WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.160 --> 00:00:05.040 Arguing for that, and I have created a couple of TV shows, and 2 00:00:05.080 --> 00:00:10.240 I do a lot of comedy and film analysis. All right, excellent, 3 00:00:10.279 --> 00:00:14.400 looking forward to this JA. And on the other side of the table tonight, 4 00:00:15.199 --> 00:00:19.839 along with or perhaps versus, he's the president of the Atheist Community of 5 00:00:19.879 --> 00:00:25.679 Austin and he hosts a show called The Atheist Debates for his lovely patrons over 6 00:00:25.719 --> 00:00:31.280 at patreon dot com. Forward slashed Atheist Debates. Name is mister Matt Dilla. 7 00:00:31.320 --> 00:00:35.560 Honey, Matt, go ahead and introduce yourself to the audience. Pretty 8 00:00:35.560 --> 00:00:38.759 sure you just did. I'm Att Delania. I've been hosting The Atheist Experienced 9 00:00:38.799 --> 00:00:43.280 show for around fifteen years or something. I was president for seven years then 10 00:00:43.320 --> 00:00:48.119 I wasn't. Now I am again. I do lectures, debates and magic 11 00:00:48.159 --> 00:00:52.640 shows. And I completely forgot because in that closet back there is this massive 12 00:00:52.679 --> 00:00:56.479 stack of DVDs, including my Dario or Agento collection, which I was going 13 00:00:56.520 --> 00:00:59.280 to have where you could, but it would be a distraction. We can 14 00:00:59.280 --> 00:01:02.920 talk about that one another time. I didn't know. It's funny you said 15 00:01:02.960 --> 00:01:07.040 that. It's yeah, it's actually not my favorite, but I understand it's 16 00:01:07.040 --> 00:01:11.959 probably his most popular and uh, yeah, okay, Yeah, it's probably 17 00:01:11.000 --> 00:01:14.879 my favorite. Go ahead, all right, excellent, all right, well, 18 00:01:14.879 --> 00:01:17.640 looking forward to it. Okay, as far as the show format goes, 19 00:01:18.280 --> 00:01:19.680 Jay, go ahead and jump in if I don't have anything right here. 20 00:01:19.680 --> 00:01:23.480 But it looks like we're gonna do ten minutes segments and I'll give you 21 00:01:23.519 --> 00:01:30.959 Fellas a thirty second warning before a segment ends, so those will be Uh 22 00:01:30.400 --> 00:01:34.159 are those uninterrupted segments? Jay? Is that how we're going to work this? 23 00:01:34.959 --> 00:01:40.319 Yeah? Yeah, ten minute uninterrupted segments and then for the first hour, 24 00:01:40.359 --> 00:01:42.560 and then if Matt, Matt wants to do a crossfire or whatever conversation 25 00:01:42.599 --> 00:01:47.840 style, we can. Okay, great, So perhaps a crossfire round in 26 00:01:47.879 --> 00:01:51.920 the second hour if we're gonna go that far. And I believe we will 27 00:01:51.959 --> 00:01:56.079 be taking a super chat Q and A at the end of the show, 28 00:01:56.359 --> 00:02:00.400 so uh, Fellas helped me make sure, I know, like a few 29 00:02:00.400 --> 00:02:02.519 minutes before everybody anyone has to leave or anything like that, so we can 30 00:02:02.640 --> 00:02:07.719 shrink get that in there, and uh, okay, I guess that's it. 31 00:02:07.959 --> 00:02:09.919 So Matt, I think we'll we'll give it to you. Do you 32 00:02:10.000 --> 00:02:15.240 want to go first or do you want to go second? Oh? I 33 00:02:15.919 --> 00:02:19.520 guess I'll go second, because I'm not the one that's presenting an argument for 34 00:02:19.599 --> 00:02:23.120 something, so it's more of a response thing and and the whole thing, 35 00:02:23.400 --> 00:02:25.400 you know, ten interrupted minutes. I don't even know if I'll end up 36 00:02:25.520 --> 00:02:29.439 using that because I'm much more interested in than back and forth. But we'll 37 00:02:29.439 --> 00:02:30.800 work it. How are you neique to okay? Okay? So that to 38 00:02:30.840 --> 00:02:34.199 be safe? So whatever, I didn't know, what, how do we 39 00:02:34.199 --> 00:02:36.639 want to do it? All right, I'll go I'll go ahead and say 40 00:02:36.639 --> 00:02:39.000 that. Um, so basically my argument will be presented like this. I 41 00:02:39.039 --> 00:02:44.400 think that worldviews are what we all have. We all function on the basis 42 00:02:44.439 --> 00:02:51.039 of three basic philosophic approaches to life that are usually boiled down to metaphysics, 43 00:02:51.120 --> 00:02:55.560 ethics, and epistemology. So these three branches of philosophy historically have been what 44 00:02:55.680 --> 00:02:59.639 makes it what we could we could call a worldview, at least in Western 45 00:02:59.639 --> 00:03:04.080 phil I would say that I believe, and I would argue that each one 46 00:03:04.080 --> 00:03:07.280 of these branches is intertwined with the other. So, for example, if 47 00:03:07.319 --> 00:03:10.719 I argue for something in the realm of epistemology, if I argue that a 48 00:03:10.719 --> 00:03:15.840 belief is true, typically what goes along with that is also an assumption about 49 00:03:16.280 --> 00:03:21.560 ethics and moral claims moral judgments that one ought to follow what is true. 50 00:03:22.400 --> 00:03:25.240 Now one could disagree with that conceivably, but I'm going to argue that I 51 00:03:25.280 --> 00:03:30.039 think they're all intertwined. Similarly, if I were to say that we know 52 00:03:30.120 --> 00:03:35.000 that something is the case, it also tends to imply or necessitate certain beliefs 53 00:03:35.039 --> 00:03:38.639 about metaphysics, claims about what's real, what's not real, what can be 54 00:03:38.759 --> 00:03:43.199 or what can't be. So these three aspects of a worldview I would say, 55 00:03:43.280 --> 00:03:46.800 are in a sense transcendental categories, or they at least utilize a lot 56 00:03:46.800 --> 00:03:53.039 of transcendental categories. Transitial categories would be things like the principle of induction, 57 00:03:53.120 --> 00:03:57.280 the laws of logic, the past, identity over time, the self, 58 00:03:59.120 --> 00:04:03.479 the regularity that we find in nature. These are not subjects that are the 59 00:04:03.520 --> 00:04:11.199 immediate purview of empirical sense data or empirical science. They're related to empirical science, 60 00:04:11.240 --> 00:04:14.120 for example, the principle of abduction that the future will be like the 61 00:04:14.159 --> 00:04:18.439 past, that there's regularity in logic, there's regularity, and there's a flow. 62 00:04:18.519 --> 00:04:21.319 You could say to the scientific method. For example, if you study 63 00:04:21.600 --> 00:04:26.360 philosophy, of science. You'll know that there's actually a logical process that's assumed 64 00:04:26.839 --> 00:04:30.879 in the process of doing the scientific method So from reasoning on the basis of 65 00:04:30.959 --> 00:04:35.720 hypothesis to what the data supports towards a conclusion. For example, it presupposes 66 00:04:35.759 --> 00:04:41.560 that one ought to be true in this process if one wants to obtain the 67 00:04:41.560 --> 00:04:48.920 most true conclusions in this process. It presupposes the logic that one process, 68 00:04:49.000 --> 00:04:53.800 one step in this process should follow another step. And it also presupposes all 69 00:04:53.879 --> 00:04:58.000 kinds of other things, like that words have meaning, regularity, etc. 70 00:04:58.560 --> 00:05:01.600 That objects have a sort of uniformity to them over time. That's I would 71 00:05:01.600 --> 00:05:08.399 say, is all presupposed in the scientific process itself. Numbers would be presupposed 72 00:05:08.399 --> 00:05:12.079 in this process. And these are all I think things that are immaterial, 73 00:05:12.279 --> 00:05:15.639 invariant, they're conceptual, and they're abstract. Now, I think that because 74 00:05:15.680 --> 00:05:23.199 something is presupposed in the scientific methodology doesn't necessarily mean that. In other words, 75 00:05:23.240 --> 00:05:26.040 what I'm saying we don't necessarily prove everything in the same way. Right, 76 00:05:26.079 --> 00:05:29.600 So, in other words, something that is assumed, it's a category 77 00:05:29.680 --> 00:05:33.079 like that a law of logic, or something that's utilized in the scientific method 78 00:05:33.160 --> 00:05:38.319 is in in a way more properly basic, more fundamental than even the scientific 79 00:05:38.360 --> 00:05:42.399 method itself. So, even though the scientific method is not doesn't have the 80 00:05:42.480 --> 00:05:46.920 laws of logic under its immediate purview, it still assumes laws of logic and 81 00:05:46.959 --> 00:05:50.519 that regularity that cannot be proven in terms of empirical sense data. So if 82 00:05:50.560 --> 00:05:55.240 one we're to adopt a kind of naive impurisist view, a kind of logical 83 00:05:55.279 --> 00:06:00.680 positivism, what we end up with is the inability to understand or to justified 84 00:06:00.720 --> 00:06:03.600 the belief in the principle of induction, the regularity of nature that the future 85 00:06:03.600 --> 00:06:08.519 will be like the past. Now, one could say conceivably that they don't 86 00:06:09.000 --> 00:06:11.839 think that we have to justify it, or that we can't justify it. 87 00:06:12.079 --> 00:06:14.759 But I think that at that point we would be being arbitrary, and we 88 00:06:14.800 --> 00:06:19.319 would be believing in and admitting things that we don't have any sort of justification 89 00:06:19.399 --> 00:06:25.360 for. And I'm speaking here of a kind of specific philosophic justification here in 90 00:06:25.439 --> 00:06:29.480 terms of warranted beliefs, in terms of justifying true beliefs, etc. The 91 00:06:29.519 --> 00:06:34.720 way history of philosophy in the West has typically justified propositions and beliefs. I 92 00:06:34.759 --> 00:06:39.000 would say that we would be relying on things that are immaterial that we can't 93 00:06:39.040 --> 00:06:42.920 justify. And so the way that I move from that to God is to 94 00:06:42.959 --> 00:06:45.959 say that there are actually a whole bunch of things in all of our lives 95 00:06:45.959 --> 00:06:51.560 that we assume that are not strictly speaking physical, not strictly speaking quote pragmatic, 96 00:06:51.680 --> 00:06:56.399 because from what I gather from Matt's worldview, he tends to have a 97 00:06:56.480 --> 00:07:00.800 very sort of pragmatic approach. There's all these types of things that are not 98 00:07:00.879 --> 00:07:08.240 immediately justified or known by sense data or basic empiricism, or in what's in 99 00:07:08.360 --> 00:07:12.040 history philosophy called naive empiricism. So what I would say is that if I 100 00:07:12.079 --> 00:07:15.639 were Matt, if I wanted to be a consistent skeptic, I would go 101 00:07:15.720 --> 00:07:18.959 the route of David Human be a skeptic all the way, And to be 102 00:07:18.959 --> 00:07:23.439 a skeptic all the way would be to admit ultimately that no, there's not 103 00:07:23.560 --> 00:07:28.480 a justification for induction for the regularity that we see in nature, and thus 104 00:07:28.480 --> 00:07:33.279 there's no justification epistemically logically, in terms of rationality, reason logic, etc. 105 00:07:33.920 --> 00:07:38.279 For the scientific method itself. Now we can fast forward all the way 106 00:07:38.319 --> 00:07:43.399 up to modern logicians like Bertrand Russell or William van ormand Quine. Russell and 107 00:07:43.480 --> 00:07:47.480 Quine also continue this idea of saying that there's not really a justification if you're 108 00:07:47.480 --> 00:07:53.160 a basic empiricist for these ideas. They just have to be kind of a 109 00:07:53.160 --> 00:07:57.439 given. We can treat them like they are, but we can't coherently give 110 00:07:57.480 --> 00:08:00.519 a basis or justification for them. So to me, that's kind of an 111 00:08:00.560 --> 00:08:05.079 emission of the intellectual bankruptcy of this kind of logical positivist position. So you 112 00:08:05.079 --> 00:08:11.079 have all these kinds of things that are different from just physical material physicalism, 113 00:08:11.240 --> 00:08:16.240 like laws of logic, like numbers, like number theory like Mandel brought sets 114 00:08:16.319 --> 00:08:22.600 right, very very elaborate mathematical sort of equations that many philosophers and mathematicians somebody 115 00:08:22.639 --> 00:08:24.959 like Roger Penrose, and I'm just bringing this forth as a testament, not 116 00:08:26.000 --> 00:08:30.000 a proof, just as an expert testament. You know. Penrose says that 117 00:08:30.040 --> 00:08:33.879 when I looked into the advanced mathematics of Penrose Tiling, he said, it 118 00:08:33.919 --> 00:08:39.720 looked to me like we're actually discovering these mathematical principles, not socially constructing them. 119 00:08:39.720 --> 00:08:41.159 So if you know about fractals, you know about mandelbrought sets. You 120 00:08:41.200 --> 00:08:45.559 know, they're very elaborate, right, They're not something that could just be 121 00:08:45.639 --> 00:08:50.679 a social construct, their actual mental discoveries. So the point is that if 122 00:08:50.720 --> 00:08:52.960 that's the case, then I don't think it's at all irrational to believe that 123 00:08:54.600 --> 00:09:00.480 all of these different kinds of categories are transcendental preconditions could be explained perfect in 124 00:09:00.559 --> 00:09:03.600 a worldview where God exists, and particularly the Christian view. So I'm here 125 00:09:03.639 --> 00:09:09.279 to defend Orthodox Christianity, not Southern Baptist theology, not the fundamentalist stuff, 126 00:09:09.399 --> 00:09:11.360 not Roman Catholicism or any of the other views. I have a very specific 127 00:09:11.440 --> 00:09:18.360 view in argument from Orthodox Christology and theology. So when we have that conception 128 00:09:18.399 --> 00:09:22.759 of God, God as a divine mind, omnipotent, omnipresent, etcetera, 129 00:09:22.799 --> 00:09:28.200 etce. What we then see is that reality has its grounding in its basis 130 00:09:28.480 --> 00:09:31.919 in the mind of God. So quite literally, everything that exists has a 131 00:09:31.960 --> 00:09:35.159 logo or a logi and exemplar, as it's called in the West. This 132 00:09:35.240 --> 00:09:37.960 is kind of like Platonism, but I want to be very precise because we're 133 00:09:37.000 --> 00:09:41.799 not Platonist, but we do believe that the essences and the universals that exist 134 00:09:41.360 --> 00:09:45.720 are ultimately grounded in the mind of God. And that makes perfect sense. 135 00:09:45.759 --> 00:09:50.720 That makes sense why there's regularity in nature because of divine providence, because everything 136 00:09:50.720 --> 00:09:54.039 that exists is in a sense grounded in the mind of God. Thus, 137 00:09:54.240 --> 00:10:00.279 truth has more than just a pragmatic function and actually is a trans send in 138 00:10:00.399 --> 00:10:05.000 quality. Truth is actually objective. It's not just a social construct. It's 139 00:10:05.000 --> 00:10:07.639 actually a reflection of the mind of God. And specifically, I would argue 140 00:10:07.679 --> 00:10:11.120 that if we got into the nitty gritty of it, it would be a 141 00:10:11.159 --> 00:10:15.759 defense of the orthodox view of God. Right getting down to the point of 142 00:10:16.039 --> 00:10:18.879 the one in the Mini for example, this is a classic problem in the 143 00:10:18.919 --> 00:10:20.919 history of Western philosophy. The one of the Mini problem is solved by our 144 00:10:22.039 --> 00:10:26.440 doctrine of the Trinity, and more specifically by the logos Christ and the logi 145 00:10:26.600 --> 00:10:31.279 right, the rational principles that are operant in nature. Now, it's true 146 00:10:31.320 --> 00:10:33.159 that we could remove all that, we could just say, well, none 147 00:10:33.159 --> 00:10:35.440 of that's true. I don't buy any of that. Those are a bunch 148 00:10:35.440 --> 00:10:39.440 of logical crazy leaps, and I just think that what exists out there is 149 00:10:39.559 --> 00:10:43.200 matter in motion. I don't know Matt's heard this argument many times. I'm 150 00:10:43.200 --> 00:10:46.799 not going to rehash all the sort of classic presubsitionalists quote unquote that he's debated, 151 00:10:46.840 --> 00:10:50.919 because I think my argument is a little more precise, a little more 152 00:10:50.960 --> 00:10:54.840 fleshed out, better argued hopefully. And then that as that all of these 153 00:10:54.879 --> 00:10:56.720 different transcend old categories, if you were to sort of bundle them into a 154 00:10:56.720 --> 00:11:01.279 big pile, they make perfect sense in a world created by God, in 155 00:11:01.320 --> 00:11:07.960 a world that unfortunately is fallen but nevertheless still reflects to a degree the truth 156 00:11:07.039 --> 00:11:11.000 about God. If we're made in the image of God, we understand how 157 00:11:11.039 --> 00:11:13.480 there's dignity. If we are made in the image of God, we have 158 00:11:13.519 --> 00:11:16.799 the ability to know objective truth. Right, God's world is regular, it 159 00:11:16.799 --> 00:11:20.799 operates on principles of regularity. If the mind of God is the basis of 160 00:11:20.840 --> 00:11:26.720 all reality, we have a basis for these really abstract and obtuse mathematical principles 161 00:11:26.720 --> 00:11:30.360 that we know are real that are not strictly speaking physical. So all of 162 00:11:30.360 --> 00:11:33.440 these kinds of things right, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, they make perfect 163 00:11:33.480 --> 00:11:37.519 sense in a worldview where our God exists and the kind of God that we 164 00:11:37.600 --> 00:11:41.799 argued for, in a worldview where we have pure materialism, pure pragmatism, 165 00:11:43.200 --> 00:11:48.240 random chance, random chaos. There's nothing like invariant, immaterial conceptual law like 166 00:11:48.519 --> 00:11:52.399 things. Where are they? What are they? They're just social constructs. 167 00:11:52.399 --> 00:11:54.799 Now. I don't know if that's Matt's opinion or view, but I have 168 00:11:54.840 --> 00:11:58.919 heard him say in previous discussions and talks that he doesn't think that there is 169 00:12:00.279 --> 00:12:03.679 a justification, so to speak, for logical laws, mathematical principles. He's 170 00:12:03.679 --> 00:12:07.799 sort of abstract conceptual things. He thinks that they're just kind of things that 171 00:12:07.840 --> 00:12:11.440 we just use and they work. But that would be, I would say, 172 00:12:11.519 --> 00:12:16.240 to be arbitrary, and when it comes to debate, we're presupposing universal 173 00:12:16.279 --> 00:12:22.960 categories and laws, and that doesn't allow us to be arbitrary. All right, 174 00:12:24.000 --> 00:12:28.440 thank you Jay, excellent, well done, It was right on time. 175 00:12:28.720 --> 00:12:33.399 And over to Matt. Now let me reset our timer here, okay, 176 00:12:33.399 --> 00:12:39.799 Matt, over to you, Hi Hi, Yeah, yeah, So, 177 00:12:39.799 --> 00:12:43.639 first of all, thanks for having me. I will say I'm not 178 00:12:43.720 --> 00:12:50.519 convinced that I actually heard an argument in all of that. One of the 179 00:12:50.559 --> 00:12:54.840 things is is that, yeah, I'm not necessarily requiring that we have you 180 00:12:54.879 --> 00:12:58.240 know, fully constructed syllogism, but if we can get close to that, 181 00:12:58.279 --> 00:13:03.080 because you seem to be arguing for in this is Hey, we all have 182 00:13:03.120 --> 00:13:07.399 a worldview and it includes all these things and they're intertwined. I agree. 183 00:13:07.799 --> 00:13:11.080 But what I'm getting to is to whether or not the things in our worldview 184 00:13:11.120 --> 00:13:15.799 are true. I mean, there probably needs to be a side discussion about 185 00:13:16.080 --> 00:13:18.399 truth and whether or not we can actually whether that we can attain it, 186 00:13:18.480 --> 00:13:24.240 because when you say that it's essentially arbitrary to decide that we can't justify the 187 00:13:24.240 --> 00:13:30.000 things that we presuppose. I disagree. When we have, for example, 188 00:13:30.039 --> 00:13:35.159 the laws of logic, which I would argue presupposes truth or presupposes reality, 189 00:13:35.240 --> 00:13:37.799 and so there's a number of things that we're going to presuppose just to get 190 00:13:37.840 --> 00:13:41.879 work done, and but they're not. It's not just arbitrary. It's not 191 00:13:41.919 --> 00:13:46.559 like we decided, oh, a thing is what it isn't and we'll just 192 00:13:46.679 --> 00:13:52.600 arbitrary accept that there are reasons why we have justification to think that that's reasonable. 193 00:13:52.559 --> 00:13:58.840 But the recognition that we don't necessarily know what guarantees that is not arbitrary. 194 00:14:00.000 --> 00:14:03.559 It's an acknowledgement that throughout all of the time that we've been kind of 195 00:14:03.600 --> 00:14:07.840 pouring over these things. In philosophical context, we haven't been able to come 196 00:14:07.919 --> 00:14:13.919 up with something that is demonstrably a guaranteer of logic or a guaranteur of human 197 00:14:13.919 --> 00:14:16.559 dignity, or any of the things that you might list, And so it's 198 00:14:16.559 --> 00:14:22.639 completely unsurprising to me that, and I think it's true a worldview that includes 199 00:14:22.639 --> 00:14:24.519 a belief in a god that could serve as a guaranteer for all of those 200 00:14:24.519 --> 00:14:30.879 things makes the world makes sense. But that's about a belief in a god 201 00:14:30.919 --> 00:14:33.519 that does that. And you can substitute the word god with anything. Belief 202 00:14:33.799 --> 00:14:41.240 that there is a justifiable foundation serves as a justifiable foundation. It's virtually circular 203 00:14:41.399 --> 00:14:46.919 there. The problem here is that you're assuming that, in fact, there 204 00:14:46.159 --> 00:14:50.919 is some sort of foundation, and I don't know if you're doing it in 205 00:14:50.360 --> 00:14:54.279 a sort of causal sense, which I would argue might be a mistake because 206 00:14:54.600 --> 00:15:01.039 causality, primarily, I think, would deal with like physical physicality, and 207 00:15:01.279 --> 00:15:05.080 causality may not apply to the abstract, at least not without there being some 208 00:15:05.159 --> 00:15:09.799 physical thing. Like you know, you have an abstract thought, you convey 209 00:15:09.840 --> 00:15:11.720 it to me, and that leads to this, But that's still a physical 210 00:15:11.720 --> 00:15:15.159 process of what's happening in the brain, and that there may not be causality 211 00:15:15.200 --> 00:15:16.840 with regard to the abstract. And so when I when I look at things 212 00:15:16.879 --> 00:15:22.440 like truth, yeah, I'm fine with the you know, truth is that 213 00:15:22.519 --> 00:15:26.519 which comports with reality. But I don't see any path to absolute certainty. 214 00:15:26.559 --> 00:15:33.840 I don't see any way to guarantee or or point is something that says this 215 00:15:33.919 --> 00:15:39.000 guarantees that identity, non contradiction excluded, middle are always universally correct. They 216 00:15:39.039 --> 00:15:43.960 appear to be they are. Reliance on them is because they continually demonstrate their 217 00:15:45.039 --> 00:15:48.559 reliability in the sense that we're not all dead. If I, if I 218 00:15:48.600 --> 00:15:52.559 have a worldview that says that buses are imaginary, all of a sudden becomes 219 00:15:52.639 --> 00:15:56.240 crossing the street becomes far more dangerous. And so the only thing that I 220 00:15:56.240 --> 00:16:00.480 can do is interact with the reality that I have. And so I'm I'm 221 00:16:00.519 --> 00:16:07.320 a big proponent of Ockham's razor don't multiply entity is unnecessarily And so I presuppose 222 00:16:07.440 --> 00:16:12.279 that there's a reality which I share which I can't prove or justify. I 223 00:16:12.320 --> 00:16:18.279 do find I think there are some potential arguments against hard solive sism, but 224 00:16:18.399 --> 00:16:22.200 only in the sense that they seem satisfying us. There's there's no way to 225 00:16:22.200 --> 00:16:26.960 demonstrate, Like the one I've used before is that I find it patently absurd 226 00:16:26.000 --> 00:16:30.000 that I've both written every wonderful song that I've enjoyed, which I don't understand 227 00:16:30.000 --> 00:16:33.279 and it don't know the key of or anything else but h and also the 228 00:16:33.279 --> 00:16:37.360 ones that I despise, or I've been every caller who's called into this show 229 00:16:37.639 --> 00:16:41.480 with good points and all the callers that have called in with bad points. 230 00:16:41.120 --> 00:16:48.240 That level of I am the only thing I think, perhaps intuitively, if 231 00:16:48.320 --> 00:16:52.799 if no other justification, appears to be far more absurd than the likelihood that 232 00:16:52.879 --> 00:16:57.360 Jay and I are sharing a reality. And so when I look through the 233 00:16:57.399 --> 00:17:03.840 opening here, I agree we have worldview. I notice that among the abstract 234 00:17:04.000 --> 00:17:10.599 transitory items he didn't list truth. Whether or not it's in there on his 235 00:17:10.720 --> 00:17:15.720 view is up to him. But oh, there's a nope popped up there. 236 00:17:17.160 --> 00:17:19.880 Um. But so when it was interesting because when Jay said, here's 237 00:17:19.880 --> 00:17:22.000 how I get from there to God, and we've gone through a long list 238 00:17:22.039 --> 00:17:25.240 of things, and it's here's how I get from there to God, and 239 00:17:25.279 --> 00:17:29.960 then we heard about Russell and Quine and just on and on and on about 240 00:17:30.039 --> 00:17:33.960 how uh, and some items about mathematics, and the only thing that came 241 00:17:34.000 --> 00:17:37.400 close to how we get to a God, as far as I can tell, 242 00:17:37.079 --> 00:17:45.640 is sort of I'm not gonna I'm not gonna remember the right term, 243 00:17:45.720 --> 00:17:51.759 but essentially it's an it's it was an expression that a worldview without a god 244 00:17:52.160 --> 00:17:55.960 leaves us without answers to this, but a world view with a god gives 245 00:17:56.000 --> 00:18:00.400 us answers to this. And that presupposes that the type of answers that you're 246 00:18:00.400 --> 00:18:07.359 getting from a god are actually answers, that there is some explanation the questions 247 00:18:07.359 --> 00:18:12.039 that I would have is tons of them, which will get to at different 248 00:18:12.039 --> 00:18:18.160 points throughout this. But is it possible for something to just be the way 249 00:18:18.200 --> 00:18:23.319 it is, that something X is true without some sort of external justification, 250 00:18:23.440 --> 00:18:30.960 guaranteer or prescriber. Because if if that's the case, and there's a whole 251 00:18:32.000 --> 00:18:34.200 bunch of philosophy about what truth is and whether or not it's accessible, And 252 00:18:34.400 --> 00:18:37.119 you know, if I'd known we were going to spend as much time as 253 00:18:37.119 --> 00:18:40.960 we likely are today, I probably would have gotten high beforehand, because that 254 00:18:41.240 --> 00:18:44.480 makes those conversations at least a little more fun, Except that I don't like 255 00:18:44.640 --> 00:18:51.519 to be high and certainly not in a debate. But the question about truth, 256 00:18:52.880 --> 00:18:57.279 you could argue, for example, let's take identity noncontradiction exclude the middle, 257 00:18:57.279 --> 00:19:00.559 which I used to say was the only thing that I suppose, and 258 00:19:00.559 --> 00:19:03.160 then I realized, no, I have to presuppose truth in order to be 259 00:19:03.240 --> 00:19:08.279 able to presuppose those The problem is is that there's a little loop there automatically, 260 00:19:08.880 --> 00:19:15.519 which is, if I want to justify that there is truth, that 261 00:19:15.599 --> 00:19:19.200 there is a reality, if I'm using a compatiblest model of truth, I 262 00:19:19.279 --> 00:19:23.319 still have to exercise reason to reach that conclusion. So we're back to the 263 00:19:23.400 --> 00:19:27.240 essentials of identity, non contradiction, etc. And so when we talk about 264 00:19:27.279 --> 00:19:36.039 whether or not something is true, we quite often is there must be some 265 00:19:36.160 --> 00:19:38.599 explanation for this, because we run around the world and we see things and 266 00:19:38.680 --> 00:19:41.440 we look at it and say, why is that the way it is? 267 00:19:42.079 --> 00:19:47.000 And I've said before that, you know, people would argue that, well, 268 00:19:47.079 --> 00:19:51.079 science offers how questions, not why questions. But that's that's semantics, 269 00:19:51.079 --> 00:19:53.720 because I can reward any question we have as a how or why how did 270 00:19:53.720 --> 00:19:57.680 this come to be? Is essentially the same as why does this exist as 271 00:19:57.720 --> 00:20:04.200 long as you're being content sextual. And so this and this admission that I 272 00:20:04.240 --> 00:20:10.240 don't have an explanation for why there is truth or is there truth, or 273 00:20:10.279 --> 00:20:18.039 why are the logical laws apparently absolute and in viable isn't an admission of intellectual 274 00:20:18.079 --> 00:20:22.839 bankruptcy. It is an admission of what appears to be the facts of the 275 00:20:22.880 --> 00:20:27.440 case, which is why you know you've got the transcendental arguments for the existence 276 00:20:27.480 --> 00:20:32.480 of God, which I would argue, and you might have other arguments, 277 00:20:32.519 --> 00:20:34.400 I mean, planetics, modo, logic, ontological, et cetera. And 278 00:20:34.440 --> 00:20:41.359 these are kind of held up amongst incredibly smart and well read people as some 279 00:20:41.440 --> 00:20:45.680 of the best arguments for the existence of God, and that may or may 280 00:20:45.720 --> 00:20:49.039 not be the case. I've been asked many times what's the best argument for 281 00:20:49.079 --> 00:20:53.519 God? And I don't know, but that they're being held up is this 282 00:20:55.480 --> 00:21:00.480 seems to be based on an idea that there is in fact the next eplanation. 283 00:21:00.119 --> 00:21:07.559 And I have seen no argument or evidence that there is in fact that 284 00:21:07.680 --> 00:21:11.319 sort of an explanation. And so, while you can phrase it is I'm 285 00:21:11.400 --> 00:21:17.799 admitting intellectual bankruptcy, I prefer to view it as being intellectually honest that I'm 286 00:21:17.920 --> 00:21:22.119 not going to make more presuppositions than necessary. I'm not going to say, 287 00:21:22.200 --> 00:21:25.440 you know what would be really nice if there was something that could serve as 288 00:21:25.559 --> 00:21:27.279 a foundation for logic, And it would also be really nice if there was 289 00:21:27.279 --> 00:21:30.279 something could serve as a foundation for morality. There would also be something very 290 00:21:30.359 --> 00:21:36.200 nice if they could serve as a foundation for human dignity, etc. That'd 291 00:21:36.240 --> 00:21:41.160 be really cool, except that I don't know that there are foundations for those 292 00:21:41.680 --> 00:21:45.319 I don't know that it's impossible that they couldn't. Just well, first of 293 00:21:45.319 --> 00:21:48.920 all, they may not all be true, but I don't see that it's 294 00:21:48.920 --> 00:21:53.440 impossible. There's been no demonstration that there must be some foundation beyond the laws 295 00:21:53.440 --> 00:21:59.039 of logic. And the curious thing is, I think that even if you 296 00:21:59.759 --> 00:22:03.839 are that a God solves that problem, the only reason that it does is 297 00:22:03.880 --> 00:22:11.319 because modern theological definitions of God include this thing that God doesn't need a justification 298 00:22:11.680 --> 00:22:15.440 as a bald assertion. So we have these things that may or may not 299 00:22:15.519 --> 00:22:19.319 have a justification, we're not aware of what that justification would be, and 300 00:22:19.359 --> 00:22:25.759 then we argue for something that hypothetically could serve as that justification. And maybe 301 00:22:25.799 --> 00:22:32.160 even just believing it exists serves as a satisfier but not a guarantee. And 302 00:22:32.920 --> 00:22:37.759 in spite of that, we're stuck with how did we come up with this 303 00:22:37.640 --> 00:22:41.160 thing that serves as an exploitation for nothing and needs no explanation of itself? 304 00:22:41.599 --> 00:22:47.279 Okay, times a good one, going all right? Yeah, great comments 305 00:22:47.279 --> 00:22:51.000 there in questions from Matt. So first he asked for a syllogism. So 306 00:22:51.200 --> 00:22:55.640 I think I can oblige this to a degree and say that, yeah, 307 00:22:55.640 --> 00:23:00.400 I could state it like this. There are many transcendental categories. List some 308 00:23:00.440 --> 00:23:03.119 of the ones that I think are strong. And I don't mind that Matt 309 00:23:03.200 --> 00:23:06.720 included the idea of truth. I don't have a problem including truth. There's 310 00:23:06.960 --> 00:23:08.799 there's plenty. Actually, it's just that I was just kind of going off 311 00:23:10.400 --> 00:23:11.920 the top of my head and listening some. But you could say something like 312 00:23:12.680 --> 00:23:17.160 identity of objects over time. You could say value judgments. You could say 313 00:23:17.759 --> 00:23:19.519 interpretive frameworks. You could say the problem of the one in the minute. 314 00:23:19.519 --> 00:23:22.599 You could say meaning in language. You could say words themselves. You could 315 00:23:22.640 --> 00:23:27.359 say temporal spatial relations. You could say the past. You could say numbers. 316 00:23:27.359 --> 00:23:30.759 You could say the idea of causality. You could say that the idea 317 00:23:30.759 --> 00:23:37.680 of t los rights, freedom, all of these could be buddled together if 318 00:23:37.680 --> 00:23:42.920 we were to discuss those things. They are presupposed not just in the process 319 00:23:42.960 --> 00:23:47.799 of scientific methodology, which I was kind of focusing on in the opening statement, 320 00:23:48.160 --> 00:23:49.799 but in life in general. Right, I mean throughout life we assume 321 00:23:49.880 --> 00:23:52.359 these kinds of things. All throughout we assumed the existence of a self. 322 00:23:52.440 --> 00:23:56.920 Right. This self, however, is not something obviously that is empirically verifiable. 323 00:23:56.920 --> 00:24:00.880 We kind of assume it in the process of our for it or against 324 00:24:00.880 --> 00:24:04.039 it. Now, I'm not saying that people that argue about it or that 325 00:24:04.440 --> 00:24:08.680 there might not be in you know, some attempt to scientifically investigate the notion 326 00:24:08.680 --> 00:24:12.759 of a self. But even if you were to find a pineal gland where 327 00:24:12.759 --> 00:24:17.279 you thought something like Descartes, where the soul or the self or mind or 328 00:24:17.319 --> 00:24:22.880 whatever was howelsed or whatever, there's still a distinction I would argue between brain 329 00:24:22.039 --> 00:24:26.759 and mind in my view. Now, that's why I'm saying that when we 330 00:24:26.880 --> 00:24:29.920 talk about reasoning, when we talk about logic, when we talk about all 331 00:24:29.920 --> 00:24:33.680 these different categories, I think we're talking about things that are outside the purview 332 00:24:33.680 --> 00:24:37.680 of mere sense, data, and sense experience. That does it mean that 333 00:24:37.720 --> 00:24:41.640 they don't have any connection to material sense data, and sense experience. They're 334 00:24:41.680 --> 00:24:44.920 interrelated, but they're not identical. So I want to say that I don't 335 00:24:44.920 --> 00:24:48.920 think we have to fall into like an either or unless we presuppose materialism. 336 00:24:48.960 --> 00:24:52.799 I think if we did presuppose materialism, it would be self contradictory. So 337 00:24:52.839 --> 00:24:56.319 the argument, specifically in terms of sollogism is that all of these transcendental categories, 338 00:24:56.680 --> 00:25:00.480 if they are to be made coherent and sensible, and I do believe 339 00:25:00.519 --> 00:25:07.279 in a coherentist view of truth and justifying claims, not a classical foundationalist type 340 00:25:07.279 --> 00:25:10.039 of view in terms of epistemology, So I'm gonna be arguing for that school 341 00:25:10.039 --> 00:25:12.079 of thought. I would say that that we would justify them in terms of 342 00:25:12.079 --> 00:25:17.720 their coherence in the worldview in which there is a God that's presented according to 343 00:25:18.119 --> 00:25:22.079 orthodox Christianity. So that's the syllogism, if you want to boil down version 344 00:25:22.079 --> 00:25:26.319 of it, And that's a positive statement of the argument that he's justified on 345 00:25:26.359 --> 00:25:32.000 the basis of being the grounds and the coherence, if you will, what 346 00:25:32.119 --> 00:25:36.599 strings all these many pearls of transcendentals together on a golden string, if you 347 00:25:36.640 --> 00:25:40.359 will, a pearl necklace is God himself. God is the personal one who 348 00:25:40.359 --> 00:25:45.519 does this. And because he's personal, not an immaterial abstract force like a 349 00:25:45.599 --> 00:25:48.319 law of logic or gravity, or the way the Greeks thought of God has 350 00:25:48.359 --> 00:25:52.599 thought thing in itself or its impersonal force. He's actually personal. That then 351 00:25:52.680 --> 00:25:56.680 makes reality at a fundamental level personal and not dead matter. It's not a 352 00:25:56.759 --> 00:26:02.240 meaningless matter out there. It's actually fundamentally at the very fabric and structure, 353 00:26:02.559 --> 00:26:06.359 at subatomic level. I would argue a personal God that's there, that's present, 354 00:26:06.359 --> 00:26:08.319 that's staring us at the face in the face in every action or predication, 355 00:26:08.359 --> 00:26:11.440 in every act in the world, even in the midst of evil actions. 356 00:26:11.440 --> 00:26:14.640 If we think about the problem of evil, I would argue that that 357 00:26:14.680 --> 00:26:18.480 presupposes some standard by which we had judge good and evil. Now That's response 358 00:26:18.640 --> 00:26:23.680 was that can we even attain to this truth? He's not convinced that we 359 00:26:23.759 --> 00:26:27.759 can. And so he went on to sort of explicate that. As I 360 00:26:27.759 --> 00:26:32.640 wrote down what he was saying, I don't want to misrepresent him that just 361 00:26:32.720 --> 00:26:37.440 because we believe that we sort of constructed justifications for things in an abstract way 362 00:26:37.119 --> 00:26:41.680 doesn't necessarily mean that it perhaps matches up to the external world. Maybe that 363 00:26:41.960 --> 00:26:45.759 we just believe that we've attained justifications, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it 364 00:26:45.920 --> 00:26:48.799 is right that we can't move to this, this abstracted realm into the realm 365 00:26:48.839 --> 00:26:52.759 of the here and the now out there in the world. I could, 366 00:26:52.799 --> 00:26:56.119 to a degree concede that, except that I don't think that that's what my 367 00:26:56.319 --> 00:26:59.680 argument was, or was intended to be. I wasn't trying to argue that 368 00:27:00.400 --> 00:27:03.279 just because we can find a rational justification that it necessarily means that everything in 369 00:27:03.279 --> 00:27:07.720 the world conforms to a purely mental structure, because I'm not just trying to 370 00:27:07.759 --> 00:27:11.720 map the external world with mathematics or something like that. I'm actually looking at 371 00:27:11.759 --> 00:27:15.799 something that's even more fundamental, in my view than numbers or mathematics. I 372 00:27:15.799 --> 00:27:19.759 would argue that in our system, yes, God is the ultimate presupposition. 373 00:27:19.839 --> 00:27:23.960 So Matt was correct to say that it sounds like Jay's presupposing the existence of 374 00:27:25.000 --> 00:27:27.640 God, and yes I am, and I know that Matt's debated presubsition before. 375 00:27:29.079 --> 00:27:32.119 I don't think they were very good presenters of that argument. But yes, 376 00:27:32.920 --> 00:27:36.720 in effact, because I believe in that sort of coherentist view of truth 377 00:27:36.759 --> 00:27:40.839 and of the world. It's impossible for me not to have some final circular 378 00:27:40.839 --> 00:27:44.240 authority that I appealed to in my belief, in my system, my worldview, 379 00:27:44.240 --> 00:27:48.079 it is ultimately going to be God. And that's not inconsistent with the 380 00:27:48.559 --> 00:27:55.400 system or the philosophy that I'm promoting. Right, coherentism, not classical foundationalism, 381 00:27:55.440 --> 00:27:59.799 which out of the Enlightenment actually leads to that kind of atheist materialist perspective. 382 00:28:00.240 --> 00:28:06.440 Say, but in fact, there's nothing logically wrong or incoherent by saying 383 00:28:06.440 --> 00:28:10.160 that God is the ultimate foundation in my worldview and that I am presupposing it, 384 00:28:10.400 --> 00:28:15.240 and that I'm comparing what I presuppose to Matt's presupositions. Mass presuppositions are 385 00:28:15.599 --> 00:28:18.799 very pragmatic. As I said, they're very They're skeptical, and they're pragmatic, 386 00:28:18.839 --> 00:28:22.200 and I understand that I don't necessarily have a problem with it. I 387 00:28:22.240 --> 00:28:26.039 would just enjoy Matt to be more consistent if he's going to go that route 388 00:28:26.079 --> 00:28:30.400 and go the route of hum and go ahead and say that truth can't be 389 00:28:30.440 --> 00:28:34.759 justified, induction can't be justified, and not only can it not be justified. 390 00:28:34.799 --> 00:28:38.680 We have to utilize all these things that don't make sense on our worldview. 391 00:28:38.759 --> 00:28:42.440 So I wasn't just throwing out names of Russell and williament or in Quine 392 00:28:44.319 --> 00:28:47.359 to be fancier or whatever. But I'm actually making a specific point about the 393 00:28:47.359 --> 00:28:49.880 fact that Russell and Quine all the way back to hum there's been a consistent 394 00:28:49.920 --> 00:28:55.359 pattern amongst the empiricists, the pragmatic tradition to say, there's not a rational 395 00:28:55.400 --> 00:29:00.799 logical justification for these things that we use in an empiricist worldview. And if 396 00:29:00.839 --> 00:29:06.000 there's not, then then we don't really have a reason or a basis to 397 00:29:06.119 --> 00:29:08.160 go into debate. I'm not saying that you can't debate. I'm glad that 398 00:29:08.200 --> 00:29:12.440 you did, but on the grounds of logic, on the grounds of debate, 399 00:29:12.480 --> 00:29:15.759 which I think presupposes logic and truth, As you talked about, we 400 00:29:15.799 --> 00:29:21.319 don't really have the grounds to debate itself, right, So debate presupposes some 401 00:29:21.400 --> 00:29:25.599 common notion of truth. It presupposes the ability to communicate truths that are not 402 00:29:25.759 --> 00:29:30.039 merely material. I mean, I'm speaking words that have meaning, that are 403 00:29:30.079 --> 00:29:33.000 conceptual in some way that go beyond just the vocal chords. And just the 404 00:29:33.039 --> 00:29:37.920 electricity that actually convey information. We look at information science, information science to 405 00:29:38.079 --> 00:29:44.640 suggest that we don't find information meaningful information being transferred anywhere in the world that's 406 00:29:44.680 --> 00:29:48.079 not from a mind. So the argument that I made was that even more 407 00:29:48.079 --> 00:29:53.839 fundamental than numbers or the concept of information or words is all of these transcendal 408 00:29:53.920 --> 00:29:59.519 categories that are presupposed in communication, in life and logic and ethics and whatever, 409 00:30:00.079 --> 00:30:03.759 and they make sense in a paradigm and a complete worldview where we have 410 00:30:03.880 --> 00:30:06.599 the kind of God that we believe in. That is the argument. Now 411 00:30:06.799 --> 00:30:11.200 one could conceivably say I don't accept transcenental arguments, I don't believe that they're 412 00:30:11.240 --> 00:30:14.000 a valid form of logic. Well, one could do that, but I 413 00:30:14.000 --> 00:30:18.599 think that that would lead to again more fundamental, self contradictory positions that are 414 00:30:18.680 --> 00:30:22.039 ultimately sort of destructive to philosophy as a whole. I mean, I kind 415 00:30:22.039 --> 00:30:25.680 of appreciate that Matt was almost hinting maybe that, well, maybe there could 416 00:30:25.680 --> 00:30:27.440 be some sort of sellipsism or something like that. And I think that if 417 00:30:27.480 --> 00:30:32.319 one were to go down the logical positivist Humian route, that would be the 418 00:30:32.359 --> 00:30:36.480 consistent way to go. You would kind of be led to that whoa, 419 00:30:36.720 --> 00:30:38.119 you know, we live in the matrix kind of view, like Neo or 420 00:30:38.119 --> 00:30:42.200 something, right, that this is just sort of a projection of my subconscious 421 00:30:42.200 --> 00:30:47.680 of my mind. Because many in the empiricist tradition actually did go down that 422 00:30:47.720 --> 00:30:49.200 way. They went down that route by saying that, you know, if 423 00:30:49.200 --> 00:30:53.880 we're going to talk about justifying our beliefs, being rational, giving a coherent 424 00:30:53.920 --> 00:30:57.039 account of our beliefs, we can't really prove the existence of the past. 425 00:30:57.680 --> 00:31:00.839 Not only can we not do that, we can justify induction, the principle 426 00:31:00.880 --> 00:31:04.000 belief that the future will be like the past. We can't really justify the 427 00:31:04.079 --> 00:31:07.720 self. I mean, we have a suck maybe a bundle of memories, 428 00:31:07.720 --> 00:31:11.400 but that doesn't necessarily equate to a quote self that there's a transcendental unity of 429 00:31:11.640 --> 00:31:15.960 a self, that that sort of is underlying all these perceptions, right, 430 00:31:15.000 --> 00:31:21.880 all these these the sense data that comes to us from our from empirical experiences. 431 00:31:22.640 --> 00:31:25.960 If we can't justify those things, then some of them went in this 432 00:31:26.039 --> 00:31:27.319 route of a kind of radical sallipsism, and they said, yeah, the 433 00:31:27.359 --> 00:31:32.599 only thing that we can know is what's immediately presented to our senses and even 434 00:31:32.640 --> 00:31:34.880 that we can't even know if that's coming to us from an external world. 435 00:31:36.799 --> 00:31:40.279 It's just perhaps something that our mind is presenting to our senses. Right, 436 00:31:41.039 --> 00:31:44.680 This would be eventually the debate that's called indirect realism. And if you go 437 00:31:44.759 --> 00:31:47.920 the route of indirect realism, then you don't even have a basis for an 438 00:31:47.920 --> 00:31:51.559 external world, and belief in the external world actually as a transcendental category of 439 00:31:51.599 --> 00:31:53.319 transcenal truth, I would argue, as all these other things that I listed 440 00:31:53.359 --> 00:31:57.039 are now if we're at that point in our philosophy. And I don't fault 441 00:31:57.079 --> 00:32:01.880 Matt for going perhaps into and exploring the realms of where these ideas lead. 442 00:32:02.400 --> 00:32:07.279 I think what they show us is that when we don't have the presupposition of 443 00:32:07.279 --> 00:32:10.119 God, and when we don't start with that, we're inevitably led down these 444 00:32:10.160 --> 00:32:15.839 paths to dead ends in philosophy, total contradictions. And for example, if 445 00:32:15.839 --> 00:32:19.720 one would say, well, maybe sillipsism isn't a contradiction, maybe everything is 446 00:32:19.759 --> 00:32:22.200 just a phenomena of my mind. If we were to go to that route, 447 00:32:22.240 --> 00:32:25.880 then we would be led to the conclusion that everything that's happening, everything's 448 00:32:25.920 --> 00:32:30.599 happening is essentially in some sense illusory or just a figment, a phenomena of 449 00:32:31.039 --> 00:32:35.759 passing ghost, you could say. And if that was the case, then 450 00:32:35.880 --> 00:32:38.839 my coming to know the truth of sullipsism would also be part of the sullipsist 451 00:32:39.480 --> 00:32:45.480 maze and mirror, and it would be self contradictory. All right, all 452 00:32:45.559 --> 00:32:49.079 right, and time. Thank you, Jay, very good, Very good 453 00:32:49.119 --> 00:32:52.200 everybody. If you're just joining us, you're at the Jay Dire YouTube channel, 454 00:32:52.200 --> 00:32:58.359 and we're having a friendly discussion slash debate tonight between Jay Dire and Matt 455 00:32:58.480 --> 00:33:02.920 dillahunty. I am your co host, your guest host, your moderator, 456 00:33:02.920 --> 00:33:06.359 your timekeeper, my call sign as Asher. Thank you for joining us for 457 00:33:06.359 --> 00:33:09.920 the show tonight, and all right, Matt, we'll pass it back over 458 00:33:10.000 --> 00:33:17.480 to you. The mic is yours. Yeah. So I'm a huge fan 459 00:33:17.559 --> 00:33:22.720 of Hume. Doesn't mean I agree with my everything. I'm definitely not a 460 00:33:22.759 --> 00:33:27.319 logical positivist, but I think hum on the foundations of epistemology is probably where 461 00:33:27.440 --> 00:33:31.880 most of my views either formed or began and and for longest time. And 462 00:33:31.920 --> 00:33:36.119 I don't really go with labels when we talk about a lot of things, 463 00:33:36.160 --> 00:33:38.960 like I'm fine with truth, is that which comports the reality largely as opposed 464 00:33:38.960 --> 00:33:44.720 to a coherence view of truth. When it comes to the foundations, I 465 00:33:44.759 --> 00:33:47.000 think probably one of my favorite ones, it comes closest to being a label 466 00:33:47.039 --> 00:33:51.599 that I could apply to myself, is actually found hereintism, which is something 467 00:33:51.640 --> 00:33:55.720 that's Susan Hawk but forth I don't know, somewhere in the last twenty years 468 00:33:55.759 --> 00:34:02.000 or so. Maybe it's a combination of foundationalism and coherentism, and yet none 469 00:34:02.039 --> 00:34:06.240 of it actually works because I don't think we've completely cracked the problem, or 470 00:34:06.759 --> 00:34:09.880 it would be ridiculous of us to pretend that we are all in agreement on 471 00:34:12.239 --> 00:34:15.000 the best epistemology. As a matter of fact, I'm in an argument or 472 00:34:15.159 --> 00:34:17.280 about to be in an argument with somebody else who argued for intuition as an 473 00:34:17.320 --> 00:34:21.880 epistemology, and I find that patently absurd, especially when you say, oh, 474 00:34:21.960 --> 00:34:24.280 yeah, intuitions and epistemology, but you can't really trust it. You 475 00:34:24.280 --> 00:34:28.119 have to go and test it, and that means that testing is now your 476 00:34:28.159 --> 00:34:32.679 epistemology, and intuition is the process by which you apply the results. But 477 00:34:32.760 --> 00:34:37.360 to say that my view means I have no grounds to debate, because you 478 00:34:37.440 --> 00:34:39.960 know, we don't have a common ground. We do have a common ground, 479 00:34:40.480 --> 00:34:45.599 we are in fact doing it. We're debating concepts beyond what we already 480 00:34:45.599 --> 00:34:47.039 agree with. As far as I can tell, Jay and I agree that 481 00:34:47.039 --> 00:34:51.840 we share a reality. Whether or not we can justify that as independent of 482 00:34:51.880 --> 00:34:53.760 the fact that we agree that we do. We seem to share the notion 483 00:34:53.800 --> 00:34:59.559 that identity, non contradiction, excluded, middle are as absolute as anything I 484 00:34:59.559 --> 00:35:04.440 can imagine. We begin with that common ground and then we debate the things 485 00:35:04.480 --> 00:35:07.519 that aren't common And one of those things is is there a foundation behind this? 486 00:35:07.760 --> 00:35:14.159 Is there some justification for thinking there's a foundation or is this circular appeal 487 00:35:14.239 --> 00:35:17.519 to the God presupposition that Jay talked about. Is that really something that we 488 00:35:17.639 --> 00:35:22.039 use to ease our discomfort Because one of the one of the cool things that's 489 00:35:22.039 --> 00:35:25.840 happened over the years, and when I've mentioned Akham's razor before, Akham's Razors 490 00:35:25.880 --> 00:35:31.360 often misrepresented is the simplest explanation is often the best, and literally the formal 491 00:35:31.760 --> 00:35:37.199 phrasing of that is what I mentioned earlier, which is don't multiply entities unnecessarily. 492 00:35:37.119 --> 00:35:43.519 The problem is is that when you say God did it, that feels 493 00:35:43.559 --> 00:35:46.760 simple to people and so they think they're consistent with God, with with Akham's 494 00:35:46.800 --> 00:35:50.840 razor, and so they're saying, ah, well, you presuppose logic and 495 00:35:50.920 --> 00:35:53.639 dignity and morality and all these other things, which isn't necessarily true. I'm 496 00:35:53.639 --> 00:35:57.440 just using those all as examples. I find I think that some of them 497 00:35:57.440 --> 00:36:00.920 are derivative. But you presuppose all those things, and all I have to 498 00:36:00.960 --> 00:36:02.920 do is presuppose God, so I have fewer entities. And it's simple, 499 00:36:04.199 --> 00:36:07.480 except that that God presumption comes with a load of baggage and a lot of 500 00:36:07.519 --> 00:36:12.840 manipulation, including getting it to be the thing that does not require an additional 501 00:36:12.880 --> 00:36:17.119 justification. And there are questions, well, let me let me finish this 502 00:36:17.159 --> 00:36:23.159 part. We're debating the part that's not common now, whether or not we 503 00:36:23.159 --> 00:36:27.559 can justify those things that we agree on. I don't. I'm not convinced 504 00:36:27.599 --> 00:36:31.000 that we can. Otherwise there wouldn't be this debate. We just agree, 505 00:36:31.119 --> 00:36:35.800 Yep, we can or we can't. So I think what we're starting to 506 00:36:35.840 --> 00:36:38.840 talk to is about and this may be a bit of a cheat on my 507 00:36:38.920 --> 00:36:46.480 part, but about certainty, because that's the thing that seems to pervade this 508 00:36:46.639 --> 00:36:51.679 in the well, what is your confidence level or what is your like if 509 00:36:51.719 --> 00:36:55.280 you were to try to quantify your rational justification in X, and if you 510 00:36:55.320 --> 00:37:01.800 begin with a presupposition, nothing that is derived from a standard can be more 511 00:37:01.840 --> 00:37:07.519 accurate than the standard. So if I have a watch that doesn't keep good 512 00:37:07.519 --> 00:37:09.360 time, or I have a ruler that isn't to a standard, all of 513 00:37:09.360 --> 00:37:13.440 my measurement, none of my measurements with that can be more accurate than the 514 00:37:13.480 --> 00:37:17.239 standard that I'm going with. And so we have this grand unknown about logic 515 00:37:17.280 --> 00:37:22.480 and whether or not it is in fact absolute and inviable as it seems to 516 00:37:22.519 --> 00:37:30.519 appear. And even in pure pure reasoning terms, you're automatically led to presuppositions. 517 00:37:30.519 --> 00:37:31.559 You would have to assume they were true. In order to prove they 518 00:37:31.559 --> 00:37:35.400 weren't true, you would have to And that gets us to the assumptions about 519 00:37:35.400 --> 00:37:42.159 truth. For me, what I often see is this assertion that your worldview 520 00:37:42.159 --> 00:37:45.119 can't justify this, and therefore you have no grounds to say anything or do 521 00:37:45.159 --> 00:37:49.239 anything else. And when I hear that, it seems to me that somebody's 522 00:37:49.239 --> 00:37:52.360 saying you can't be absolutely certain, even if you could be reasonably certain, 523 00:37:52.800 --> 00:37:57.079 And so what I don't think you can be absolutely certain about anything. And 524 00:37:57.119 --> 00:38:02.679 I've in the past talked about what I described as I'm fully acknowledge that I 525 00:38:02.719 --> 00:38:08.239 am adela times and not a degree or credentialed person in this field at all, 526 00:38:08.320 --> 00:38:12.400 So I work things out on my own based on others. But it's 527 00:38:12.440 --> 00:38:15.280 what I described as maximal certainty. If I begin with there is a reality, 528 00:38:15.320 --> 00:38:20.239 and the laws of logic appear to be inviolate, and I will revise 529 00:38:20.320 --> 00:38:23.199 that the second somebody demonstrates that the laws of logic can be violated or don't 530 00:38:23.239 --> 00:38:27.320 always apply, I don't know how they could do that. But then everything 531 00:38:27.320 --> 00:38:32.039 that is deductively arrived from those like mathematics, I would say you can be 532 00:38:32.079 --> 00:38:37.719 maximally certain about because the deduction from logic leads to essentially the same level of 533 00:38:37.760 --> 00:38:42.679 certainty, not in your actual results, because we can always forget to carry 534 00:38:42.719 --> 00:38:45.880 the one or something, but mathematics itself is deductively derived from that, and 535 00:38:45.880 --> 00:38:51.199 so we can be maximally certain. Other things are inductively derived, and so 536 00:38:51.239 --> 00:38:54.719 there's a lower standard of certain certainty that doesn't approach to maximal, and maximal 537 00:38:54.800 --> 00:38:59.199 could be absolute. If the laws of logical absolute, then maximal becomes absolute. 538 00:38:59.480 --> 00:39:01.360 It's just that I don't have any way to demonstrate that. For everything 539 00:39:01.360 --> 00:39:05.320 else, we have a lower confidence level, and I'll ah hume. The 540 00:39:05.360 --> 00:39:12.119 wise Man proportions is belief to the evidence, and so recognizing that I live 541 00:39:12.119 --> 00:39:15.639 in a world and I don't think I can be absolutely certain about anything, 542 00:39:15.880 --> 00:39:20.760 but that doesn't mean that I'm in a state of chaos and can't determine anything. 543 00:39:21.159 --> 00:39:25.000 I live in a world that is apparently reasonable, where we have scientific 544 00:39:25.039 --> 00:39:29.400 methods, which, by the way, science doesn't make any proclamations about truth 545 00:39:29.480 --> 00:39:32.639 or claim any sort of certainty. Science is always about this is our tentative 546 00:39:32.639 --> 00:39:37.679 conclusions based on the best current evidence. It's always subject to revision. Nobody's 547 00:39:37.679 --> 00:39:42.159 claiming that you know the moon absolutely well. All right, I was going 548 00:39:42.239 --> 00:39:45.559 to go with green cheese. But there is the thing where you can you 549 00:39:45.599 --> 00:39:47.679 may not know what something is, but you can still demonstrate what it Isn't 550 00:39:47.880 --> 00:39:52.119 you know that this doesn't apply. So I have a belief in an external 551 00:39:52.159 --> 00:39:57.599 world. I agree that that is a transcendental view. But as long as 552 00:39:57.639 --> 00:40:00.360 you and I agree that we share the same reality, which we must do, 553 00:40:00.480 --> 00:40:04.880 Otherwise we wouldn't have agreed to reschedule this debate and come on here and 554 00:40:04.920 --> 00:40:07.880 talk there. Then that's all we need to then begin to have a discussion 555 00:40:08.079 --> 00:40:15.559 about whether or not we have foundations beyond that. So there's a problem that 556 00:40:15.639 --> 00:40:19.960 was stated very early in the last ten minutes or so, where you were 557 00:40:20.199 --> 00:40:22.239 going to try to put it in some sort of syllogistic form. I don't 558 00:40:22.239 --> 00:40:24.920 think we really got there, but I think I might have a better understanding, 559 00:40:25.199 --> 00:40:30.840 which is, there's a whole bunch of transcendental categories, and if those 560 00:40:30.880 --> 00:40:35.480 categories are to be made coherent and sensible, then they require justification. And 561 00:40:35.840 --> 00:40:38.480 you believe that you've found that justification. This is a problem that I have 562 00:40:38.559 --> 00:40:44.480 with the coherent model of truth, and that is you're absolutely right, Jay, 563 00:40:44.960 --> 00:40:51.559 as long because the coherent model of truth is one where you truth is 564 00:40:51.599 --> 00:40:55.119 coherent with a set of propositions. And one of the propositions that you're including 565 00:40:55.320 --> 00:41:00.840 is these things have a foundation. That is the proposition that I reject. 566 00:41:00.920 --> 00:41:05.000 I'm not saying it's false. I can't demonstrate that they don't have a foundation. 567 00:41:05.320 --> 00:41:07.599 I'm just saying there's been no demonstration that they do. I don't see 568 00:41:07.599 --> 00:41:12.880 any reason why these things aren't true in and of themselves, in much the 569 00:41:12.920 --> 00:41:15.480 same way that people would argue that God doesn't need a foundation in and of 570 00:41:15.519 --> 00:41:22.079 itself. To me, if there's no demonstration, there's no way to demonstrate 571 00:41:22.079 --> 00:41:25.480 that this could have been any other way, then we're on pretty good ground 572 00:41:25.480 --> 00:41:30.159 and saying the laws of logic have to be absolute, or at least it's 573 00:41:30.199 --> 00:41:36.480 a reasonable not quite maximally certain inference from the direct observations and the fact that 574 00:41:36.519 --> 00:41:42.280 these tools keep providing us with what appears to be consistent understandings of reality. 575 00:41:43.159 --> 00:41:47.599 Now you can construct a justification for anything. And this is why. If 576 00:41:47.599 --> 00:41:52.119 we're sitting at a card table full disclosure, I'm a magician. I can 577 00:41:52.280 --> 00:41:57.559 cheat at cards, and I deal out the cards and you get We're playing 578 00:41:57.559 --> 00:42:00.320 bridge and you get thirteen spage, you get the perfect bridge Chand now, 579 00:42:01.159 --> 00:42:06.559 within the context of our understanding of the world, you could make a reasonable 580 00:42:06.559 --> 00:42:08.519 conclusion that perhaps I cheated, especially if you know you're sitting there with someone 581 00:42:08.559 --> 00:42:13.840 who's capable of dealing out pretty much whatever they want, or seemingly dealing out 582 00:42:13.880 --> 00:42:19.280 whatever whatever they want, And it would be easily argued that the worldview that 583 00:42:19.320 --> 00:42:24.159 includes Matt cheated would offer the best explanation, the most likely explanation for how 584 00:42:24.159 --> 00:42:30.320 you wound up with all thirteen spades, But that doesn't tell us whether or 585 00:42:30.360 --> 00:42:34.400 not that's actually true at all. Because we know at least a couple of 586 00:42:34.400 --> 00:42:37.880 times in actual bridge tournaments the perfect bridge hand has been dealt and there's no 587 00:42:37.960 --> 00:42:40.880 evidence of any cheating. We also know that it is possible as one of 588 00:42:40.920 --> 00:42:50.039 the many random outcomes of a shuffle deck of cards. It's more comforting to 589 00:42:50.159 --> 00:42:52.719 say I don't know if he cheated or not, but boy, sure would 590 00:42:52.760 --> 00:42:55.000 make a lot more sense if he cheated. That's completely independent from whether it's 591 00:42:55.000 --> 00:42:58.480 true, which gets us back to what I was saying earlier, that the 592 00:42:58.559 --> 00:43:00.960 belief that there's a God that serves as a foundation may be comforting, but 593 00:43:01.079 --> 00:43:07.519 I see no demonstration that it's necessary or true. Really good statements there, 594 00:43:07.679 --> 00:43:13.000 um. The first thing I would point out is that when you said that 595 00:43:13.960 --> 00:43:21.119 we appeal to God to ease our discomfort, my first argument would be that 596 00:43:21.119 --> 00:43:24.039 that is an appeal to motion. That's not a valid argument. That's actually 597 00:43:24.119 --> 00:43:28.360 a fallacy to appeal to the fact that the people that believe this or go 598 00:43:28.400 --> 00:43:30.639 down this route are doing it because of psychological motivation. So I don't think 599 00:43:30.639 --> 00:43:36.400 that's a valid argument. I would say next that the idea that you have 600 00:43:36.480 --> 00:43:40.800 the ability to distinguish between the categories that are maximally certain, such as abstract 601 00:43:40.920 --> 00:43:46.119 numbers, etc. Versus the things that are derived from induction, scientific experimentation, 602 00:43:46.159 --> 00:43:52.519 empiricism, the ability to make that distinction itself presupposes some true category. 603 00:43:52.559 --> 00:43:55.880 Once again, So while I recognize that you wanted to sort of qualify by 604 00:43:55.920 --> 00:44:00.320 moving into the category of maximally certain and not absolutely certain, that's fine. 605 00:44:00.360 --> 00:44:04.480 You can use whichever terms you want to use. From my perspective, it 606 00:44:04.480 --> 00:44:07.239 doesn't matter to me because I don't believe that you would be able to have, 607 00:44:07.079 --> 00:44:13.280 in the pragmatic perspective a justification for any kind of truth whatsoever. In 608 00:44:13.320 --> 00:44:19.159 fact, the whole system quite literally should lead directly into syllipsism and total relativism. 609 00:44:19.159 --> 00:44:22.159 Now, I know that you don't necessarily accept total relativism, because, 610 00:44:22.199 --> 00:44:28.559 as you said, we have a common world, a something area where we 611 00:44:28.599 --> 00:44:30.360 can dialogue about these things and have the debate, So we don't believe in 612 00:44:30.440 --> 00:44:35.320 total relativism. However, in order to not believe in total word relativism, 613 00:44:35.320 --> 00:44:38.599 again, assumes these categories, assumes these things that you seem to admit, 614 00:44:38.679 --> 00:44:44.159 but don't think that they necessarily presuppose or lead to any kind of a personal 615 00:44:44.199 --> 00:44:46.480 God. And I understand why you're saying that, So I want to stress 616 00:44:46.559 --> 00:44:51.480 that I don't think the appeal to discomfort is a valid argument. I don't 617 00:44:51.480 --> 00:44:55.480 think that you have the ability to have even maximal certainty, And I don't 618 00:44:55.519 --> 00:44:59.960 believe that you can construct a justification for anything. So the example that you 619 00:45:00.079 --> 00:45:02.719 gay was a case where you could you know, you cheated at cards, 620 00:45:02.719 --> 00:45:05.920 et cetera, et cetera, and somebody could build a case or whatever. 621 00:45:06.760 --> 00:45:12.960 When it comes to normative day to day kinds of activities or what you could 622 00:45:12.960 --> 00:45:15.039 call normative logic, that could be true. Yes, there's a lot of 623 00:45:15.039 --> 00:45:20.159 situations where we would have, through induction, limited amounts of certainty. But 624 00:45:20.480 --> 00:45:22.800 the strength of the transcendental argument, the strength of the argument that's being presented 625 00:45:22.840 --> 00:45:28.880 here, is that there are some things that are so fundamental that to deny 626 00:45:29.000 --> 00:45:32.559 them or doubt them, which theoretically one could doubt them, but to actually 627 00:45:32.639 --> 00:45:37.159 live or to actually consistently try to doubt them and not live according to them 628 00:45:37.280 --> 00:45:43.559 or not debate, according to them, would lead to such a fundamental breakdown 629 00:45:43.599 --> 00:45:46.800 of the coherence of one's belief system or even the possibility of knowledge, the 630 00:45:46.840 --> 00:45:52.000 possibility of operating in the world, predicating about objects in the world, of 631 00:45:52.400 --> 00:45:57.000 knowing things in the world, or doing science at all. Those types of 632 00:45:57.039 --> 00:46:00.679 things are so fundamental that they're I'm arguing even stronger as an argument, they're 633 00:46:01.000 --> 00:46:05.840 maximally certain to whatever degree you want to pause it there. If you want 634 00:46:05.840 --> 00:46:07.239 to say absolute or not absolute, that's fine, it doesn't matter to me. 635 00:46:07.800 --> 00:46:13.480 I don't have a problem using the terms of warranted beliefs or highly warranted 636 00:46:13.559 --> 00:46:15.960 or maximally or whatever, because that really those are just humanly derived terms that 637 00:46:16.000 --> 00:46:21.400 are trying to describe the strongest level of certainty possible. So I believe that 638 00:46:21.400 --> 00:46:28.000 those kinds of transcendal categories are not only maximally certain or necessary, but that 639 00:46:28.039 --> 00:46:31.880 they don't operate independently. They actually presuppose and interact with one another, which 640 00:46:31.920 --> 00:46:36.360 is kind of why I started the debate talking about the three branches of philosophy 641 00:46:36.400 --> 00:46:40.320 which make up a worldview. These things all I believe cohere and kind of 642 00:46:40.360 --> 00:46:44.960 presuppose and are tied together with one another. For example, it wouldn't make 643 00:46:45.000 --> 00:46:50.480 any sense to talk about the past experiences, and can I have a rational 644 00:46:50.480 --> 00:46:54.599 belief in past experiences if I didn't believe that there was a self that had 645 00:46:54.639 --> 00:46:59.760 those experiences. It seems that these two things kind of go together. Being 646 00:46:59.800 --> 00:47:02.360 able to predicate about objects in the external world, right, kind of assumes 647 00:47:02.400 --> 00:47:07.440 that objects in the external world have identity over time. Right, that I 648 00:47:07.440 --> 00:47:09.639 can pick out one object amongst many objects, and so that's the problem of 649 00:47:09.679 --> 00:47:13.800 the one in the many. Right, So any any kinds of examples like 650 00:47:13.840 --> 00:47:19.440 this tend to I would say, kind of assume all these transcendental categories together, 651 00:47:19.519 --> 00:47:22.239 even if we're only focusing on maybe one area here or there. Maybe 652 00:47:22.239 --> 00:47:25.079 we're only talking about linguistics. A lot of modern philosophers P. F. 653 00:47:25.159 --> 00:47:30.639 Strawson call auto apple. They've done a lot of work in transcendent arguments as 654 00:47:30.639 --> 00:47:32.639 they apply to language. In linguistics. How many things, It's kind of 655 00:47:32.679 --> 00:47:38.000 amazing, how many things we presuppose just in communication, just in subject predicate 656 00:47:38.039 --> 00:47:43.480 relations and sentences, just in trying to communicate that information to another bunch of 657 00:47:43.880 --> 00:47:49.760 gray matter. The intricacy, the complexity in this is fascinating. It's it's 658 00:47:49.760 --> 00:47:53.840 phenomenal actually, And so what I think is so strong about this argumentation is 659 00:47:53.880 --> 00:47:59.000 that we're not just arguing that it's a kind of a model up here in 660 00:47:59.039 --> 00:48:02.559 the abstract that's pretty cool, like some big world of warcraft scheme that we've 661 00:48:02.599 --> 00:48:07.480 we've invented that really doesn't have anything to do with the external world. I'm 662 00:48:07.480 --> 00:48:09.440 saying that, No, when when I have a friend who's a rocket scientist. 663 00:48:09.480 --> 00:48:14.239 He's done contract word for NASA, he designs black hawks, right, 664 00:48:14.800 --> 00:48:20.119 he talks about the amazing complexity of the algorithms that he works with. Now, 665 00:48:20.119 --> 00:48:22.239 I'm not a mathematician, right. I know about math theory in terms 666 00:48:22.239 --> 00:48:27.639 of philosophy, but I don't do the abstract, you know, calculus that 667 00:48:27.679 --> 00:48:30.880 he does to how to build you know, black hawks. Right. But 668 00:48:31.320 --> 00:48:35.280 to him, at least in his mind as an engineer and many other engineers 669 00:48:35.280 --> 00:48:39.039 and mathematicians who utilize math and engineering, is that they see the practical application 670 00:48:39.199 --> 00:48:44.159 of this very abstract realm into the here and the now. And if something's 671 00:48:44.199 --> 00:48:45.880 wrong in the equation, the black Hawk's not gonna fly, it's gonna crash. 672 00:48:46.000 --> 00:48:49.360 Right, So he has to be very precise. He has to be 673 00:48:49.440 --> 00:48:52.599 very clear in the way that he gets it all perfectly right. And so 674 00:48:52.679 --> 00:48:55.719 it's not just in the realm of the abstract. It's also very present in 675 00:48:55.760 --> 00:49:00.280 the here and the now, and that's just mathematics. So what I think 676 00:49:00.280 --> 00:49:04.400 if we reorient our perspective when we look at the power and possibility of transcendental 677 00:49:04.480 --> 00:49:08.199 arguments, we're not just saying something theoretical. We're actually mapping us onto reality 678 00:49:08.199 --> 00:49:12.079 and saying that all of reality kind of presupposes this kind of a god, 679 00:49:12.320 --> 00:49:16.400 and that itself is the argument. So again, one could conceivably say I 680 00:49:16.400 --> 00:49:20.559 don't accept transidental arguments, but I think that that would lead to a bunch 681 00:49:20.639 --> 00:49:23.280 of dead ends and a reductive who is a valid argument if we're led to 682 00:49:23.360 --> 00:49:27.119 dead ends when we deny this thing over here? To me, I think 683 00:49:27.119 --> 00:49:31.000 that's one of the strongest possible arguments. A couple other last points on Matt's 684 00:49:32.039 --> 00:49:38.559 last statements there is that I think when he says that coherentism. When he 685 00:49:38.599 --> 00:49:43.280 was listing coherentism, he talked about how your beliefs don't have a foundation. 686 00:49:44.000 --> 00:49:45.840 Well, I'm not trying to fault Matt as if he necessarily doesn't understand this. 687 00:49:45.880 --> 00:49:50.679 Maybe misspoke. But the coherentism is not about foundations. It's actually about 688 00:49:50.719 --> 00:49:52.360 the coherence of the web of beliefs. Right. So there's two models. 689 00:49:52.400 --> 00:49:57.519 The foundationalist model is like self evident maxims and then beliefs on top of the 690 00:49:57.519 --> 00:50:00.679 self evident maxims, and then beliefs that lead to further believes that lead to 691 00:50:00.719 --> 00:50:04.679 further beliefs. Right. So that's foundationalism, and it has foundations. We 692 00:50:04.719 --> 00:50:07.639 don't have that model right when it comes to webs of beliefs and when it 693 00:50:07.639 --> 00:50:14.360 comes to paradigms and worldviews that are justified in terms of coherentism. So that's 694 00:50:14.400 --> 00:50:19.639 because if I'm thinking about logic over here in this arena, maybe I'm talking 695 00:50:19.679 --> 00:50:22.960 about the laws of logic. That's not disconnected from who I am. That's 696 00:50:22.960 --> 00:50:28.440 not disconnected from my belief in God. It's not disconnected from ethics that we 697 00:50:28.559 --> 00:50:32.639 ought to be logical, that we ought to reason from premise to valid conclusion. 698 00:50:32.760 --> 00:50:36.840 Right, So it's all connected in our view, And I think that's 699 00:50:36.880 --> 00:50:42.280 a better method, a better way of understanding truth propositions, beliefs, claims, 700 00:50:42.320 --> 00:50:45.639 etc. So I would say that I think Matt's position, while he 701 00:50:45.760 --> 00:50:52.039 did ask some good questions kind of misunderstood and made a couple of logical violations 702 00:50:52.079 --> 00:50:57.239 there, and the response that what if there's no explanation, Well, I 703 00:50:57.239 --> 00:50:59.800 would say that if we're here to debate, and if we want to to 704 00:51:00.159 --> 00:51:05.400 theism, I would say that if Matt wants to say that there's all these 705 00:51:05.400 --> 00:51:09.920 things that he utilizes but doesn't necessarily think that they're true in the external world, 706 00:51:10.000 --> 00:51:13.800 per se laws of logic and all that truth with a capitalty or whatever, 707 00:51:14.440 --> 00:51:16.559 I would say that Matt's being arbitrary. And if Matt can be arbitrary, 708 00:51:16.599 --> 00:51:22.159 then I can say God just is right. So if arbitrary is allowed, 709 00:51:22.239 --> 00:51:25.039 if we can be at hawk, then I think that the debate is 710 00:51:25.079 --> 00:51:29.199 over, because that would be a violation of the laws of debate. But 711 00:51:29.239 --> 00:51:30.760 of course we don't believe that we can be arbitrary or at hawk, and 712 00:51:30.800 --> 00:51:34.280 so therefore we can't just say, well, the laws of lodging just are 713 00:51:34.960 --> 00:51:37.599 I forget Matt's phrase. He said that truth is what maps up to reality 714 00:51:37.719 --> 00:51:44.000 or belief that conforms to reality. That's a metaphysical claim, right, That's 715 00:51:43.239 --> 00:51:46.880 a metaphysical statement about the external world. Right now, I'm not I know 716 00:51:46.920 --> 00:51:50.840 Matt's would only say that, well, that's maximally certain in a pragmatic sort 717 00:51:50.840 --> 00:51:53.880 of sense. Okay, fair enough, but it still doesn't work to say 718 00:51:53.920 --> 00:52:00.159 it just is, because once we've admitted it just is, then that's being 719 00:52:00.199 --> 00:52:07.079 arbitrary in at hoc. Right, All right, Jay, good one, 720 00:52:07.440 --> 00:52:10.000 you're right down there. I was just about to give you a thirty second 721 00:52:10.039 --> 00:52:14.719 warning. So let's see where are we at. That was your third one, 722 00:52:14.840 --> 00:52:17.039 Matt, this will be your third one coming up? Am I right? 723 00:52:17.079 --> 00:52:22.079 Am? I on track here? Folks? All right, I don't 724 00:52:22.119 --> 00:52:23.440 think this one will take the whole ten minutes. All right, Well, 725 00:52:23.480 --> 00:52:29.159 feel free, the mic is yours, and then we'll switch gears into something 726 00:52:29.239 --> 00:52:36.159 else. Sure. So Jay's basically just saying that if I can arbitrarily say 727 00:52:36.760 --> 00:52:38.840 the laws of logic just are, then he can just arbitrarily say that God 728 00:52:38.960 --> 00:52:44.400 is. He's completely right. Except that's not what's happening. I'm not arbitrarily 729 00:52:44.440 --> 00:52:47.320 saying the laws of logic just are. I'm not even asserting that they just 730 00:52:47.440 --> 00:52:52.880 are. I am recognizing that I have no reason to think that they could 731 00:52:52.239 --> 00:52:58.360 be anything other than what they appear to be, which is in violent and 732 00:52:58.519 --> 00:53:04.360 absolute. I'm not they are absolute. I'm saying it's my presupposition, and 733 00:53:04.440 --> 00:53:08.159 that presupposition is supported by the continued reliability of these things. And yes, 734 00:53:08.960 --> 00:53:12.639 there's something in there that's always going to be circular, which is why we 735 00:53:12.800 --> 00:53:15.079 call him a presupposition. But what but when, Jay, what he's really 736 00:53:15.119 --> 00:53:21.760 doing is admitting that he's presupposing a foundation to the thing that I'm presupposing. 737 00:53:22.599 --> 00:53:29.000 And okay, you can call it an arbitrary you can call whatever I'm saying. 738 00:53:29.119 --> 00:53:31.599 The whole point of this discussion is we both agree on the absolutes, 739 00:53:31.599 --> 00:53:36.079 and my view is I'm not aware of any way that they can have a 740 00:53:36.119 --> 00:53:38.599 foundation. I'm not sure that there's any way to demonstrate that they have a 741 00:53:38.599 --> 00:53:43.960 foundation, and presupposing a foundation, you can say it's an emotional appeal. 742 00:53:44.159 --> 00:53:49.480 I don't what other reason would somebody have to presuppose a foundation to something that 743 00:53:49.559 --> 00:53:52.320 can't be demonstrated or hasn't been demonstrated to have a foundation, other than their 744 00:53:52.440 --> 00:53:59.199 discomfort with the lack of a foundation. Because I'm not convinced that even the 745 00:53:59.239 --> 00:54:01.000 foundation that they're resupposing can do what they think of to do. And I'll 746 00:54:01.000 --> 00:54:05.760 get to that in just a second. He said, all of reality priests 747 00:54:05.760 --> 00:54:08.679 supposes a God. That's just a bald assertion. I'm part of reality as 748 00:54:08.679 --> 00:54:12.039 far as I can tell, I don't presuppose a god. So that's clearly 749 00:54:12.079 --> 00:54:15.039 false. But in the context of what he was actually saying, he seems 750 00:54:15.079 --> 00:54:19.199 to be claiming that all of this necessitates a god. And when he refers 751 00:54:19.280 --> 00:54:22.159 to you know, the use of a reductio ad absurd him. I agree. 752 00:54:22.159 --> 00:54:24.199 I got no problem with a reductio, but no, finding a dead 753 00:54:24.360 --> 00:54:30.800 end in your constructed reductio doesn't mean that your other proposition is correct. There 754 00:54:30.800 --> 00:54:32.679 are two things that need to happen in order for that reductio it to be 755 00:54:32.679 --> 00:54:36.760 of any use. The first is that you have to demonstrate that there is 756 00:54:36.800 --> 00:54:42.920 a necessity of an explanation for X, and then all other possible explanations for 757 00:54:43.199 --> 00:54:49.360 X fail, and that neither of those has been has been done by any 758 00:54:49.360 --> 00:54:52.679 stretch of the imagination. I'm you know, where's the demonstration that there must 759 00:54:52.719 --> 00:54:55.639 be an explanation that it couldn't just be so. I'm not saying it is 760 00:54:55.719 --> 00:54:59.639 just so, which I was kind of accused of, but I'm just going 761 00:54:59.679 --> 00:55:05.559 to say that was talking quickly and that there was no malice misrepresenting it. 762 00:55:05.760 --> 00:55:08.079 I'm not saying it has to be so. I'm saying, where's the demonstration 763 00:55:08.119 --> 00:55:13.519 that it that it is necessary? That it can't be so? And we 764 00:55:13.599 --> 00:55:15.840 haven't gone through all other possibilities to show that they lead to a dead end. 765 00:55:15.880 --> 00:55:22.519 We haven't even gone through the raw theism versus non theism view to show 766 00:55:22.559 --> 00:55:25.480 that this doesn't have an explanation. Because just because we don't have an explanation 767 00:55:25.559 --> 00:55:30.000 for something today that is consistent with a worldview that doesn't include a god, 768 00:55:30.239 --> 00:55:34.239 doesn't mean that that's not going to happen at a later time. This is 769 00:55:34.280 --> 00:55:37.800 the thing about skepticism. There may be some things for which we will never 770 00:55:37.840 --> 00:55:44.159 have an explanation. That's incredibly we're all uncomfortable with not knowing. I wasn't 771 00:55:44.159 --> 00:55:46.440 trying to make an emotional appeal. I think that's how humans operate. Our 772 00:55:46.559 --> 00:55:50.639 discomfort with not knowing is what makes us seek answers. It's the reason we're 773 00:55:50.679 --> 00:55:54.960 having this potential discussion today because if Jay can successfully present something that convinces me, 774 00:55:55.199 --> 00:55:59.599 well, now there's another person ostensibly on his side, and if I 775 00:55:59.639 --> 00:56:01.960 can, if I can show the word Jay has made a mistake in assuming 776 00:56:01.960 --> 00:56:06.800 something that isn't necessary and can't be demonstrated. Well, then maybe I have 777 00:56:06.840 --> 00:56:08.559 an ally on my side. I don't think either one of us came into 778 00:56:08.599 --> 00:56:12.639 day thinking that we were going to change the other person's mind. I don't 779 00:56:12.760 --> 00:56:15.320 do this. I mean, I'd be happy if Jay and I wound up 780 00:56:15.320 --> 00:56:17.400 agreeing on stuff, But I do it for the people who are listening so 781 00:56:17.440 --> 00:56:22.199 that they can hear a discussion about this, and especially in areas like you 782 00:56:22.239 --> 00:56:28.119 know, deep philosophical concepts where I'm not remotely an expert. I just think 783 00:56:28.159 --> 00:56:31.480 what I think and for my reasons, but I can do my best to 784 00:56:31.519 --> 00:56:36.039 explain it. I'm not as you know, you talked about language. I 785 00:56:36.519 --> 00:56:38.920 would never assume that Jay and I have the exact same understanding of word usage. 786 00:56:38.920 --> 00:56:40.920 As a matter of fact, I would assume the exact opposite, that 787 00:56:40.920 --> 00:56:44.800 there are things where we're going to have a different understanding of a word, 788 00:56:44.840 --> 00:56:47.519 a different understanding of a concept. But my presumption coming in here is that 789 00:56:49.079 --> 00:56:53.920 we both speak English and have an understanding of usage that is sufficient for us 790 00:56:53.960 --> 00:56:58.000 to be able to discuss things, to find the areas where we agree, 791 00:56:58.079 --> 00:57:00.719 like, Hey, what do you mean by this word mean by God. 792 00:57:00.480 --> 00:57:04.599 Okay, well, now we can have this secondary discussion. I think you 793 00:57:04.639 --> 00:57:07.400 know that's the only assumption I'm making is that there's a likelihood that we can 794 00:57:07.400 --> 00:57:12.480 come to an agreement on terms and communicate ideas. And I think that it's 795 00:57:12.480 --> 00:57:16.320 evident that we're actually succeeding at that. But the notion that a God could 796 00:57:16.360 --> 00:57:21.639 serve as a foundation for the laws of logic, in addition to no demonstration 797 00:57:21.679 --> 00:57:24.239 of necessity, and I'm not sure what the warrant is apart from an assertion 798 00:57:24.280 --> 00:57:30.559 that there is a need and atheism or a nontheistic view of the world doesn't 799 00:57:30.599 --> 00:57:36.360 fill that is this, can God change, alter, or violate the laws 800 00:57:36.360 --> 00:57:39.119 of logic? Because if so, then they're not guaranteed, and if not, 801 00:57:39.239 --> 00:57:44.159 then he's not the guaranteer. He is now subject to those same laws. 802 00:57:44.760 --> 00:57:49.599 And the second problem is that we all recognize I would hope that each 803 00:57:49.639 --> 00:57:53.760 of us is a flawed thinker, that we not only have varying IQs and 804 00:57:53.840 --> 00:58:00.360 varying understandings and various biases that come in and the process by which we learn, 805 00:58:00.480 --> 00:58:04.280 every single one of us makes mistakes, and we can't even guarantee that 806 00:58:04.320 --> 00:58:07.480 we're that the model of reality that is in our head actually maps to an 807 00:58:07.519 --> 00:58:12.559 actual reality. That's a kind of an assumption we're making as well when we 808 00:58:12.639 --> 00:58:16.239 were talking about solid system. And so if we are flawed in our thinking, 809 00:58:17.159 --> 00:58:22.480 how can a god, even a perfect God, make your flawed mind 810 00:58:22.559 --> 00:58:27.599 correct and warranted without making your mind unflawed. It is like pouring clean water 811 00:58:27.639 --> 00:58:30.960 through a dirty filter. And so the fact that you are convinced that there's 812 00:58:30.960 --> 00:58:34.960 a God out there that serves as a foundation for logic doesn't mean there is 813 00:58:35.000 --> 00:58:38.320 one. And even if that God does exist and does serve as the foundation 814 00:58:38.639 --> 00:58:43.719 for logic, there's no way for that God to demonstrate that to you and 815 00:58:44.360 --> 00:58:50.760 to the point where you would have the essentially absolute or maximal epistemic warrant, 816 00:58:51.360 --> 00:58:54.199 unless that God makes your mind completely not flawed, at which case there would 817 00:58:54.199 --> 00:58:58.039 be no more debate or discussion. It would just be hey, this is 818 00:58:58.039 --> 00:59:00.840 the way it works, and we go Gosh, because we would have godlike 819 00:59:00.079 --> 00:59:05.760 mentality. And so I don't know how, even you know, I don't 820 00:59:05.800 --> 00:59:09.280 know how to overcome those problems. The laws of logic are our descriptions of 821 00:59:09.440 --> 00:59:15.400 abstract truths, which, okay, I'll set aside the presupposing of truth or 822 00:59:15.440 --> 00:59:20.760 discussions about truth. And I don't know that it's not the case that something 823 00:59:20.800 --> 00:59:24.159 can't simply be true, that this is the way it is, and in 824 00:59:24.199 --> 00:59:28.000 fact it could not have been any other way. If we look at the 825 00:59:28.079 --> 00:59:30.760 laws of logic and they could not have been any other way, which is 826 00:59:30.760 --> 00:59:34.719 what it appears to be, even though we can't be absolutely confident about that, 827 00:59:35.840 --> 00:59:39.280 then it would seem to me patently absurd to suggest that there's something that 828 00:59:39.400 --> 00:59:43.920 must exist that serves as a guarantee that it couldn't be any other way, 829 00:59:44.079 --> 00:59:51.679 if in fact it couldn't have been any other way. All right, excellent, 830 00:59:52.559 --> 00:59:58.840 great discussion you guys. That concludes the first hour of our talk here. 831 00:59:59.039 --> 01:00:01.679 So Jay over to you for you know what you want to do next? 832 01:00:02.719 --> 01:00:09.639 Do we want to do like a conversational now whatever, I'm up for 833 01:00:09.679 --> 01:00:13.760 whatever. I mean, if there's questions from from the chat or super chat, 834 01:00:13.800 --> 01:00:15.840 we can do those if you have questions for me. I mean, 835 01:00:15.880 --> 01:00:17.920 I asked a few questions there at the at the end of dress so I'm 836 01:00:17.960 --> 01:00:22.920 sure we'll get to the super chats here towards the last section. So, 837 01:00:23.119 --> 01:00:29.000 um, the first thing I would say is that you talked about um. 838 01:00:29.119 --> 01:00:32.719 What what I was saying was that when it comes to the domain of philosophy 839 01:00:32.760 --> 01:00:37.559 where we do debates, where we do argumentation, to say, I mean, 840 01:00:37.559 --> 01:00:44.239 it's fine to say that you believe that we seek justification for a beliefs, 841 01:00:44.559 --> 01:00:51.119 perhaps at times out of psychological motivations for comfort, but that doesn't translate 842 01:00:51.159 --> 01:00:55.639 into an argument in a debate. So just because and it could be entirely 843 01:00:55.679 --> 01:00:59.400 the case. It could be the case that maybe maybe a person is only 844 01:00:59.480 --> 01:01:05.800 arguing for or the existence of God because of psychological motivations, and they're weak 845 01:01:05.880 --> 01:01:07.239 people and they want they want to have comfort. But I still think that 846 01:01:07.239 --> 01:01:12.280 that's a fallacious argument in terms of strict logic, it's not valid to the 847 01:01:12.280 --> 01:01:15.679 truth or falsity of God's existence. So when we're talking about logical necessity, 848 01:01:15.719 --> 01:01:20.239 we're talking about something that's a little more forceful and it's a little more strict. 849 01:01:20.639 --> 01:01:25.719 And again, it doesn't matter if we limit the certitude or the trueness 850 01:01:25.760 --> 01:01:30.039 to maximal certainty. It really doesn't matter, because I think the argument that 851 01:01:30.079 --> 01:01:35.199 I'm trying to present is that if we had the system of truth that you 852 01:01:35.239 --> 01:01:38.079 had, if we had your worldview, it would and should lead us down 853 01:01:38.159 --> 01:01:43.920 a certain path, a consistent path of sallipsism, of total skepticism if we 854 01:01:43.920 --> 01:01:46.280 were to follow through with those conclusions. But that the point is that you're 855 01:01:46.320 --> 01:01:52.159 not really doing that. You're still utilizing things that wouldn't make sense given your 856 01:01:52.159 --> 01:01:59.119 presuppositions, and that is itself the argument. So, as a skeptic and 857 01:01:59.159 --> 01:02:02.000 somebody who essentially teaches about skepticism, I often get asked this thing about can 858 01:02:02.039 --> 01:02:06.159 you be too skeptical? And of course my answer is no, because what 859 01:02:06.239 --> 01:02:10.320 they're generally be talking about there is not skepticism and cynicism. Skepticism is an 860 01:02:10.320 --> 01:02:15.199 ideology in an ideological sense. Is I want my internal model of reality to 861 01:02:15.280 --> 01:02:21.079 match the reality I experience as best as possible. And so you have a 862 01:02:21.119 --> 01:02:25.119 couple times now suggested that my worldview should lead me down a path of total 863 01:02:25.159 --> 01:02:30.159 skepticism. Well, I am a total skeptic in the sense that I have 864 01:02:30.400 --> 01:02:37.000 doubts about everything. I am not absolutely certain about anything, But that doesn't 865 01:02:37.000 --> 01:02:39.519 mean that I don't have reasonable confidence in things that are based on the foundation 866 01:02:39.800 --> 01:02:45.159 of logic. Now, if we're gonna have the conversation about what's beyond logic, 867 01:02:45.320 --> 01:02:51.800 which is apparently what we're trying to do. Criticizing the view is just 868 01:02:51.960 --> 01:02:54.199 one more attempt to say, oh, there must be a foundation. Well, 869 01:02:54.239 --> 01:02:59.239 where's the demonstration that there must be a foundation? What are the consequences 870 01:02:59.639 --> 01:03:01.679 if there's not a foundation. Of the argument is that you don't have a 871 01:03:01.719 --> 01:03:07.800 basis or ability consistently to appeal to logic itself, Setting aside the justification of 872 01:03:07.800 --> 01:03:13.800 whether I have the same basis everybody else does. I'm convinced that it is 873 01:03:13.840 --> 01:03:16.440 reliable, as are you. The difference between us is that you are convinced 874 01:03:16.480 --> 01:03:22.000 that you found why it's liable. That's not but but but that was why 875 01:03:22.039 --> 01:03:24.519 I asked that the Prince the question about induction, Right, So induction and 876 01:03:24.960 --> 01:03:29.800 saying that you're convinced about it, it would presumably mean that you think that 877 01:03:29.920 --> 01:03:34.199 it works. Right, it's pragmatic. Yeah, yeah, it works. 878 01:03:34.559 --> 01:03:37.760 We both agree with that. So, just pretty much else in the planets, 879 01:03:37.000 --> 01:03:42.199 something works is a value judgment, right that you're using another category to 880 01:03:42.239 --> 01:03:45.320 try to say that that's why this thing is true. But ultimately that would 881 01:03:45.320 --> 01:03:50.960 be circular. Yes, yes, So the whole thing is I've acknowledged a 882 01:03:51.000 --> 01:03:53.000 presupposition. Why how on earth is it as a counter to me to say, 883 01:03:53.039 --> 01:03:57.960 oh, you're presupposed because on the world view that you have, those 884 01:03:58.039 --> 01:04:03.199 kinds of things shouldn't exists. That's that's absolutely not true. So this is 885 01:04:03.199 --> 01:04:06.360 where we're always going to get in trouble. You make an assertion about my 886 01:04:06.480 --> 01:04:13.559 worldview and about what shouldn't exist my worldview is that I accept to this because 887 01:04:13.599 --> 01:04:16.559 of a demonstration of its continued reliability called induction. I haven't. That's not 888 01:04:16.679 --> 01:04:21.320 a justification. That's just saying that it is right. So in logical justification, 889 01:04:21.679 --> 01:04:24.800 that was why I pointed to Hume. All the way up to Quine, 890 01:04:25.199 --> 01:04:28.280 they still say that this is not a belief or a view that can 891 01:04:28.280 --> 01:04:35.000 be justified. Yes, I agree, yes, and I agree, I 892 01:04:35.440 --> 01:04:40.239 see no justification. You're asserting there is a justification, and when I ask 893 01:04:40.280 --> 01:04:43.679 for what it is, you're just asserting that while my worldview collapses without it, 894 01:04:43.679 --> 01:04:46.039 and you even asserted that these sorts of things shouldn't exist, stopped you 895 01:04:46.119 --> 01:04:49.719 sort of these short of things shouldn't have existed in my worldview. Where's the 896 01:04:49.760 --> 01:04:55.639 demonstration that my worldview should not include things that are just true or better yet 897 01:04:55.920 --> 01:05:00.039 that are reasonably presupposed because of their continued demonstrate of effort, because they would 898 01:05:00.079 --> 01:05:02.920 be that would be being ad hoc and being arbitrary. And I'm saying the 899 01:05:02.960 --> 01:05:06.639 justification is that in a world where there is a god, the doctrine of 900 01:05:06.679 --> 01:05:12.159 providence actually makes sense. Why there's induction and the regularity that's in nature. 901 01:05:12.679 --> 01:05:15.199 I'm not aware of. I'm not aware of a girl where the world where 902 01:05:15.199 --> 01:05:16.440 there is a god. I'm aware of a world where there are people who 903 01:05:16.440 --> 01:05:19.639 are convinced there's a god and who are convinced it serves as a foundation right 904 01:05:19.679 --> 01:05:27.039 here, right right, And so where's the demonstration for that other than in 905 01:05:29.440 --> 01:05:31.280 it's not. No, it's not I mean, if we're just, if 906 01:05:31.280 --> 01:05:35.480 we're just going to make flat out assertions, then you assert your rights. 907 01:05:35.320 --> 01:05:40.000 It's it's not an argument. You haven't presented a single argument for the for 908 01:05:40.000 --> 01:05:45.199 the for the entire thing. You've presented colloquial kind of loose arguments, but 909 01:05:45.239 --> 01:05:49.159 there's not the whole thing is you just you claimed that this shouldn't exist in 910 01:05:49.159 --> 01:05:54.960 my worldview, that logical absolutes could not be true under my worldview. The 911 01:05:55.000 --> 01:05:59.920 fact that I you're presupposing that there is an explanation for why they're absolute, 912 01:06:00.480 --> 01:06:03.119 rather than just recognizing that they are. That would be being arbitrary and being 913 01:06:03.159 --> 01:06:11.119 at hawk, and typically in debates that's not allowed. It's it's wow, 914 01:06:11.840 --> 01:06:14.760 hey, Jade, I'm sorry to interrupt. Um. We are getting some 915 01:06:14.880 --> 01:06:17.639 complaints as you guys are doing the more free form conversations, So if you 916 01:06:17.760 --> 01:06:20.960 can, if you guys can kind of like, I hate to interrupt the 917 01:06:21.000 --> 01:06:27.519 flow, but we are getting some echo on your mike j So, okay, 918 01:06:27.559 --> 01:06:33.719 cool, thanks. It's so it would only be arbitrary if I were 919 01:06:33.760 --> 01:06:39.280 asserting these things are in fact absolute and I viable. That is not my 920 01:06:39.320 --> 01:06:47.159 position at all. My position that's not that's not all that, that's not 921 01:06:47.199 --> 01:06:51.119 all that's required to be arbitrary. Being arbitrary or at hawk is just saying 922 01:06:51.199 --> 01:06:54.840 something simply is, and I can appeal to this thing and I don't have 923 01:06:54.880 --> 01:07:00.199 to justify. I don't have to give any reasons for here. I don't 924 01:07:00.199 --> 01:07:02.239 know how many times I can explain the same thing I'm not saying and have 925 01:07:02.360 --> 01:07:06.559 never said, these are the way things the logic clabslutes are the way things 926 01:07:06.559 --> 01:07:10.199 are, and I don't have to justify it. I've not said that. 927 01:07:10.239 --> 01:07:14.280 I've not implied that or anything else. I'm saying I am convinced that they 928 01:07:14.360 --> 01:07:17.760 are, and I am not convinced that they have or need a justification. 929 01:07:17.880 --> 01:07:23.599 So stop misframing what my position is so that it is a straw man to 930 01:07:23.760 --> 01:07:27.400 knock down. I have never said the logic lab well. I probably have 931 01:07:27.519 --> 01:07:30.920 said fifteen years ago or whatever, but not throughout the course of this debate 932 01:07:30.960 --> 01:07:33.639 that the logic clabslutes are in fact true and don't need justification. I'm saying 933 01:07:33.719 --> 01:07:39.079 I don't see a need or any demonstration that they do need a justification. 934 01:07:39.480 --> 01:07:44.239 There's a huge difference. It's the difference between I am not convinced this person 935 01:07:44.360 --> 01:07:46.960 is guilty and I am, in fact convinced this person is innocent. Those 936 01:07:46.960 --> 01:07:55.239 are different things. So why is that not being at hog or arbitrary. 937 01:07:53.400 --> 01:08:02.639 It's not arbitrary, You've got an echo. Okay, it's not ad hoc 938 01:08:03.039 --> 01:08:09.000 because I'm not offering an explanation for how they are. I'm not even I'm 939 01:08:09.039 --> 01:08:11.920 not even acknowledging that there could be an explanation for how they are. There's 940 01:08:11.920 --> 01:08:15.760 been no demonstration that they require an explanation. So it's not ad hoc in 941 01:08:15.800 --> 01:08:19.560 that sense of because ad hoc would be providing a justification for something. I'm 942 01:08:19.600 --> 01:08:23.479 not providing a justification for it. I'm saying I don't even know that there 943 01:08:23.560 --> 01:08:26.880 could be or that there is a justification for it. Do you see how 944 01:08:26.920 --> 01:08:29.079 that's not ad hoc. Well, I mean, you can say that that's 945 01:08:29.119 --> 01:08:30.960 not ad hoc, but I don't see how it's not. Because typically when 946 01:08:30.960 --> 01:08:35.520 we talk about in the domain of epistemology, justifying beliefs and justifying claims, 947 01:08:35.920 --> 01:08:40.880 it requires some kind of explanation. Now you can do that. I understand 948 01:08:40.880 --> 01:08:43.439 you're doing that. You're saying that, but I don't think that that's a 949 01:08:43.479 --> 01:08:46.439 coherent answer, And I think that you're led to that conclusion because of the 950 01:08:46.479 --> 01:08:49.880 beliefs in the rest of the system, because it would require the admission of 951 01:08:49.960 --> 01:08:55.920 other things that are not compatible with the other beliefs that you have, namely 952 01:08:55.960 --> 01:09:01.279 the atheistic agnostic Tuch views. Make try another way, How could it possibly 953 01:09:01.319 --> 01:09:05.479 be an ad hoc explanation to say I am not aware that there is or 954 01:09:05.560 --> 01:09:10.800 needs to be an explanation, because that's being arbitrary. It doesn't need one 955 01:09:12.640 --> 01:09:16.199 as so let me frame it this way. So there's disciplines that are called 956 01:09:16.239 --> 01:09:21.680 metadisciplines, right, meta ethics, meta mathematics, meta logic. These are 957 01:09:21.720 --> 01:09:25.520 real disciplines that people study. Now, one could say that they're not real 958 01:09:25.560 --> 01:09:30.159 disciplines and dismiss it or whatever. But when we talk about giving a justification 959 01:09:30.279 --> 01:09:32.640 or giving an explanation for things, or explaining how they could be in the 960 01:09:32.640 --> 01:09:35.800 rest of one's worldview, I don't think that that's an invalid question. And 961 01:09:36.079 --> 01:09:42.159 you've said that you don't believe that it needs a justification. Again, you 962 01:09:42.199 --> 01:09:45.079 can say that that's not arbitrary, but to me, it sounds arbitrary. 963 01:09:45.239 --> 01:09:48.560 On the worldview where God exists, there's regularity in nature because of providence, 964 01:09:48.600 --> 01:09:53.720 because God has said the world up to be regular, and that's how we 965 01:09:53.760 --> 01:09:57.720 can do the scientific method, that's how we can do logic, that's how 966 01:09:57.760 --> 01:10:00.920 we can do math. The world operates in a reg other way. But 967 01:10:00.920 --> 01:10:04.039 when we don't have that and we just say that we only have our immediate 968 01:10:04.039 --> 01:10:09.399 sense experience, we only have what's pragmatic, then we're led to these foolish 969 01:10:09.399 --> 01:10:15.159 conclusions. Okay, I'm a fool. No, I'm not saying you're a 970 01:10:15.159 --> 01:10:18.560 fool in terms of a pejorative. I'm saying, no, yes, yes 971 01:10:18.640 --> 01:10:24.479 you are. And this is the problem. I'm not offering any ear echoing. 972 01:10:25.479 --> 01:10:28.880 I'm not offering an explanation, so it can't be an ad hoc explanation 973 01:10:29.000 --> 01:10:31.520 what I and I'm not saying this does not require justification. I'm saying, 974 01:10:31.520 --> 01:10:35.880 where's the demonstration that it does. I'm not aware that. And I you 975 01:10:36.159 --> 01:10:41.840 you at least presuppose one thing that you think does not require a foundation, 976 01:10:42.439 --> 01:10:49.479 right, correct, So you presuppose one thing that you don't think requires a 977 01:10:49.479 --> 01:10:55.239 foundation, and yet you want to criticize my presupposition, which does not say 978 01:10:55.319 --> 01:10:59.880 this does not require a foundation, but instead says I am not yet convinced 979 01:11:00.159 --> 01:11:03.239 that it needs a foundation. I haven't asserted that it doesn't. There could 980 01:11:03.239 --> 01:11:06.199 be. There could be some foundation, as far as I know. You 981 01:11:06.239 --> 01:11:10.119 could be right about the foundation, as far as I know. It's just 982 01:11:10.159 --> 01:11:13.119 there's no demonstration that there is a foundation, or that you have found the 983 01:11:13.199 --> 01:11:16.319 right one. What you've found is one that is consistent and appears to serve 984 01:11:16.359 --> 01:11:20.199 as that. But only because if anything, and I was going to go 985 01:11:20.199 --> 01:11:26.119 aoid doing this, you seem to be making an ad hoc explanation for the 986 01:11:26.159 --> 01:11:31.720 foundation of logic in there's a personal god agent who serves as the guaranteer for 987 01:11:31.760 --> 01:11:39.239 something which we haven't even demonstrated needs a guaranteur or could be guaranteed And sorry 988 01:11:39.680 --> 01:11:43.800 lost it for a second there. So there's an ad hoc explanation there, 989 01:11:43.800 --> 01:11:47.119 which is one step removed from the thing that we both agree on. Yeah. 990 01:11:47.119 --> 01:11:48.880 Well, in a response to that, I would say that when you 991 01:11:48.960 --> 01:11:51.680 say that, down the road, maybe we'll have an answer to these things. 992 01:11:51.720 --> 01:11:56.319 That seems to me to be kind of a leap of faith, the 993 01:11:56.439 --> 01:12:01.039 idea that down the road we can answer these things. Right again, that's 994 01:12:01.039 --> 01:12:05.560 probably the most frustrating thing is because I did not say that you did say 995 01:12:05.720 --> 01:12:09.640 this down. I wrote it down when you were talking down the answer down 996 01:12:09.640 --> 01:12:14.720 the rope. Perhaps we'll have an answer to this justification. So the point 997 01:12:14.760 --> 01:12:19.479 here is that I don't know that we won't have see you seem the point 998 01:12:19.520 --> 01:12:26.279 in my response, well, yes it is, yes, it is saying 999 01:12:26.439 --> 01:12:32.880 okay, here we go. Your your case is that a worldview without a 1000 01:12:32.920 --> 01:12:36.520 god cannot offer an explanation for the logical absolutes. We'll just stick with that. 1001 01:12:36.520 --> 01:12:40.680 One and not all the other ones. My position is, and I 1002 01:12:40.720 --> 01:12:45.960 was talking specifically about your argument about using a reductio essentially saying that you know, 1003 01:12:45.159 --> 01:12:50.720 under God there's an exploit or be a screwpt. I'm gonna I'm gonna 1004 01:12:50.720 --> 01:12:56.039 skip that because I was looking for the particular so disjunctive illogism, essentially showing 1005 01:12:56.399 --> 01:12:59.039 that you know, with God we have an explanation. Without God, we 1006 01:12:59.039 --> 01:13:03.760 don't have an explanation there or got what I said was in a reductio, 1007 01:13:03.920 --> 01:13:08.840 you have to demonstrate that there is a necessity for an explanation in this case, 1008 01:13:09.239 --> 01:13:13.159 and simply getting to a dead end, which was your language which I 1009 01:13:13.319 --> 01:13:16.399 went down, does not mean you've demonstrated the truth of the other one. 1010 01:13:16.520 --> 01:13:20.640 Because a dead end now does not mean that there won't be an explanation down 1011 01:13:20.680 --> 01:13:25.560 the line. I did not say we will find it. I didn't even 1012 01:13:25.600 --> 01:13:29.119 say, well, if I said we might find it that I'm talking in 1013 01:13:29.159 --> 01:13:32.319 a philosophical sense. I'm not saying that it's true we're likely to find it. 1014 01:13:32.600 --> 01:13:36.199 I also acknowledged we may never find it, and I'm fine with that 1015 01:13:36.239 --> 01:13:41.920 one, because I don't have any demonstration that there is an explanation well, 1016 01:13:41.920 --> 01:13:46.560 I would reply by saying that you claim to be a proponent of the skeptical 1017 01:13:46.600 --> 01:13:50.159 tradition, that you're within that tradition of skepticism, and I'm very read in 1018 01:13:50.199 --> 01:13:54.520 that tradition, and I respect a lot of areas of the skeptical tradition. 1019 01:13:54.920 --> 01:13:58.560 But whether we go back to Descartes and his meditations when he begins to question 1020 01:13:58.600 --> 01:14:02.079 things, or whether it's Hume or whether it's the more modern skeptics, they're 1021 01:14:02.199 --> 01:14:09.840 very interested in questioning justification, questioning epistemic claims, questioning metal level questions. 1022 01:14:09.880 --> 01:14:13.239 They're asking all those metal level questions. They're very interested in how we do 1023 01:14:13.359 --> 01:14:16.239 or can't justify laws of logic, numbers, all those different things. So 1024 01:14:16.520 --> 01:14:21.600 it's not within it's not unfair to bring those issues up because they're the heart 1025 01:14:21.600 --> 01:14:25.600 of the issue, especially in the history of epistemology. I mean, you 1026 01:14:25.600 --> 01:14:30.560 can read epistemology textbook that's common bonjour something like this, and you'll find that 1027 01:14:30.600 --> 01:14:35.039 the whole of the textbook is debates about coherentism and foundationalism and justifying claims. 1028 01:14:35.359 --> 01:14:39.279 Now, one could say I don't really care, or I don't it doesn't 1029 01:14:39.319 --> 01:14:43.199 matter to me, or whatever, But in a debate. What's presupposed is 1030 01:14:43.359 --> 01:14:48.880 some question or some rule right by which we go by these rules to confirm 1031 01:14:49.000 --> 01:14:53.880 or deny the case right. And I think what you've missed or tended to 1032 01:14:53.920 --> 01:14:58.560 miss is that the transital argument is not just an argument that's a reductio against 1033 01:14:58.640 --> 01:15:02.479 some other position. It's a positive argument that's about all of those transcendental categories. 1034 01:15:02.479 --> 01:15:08.039 And if those transcendental categories are actually necessary, and if they're actually very 1035 01:15:08.159 --> 01:15:13.399 strong arguments of themselves, then the argument for God itself is also strong. 1036 01:15:13.479 --> 01:15:16.199 And it's also a positive argument. It's not just a negative argument about, 1037 01:15:16.520 --> 01:15:19.399 well, I can find a flaw in your worldview, therefore mind's true. 1038 01:15:19.479 --> 01:15:24.079 That's not the totality of the argument. The totality argument is that this worldview 1039 01:15:24.119 --> 01:15:29.560 is coherent because I can look at all those different paradigmatic claims and preconditions and 1040 01:15:29.600 --> 01:15:32.520 they make sense. They're coherent. When I look at the system over here, 1041 01:15:32.520 --> 01:15:34.239 and you can say I don't have a system. You can say, 1042 01:15:34.279 --> 01:15:36.319 I'm not saying you said that, But a person could say, as a 1043 01:15:36.319 --> 01:15:40.760 skeptic, I don't have a holistic system. I just have the best that 1044 01:15:40.840 --> 01:15:45.439 I can go by with maximal certainty and pragmatic approaches, but that still has 1045 01:15:45.560 --> 01:15:51.159 claims that are necessary and implicit about metaphysics, about epistemology, and about ethics. 1046 01:15:51.199 --> 01:15:54.880 Even if you don't want to go down any of those specific routes, 1047 01:15:54.920 --> 01:16:00.560 it's still has a necessary implication. If I were to say I'm a total 1048 01:16:00.600 --> 01:16:02.920 skeptic and I don't think that I know anything is true, that's still a 1049 01:16:03.000 --> 01:16:06.600 claim about metaphysics, about ethics, and about epistemology, even if I don't 1050 01:16:06.600 --> 01:16:19.800 want it to go there. So you're working. But the issue here is 1051 01:16:20.000 --> 01:16:25.479 whether or not there's a God, and you're presenting an argument for the existence 1052 01:16:25.520 --> 01:16:30.920 of God based on the necessity of an explanation for logic, among other things, 1053 01:16:30.560 --> 01:16:34.840 as a foundation for it. My response is, you haven't demonstrated that 1054 01:16:34.880 --> 01:16:39.920 this is a necessity. You've just asserted that the absence of such an explanation 1055 01:16:40.399 --> 01:16:44.640 leads to problems. But those problems presupposed that there is an explanation. There's 1056 01:16:44.680 --> 01:16:47.119 been no demonstration that the laws of logic could have been in any other way, 1057 01:16:47.199 --> 01:16:53.039 or that there's any case that they that they need some sort of guarantee. 1058 01:16:53.600 --> 01:16:57.520 And when I try to point this out, you've on a couple of 1059 01:16:57.560 --> 01:17:01.159 occasions completely misframed what I was talking about. The card example, which I 1060 01:17:01.199 --> 01:17:04.960 agree is and I know you didn't raise the subjection, but somebody I'm not 1061 01:17:05.000 --> 01:17:09.720 watching. I'm sure somebody out there was complaining about you know this analogy that's 1062 01:17:09.720 --> 01:17:13.880 within you know the reality, and you can provide evidence, and it doesn't 1063 01:17:13.880 --> 01:17:15.479 fit within the transcendental thing. Yes, it's an analogy, I get it. 1064 01:17:16.640 --> 01:17:21.279 The thing is, it would be a coherent if you don't know whether 1065 01:17:21.399 --> 01:17:25.840 or not how you ended up with thirteen spades, it would be a coherent 1066 01:17:28.399 --> 01:17:33.520 explanation to believe that I cheated. Because if you're not sure whether I believe, 1067 01:17:33.560 --> 01:17:36.359 and I'm not sure whether or not I cheated or whether somebody they're cheated, 1068 01:17:36.640 --> 01:17:40.520 then you're in this state of I don't know. And this is why 1069 01:17:40.560 --> 01:17:43.520 I was talking about our discomfort with not knowing. I wasn't using as it 1070 01:17:43.680 --> 01:17:47.359 is an emotional fallacy. It's just a fact we are uncomfortable with not knowing. 1071 01:17:47.359 --> 01:17:50.159 It's the reason we see answers. It's the reason why we presuppose in 1072 01:17:50.199 --> 01:17:55.479 some cases that something may have an answer, when we might be wrong about 1073 01:17:55.520 --> 01:17:58.319 whether or not it has an answer. And so the card cheating example. 1074 01:17:58.359 --> 01:18:00.520 There, of course, if you across from me at the table and you 1075 01:18:00.560 --> 01:18:06.279 get that, almost anybody is going to be tempted to say, Wow, 1076 01:18:06.920 --> 01:18:12.319 I bet somebody cheated, because everything makes a lot more sense if in fact 1077 01:18:12.359 --> 01:18:16.920 somebody cheated, and that might make you more comfortable rather than not knowing that. 1078 01:18:17.000 --> 01:18:19.560 Maybe I'm not saying that is the reason for doing it. You can 1079 01:18:19.600 --> 01:18:24.880 convince yourself in a worldview where Matt cheated. Now all of a sudden, 1080 01:18:24.920 --> 01:18:28.479 this outcome makes a lot more sense. And you're right, I acknowledge that 1081 01:18:28.520 --> 01:18:31.119 at the outset of the debate, at the very beginning, But that has 1082 01:18:31.159 --> 01:18:33.840 nothing to do with whether or not I actually cheated. That has everything to 1083 01:18:33.840 --> 01:18:38.840 do with your comfort or discomfort with not knowing. And if you're convinced that 1084 01:18:38.880 --> 01:18:42.319 I did cheat, then of course that's going to be a satisfying answer, 1085 01:18:42.479 --> 01:18:45.680 and it would probably be satisfying for almost anybody there, as long as they 1086 01:18:45.680 --> 01:18:48.239 didn't care whether or not it was actually true. And I care whether or 1087 01:18:48.279 --> 01:18:51.560 not things are actually true to the best that we can find out, and 1088 01:18:51.600 --> 01:18:55.560 so I can't make a leap to oh, there must be a god that 1089 01:18:55.600 --> 01:18:59.479 serves as a foundation for logic because I'm not yet convinced that logic needs a 1090 01:18:59.479 --> 01:19:01.800 foundation. I see, and I think I see the point of departure now. 1091 01:19:01.920 --> 01:19:06.319 So basically, where I would disagree where I think we're talking past, 1092 01:19:06.479 --> 01:19:12.000 is about the issue of different types of proofs and different types of things. 1093 01:19:12.000 --> 01:19:15.039 So, for example, your your analogy is fine when it comes to matters 1094 01:19:15.119 --> 01:19:19.760 of normative daily life, normative discourse, but when it's issues I would argue 1095 01:19:20.119 --> 01:19:27.600 that are so fundamental and paradigmatic that they destroy the possibility of knowledge or predication 1096 01:19:28.000 --> 01:19:31.680 or logic ethics at all. They're different from the kinds of claims or beliefs 1097 01:19:31.680 --> 01:19:35.920 that we have that speak to what you're talking about with your example. So, 1098 01:19:35.960 --> 01:19:40.640 for example, if I deny the laws of logic, there's there's something 1099 01:19:40.760 --> 01:19:47.079 very fundamental about argumentation, living, speaking, communicating that's completely destroyed, right 1100 01:19:47.119 --> 01:19:50.039 if I if I deny them, if I doubt them, I don't think 1101 01:19:50.039 --> 01:19:55.239 they have a true existence. If they're not real, if they're just social 1102 01:19:55.279 --> 01:19:59.720 constructs, that's a much more damaging thing to doubt. Then if I doubt 1103 01:19:59.760 --> 01:20:02.039 that little Wayne has moved in next door to me, right, I might 1104 01:20:02.079 --> 01:20:05.319 see a dude with dreads and I think it's little Wayne over there. Therefore, 1105 01:20:05.439 --> 01:20:09.880 little Wayne has Now, if I'm wrong about that, it doesn't destroy 1106 01:20:10.000 --> 01:20:14.199 my whole worldview to be wrong about that. If I deny basic laws of 1107 01:20:14.239 --> 01:20:17.119 logic, it does destroy my whole worldview. And so not everything has proven 1108 01:20:17.159 --> 01:20:23.279 the exact same way. And so because those kinds of things are much more 1109 01:20:23.920 --> 01:20:28.840 fundamental, much more powerful and paradigmatic, that's why it's such a strong argument, 1110 01:20:28.840 --> 01:20:31.439 and that's why they do require a justification. I mean, the argument 1111 01:20:31.479 --> 01:20:35.640 that you gave about the cards, you are giving a kind of justification. 1112 01:20:35.680 --> 01:20:39.359 You're saying that we can't always go by the appearances of things, and I 1113 01:20:39.359 --> 01:20:44.560 would agree with that, but it's different when we're talking about paradigmatic level presuppositions. 1114 01:20:44.600 --> 01:20:50.159 And that's why transcendentals are different than normative argumentation and logic. Yeah, 1115 01:20:50.199 --> 01:20:53.680 first of all, I don't know how that's special pleading. But going on 1116 01:20:53.800 --> 01:20:57.479 about the consequences, oh, you need to mute going on about the consequences 1117 01:20:57.520 --> 01:21:00.880 of denying the laws of logic seeming as completely irrelevant because I'm not doing that. 1118 01:21:01.520 --> 01:21:04.920 See, you're trying to argue for a foundation behind the laws of logic. 1119 01:21:05.560 --> 01:21:10.640 That's the part that I'm denying, but not the laws of logic themselves, 1120 01:21:10.880 --> 01:21:12.880 And so I would agree, if you deny the laws of logic, 1121 01:21:12.920 --> 01:21:16.039 then we can't have any kind of conversation, we can't do anything. We 1122 01:21:16.079 --> 01:21:20.039 are forced essentially to recognize these things, and denial of them would lead to 1123 01:21:20.199 --> 01:21:24.800 chaos, except that I'm not doing that at all. I am denying your 1124 01:21:24.880 --> 01:21:29.840 bald assertion that there must be a foundation. Yeah. But as a skeptic, 1125 01:21:29.880 --> 01:21:32.960 shouldn't we have a justification for things that we believe in. Yes, 1126 01:21:33.479 --> 01:21:38.680 And That's why I've been so strong on pointing out the difference between saying I 1127 01:21:38.720 --> 01:21:43.159 am convinced of X, I am not convinced of X, and I am 1128 01:21:43.199 --> 01:21:45.479 convinced of not X. As a skeptic, I want to believe as many 1129 01:21:45.479 --> 01:21:48.600 true things and as few false things as possible, and I proportion my confidence 1130 01:21:48.680 --> 01:21:53.960 level in what I believe to the available evidence for it, of which for 1131 01:21:54.399 --> 01:21:58.159 the evidence of a foundation for the logic cloud lutes zero evidence. The evidence 1132 01:21:58.199 --> 01:22:01.239 that God serves as a foundation zero evidence, as far as I can tell, 1133 01:22:02.039 --> 01:22:06.479 for any of these things. My position is not the laws of logic 1134 01:22:06.560 --> 01:22:12.359 are in fact absolute and viable other than they appear to be, And we 1135 01:22:12.439 --> 01:22:15.119 should operate as if they are until there's such time as as a demonstration when 1136 01:22:15.159 --> 01:22:21.720 they're not. These things continually demonstrate we can't have conversations without them. They 1137 01:22:21.760 --> 01:22:26.520 are as close to, if they're not absolute, there as close as I 1138 01:22:26.520 --> 01:22:30.079 think any of us could possibly imagine. And so my position is not they 1139 01:22:30.119 --> 01:22:33.800 don't require a foundation, because that would be an assertion that I would have 1140 01:22:33.880 --> 01:22:36.079 to defend it have a burden approof How did you come to the conclusion they 1141 01:22:36.119 --> 01:22:40.359 don't need a foundation. I didn't come to that conclusion. I am not 1142 01:22:40.439 --> 01:22:44.239 yet convinced that they do, because I have not nobody's demonstrated that, and 1143 01:22:44.319 --> 01:22:46.479 you and I would agree, at least within your worldview, there's at least 1144 01:22:46.479 --> 01:22:53.119 one thing that does not require a foundation. And so given that you know, 1145 01:22:53.399 --> 01:22:56.640 I'm not sure whether or not there's one thing that doesn't require a foundation, 1146 01:22:56.720 --> 01:22:59.520 or two things that doesn't require a foundation, or zero things that doesn't 1147 01:22:59.560 --> 01:23:02.039 require nation. Those are things that we can't don't seem to be able to 1148 01:23:02.039 --> 01:23:05.640 demonstrate. Well at that point, I would say that when it comes to 1149 01:23:05.720 --> 01:23:13.000 the question of demonstration and how that's been used in epistemology and philosophy, I 1150 01:23:13.039 --> 01:23:18.039 appreciate that admission, because if we're believing in things because they work and they 1151 01:23:18.560 --> 01:23:24.520 don't have to be justified, that's not skepticism. Skepticism is interested in asking 1152 01:23:24.560 --> 01:23:28.399 those questions. And I understand you're what you're saying, and I appreciate the 1153 01:23:28.399 --> 01:23:31.439 attempt to be consistent, but I don't think that it's ultimately consistent because you 1154 01:23:31.520 --> 01:23:34.520 can't just say, well, you know, I just I don't see why 1155 01:23:34.600 --> 01:23:38.800 they have to be justified, because that is being arbitrary. It's being at 1156 01:23:38.800 --> 01:23:41.279 hawk. And you can say it's not being arbitrary because you don't see a 1157 01:23:41.319 --> 01:23:44.199 reasoning why it has to be. But that's the whole skeptical truth. That's 1158 01:23:44.199 --> 01:23:47.079 why skeptics do what they do is to try to justify claims, to try 1159 01:23:47.079 --> 01:23:50.920 to justify beliefs, to try to justify systems and so and so. If 1160 01:23:51.000 --> 01:23:55.239 you can say, I don't we're not going to do that. We try, 1161 01:23:55.640 --> 01:23:59.079 We try, and if we don't find a justification, we keep trying, 1162 01:23:59.079 --> 01:24:02.880 and we're so echo but we yes. So first of all, I'm 1163 01:24:02.960 --> 01:24:06.239 sure, please people who watch this later don't beat J up too much for 1164 01:24:06.319 --> 01:24:14.840 lecturing me about skepticism while arguing on behind for a god. Skepticism is about 1165 01:24:15.039 --> 01:24:19.439 wanting your internal model from an idealistic standpoint, modern scientific scan to match reality. 1166 01:24:19.600 --> 01:24:25.520 Modern scientific skepticism is about testing as best we can. But that's that's 1167 01:24:25.520 --> 01:24:30.319 within the context of testing fact claims about reality, so that modern scientific skepticism 1168 01:24:30.359 --> 01:24:33.319 isn't going to address whether or not logic hows a foundation. You're talking about 1169 01:24:33.520 --> 01:24:41.119 almost an ancient Greek knowledge of skepticism that has been discarded because it leads to 1170 01:24:42.800 --> 01:24:47.119 they're the very questions that human Quin asked. Yeah. Yeah, that's not 1171 01:24:47.199 --> 01:24:53.279 ancient Greece. They ask questions, they did not assert answers. That's the 1172 01:24:53.439 --> 01:24:57.479 difference. You're asserting an answer. William van Orman Quine's essay Two Dogmas of 1173 01:24:57.479 --> 01:25:00.359 Empiricism. He says that they cannot be logically to fight on empiricis's grounds. 1174 01:25:03.039 --> 01:25:06.800 That's why they're called two Dogmas of empiricism. According to Quin's famous essay, 1175 01:25:09.279 --> 01:25:19.560 sure psher, yes sir, yes, sir. We want to read some 1176 01:25:19.600 --> 01:25:24.279 super chats. We're getting towards the last fifteen twenty minutes. All right, 1177 01:25:24.359 --> 01:25:28.079 yeah, all right, yeah, we are into the final segment here. 1178 01:25:28.159 --> 01:25:30.399 Great discussion, you guys. Yeah, let's do that. Jay, let's 1179 01:25:31.199 --> 01:25:35.239 yeah, I'm I'm really enjoying it over here. And yeah, Jay, 1180 01:25:35.319 --> 01:25:38.840 if you have any super chats, I guess now would be a good time 1181 01:25:38.920 --> 01:25:44.079 to round those out. Franklin chant, as one last clarification, you can 1182 01:25:44.119 --> 01:25:45.600 say whatever you want about quine. I'm not beholding the quin. I'm talking 1183 01:25:45.640 --> 01:25:51.079 about my thing and this notion of skepticism. I've already explained it over and 1184 01:25:51.119 --> 01:25:54.840 over and over again, and you have yet to demonstrate any sort of problem 1185 01:25:54.880 --> 01:25:58.479 with it except to assert that I'm not a skeptic in the same way whoever 1186 01:25:58.520 --> 01:26:01.000 the hell you reference is a skeptic. I don't care. Fair enough, 1187 01:26:01.359 --> 01:26:04.760 Definitely, one can take a different track. But I'm just interested in the 1188 01:26:05.399 --> 01:26:10.000 history of different skeptics and how they talk, and what they consider justification, 1189 01:26:10.079 --> 01:26:15.199 and how philosophy and epistemology typically speaks of justifying claims. But so and I'm 1190 01:26:15.199 --> 01:26:18.720 not I'm interested in what's actually true and demonstrable, which is why we're stuck. 1191 01:26:18.960 --> 01:26:23.479 Okay, so we'll go to Franklin Chan. He says, thanks for 1192 01:26:23.520 --> 01:26:27.199 the debate, Thank you, Franklin. Joelene Kay says for the cause, 1193 01:26:27.239 --> 01:26:30.319 Thank you, gentlemen, Thank you. Joel Michael Flaherty one hundred dollars. 1194 01:26:30.319 --> 01:26:32.880 Thank you, Michael, Finally a real debate. This is all ten or 1195 01:26:32.960 --> 01:26:40.840 Terry two dollars says Atheism saved dormant three sixty says Jay, bringing up Hume's 1196 01:26:40.920 --> 01:26:46.079 argument about induction being unjustifiable in a materials worldview. Why would the same why 1197 01:26:46.119 --> 01:26:50.119 would today be the same tomorrow for no reason? Yeah, I mean that's 1198 01:26:50.199 --> 01:26:58.000 essentially the argument. Ten or Terry five dollars to both debaters, what are 1199 01:26:58.079 --> 01:27:00.640 are we going to address some of these? Some of the some of these? 1200 01:27:00.760 --> 01:27:03.319 I mean, you know when I say I don't, I don't care 1201 01:27:03.359 --> 01:27:06.239 what Hume set or client set or anybody else, because you know, I'm 1202 01:27:06.319 --> 01:27:10.720 going to take pieces from different things, and I'm certainly not as well versed 1203 01:27:10.760 --> 01:27:13.800 on some of those as they are. I'm talking about what my position is 1204 01:27:13.800 --> 01:27:18.880 and why when we talk about induction, we live our entire lives by inference 1205 01:27:18.880 --> 01:27:23.680 and induction. We begin with this assumption that tomorrow is pretty much going to 1206 01:27:23.760 --> 01:27:29.079 be like today, because the entire history of the world has continued to show 1207 01:27:29.079 --> 01:27:31.199 that that's going to be the case. But we also do it with the 1208 01:27:31.239 --> 01:27:35.640 recognition that tomorrow is not identical to today and that there are trends. So, 1209 01:27:36.039 --> 01:27:39.920 yeah, you know, I don't expect that the Earth's going to stop 1210 01:27:39.920 --> 01:27:43.000 spinning on its axis in the next ten minutes, but I do it with 1211 01:27:43.039 --> 01:27:45.880 the understanding that it's very likely and almost certain that it will stop spinning on 1212 01:27:45.960 --> 01:27:49.199 its axis at some point in the future. And so when we talk about 1213 01:27:49.239 --> 01:27:55.720 induction, there's a reason. It's it's not deduction. It's an approximation. 1214 01:27:55.800 --> 01:27:59.039 It is an estimation. It's an inference about what things are going to be 1215 01:27:59.079 --> 01:28:03.680 like. But that is not the same as wild ass guessing. I guess 1216 01:28:04.000 --> 01:28:08.199 is probably the best way to put that, and it's the reason why we 1217 01:28:08.239 --> 01:28:13.279 rely on science, despite the fact that science is virtually almost entirely an inductive 1218 01:28:13.279 --> 01:28:15.720 process. Yeah, and I would agree with everything that Matt just said. 1219 01:28:15.720 --> 01:28:18.039 It is just that in the history of this debate that I'm bringing up the 1220 01:28:18.119 --> 01:28:24.239 question of justifying the belief in induction the entire history of skepticism and empiricism, 1221 01:28:24.279 --> 01:28:28.319 and from what I understand, Matt is an empiricist at least to some degree. 1222 01:28:29.239 --> 01:28:31.239 The whole point of Quine's essay. I'm not saying that Matt has to 1223 01:28:31.239 --> 01:28:35.560 agree with everything que argues, but that Quine restated the argument from the time 1224 01:28:35.560 --> 01:28:40.640 of Hume that it's a belief that can't be justified, and it's a belief 1225 01:28:40.680 --> 01:28:44.840 that undergirds science. So the point is that science believes in things it cannot 1226 01:28:44.840 --> 01:28:48.520 be logically justified. Therefore, the transmittal argument is the next logical step, 1227 01:28:48.560 --> 01:28:53.279 and that's what I've been trying to argue throughout the debate. Tan Ortarry five 1228 01:28:53.279 --> 01:28:57.880 dollars to both debaters. What is the consequence of one's epistemology breaking down due 1229 01:28:57.920 --> 01:29:06.119 to incoherence with their view of metaphysics and axeology. I don't know that there 1230 01:29:06.239 --> 01:29:12.319 is. Well, one of the consequences is that if if I'm wrong, 1231 01:29:12.439 --> 01:29:15.199 then oh well, now, actually that's not even it. So if my 1232 01:29:15.319 --> 01:29:19.600 pistemology breaks down, I'd have to know in what way it broke down and 1233 01:29:19.680 --> 01:29:24.359 know the consequences, because my position is not the large coal absolutes don't have 1234 01:29:24.439 --> 01:29:27.239 a foundation. It's that I'm not aware of one or a need for one. 1235 01:29:27.279 --> 01:29:30.039 If if it turns out somebody was able to demonstrate that there is a 1236 01:29:30.119 --> 01:29:33.760 need for one, that doesn't crush my worldview. All it does is add 1237 01:29:33.840 --> 01:29:39.479 something that I have yet to be convinced of I become convinced of something new, 1238 01:29:39.520 --> 01:29:43.239 and so my worldview changes all the time every time I become convinced of 1239 01:29:43.319 --> 01:29:46.279 something new across the board. And if if there was a further demonstration that, 1240 01:29:46.359 --> 01:29:48.840 for example, not only do they have a foundation, but it is 1241 01:29:48.880 --> 01:29:55.199 a God, and in particular the God of the Orthodox Christian tradition, well 1242 01:29:55.279 --> 01:29:58.279 then I would now be I would no longer be an atheist because I would 1243 01:29:58.279 --> 01:30:03.319 have to be convinced that the or Christian model of God was real. It 1244 01:30:03.359 --> 01:30:08.359 may not change my view on that, being like I'm never going to worship 1245 01:30:08.880 --> 01:30:13.079 as out of an obligation or an expectation, because I think that any being 1246 01:30:13.079 --> 01:30:16.720 that would be deserving of worship could never demand it, because that, at 1247 01:30:16.760 --> 01:30:19.600 least to my understanding, would would put in a position where we would no 1248 01:30:19.600 --> 01:30:23.880 longer be deserving. But that's kind of off the track. But as far 1249 01:30:23.920 --> 01:30:29.840 as I was one, I redefined knowledge. And I'm sure I'll get beaten 1250 01:30:29.920 --> 01:30:32.439 up for this, but I had so many conversations about the nature of belief 1251 01:30:32.479 --> 01:30:34.960 and knowledge and how knowledge is a subset of belief, and there were people 1252 01:30:34.960 --> 01:30:36.560 like no, no, no, no, No. Beliefs are a subset 1253 01:30:36.560 --> 01:30:40.199 of knowledge, and no, no, you're wrong. Knowledge is a subset 1254 01:30:40.199 --> 01:30:42.920 of beliefs. They're the things you believe, and then there's some subset of 1255 01:30:42.920 --> 01:30:45.680 that that you count as knowledge. And by and large, in a kloqu 1256 01:30:45.800 --> 01:30:47.560 of sense, when people talk about knowledge, not in a philosophical sense, 1257 01:30:47.600 --> 01:30:50.960 because there you get to justify true belief and now there's arguments over what's justified 1258 01:30:51.000 --> 01:30:54.880 and what's true. In a cloqus sense, when people say I know something, 1259 01:30:55.199 --> 01:30:58.720 and they're not just talking about like familiarity or awareness, but they're talking 1260 01:30:58.720 --> 01:31:01.800 about knowledge in the sense of apismology, all they're really doing, from my 1261 01:31:01.880 --> 01:31:05.439 experience, is expressing a confidence level. They're saying, I really, really, 1262 01:31:05.439 --> 01:31:09.760 really really believe it. And so my working definition of knowledge was to 1263 01:31:09.800 --> 01:31:14.000 say, belief is anything that you are convinced is true or likely true, 1264 01:31:14.319 --> 01:31:17.880 and knowledge are those beliefs that if you were to find out you were wrong, 1265 01:31:18.000 --> 01:31:25.479 it would be dramatically worldview altering. You know, if I can claim 1266 01:31:25.520 --> 01:31:30.199 to know, I don't know whether or not my phone is turned on. 1267 01:31:30.359 --> 01:31:33.479 But what I'm really saying is I'm confident my phone is still turned on because 1268 01:31:33.560 --> 01:31:35.960 I haven't turned it off yet, and I know the battery is pretty full, 1269 01:31:35.960 --> 01:31:39.279 and there's lots of good reasons, and so I would argue that my 1270 01:31:39.279 --> 01:31:42.680 confidence level is really high and I know this, but I'm not saying I 1271 01:31:42.720 --> 01:31:47.359 can't be wrong. And that's a fundamental difference, because if in philosophy it's 1272 01:31:47.399 --> 01:31:50.319 justified true belief and it turns out it's not true that my phone is on, 1273 01:31:50.359 --> 01:31:53.720 then I could never counted as knowledge, and I don't think that's the 1274 01:31:53.720 --> 01:31:57.159 way most of us use knowledge when we're talking about it in general. So 1275 01:31:57.199 --> 01:32:00.560 I just went with knowledge or those things we believe, so only that if 1276 01:32:00.600 --> 01:32:01.760 we were to find out that we're wrong, it would be worldview altering. 1277 01:32:02.159 --> 01:32:06.880 And if I don't have a position, like if I'm not convinced that if 1278 01:32:06.920 --> 01:32:11.920 I had of you that the laws of logic do not require a foundation, 1279 01:32:12.319 --> 01:32:14.720 then yes, that would be world view altering to find out it was wrong. 1280 01:32:15.199 --> 01:32:18.159 But that's not my position. My position is not being convinced of something. 1281 01:32:19.000 --> 01:32:24.039 It's a sacred for God. I'm depending on God. I may be 1282 01:32:24.039 --> 01:32:27.560 convinced that God doesn't just depending on how it's defined, but generally speaking, 1283 01:32:27.600 --> 01:32:30.119 I'm just not convinced that there is one right. I would reply to the 1284 01:32:30.199 --> 01:32:32.960 question, what are the consequences of ones epistemology of breaking down due to incoherence 1285 01:32:33.079 --> 01:32:38.600 in their view of metaphysics and axiology. I would say, it's devastating if 1286 01:32:39.079 --> 01:32:45.880 the arguments and the positions that you're stating are so fundamentally unjustifiable, right, 1287 01:32:45.920 --> 01:32:49.119 I mean, if I can't give an account for things in a philosophic, 1288 01:32:49.159 --> 01:32:53.479 any logical, reasonable sense, which is often what we're required to do. 1289 01:32:53.520 --> 01:32:56.359 This was so kind of ironic is in this kind of a debate, Is 1290 01:32:56.359 --> 01:32:59.520 that it's always pressed upon the theist, which fair enough, Yeah, we 1291 01:32:59.560 --> 01:33:01.279 are making pretty grandiose claims, right, so we ought to be able to 1292 01:33:01.359 --> 01:33:05.880 logically give an account, given a justification for those kinds of claims. And 1293 01:33:05.920 --> 01:33:11.039 I think that the transmittal argument is the case. It is the argument for 1294 01:33:11.239 --> 01:33:15.640 the existence of God, and so it is pretty consistent with a coherent, 1295 01:33:15.039 --> 01:33:19.159 coherence type of view in terms of epistemology. So I would say that if 1296 01:33:19.279 --> 01:33:25.159 one makes a fundamental paradigmatic flaw in one's epistemology, then their worldview and their 1297 01:33:25.199 --> 01:33:28.760 system completely breaks down and it is incoherent. Like, for example, if 1298 01:33:28.800 --> 01:33:30.680 I say I don't believe that there's an external world right, or something like 1299 01:33:30.680 --> 01:33:33.359 this, This would be so fundamental if I don't believe that there's logic right, 1300 01:33:33.439 --> 01:33:38.039 that would be so fundamental that our whole system would collapse. And again, 1301 01:33:38.119 --> 01:33:44.199 historically, nobody's had a problem asking can we investigate and justify these kinds 1302 01:33:44.199 --> 01:33:45.880 of claims. And I know that Matt's not saying that you can't ask those 1303 01:33:45.920 --> 01:33:48.359 things, but he's saying that he's not convinced that there is a need to 1304 01:33:48.399 --> 01:33:54.159 justify those kinds of claims and those kinds of positions. And again, I 1305 01:33:54.279 --> 01:33:58.159 still think that it's arbitrary to say that I don't know, and they don't 1306 01:33:58.159 --> 01:34:00.079 require it, because if you're going to utilize things, if you're gonna believe 1307 01:34:00.119 --> 01:34:03.720 in things and act as if those things are the case, there's nothing wrong 1308 01:34:03.760 --> 01:34:06.840 with me in a debate asking for the justification for those kinds of things, 1309 01:34:06.840 --> 01:34:10.920 because it's the same kind of question that you would ask about atheist. Now, 1310 01:34:10.960 --> 01:34:14.159 the argument is that in Matt many times said, but yeah, but 1311 01:34:14.199 --> 01:34:15.800 you're saying that God is circular. You don't have to give a justification for 1312 01:34:15.880 --> 01:34:19.920 God. I'm saying that God is the justification for God is the transcendential argument, 1313 01:34:20.239 --> 01:34:25.439 and all systems ultimately are circular at their root. Yes, absolutely, 1314 01:34:25.680 --> 01:34:30.159 because you can never ultimately get past some final authority. Right. But to 1315 01:34:30.319 --> 01:34:32.640 say that that's not an argument as I think, I think just flatly incorrect. 1316 01:34:32.720 --> 01:34:36.039 It is an argument. It's a transcendental argument, and transit arguments are 1317 01:34:36.239 --> 01:34:41.359 valid arguments. Now again, one could deny that, but the fact that 1318 01:34:41.399 --> 01:34:45.479 if we deny transcendental arguments leads us to absurdities. That's the reduction, right, 1319 01:34:45.520 --> 01:34:48.800 and that would prove that they are valid arguments in a logical sense. 1320 01:34:48.840 --> 01:34:54.119 If something leads to a reduct, you right, Well, if you do 1321 01:34:54.239 --> 01:34:58.159 this again, maybe putting tag in a in a syllogism, that can be 1322 01:34:58.159 --> 01:35:01.279 addressed. Okay, maybe we can get closer to our But is it for 1323 01:35:01.600 --> 01:35:05.439 the third time now, just a second ago, if you rewind you were 1324 01:35:05.479 --> 01:35:12.199 saying that that you think there was a problem with saying I don't know and 1325 01:35:12.560 --> 01:35:16.720 they don't hang on. When you were talking about whether or not the absolutely 1326 01:35:16.760 --> 01:35:19.159 out of foundation, you said, do you think there's a problem with saying 1327 01:35:19.199 --> 01:35:24.079 I don't know and they don't require it. I don't see any problem with 1328 01:35:24.079 --> 01:35:26.800 saying I don't know. I don't say it's because that's almost always the right 1329 01:35:26.840 --> 01:35:30.000 answer. I don't see any problem with asking a question. But at no 1330 01:35:30.039 --> 01:35:32.279 point did I say they don't require it, which is once again you're you're 1331 01:35:32.319 --> 01:35:35.279 so phrasing, this is it, and I know you weren't necessarily directing at 1332 01:35:35.279 --> 01:35:39.720 me that you were talking in general about a problem. I would agree with 1333 01:35:39.760 --> 01:35:44.640 you. Anybody who says the laws of logic don't require justification has adopted a 1334 01:35:44.680 --> 01:35:46.439 burden of proof that I don't know how they could ever meet, and certainly 1335 01:35:46.479 --> 01:35:51.520 nobody's ever done it. Saying they don't require it is a claim. Saying 1336 01:35:51.560 --> 01:35:56.000 I'm not convinced they do is not a claim that they don't. Yeah, 1337 01:35:56.039 --> 01:36:00.680 but you utilize the things that you say you don't know if any require justification. 1338 01:36:00.840 --> 01:36:04.680 Yes, as a pragmatic sense, because they continue to work, and 1339 01:36:04.720 --> 01:36:08.960 you utilize the same things. The one thing you utilize that I don't. 1340 01:36:09.600 --> 01:36:12.199 You don't utilize the laws of one that when you say that you do it 1341 01:36:12.199 --> 01:36:16.640 because it's pragmatic and it works. That's not a coherent response as to how 1342 01:36:16.680 --> 01:36:24.840 that's That's not a coherent justification just because something works, whether or not it 1343 01:36:24.920 --> 01:36:28.840 works, with how it works or why it works, that you can't saying 1344 01:36:28.840 --> 01:36:31.720 that something works. Presuppose is a category of value judgment to say that this 1345 01:36:31.880 --> 01:36:34.399 is working, this is not working, this is good, this is bad. 1346 01:36:38.560 --> 01:36:43.720 Yeah, And those are metaphysical beliefs and claims and truths. It's truth, 1347 01:36:43.840 --> 01:36:45.640 which is what I talked about at the very beginning. That's only that's 1348 01:36:45.640 --> 01:36:49.720 the only thing that I'm presupposing here when I talk about using laws of logic, 1349 01:36:49.760 --> 01:36:55.359 because it's pragmatic. We both use them, and we are in agreement 1350 01:36:55.680 --> 01:37:02.960 that they are the reliable method and apparently seem to be inviolent. That's the 1351 01:37:03.000 --> 01:37:08.399 thing that point we agree on. You are now utilizing something that I don't 1352 01:37:08.520 --> 01:37:13.880 use, which is a god, as a foundation for them. That's the 1353 01:37:14.000 --> 01:37:16.520 point at which we disagree. And what you seem to be saying is that 1354 01:37:16.640 --> 01:37:21.439 unless I can provide an explanation for why they work, I cannot have any 1355 01:37:21.479 --> 01:37:28.319 reasonable expectation that they are in fact working. And that's a croc because I 1356 01:37:28.439 --> 01:37:30.600 can. I don't need to know how my car works to know whether or 1357 01:37:30.640 --> 01:37:34.039 not it's working. I don't need to know how we got to the moon 1358 01:37:34.079 --> 01:37:38.199 to know whether or not we actually got to the moon. And logic, 1359 01:37:38.439 --> 01:37:41.840 the laws of logic or something that all of us, well you and I 1360 01:37:41.880 --> 01:37:45.039 at least, let's not speak for everybody on the planet, we're in agreement 1361 01:37:45.119 --> 01:37:47.359 of what they are and that they work. And so there's no way to 1362 01:37:47.359 --> 01:37:51.640 criticize somebody for using something that works just by saying you don't know how it 1363 01:37:51.680 --> 01:37:56.039 works. Well, I'm not against I'm not convinced that you know either. 1364 01:37:56.600 --> 01:37:59.359 Yeah, but again, it's a very specific and different question. And I 1365 01:37:59.439 --> 01:38:01.640 appreciate the honesty of saying that you don't know that it can be justified, 1366 01:38:01.680 --> 01:38:05.279 and I want to phrase it right, So don't I don't miss that you 1367 01:38:05.439 --> 01:38:10.319 that you don't know that it's possible and you don't know that it can be 1368 01:38:10.399 --> 01:38:15.319 justified. But I think that that that's a weakness in the approach and the 1369 01:38:15.399 --> 01:38:20.319 argumentation, because as a skeptic, you ought to be able to be asked 1370 01:38:20.439 --> 01:38:25.920 that question. And it's not an unfair question because if if you're going and 1371 01:38:27.039 --> 01:38:30.439 I am, I am, and the correct answer is you can ask me 1372 01:38:30.479 --> 01:38:32.119 whatever question you want is a skeptic, and you can ask what is your 1373 01:38:32.159 --> 01:38:36.800 justification for why the laws of logic are seemed reliable? And my answer is 1374 01:38:36.880 --> 01:38:42.000 I don't know, because that is the proper skeptical response. You keep Oh, 1375 01:38:42.119 --> 01:38:44.720 as a skeptic, you must do X. And I'm sitting here telling 1376 01:38:44.760 --> 01:38:46.840 you, no, that's not what skepticism is in the way that I and 1377 01:38:46.960 --> 01:38:50.520 most modern skeptics would use it. Because you can ask me, what's your 1378 01:38:50.560 --> 01:38:54.279 justification for this, and my answer is, I don't know. Because if 1379 01:38:54.319 --> 01:38:57.600 modern skepticism is about anything, and I'll talk about this in the in the 1380 01:38:57.600 --> 01:39:02.039 Magic and Skepticism Show a Dragon conor wherever. It is about recognizing our discomfort 1381 01:39:02.159 --> 01:39:06.720 with saying I don't know, and how that is plaguing us to make logical 1382 01:39:06.760 --> 01:39:11.920 mistakes and make fallacious leaps, because, as I pointed out before, our 1383 01:39:11.960 --> 01:39:15.720 discomfort with not knowing when most of the time I don't know is actually the 1384 01:39:15.840 --> 01:39:19.800 right answer, and the fact that that answer isn't satisfying to people, it's 1385 01:39:19.840 --> 01:39:25.399 just too damn bad if it's the right answer. The fact that it doesn't 1386 01:39:25.439 --> 01:39:29.479 satisfy it's frustrating. I know, because as kids, you know when you 1387 01:39:29.520 --> 01:39:30.880 when you ask your parents why and they say, because I said so, 1388 01:39:31.119 --> 01:39:34.880 that's a crappy answer. I mean, that's completely dissatisfying. That's that's never 1389 01:39:34.920 --> 01:39:41.319 appealing to anybody. And what I see from from Tag and others is basically 1390 01:39:41.359 --> 01:39:45.279 a because guy said, so only the eye is God. It doesn't explain 1391 01:39:45.359 --> 01:39:50.439 anything to us. The god God has no explant, that god concept has 1392 01:39:50.479 --> 01:39:55.279 no explanant touring. And I've been arguing this whole time how it does. 1393 01:39:55.359 --> 01:39:58.840 It does because of the fact that there's a whole bunch of transcendental categories. 1394 01:39:58.840 --> 01:40:01.840 They are not material that we all presuppose, that we all utilize. You 1395 01:40:01.880 --> 01:40:06.199 talk about utilizing the concept of truth as a presupposition, but you don't know, 1396 01:40:06.279 --> 01:40:10.479 and you can't say if it's actually out there. That is a fundamental 1397 01:40:10.640 --> 01:40:15.000 sophistry and absurdity. You can't utilize these things. You can do it, 1398 01:40:15.159 --> 01:40:18.079 but you're doing it because the world view of atheism is not true. That's 1399 01:40:18.119 --> 01:40:20.560 the argument. And you could say that's not an argument, that's fine, 1400 01:40:20.920 --> 01:40:25.600 but it is an argument, and it's a very powerful argument because all of 1401 01:40:25.600 --> 01:40:29.640 these trands and old categories are used and to say that they're not real and 1402 01:40:29.640 --> 01:40:32.279 it can't be justified, well, didn't say that they weren't real, and 1403 01:40:32.279 --> 01:40:35.920 I didn't say it can't be justified. This is like teenth time you've you've 1404 01:40:36.000 --> 01:40:42.600 used that phrasing. It's you don't even understand what skepticism is. Is I 1405 01:40:42.640 --> 01:40:46.479 studied it intensely InCred school. I argued what skeptical professors, I know what 1406 01:40:46.479 --> 01:40:50.039 skepticism is, and you can keep qualifying it and saying that, well, 1407 01:40:50.600 --> 01:40:54.000 I just don't know. I just don't know, And I understand that in 1408 01:40:54.159 --> 01:40:57.880 many you know. In a sense, it's fine to take the approach of 1409 01:40:58.319 --> 01:41:01.159 being willing to be correct, being willing to say I don't know. But 1410 01:41:01.319 --> 01:41:08.880 that's different than being asked about justifying claims. And a debate is about justifying 1411 01:41:08.920 --> 01:41:15.399 beliefs and claims, is it not, Well, you're making a claim which 1412 01:41:15.439 --> 01:41:17.920 you have to justify, and I'm explaining why I don't accept it. I'm 1413 01:41:17.920 --> 01:41:21.039 not making it, but you are. That's something that you don't understand. 1414 01:41:21.079 --> 01:41:25.439 You are. No, you are, You're absolute. You can say I'm 1415 01:41:25.479 --> 01:41:30.399 not, but you logically necessarily do. That's what you don't get. No. 1416 01:41:30.920 --> 01:41:33.119 This is why I explain the difference between saying I'm convinced that you're innocent 1417 01:41:33.239 --> 01:41:38.239 versus I'm not convinced that you're guilty. What claim did I make about the 1418 01:41:38.279 --> 01:41:42.239 logical absolutes other than I am not convinced that they need a foundation? That 1419 01:41:42.319 --> 01:41:45.119 they work and you can use them, but they don't and perhaps cannot be 1420 01:41:45.199 --> 01:41:51.760 justified. You don't think, you don't think. I don't know whether or 1421 01:41:51.840 --> 01:41:55.880 not they can be justified. But claiming that they work is something that I'm 1422 01:41:56.039 --> 01:42:01.880 that you agree with. But is that a metaphetic in any sense? Is 1423 01:42:01.880 --> 01:42:06.399 its well under the under the presuppositions that I listed that I'm presupposing truth and 1424 01:42:06.439 --> 01:42:11.039 a reality and those absolutes, then yes, those are all entailed in there. 1425 01:42:11.159 --> 01:42:15.119 My objection is that you are going, that's what I'm trying to say, 1426 01:42:14.479 --> 01:42:18.840 I met what you admit that there's logical entailment in even saying that I 1427 01:42:18.960 --> 01:42:23.119 use these things, but I don't know if they can be justified. That's 1428 01:42:23.159 --> 01:42:30.119 still claiming things about metaphysics and epistemology. I'm saying they're presuppositions, which by 1429 01:42:30.199 --> 01:42:33.239 definition are not justified. If they were justified, we wouldn't freaking presuppose that 1430 01:42:33.359 --> 01:42:35.800 that's not true. You can't true. That's that's to say that there's no 1431 01:42:35.840 --> 01:42:42.359 such thing as a transcendental argument. That's what the hell is a presupposition? 1432 01:42:42.399 --> 01:42:45.119 If if if we have a justification or something, we don't need to presuppose 1433 01:42:45.159 --> 01:42:47.520 it. That's not right. That's why you don't understand what a transcendental argument 1434 01:42:47.680 --> 01:42:50.640 is. It is a logical form of argumentation. For example, let me 1435 01:42:50.680 --> 01:42:54.640 give an example from mathematics. I mean, you can disagree with them, 1436 01:42:54.680 --> 01:42:59.000 but the denial of that kind of an argumentation is what leads to the absurdity 1437 01:43:00.199 --> 01:43:03.840 by it. I don't know if we should probably go back to the more 1438 01:43:03.840 --> 01:43:06.560 super check. You and I are not speaking the same language at all. 1439 01:43:06.600 --> 01:43:12.239 I didn't deny that this wasn't an argument or or logical Okay, anyway, 1440 01:43:12.920 --> 01:43:17.159 Midwave Productions fifty sek. Question for Matt, is your belief that God doesn't 1441 01:43:17.239 --> 01:43:23.399 exist? Rational or determined? Is your response to this question rational or determined? 1442 01:43:26.239 --> 01:43:29.560 When did I say so? Wow? This is the frustrating thing, 1443 01:43:29.880 --> 01:43:32.279 Matt. Is your belief that God doesn't exist? When did I? When 1444 01:43:32.319 --> 01:43:35.560 did I express that? Because I'm not convinced that a god. First of 1445 01:43:35.560 --> 01:43:38.760 all, we need to define a god. What God are you talking about? 1446 01:43:38.840 --> 01:43:43.439 Which God? Because there are some gods which by virtue of them conflicting 1447 01:43:43.479 --> 01:43:47.399 with observations from reality, and I think we can be reasonably confident those gods 1448 01:43:47.399 --> 01:43:53.279 don't exist. If you say that you're God makes the sky pink twenty four 1449 01:43:53.279 --> 01:43:56.119 to seven. Well, this guy's not pink twenty four to seven. And 1450 01:43:56.199 --> 01:44:00.239 so there's a conflict either with whether or not that God exists or whether or 1451 01:44:00.239 --> 01:44:02.239 not you're understanding that God is the same thing. My position is, I 1452 01:44:02.239 --> 01:44:05.319 am not convinced that God exists. So when you freeme it as if I'm 1453 01:44:05.319 --> 01:44:09.720 asserting that there isn't a God and then asking whether or not it's rational, 1454 01:44:10.479 --> 01:44:13.039 well, it depends entirely on which God we're talking about, and whether or 1455 01:44:13.079 --> 01:44:15.520 not I do actively believe that that God doesn't exist. Yeah, I don't 1456 01:44:15.560 --> 01:44:19.319 think that there is such a position as a skeptical neutrality that Matt would like 1457 01:44:19.439 --> 01:44:24.079 to have. I know that in an existential sense, Matt takes the position 1458 01:44:24.079 --> 01:44:28.359 of skeptical neutrality, but I don't think that he understands that even that position 1459 01:44:28.439 --> 01:44:32.960 necessitates logical claims and metaphysical claims and claims about justifying things, whether he wants 1460 01:44:32.960 --> 01:44:38.479 it to or not. That's what I think is the disparity here. Jay. 1461 01:44:38.479 --> 01:44:40.720 Do you believe I have a thousand dollars in my wallet right now? 1462 01:44:41.319 --> 01:44:45.479 I don't know. Do you believe that I don't have a thousand dollars in 1463 01:44:45.520 --> 01:44:49.159 my wallet right now believe either claim. Okay, thanks for refuting your own 1464 01:44:49.199 --> 01:44:53.880 point from a moment ago. Correct, But that's at the normative level of 1465 01:44:54.239 --> 01:44:59.560 interactions and not at the paradimatic level. And that's special things, two different 1466 01:44:59.560 --> 01:45:01.399 things. No, that's that's what I've been argued pleading, special pleading, 1467 01:45:01.439 --> 01:45:06.039 because the whole time I've been arguing for transcendental categories and arguments, not normative 1468 01:45:06.079 --> 01:45:11.920 logical claims. Yeah, it's called special pleading. You're claiming the transcendental arguments 1469 01:45:11.920 --> 01:45:14.680 are special so they don't have to apply. You just said a minute ago 1470 01:45:14.720 --> 01:45:18.560 that they're in they're presupposed there, and that they're different. I said that 1471 01:45:18.600 --> 01:45:21.800 they're presupposed. That's with respect to whether or not they can be justified, 1472 01:45:21.840 --> 01:45:26.000 not whether or not there they are fundamentally different, and whether they follow. 1473 01:45:26.239 --> 01:45:29.560 Like, if you pres everything is derived from logic. Once you presuppose that 1474 01:45:29.640 --> 01:45:32.079 is the thing that there's something there's that if I deny the laws of logic, 1475 01:45:32.239 --> 01:45:36.560 that's more fundamental than whether I'm wrong about the thousand dollars in your pocket 1476 01:45:36.600 --> 01:45:39.439 or a little way and living next to orgment is it one of those more 1477 01:45:39.479 --> 01:45:43.760 fundamentally damaging to a world. Then you at the point, that's the whole 1478 01:45:43.760 --> 01:45:47.399 point that I'm making about what a transcendentalism? Why so more fundamentally periodomatic. 1479 01:45:49.000 --> 01:45:54.039 I agree that two things are different, I don't agree that your explain I'm 1480 01:45:54.039 --> 01:45:58.319 sorry again a time take to trash out. I don't agree that your claim 1481 01:45:58.399 --> 01:46:03.319 that because they're different, they're no longer subject to reason or the sort of 1482 01:46:03.359 --> 01:46:09.600 episdemic warrant. The fact that we presuppose something is because we can't justify it 1483 01:46:10.119 --> 01:46:15.920 currently. Maybe you're you're offering a justification and a justification without any episdemic warrant. 1484 01:46:15.920 --> 01:46:21.119 No, I'm not. It does have episdemic warrant. Okay, I 1485 01:46:21.119 --> 01:46:25.399 mean the episodemic warrant is the arguments I've been making for the last two hours. 1486 01:46:26.239 --> 01:46:29.279 Let's move on. So the next one is Admiral squatbar. He says 1487 01:46:29.319 --> 01:46:30.760 two dollars. Jay scoots away from the mic and the speakers. Okay, 1488 01:46:30.760 --> 01:46:36.760 I'll try John DeFranco ten bucks, Thank you, John Vitali Chmelski five dollars. 1489 01:46:36.840 --> 01:46:44.760 His argument essentially actually proves God every subposition is based on Christian philosophy, 1490 01:46:44.840 --> 01:46:46.800 whether he knows it or not. That is the transnt argument in summation. 1491 01:46:46.880 --> 01:46:51.439 Correct, that's allD ass assertion. So if that's what the transcendental argument is, 1492 01:46:51.479 --> 01:46:55.319 then congratulations. It's not an argument, it's an assertion. Well, 1493 01:46:55.399 --> 01:46:59.479 it's a summation of what the transcendent argument is in a proposition. But not 1494 01:46:59.520 --> 01:47:02.920 every problem position isn't it's not every assertion it's false or not. Actually, 1495 01:47:02.960 --> 01:47:06.720 it's about it's a summation of the argument. It does require fleshing. It's 1496 01:47:08.119 --> 01:47:11.479 as certain h this assertion that I'm not aware of it. The number of 1497 01:47:11.479 --> 01:47:14.439 times today that it's been suggested that I'm just you know, an ignorant buffoon 1498 01:47:14.520 --> 01:47:18.279 today is rather staggering, which is wife's check. Well, I you know, 1499 01:47:19.439 --> 01:47:26.920 I think. Uh. The next one is Demetrios. Excuse me, 1500 01:47:26.920 --> 01:47:30.319 Tanetary U now we already did that one. Excuse me, Tanertary. Matt, 1501 01:47:30.359 --> 01:47:34.560 you say you believe in the laws of logic having a meaningful ontological status, 1502 01:47:34.600 --> 01:47:39.319 but you cannot tell us what the grounds are of them in our world. 1503 01:47:39.399 --> 01:47:45.800 So how do you know that they have any ontological status. I'm not 1504 01:47:45.840 --> 01:47:53.119 sure I understand what you mean by ontological status other than so, what we're 1505 01:47:53.119 --> 01:47:56.279 talking about is the difference between whether something works and how how or why it 1506 01:47:56.319 --> 01:48:01.439 works, or the ontology of what it is, which i'm I actually took 1507 01:48:01.439 --> 01:48:08.520 some notes about this earlier because there's some confusion about whether or not these sorts 1508 01:48:08.520 --> 01:48:13.439 of thing, whether abstracts can have an ontology at all, and it's you 1509 01:48:13.479 --> 01:48:16.600 know, you can conceptualize anything, but like if you removed every mind from 1510 01:48:16.680 --> 01:48:25.239 the universe, I would agree that what we point to by the descriptive laws 1511 01:48:25.239 --> 01:48:29.840 of logic have not vanished. You know, something still is what it is 1512 01:48:29.920 --> 01:48:31.960 or isn't what isn't, and that I can't demonstrate that nobody ever could, 1513 01:48:32.000 --> 01:48:35.000 because we couldn't be there in a universe without a mind. But this is, 1514 01:48:35.079 --> 01:48:39.880 this is what is implied by accepting them now, whether or not they 1515 01:48:39.880 --> 01:48:43.560 have an ontology unto themselves of some sort of characteristic I don't think that that's 1516 01:48:43.640 --> 01:48:46.199 necessarily the case. I think that the language we use to describe these for 1517 01:48:46.279 --> 01:48:49.960 me, identity, non contradiction, exclude a middle. Are summed up easiest 1518 01:48:50.279 --> 01:48:54.439 in a simple vend diagram with a single circle, and everything is either in 1519 01:48:54.479 --> 01:48:58.359 the circle or not in the circle, and that's it. And so these 1520 01:48:58.399 --> 01:49:02.960 are these are the sorts of ways that we straight the truth under the assumption 1521 01:49:03.000 --> 01:49:08.880 truth of these things. But I don't think they're out there like they're not 1522 01:49:09.079 --> 01:49:13.880 prescriptive X must be the case. I think they're just the way things are 1523 01:49:14.399 --> 01:49:17.279 and they're not something that exists unto themselves, and so I don't think they 1524 01:49:17.279 --> 01:49:19.760 could have an ontology in that sense, but I could be wrong. Yeah, 1525 01:49:19.760 --> 01:49:23.520 I think that this would be another weakness in that argument, which is 1526 01:49:23.560 --> 01:49:28.479 that this question is specifically about the ontological status of those things, and the 1527 01:49:28.560 --> 01:49:33.079 argument that I've been giving is dealing with proving the ontological status of those types 1528 01:49:33.119 --> 01:49:36.000 of things. Now Matt is free to disagree with that and not accept the 1529 01:49:36.079 --> 01:49:40.680 argumentation, but I think what he's missed is that a transcental argument is a 1530 01:49:40.720 --> 01:49:44.199 different type of argument. And that doesn't mean that it's not an argument, 1531 01:49:44.319 --> 01:49:46.600 but it's a different type of argument, and it is a little counterintuitive to 1532 01:49:46.600 --> 01:49:50.600 the way that we do normative logical than diagrams, as he mentioned, because 1533 01:49:50.600 --> 01:49:55.600 it's a meta question. So one could theoretically say I'm not interested and I 1534 01:49:55.640 --> 01:49:59.439 don't accept or I don't want meta level questions to be asked or dealt with. 1535 01:50:00.119 --> 01:50:01.880 But I don't think that that's a that's I mean, I'm not saying 1536 01:50:01.880 --> 01:50:04.960 Matt's necessarily doing that. Matt says he's open to any questions. But if 1537 01:50:05.000 --> 01:50:10.119 we take the route of saying that I'm not going to accept transcendental arguments as 1538 01:50:10.159 --> 01:50:14.479 valid arguments, then I think that leads us to very absurd conclusions. It 1539 01:50:14.560 --> 01:50:19.680 leads us to reductios, and reductios are fallacies. So yeah, yeah, 1540 01:50:19.720 --> 01:50:23.520 I'm open to any questions, just as long as the person who's asking the 1541 01:50:23.600 --> 01:50:27.720 questions doesn't rule out potential answers like I don't know. And you've once again 1542 01:50:27.800 --> 01:50:30.000 said this is a weakness. You think this is a weakness of the argument. 1543 01:50:30.079 --> 01:50:32.960 What argument is a weakness out? Yeah, saying I don't know is 1544 01:50:33.000 --> 01:50:35.800 not an argument, And that's fine that you don't want it to be an 1545 01:50:35.880 --> 01:50:40.680 argument, right, But that's the weakness of it. But that's what debates 1546 01:50:40.680 --> 01:50:45.000 are. And so when I give argumentation, you're essentially saying that presuppositions transcendols 1547 01:50:45.000 --> 01:50:47.479 can't be justified. You said they can't be You said that we don't justify 1548 01:50:47.520 --> 01:50:50.840 them, we assume them. That's not true, they can be justified. 1549 01:50:50.880 --> 01:50:58.520 So you are making arguments I did. I'm not aware of any way in 1550 01:50:58.520 --> 01:51:00.880 which they can be justified or if they need a justification. You are convinced 1551 01:51:00.920 --> 01:51:04.079 that they do need a justification and that you have the justification. But when 1552 01:51:04.079 --> 01:51:08.319 you start talking about what debates are, debates are not. One side shows 1553 01:51:08.359 --> 01:51:10.840 up and says X is true, and the other side shows up and says 1554 01:51:11.000 --> 01:51:16.199 X is not true or X is false. You don't have to have both 1555 01:51:16.279 --> 01:51:20.920 two different people asserting something. That's classic debate, affirmation and negation. That's 1556 01:51:20.960 --> 01:51:25.920 classic debate. Okay, well, I don't give a rats ask about classic 1557 01:51:25.920 --> 01:51:31.600 debate because you can't still have a debate where one person presents their evidence for 1558 01:51:31.640 --> 01:51:35.159 their claim and the other person points out flaws and the events for the claim. 1559 01:51:35.159 --> 01:51:39.199 It's not a demonstration that they're wrong. It's a demonstration that they are 1560 01:51:39.279 --> 01:51:43.880 not warranted in saying that they're correct. And you still have a debate there, 1561 01:51:45.079 --> 01:51:47.359 right, Yeah, And that can still be formulated as an affirmation and 1562 01:51:47.479 --> 01:51:50.279 negation because I can ask you, I mean, unless you don't want to 1563 01:51:50.319 --> 01:51:53.800 deal with those kinds of questions, and that's fine if you don't want to, 1564 01:51:53.880 --> 01:51:57.399 but there's nothing wrong with asking those questions back to you and pointing out 1565 01:51:57.479 --> 01:52:02.199 that to say that something is I don't know that it's provable. That still 1566 01:52:02.239 --> 01:52:09.439 necessitates and implicates you in metaphysical and epistemic claims even if you don't want it 1567 01:52:09.439 --> 01:52:13.880 to do. That's what you don't understand, and that's why you don't understand 1568 01:52:13.880 --> 01:52:18.039 that a transcental argument is a logical argument. It's valid. Keep it's going 1569 01:52:18.079 --> 01:52:23.680 to be fun, all right. Next up torpedo fish five dollars. Atheist 1570 01:52:23.800 --> 01:52:29.760 empiricism provides no epistemic justification for universals, but theism does. Therefore, theism 1571 01:52:29.800 --> 01:52:33.520 has more explanatory power of reality. I would say, I would phrase it 1572 01:52:33.560 --> 01:52:38.920 different, but not more explanatory power, but it does have the explanatory power 1573 01:52:39.000 --> 01:52:44.359 correct Yeah, and skeptical positioning of not being aware of whether or not you 1574 01:52:44.479 --> 01:52:47.079 cheated does not have the explanatory power of being convinced that I cheated. And 1575 01:52:47.279 --> 01:52:50.359 neither of them demonstrate whether or not I anology is I do this ology because 1576 01:52:50.399 --> 01:52:56.079 it assumes that normative epistemic logical claims are the same as paradomatic claims, and 1577 01:52:56.119 --> 01:53:00.680 they're not. That's what you don't understand. Justin stand im ten bucks. 1578 01:53:00.680 --> 01:53:04.119 Excellent display of logic of atheists presubpositions, But again, we see outside the 1579 01:53:04.119 --> 01:53:10.439 format of a control setting in university, atheists lose the argumentation. I'm sure, 1580 01:53:10.800 --> 01:53:14.560 I'm sure Matto was cool that Randy Churchill twenty bucks. Thank you, 1581 01:53:14.640 --> 01:53:17.319 Randy, Orthodox pilgrim fifty bucks, Matt dillahuney. Why does some many atheists 1582 01:53:17.399 --> 01:53:21.079 go after Christians and not other religious beliefs? Is there something about Christianity that 1583 01:53:21.159 --> 01:53:26.239 is infuriating to atheists? Look at Orthodox Christianity. It is a better It 1584 01:53:26.359 --> 01:53:33.399 is better than watered down Southern Baptist views. Well, why does some many 1585 01:53:33.439 --> 01:53:36.000 atheists go after Christianity? Well, I do a call in show, so 1586 01:53:36.079 --> 01:53:41.680 I take whatever God claims people present when they call in, and when I'm 1587 01:53:41.720 --> 01:53:46.319 doing debate, so I debate whatever they're actually presenting. If you're an English 1588 01:53:46.319 --> 01:53:49.520 speaking person somewhere in the West. Probably the reason you see atheists going off, 1589 01:53:49.680 --> 01:53:53.560 especially in the United States, why you would see atheists going after Christians 1590 01:53:54.439 --> 01:53:58.119 and versions of Christianity more often, is because that's the predominant religion that has 1591 01:53:58.159 --> 01:54:03.000 a privileged position that most people adhere to. In some sense, it would 1592 01:54:03.119 --> 01:54:08.880 make I mean, I've I've gone after Scientology, Islam, you name it. 1593 01:54:10.279 --> 01:54:15.439 But the it's kind of like saying, if where you live, seventy 1594 01:54:15.680 --> 01:54:21.279 people are dying from cancer, why aren't you guys studying athletes foot Now? 1595 01:54:23.479 --> 01:54:30.159 Is Christianity the biggest religious problem worldwide? No? And actually what I go 1596 01:54:30.199 --> 01:54:35.520 after isn't necessarily Christianity unless that's what the person's presenting or whatever version of theres 1597 01:54:35.640 --> 01:54:41.439 is. My My thing here is to constantly go after whether or not a 1598 01:54:41.439 --> 01:54:45.560 belief's warranted. And this is where one of the confusions, or in Jay's 1599 01:54:45.600 --> 01:54:49.479 case, I just don't understand you. I'm not when you show up and 1600 01:54:49.520 --> 01:54:57.199 say I'm convinced God exists for these reasons. My response is not you're wrong, 1601 01:54:57.479 --> 01:55:01.399 God doesn't exist. It's you're wrong. Those reasons don't provide the evidentiary 1602 01:55:01.439 --> 01:55:05.880 warrant that you think it does. I'm not challenging your conclusion. I'm challenging 1603 01:55:06.000 --> 01:55:10.279 your argument and evidence. And if I'm not presented with an argument and evidence, 1604 01:55:10.319 --> 01:55:13.199 if I'm just presented with assertions, then we just keep going back and 1605 01:55:13.239 --> 01:55:15.039 forth. And this is why when people say, oh, well you're saying 1606 01:55:15.079 --> 01:55:18.840 this, No, I'm actually not saying that. And it happens all the 1607 01:55:18.880 --> 01:55:21.479 time. Yes, and I understand what you're saying. There Matt is just 1608 01:55:21.520 --> 01:55:27.600 that the claim for the transcendental argument is different than most argumentation. It's a 1609 01:55:27.600 --> 01:55:30.920 different type of argument, and it's an analysis of two different paradigms. So 1610 01:55:31.039 --> 01:55:34.079 one can say I don't want to do that, and that's fine, but 1611 01:55:34.880 --> 01:55:40.640 that's part of my argument. My argument necessitates doing that as well. So 1612 01:55:40.680 --> 01:55:45.640 that's why it's unique. And it's unique because transcendental categories and preconditions themselves are 1613 01:55:45.760 --> 01:55:48.560 unique. They're a different type of argument. Let me give you one example, 1614 01:55:49.159 --> 01:55:54.560 Gridell. Gridell famously did this type of argument with mathematics when he argues 1615 01:55:54.600 --> 01:55:59.560 with Merchant Russell overset theory and he does the incompleteness theorems. That's a mathematical 1616 01:55:59.680 --> 01:56:03.720 form of a transcendental argument. So one could theoretically say that it's not valid 1617 01:56:03.800 --> 01:56:06.760 or they don't accept it, but we use it in mathematics. It actually 1618 01:56:06.800 --> 01:56:11.600 does come into play in different disciplines. So I think their valid argumentation. 1619 01:56:11.760 --> 01:56:14.199 And I would say that if one is at the I'm not saying you're saying 1620 01:56:14.239 --> 01:56:17.119 this, but if one is at the point of saying that they're not justifiable, 1621 01:56:17.159 --> 01:56:20.039 they can't be justified. I don't see why they would be justified. 1622 01:56:20.079 --> 01:56:25.479 I think that that is not a solid critique, not a solid response to 1623 01:56:26.319 --> 01:56:30.960 the argument itself. And my concern isn't whether or not the argument is valid. 1624 01:56:30.000 --> 01:56:31.840 Is so much is whether or not it's sound. And if I'm not 1625 01:56:31.880 --> 01:56:38.520 presented with something some sort of syllogistic form, I can't even in a conversational 1626 01:56:38.560 --> 01:56:44.760 thing. It is almost impossible the way we speak and communicate to say that's 1627 01:56:44.800 --> 01:56:47.760 an invalid argument, because validity goes to the structure, and in a colloquial 1628 01:56:47.840 --> 01:56:51.720 sense where we're using shorthand and we haven't actually put things in premises, it's 1629 01:56:51.720 --> 01:56:55.960 really hard. You can easily hide whether or not a structure is valid or 1630 01:56:55.960 --> 01:56:59.119 not. And that's why we prefer to do things in syllogistic form. It's 1631 01:56:59.119 --> 01:57:03.239 also the reason that when we're evaluating a claim and propositional logic, there's a 1632 01:57:03.279 --> 01:57:09.199 proposition and not two propositions. We evaluate a single proposition. That's how you 1633 01:57:09.199 --> 01:57:12.800 get to reduct you premise one is the thing that you're potentially going to show 1634 01:57:12.880 --> 01:57:16.239 is absurd. It's not premise one, is this premise two is the opposite 1635 01:57:16.239 --> 01:57:19.520 of it would happen. That's the reason we do logic the way we do, 1636 01:57:19.600 --> 01:57:24.680 and that's almost always true, except in the cases where we're asking questions 1637 01:57:24.680 --> 01:57:28.800 of metallogic. And the whole argument about transcendental arguments is a metallogical question. 1638 01:57:29.159 --> 01:57:32.079 So you can say that we don't want to go there, but I'm going 1639 01:57:32.119 --> 01:57:34.920 there, and that's what the argument is. It's a question of meta logic, 1640 01:57:36.960 --> 01:57:42.439 all right. Next up is a Doorman twenty bucks. Assuming the skeptics 1641 01:57:42.479 --> 01:57:47.319 that preceded us weren't interested in truth displays a bit of conceit and bad faith, 1642 01:57:47.439 --> 01:57:53.039 especially when they tackled metaphysical questions so profound that it threatened to destroy their 1643 01:57:53.039 --> 01:57:57.520 own worldview. I don't I'm not saying that Hume or even Kant, or 1644 01:57:57.760 --> 01:58:00.159 people who were skeptical. I mean, Kant was events of Hume's argumentation. 1645 01:58:00.199 --> 01:58:04.439 I'm not saying that that they're in bad faith. I'm saying that they were 1646 01:58:04.479 --> 01:58:09.840 consistent and they led. Hume went to a certain degree of skepticism where he 1647 01:58:09.880 --> 01:58:13.479 admitted a lot of things that most skeptics, maybe not with Matt, but 1648 01:58:13.560 --> 01:58:16.600 most skeptics won't admit. For example, Hume says there's no basis for causality, 1649 01:58:16.760 --> 01:58:20.159 there's no basis that you're not observing causal relations. You're observing event a 1650 01:58:20.680 --> 01:58:26.319 event, be their discrete operations events, and you're just calling them causality. 1651 01:58:27.159 --> 01:58:30.279 I think that causality is real. I think that's a transcendental category. Just 1652 01:58:30.359 --> 01:58:34.199 like t loas and the other things that I've listed. The question about meta 1653 01:58:34.319 --> 01:58:39.520 issues is can they be justified? And one can say I don't think so, 1654 01:58:40.079 --> 01:58:43.800 I don't know mass position. I think they can. I think because 1655 01:58:43.840 --> 01:58:46.479 they point us to God is why it's such a strong argument. And again, 1656 01:58:46.600 --> 01:58:50.680 Matt, I understand Matt doesn't buy that argue that the way that was 1657 01:58:50.680 --> 01:58:54.159 phrased, I'm not sure that was directed at you or me. But if 1658 01:58:54.159 --> 01:58:58.640 I gave in an impression that that skeptics don't care about truth, that's that's 1659 01:58:58.680 --> 01:59:02.239 not remotely what I'm talking about. There is the question of do we have 1660 01:59:02.319 --> 01:59:06.279 access to truth? And you know, the Salasism and all the other little 1661 01:59:06.279 --> 01:59:10.399 things we talked about planned to whether or not we actually have access to truth. 1662 01:59:10.840 --> 01:59:15.600 And so when I look at the world, I'm not I don't make 1663 01:59:15.760 --> 01:59:25.159 proclamations about absolutely certainty or truth in anything other than a kind of compatibles or 1664 01:59:25.199 --> 01:59:27.640 I'm not compatables. But I think I don't want to go down and get 1665 01:59:27.640 --> 01:59:32.239 people confusing free will. So if I roll a diet and it comes up 1666 01:59:32.239 --> 01:59:34.640 before, I can look at that, and I can say, ah, 1667 01:59:34.680 --> 01:59:39.920 it's true that that die is rolled afore, and if the population agree with 1668 01:59:39.960 --> 01:59:43.079 me, now I've got this independent confirmation that we rely on, you know, 1669 01:59:43.159 --> 01:59:45.399 for testing epistemic claims and stuff like that. But the fact that there's 1670 01:59:45.399 --> 01:59:47.720 one percent of the population that points of that die and says no, no, 1671 01:59:47.720 --> 01:59:53.119 no, it's true that it's the die roll to seventeen doesn't mean that 1672 01:59:53.159 --> 01:59:59.399 we're on any sort of shaky ground in what we're talking about. But that 1673 01:59:59.560 --> 02:00:03.079 is truth at kind of this level. And the question is, oh, 1674 02:00:03.079 --> 02:00:06.359 how do you know that you're you know, reality, your experience of reality 1675 02:00:06.439 --> 02:00:09.680 is true. How do you know that the reality that you think you experience 1676 02:00:09.760 --> 02:00:12.600 is actually the true reality? And I don't know that there's any solution to 1677 02:00:12.720 --> 02:00:15.880 those problems, And so rather than pretending that there is, I'm just going 1678 02:00:15.920 --> 02:00:18.520 to say, Wow, that's an incredibly intriguing, you know, question that 1679 02:00:18.560 --> 02:00:23.880 philosophers have toiled over for ages, and I'm not convinced that anybody's come up 1680 02:00:23.920 --> 02:00:28.439 with the right answer yet. Benny Redpill five Canadian Matt, would you why 1681 02:00:28.439 --> 02:00:31.359 do you refuse debate? To debate Skeptico? He has an empirical he has 1682 02:00:31.399 --> 02:00:38.720 empirical data that destroys materialistic dogma. I don't know that I'm aware of who 1683 02:00:38.760 --> 02:00:44.840 Skeptico is or that I've ever refused to debate. I don't where did you 1684 02:00:44.920 --> 02:00:46.720 hear that I refuse to debate. I'll tell you who I've refused debate. 1685 02:00:46.800 --> 02:00:50.159 I won't debate Sigh again, and I won't debate Ray Comfort again, even 1686 02:00:50.199 --> 02:00:54.880 though I've debated both of them, because Ray has expressed that he's not interested 1687 02:00:54.920 --> 02:00:58.640 in debate. He just wants to come on and witness. And you know, 1688 02:00:58.720 --> 02:01:00.720 okay, if you're not going to present an argument and you just want 1689 02:01:00.720 --> 02:01:02.920 to tell me that Jesus loves me, cool that you can do that anytime 1690 02:01:03.039 --> 02:01:08.079 and it's not a debate. And Si is a genuinely terrible person who mistreated 1691 02:01:08.079 --> 02:01:11.600 somebody who was a friend of mine. Apart from that, I don't know 1692 02:01:11.640 --> 02:01:15.479 if there's anybody who I've refused to debate. You could probably you can find 1693 02:01:15.479 --> 02:01:21.079 some people who refuse debate me, like Bill Craig, But I take pretty 1694 02:01:21.159 --> 02:01:26.600 much any debate. Somebody wants to do so. I don't know who the 1695 02:01:26.680 --> 02:01:29.800 skeptico is or anything. Maybe I do, maybe in the course of the 1696 02:01:29.880 --> 02:01:31.279 years, once upon a time I knew who it was. I don't know. 1697 02:01:31.479 --> 02:01:33.960 I debated Skeptico. You can find my debate with him. It's pretty 1698 02:01:34.000 --> 02:01:39.880 amusing if anybody wants some entertainment. But Demetrios Clado's twenty Jay as a scientist 1699 02:01:39.880 --> 02:01:42.840 and orthodox, I stopped debating with an atheists a while back. Now I 1700 02:01:42.960 --> 02:01:45.560 just pray for them. However, I appreciate watching your attempt to reason with 1701 02:01:45.680 --> 02:01:54.600 spiritually dead and the unreasonable God bless that's thank you. I'm getting out spiritually 1702 02:01:54.640 --> 02:01:57.640 dead and unreasonable. That's getting on a T shirt. I'm not going to 1703 02:01:57.720 --> 02:02:00.840 read the next one for gone. That's not going to any rude comments. 1704 02:02:00.840 --> 02:02:03.319 Ten or Terry five bucks to both debaters, How does your worldview deal with 1705 02:02:05.439 --> 02:02:10.439 ground types and classes of things? I don't know what ground types are. 1706 02:02:12.880 --> 02:02:15.960 Well, that's two of us that don't know classes of things. If you 1707 02:02:15.000 --> 02:02:19.920 mean like Aristotle's classes of kingdom hylum, I mean I don't have any problem 1708 02:02:19.960 --> 02:02:25.920 admitting the reality of classes of things. So Franklin Chan nine, thank you 1709 02:02:26.000 --> 02:02:30.399 for all your work. We do a lot of categorizing, which we've done 1710 02:02:30.439 --> 02:02:32.479 in here. There's a difference between something that's physical and something that's abstract, 1711 02:02:32.560 --> 02:02:35.000 something that's you know, you don't want to confuse the map for the place 1712 02:02:35.079 --> 02:02:38.640 sort of thing, so we can put things in. If that's what you're 1713 02:02:38.640 --> 02:02:43.239 talking about, I don't know how much time I spend doing that. Franklin 1714 02:02:43.319 --> 02:02:46.239 Chan ten bucks. Thanks for all the work you guys. Hans Laga five 1715 02:02:46.279 --> 02:02:51.960 bucks support for Jay. Thank you Front, Hans hans Laga. Michael Flaherty 1716 02:02:53.000 --> 02:02:55.960 one hundred and fifty dollars. Matt, you have been a gentleman and the 1717 02:02:56.000 --> 02:03:00.920 best that we've seen with Jay. Let's get off of the inter and onto 1718 02:03:00.079 --> 02:03:04.720 a stage with your buddy Sam Harris. I guess are you saying me or 1719 02:03:04.720 --> 02:03:09.239 are you saying Matt. Matt's been on stage with Sam Harris must be you. 1720 02:03:09.359 --> 02:03:11.279 I've done quite a few events with Sam. Now, yeah, I 1721 02:03:11.319 --> 02:03:15.760 would always. I don't turn down debates either. I'm a like Matt, 1722 02:03:15.800 --> 02:03:18.520 I'm a debate hound, so I would say yes to most debates. Seraph 1723 02:03:18.640 --> 02:03:23.479 m s five dollars. Matt said that we should follow laws of logic. 1724 02:03:24.359 --> 02:03:27.960 This is an ethical claim. Why should we follow the laws of logic in 1725 02:03:28.119 --> 02:03:32.680 his worldview, since this is a question of metathic, Well, I don't 1726 02:03:32.720 --> 02:03:38.079 recall I don't recall making a statement that we ought to but or at least 1727 02:03:38.079 --> 02:03:42.079 not in the context that you're saying. But you know, I talked about 1728 02:03:42.079 --> 02:03:45.279 it being a This is useful, it's it provides truth. There's a presupposition 1729 02:03:45.359 --> 02:03:48.079 in order to say that you ought to follow the laws of logic, and 1730 02:03:48.119 --> 02:03:51.359 that is that you ought to do the thing. Well, it becomes circular, 1731 02:03:51.439 --> 02:03:54.880 right then, because you ought to care about the truth and you ought 1732 02:03:54.880 --> 02:03:59.960 to work to be consistent with that. Any argument that I make for why 1733 02:04:00.079 --> 02:04:03.399 we should care about the laws of logic necessarily depends upon them. You can't 1734 02:04:03.520 --> 02:04:10.279 have any sort of argument or reason without beginning to assume them. And the 1735 02:04:10.439 --> 02:04:14.159 fact that we must do that. Even this is why, this is why 1736 02:04:14.199 --> 02:04:17.560 I'm convinced to the highest confidence that I can that they're absolute, is that 1737 02:04:17.560 --> 02:04:20.000 you would have to assume that they're true to try to demonstrate that they're not 1738 02:04:20.039 --> 02:04:27.640 true. And my thing isn't so logic tells you nothing. Logic itself tells 1739 02:04:27.640 --> 02:04:30.720 you nothing about the facts of reality. It is the tool that we use 1740 02:04:31.119 --> 02:04:34.079 to then categorize things to say this is a and this is not a. 1741 02:04:34.279 --> 02:04:38.840 I mean, that's the nuts and bolts of it. Why should we do 1742 02:04:38.920 --> 02:04:45.279 that? I would argue that the evidence shows that remaining consistent with logic and 1743 02:04:45.319 --> 02:04:50.439 constructing logical arguments makes you avoid being wrong or limiting your risk of being wrong, 1744 02:04:50.800 --> 02:04:55.520 and that if you stopped doing that, if you tossed out the laws 1745 02:04:55.520 --> 02:04:59.079 of logic, you would be dead. The world would descend into chaos. 1746 02:04:59.079 --> 02:05:01.960 As Ja was pointing out earlier, that this is not only absurdity, but 1747 02:05:02.279 --> 02:05:05.920 as I would say, it's incredibly dangerous. But now you're at a point 1748 02:05:05.960 --> 02:05:09.600 where the question becomes, oh, well, what makes you think I need 1749 02:05:09.640 --> 02:05:13.760 to care about whether or not I keep living. Well, that's entirely up 1750 02:05:13.800 --> 02:05:16.239 to you as to whether or not you want to keep living. But if 1751 02:05:16.279 --> 02:05:19.359 you toss the laws of logic out, I think you probably will find out 1752 02:05:19.399 --> 02:05:25.960 you're probably not going to live that long. Okay, yeah, I would 1753 02:05:26.239 --> 02:05:28.760 The one point where I would disagree with Matt there is the claim that the 1754 02:05:28.840 --> 02:05:31.720 laws of logic don't tell us anything about the reality or the real world. 1755 02:05:32.239 --> 02:05:35.560 I think that they do, and I think that the meta level questions and 1756 02:05:36.479 --> 02:05:41.520 math related questions, questions that relate to engineering, those kinds of things I 1757 02:05:41.520 --> 02:05:44.800 actually do teach us and tell us things about the world, especially when we 1758 02:05:44.880 --> 02:05:47.960 actually go and test them. Taylor Terry five bucks to both do we know 1759 02:05:48.119 --> 02:05:53.880 when something is convincing or has been properly demonstrated? Is there some standard? 1760 02:05:54.319 --> 02:05:59.359 And if not, can anything be convincing? I would say that we have 1761 02:05:59.439 --> 02:06:03.359 to assume that there is some intuitive sense that humans are so constituted such that 1762 02:06:03.359 --> 02:06:10.399 they can recognize when something is coherent, when something is demonstrated and demonstrable, 1763 02:06:11.079 --> 02:06:14.279 and they can recognize those standards. So it would be another one of those 1764 02:06:14.359 --> 02:06:16.560 kind of things that are assumed in the process of learning, the process of 1765 02:06:16.600 --> 02:06:23.920 science, the process of truth and mathematics, so the coherence between propositions and 1766 02:06:24.000 --> 02:06:28.800 truths, between words and concepts, meanings, etc. That would be another 1767 02:06:28.840 --> 02:06:31.640 transcendental category that would be assumed in the process and something that I don't think 1768 02:06:31.720 --> 02:06:38.359 you could empirically justify. But just because something's not empirically justifiable, in my 1769 02:06:38.479 --> 02:06:41.560 view, does not mean that it can't be argued for or justified. Hence 1770 02:06:41.680 --> 02:06:45.680 the meta questions. I don't know. This is the whole reason that there's 1771 02:06:45.720 --> 02:06:50.479 a debate is kind of what you're asking is what quality and quantity of evidence 1772 02:06:50.479 --> 02:06:55.199 should be convinced. It should be sufficient to know that you have a warranted 1773 02:06:55.199 --> 02:07:00.439 belief. And as saying, another's pointed out, you know or Hume proportioned 1774 02:07:00.479 --> 02:07:04.520 your confidence to the evidence, and Sagan would point out that extraordinary claims require 1775 02:07:04.520 --> 02:07:09.439 extordinary evidence. They answer to your question is incredibly complicated. But the shortest 1776 02:07:09.479 --> 02:07:15.359 version is each claim is going to have its own bar, and the quality 1777 02:07:15.359 --> 02:07:18.600 and quantity of evidence would have to rise above that bar for that claim. 1778 02:07:18.640 --> 02:07:23.479 That the sort of evidence I would need to believe that you just got a 1779 02:07:23.520 --> 02:07:27.720 new puppy is different from the sort of evidence that might convince me you just 1780 02:07:28.079 --> 02:07:31.880 got a Bugatti Veyron, or even worse, you have a pet unicorn. 1781 02:07:32.279 --> 02:07:35.840 Those three claims are of a slightly different nature. But at the end of 1782 02:07:35.880 --> 02:07:42.239 the day, this is the terrible dirty secret. It's up to each individual. 1783 02:07:43.399 --> 02:07:45.039 You're not in control of your beliefs. You're not in control. You 1784 02:07:45.399 --> 02:07:50.319 are either convinced or you're not. And for many people there are roadblocks with 1785 02:07:50.359 --> 02:07:54.479 regard to biases and other things that are hidden that you may not see. 1786 02:07:54.760 --> 02:07:58.279 And for others they may be far more open when there are people we know 1787 02:07:58.359 --> 02:08:01.359 who are gullible and easily vinced of things, or we would describe it that 1788 02:08:01.399 --> 02:08:05.319 way. Doesn't mean they're wrong, but they can be easily convinced. And 1789 02:08:05.359 --> 02:08:11.159 so no, there's not any pick any claim. There's not a set standard 1790 02:08:11.159 --> 02:08:16.399 of when we have this much evidence of this type. Now we're on firm 1791 02:08:16.439 --> 02:08:20.720 ground, which is why we've always had these arguments and debates about how much 1792 02:08:20.760 --> 02:08:24.880 and what quality of evidence is enough and what Jay thinks is enough to warrant 1793 02:08:24.960 --> 02:08:28.479 belief is fundamentally different than I do on some things, and yet we would 1794 02:08:28.520 --> 02:08:33.319 probably agree on lots of other things. Yeah, the one thing I would 1795 02:08:33.359 --> 02:08:37.640 say about the argument that Matt just gave itself is a form of a universal 1796 02:08:37.680 --> 02:08:43.000 claim. Is a statement about a universal state of affairs that relates to what 1797 02:08:43.199 --> 02:08:46.199 is universally the case about how we can and can't know and what we can 1798 02:08:46.279 --> 02:08:52.079 and can't prove. And I would say that that itself is inconsistent with a 1799 02:08:52.199 --> 02:08:56.399 pragmatic empiricism. But I don't know, we may not want to go down 1800 02:08:56.399 --> 02:09:01.600 that route. I don't know. Anthony Magnavos two dollars, who is making 1801 02:09:01.600 --> 02:09:07.039 the most presuppositions. I would say we both make all the same presuppositions because 1802 02:09:07.119 --> 02:09:13.359 the presuppose God and I don't. So clearly that's not true. Well, 1803 02:09:13.520 --> 02:09:18.199 that's true in the case of the normal transcendental categories of the past. The 1804 02:09:18.279 --> 02:09:22.319 self laws of logic numbers. That's what I mean, we all have the 1805 02:09:22.319 --> 02:09:26.399 same presuppositions. I think that those meta questions are solved by a God who's 1806 02:09:26.439 --> 02:09:33.720 a metaphysical being. It's a meta question to talk about God. Metaphysics and 1807 02:09:33.800 --> 02:09:37.600 meta ethics and meta logic are very similar in the way that they're demonstrated, 1808 02:09:37.600 --> 02:09:39.920 And of course one can refuse that, but I think it's a valid argument, 1809 02:09:39.920 --> 02:09:45.319 and that's what I've been trying to present. I think it's kind of 1810 02:09:45.319 --> 02:09:48.279 strange because I would expected to say that you make exactly one presupposition and that's 1811 02:09:48.319 --> 02:09:52.600 God, and everything else is derived from that, because when you use God 1812 02:09:52.600 --> 02:09:56.399 as a foundation, you're no longer presupposing logic, you are presupposing the foundation 1813 02:09:56.439 --> 02:09:58.399 for logic. No, I mean, I wouldn't say that those things are 1814 02:09:58.439 --> 02:10:01.479 either or. I mean, I believe in all of those categories that we've 1815 02:10:01.479 --> 02:10:03.920 talked about. I think they're they're very real, and I think that they 1816 02:10:03.960 --> 02:10:09.039 have a logical justification. And that's what a transcendental argument is is a form 1817 02:10:09.079 --> 02:10:13.880 of logic. It's a logical argument. It's a logical it's a different type 1818 02:10:13.880 --> 02:10:16.760 of logic, but it is a logical argument. Now one could again, 1819 02:10:16.800 --> 02:10:20.199 one could disagree with that and not accept that. But I think then I'm 1820 02:10:20.239 --> 02:10:24.199 genuinely trying to understand this. I presuppose the laws of logic. Would you 1821 02:10:24.199 --> 02:10:30.279 say that you presuppose the laws of logic? Sure, and yet you think 1822 02:10:30.319 --> 02:10:33.920 you have a foundation for those, which means that no supposition is required If 1823 02:10:35.560 --> 02:10:39.359 I have the argument, the argument is not that a presupposition doesn't require a 1824 02:10:39.439 --> 02:10:48.359 justification. Wow, so there's a word that perhaps I've been wrong about my 1825 02:10:48.520 --> 02:10:52.920 entire life, a thing tacitly assumed beforehand, at the beginning of a line 1826 02:10:52.920 --> 02:10:56.319 of argument or course of action, the action or state of presupposing or being 1827 02:10:56.359 --> 02:11:00.880 proposed. When I look at a presupposition, when people talk about what they're 1828 02:11:00.880 --> 02:11:07.039 presupposing, if you have an explanation for something, then I'm not presupposing it. 1829 02:11:07.039 --> 02:11:09.920 It is derived from that explanation. I could because then I could just 1830 02:11:11.039 --> 02:11:18.279 argue, um, well, I presuppose that I did not spontaneously come into 1831 02:11:18.319 --> 02:11:26.560 existence because my parents had sex and I share genetic traits with them. Now, 1832 02:11:26.680 --> 02:11:30.680 I don't presuppose that. I just pot that I didn't just pop into 1833 02:11:30.680 --> 02:11:33.760 existence. I'm convinced of that for an actual reason. Now, I might 1834 02:11:33.800 --> 02:11:39.319 presuppose that my parents had sex and the evidence shows genetics. But to me, 1835 02:11:39.359 --> 02:11:45.560 a presupposition to something for which you presuppose it because you don't have an 1836 02:11:45.560 --> 02:11:48.239 evidentiary foundational warrant behind it, because if you do, it's no longer press 1837 02:11:48.399 --> 02:11:52.920 presupposition. It is derived from that. No, That's why I was saying 1838 02:11:52.920 --> 02:11:54.439 that different things are proven in different ways. So the way that we would 1839 02:11:54.439 --> 02:12:00.359 go about proving things that relate to the natural world, what temperature to water 1840 02:12:00.439 --> 02:12:03.840 boil, the way that we prove that is different than the way that we 1841 02:12:03.920 --> 02:12:07.119 prove things that are fundamentally different in nature. Now, one could say that 1842 02:12:07.159 --> 02:12:11.439 I don't accept anything that's not material. But if I believe in things that 1843 02:12:11.479 --> 02:12:15.600 are immaterial, it stands to reason that the way that I would prove them 1844 02:12:15.880 --> 02:12:18.640 would be different than the way that I prove the material things. Because the 1845 02:12:18.640 --> 02:12:22.319 thing that we're talking about is immaterial. It's invariant, it's conceptual. It's 1846 02:12:22.359 --> 02:12:24.720 not going to be proven in the same way that things that are material are 1847 02:12:24.760 --> 02:12:30.760 proven. Hence the transcendental argmentation and transcendental arguments are arguments. That's the whole 1848 02:12:30.800 --> 02:12:33.880 point. Now again, you could say I don't accept transcendent arguments. They're 1849 02:12:33.880 --> 02:12:37.960 not valid arguments, and the response to why you don't know why you keep 1850 02:12:37.960 --> 02:12:39.000 going there, I never say it's not valid. I didn't say I'm not 1851 02:12:39.000 --> 02:12:45.079 going to accept transcendental arguments. I'm talking So this is only this little subtext 1852 02:12:45.159 --> 02:12:50.720 is only about presuppositions. It doesn't matter that it's abstract. I don't presuppose 1853 02:12:50.880 --> 02:12:52.760 love. Well, that's I mean, you could say that. But but 1854 02:12:52.880 --> 02:12:58.119 again, all I'm trying to say is that this is a branch of logic, 1855 02:12:58.199 --> 02:13:03.840 and it's a branch of argumentation that deals with justifying presuppositions and preconditions for 1856 02:13:03.960 --> 02:13:07.359 things. Now, again, maybe you're not saying that you don't accept them. 1857 02:13:07.399 --> 02:13:09.119 I don't understand that you're saying that they make sense in a logical way. 1858 02:13:09.439 --> 02:13:13.680 But I'm saying it's not wrong to ask the meta level, meta logic 1859 02:13:13.760 --> 02:13:16.319 question of can they be justified? And how do we make sense of them. 1860 02:13:16.439 --> 02:13:20.960 In fact, it's the why are you talking about the exact? This 1861 02:13:20.039 --> 02:13:22.560 has nothing to do what we're actually talking about. By argument, you're saying 1862 02:13:22.600 --> 02:13:28.359 that I'm arguing for a thing that's immaterial and invariant. I'm talking about what 1863 02:13:28.520 --> 02:13:31.640 is a pre subposition and whether or not it's justified. So I could say 1864 02:13:31.680 --> 02:13:37.920 I presuppose logic, but here's the reason why I think logic is real, 1865 02:13:37.199 --> 02:13:41.359 and here's my evidence for the thing I think is that. Sorry, I 1866 02:13:41.600 --> 02:13:45.520 love here's you know, if I then provide a foundation for it, I'm 1867 02:13:45.560 --> 02:13:48.880 no longer presupposing it. It is now a warranted position based on my artre 1868 02:13:48.960 --> 02:13:52.479 subpositions of our presubpositions are not things for which you have no warrant. They're 1869 02:13:52.520 --> 02:13:56.520 different types of arguments and different types of things. They're just proven in a 1870 02:13:56.560 --> 02:14:01.479 different way, That's all we're saying. Then, a good junk of this 1871 02:14:01.560 --> 02:14:05.840 is going to be incredibly confusing, because we mean two entirely different things by 1872 02:14:05.880 --> 02:14:09.720 presuppositions. For me, when I say I presuppose something, this is something 1873 02:14:09.760 --> 02:14:15.359 that I am convinced is true, but I cannot justify, and I'm not 1874 02:14:15.399 --> 02:14:18.560 convinced anybody else can justify or I would have a justification and I would no 1875 02:14:18.600 --> 02:14:24.159 longer presuppose it. And I don't ever say I presuppose love or any other 1876 02:14:24.199 --> 02:14:28.560 abstract and so I don't know what the justification is for saying, oh, 1877 02:14:28.600 --> 02:14:33.439 I presuppose something, but here's its evidential warrant. Right, So evidences can 1878 02:14:33.520 --> 02:14:37.279 be given and proven or demonstrated for different types of things in different ways. 1879 02:14:37.319 --> 02:14:41.640 Again, the way that we would do a courtroom drama and settle a dispute 1880 02:14:41.680 --> 02:14:46.159 over who was murdered so and so did Bill Cosby do x y Z, 1881 02:14:46.600 --> 02:14:50.479 that's different than the way that we would solve an abstract complex math problem. 1882 02:14:50.600 --> 02:14:54.159 Right, Two different types of things, two different types of arguments. One 1883 02:14:54.279 --> 02:14:58.720 is more abstract, more a priori, more immaterial and invariant in its nature. 1884 02:14:58.760 --> 02:15:01.560 The other one is more solid, empirical, physical, Right, But 1885 02:15:01.640 --> 02:15:07.239 that doesn't mean that what we're arguing for it in terms of transcendental categories aren't 1886 02:15:07.359 --> 02:15:11.199 arguable and aren't provable and aren't it's just that they're proven in a different type 1887 02:15:11.239 --> 02:15:13.640 of way. So, for example, and I know that doctor Malpass disagrees, 1888 02:15:13.720 --> 02:15:18.600 but action and I'll make one last point about this, this transcendental will 1889 02:15:18.640 --> 02:15:22.159 move on. But if you look at John Damascus, a famous eighth century 1890 02:15:22.199 --> 02:15:26.880 Christian theologian, he wrote a book called Fount of Knowledge, and he looked 1891 02:15:26.880 --> 02:15:30.039 back at Aristotle. I'm not saying that true, because Arisota said, I'm 1892 02:15:30.039 --> 02:15:33.079 just giving an example from Aristotle. M Aristotle argued with the sofis, and 1893 02:15:33.119 --> 02:15:37.720 the sofist said that if we deny the law of noncontradiction, you can't prove 1894 02:15:37.720 --> 02:15:39.880 that. Aristotle, what if I come along and I deny the law of 1895 02:15:39.880 --> 02:15:45.560 non contradiction. Aristotle responds with a transcendental argument, and John Damascus backs us 1896 02:15:45.640 --> 02:15:48.800 up. And I hope that doctor Malpass is watching, because that's a response 1897 02:15:48.840 --> 02:15:52.399 to his last essay that he wrote about me. But he saw John Damatt. 1898 02:15:52.760 --> 02:15:56.479 John Damascus saw Aristotle as giving a transcendental argument. And the argument is 1899 02:15:56.520 --> 02:16:01.520 that when you deny something that it's fundamental and paradigmatic, the proof for that 1900 02:16:01.560 --> 02:16:05.119 thing is in the fact that it's assumed in its denial. That is a 1901 02:16:05.119 --> 02:16:09.640 transcendental argument. That's it's that simple, and it is a positive proof. 1902 02:16:09.039 --> 02:16:15.319 It's just a different type of proof than normal empirical claims or even normal logical 1903 02:16:15.319 --> 02:16:18.119 claims. And that's why because the nature of the thing is unique due to 1904 02:16:18.199 --> 02:16:26.560 its paradigmatic level. The three of you on stage, public forum. Can 1905 02:16:26.640 --> 02:16:30.640 Jordan come, Michael Flaherty, that's out of my out of my range. 1906 02:16:30.640 --> 02:16:35.000 That's not up to me. I can't read Arabic. Two dollars, Matt, 1907 02:16:35.040 --> 02:16:41.479 would you debate Steve McCray. Oh, that's a really good question. 1908 02:16:41.959 --> 02:16:48.920 Uh no, Zach, Zach, two dollars, get it going, Jordan 1909 02:16:48.000 --> 02:16:54.000 Peterson Dyer Harris. Uh, you know we're not gonna read any insults, 1910 02:16:54.520 --> 02:16:58.000 mister an Arctica twenty or one dollar, thank you, Nemo Utopian two dollars, 1911 02:16:58.639 --> 02:17:03.319 Jade. Does God generate logic or obey it? That's actually one quick 1912 02:17:03.319 --> 02:17:07.040 thing I did want to touch on, which was if you know that, 1913 02:17:07.120 --> 02:17:09.159 like the transport argument for the non existence of God from Michael Martin Tang, 1914 02:17:09.879 --> 02:17:13.040 what this does is that it basically says that it assumes that the laws of 1915 02:17:13.040 --> 02:17:18.920 logic or arbitrary categories that God sort of can change or play with it will 1916 02:17:20.000 --> 02:17:22.440 or whatever. We wouldn't say that, We would say that the laws of 1917 02:17:22.440 --> 02:17:26.239 logic, truth, etc. Are reflections of God, the reflections of the 1918 02:17:26.280 --> 02:17:28.799 divine mind. So no, God does not change the laws of logic, 1919 02:17:28.840 --> 02:17:33.479 and that's not a denial of his omnipotence because within our paradigm, within our 1920 02:17:33.520 --> 02:17:37.879 worldview, the meaning of omnipotence would be determined by the highest absolute metaphysical category 1921 02:17:37.920 --> 02:17:41.360 within the world view, which has God himself. So omnipotence is not determined 1922 02:17:41.360 --> 02:17:45.920 by the guy who says, well, I think omnipotence must mean that you 1923 02:17:45.959 --> 02:17:48.399 can make truth into a lot. We would reject that whole, that whole 1924 02:17:48.440 --> 02:17:52.440 definition of what omnipotence is. So that's why we don't believe in the Tang 1925 02:17:52.520 --> 02:17:58.799 view Tan or Tarry five dollars. Matt, would you agree that meta level 1926 02:17:58.920 --> 02:18:11.399 discourse deals with justifying presuppositions or while normative level discourse does not. I don't 1927 02:18:11.399 --> 02:18:22.399 know. I I'm sorry, I'm getting the echo thinking and um. Metal 1928 02:18:22.479 --> 02:18:28.520 level discussions are about understanding and attempting to justify whatever the normative level is. 1929 02:18:28.559 --> 02:18:39.040 I mean, that's that's or the metal level themselves. Okay, Lucid Locomotive 1930 02:18:39.079 --> 02:18:41.959 one ninety nine, and thank you, mister Antarctica. Are you bread though 1931 02:18:43.000 --> 02:18:50.000 on all? Right? Well? Um wait, Matt Catholicism orthodox, Matt 1932 02:18:50.239 --> 02:18:54.760 is Catholicism. I don't know. Why. I mean, all right, 1933 02:18:54.959 --> 02:18:56.920 it doesn't make any sense, Matt, is Catholicism or Orthodoxy more biblical or 1934 02:18:56.959 --> 02:19:05.360 Protestantism? Um? Well, I would I would argue, first of all, 1935 02:19:05.399 --> 02:19:11.399 it depends on which Bible you're going to point Tom, I think I 1936 02:19:11.440 --> 02:19:13.959 think the easiest way for me to do this, And yes, I was 1937 02:19:13.000 --> 02:19:18.799 a Southern Baptist, but I've also debated orthodox in Catholics as well. Catholics 1938 02:19:18.799 --> 02:19:22.079 have extra books that don't exist in the Protestant Bible. So if you're going 1939 02:19:22.159 --> 02:19:24.920 to say which one's more Biblical, then it depends on which books you're going 1940 02:19:24.959 --> 02:19:28.479 to include in your you know, your liturgy there to say, oh, 1941 02:19:28.559 --> 02:19:31.799 this is what it's based on. Um. I think there are Catholic beliefs 1942 02:19:31.840 --> 02:19:35.120 that fly in the face of what is in, of course, the Protestant 1943 02:19:35.120 --> 02:19:39.680 Bible. Um. I think they've added to it. Whether or not that's 1944 02:19:39.559 --> 02:19:46.319 justified or whatever, I don't know. It's I I remember growing up as 1945 02:19:46.360 --> 02:19:48.239 a Baptist, we were taught that the Catholics were married, worshiping idol, 1946 02:19:48.280 --> 02:19:52.440 worshiping heretics who probably weren't going to heaven. But that was obviously a Protestant 1947 02:19:52.520 --> 02:19:58.959 view, and so one of the things is that occult is uh or the 1948 02:20:00.040 --> 02:20:03.840 it's the religion that's not yours and perhaps not as popular. And so there's 1949 02:20:03.879 --> 02:20:09.000 been this constant conflict between you know, Protestants and Catholics, and I can't 1950 02:20:09.040 --> 02:20:13.719 tell you which one is more biblical until we know what the Bible is and 1951 02:20:13.760 --> 02:20:18.799 what it's supposed to be, because you know, I would argue that the 1952 02:20:18.840 --> 02:20:24.079 fact that there's a thousand or more denominations that all identify as Christian and disagree 1953 02:20:24.120 --> 02:20:28.079 on every single point of doctrine is probably one of the many potential death knells 1954 02:20:28.079 --> 02:20:31.799 for Christianity in general. But then now we're into an argument basically from divine 1955 02:20:31.879 --> 02:20:35.440 hiddeness, and that's outside the scope of this. Well, I would definitely 1956 02:20:35.440 --> 02:20:39.399 say Orthodox, he's more biblical, And like Matt, I was raised Baptist, 1957 02:20:39.399 --> 02:20:43.079 so I can definitely understand Matt in terms of where he's coming from. 1958 02:20:43.120 --> 02:20:46.719 Super Chat ten Bucks. To be fair, I'm not as familiar with just 1959 02:20:46.760 --> 02:20:50.520 by having debated Orthodox people before, I'm not as familiar with Orthodox doctrine how 1960 02:20:50.879 --> 02:20:58.840 how it differentiates from Prosestism or Catholicism. So I'm not the right guy to 1961 02:20:58.840 --> 02:21:03.239 ask super Chat ten Bucks Matt, if you're a materialist, what makes you 1962 02:21:03.280 --> 02:21:07.639 believe that your brain's neural firings have anything to do with truth on a metaphysical 1963 02:21:07.760 --> 02:21:15.840 level. I don't think I claim that mister Antarctica to Z's Jay without God 1964 02:21:16.159 --> 02:21:22.959 is knowledge impossible if by knowledge you mean justified true belief or giving a coherent 1965 02:21:22.000 --> 02:21:26.559 account for our beliefs. Um, yes, I believe that it would lead 1966 02:21:26.600 --> 02:21:30.479 to absurdity. And ultimately that's kind of what the argument is in summation. 1967 02:21:31.719 --> 02:21:35.000 Um, that's all the super chats. Great debate, two and a half 1968 02:21:35.040 --> 02:21:39.079 hours. Thank you very much, Matt. Appreciate that I've got I've got 1969 02:21:39.120 --> 02:21:43.680 Matt's uh link there if anybody wants to check out his channel there in the 1970 02:21:43.840 --> 02:21:50.159 description and a gentleman scholar. Thank you, thank you, thank you. 1971 02:21:50.520 --> 02:21:58.600 I enjoyed it. Oh I'm getting the ax yep. Oh uh yeah. 1972 02:21:58.639 --> 02:22:01.920 I just want to say, and we'll get this posted, and I'm sure 1973 02:22:01.079 --> 02:22:05.559 we'll both get feedback from lots of people, and I'm sure i'll be pointed 1974 02:22:05.559 --> 02:22:07.319 out, oh, you should have said this, or you didn't say this, 1975 02:22:07.440 --> 02:22:09.239 or you were wrong here or whatever else. And that's honestly one of 1976 02:22:09.280 --> 02:22:13.040 the biggest reasons I do this. When I talked about before how I didn't 1977 02:22:13.040 --> 02:22:18.200 walk in here with any notion that I'm likely to change Jay's mind about the 1978 02:22:18.239 --> 02:22:22.000 big issues. There's also this notion that, you know, I perhaps might 1979 02:22:22.079 --> 02:22:26.399 change Jay's mind on some other issue, or that Jay might change my mind, 1980 02:22:26.479 --> 02:22:28.239 or by having the discussion, somebody else might change both of our minds. 1981 02:22:28.559 --> 02:22:39.520 And so I liked the discussions. I just I kind of wish every 1982 02:22:39.559 --> 02:22:41.639 single time. And there are people who I know are very frustrated with debates. 1983 02:22:41.639 --> 02:22:43.879 I mean, I do people calling to the show all the time. 1984 02:22:43.920 --> 02:22:46.959 I have my Atheist Debates Channel. I talk about debates and debating and everything 1985 02:22:46.959 --> 02:22:50.280 else. I know there people who frustrated because they don't think any good comes 1986 02:22:50.280 --> 02:22:54.440 of any of this. And despite that, I have a number of friends 1987 02:22:54.559 --> 02:22:58.239 who agree and disagree about the God thing, who engage in conversations, and 1988 02:22:58.559 --> 02:23:03.920 I have of thousands upon thousands of emails from people who have benefited from those 1989 02:23:03.920 --> 02:23:07.879 conversations. A good chunk of them have found their way out of one particular 1990 02:23:07.920 --> 02:23:11.879 religious belief or another, or gained a better understanding of skepticism. And a 1991 02:23:11.879 --> 02:23:13.959 few of them have just said, you know what, I listened to you, 1992 02:23:15.000 --> 02:23:18.360 and I walked away more confident and firm in my beliefs than ever. 1993 02:23:18.959 --> 02:23:24.280 And while I don't know you, I'm thankful that they at least listened and 1994 02:23:24.280 --> 02:23:28.200 considered, because I think that's probably more than most people do in their lifetime. 1995 02:23:28.239 --> 02:23:30.920 I know that one of the reasons it took me forever to kind of 1996 02:23:30.920 --> 02:23:35.000 find my way out of Christianity is because there was no reason to consider it. 1997 02:23:35.399 --> 02:23:39.319 Everybody around me believed and it made sense. And like I was saying 1998 02:23:39.360 --> 02:23:46.000 with Jay at the outset, yeah, if you want to be confident that 1999 02:23:46.040 --> 02:23:52.319 logic is reliable, then being convinced that there's a God who guarantees that logic 2000 02:23:52.680 --> 02:23:58.559 is inviolate, that's very satisfying. And it may be exactly the sort of 2001 02:23:58.559 --> 02:24:03.360 thing that but he needs to be comfortable continuing to use logic. I don't 2002 02:24:03.399 --> 02:24:09.840 need that extra step because I haven't seen a demonstration that it's necessary. And 2003 02:24:09.920 --> 02:24:13.879 I'm pretty much convinced that while Jay and I agree that while as of logic 2004 02:24:13.920 --> 02:24:18.520 are absolute and viable or in violent or as close to that as possible, 2005 02:24:20.760 --> 02:24:24.719 I'm not convinced that there is an explanation or that there needs to be one 2006 02:24:24.719 --> 02:24:28.399 but I'm open to the possibility that it might be the last couple of ones. 2007 02:24:28.440 --> 02:24:33.159 Grombeard. Thank you Matt and Jay for courageously expressing beliefs. I enjoyed 2008 02:24:33.159 --> 02:24:35.280 the debate. I hope you get back together for another session. Super curious 2009 02:24:35.360 --> 02:24:39.520 to twenty nine, what method do you use to determine truth? I think 2010 02:24:39.559 --> 02:24:45.319 we've we've talked about that the whole time. So he just said, you 2011 02:24:45.319 --> 02:24:48.879 know, Matt just gave a good description of areas where we degree in terms 2012 02:24:48.920 --> 02:24:54.479 of laws of logic. Mister Antarctica again, are aren't certain things self evident? 2013 02:24:54.600 --> 02:25:00.200 I don't believe in self evident maxims in terms of foundationalism? Matt as 2014 02:25:00.239 --> 02:25:03.799 a question on that, Oh, I'm sorry, I mean I thought you 2015 02:25:03.840 --> 02:25:11.680 were done there. Now the question that what's your view on properly basic beliefs? 2016 02:25:11.719 --> 02:25:13.600 Because that to me feels a lot like self evident but I wanted to 2017 02:25:13.680 --> 02:25:16.120 check. Yeah, No, I would say that that's pretty much. Um. 2018 02:25:18.280 --> 02:25:24.920 The main attempt of classical foundationalism to justify how they don't fall into a 2019 02:25:24.959 --> 02:25:31.840 circular regress is that they'll say that there are beliefs that are just properly basic. 2020 02:25:31.360 --> 02:25:35.239 Um. I don't find that to be a coherent answer when in the 2021 02:25:35.280 --> 02:25:41.600 history of philosophy, people actually, especially after Descartes, they really started trying 2022 02:25:41.639 --> 02:25:46.000 to question things at the most fundamental levels. So if you read the meditations, 2023 02:25:46.159 --> 02:25:50.399 um, you know, Descartes looking for a way to find that certainty 2024 02:25:50.399 --> 02:25:52.079 that we've been kind of talking about, is it possible? And he questions 2025 02:25:52.120 --> 02:25:56.799 everything down to what he thinks is the most basic thing. But and I 2026 02:25:56.840 --> 02:26:01.639 would agree with Burch and Russell on this, that the very thing that Descartes 2027 02:26:01.680 --> 02:26:05.360 thinks is the most foundationally basic thing to doubt his own existence in his own 2028 02:26:05.360 --> 02:26:11.680 consciousness. He actually doesn't go deep enough, all right, So he says, 2029 02:26:11.879 --> 02:26:15.959 I think therefore I am, And I think Russell is actually correct to 2030 02:26:16.000 --> 02:26:22.639 point out that that's that was logically a non sequitor, because all Descartes claim 2031 02:26:22.760 --> 02:26:26.360 shows is that thinking is occurring. I think that's true. And as many 2032 02:26:26.360 --> 02:26:31.159 philosophers afterwards have pointed out, Descartes didn't think yet to doubt things like language, 2033 02:26:31.239 --> 02:26:35.280 like words having meaning. And that's because that comes later in the in 2034 02:26:35.360 --> 02:26:41.239 the discourse of Western philosophy, after Jean Patissa Vico, when people start doubting 2035 02:26:41.639 --> 02:26:43.559 linguistic philosophy, which all I think is great, and that actually led people 2036 02:26:43.639 --> 02:26:48.159 into doing trans antal argumentation. Po Strawson people like this have done a lot 2037 02:26:48.200 --> 02:26:52.879 of transcendental argumentation relation in relation to language. So I would say that no, 2038 02:26:52.959 --> 02:26:58.079 I don't think the properly basic beliefs can be coherently made sense of outside. 2039 02:26:58.239 --> 02:27:01.559 That's why it's one of the reasons why coherentism, as I think, 2040 02:27:01.600 --> 02:27:07.360 a better view of truth than classical foundationalism, is because my view, just 2041 02:27:07.399 --> 02:27:13.840 saying that some beliefs are properly basic is just another restatement of circularity in the 2042 02:27:13.879 --> 02:27:18.959 classical foundationalist paradigm. That's incredible. See, that's incredibly interesting that after two 2043 02:27:18.000 --> 02:27:20.600 and a half hours we get to this, because I think you and I 2044 02:27:20.600 --> 02:27:24.440 are pretty much in agreement on that. I've a matter of fact, even 2045 02:27:24.479 --> 02:27:26.520 a week or so ago in the show, somebody called in to ask me 2046 02:27:26.520 --> 02:27:28.920 about properly basic beliefs, and I gave a kind of quick, glib answer 2047 02:27:28.920 --> 02:27:33.920 that I think it is a way to obfuscate that there isn't a justification, 2048 02:27:33.959 --> 02:27:39.399 to just assert that we don't need one, although I'd be interested in in 2049 02:27:39.120 --> 02:27:43.719 uh, Russell, you were for everything. Russell pointing out the problem with 2050 02:27:43.760 --> 02:27:48.959 Descartes, but I thought it was Hobbes that pointed out that that Descartes cogito 2051 02:27:48.159 --> 02:27:54.079 was contingent on logic and therefore was not you know, I used to I 2052 02:27:54.159 --> 02:27:54.920 used to say, well, Descartes, you know, got all kinds of 2053 02:27:54.959 --> 02:27:58.159 stuff wrong, but at least it got the one thing right. And then 2054 02:27:58.159 --> 02:28:01.399 I find out, you know, after I think it was that he didn't 2055 02:28:01.479 --> 02:28:03.600 I mean to actually get that one right. That it's basically you know, 2056 02:28:03.639 --> 02:28:07.120 I think therefore I am doesn't actually demonstrate the thing. Yeah, I agree 2057 02:28:07.120 --> 02:28:09.120 with that, and you may be right that it could have been housed before 2058 02:28:09.200 --> 02:28:16.040 Russell that made that point. Yeah, so that next question is about Descartes 2059 02:28:16.120 --> 02:28:22.159 Kogi tho. We just covered that Compillow like, so yeah, good debate 2060 02:28:22.200 --> 02:28:24.159 from all sides. Thank you for that dirty name, you filthy name, 2061 02:28:24.520 --> 02:28:28.680 Nemo Utopian ten bucks, How does God explain the laws of logic if it's 2062 02:28:28.680 --> 02:28:35.760 simply if it is simply the fact that God exists and has a logical nature 2063 02:28:35.000 --> 02:28:39.159 that makes laws sound descriptive of God, and it fails to explain why he 2064 02:28:39.200 --> 02:28:43.559 is logical. Actually, I would agree with you, Utopian, and that's 2065 02:28:43.600 --> 02:28:46.079 one of the reasons why Orthodox theology is unique. It's because we believe in 2066 02:28:46.079 --> 02:28:50.319 the essence energy distinction. So we would not say that the laws of logic 2067 02:28:50.360 --> 02:28:54.760 are descriptors of the divine nature. They would be descriptors of the energies the 2068 02:28:54.799 --> 02:28:58.680 actions the logi, as I mentioned at the beginning from Saint Maximus. So, 2069 02:28:58.760 --> 02:29:01.319 yeah, are onto a good point there, Nemo, that we don't 2070 02:29:01.360 --> 02:29:05.079 believe that they literally describe the divine nature. That would be the Western doctrine 2071 02:29:05.079 --> 02:29:11.680 of divine simplicity. Mitchell day two dollars. Congrats on winning, Matt. 2072 02:29:13.559 --> 02:29:18.159 I guess that's up for the audience to decide. Well, maybe if this 2073 02:29:18.200 --> 02:29:20.959 is really bad English, what they mean by winning, Matt is you beating 2074 02:29:22.000 --> 02:29:24.680 Matt, So you go either way. I guess we don't know what. 2075 02:29:24.719 --> 02:29:28.440 I don't know what Mitchell. I don't know what Mitchell's view is. But 2076 02:29:30.079 --> 02:29:35.719 the ambiguity of that language there is great doormat. It's funny for me because 2077 02:29:35.680 --> 02:29:39.479 legitimately I've said this a bunch of times, and I know that there's people 2078 02:29:39.479 --> 02:29:41.760 who don't believe it, But there's people who don't believe that I don't believe 2079 02:29:41.760 --> 02:29:43.200 in God, and they assert all the time, Oh no, no, 2080 02:29:43.200 --> 02:29:45.440 no, you really know there's a you know there's a God, and you're 2081 02:29:45.479 --> 02:29:48.479 denying it. And I'm just like, every time you say that, you 2082 02:29:48.559 --> 02:29:52.040 demonstrate to me conclusively that you're far more about projection and telling me who you 2083 02:29:52.079 --> 02:29:58.360 are. And so this this notion. Um oh and I just completely lost 2084 02:29:58.360 --> 02:30:05.719 track of what he'd said. Um crap, never mind sixty best debate on 2085 02:30:05.920 --> 02:30:09.399 the channel. Good job, Thank you, Um, Hans Laga, five 2086 02:30:09.399 --> 02:30:13.159 bucks, Matt, You're a good sport. Thank you for coming on. 2087 02:30:13.000 --> 02:30:18.079 Mister an article. Mister an article again. Is God self evidence? Um? 2088 02:30:18.120 --> 02:30:20.440 In a sense? Yes, um, if you mean by self evident 2089 02:30:20.799 --> 02:30:24.799 classical foundationalism no. Um, all right, I don't see any more super 2090 02:30:24.879 --> 02:30:28.559 chats, Great night. Uh. I don't want to want to keep Matt 2091 02:30:28.600 --> 02:30:31.600 too long. Thank you for coming on, Matt. And maybe in the 2092 02:30:31.600 --> 02:30:33.959 future we can have another chat on some philosophy topics if you want to. 2093 02:30:35.239 --> 02:30:37.799 Yeah, yeah, and and not necessarily in debate format, because I mean, 2094 02:30:37.799 --> 02:30:43.680 if you're there are certainly curiosities about orthodox theology. Uh that I have 2095 02:30:43.760 --> 02:30:48.399 more than a passing interest that one of the first, if not the first 2096 02:30:48.479 --> 02:30:52.440 public debate I did live in front of a big audience was against father Hans 2097 02:30:52.520 --> 02:31:00.760 Jacobs, who's an orthodox priest about morality, and while everybody's welcome to go 2098 02:31:00.799 --> 02:31:03.120 watch that, so that they don't just trust my assessment,