.000 differently for the sake being different from your predecessor, which is why I think 280 00:24:55.000 --> 00:24:57.599 you're right that this kind of stuff should not be partisan. And if we 281 00:24:57.680 --> 00:25:03.720 can have a lot more agreement, both on both sides of the island the 282 00:25:03.799 --> 00:25:07.640 US and on both sides in the UK, to be able to work together 283 00:25:07.759 --> 00:25:11.400 on some kind of long term plan, I think that will remove a lot 284 00:25:11.440 --> 00:25:15.880 of the issues that we have with not procuring the right things because we are 285 00:25:15.920 --> 00:25:22.440 not having that long term view in terms of procurement as well. I think 286 00:25:23.119 --> 00:25:30.799 the biggest difference I've seen between the UK military industrial complex and the American version 287 00:25:30.680 --> 00:25:36.279 is the sheer level of political involvement that you guys have in your defense budget. 288 00:25:37.039 --> 00:25:44.119 So in the UK, defense spending is as part of the overall budget 289 00:25:44.160 --> 00:25:47.400 and there is one vote. It is an up or down vote, and 290 00:25:47.440 --> 00:25:51.720 that vote is a vote of confidence in the government. So the government can 291 00:25:51.720 --> 00:25:55.200 whip every single one of their mpiece to vote with it, and that is 292 00:25:55.240 --> 00:26:00.440 the only vote we have on defense spending. There's no amendments, there's no 293 00:26:00.960 --> 00:26:07.440 discussions of specific programs. It is all just done and that's it. Whereas 294 00:26:07.519 --> 00:26:11.359 in the US you have the ability. You know, Congress every year debates 295 00:26:11.599 --> 00:26:18.279 the defense authorizations and appropriations and any member can load any amendment they want onto 296 00:26:18.359 --> 00:26:22.720 it. They can ask for two hundred and fifty million dollars for this one 297 00:26:22.759 --> 00:26:29.000 specific program that happens to have a factory in their district, and they can 298 00:26:29.680 --> 00:26:33.039 vote for things that they want in order to big up their donors. And 299 00:26:33.279 --> 00:26:37.759 you know, there's all of these very low level political incentives for port barrel 300 00:26:37.799 --> 00:26:42.640 spending and lobbying that we just don't have in the UK. And I think 301 00:26:42.960 --> 00:26:48.720 that happens. That political incentive that you guys have really does distort things a 302 00:26:48.759 --> 00:26:52.920 lot more than we do it we have over here. I've absolutely no idea 303 00:26:52.920 --> 00:26:56.680 how you fixed that, but it is a problem that I've noticed has been 304 00:26:57.680 --> 00:27:03.200 really present in a the case studies that I did during my dissertation, you 305 00:27:03.240 --> 00:27:08.079 know, and things I've read about elsewhere as well. Yeah, it's funny 306 00:27:08.079 --> 00:27:14.880 oftentimes and things you can find bugs in your features and features in your bug 307 00:27:15.359 --> 00:27:18.759 and as our friend Brian McGrath always points out about earmarks and stuff like that, 308 00:27:18.759 --> 00:27:22.920 that things have gotten worse since it's main we've made it harder to do 309 00:27:22.960 --> 00:27:27.720 that. And recently an individual put out and I wish I could find it. 310 00:27:29.519 --> 00:27:34.519 They put out just a real short list of really valuable assets in the 311 00:27:34.599 --> 00:27:41.319 US military that only exist because somebody earmarked it. Included that with predator drones 312 00:27:41.440 --> 00:27:45.319 and tea lambs that were saved at the end of the Carter administration, if 313 00:27:45.319 --> 00:27:49.400 memory shows me right. So, yeah, there's features and bugs, But 314 00:27:49.720 --> 00:27:57.039 I do think it's really interesting the amount of control that the party and power 315 00:27:57.039 --> 00:28:03.480 in the UK has of in a unique position in that you know the British 316 00:28:03.480 --> 00:28:10.319 system pretty well, and you got your PhD studying the American system, so 317 00:28:10.400 --> 00:28:15.240 you've kind of seen both both of them from from in the middle, so 318 00:28:15.279 --> 00:28:18.000 to speak. I guess that would put you on Bermuda. Take vacation Bermuda. 319 00:28:18.000 --> 00:28:22.559 It's pretty nice there. But if you had if you had somebody who 320 00:28:22.599 --> 00:28:26.559 mostly understood the British system and was looking at the American system, and if 321 00:28:26.559 --> 00:28:30.480 you had somebody in DC very familiar with the American system but really didn't know 322 00:28:30.839 --> 00:28:36.519 anything about the British system, what would you think or the top things that 323 00:28:36.559 --> 00:28:41.400 they would not expect to see or would assume was there that's not looking from 324 00:28:41.440 --> 00:28:47.400 one side to the other. That was a great question. So for the 325 00:28:47.480 --> 00:28:51.680 American side, So I can for the American side, I can say the 326 00:28:51.680 --> 00:28:56.880 things that surprised me because that's the position I was in when I started studying 327 00:28:56.920 --> 00:29:03.880 this. So it would be the amount of money in your political system is 328 00:29:03.319 --> 00:29:11.680 wildly different from the UK. So we have very very small limits on the 329 00:29:11.720 --> 00:29:17.920 amount of electoral spending, campaign spending, donations, lobbying like all of that 330 00:29:18.119 --> 00:29:23.440 is really really really tightly restricted. So I mean, I've worked in electoral 331 00:29:23.480 --> 00:29:30.000 politics in the UK for about fifteen years and we run an entire election campaign 332 00:29:30.640 --> 00:29:36.279 for an MP's constituency on ten thousand pounds that's all we're allowed to spend. 333 00:29:36.559 --> 00:29:42.680 So the amount of money that's slashing around in the US is phenomenal when you 334 00:29:42.720 --> 00:29:49.200 look at it from over here, and the amount of money that companies can 335 00:29:49.319 --> 00:29:56.839 give to candidates or packs or super PACs or whatever, it's just it's something 336 00:29:56.880 --> 00:30:00.880 that completely boggles our minds. It's something that we would ever allow here. 337 00:30:02.559 --> 00:30:08.200 And I think that although having that much money helps you to communicate better with 338 00:30:08.240 --> 00:30:15.519 your constituents, if that money is coming from defense companies or other companies who 339 00:30:15.559 --> 00:30:22.359 are trying to affect your votes on defense issues, that can very much give 340 00:30:22.440 --> 00:30:27.000 the impression of distortion in how you're voting. And even though that may not 341 00:30:27.759 --> 00:30:34.960 be the case for every representative or senator, having that perception is something that 342 00:30:36.000 --> 00:30:40.119 we just don't have in the UK. So that was something that really surprised 343 00:30:40.119 --> 00:30:42.640 me. I think I in one of my chapters, I did a graph 344 00:30:42.720 --> 00:30:48.920 of campaign contributions from the top ten prime defense companies in the US, and 345 00:30:48.960 --> 00:30:55.640 the figures were staggering to me. I might just be being naive, brit 346 00:30:55.799 --> 00:30:59.519 Better. Yeah, it was something that really shocked me. So that was 347 00:30:59.559 --> 00:31:04.240 the first thing. The second thing would be the fact that it's very difficult 348 00:31:04.240 --> 00:31:11.480 to do multi year programs in the US and so our because you have to 349 00:31:11.559 --> 00:31:17.279 vote in your budget every year in such a very granular way. It just 350 00:31:17.279 --> 00:31:21.039 seems to me like it's much more difficult to do big, multi year procurement 351 00:31:21.240 --> 00:31:25.720 than it is in the UK. I suppose there's arguments either way as to 352 00:31:25.759 --> 00:31:32.640 which is the better way in terms of accountability or scrutiny, but it seems 353 00:31:32.680 --> 00:31:37.440 to me that the UK method might be a bit more efficient in terms of 354 00:31:37.599 --> 00:31:42.599 spending over a multi year period. In terms of the other way around, 355 00:31:45.559 --> 00:31:52.119 I guess the UK system must seem very odd because MPs don't get involved. 356 00:31:52.440 --> 00:31:56.519 So most members of Parliament, if you are, unless they have a specific 357 00:31:56.599 --> 00:32:02.079 kind of nerdy interest in defense they're on the Defense Committee, they probably will 358 00:32:02.079 --> 00:32:07.640 have absolutely no idea about defense procurement at all. So if you asked, 359 00:32:07.920 --> 00:32:13.640 just like a random MP their thoughts on the F thirty five, you probably 360 00:32:13.640 --> 00:32:17.079 get a sentence out of Then maybe I think there's a lot more knowledge in 361 00:32:17.119 --> 00:32:23.039 the United States on these kind of military issues than there is over here, 362 00:32:23.079 --> 00:32:29.880 because here MPs are not required to vote in such a granular way, so 363 00:32:29.920 --> 00:32:34.160 they don't need to have that kind of granular knowledge of the programs. So 364 00:32:34.359 --> 00:32:39.839 that's probably one of the biggest differences, and I think maybe it's just that 365 00:32:39.880 --> 00:32:47.519 we don't really know how to explain it, but it the vibe is just 366 00:32:47.640 --> 00:32:52.400 very different, and I think that might just be because there is a lot 367 00:32:52.680 --> 00:32:59.119 less money over here in the UK and we don't have the ability to kind 368 00:32:59.160 --> 00:33:02.039 of bung three hundred million dollars into a program just to see if it works. 369 00:33:02.960 --> 00:33:08.240 And there's a lot of times that we've done problem programs that haven't worked, 370 00:33:08.640 --> 00:33:14.240 wasted a lot of money, but we don't really because we don't have 371 00:33:14.279 --> 00:33:19.079 that bigger defense budget. I think there's a lot of conservatism in how we 372 00:33:19.160 --> 00:33:22.440 spend money, and we don't do things because they might work. We do 373 00:33:22.599 --> 00:33:28.240 them if we've all talked about them for ten years and then decided we probably 374 00:33:28.240 --> 00:33:30.519 should have done it already, and then we might do it but on the 375 00:33:30.599 --> 00:33:35.519 cheap, and it just the vibe is just a lot more kind of constrained. 376 00:33:36.079 --> 00:33:39.160 So, yeah, those are the big differences. That's very unacademic language, 377 00:33:39.200 --> 00:33:46.200 but there we are. How much do you think the holiday from history 378 00:33:46.279 --> 00:33:53.079 after the end of the Cold War has affected both the UK and the US 379 00:33:53.240 --> 00:33:59.279 approach to ship building and all the rest of it. We seem to have 380 00:33:59.319 --> 00:34:04.200 just kind of let it all drift away. I'm not quite sure that the 381 00:34:04.319 --> 00:34:08.880 UK has done the same, but that I have that vibe, I definitely 382 00:34:08.880 --> 00:34:15.079 think it's similar. It's part of me that wants to get in a time 383 00:34:15.119 --> 00:34:21.159 machine and go back thirty years to every defense secretary in nineteen ninety two and 384 00:34:21.239 --> 00:34:27.199 shake them by the lapels and say, do not stop spending. This is 385 00:34:27.239 --> 00:34:30.880 going to really backfire on you in the future. And it is the same 386 00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:36.320 in the UK. I mean, so, we had a defense review, 387 00:34:37.039 --> 00:34:42.079 a big one in nineteen ninety eight after the Blair labor government took over, 388 00:34:43.000 --> 00:34:49.519 and they had all sorts of bright ideas about military spending, including really upping 389 00:34:49.559 --> 00:34:54.079 the number of holes in the Royal Navy, and those plans sort of got 390 00:34:54.119 --> 00:34:58.440 cut and then got cut and we didn't think we really needed to do them, 391 00:34:58.519 --> 00:35:00.960 and we could just kind of shave off a couple of frigates here. 392 00:35:01.079 --> 00:35:07.199 And then the big thing that really messed with our navy is this concept called 393 00:35:10.599 --> 00:35:16.440 so essentially, you build this ship and it can have an armament added to 394 00:35:16.480 --> 00:35:20.760 it, but we're not going to put the armament on it because that's really 395 00:35:20.800 --> 00:35:23.519 expensive and we probably don't need it right now. So it's called by but 396 00:35:23.639 --> 00:35:30.760 not with. So we have ships that have space for missile cells but don't 397 00:35:30.840 --> 00:35:36.639 have missile cells, and I think that's the kind of way they decided to 398 00:35:36.679 --> 00:35:42.519 kind of shave off some money from the Navy budget, and it's left us 399 00:35:42.639 --> 00:35:49.679 with ostensibly a certain number of holes, but actually the capability is a lot 400 00:35:49.760 --> 00:35:54.280 less than one would expect because it has the empty space where a missile cell 401 00:35:54.320 --> 00:35:59.960 should be. So that's kind of the danger point for the role. Now 402 00:36:00.280 --> 00:36:05.000 in terms of the peace divident, is that kind of well, we'll build 403 00:36:05.000 --> 00:36:07.920 a destroyer, but it won't be a very good destroyer because we don't really 404 00:36:07.960 --> 00:36:12.280 need it to be able to fight. We just need to have a destroyer. 405 00:36:13.079 --> 00:36:15.119 So that's kind of how we dealt with it. I think in the 406 00:36:15.199 --> 00:36:22.519 US, the kind of impression I've got is that you just stop building stuff 407 00:36:22.840 --> 00:36:28.000 quite a lot. And so although we have kind of shadow destroyers, you 408 00:36:28.079 --> 00:36:31.280 have no destroyers. So I'm not sure which is which is better to have 409 00:36:31.719 --> 00:36:38.719 a destroyer that isn't very good or just fewer destroyers. But yeah, like 410 00:36:38.840 --> 00:36:47.400 that period of time I think has really undermined naval capability here in the States 411 00:36:49.000 --> 00:36:52.480 and in a lot of European navies as well, because we all had the 412 00:36:52.519 --> 00:37:00.480 same sort of view in the nineties about the possibility of a future great power 413 00:37:00.559 --> 00:37:06.679 conflict, and everybody turned out to be wrong. So here we are the 414 00:37:07.079 --> 00:37:10.280 four but not with I kind of went a little over a month ago. 415 00:37:10.239 --> 00:37:17.840 I went down a rabbit hole in that interesting phrase that specifically got my attention, 416 00:37:19.000 --> 00:37:23.440 because I'm kind of a multipurpose gun nut. Whether it's a four and 417 00:37:23.480 --> 00:37:27.519 a half inch like you see on some of your ships, are the ubiquitous, 418 00:37:27.559 --> 00:37:31.440 you know, five inch are the the all praise the auto malaria seventy 419 00:37:31.480 --> 00:37:37.199 six millimeters, they're quite useful, and in the Red Sea they've actually as 420 00:37:37.199 --> 00:37:43.159 opposed to lobbying two million dollar plus missiles at flying lawnmowers, they've been able 421 00:37:43.199 --> 00:37:46.320 to make pretty good work with their the main gun, the seventy six millimeters 422 00:37:46.360 --> 00:37:52.320 and the five inches against some of those targets. More economical and as you 423 00:37:52.320 --> 00:37:55.400 mentioned earlier in the show, you know, having a diversity of options when 424 00:37:55.400 --> 00:38:01.559 it comes to your weapons suite, and it mentioned the the British destroyers with 425 00:38:01.599 --> 00:38:07.119 the four and a half inch gun that to save money, even though that 426 00:38:08.360 --> 00:38:13.199 actually is supposed to have an anti air capability. They took that out of 427 00:38:13.199 --> 00:38:17.599 the gun system simply to save money, and then it went into well, 428 00:38:17.639 --> 00:38:22.920 this the ncee gym you have here is supposed to actually have mark forty one 429 00:38:22.000 --> 00:38:28.360 vls sells. So it's an interesting version of what I'm sure you've read about 430 00:38:28.360 --> 00:38:31.760 here, the salami slicing that we do. Okay, instead of instead of 431 00:38:31.760 --> 00:38:37.880 buying four destroyers, we're going to buy three or three and a half. 432 00:38:37.360 --> 00:38:43.079 It seems like the build for but not with is well, we're going to 433 00:38:43.280 --> 00:38:46.480 build four destroyers, but each destroyer is actually only going to have point seventy 434 00:38:46.519 --> 00:38:52.159 five of its capabilities, but we have four destroyers. It's it seems to 435 00:38:52.159 --> 00:39:00.800 be a similar to what the Danish frigate that had to go back home, 436 00:39:00.960 --> 00:39:05.280 which was kind of fun to see, and maybe you have other stories along 437 00:39:05.360 --> 00:39:08.280 those lines. Is even before the ship was coming home, the emails from 438 00:39:08.320 --> 00:39:15.840 the skipper of the ship back home were leaked about the fact that his missiles 439 00:39:15.000 --> 00:39:19.119 and his radars didn't communicate with each other. And before the ship he didn't 440 00:39:19.119 --> 00:39:22.639 come home. You had the different defense contractors saying wasn't us our stuff is 441 00:39:22.639 --> 00:39:29.960 fine, it's you. So you have that little conflict between defense contractors when 442 00:39:30.559 --> 00:39:36.599 those compromises that we've all seen in peace. And this goes back to the 443 00:39:36.599 --> 00:39:42.159 torpedo problem of World War Two, that when the shooting actually starts, or 444 00:39:42.840 --> 00:39:45.440 you have a flying lawnmower, you would like to shoot with your four and 445 00:39:45.480 --> 00:39:47.880 a half inch main gun, but you can't, Or you'd really like to 446 00:39:47.920 --> 00:39:54.119 have your ship's contribute to a Tomahawks strike but can't because the weight room is 447 00:39:54.119 --> 00:39:59.920 in the way. It really does manifest itself in these real world situations, 448 00:40:00.199 --> 00:40:07.360 it absolutely does, and to be able to have and because we have the 449 00:40:07.400 --> 00:40:10.159 ships, but they're just not as you say, like the're point se than 450 00:40:10.239 --> 00:40:15.679 five of the ship, because that kind of armament stuff is quite nerdy. 451 00:40:16.440 --> 00:40:22.719 I think people who aren't as knowledgeable about naval power assume that a destroyer is 452 00:40:22.760 --> 00:40:30.920 a destroyer, and they don't realize that a destroyer with a gym is lesleth 453 00:40:30.000 --> 00:40:34.760 or than a destroyer with a Mark forty one bs cell, and they don't 454 00:40:34.840 --> 00:40:38.119 understand where those savings have been made because the ship's right there. It's a 455 00:40:38.159 --> 00:40:44.639 destroyer. It's great. So it's sort of I wonder whether that kind of 456 00:40:45.760 --> 00:40:52.559 disparity in perception is a little more dangerous because the role Navy has ships, 457 00:40:52.719 --> 00:40:58.400 So maybe the perception is that they don't need extra investment because the ships are 458 00:40:58.440 --> 00:41:02.239 there, but actually they do because the capabilities are not on board to be 459 00:41:02.280 --> 00:41:07.280 able to make full use of that whole. And I've actually recently co authored 460 00:41:07.280 --> 00:41:13.519 a paper on Royal Navy lethality which will be coming out in a couple of 461 00:41:13.519 --> 00:41:19.599 weeks little teaser, which goes through the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 462 00:41:19.599 --> 00:41:27.679 platform by platform and recommends how we fix the problems that have been created by 463 00:41:27.880 --> 00:41:31.960 this for but not with mentality, and then what investments we need to go 464 00:41:32.480 --> 00:41:37.599 into in the future to be able to up our mass. So it focuses 465 00:41:37.639 --> 00:41:43.519 on firepower and a mass, and it you know, we all argue that 466 00:41:43.559 --> 00:41:45.079 we need a bigger navy, but we're kind of putting our money where our 467 00:41:45.119 --> 00:41:50.760 mouth is about what that should look like. So it's very very techy, 468 00:41:51.159 --> 00:41:55.719 very specific, but we're hoping that that will help to shape the conversation because 469 00:41:55.719 --> 00:42:00.079 it's all very well saying we need to give x billion pounds more to the 470 00:42:00.199 --> 00:42:04.719 Navy, but we also need to make suggestions as to how they should spend 471 00:42:04.760 --> 00:42:09.400 it. Because if there's no direction, then you don't know whether that money 472 00:42:09.480 --> 00:42:15.159 is going to be spent effectively or efficiently. So that's kind of our contribution 473 00:42:15.599 --> 00:42:20.199 to the conversation, and we hope it will be helpful because if the next 474 00:42:20.199 --> 00:42:24.239 government does increase defense spending to two put five percent GDP, hopefully we'll have 475 00:42:24.239 --> 00:42:29.159 a bit more money to play with and hopefully they can enact some of our 476 00:42:29.159 --> 00:42:34.719 recommendations. Here's here's a curve ball for you, Emma. Have you have 477 00:42:34.800 --> 00:42:39.199 you been watching The Three Body Problem? Yes? Love it, absolutely love 478 00:42:39.239 --> 00:42:43.360 it. I don't know whether it's gonna be helpful to the conversation or not, 479 00:42:43.440 --> 00:42:47.960 but the character world Aavy Commander Raj Varba what rude things he had to 480 00:42:49.000 --> 00:42:52.480 say about the Type forty five. It was very, very it was fun 481 00:42:52.519 --> 00:42:55.639 to watch. My wife was like, what is so funny about that. 482 00:42:55.719 --> 00:42:59.639 I was like, I don't want to exploit it. But yeah, for 483 00:42:59.719 --> 00:43:01.719 the list if you're not watching The Three Body probably if you're a naval list, 484 00:43:01.800 --> 00:43:06.440 there's especially if you know anything about the Royal Navy or really any navy. 485 00:43:07.039 --> 00:43:12.360 There's a nice comment that was made that is kind of the thing that 486 00:43:12.480 --> 00:43:16.480 people will tell you in private when you're listening anyway, I thought that was 487 00:43:16.559 --> 00:43:21.880 kind of entertaining over to you. Mark, Yeah, I was such a 488 00:43:21.920 --> 00:43:25.079 near thinking about modularity, and I know you wrote a piece on this some 489 00:43:25.079 --> 00:43:28.920 time ago, but you know, you end up like with the LCS, 490 00:43:28.920 --> 00:43:31.079 We've got a ship that's supposed to be able to do three things I think 491 00:43:31.119 --> 00:43:34.920 maybe four things, but it can only do them one at a time, 492 00:43:35.119 --> 00:43:37.760 which means you have a ship that's always in the wrong configuration. I would 493 00:43:37.760 --> 00:43:42.320 guess, you know, talk a little bit about modularity and the effect that 494 00:43:42.320 --> 00:43:45.760 that's had on the readiness of some of these the ships that we're putting at 495 00:43:49.000 --> 00:43:54.119 well. To hark back to your previous conversation, I think I believe that 496 00:43:54.159 --> 00:43:59.199 the Danish warship that had to return home from the Red Sea was a moguinal 497 00:43:59.239 --> 00:44:02.840 warship. So I feel like this proves my point that I don't like modularity. 498 00:44:04.679 --> 00:44:10.280 And I think the problem with modularity is that when you get those capabilities 499 00:44:12.199 --> 00:44:15.599 in those modules, you don't get the best version of that capability. You 500 00:44:15.679 --> 00:44:22.079 get the best modular version of that capability. And if that capability can't be 501 00:44:22.119 --> 00:44:28.119 effectively modularized, and if you're going to make it into a module because that's 502 00:44:28.159 --> 00:44:32.760 all you have, then you're going to have worst capabilities. And it may 503 00:44:32.800 --> 00:44:38.239 well be that modularity works for a few things, but if modularity becomes fashionable, 504 00:44:38.360 --> 00:44:43.480 if that becomes the structure of your navy, if that's how you procure 505 00:44:43.519 --> 00:44:49.559 things as new modules, then you're limiting yourself to that and you're not having 506 00:44:49.559 --> 00:44:57.400 those wider conversations about fleet structure, about whether a traditionally fitted ship would do 507 00:44:57.480 --> 00:45:02.119 that thing better than a module would. And I just think it's very unnecessarily 508 00:45:02.800 --> 00:45:09.960 constraining for navies to be put into a kind of fashionable modulu approach. I 509 00:45:10.000 --> 00:45:15.280 know that would make me unpopular with the Royal Navy as well as we although 510 00:45:15.280 --> 00:45:19.760 we are a bit different, so we call it podular, so we have 511 00:45:19.880 --> 00:45:23.239 pods instead of modules, but it's basically the same thing, and I have 512 00:45:23.320 --> 00:45:28.360 my concerns about that as well. So I think it can be done well 513 00:45:28.719 --> 00:45:31.039 as long as you limit it to what it does well. But if you 514 00:45:31.079 --> 00:45:36.679 start trying to make all of your frigates modulo, or all of your destroyers 515 00:45:36.679 --> 00:45:39.800 modula, or all of your off your patrol vessels modular, just because that's 516 00:45:39.880 --> 00:45:45.199 what we do now, then I really think it would be a very very 517 00:45:45.239 --> 00:45:51.639 bad thing to do for the naval power. And one thing I definitely wanted 518 00:45:51.639 --> 00:45:54.760 to touch on is I'd like to get somebody who has a good view on 519 00:45:55.400 --> 00:46:00.400 the British side of the equation because on mid ratch here we've covered the American 520 00:46:00.559 --> 00:46:06.519 and the Australian pretty well on it. But that's that's aucus which on paper, 521 00:46:07.920 --> 00:46:12.239 it's a great opportunity and I always remind people in Australia may be the 522 00:46:12.280 --> 00:46:15.760 size of a continent, pretty much the size of continental US, but I 523 00:46:15.800 --> 00:46:19.840 believe the population is one third of the UK. Uh not a lot of 524 00:46:19.880 --> 00:46:27.440 people there, But in August there's a great opportunity here that if we get 525 00:46:27.440 --> 00:46:30.559 another country that you know, wants to get in on the nuclear submarine game 526 00:46:30.639 --> 00:46:36.280 and they want to do that in conjunction with the UK and the US that 527 00:46:36.440 --> 00:46:45.639 are that gives us additional funds to help our already rather thin industrial based submarine 528 00:46:45.639 --> 00:46:49.360 wise. And there's there's been some on the U s side of the equation, 529 00:46:49.559 --> 00:46:54.199 some people who I am being charitable here, I don't think they get 530 00:46:54.199 --> 00:46:58.519 the big picture. I've always been that at the end of the day that 531 00:46:58.719 --> 00:47:02.159 if we have to in twenty twenty eight, twenty thirty. Whenever that data 532 00:47:02.239 --> 00:47:07.119 is if we have to take one of our Virginia class and say okay, 533 00:47:07.119 --> 00:47:12.199 it's not going to be uss X, it's going to be hmas Y, 534 00:47:12.320 --> 00:47:16.920 then we need to do that. But on the British side of the equation, 535 00:47:19.239 --> 00:47:24.239 what are the technology or support to your defense infrastructure are you hoping to 536 00:47:24.360 --> 00:47:30.280 gain from AUCUS and is there a feeling that it's on track or it needs 537 00:47:30.320 --> 00:47:35.599 to be aggressively nudged in the direction really everybody wants it to go at the 538 00:47:35.679 --> 00:47:40.719 end. Well, in the UK we are hugely supporting with AUCUS, so 539 00:47:40.840 --> 00:47:46.679 August will be our next class of attack submarine, so we have that very 540 00:47:46.960 --> 00:47:52.519 strong built in incentive to do a good job and they will be built in 541 00:47:52.559 --> 00:47:58.239 the UK, which means that our submarine industrial base has will have a suite 542 00:47:58.239 --> 00:48:01.719 of orders for an couple of decades, which again is a really good sign 543 00:48:02.880 --> 00:48:10.119 in terms of making that happen. You know, until we have the specific 544 00:48:10.199 --> 00:48:14.679 numbers of those submarines that are going to be ordered, until the design is 545 00:48:15.039 --> 00:48:20.239 you know, cleared with everybody, until those kind of bits are nailed down, 546 00:48:20.480 --> 00:48:25.199 I think there will still be a little bit of jitteriness because while we 547 00:48:27.239 --> 00:48:30.639 are very excited about August, we are a little worried about you guys. 548 00:48:31.480 --> 00:48:38.280 And the reason for that is that it would because for the UCUS is essentially 549 00:48:38.400 --> 00:48:43.480 or Pillar two at least is essentially a technology transfer deal. You know, 550 00:48:43.519 --> 00:48:46.719 the US maybe is not getting any submarines out of this. So if there 551 00:48:46.719 --> 00:48:52.559 are any problems with that tech transfer process, then there could be some very 552 00:48:52.559 --> 00:49:00.719 significant delays to Pillar two a aucus, which means delays to our next attack 553 00:49:00.800 --> 00:49:06.119 submarine, which means delays for the Australian as well. And I'm worried that 554 00:49:06.159 --> 00:49:12.320 there might be a gap between the retirement of our current subweins, the Stute 555 00:49:12.360 --> 00:49:17.079 class, and the coming into surface of the August class if there are any 556 00:49:17.079 --> 00:49:22.880 delays. So I think we should build a couple more astutes to kind of 557 00:49:22.920 --> 00:49:29.639 bridge a potential gap, because I am worried that if that gap is there 558 00:49:29.679 --> 00:49:32.199 and persists, then that could have a problem for our workforce and for our 559 00:49:32.199 --> 00:49:37.360 facilities, much like I've written about with the US case with the Sea Wolf, 560 00:49:37.199 --> 00:49:40.280 And we did have a bit of that problem ourselves between the Vanguard and 561 00:49:40.320 --> 00:49:45.400 the Ischuet for the same reason for having too much of a gap, and 562 00:49:46.000 --> 00:49:50.679 so I think aucast will happen, and I think the submarine that we get 563 00:49:50.719 --> 00:49:53.719 out of it will be really good. I am just worried that it's not 564 00:49:53.760 --> 00:49:58.920 going to be on time. And this may be some deep seated trauma from 565 00:49:59.039 --> 00:50:01.840 all of the other labor programs I've studied that we'reever on time. But I 566 00:50:01.880 --> 00:50:07.159 just think we should have some kind of insurance policy in the form of at 567 00:50:07.239 --> 00:50:12.840 least one more sheet too. Yeah, I was going to I was going 568 00:50:12.920 --> 00:50:16.440 to ask a question about that. Whether the the differences in the procurement systems 569 00:50:16.480 --> 00:50:22.679 between the UK and Australia and the US and whoever else now is playing in 570 00:50:22.719 --> 00:50:27.199 AUCUE is going to be one of the major issues because as you note, 571 00:50:27.320 --> 00:50:30.920 you know we do we do our funding. We're not good on long term 572 00:50:30.960 --> 00:50:36.880 funding. So which would allow a lot of the issues with technology and stuff 573 00:50:36.880 --> 00:50:39.880 to be resolved. Is do you do you foresee that as a as a 574 00:50:40.079 --> 00:50:45.559 potential hang up in the in the Auchice deal. I do, yes, 575 00:50:45.760 --> 00:50:50.639 I mean, until you know, once we've kind of got over those hurdles, 576 00:50:51.159 --> 00:50:54.760 the designs agree, the texts been transferred, and you know the first 577 00:50:55.679 --> 00:51:00.800 component has been laid down for the first ss N August, I will still 578 00:51:00.840 --> 00:51:05.679 be a little bit worried, and that might just be my own anxiety. 579 00:51:05.840 --> 00:51:13.440 But until that happens and we can build those submarines ourselves without the need for 580 00:51:13.480 --> 00:51:19.159 further input from the US, that will make me feel better. I'm also 581 00:51:19.199 --> 00:51:25.039 a little worried in terms of what a future Trump administration could due to WUCUS. 582 00:51:28.599 --> 00:51:32.920 It may well be that a Trump Difference Secretary would be fully gung ho 583 00:51:34.079 --> 00:51:37.760 for it, and that would be great, but it's that uncertainty. I 584 00:51:37.760 --> 00:51:43.760 think that is the problem. Given how mercurial he is on many policy areas, 585 00:51:45.320 --> 00:51:50.599 I think we're all just a little bit tense about that. And the 586 00:51:52.559 --> 00:52:00.480 you know, essentially, before the Virginias are transferred to Australia, any point, 587 00:52:00.960 --> 00:52:05.639 the US Navy or Congress or the President can say, actually we still 588 00:52:05.639 --> 00:52:08.880 need this Virginia, sorry you're not getting it, or actually we're not comfortable 589 00:52:08.880 --> 00:52:14.119 about transferring that technology to you, or we can't get this vote through Congress 590 00:52:14.239 --> 00:52:19.960 to permit this technology transfer. And there's just all these little hurdles that are 591 00:52:20.039 --> 00:52:22.440 making us sort a little bit worried. So I think once we've cleared all 592 00:52:22.480 --> 00:52:28.320 of those, Ugust will be fantastic and we'll get some really good submarines out 593 00:52:28.320 --> 00:52:30.679 of it. But until that happens, I'm just not going to sleep quite 594 00:52:30.679 --> 00:52:36.400 as well as I could. I think that's probably one of the more sensible 595 00:52:37.559 --> 00:52:42.760 mindsets to have towards a stool. We should all light a candle and buy 596 00:52:42.760 --> 00:52:46.880 a havy I meanxprectation. It's probably part of a mental health month and self 597 00:52:46.920 --> 00:52:52.679 care not to you head your bets. There are a lot more cards to 598 00:52:52.719 --> 00:52:57.199 come out of what on paper just looks like it's like, can we make 599 00:52:57.239 --> 00:53:00.480 this happen? This is really good? Can we not screw this up? 600 00:53:00.519 --> 00:53:06.559 But yeah, applied pestimism might be be an order here. Before we got 601 00:53:06.599 --> 00:53:09.119 about ten minutes or so left, I think. But I wanted to get 602 00:53:09.159 --> 00:53:15.639 your take on this because you've got a view a little bit broader than either 603 00:53:15.840 --> 00:53:22.400 nation, and I know that you've played around with some of the industries on 604 00:53:22.440 --> 00:53:28.800 the continent as well. But here on the US we have had our shipyards 605 00:53:28.920 --> 00:53:32.679 get bought by or partnered with to help build ships. We got the Italians 606 00:53:32.719 --> 00:53:39.000 come in with Concentiary, We've had the Australians come in with austele and in 607 00:53:39.039 --> 00:53:44.519 the last couple of weeks, one of the bits of news that had popped 608 00:53:44.519 --> 00:53:51.639 above the background noise is second av del Toro has brought into the discussion of 609 00:53:51.800 --> 00:54:00.320 perhaps partnerships with the superb South Korean ship building business. And independent of all 610 00:54:00.400 --> 00:54:07.239 that, what keeps popping in my mind isn't so much the fact that we 611 00:54:07.320 --> 00:54:15.239 need the Italians, the Australians and the South Koreans to help our shipbuilding business. 612 00:54:15.480 --> 00:54:22.320 But what does that say about the state of American industry, American industrial 613 00:54:22.519 --> 00:54:30.679 leadership, vision, research, and industrial capability that the previous generation's arsenal democracy 614 00:54:31.559 --> 00:54:39.719 is having to bring in outside capital and expertise to try to get our shipbuilding 615 00:54:39.880 --> 00:54:45.599 on the level. Is that a little too cynical view of this type of 616 00:54:45.639 --> 00:54:54.119 interplay or is there something going on that these are just indications of I think 617 00:54:54.119 --> 00:55:00.199 we're pretty struggling about those stories. Is whever I read anything about that, 618 00:55:00.360 --> 00:55:06.800 especially what Sexuary Deltura has been talking about with Hamwa. I always see people 619 00:55:07.480 --> 00:55:13.800 bleeting that shipbuilding should be domestic, it should be made in America, everything 620 00:55:13.800 --> 00:55:17.320 should be done by American companies with American national security, and why can't we 621 00:55:17.400 --> 00:55:22.039 keep our shipbuilding American? And I just think to myself, but you've done 622 00:55:22.119 --> 00:55:30.840 not a great job of that. And this is not just down to American 623 00:55:30.880 --> 00:55:37.840 industry or Congress or presidential administrations or the Navy leadership. It's everybody. Over 624 00:55:37.840 --> 00:55:45.639 the last thirty years, you haven't done enough for your shipbuilding industry and you 625 00:55:45.800 --> 00:55:51.320 need to build ships. So if you're going to fix that problem, you 626 00:55:51.440 --> 00:55:57.199 need partners to come in. And that's just the situation you're in. And 627 00:55:57.960 --> 00:56:02.360 I would much rather see ships being built in U s shipyards with a partnership 628 00:56:02.480 --> 00:56:07.679 from ostolop and Canti Area or Hammoir than no ship's being built. And that 629 00:56:07.800 --> 00:56:13.599 really is the choice right now. Without billions and billions and billions of dollars 630 00:56:13.639 --> 00:56:17.159 in investment, it's just not going to happen. So I think you're in 631 00:56:17.199 --> 00:56:23.280 this situation you're in. People who are worried about that will need to blame 632 00:56:23.800 --> 00:56:31.840 sources closer to home. And also, I don't think that having non US 633 00:56:31.920 --> 00:56:38.400 partners and shipbuilding as a problem. I've often said that we as an alliance, 634 00:56:38.800 --> 00:56:44.320 as a network of allies and partners, should be doing a lot more 635 00:56:44.400 --> 00:56:47.920 to augment each other's defense industries. I think there's a lot of economies of 636 00:56:47.960 --> 00:56:52.679 scale. I think there's a lot of partnerships that could be really fruitful in 637 00:56:52.760 --> 00:56:58.400 terms of new technologies, new ways of building things, new automation, all 638 00:56:58.400 --> 00:57:02.440 of these things. We should be sharing those between ourselves as friends. We 639 00:57:02.440 --> 00:57:08.440 should be friendshoring defense production, because if we stick with our kind of autaric 640 00:57:08.719 --> 00:57:15.079 blinked view that every single piece of equipment that a military uses must be produced 641 00:57:15.840 --> 00:57:21.639 in that country, it just doesn't work. And although shit building is a 642 00:57:21.760 --> 00:57:29.639 very obvious production line and it's something that's very totemic in terms of defense production, 643 00:57:30.239 --> 00:57:34.199 I don't think that should be blanked off from having this kind of input 644 00:57:34.239 --> 00:57:37.519 from overseas. And I think it will actually be really really healthy for the 645 00:57:37.599 --> 00:57:43.119 US defence industry to have someone come in from the outside and just injects a 646 00:57:43.119 --> 00:57:46.239 little bit of life back into it. You know. Yeah, But we 647 00:57:46.320 --> 00:57:53.000 go back to the investment the need for short term gain that we place on 648 00:57:53.039 --> 00:57:58.079 our industries internally. I mean, you know, it's hard to run a 649 00:57:58.079 --> 00:58:01.639 company with your shareholders of demand and you pay dividends and all that, and 650 00:58:01.639 --> 00:58:07.800 they want they want their investments right away, and our way of funding defense 651 00:58:08.039 --> 00:58:12.599 isn't necessarily conducive to that. And also, you know, when we get 652 00:58:12.719 --> 00:58:15.960 the other thing is we get something like the Constellation class free it, which 653 00:58:16.239 --> 00:58:20.920 you know, we're buying a known design, and then we then we take 654 00:58:20.960 --> 00:58:23.519 it and rearrange it. Now we're going to have none of these things for 655 00:58:23.559 --> 00:58:29.320 a while because we've managed to screw up another, yet another existing designs. 656 00:58:29.480 --> 00:58:34.000 I mean, does that kind of thing bother you as a as a person 657 00:58:34.039 --> 00:58:39.760 looking at the industrial system the way defense industry in the US. So when 658 00:58:39.800 --> 00:58:45.960 I was first looking at the Constellation, I thought, this is a really 659 00:58:46.000 --> 00:58:52.639 really good idea to use the FREM design, and I thought, I wonder 660 00:58:52.719 --> 00:59:01.480 how they are going to mess this up? And you did, even with 661 00:59:02.039 --> 00:59:06.880 a I mean, that's like a home run right there, and you still 662 00:59:07.519 --> 00:59:13.800 manage to not do it well. And it just speaks to some really systemic 663 00:59:13.960 --> 00:59:21.719 issues that even with a spectacular design like the frame for the Constellation, I 664 00:59:21.719 --> 00:59:28.400 mean, it's still it's still not working. And you know, part of 665 00:59:28.440 --> 00:59:32.519 me kind of wants to throw my hands up and just kind of curse loudly 666 00:59:32.599 --> 00:59:37.960 and stop thinking about US shipbuilding. But that's really not in the interests of 667 00:59:38.000 --> 00:59:44.199 my nation to not be supported by a strong and vibrant US Navy. So 668 00:59:44.280 --> 00:59:50.079 I will keep hacking away at it, but it is very frustrating. Well, 669 00:59:50.079 --> 00:59:57.679 that's usually there's a nationalistic defense one comes to. But that's that's fair. 670 00:59:58.239 --> 01:00:01.480 We did. I was like you, and it's the written record, 671 01:00:01.519 --> 01:00:06.840 is there eve before they selected from I was like, take the Frams proven 672 01:00:06.880 --> 01:00:09.719 to design. The French and the Italians have given you a couple of different 673 01:00:09.760 --> 01:00:15.280 ideas. Let's just print that sucker on metric and let's get some holes in 674 01:00:15.320 --> 01:00:21.519 the water. And no, I guess, I guess nobody wants the easy 675 01:00:21.559 --> 01:00:24.199 button around here. Well, Emma, we've kept you for an hour and 676 01:00:24.280 --> 01:00:28.719 out, just what a great time. It's great to talk with you. 677 01:00:29.920 --> 01:00:32.440 I know a lot of our listeners are wondering the same thing that we are. 678 01:00:32.920 --> 01:00:36.239 Obviously, we know how to keep track of you. But if people 679 01:00:36.360 --> 01:00:42.039 are new to the good doctor Emma Salisbury, where's the best place for him 680 01:00:42.039 --> 01:00:45.440 to keep track of you? And what are some of the projects you're working 681 01:00:45.480 --> 01:00:49.880 on right now that people can look forward to as the best place to connect 682 01:00:49.880 --> 01:00:54.880 with me is on x or Twitter. I'm at saulsbot S A L S 683 01:00:55.039 --> 01:01:00.639 b O T. And there's a link to my website and my bio with 684 01:01:00.840 --> 01:01:06.639 lots of more publications. I'm currently so I just finished the paper I mentioned 685 01:01:06.719 --> 01:01:10.800 on the Royal Navy lethality issue. I'm now writing another one on the Chinese. 686 01:01:10.880 --> 01:01:16.599 Maybe. I've got some other projects, smaller projects coming up that would 687 01:01:16.800 --> 01:01:21.559 be published soon. But yeah, the big ones are the Royal Navy and 688 01:01:21.599 --> 01:01:25.679 the Chinese Maybe perfect. Really look forward to it. And thanks again for 689 01:01:25.760 --> 01:01:30.400 joining us today. I appreciate it. It was awesome. Thank you. 690 01:01:31.000 --> 01:01:34.840 Yeah, I mean it's been it's been awesome. Thank you very much, 691 01:01:35.920 --> 01:01:39.320 and thank you very much everybody for joining us for another edition of mid Rats. 692 01:01:39.320 --> 01:01:42.960 And until next time, we hope you have a great Navy day. 693 01:01:43.559 --> 01:02:01.960 Cheers Mike one, don't marry me and live for you being to blame for 694 01:02:02.320 --> 01:02:14.800 long all me said faulting your the tame. It's a long way to dimperary. 695 01:02:15.880 --> 01:02:22.440 It's a long way to go. It's a long way to dipper, 696 01:02:22.639 --> 01:02:36.800 really, to between gorb becond a farewell, listen, well, it's a 697 01:02:36.960 --> 01:02:43.320 long long way to disperate. But my wi, my d