M S s SS, spending the most says really a most lives. I
love spas, loves little space, the spand spend the span new All right,
what's up? What come everybody? More of the stupid nonsense. So
we're gonna do. I'm gonna play these clips or eight clip and for the
benefit of the audience, because most people are not familiar with Tomism, they're
not familiar with a lot of these sort of scholastic nuances. I will be
briefly pausing here and there to give the references and the sources to their various
papers that I am referring to. So there's a couple of places where I
want to pull up the Bradshaw book for you guys, or the text for
you guys. This is not his book, airs Al Easton West. It's
his paper from an Alogia Journal. It's the concept of divine energies, which
I think you have to get. No, it's essence energy, what kind
of distinction? That's it. It's a separate paper. But I'm I'm trying
to find the PDF link. What because the first part of our discussion is
about cat epanoia, which you actually ended up agreeing on here. It is
Okay, So I just want this link ready for you guys, so I
can give it to you in the YouTube chat. It's one of those websites,
but it's you can tell it. It's like it's a legit link.
I've done loaded it many times. So I'll just tritt a bunch of coffee.
So that's why I'm all acting weird. Here is the ink for the
Bradshaw paper that comes up pretty early in the discussion, and you know,
Bradshaw goes into the different levels of later Latin types of distinctions, but really
none of this he's even that controversial, because we actually ended up agreeing for
the first fifteen minutes of this discussion on these points. So here is that
link. There it is, and what we're gonna do is it's not a
very long clip. I'm gonna play the clip. I'm gonna explain some of
the ideas and topics and what he was saying. And as you'll see,
for about the first ten to fifteen minutes, we basically just agreed because he
was stating the Thomas position, and this actually shows that we're on the same
page. And what I've been saying Tomasm says for many years is actually correct.
So I don't think he had the intention of demonstrating that I did accurately
understand the Thomas position. But when we go through the these points, it
actually does show that. So it's fine for the first fifteen minutes, and
then it turns into discussion about the divine ideas and the actualization of those ideas
and pure act, and he tries to pull from some distinctions and acquaint us
in an Aristotle relating to imminent action and transient action, which don't do the
work that he thinks it does. And we're going to show that that imminent
activity and transient activity are a type of distinction that can be made. But
the problem is not does Tomism claim that. So one thing that we'll notice,
and this is my perpetual criticism of Tomism, is that quite often,
not in every case, but quite often Tomism thinks that if you just keep
stating and fleshing out the position, that that constitutes an argument. And as
we'll see, as we progress through the discussion, and as he unfolds more
and more the Tomas position, it's not addressing the objection that's being made.
He keeps adding new distinctions, and he adds new things like the difference between
an imminent action and a transient action. But that doesn't answer the question of
when the fact that the divine ideas are synonymous with the divine essence and thus
necessary to just say, well, but God is a personal being with will,
and so he can will to actualize whatever he wants. I understand,
we understand that that is the Tomas position. I know that you guys confess
that God has a will. I know that you don't believe that creation is
necessary. I know that you don't want to affirm what the modal collapse arguments
say. We know that, But the question is not do you have a
position that says that God has free will? The question is is that consistent
with what you've said over here? Those are two different things, and so
so often because the way of the way that Thomas think about argumentation and the
way they think about systems, they actually mistake the argument for the position with
laying out the position. And that's what we're gonna see. So I'll go
ahead and start it. I think a lot of you are going to be
really disappointed. You were gonna be all hyped up thinking that this was some
like big gotcha and it's nothing. And the reason that I left the discussion
was because it got to the point where I'd asked the same question about three
or four times and he and I said, this is all just bullshit,
dude, I'm talking about the discussion and he got all butt hurt about it
and said, what are you talking to me? It's such a way to
its supped to be. It wasn't an insult. It just said the conversation
is bullshit. Okay, that's not a personal insult on you. And so
if it's at that point where it's like and then what's the point? So
here we go. We'll play it and uh, this is there's so much
of hubble over nothing basically right here. Okay, So we're gonna have a
discussion today with Fanatic Tomas on the topic of distinctions in God, the processions
or generation and so forth, the energies, what his views are, what
our views are. So now that we're recording, I'll let him go ahead
and make his make his points. Yeah, so hi everyone on Fanatic Tomas.
You guys already know me from Twitter. My ad is schlastic Kicks.
So the reason I agree to do this discussion with Chase because it's so hard
to do a discussion on Twitter it's or limited characters, so it's fitter to
have a yeah DC chat. So anyways, my I'm a Tomas and I
take to classical Thomas position on the mine attributes the vine essence and the things
of person the essence. So my position is that there is a minor virtual
distinction between the divine attributes to divine essence and between the persons and the divine
issse. However, there is a major real distinction between the divine persons themselves.
So the Father is really distinct from the Sun because by the virtue of
the real production as beginner to the begotten, and the same applies to the
spirit aspirator aspiated. Now, the way the hash out this distinction is that
the minor virtual distinction is a logical distinctional rational distinction. It's called distinct your
atsioni's. But this distinction is not purely mental. So there's a difference between
a purely mental distinction and virtual distinction. The purely mental distinction is only on
the part of our intellect, whereas the virtual distinction is both on the part
of our intellect and on the part of the thing itself insofar as the thing
itself, in its richness, has the virtue or power. That's why it's
all the virtual distinction. It doesn't power are present itself to your mind through
different aspects to An example of this would be rationality and animality. So rationality
and animality are are not really distinct because man is rational and animal by one
and the same entity. But just because you have animality, it doesn't mean
that you have rationality, So you can have one without the other. But
the converse does not all true. Now it's called a mid major ritual distinction
because you have animality and you have rationality, but animality does not include rationality
necessarily. There's another kind of distinction called minor virtual distinction. This is called
minor virtual distinction because it's not after the manner of excluding and excluded, like
rational animal, but implicit and explicit insofar as concept of attributes implicitly include each
other. So we can give the example of transcendentals. Each of them implicitly
include the other. So for example, truth and being ends veritas, those
are Yeah, so I forgot it. I didn't notice that that was muted
because I was playing the clip. Yeah, I apologize for guys. I'll
just kind of add that in later the audio part. But basically what I
was saying in summation is that everything that's going on here is not that controversial.
We pretty much agree he's when he's talking about the minor virtual distinctions.
He's talking about how at Hoomis conceives of the attributes as all basically in reality
identical and synonymous, but in our conception we make distinctions. Right. So
he says that a minor virtual distinction does have some basis in the thing itself
in reality, but it's not telling you ontologically what that thing is like.
It's only telling you to use this phrase. It's looking to propose that to
the mind, and then the mind, as he phrases it, struggles to
capture this reality of God's unity in a bunch of conceptual distinctions. Right.
So that's what he means by a minor virtual distinction. And why is that
Because all of the attributes are actually in reality synonymous with the divine essence and
reducible to the divine essence. So in this debate, this is actually called
identity thesis. And what I was saying a minute ago was that the major
real distinction is what he believes about the persons, right, the Tomas position
believes that the persons in the triad are major real distinctions. We believe that
that's not controversial. We agree with that. We don't affirm this. And
this is the point. When Basil argues that the energies are just as distinct
as the persons in the triad, then it's it's just as real for the
energies. And so the later scholastic distinctions that come up in the Middle Ages
that in the Bradshaw text that I linked you, they're they're not that relevant
for the Kappa nocean distinctions. And basically in Tomasm, we don't have a
problem with this, except that the attributes can't be This is what we're gonna
say. We would hold the real distinction or what they're calling a major real
distinction also for the energies you see, and not just the energies amongst themselves,
but also the energies as distinct from the essence. And I've got to
press him on those points, but I hopefully hopefully we're seeing that right now.
He's just laying out the Tumas position, and I agree with him,
and what this demonstrates is that I've accurately understood and present the Tumas position.
There wasn't misunderstanding. There wasn't me trying to be deceptive. In the history
of these discussions, if you go back to the debate or the discussion that
I have with classical theists, I mean, we basically had this same structure,
right, We had me saying that the Thomas conception of the attributes is
conceptual, but it's not the position of the Cappadocians, right, because the
Cappadocians think that the distinction in the energies is just as quote real as a
distinction between the hypostasies. So there's a departure, there's a difference in this
view, and we'll let him continue here implicitly include each other. And this
is a kind of distinction that if you paus it between the divine attributes and
the dvine essence and among the attributes himsell and between the person is in the
essence. So so this twofold foundation is first on the part of the think
itself, insofar as the divine essence, in its supreme eminence and simplicity becaussesses
all these perfections, not as really distinct attributes, but has one, so
so there he's stating this that the reality of the divine essence is beyond our
comprehension, and so the various attributes cannot in reality be distinct realities. The
Palamite synods actually use that terminology to contrast themselves to Tomism when the toe most
defines it as distinct realities. The reality that is Providence is not and cannot
be identical to the reality that is love or the reality of this glory and
God. That's the real distinction or what they're calling a major real distinction.
So again when it comes to hypostases, we all agree major real distinction.
Cappadocians call that a real distinction. Cat Epanoia is referring to that in Basil's
uses, because cat ipanoia, for Basil is not strictly always purely conceptual.
Sometimes it refers to something conceptual and real at the same time. And so
what the Thomas is calling the major distinction between the persons is equivalent to what
Basil talks about when he talks about a real distinction. What they're talking about
as pure cat epenoia or purely conceptual distinction is what they're calling their minor virtual
right. And that's only applicable to the divine attributes and actions because in God,
in Thomism, God is act as purists or pure act right, so
there's not potential, there's not unrealized capacity in God. God is purely second
actuality. And that will come up here in a moment. God is one
and God is powerful, and God is knowing game, God is feeling by
one and the same thing, which is a divine issies. But since the
objective, but you'll notice he made the statement there that the minor virtual distinction
is grounded in the thing. So the distinction is grounded in it, but
not actually ontologically present in it. It's only grounded in it in our conception
of it. You see, That's what's meant by minor virtual. But what
I press him on here in a moment is that, as Palamoss press barleym,
the distinctions then in those terms actually come to mean nothing. They're they're
only relative to human understanding and conceptual conceptualization, and thus we don't actually know
what foreknowledge is or what providence is different or distinct from love and glory if
they're just human conceptual categories and foreknowledge, and these things don't actually correspond to
realities. Then they're all basically blended together in the modal collapse point. So
I understand them. But you'll notice that as I keep pressing these points,
he doesn't addres rest that objection. He just states more of the tomistic positions
and views, never addressing the point form of concepts of these attitudes differ.
It has a foundation in the thing itself, but that foundation is potential,
and it's looking towards in mind to present itself or in other words, to
impose itselfable. So notice there that he said that the foundation of the minor
virtual distinction in God is looking really to impose that elsewhere in the human mind.
So it's not an act. It's not a distinction that's actually grounded in
the thing. So in other words, when we start listening divine attributes,
and this is the Palami critique, the divine attributes begin to lose their meaning
because they're in reality synonymous. But when I press them on this, you'll
see where he goes with it. So let's say that we have divine providence,
right, and we have glory, and we have love. Right,
here's some of divine attributes. The problem is that certain attributes only apply to
the created order, and the answer of the Thomas will be to simply restrict
these attributes to causal effects in the created order. But providence is not a
causal effect. Providence is an operation or action or energy or attribute of God.
But you'll notice as we as I press this issue and keep pressing it,
it keeps getting cashed out as Thomas always do as God cause and creature
effect, creature effect, never addressing the actual objection, which is that the
question is what is providence? Qua providence? I'm not asking you to tell
me that you think it's a cause and effect relation. I already know that
everything in Tomism, when it comes to these attributes then gets cashed out as
cause and effect. So when I ask him what is providence, he's going
to explain that that is something that is a it relates only to the created
order, and it's a created effect that is an eternal thing in the divine
mind. But that's not going to work because providence, love, glory,
and the divine ideas are not just capacities in the divine mind that God wills
or to not create. And why is that? Because the divine will is
synonymous with the divine essence, which he will call necessary. That's the key
point here. So I'm not asking him if he believes that God has a
will and that he chooses which reality he wants to actualize and create. I
know he believes that. The objection is that it's not consistent with the way
he's cashed out divine simplicit city and identifying and calling all the divine attributes synonymous.
Because if these words are to have any meaning, and we're going to
say that divine providence is also what eternal, because he's going to say that
all of these are also eternal, then how does God have divine providence as
a pure actual as a pure act Remember there's not a capacity, there's there's
no first actuality in God and tomism. Providence has to be actualized as an
attribute, just as much as glory or love is actualized, right because God
is pure act act as purists, and the problem is that he's that eternally
and so when we start listing different types of attributes. This goes back to
the area in debate with Saint Athanasius and the Arians the power of creating.
He's basically going to end up saying that the power of creating is an eternal
capacity, but it only is realized in the temporal effects. But God has
no capacities, and he says, yes, correct, God has no capacities.
All God's powers are realized because he believes in pure act God is pure
acts. So if he's pure act there's no potentiality, there's no capacities that
are not actualized, and hence God does not have first actuality. God is
pure second actuality, which is pure error, gone, pure work, pure
act Right do we see so far how this is working out? So I'm
going to start pressing him on, well, how can all of these be
synonymous and eternal? And then you're going to start restricting certain attributes to in
the divine mind. But if it's in the divine mind, then he doesn't
actualize all the potentialities are all all the possible worlds. Now, there's capacities
in God. And they'll say no, no, it doesn't work because there's
also imminence and transient and there's imminent acts and transitive acts. But as we're
going to say that, to talk about imminent actions and transitive actions transient actions
is not actually going to work either, because the divine ideas do not,
according to Quinas, relate to act in the same way as transient act does.
In fact, the divine ideas are just as eternal and necessary as everything
else in God. And so if the divine will is equivalent to the divine
essence, and is also equivalent to eternity, and is also equivalent to necessity,
which you will say, is God's a necessary being, and God's attributes
are also necessary, then the action of creating is necessary, which he says,
yes, but not in the effect. That's bypassing the issue. The
question was not do you think the effects are temporal? The question was the
act itself, the power of creating, to act to create. I know
that you think creation is temporal, but I'm asking about the action of creating,
which is not the same thing as the eternal manifestation of glory or love,
because one pertains to the created order and is relevant only to creation.
On that mind and then and the second foundation is the foundation on the part
of our intellect. So then we actually consider the object, that thing which
has the virtue or character presents itself, that actually presents itself, And now
mind captures that distinction. And so the first foundation is in the thing itself
and in the case of God, the divine necess and the second foundation is
on the part of our intellect, which is unable to grasp the simple,
single, simple entity by one concept, so has to consider it by various
concepts. I think that's enough. Yeah, And so none of that is
even controversial in regards to what Thomasm teaches, and it's what I've always said,
Thomas teach right. But by the way, God is not an absolutely
simple, single being. God is a triad, and he's known as triad.
God exists in the mode of triad, not in the mode of absolutely
simple monad. And anybody who knows the Cappadocians, and I mean the Trinitarian
theology of their communical counsels, would know that everything that he just stated there
about God is completely foreign to the Cappadocians and the way that they go about
Trinitarian theology. I have a question on that. So, when you're describing
the minor virtual and you said that the foundation in regard to the abtributes in
the thing itself, that it really is some type of distinction that looks to
impose itself on our minds, And I'm what exactly is the nature of the
distinction itself in that in your view? Make sure if the distinction you mean
bitter is his real or between say, providence and divine glory. Oh okay,
so between your providence and divine glory there exists and minor virtual distinction,
right, but yeah, which which has a foundation? The thing is said,
But there's a distinction God which has no foundation. And that's and he
says, which does have a basis in the thing itself. That's what I'm
concerned with that phrase, because the argument is that in minor virtual distinctions they're
only conceptual. Well, if they're only conceptual, there's not actually a justification
for claiming that. But it also has a basis in the thing itself,
because you don't actually know that these attributes match up to anything in the thing
itself. I know you're saying that. I know you believe it on the
basis of cause and effect. I know that. But the point is that
if all of these attributes are synonymous, then you don't really have a conception
of what they are in terms of their definitions. So providence is not actually
in reality different from glory, it's only different in our conceptions. And if
that's the case, then you can total all of these up and make them
come possible, and they don't tell you anything at all because they're interchangeable.
They don't necessarily match up to the being that is describing. That's Palomas's critique
against Barlam in the debate with the Barlamon. So I'm well aware that you
believe that these are minor virtual distinctions, and I'm well aware that you think
in human conception that we can talk about these in different ways, but it's
not addressing the actual question of how do you know that that matches up to
anything in God? Because all you know these things by are created effects.
In Tomism, all you know when it comes to providence, glory, divine
love is the created effect that signifies something quote grounded in that being beyond the
veil of the created effects. But how do you know, other than to
just restate Tomaism that love or glory is actually telling you something about God?
You don't. That's why Paloma says this leads to atheism because there's no direct
participation and real experience of the energies of love and glory. Remember in tomaism,
you are only experiencing various created effects. And if they are various created
effects which signify these realities, they're not actually realities plural they are a different
mode of being, which is a pure, single spiritual monad that does not
bear a similarity to the multiplicity of attributes. So wait a minute. If
it doesn't bear that similarity similarity, how do we know it. Oh,
because the effect bears a similarity to the cause. But that's just restating what's
in question. How do you know that the effect bears a similarity to the
cause. Oh, well, that's what Thomas says. You see, that's
what Aristotle says. Yeah, but I'm challenging on this view how you would
know that. You can assert that, but you've also asserted that the motive
existence of the divine essence does not correspond to this multiplicity reality. Furthermore,
we go back to the modal collapse question about creating, and I'm going to
keep pressing him on this show, and you'll see how he answers that.
Well, you'll see how he doesn't answer it in action. So, for
example, God's knowledge, God's acts of knowing have no our only purely mentally
sting right as God's knowledge and vil I understand that, yeah, yeah,
because that's that would be required by actors purist right, Yeah, because you
don't believe that God has so the humans have the power. Right. So
do we see that I'm agreeing when he states the temas position, So I've
understood the temas position. Yeah, yeah, so we agree. I mean,
I agree that I understand that your position holds that. Let's go back
though to that minor virtual because what I'm what I'm trying to understand from you
is sure what exactly you said? There is a foundation in the thing itself?
Yeah, and you listed two things. The third the first thing I
heard you say was it it looks to impose that on our minds, and
then secondly our mind captures it. So remember without assuming an analogia. But
remember God's essence, right, is not like creatures. How do we know
that the analogue loggia holds to the divine essence? Well, and if you
read Whipple, Whipple starts to give different examples from a quinas to show that
there's a similarity between the cause and the effect. He says, though there's
a divine ideas, and then he says, there's the principle that every effect
bears some similarity to its origin and to its cause. We wait a minute,
that's the thing in question, though, Now in the created order,
I guess that might make sense. A son gives rise to a father gives
rise to a son. Human being bears some analogy or some there's some similarity
between those two temporal causes. But in the way that Tomasm describes God's essence,
it is not like creatures. It is not temporal, It is not
changeable, it is not passable, it is not composed, it is not
acted upon, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. And so every way that it's
cashed out is actually opposite the created reality. So the question is, then,
if tomism is consistent with its view of simplicity, on what basis is
there a similarity or an analogia between the creative principle of love and the divine
essence is love because love is the divine essence And Thomas, what is the
reality? Oh, it's an analogia. Okay, so you're saying there's analogy,
but the way that you've cashed out divine simplicity and divine essence doesn't seem
to allow for analogy, because the mode of divine essence is not at all
like creatures and their multiplicity. So when you call these different names, you're
basically saying nothing about what's behind the created causal veil. It's a very simple
objection. I don't understand why Tomas have such a propt with this, and
their answer is to just repeat tomism that every effect has a similarity to its
cause. Every effect And it's like, I know you claim that, but
we want to know the argument to prove that. Well, it's just self
oathernent principle. Arosols better physics a self otheran principal. So you cite Ariostole
as the source exactly, But the question is, how do we know Aerostol
is right about it? Maybe it is right. I'm not saying it's wrong.
I actually do believe in the principle of cause and effect and that yeah,
an effect bears a similarity to its cause. But you can't move from
the created order of the similarity between a son and a father and then just
assume that, oh, well that holds in the uncreated supernatural realm as well.
I mean, on what basis does that hold? How do you know
because every way that you've cashed out God's attributes accent, simplicity, and Tomism
is opposite creatures. Well, if God has cashed out opposite creatures, and
I argue that he is intemism, how is their end? The loggia and
all of these arguments presuppose anialgiin now in the Orthodox view, because the divine
essence is not like creatures, bears no similarity to creatures. As Paul says
in Acts seventeen, how do we have the ability to predicate of God?
Well, Basil answers that, and Basil says that the energies come down to
us. And it's not just energies that are conceptual categories that allow us to
name God. It's the same energy that Dionysius talks about that we participate in.
They're not created realities. Divine glory is not a creature. When Jesus
said in John seventeen that he would make us partakers of the glory that he
had with the Father before the foundation of the world, that's not a created
reality. It's an uncreated reality. The Eucharist conveys to us uncreated grace and
energy. Tomism and Rome Catholicism do not believe that, and it's consistent with
their position on the attributes, because it's not just a question of how do
we list these attributes and conceive them as systematic theology in our mind, it's
a question of what are we participating in? Are we participating in uncreated glory
or a supernatural accident in the soul, as Little God says, as Roman
Callagdogma says. So the Roman Calic position is that grace is a supernatural creature
in the soul. So these are not just questions of God's relation to the
created order. There are questions of grace and salvation. And Roman Catholicism teaches
that grace strictly speaking, what you're participating in is it created reality. But
what is the nature of the distinction quad distinction the thing? And what is
that distinction that's that is in the object? In the object, So you
would see that the real virtual distinction is a real distinction, not in the
minor virtual What is the what is that? Yeah, I'm a destriving minor
ritual minor virtual distinction is a real distinction because it's exists in the thing itself.
What is the nature of that distinction. Yeah, yeah, he's asserting
that. I want to know how he knows that. How can he actually
say these things? Right? I know that's the Tumbus position. We understand
that that the attributes are minor virtual distinctions. I'm going to explain that it's
real listening in the thing it'sself, but it's not true as having diverse realities
contained in it. But yeah, which we already know. So he's again
just stating the thumbs position that in God providence, glory and love are not
actually distinct, They're only distinct in our conception. So so it's not okay,
So so it's not a diverse reality, so it's not. Yeah,
of course, minor virtual is essentially still conceptual. But you're saying that it
has a basis in the thing itself, but you can't but what is the
name? What is the basis in the thing itself? Yeah, the basis
is its eminent simplicity, which, oh, but wait a minute, So
the basis for the multiple attributes multiple at is the imminent simplicity. Imminent simplicity
is not like the diversity of the attributes, is it? So the thing
that I've asked him for the basis. You're saying that it does have an
origin in God. It does have an the many attributes has some point of
origin actually in God. But that point of origin is a radical simplicity that
is not like creatures and is not like distinct things. Because in Tomasm,
distinction entails composition and division. So I'm asking him a very precise question about
Wait a minute, you've said that there is some basis in the thing itself,
in God for these distinctions. I ask him what is it? He
says, the simplicity of God. That doesn't answer the question. Do you
see that the simplicity of God is not like the many things we're listing here,
So it's not grounded in that thing. And then he'll just start saying,
but it is, and let me define more Tomism for you. Okay,
So simplicity, though, is not a basis for distinction. Yeah.
Yeah, The basis is in the divine is which is simple. It contains
all these perfections. Oh wait a minute, the divine essence, which is
simple, contains these perfections plural. But the perfections plural are not actually in
the thing. Those are in our mind. So now he's going back and
forth again. You see it. So first he said the basis was the
absolute simplicity of God. Now he's saying it's the perfections plural, but it's
it can't be both, and he knows that. The question I'm asking is,
you're predicating multiplicity to something that contains no multiplicity. And you've already said
that that multiplicity only applies in human conception. But you said that it is
grounded in the thing. So saying that it's the thing basically amounts to saying
nothing, you see sist. Those perfections have a different object to formal concepts.
They cannot be identified in concept with each other. So there's a foundation
that things. I understand, so, but you said, but you said
so. Then he just goes back back to restating that they're not identical in
human conception. We know that. We've always known that. I've been saying
that for fifteen freaking years since I left a stupid system, And he just
reached again. You're gonna notice all these people who thought there was some big
own, Oh you got owned today. The whole discussion is this. It's
a big bugaboo of nothing and nothing ever getting answered. Now I give him
credit just in the fact that in the first ten to fifteen minutes, we're
basically just agreeing on what Thomism says. So I give him credit for just
accurately saying Tomism. That's great. Finally, finally we have Thomas. He's
not the only one, but finally we have Thomas who are accurately presenting Tomism.
What do we see? We are agreeing on what Tomasm says all the
way up until about maybe fifteen minutes in. So that means that I've accurately
been saying what Thomas em says. I'm at lied about Tomaism. You might
disagree with me, but I'm not intentionally trying to mis represent Thomas. I
actually have. These are the reasons why I don't believe the system anymore.
I quit believing it. I mean, there's many reasons, these are some
of the key reasons. So I keep pressing specific questions and they will not
be answered. You see, you'll see that in the thing itself there is
a basis for the distinction. But by basis, you're saying the basis is
in our head virtually right. No, No, there's a two fold basis
in the thing itself and in our online What is the nature of the base.
What is the nature of the basis of the thing itself? What is
the nature of the distinction that he says it's grounded in the thing, and
it impresses upon our mind. Our mind tries to grasp it. That's the
twofold basis. We understand, that's the position. And this is every discussion
with A Thomas. Everything just comes back to them restating the position twenty thirty
times. So when I leave, it's not because he stumped me. It's
because the same question goes on for the After about the fifteen minute mark,
it gets asked about three or four times, and since it's not going anywhere,
and he just keeps introducing things that don't answer the objection, I just
left. But I didn't just leave because of that. I left because he
got all butt hurt when I said that the conversation was BS. I didn't
say he was bullshit. I said the conversation is And then he acted like
he was all, Oh, you cushion at me, you hood my feeling.
Here are the here's the crusaders right with his with this uh not testosterone
based voice that he has of the distinction in itself and the thing itself.
I just told you what it's. It's yeah, it's the power the champ
present itself to them. So I asked him for the basis of the multiplicity
that he says is grounded in the thing, which is not really in the
thing. The distinctions are not really in God. Between the attributes, I
said, what is the basis for that? The power that it has to
press to present thisself to our minds, that is not a grounding. That's
just restating what you think it does in this causal scheme of cause and effect.
It's a causal relation of the created effects impressing upon our mind some similarity
to God as the cause. But it's not addressing the objection that how do
you know? And on what basis is it grounded in the thing? You're
just stating that. And at no point in this discussion, as it keeps,
the can will keep getting kicked down the road, at no point will
the objections that I'm giving your actual arguments that if then if you believe this,
then you should believe this. How do you? Oh? Thomasm says
this, Yeah, I know what your position says. Address the objection.
That's the power, that's that's something directed towards us, and you're saying that
it's in the thing itself. So this amounts to not not any kind of
distinction. He's going to repeat that it's a conceptual distinction. I know that
the point is that it's not telling us anything. It's not telling us anything.
To say that, well, it just there's a power in the thing
that impresses upon us. Yeah, but the power and the thing is singular.
Power is singular. These are plural, So the pluralities are not.
Actually, when we define these words love, glory, providence, the meanings
of those words is not synonymous, are they Can everyone understand this, Love
and glory and providence are not defined in the same way there, They have
different definitions. So if the definitions of those words are going to actually tell
us anything, they cannot be referring to something that is totally unlike that multiple
reality. Well, it's not totally unlike that. There's an analogia. That's
the thing that's in question. How do you know there's an analog gear without
just asserting it. And all of tomism, all of classical foundationalism, all
of this recitilient stuff is just based on those assertions that it is so,
and Father Deacon has a great paper where he points out that how do we
know that it's I mean, we understand that you're asserting these things, and
this is Palomas's objection to Barlan. Yeah, not so it's not a distinction
at all. No, it's a virtual distinction. I'm telling you that it's
not any distinction sense that you haven't. Yeah, that's not real by in
this, in the sense of when we delineate the attributes themselves. I know
what the position is. That's what I've always said the position is. So
the question then is would you then say that divine glory is identical to divine
providence. It's identical materially enough formally well, so wait, in God there's
material and formal distinctions. No, material and formal distinction is basically identity that
works and everything mad and everything. But hold on, material we're talking about
in God? Yeah, you can go matter informed did not apply to God
materiality inform matter. So he's avoiding he's beginning to avoid where I'm going with
us. Of course, So there's a material identity in God, which means
that identity in reality, but there's not a formal identity meaning them So there's
a there's a conceptual distinction between divine glory and divine providence, but in reality,
in reality as a material identity is they're not right, That's what I'm
in. If you said that, then you're wrong, But you're right.
Yep. Yeah. Are they both eternal? The providence and glory? Providence
in so far as it's considered as an act of intellection and milition, yes,
insofar as it's concerned. Start introducing the distinction between something that's purely a
divine intellectual intellection versus something that's an actualized thing. But the problem is that
that's not what providence and the divine idea is equate to. Right, there's
no such thing as God having capacities or things in his mind that he doesn't
realize, because the divine ideas are synonymous with the divine essence. And I'll
show you that in the in the Semihar in a second execution. Oh so
God has not actualized all these capacities. No, Look, so did you
hear what he said there? Did you catch that? There is in the
divine mind providence as an intellection, but he does not necessarily execute divine providence.
Now wait a minute, but providence is a divine operation. It's not
a purely intellectual operation. Right, It's an attribute that he just said was
synonymous with these other attributes. But now he wants to introduce a distinction between
operations or actions that are imminent in God that are not equivalent to the external
effect or actualization. But that's bypassing and avoiding what the question is. The
question is about the energy operation, the operation, or the attribute itself,
and you can't have in the divine mind capacities that are unrealized. But that's
why I'm gonna start asking him questions about, well, wait a minute,
does God know about worlds that he didn't create? And he'll say yes,
and then I'll point out that, well, those should be actualized in there's
a capacity which is not actualized. God could have created a world without Thomas
Aquinas and he didn't do that. That's a potentiality. It's a capacity that
he didn't that he didn't. Actually, there's all kinds of capacities, and
so this is why we believe that God can possess first and second actuality.
But his position, as he will say as a Thomas, is that no,
God is only second actuality. Do you understand what first and second actuality
is. First actuality is a potentiality, a capacity to engage an activity that
is then the corresponding second actuality. Second actuality is the exercise of a function
and air gone a work, and the first actuality is the capacity or the
disposition to exercise that function. Bradshaw uses example that you might be familiar with
of I have the ability, for example, to let's say, ride a
bike, speak Spanish, and play guitar and do a live shame. I
have those capacities, those powers, but I'm not necessarily actualizing all of those
powers at once. For the thomast in God, God does not possess first
actuality because he cannot have any potentia, he cannot have any capacities that are
not actualized realized, because he has act as pure as pure act right.
So God is strictly speaking as he will say, second actuality. And they
think that it has to be that way because otherwise God is not perfect.
That's the only way that God could be perfect and have all the perfections.
And doctor bo Branson is some great talks critiquing and getting into a lot of
these ideas of perfection in the middle ages, and how it's kind of tied
up into presuppositions of metaphysics and metaphysical systems that are not necessarily justified. We
don't know necessarily that all of the Thomas metaphysics crib from Aristotle is necessarily the
case. That's why they're all foundationalists. And they just said, well,
it's self evidence. All the metaphysical things are first principles and they're self evident.
Then we'll build our theology on top of that. You know, the
Trinity is first, Triad is first. That's why John Damascus begins his systematic
theology with the triad. So remember, first, actuality is capacity that's not
necessarily engaged. And so I might will to ride my bike or to do
something else. That's because I'm a being with free will. I'm not.
There's nothing about me that necessitates that I actualize all of my capacities, or
all my potentialities, my all of my abilities. Right. They think that
if we say that about God, we're implying that God is imperfect and he's
like a creature. Well, now, wait a minute, you believe in
analyogists, so in certain ways he is like creatures. Supposedly, according to
you, but no, we believe that he he's like creatures also in the
ability to will or not to will, and the fact that he didn't actualize
all the possible worlds that he has knowledge of shows that there is capacity in
God. There is first actuality in God. He did not do the thing
that he could do. And when I bring this up, you're going to
see that he doesn't actually address this critique or this question. He agrees with
me that in the temus view, God is only second actuality, pure act
But when I press him on what that should mean, what that should lead
him to, what that implies, He restates things and uses analogies comparable to
the analogies that I gave, which don't actually help his case. As you'll
see, God there's always in second act The only thing that begins to exist
is the effect. God is always second act, second actuality. That's exactly
what you just heard me say. So you guys can see I'm not misrepresenting
anybody's position. That's what we've been saying for years. All right, we're
all in the same page here. He says God is only second actuality.
That means that there are no unrealized capacities potentialities. All potentialities must be realize
or actualized. So I just start asking him various questions about things that God
didn't do which you could do, and then he'll say no. But there's
internal actions in God versus external causal effects. So you see everything is cashed
out as the cause and effects scheme, right, But the questions are constantly
about not just that you're just assuming that it's a twofold diatic scheme of cause
and effect God world, right. The questions are about the specific attributes and
actions themselves create the power of creating. Qua creating which you identify as in
your system has to be identical to second act. Providence, love, glory
are all identicals to second act? And what is he gonna say when I
when I raise that objection, He's simply going to make a distinction between the
created effects and the uncreated cause, the pure act. That's not addressing the
objection. I know that you believe that, but it's it's it's bypassing.
It's missing the argument for the people in the chat. We're gonna open it
up here in a minute. There's not much more to this, but there's
a couple of maybe two more minutes. But yeah, we don't have a
problem saying that, whether it's palamass I've got the book right here. If
you look at Maximus is two hundred chapters. When he calls God pure act,
he's not saying the divine essence is pure act. In fact, the
first five pages of this book say that we can call God pure act in
his essence. We call God pure act in contrast to creation. So unlike
creatures, right, God is not composed of parts. God is not a
material being. God is not in time. God is not changeable. He
doesn't undergo change in his essence. He's impassable. Right. Those are the
things that Maximus says that we can say about God in contrast to creatures.
Maximus also says that, however, when we call God pure act, it
is not a statement of what he is in his essence, and he is
not reducible to that. The very five pages of this are an explicit rejection
of saying that essence and act are the same in God. The two hundred
chapters, first five pages literally says that. And why am I saying that
about Maximus, Because that's the word our position. It's the exact same thing
that we say. So when John Damascus says we can talk about God is
pure act, he says it in trastic creatures. He's not saying that that's
the definition or what the identity of the divine essences. So Thomas take the
statements about God's true act, which we agree with, and they say that
God's essence is reducible to that. That's an identity thesis view. Peter Lombard
the identity thesis view. God is reducible to the predicates that you say of
him, but he actualizes all capacities, meaning that he has meaning that there's
no distinction between first and second act and God in your view, what do
you mean by for sen second dact? Because whatever he just agreed, God
is second act. So he knows what I mean by first and second act
means what you just said, But it's always you said, He's always in
second actuality. Yeah, first actuality is at second actuality is the actual So
I asked him that he already said it, and then he agreed with it.
But he says, what do you mean by that? He knows what
I means first and second act to sure? Sure? So act is active
power? Right right? Yeah? Right? Kind of capacity. Yeah sure,
yeah, sure sure. So the second act is action ractualization of death
act. So first act is a capacity. Second act is the actuality corresponding
to capacity. You see. So that's the difference between me actually riding the
bike and me having the capacity or the power to ride the bike. Right,
Donna miss actual power actuality first act, second act, second act is
the work the air gone. In the Roman calittimistic scheme, God is strictly
and solely defined as pure act second act. Do we need to read phaser
for you, guys? But it's not even This isn't controversial. God is
absolutely pure act with no let's read phase. Turning to the divisions of act
or actuality, the first distinction is between a pure act and a mixed act.
Act as purists or act utterly unmixed with any potential. Is the core
philosophy of the scholastic conception of God. Everything else is act in some way
mixed with potency. Only God is pure act with no potency. And so
he goes on to talk about combining these senses as an expay is forty one.
This is what we mean by doing amiss right and a Greek Combining these
senses. A man's having a substantial form a rational animal is first actuality.
Is having the power of speech is second actuality relative to that first actuality.
Having the power of speech, however, itself, is first actuality if it's
relative to the actual exercise of that power. So I might have the ability
to speak, that's first act When I speak right now, that's second act
I'm actualizing a capacity of power that I have. Roman Catholicism does not believe
that God possesses first actuality because they think that that would mean God's a creature,
imperfect and so forth. We believe that for God to have free will,
he must have that as well. God does not have to exercise all
of his powers or all of his abilities, and in fact, every time
he does a specific action in history, and by the way, the divine
energies actually are in history when it's Christ walking on water, that's a divine
energy and action in history and time and space. Roman Caloics don't think that
divine divinity can actually be in time and space, so they don't actually consistently
believe in the incarnation. Because if God is strictly speaking, pure act then
the second hypostasis, the second person of Godhead can't actually be in time and
space doing different actions. You see their act as purists would compromise the reality
of the incarnation, and it actually does. Now. If I were to
say that to it Thomas, the first thing they would say is, we
believe in the incarnation. Thomas believes that the second person, the Trinity,
became incarnate. I know that the objection is not do you believe that the
objection is is it consistent with what you've already said? This is a different
argument, And you tell them that blows past them. They're just going to
recite to you what Thomas's position is about the incarnation, which we agree with.
Yeah, we agree the second hypostasis became incarnate. What we're saying is
that if God is reducible to pure act, and his actions aren't reducible to
pure act, and they're only conceptually distinct, then Jesus walking on water is
only conceptually distinct from the conflagration. That's dumb. Clearly, the creating of
the world is a divine power and action that is not purely a created effect.
The power of creating is not created. The power of creating is not
a created effect. But in their system it is because everything collapses into the
twofold scheme of God's cause created effect. But the power of creating itself is
not an effect. It's something God possesses. And God didn't have to create
the world. So God had the capacity to create the world and chose to
create the world first actuality, second actuality. And as we progress through this
conversation, he will consistently attempt to give analogies, an attempt to say things
that try to allow for God willing certain realities to come to be, certain
things to come to be. But that's not consistent with defining God as only
second act And we've been hammering this for so long, and all he does
is keep stating other Tomastic views and positions to try to make it work.
Right, pure, Yeah, exactly right. So I'm glad that he agreed
that pure actual means God's will. The reasons say from that, right,
we agree that. Okay, I don't, that's not my position, but
that's no I know, that's what I understand the Tomust position to it.
It's not controversial. We've all we've been saying this whole Well, yes,
so there's no no unactualized capacities in God, right, yeah, because up
there we go, there's no unactualized capacities. And when I start talking about
specific things that only makes sense in regard to the created order. He will
attempt to introduce a distinction between the mental conception in God, in the divine
mind of the created order, and the internal mental providence and the execution of
that at extra. That's not what providence is. And by the way,
there's not actually a distinction at intra at extra if God is reducible to pure
act. You see. In other words, it just keeps begging the question
because if you say, well, God's reducible to pure act, but there
are imminent divine ideas by which he can choose to create this or that,
that's not consistent with what he just said. He just said God is second
act with no unrealized capacities, and that's where he really begins to shoot himself
in the foot. He would be imperfect Niste. Yeah, yeah, okay,
So divine providence is not eternally actualized, or is it? Insofar as
it is an intitative act. It's always eternal in so far as there's an
execution of effect. Notes. So now he's introduced to inction that divine providence
is an imminent, intative act, but it's not executed forever. So now
he's introduced two types of acts in God, acts that actually externally cause their
effect and acts that are internal and intaitive in God. Right, But remember,
how are we actually having all these different types of distinctions in God?
That all of the naming ultimately comes from predicates that are not actually matching up
to the referent because when we talk about providence, school or or love or
the power of creating, those are only virtually in our mind. If they
were consistent, I could go on to say that, but the same way
that you know that the persons are distinct is the same way that you know
the attributes. So you don't really have a basis to say that the distinction
between the persons is a major, real distinction versus minor virtual distinctions of attributes.
You can claim that, but you're introducing all of these levels into God,
which in reality don't exist in God unless we assume your system in your
position. But that's the thing in question. And so the same methodology by
which he's going to say that the divine attributes signify a synonymous reality in the
thing itself, but in our minds are multiple. I can turn that around
and say, why wouldn't it be the same thing for the divine persons.
I know that you believe there's a major real attribute. I'm just getting you
to try to tell me on what basis should I accept that you have an
actual adjudication between major real and minor virtual. Do you understand that this is
just begging the question to introduce another type of distinction. Oh well, but
there's these these well they're not really in God except for the major real ones.
You see, it's just question begging. So you can layer on all
of these different scholastic distinctions. But remember, at the base of it,
all of these are known in the same way, which is by created analogia.
But how do we know that the created analogia when we predicate about the
major really accurately matches up to the persons, versus when we do the minor
virtual that it doesn't actually match up in reality? You see, it's all
arbitrary. That's why I will start saying to him that the more distinctions that
attacks on are arbitrary, and all he will ever do is just state the
thumbus position over and over and over. And remember, now we've got other
levels of distinctions, major minor. So remember we've got major minor, begging
the question that major and minor. Wait a minute, how do I know
that that matches up? Because this is major and minor are actually the supercategory,
or the more fundamental category by which to parse out names that apply that
are minor virtual and names that apply that are major real like hypostases. Do
you understand that to keep stacking on these distinctions. I know he thinks that
that's helping the system work, but all it's really doing is piling on more
question begging, kicking the can down the road problems. And he they never
get what you're asking. They never get this objection. And then when you
say you're not addressing the objection, he'll say, I am addressing it by
giving you more tomistic distinctions. But the distinctions beg the question, and aren't
ask answering my objection, which is very specifically and very precisely that the twofold
distinction between major and minor itself is the presupposition that you can't justify. How
do we know that you actually have the right list between the two, And
god, well, it must be by a necessity and because I conside Aristotle
blah blah blah blah blah. Oh, how can you have the action of
divine providence but there's no execution of that act? Sure, so let me
give you an example of creation which will make it easier. So we have
creation. You believe that creation, consider it as an act? So he
will define creation by what. By the way, again, you're notice how
he's not going to answer the objection because my question was divine providence or the
action of create, the act of creating. I'm asking about that itself,
and he's just gonna say, well, the cause is eternal God, the
effect is temporal creation. No, no, that's not the question. That
is eternal so God never began. That's that's not true. Yeah. No,
I'm seeing my position right, And I'm saying that that's not biblical theology
because I'm saying that if you're considered that it would lead to eternal creation,
it would lead to the originous position. Okay, you can't think that,
and I'm disagreeing. I'm just laying out my position. I thought you were
here to lay out to our position. I'm listening, Okay, So creative
action considered as an action is eternal. Considered in its termination is created.
Action considered in its action is eternal. Notice he said that creative action in
God. Okay, how does God act to create? But it doesn't eternally
affect that action? Yeah? Sure so, because God's alitional agent. Remember
creative acting, the action to create is eternal. And what you're going to
notice is that as he fleshes this out, the words themselves no longer have
the meaning that they mean, right, because he's going to bypass the actual
meaning of the word. The action to create is eternal. That's an eternal
action according to him, and it has to be if God is defined as
second actuality. And then he'll say that the termination of this eternal act is
temporal creation finite. So that's just the creaturely effect. But now wait a
minute. Do you notice what's happened here? And this is the only reason
they're doing this is because they want to try to believe in creation. X
nelo. I understand Roman Catholics in Thomas that you, like us, we
all affirm creation, x nelo. The problem is that this is not consistent.
I know you believe this in creation, x neilo, but you just
said that the action to create is eternal. If this word has any meaning,
if it's an eternal action, then what comes forth, what it corresponds
to, must also be eternal or else this no longer has meaning. And
actually, in Thomasm the words, as we begin to see, they lose
their meaning. This doesn't actually mean this anymore because it's all cashed out in
the twofold scheme of cause and effect, eternal cause, created effect. We're
not asking do you believe in a created effect? We're asking on what basis
is it consistent to say that the effect is created in temporal when the action
is not created in temporal. And he's going to say that the mine will,
but the divine will is just as eternal and necessary as this as he
will say, and that's why I keep saying. Then therefore it doesn't answer
the objection, and he just keeps restating it. And volitional agent determines not
only the conditions of the effect, but also it's time. So because God
is a volitional agent. Yeah, I know you believe that there's a divine
will. I'm not asking you if you believe that, I'm asking you how
it's consistent that there's an eternal action of creation, but the effect is temporal
because God only wills it to be temporal. Then this does not mean what
you think of me is Now there's a distinction between the eternal actions in God,
which are from all eternity, and the actions that he exercises towards the
created order, which are not eternal, namely the power of creating. Now,
why do you think Roman Catholics, as Palamas said to barleyam God wrested
from his works on the seventh day? Does that sound like the power of
creating is an eternal action? So you don't actually believe God rested from his
works on the seventh day. And if you read Augustine, because of his
neo Platinian platinus neo Platonic doctrine of the monad in confessions, he struggles with
this. He says, I don't understand how we could say God rests from
his act of creating on the seventh day. God rested. That means he
did not continue the act of creating. And all they ever do to answer
this objection it's and it's not an answer is to say the effects are temporal
and created. I know that we know that's your position, man, But
it's not answering the objection, and you'll see that it doesn't. So God's
from only turn into you ill, is that this effect takes place like let's
see in two thousand. Yeah, but you're just now he's saying that God's
will imposes that the eternal act of creating is only a temporal effect. That's
nonsense. Now you've introduced new layers of distinctions which don't match up. And
I hope Father Deacons able to come on here in a little bit because we're
almost getting to the end here. That's not answering the question. That's just
stating the difference between eternity and time, and that you think that there's cause
and effect. I'm asking how it's possible in the metaphysical scheme to be consistent
to say that there's an eternal realization of providence that doesn't have an eternal corresponding.
What corresponds to that? So the effect should be just as eternal as
the cause. And their answer is that, well, God doesn't will it
to be. Yeah, but God's will is identical to his essence. God's
will is identical to his eternity. God's will is identical to Providence in their
view. No, no, dislets your confusing realization in so far, I
know you make that distinction, but it doesn't because now providence doesn't make any
sense because you've equated providence with divine glory and all these other attributes. So
again, remember he wants a different meaning for the creative power, but he's
also defined the creative power as identical to the other attributes like glory and love.
Remember that they're only conceptually distinct. Well, they're only conceptually distinct.
Then they really don't do us any good because we don't know if it's actually
matching up to the thing itself, and the prior distinction itself has to be
true to know if you can distinguish major real and minor virtual. Father de
you can. I hope you're hearing this and that you can comment on this
in a minute. Okay, okay, So you think that God did until
he'sn't have a plan before creating. Now he's switching it over to the divine
plan for the created order, which, yeah, we all believe that God
has in the divine mind, the divine ideas. This is why Saint Maximus
calls them the thought wills and they are not the divine essence. Saint or
Thomas Aquinas believes that divine ideas are the divine essence, and that is right
here in Suma question first one part first part, Question fifteen. I'll give
it in the chat for you. Right here you can see that for a
Quainas, the divine ideas are absolutely identical to and synonymous with the divine essence.
So the divine ideas are actually in that category that we mentioned earlier of
the major of the minor virtual distinct distinction. Again, just assuming that we
know that that's actually correct, right, the divine ideas are also part of
that category of things in God. Notice we're basically drawing out a giant algorithm
and list of planes and levels of existence in God, which Pallemism does as
well. But their system is saying that, well, these a lot.
Really this is all just deriving from human conceptual distinctions from analogia. Yeah,
exactly, so that it's not actually corresponding to realities in the thing itself,
which he's already admitted. And so if that's the case, then what he
just said, we don't even know if that holds up, because it's another
layer and level of distinction within God. And he's gonna tack on another one
here in a minute. The plan is not identical to the execution in your
exact In his system, the plan, the divine ideas are the divine essence.
Thomas says it right there for you in that Suma, in that section.
And it must be held that the divine ideas are many. But again
they're many as they impose themselves upon us. They're not many actually in the
Divine essence though so therefore, every creature has his own species, and in
likeness of degree to the divine essence, God knows his essence, and thereby
knows himself. By knowing his essence, the divine essence contains all of the
divine ideas. And by the way, Whipple in his book on the Suma,
uses this as one of the arguments for why there is analogia. But
again, remember it doesn't work to just say that, well, well,
there's analogia between creatures and God because of the divine ideas. Right that's Thomas
says that in that section. Okay, but how do we know that that's
the case? You see, because remember the mode of existence of the divine
ideas in the divine essence is not like creatures, but it's supposed to be
the blueprint and the pattern of the creatures. Well, creatures are really many.
Did you notice that? Do you notice that creatures are actually many?
They're not one? And so what their answer is that? Well, in
the divine mind, the mode of the existence, the divine ideas might seem
to us to be many, but it is actually one, and it is
the divine essence. Oh okay, then the divine ideas, which are the
patterns for the created order, are necessary and eternal. Therefore creation is necessary
and eternal. This is a Platonius turn. Do we see this? I
know that you don't believe creation is a necessary emanation. I'm saying that you
should say that if you were consistent, because you don't have the essence inery
distinction. It's not execution. But that's why you need a distinction between essence
and energy. No, it's a distinction of action and effect action. You
know. Remember now he's made a new distinct. So the action to create
is eternal, the effect is temporal. So God is eternally acting to create,
but willing that it only be temporal. Do you see that that doesn't
match up, it doesn't work. And remember that the action to create is
synonymous with glory and eternality and it's necessary. Remember he said that the attributes
are necessary, and he classed this attribute amongst them, the power creating,
because you've already defined the action of the buying, providence and creation as eternal.
Therefore the effect must be eternal as an act, not as an effect.
That considered as an act, God is eternally creating, but the effect
is temporal. I'm saying that's inconsistent the action. How does God eternally act
to create but there's not an eternal corresponding effect of that? Okay, are
you done? Yeah? So I remember God has no unrealized capacities, there's
no first act. God is pure second act. If God's is God's messence
necessary? Yeah, God's assness is necessary. Okay. So remember now he's
going even further into exactly what I hope they would say. So let's list
these attributes or these and these powers creating, glory, love, providence.
All are necessary, All are necessary? Is there the other attributes necessary?
Every ever we want to attributes are necessary? So every attribute of God and
power of God is necessary creating glory, love, providence, which are all
in reality synonymous, our nest necessary. How is that a God who creates
by free will. I'm not asking you if you contradict yourself tomist and then
turn around and believe in free will. I'm pointing out that that's not consistent.
You see two different arguments. I don't need you to tell me in
fifty other places that Aquaintas believes in creation Nextnilo. We all know that,
and that's why we keep saying that you're not addressing the objection. The objection
is that it's inconsistent to talk about creation by free will. We know you
believe that creating, glory, love, providence all are necessary. Creating is
necessary. If it's necessary, then it's not by God's free will that he
created. But everybody confesses that God freely created the world and not out of
any necessity. So you see where he's beginning to go with this, and
he's he's just going to keep tacking on more other Tomistic positions which don't address
the objection. Creating is necessary, Can ansider it as an act on the
part of God, be called it initatively necessary, primitively streets So now there's
different a new distinction. So intitatively it's necessary, but not in its effect
in its terminus. Right, so we have inentitative versus the terminus another distinction,
right. And I'm not mad that he's going to make these distinctions.
But my point is just that you can pile on all the distinctions you want
between entitative and the creative effect or what the what it terminates in this is
just another layer of something that we don't know that that's justified, you see.
So it's just piling on more distinctions that aren't addressing the objection. So
it's fine that you believe all those things we understand, but how do you
know that? I mean, is the entitative versus the the transitive and the
termative and all this that you're later going to talk about. How much categories
does that fit into? Are those major real? Are they minor? Virtual?
Distinctions? In gone that's o no, no, no, no,
no, yes, it is explain why you're just all you do is interjective
distinction. No distinction is inconsistent because that's if you don't want to hear our
positioned And why yet no, I understand that's the tumb of position. The
distinctions are just intended to try to rescue the position from necessary creation. Right,
that's what he's trying to rescue. It's ad hoc rescue. And so
you just come up with the distinction. Oh, well, the effect is
created, but the action is eternal. Well, then the action doesn't.
The meaning of that action no longer has any meaning. Eternal creating but temporal
effect. Why because God wills it to be that way. Yeah, but
the divine will is synonymous with the drine essence, and both are necessary.
Therefore creation's necessari And I've always understood that when I left it understood that's a
position. And I'm saying that's inconsistent. You're just saying that. You're just
saying, but the effect is created. You have a created effect of an
eternal action. Yeah, the action should just be the effect should be as
eternal as the act. No. Otherwise, the words creating a providence mean
nothing, They don't make any sense. That only follows if the action you
have to go okay, okay, okay, that can only fall. Yeah,
I agree that if there's an eternal action, there has to be an
eternal effect if the action is transient, But if you don't believe it.
But here we have another distinction that he's going to try to draw between imminent
acts and trent acts or transitive acts. Right. So, and we're gonna
see once again that how do we know that this distinction holds? And he's
gonna draw analogies from guess what, creation And the analogy that he's going to
give is very similar to Bradshaw's analogy. Right, the creation is a transitent
intection within them and intection. So because the tin of theemin intection remains in
the criminals of the emin intection is intrinsic action and there's no need for defect
to be positive in them and intection, you don't need to have any trinal
effect. Yeah, but creating is not an internal imminent action in God.
That's what's under dispute here. And so he's trying to retreat into the vine
ideas that God has a plan for the creative order. That's not addressing the
question. The question is not you can't escape it by saying that this is
an imminent action, right, because imminent action is not in the direct category
of action. The second actions are called transitory action or transit actions. Right.
And if you look this up, if you look into tomistic and Scholastic
theology. It doesn't rescue the objection because, first of all, imminent activity
in God is synonymous with the divine essence and is necessary. So even if
he tries to say this, it doesn't do anything for him. It's just
introducing another distinction to have God thinking about and knowing the divine plan of the
creative order versus God willing to exercise that. And that's why I'm going to
ask him. Yeah, but doesn't God have in his mind the knowledge up
doesn't even know all the possible worlds, and yet he doesn't actualize all of
them. So there's capacity in God in the case of transing detection because transingtection
necessarily proceeds from the agent to the patient. So if there's a transing pation,
now you've introduced a new distinction into God. Right, Yeah, of
course there's transient So he's introducing a distinction to get around the objection by saying
that there's imminent action in God and transient action that refers to the receiver of
the agent's action. Right, But this is all just questioning acts and there's
eternal acts. What are transit acts? No? No, no, no,
you believe that thought's action. So first let me define two. Yeah,
okay, I'm going to explain it. So the emin intaction, as
theirs thought explains in Metaphysics Books None, chapter eight, the emin intactions and
action whose terminus is in the agents. He gives the example of acts of
new Ingaenville, and Venue. Again, this doesn't work for God and the
created order because the point is that the divine ideas in the Divine mind are
eternal and are just as necessary as the divine nature because they're identified to the
in the divine Do you understand that they're identical to the divine essence, The
divine plan the create order is identical to the divine essence. Therefore, if
they're identicals, then they're also necessary. Therefore, the plan of the created
order necessitates an eternal creation that comes forth. So the originists and even Aristotle
on this point are more consistent because if you're saying that God is an eternal,
for example, actualizer, there must be something that he actualizes other than
himself. Right. If God has an eternal, necessary created order, then
he must exercise that. And he's already said the action of creating is eternal.
But they're saying, but the terminus, they're saying that the effect is
temporal. We know that, and we're saying that that is inconsistent because it's
a creation in time. It's a work that is specific in time. And
this is where they start to have problems with God being in time and space.
Baser says that God cannot be in time and space. He says that
in the chapter on the Plotinian argument for God's existence, he says, that's
a good argument we can borrow. We can use Plotinus's argument that God cannot
be in time and space because it would require him to change and undergo change.
Oh, good job undercutting the incarnation, because the incarnation is the second
hypostasis of the Godhead in time and space, really doing actions in time and
space, not just human actions, not just created effects, divine actions.
John Damascus says walking on water is a demonstration of a specific divine act,
a divine power in time and space. You know, saying Thomas can't say
that. Thomas have to say that everything Christ does in time and space is
a created effect because they believe it would compromise their doctrine of simplicity and their
doctrine of pure act and so all of this philosophy philosophizing undercuts the incarnation.
And remember, at the end of the day, Roman Catholicism is no longer
this scholastic tomistic thing that Internet nerds are all obsessed with. Roman Catholicism is
Francis. You can larp all day long that Roman Catholicism is medieval monastics and
some you know monastery somewhere snorting book dust all day long and writing vast tones
of thousands of pages. That doesn't exist anymore. You live in a fantasy
world. The reality is Francis in Rome. The reality is the Abu Dhabi
Faith Center. So we can get into all the weeds of all of this.
At the end of the day, this system failed, This system is
no longer held in Rome as the normative system. They don't care that Leo
the thirteenth said that scholastic Toomism is the official teacher. Francis doesn't care.
Francis just paid a document called the Alexandria Document, which concedes the orthodox critiques
of the papacy. Go read the Alexandria Document. That's the reality of Rome.
That's where your church really is. It doesn't exist in the fantasy world
of Internet and Thomas on the Internet and twenty year old guys in some other
country spurging out over this that doesn't exist in reality. It's Francis, that's
the reality. It's the assy meetings that are the reality. And all of
this is a distraction from that, because this stuff is not your church anymore.
This is medieval stuff. And you all know this, and this is
why you get so mad and play the gatcha game something the acts of knowing.
When Bill something, the acts of filling is in you, whereas there's
a transient action which is not in you but in the thing. It's in
the thing that is acted at possible. All he's stating is that the transient
action is the created order that receives the effect of being created right, that
receives the coming into being, and so forth, once again cashing everything out
as to cause and effect dual scheme, never addressing the specific objection, which
is about the power creating itself, always coming up with twofold distinctions intitative,
the terminus, the imminent, the internal, the external, recipient whatever.
None of that addresses all these dents, restating other Tomistic views of cashing things
out as cause and effect agent recipient not address. This doesn't address objection.
For example, if you build the house. Yeah, but the action of
creating is not attornings. All you're doing is inventing distinctions that don't answer the
question. You're just saying, oh, well, there's another distinction. There's
another distinction. I know that he's not literally himself inventing them. I'm saying
that the scholastic position invents distinctions to make systems work, and that's notorious for
scholasticism, and it only attracts these hyper spergy people who will eventually when they
figure out that their worldview in their church doesn't believe the stuff anymore, will
cause them to have a crisis of faiths. The distinctions are inconsistent with what
you're saying. So it's all you're doing. If you let me lay out
my position, you're nothing consistent. Laying out your position is just stating what
you think is the case. That doesn't make it consistent because it's not anti
So again I'm giving objections and he's saying, let me just keep laying out
the position. Laying out the position, let me lay out more of the
position. That's not an argument. We're already passed. We agree what Tomism
teaches, and so he's just let me, let me say more Tomism though
asking why it's a consistent but it's just inventing a new neo school. It's
a scholastic distinction to say, oh, well, the problem is resolved by
saying that there's two different types of acts, and it's all it's doing is
restating by saying there's a transitive versus a nontransitive act. It's restating the very
original question, which was, how is the action of God, which is
eternal directed towards creation, not affecting eternal creation? And you're saying, well,
because there's transitive action, there's imminent acts, right, That's what I'm
trying to explain. Any that distinction is just another kicking the candem. How
do we know that that distinction is actually in God? That's the point.
And he's just gonna lay out more Temism because again, how many distinctions have
we had? Now piled up a lot of them, and again maybe maybe
that isn't God, but you understand that it's an ad hoc rescue when you
pile them on and don't address what the objection is. The objection has been
consistently. The attributes are all identical, so we don't know if it's telling
us anything about the actual object. When we ask for that grounding in the
object, you said it's in the mind, and you said a bunch of
begging the question that, well, it's just the external object. God impresses
that upon our mind. There's a power that he possesses that impresses that upon
our minds. That's what we want to know. How do we know that
that's the case based on created analogs to these attributes, which are not actually
multiple, they're actually all just one. Do you see that it cancels out
the reality of those things does not correspond to what they are in our virtual
conception. The mode of their existence totally different. And so what's it all
based? Well, but there's an analogy between them? That's the how do
we know that that? You're just saying that on what basis do we match
that up? Given the way you cash out divine simplicity. That's never answered,
it's never addressed. They just brush past it. It doesn't answer the
objection. All they do is introduce new distinctions. You're saying you can invent
and distinction these distinctions all day long, but they don't answer the objection.
They do know they don't, so they just do do they answer? They
just do. It's adding on new distinctions in the system. Okay, So
I mean so if you just add another distinction, how does that answer the
question I'm trying to ask her, and you're just cutting me out. Like,
so, let's be clear about imminent activity, right, and you can
find different academic sites for this for the sake of the audience. Eminent activity
in the ristilianti mystic tradition is very precise. It is an activity that has
no product, and of itself is perfective of the agent that carries it on.
So it's an an internal sort of It doesn't I can think about and
he'll use the example, or he maybe he already did. Uh, you
know, in two years, I want to build a house. This does
not work. When you've already said that God is second act. There's no
such thing as a distinction between imminent activity that doesn't necessitate the actual effect.
The power of creating cannot be a purely eminent activity distinct from the external at
extra effect. Otherwise, God is not second act anymore, because what he's
wanting to introduce is that God can will to create or not. But remember
God's will is synonymous with the divine essence and is eternal and is necessary,
So every act is eternal unnecessary. But no, it's not. Because there's
imminent ones and then there's transitive external recipient ones. You're just inventing distinctions that
are not consistent with what you what you previously said, it's an ad hoc
rescue. Stating the system. You don't understand. It's not Thomas. You
guys think. You guys think that stating your system is an argument the system.
You don't understand. It's not Thomas. You guys think. You guys
think that stating your system. I hope that Father you can can come on
and talk about knowing the first cause what's better known by us versus what's known
in itself, because a lot of this pertains back to the Aristotelian principle that
undergirds a lot of Tomaism and undergirds the analogia. And Father Digga Duck right
now says a lot of good talks and works on that very very Tom We're
almost done. No, I'm not just taking my system. I'm proving getting
all all you having, so all he's done is state thomasm. And now
he's saying, I've proven my system. He didn't prove Jack. And this
is where I am starting to get annoyed because everything has been fine up until
not we've agreed, until I start to ask questions, I start to raise
objections, and he says, I'm proving my system. All you've done is
state your system. But this is how these people think. They literally think
that when you state tomaism, it's proving it all you have it. No,
I'm proving attain. You were saying, oh, you don't have a
response, and you think the proof is just stating new distinctions that don't answer
the question. It doesn't answer the question. How I'm telling you're not letting
me. I'm let him talk for the last twenty minutes. What do you
mean, I'm not letting him totally? Not. This is where it starts
to getting letting you talk. You've talked all the time. No, every
time I speak and say, oh, that's a new distinction list because it's
you think I didn't start interrupting and bumping into it. But until about seventeen
minutes into his thing, and by the way, he said after about five
minutes that I could talk anyway. I think that laying out a position is
an argument. That's not what an argument is. Yeah, but if I
don't lay out my position, how are you godn't know what my response is?
When are you going to address the objection? Because I've asked you the
same question like four times and you just keep I didn't answer your question.
I said, from any trinal action, it's not it's begging the question.
It's begging the question. You're just moving the can back and stuff by introducing
a new No. Yes, of course, because but look, each one
of the distinctions just he states the divide between God and world, cause and
effect. It's not addressing the objection. Yes, I'm interesting the objection.
No, you're not stating your possession addressing Jay Jay if my name, just
address the argument. Okay, what should I call you? You don't have
to repeat my name, just address the argument. Okay, Sorry, I'm
sorry. Okay. So I'm saying that from any trinal action, tnal effect
follows. If the action is formally transient, how are we granting and knowing
that the distinction between imminent and transient is the case. Again, he's just
stating that, well, there's these different types of things. You see another
another layer and level of distinction. Right, I want to know why should
we think that's the case, especially given all of the other things that have
been said, and what does he do just keep stating the position. I'm
saying that that that distinction is an ad hoc distinction. That doesn't I'm not
saying, by the way, when I when I call the distinction ad hoc,
I'm not saying that that's not a toomistic position, right, because if
you look up you know scholastic philosophy. Yeah, Thomas and Aerosol talk about
this. I'm saying that it's not functioning as he repeats this position to do
the work that he wants it to do. It's not answering my objection.
Okay, that's why it's at It's an ad hoc rescue against my argument.
I'm not saying that the Thomas don't believe this. I know that they do.
Okay, Okay, let's be give you an example. Suppose that I'll
pay attention to his example, because this is a key point where he makes
a big mistake. His example is not actually going to work to the question
of creating. He's going to use a creaturely example, which is very silar
two kinds of examples that Bradshaw is for first act and second act right,
and his example is not gonna work for what he wants it to do.
It doesn't correspond to God in creation punched the wall. Okay, can you
hear me? Yeah, you're punching off the wall and wall getting punched are
simultaneous, right, M. Yeah, So that's it. That's an example
of transin tections. So the cause and effect are simultaneous. M. And
then there's an action called emminenttection, such as active filing. You can able
to build a house like now, but you can actually build it like to
your boom. You hear that, let's hear it that repeat it, because
this is the capacity's first and second actuality argument. This is the point where
their position is not consistent. This is why I was hammering first and second
act earlier on, and he agreed earlier on that God is only second act
right exactly. Now he wants to use an analogy of a power in a
capacity that I don't have to actualize. This is where he messed up.
Let's repeat it. So that's an example of transintection, so the cause and
effect are simultaneous, and then there's an action called emminenttection, such as active
building. You can't able to build a house like now, but you can
actually build it like two years later. So it guess what, You just
shot yourself in the foot, because that is an example that requires first act
as a capacity and second actuality as an actualization. That doesn't exist in God.
According to you, that's when you messed up. The effect doesn't have
to follow just because you have an action in mind. Just because you want
to build the house, that doesn't mean you're actually going to Yeah, but
God doesn't as an analogy to God because God is pure No, it doesn't.
God is pure act. Therefore that analogy does not work. He used
a creaturely analogy of a capacity that I don't have to actualize. Earlier,
he said, God is pure act with no unrealized capacities, only second act.
And this is what you guys are all thinking that you had this great
gotcha. So this is the essence of the debate. I'll play the last
couple of minutes. Then he just starts getting alsoy about me, saying that
the conversation was bullshit. He acts like I attacked him. Well, are
you custing? So I didn't insult you, I said the conversation is bullshit,
because that would mean your your argument that you just gave there is based
on first act and second act. Yes, it is first hold on,
listen, you want me to make Look, I understand your position. So
let me put it this way. Let me ask you a question. Are
there worlds that God could have created that he did it? Yeah? Of
course, So not every potentiality is actualized, right, Yeah, because because
duels are secondary objects, they're not on the part of God's acts, which
is in stated. Well, hold on, it doesn't matter that they're quotes
secondary objects because they're based on the divine ideas, which are in the divine
essence and synonymous with the divine essence. That's the point in terms of the
divine ideas, that the divine ideas also contain all the possible worlds doesn't matter,
because doesn't God possess in the divine essence all the ideas of all the
possible worlds? Sure, then the possible worlds, which are divine ideas,
are also just as necessary as the other ideas in the Divine essence because the
mine essence is necessary, an eternal, and it's anonymous with the power creating
an act of action of creating. Okay, did he actualize all the possible
worlds? No? Because the divine there's capacities of potential and God. No.
No, no, His very example of me thinking about building a house,
having the power to do it, and waiting to actualize it, right,
is a creaturely capacity first act moved to second act example, which doesn't
apply to what he says about God, who he said earlier is only second
act, only pure act. Yes, no, yes, I'm explaining how
that doesn't follow. He doesn't explain it. He just gives more tomistic position
every time. This is all they ever do. Should follow, But you're
not consistent, that's the point. No, no, it does. It
actually does not follow. By Yeah, I'm explaining because all of those possible
worlds that you call those are considered as secondary objects of the divine relation.
Now since Field he's talking about the creative effects, right, But it doesn't
matter because the creative effects are based on all of the divine ideas of the
possible worlds and the actual world that God created that are also in the divine
essence, and they're also anonymous. Remember how he defined the minor virtual distinction
of the attributes. That's the same for the divine ideas in Tomism, and
you can go read that in Whipple. This is inconsistent, though I understand,
Yes, it is. I understand that you believe. I mean every
time I explain something, because I already know this position. I've had this
debate for like, no, no, no, no, I don't think
you do an every time I do understand the consistent without giving any arguments.
So he knows I understand the position because we already got fifteen minutes in and
he understood. We both understood that we're saying the same position. So he
knows I'm not misunderstanding the position. But he's not addressing the objections that I
brought up. Number one, This is not the first time I brought these
objections. These are objections we brought up. I've been bringing up these objections
since I first learned to them, at least ten or twelve years ago.
I'm gonna get say, oh, that's bullshit. You want to do you
want to just cut this off? We won't conversation. Why are you insulting
me, I said that is bullshit, and now he's mad that quote I'm
insulting him. It's not an insult to you to say that what you said
right there's bullshit. That's just that's just how normal dudes talk. I'm sure
that in these circles there's not normal dudes. But I mean, when I'm
talking to my bros, we say, that's a bunch of bs. Okay,
you tuldn't get your feelings hurt over that. That's it the end of
the discussion right there. So we're gonna open it up. Hopefully everybody can
understand. I've got I'm ready to talk to any Thomas that want to talk,
and you can make whatever points you want. Don't get butt hurt and
start crying about me saying something's BS. If I think it's BSSBS, big
deal. And there's quite a few people here, I guess actually there's not
that many people here. There's ninety on Twitter. Any of anybody who wants
to come on can talk, request to speak, uh, father deacon on
if you wanted to talk or not. But Danny, what's up, Danny?
I guess it's connecting for him. Go ahead, Danny, h Well,
it's trying to connect to him. We'll go to Garrett. What's up,
Garrett, m We got all blurred out? What's up? Garrett?
Can nobody connect you Gotta? I'm mute if you would. Also, you
can support the stream vias super chats. Nobody wants to talk naktarios. What's
up? Hello? What's up? Hey? Jake? Uh? I had
a quick question on baptism and the reception of heterodoxy. Okay, that's not
the topic today. Man. I'm not trying to be rude to you,
but like it's all about tomism. So Jesse, what's up? You gotta?
I'm mute? Man, Hey Jake, thanks for taking time to answer
a few questions. I had a bit of a mini challenge for you.
Let me preface the question with this quick observation. I'm finding in my conversations
and just society in general, that we're just not really a philosophically literate society,
Like we don't really value rigorous thoughts and like even using basic terms like
epistemology, ontology, blah blah blah, claims those just go over I would
say ninety five percent of people's heads. And I'm not claiming that like I'm
an arm chairful. I'm like, I'm from the side look looking at this
stuff. So a lot of this, a lot of philosophical arguments can go
over are a bit too lofty for me as well. I get the sense
that when this is your audience, not you, it's specifically, but in
general, people just end up hearing like a word salad and it just gets
dismissed because they just it just goes over their heads. So here's my question.
Could you explain the transcendental argument for God to say a ten or twelve
year old? Could you could you like simplify to that degree, considering this
audience doesn't know much about philosophical terms and whatnot. I mean, we've done
many talks, you know, where we make a kind of a easier,
simpler presentation of TAG. I mean today we're talking about you know, tomism
in these issues. But I think the easiest way to make TAG for younger
people is to talk about how arguments the argument from the ethical angle. I
mean, if if there aren't if there is no transcendent realm at all,
if God doesn't exist, then there really is no basis for morals or for
ethical claims, right and wrong. There's no basis for you know, saying
this is good. This is about value. Judgments really don't have any way
to be grounded beyond pure subjectivity. So I think the easiest way to introduce
it to you know, ten thirteen year old people is to say things like,
you know, relativism is self refuting, right. These are elements of
the transient argument, where you say things like there's no there is no truth.
Well, that's a truth claim that there is no truth. Right,
everything is relative. Well, that's contradicting the notion that everything is relative because
you're saying that this is objectively true. And if this is objectively true,
then it's not the case that everything is relative. So these are kind of
easy ways to introduce people to TAG, and I've met many teenagers over the
years who have understood TAG at that level. Interesting. Yeah, that's that's
that's interesting. How would you were you were to take the next step and
start to bring in issues like well, we assume mathematics or we get into
that realm of like, yeah, that's taken it out of fix and into
and knowledge and into metaphysics, and so metaphysics is usually you know, a
little more difficult little more technical of a domain, and so it might be
longer to wait. You might want to wait longer. By the way,
all the Thomas and the chat like, I mean, we got an open
chat right here, and you can talk. But I'm not I'm not gonna
ban you or boot you unless you do something right to make me do that.
So you can come on and make your points. I mean, if
you saw in the conversation with the guy, I mean, we went fine
for the first first fifteen minutes. And so if you want to address those
kinds of objections and if you want to get into the actual specifics of like
you know, tomistic metaphysics, let's do it. I mean, that's I'm
giving you the Twitter space right there, and so I'm not trying to be
mean to you, Jesse. I know those that those are good questions.
But really this this stream was directed towards responding to a lot of these tomistic
positions and claims and arguments. And father Deacon, are you there, are
you able to talk for a little bit? Would you speak maybe if you
could to some of the topics that you and I've talked about for many years,
and and you know, like your paper you talked about knowing the good
Uh, well, knowing something as it appears to us versus as it is
in itself. And you know, when you you did a good critique,
I think of Thomas's you know, position that every effect contains a similarity to
its cause. I mean, these are really the positions that underlie the tomistic
analogia. And that's the problem is that those are the things that are in
question. Those are the things that are assumed when we have all of these
various distinctions that the Scholastics put upon God. They're all still based on analogical
predication. But how do we know that analogical predication holes and that it is
the case. Maybe it is, but they always want this to just assume
it. I don't know. Those that sounded like a bunch of words salad
demand. All right, Okay, here we go. What is known in
itself versus what is known to us? Like that kind of stuff. So
look, a quaintness gets something right and does acknowledge that our ability to reason
and obtain truth depends on God as But the problem is that and this will
end up being viciously circular, and you create an autonomous epistemology that can't do
the work, but the preconditions for intelligibility don't need to be placed in God.
In other words, you can He has this. Basically, what's better
known by nature is the cause, and what's better known to us is the
effects. So the idea is that in the natural order of things of our
inquiry, it's to start from things that are more noble to us. So
we start with sense, perception, and all this different stuff, and then
we proceed towards the things that Aristotle and acquaintance car clear in of themselves,
like being God, et cetera. So temporarily speaking, the effects are then
first and then the cause. But an acquaintance realizes, but in the real
order existence, it's the cause. It's first. Now, the problem with
this is that's just a it's a metaphysical statement, right, It ignores the
epistemological issues here that let me put it this way, it's putting your metaphysical
horse before the epistemological card. And so if so, that was a metaphysical
description about causality the way the world is, and you know, causes,
relate effects, et cetera, and our metaphysics determines that we can know and
how we can know. But the problem is I have to know which metaphysics
is correct. So like the your friends that you were, Militant Thomas that
you're you're arguing with, all they're doing is telling a story. In one
sense, they're just giving you a metaphysical story. But giving a metaphysical story
is not an argument, right, So when we're asking an argument, we're
in the epistemological category. And the problem is you can't do what a Quaintas
and Militant Thomas and these various people are doing. You can't put your metaphysical
horse before the epistemological cards. So if the metaphysics the correct view right,
determines what and how you can know, but then I have to know prior
to my metaphysics, so I know what my metaphys what the correct metaphysics is,
right. This is a problem if you start off with this kind of
natural theology that I can build a system. Yeah, I can build a
system autonomous from a presupposition and the only standard that could actually do the work
as far as just location God, And then I'll get up to God,
and then I'll retrospective and be like, well, but you know, after
I figured it all out, and proven God, then I can say,
well, of course he's the better known by nature and the cause of all
this. But the whole problem is you started your enterprise on shaky epistemological grounds,
no epistemological grounds, We have no idea if that's actually correct, and
so what ends up happening is something vicious circular. We'll just grant to me
that it's actually true without me having to justify it, because the justifications of
a ladder category, which is going to be dependent circular right on on my
metaphysics, so that I can actually just my my metaphysics and epistemology. Do
you see the problem? Absolutely? Yeah, every Tomas is going to be
demanding that we just grant him in that system, and they're not. They're
not interested in epistemology. I mean, if we go into epistemology, they're
gonna fold when it comes to questions of justification, self evidence, classical foundationalism
and all that. And also, how do I know that that's even right?
What's better normal by nature versus what's exactly So this Aristotelian principle right,
or you know, the paripotatic axiom, how do we know that the pariptatic
axiom is actually the justified starting point. Yeah, because I can tell story,
a metaphysical story. Yeah, that's what they'll do. They say,
well, here's a grand metaphysical story. So it's to see if that's a
proof. Yeah, and if you get me on something, I'll just throw
on an ad hoc rescue and to add another distinction on there to make the
story even more Colm, that's why it's sorcery. Right, It's just it's
all an illusion, right, It's just I'm gonna make it more and more
complicated and look, to be fair, all all of the hope philosophers do
this, right, you start getting to the heart of the matter, and
what do they do. They make it more and more complicated, so you
can't actually see that it's a con. Yeah, that's why I kept saying
that, really, all you're doing is just introducing more, introducing more and
more distinctions without dressing an objection. It's like, and the reality Roman Catholicism
is not this stuff, right. The reality Roman Catholicism is Francis and Abu
Dhabi faith Center with the Muslims and Jews. Right, that's the reality.
It's not this stuff, but it's good to point out that this natural theology
no point ten naturally leads, right, it's the natural outworking of Yeah,
absolutely no explicitly is basing its perennialist approach to the world. Religions all having
the same generic God on the tomistic idea of natural theology that we and natural
theology is defined in fit us at ratio by John Paul the Second, as
Father Deacon points out, as philosophizing about God apart from divine revelation. Right,
so it's autonomous, which is absurd, And this is an easy way
to fleck. I was speaking to a ten year old a transidental organ what
do you possibly think could be independent or a higher standard than God? They
say nothing. That's like, then you've got the transidental argument. That's it.
There is no independent starting point and there's no epistemic standard that's higher than
God that you prove God by. So you don't prove God. God is
that by which you prove everything else. So it's a fundamental category mistake,
right to think that, oh, well, I'm going to prove God.
It's like, no, no, there has to be something. And everybody
realizes this, you know, in both in philosophy and logic, there has
to be something that's not proven but that's necessary, and is that by which
proves everything else? And that's pretty straightway forward with stating the transitional argument.
What would you say, what specifically could you elucidate that point you were making
about which is better known in itself versus that which is known by us?
And you started that paper off that you wrote by by that quoting that from
Aristotle, and how we're just as assumed that that's the case. Right,
But it is that sort of begging the question, maybe it is the case,
but why are we supposed to think that it is the case? Yeah,
that's well, that's the question. Why should we Why should we think
that that's the case. So, because I've always thought that it's the principle
of sufficient reason, that every effect has a cause that I can even I
mean, look at hume, what human brings up? I don't even know
cause and effect? How is that even possible from sense experience? Oh,
you just gotta assume this metaphysical, this whole metaphysical story again, that you
start from the effects which are clear to you. So that would be something
in the astemological category, but in the real order of things. Ontologically speaking,
it's the cause that's farther away, as far as known, But the
real order of things, that's what's most real. And so you've always got
to perceive in this way. But think about how many think about how many
presuppositions are loaded into that ye, about the nature of sensation, about the
way that we know cause and effect, and furthermore, somehow I'm actually another
way that it's viciously circular. I know, what's the principle what's better known
by us versus what's better known by nature? By what the principle of what's
better known by us versus what's better known by nature? Do you see what
I mean? Yeah, So that's a metaphysical and epistemological story that if I
ask them, how do I know that that's true? What are they going
to say? Because the metaphysical picture is true, that's how we know.
But that's what's in question, you see. Yeah, And that's a you
know, great epistemic critique. What's the name of your paper? Is it
still in the discord? I can put it in the chat too? Is
the theory of knowledge? Yeah? Epistemological apolitic medics, the methods of the
trip flaws. Let me put this in your YouTube chat right there, and
in regard to the distinctions in God and the scholastic distinctions, it's in there.
Yeah, oh thanks, so everybody. Then the chat there is the
Patristic faith linked to that paper that father Deacon wrote, kind of illustrating what
he was critiquing about that which is better known by us versus what is known
in itself that how do we know that that self evident principle is actually self
evident? Right? Well, the tell mystic aristating position, just like the
peripatetic axiom, says, well, it just has to be that way.
And by the way, we can go into why rhetorsion doesn't actually get you
to justification later on. We've done that many times. Go back to that.
I did a whole talk on the Russmannion paper which is about that.
Let's read the super chats. I don't know, I mean, I gave
this out link out to like countless Roman Catholics. I don't know where they're
at. Blake, do you want to say something our black staff? Did
you want to say something? Oh? Yeah, yeah, can you hear
me? Yeah? Yeah, okay. I kind of had two things,
but One of the things that I'll bring up first is, uh, you
know about Tomasm. I've read like a bit of the Suma, you know,
and one thing that I find really confusing is he seems to say that
the relations of opposition are themselves the essence correct, So how do you distinguish
between the persons anymore at that point? Or is this just him being inconsistent.
That's an inconsistently right, because he'll he'll make statements like that all the
time that for the worth of all we think are problematic Yaska tements. They'll
just say, well, but elsewhere he says this, so yeah, yeah.
And so the other thing that I wanted to bring up is something that
I think gets overlooked by Roman Catholics when trying to understand the Orthodox position.
And I noticed this fanatic Thomas Dude posted this on Twitter earlier, a screenshot
of a quote from Saint John Damascus Orthodox faithbook one about about generation being an
act, about it well, about it being from the from the essence.
Yeah, this is fundamental mistake. It's the essence of the father, right,
It's not it's not the essence quite essence, because in the sun would
generate himself. Yeah, and I mean in context, if you go read
it, really, what he's getting at is that the sun and the spirit
are not a product of the will right there, naturally coming from this.
It's a natural generation, not a you know, the Eunomies position is that
the sun is at work of will and energy. Yeah, and so what
I wanted to ask you though, and this may kind of be off topics,
so you don't want to get into it, that's fine, But I'm
gonna think I got another podcastle I go to do in a minute, gog
ahead, Yeah, Like, is there a sense in which we would say
that the essence is sort of derivative of the father? Yeah, that's actually
an the original nice scene Creed and it's an Athanasius that the son derives his
entire being, his existence is hypostasis and everything from the Father. Yeah.
No, but I'm talking about the essence itself. It seems to me that,
like, because the Father just is the way that he is, that
kind of defines the way that the essence is. Would that be incorrect or
what do you mean? How does the father being what he is, define
what the essence is? Because there's no ontological priority, right, there's so
like in my mind, it seems that like the Father just is the way
that he is, and he is God and he is the divine one who
has the divine essence that he then communicates to the son and the spirit.
M So it seems to me and and so like I see, Like that's
why I was saying, I'm not sure about the term it being derivative of
because I don't want to bring in contingency per se, you know. But
no, I think that I don't see why that would be a term.
It's not a temporal derivation. It's an eternal derivation. Yeah, I mean,
Jesus says that everything that he has he has from the Father, so
from signifies derivation. Yeah, But I'm talking more about like because they tend
to start with the essence and then attribute all this stuff to the persons based
on the essence, right, It's like I think that they get confused about
the fact that the Father is like self determinant in all of his properties and
everything, right yeah, because they don't start with the monarchia of of the
person of the Father, right. Yeah. I just think that that's something
that they kind of really miss, is that like the Essence isn't defining the
divine persons are No. Essence only exists in hypostatically in the persons that have
it, and so person's first, not essence. Yeah, So I just
wanted to kind of like run this by you a little bit because it's something
I've been thinking about and make sure I had it kind of like framed right
in my head. But that's all I got, all right, man,
Thank you great questions and points. I got a couple of super chats,
and I gotta go run beyond somebody's podcast, So they're gonna be mad if
I don't get over there, based and chase ten dollars? Is there salvation
in the Roman Caloic Church? The Roman Catholic Church can't save you. But
if Christ has a way by which he can unite people to his mystical body,
he can certainly do that like the thief on the cross. But the
normandid means by which people are saved is through coming into the Orthodox Church.
Thory and pie infusion, elector ten dollars, what's happening? Dire exposed cave
to totally generousy. Oh he likes my NPC comedy video. Thank you,
bon Jovi, nineteen twelve forty dollars is nominalism? Is this a nominalistic viewpoint?
Tomasm? I mean tomasm is not identical to nominalism because Acquintus has a
form of realism. But many Thomas have argued that some of Thomas's positions,
especially about universals, do anticipate later nominalist developments. So it gets really precise,
but it kind of depends on what Thomas's status for universals is, and
a lot of there's Tomastic debates amongst Thomas that's exactly what his position of universals
is. But to me he seems to be more leaning nominalistic in my reading
of Aquinas Cataclysm ten seventy three. Do the debate review with Orthodox Shahada and
also the Doctor Branson stream. Yeah, Doctor Branson and I are going to
be doing a show very soon and we'll get into the monarchy of the Father
more in depth with him, and I think orthdox Shad and I are doing
a debate review. It's just we're trying to get it to where we can
all do at the same time. Brand Will fifty dollars day, I love
your stuff. How do we bring Orthodox people from the furry world. I
mean, I mean, well, they're gonna have to just give up furry
stuff first. So I don't have any insights on furry outreach. I don't
have the furry outreach program. So I just think that's a weird, odd
community. It's creepy. So they're gonna have to just give up that stuff
they need. Jesus. I was wanting to know how you go about it,
if you have any ideas, I guess be nice to them and tell
them to come to church and then tell them to throw away their cat costumes.
Do you have twenty dollars? Think everythingalysis? Can you upload the TikTok
debate? It's on my rock fan truth Seeker twelve ten dollars? Tell us
believe that person in nature are identical to essence. Do you hold this position?
Well, person in nature exists in the mode of the person has it's
in iposthtize, But nature and person are not identical in a strict sense.
That would be modalism. Why don't you argue this more often? We argue
all the time. I've probably got thirty podcasts that argue about the nature person
distinction. You typically talk about the relation between the attributes and the essence,
but not persons and essence, because Thomas will just say that Thomas believes in
a major, real distinction between the persons. But it's true that between nature
and essence. Thomas consistently says that what I lost people are talking about nonsense.
Yeah, I mean so a Quantas has these statements, and you saw
Ybara repeat it like a couple of years ago, right, that nature and
person are identical. Yeah, maybe I need to focus on that more.
King, I tell a five dollars. Prime supports the fanatic Thomas on Twitter.
Of course he does. I mean he argues all these Roman Catholic positions.
He argued is that we believe in and Selmian and penal substitution, Augustinian
stuff, and then I called him out on that. So of course he's
going to agree with anybody who goes against me. So I mean, if
Prime wants to go off into Roman Catholicism, I mean that's the direction he's
head it. In Aasgar one forty four is to incarnate a divine action,
correct, So what does this imply for identity thesis and an eternal incarnation or
Patripassianism. Yeah, if God's an absolutely simple essence, then it should be
the incarnate. It should be the Divine Essence that incarnated. If person in
nature are absolutely identical, then uh yeah, it would seem to follow the
Divine Essence became incarnate. But it's not the Divine Essence, it's the Divine's
son who Again they all the whole problem is that their order of theology is
wrong. They start with the Divine Essence, they start with a absolutely simple
monad. They don't begin with the person of the Father. And so go
watch doctor Bill Branson's lectures. It will cure your Tomism. And I think
that's all the super chats heading over to chalk dot com us the promo code J fifty