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Arguing for that, and I have
created a couple of TV shows, and

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I do a lot of comedy and
film analysis. All right, excellent,

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looking forward to this JA. And
on the other side of the table tonight,

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along with or perhaps versus, he's
the president of the Atheist Community of

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Austin and he hosts a show called
The Atheist Debates for his lovely patrons over

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at patreon dot com. Forward slashed
Atheist Debates. Name is mister Matt Dilla.

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Honey, Matt, go ahead and
introduce yourself to the audience. Pretty

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sure you just did. I'm Att
Delania. I've been hosting The Atheist Experienced

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show for around fifteen years or something. I was president for seven years then

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I wasn't. Now I am again. I do lectures, debates and magic

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shows. And I completely forgot because
in that closet back there is this massive

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stack of DVDs, including my Dario
or Agento collection, which I was going

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to have where you could, but
it would be a distraction. We can

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talk about that one another time.
I didn't know. It's funny you said

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that. It's yeah, it's actually
not my favorite, but I understand it's

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probably his most popular and uh,
yeah, okay, Yeah, it's probably

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my favorite. Go ahead, all
right, excellent, all right, well,

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looking forward to it. Okay,
as far as the show format goes,

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Jay, go ahead and jump in
if I don't have anything right here.

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But it looks like we're gonna do
ten minutes segments and I'll give you

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Fellas a thirty second warning before a
segment ends, so those will be Uh

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are those uninterrupted segments? Jay?
Is that how we're going to work this?

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Yeah? Yeah, ten minute uninterrupted
segments and then for the first hour,

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and then if Matt, Matt wants
to do a crossfire or whatever conversation

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style, we can. Okay,
great, So perhaps a crossfire round in

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the second hour if we're gonna go
that far. And I believe we will

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be taking a super chat Q and
A at the end of the show,

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so uh, Fellas helped me make
sure, I know, like a few

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minutes before everybody anyone has to leave
or anything like that, so we can

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shrink get that in there, and
uh, okay, I guess that's it.

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So Matt, I think we'll we'll
give it to you. Do you

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want to go first or do you
want to go second? Oh? I

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guess I'll go second, because I'm
not the one that's presenting an argument for

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something, so it's more of a
response thing and and the whole thing,

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you know, ten interrupted minutes.
I don't even know if I'll end up

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using that because I'm much more interested
in than back and forth. But we'll

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work it. How are you neique
to okay? Okay? So that to

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be safe? So whatever, I
didn't know, what, how do we

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want to do it? All right, I'll go I'll go ahead and say

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that. Um, so basically my
argument will be presented like this. I

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think that worldviews are what we all
have. We all function on the basis

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of three basic philosophic approaches to life
that are usually boiled down to metaphysics,

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ethics, and epistemology. So these
three branches of philosophy historically have been what

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makes it what we could we could
call a worldview, at least in Western

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phil I would say that I believe, and I would argue that each one

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of these branches is intertwined with the
other. So, for example, if

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I argue for something in the realm
of epistemology, if I argue that a

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belief is true, typically what goes
along with that is also an assumption about

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ethics and moral claims moral judgments that
one ought to follow what is true.

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Now one could disagree with that conceivably, but I'm going to argue that I

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think they're all intertwined. Similarly,
if I were to say that we know

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that something is the case, it
also tends to imply or necessitate certain beliefs

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about metaphysics, claims about what's real, what's not real, what can be

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or what can't be. So these
three aspects of a worldview I would say,

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are in a sense transcendental categories,
or they at least utilize a lot

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of transcendental categories. Transitial categories would
be things like the principle of induction,

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the laws of logic, the past, identity over time, the self,

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the regularity that we find in nature. These are not subjects that are the

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immediate purview of empirical sense data or
empirical science. They're related to empirical science,

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for example, the principle of abduction
that the future will be like the

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past, that there's regularity in logic, there's regularity, and there's a flow.

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You could say to the scientific method. For example, if you study

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philosophy, of science. You'll know
that there's actually a logical process that's assumed

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in the process of doing the scientific
method So from reasoning on the basis of

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hypothesis to what the data supports towards
a conclusion. For example, it presupposes

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that one ought to be true in
this process if one wants to obtain the

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most true conclusions in this process.
It presupposes the logic that one process,

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one step in this process should follow
another step. And it also presupposes all

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kinds of other things, like that
words have meaning, regularity, etc.

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That objects have a sort of uniformity
to them over time. That's I would

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say, is all presupposed in the
scientific process itself. Numbers would be presupposed

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in this process. And these are
all I think things that are immaterial,

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invariant, they're conceptual, and they're
abstract. Now, I think that because

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something is presupposed in the scientific methodology
doesn't necessarily mean that. In other words,

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what I'm saying we don't necessarily prove
everything in the same way. Right,

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So, in other words, something
that is assumed, it's a category

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like that a law of logic,
or something that's utilized in the scientific method

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is in in a way more properly
basic, more fundamental than even the scientific

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method itself. So, even though
the scientific method is not doesn't have the

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laws of logic under its immediate purview, it still assumes laws of logic and

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that regularity that cannot be proven in
terms of empirical sense data. So if

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one we're to adopt a kind of
naive impurisist view, a kind of logical

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positivism, what we end up with
is the inability to understand or to justified

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the belief in the principle of induction, the regularity of nature that the future

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will be like the past. Now, one could say conceivably that they don't

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think that we have to justify it, or that we can't justify it.

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But I think that at that point
we would be being arbitrary, and we

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would be believing in and admitting things
that we don't have any sort of justification

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for. And I'm speaking here of
a kind of specific philosophic justification here in

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terms of warranted beliefs, in terms
of justifying true beliefs, etc. The

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way history of philosophy in the West
has typically justified propositions and beliefs. I

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would say that we would be relying
on things that are immaterial that we can't

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justify. And so the way that
I move from that to God is to

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say that there are actually a whole
bunch of things in all of our lives

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that we assume that are not strictly
speaking physical, not strictly speaking quote pragmatic,

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because from what I gather from Matt's
worldview, he tends to have a

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very sort of pragmatic approach. There's
all these types of things that are not

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immediately justified or known by sense data
or basic empiricism, or in what's in

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history philosophy called naive empiricism. So
what I would say is that if I

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were Matt, if I wanted to
be a consistent skeptic, I would go

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the route of David Human be a
skeptic all the way, And to be

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a skeptic all the way would be
to admit ultimately that no, there's not

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a justification for induction for the regularity
that we see in nature, and thus

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there's no justification epistemically logically, in
terms of rationality, reason logic, etc.

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For the scientific method itself. Now
we can fast forward all the way

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up to modern logicians like Bertrand Russell
or William van ormand Quine. Russell and

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Quine also continue this idea of saying
that there's not really a justification if you're

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a basic empiricist for these ideas.
They just have to be kind of a

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given. We can treat them like
they are, but we can't coherently give

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a basis or justification for them.
So to me, that's kind of an

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emission of the intellectual bankruptcy of this
kind of logical positivist position. So you

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have all these kinds of things that
are different from just physical material physicalism,

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like laws of logic, like numbers, like number theory like Mandel brought sets

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right, very very elaborate mathematical sort
of equations that many philosophers and mathematicians somebody

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like Roger Penrose, and I'm just
bringing this forth as a testament, not

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a proof, just as an expert
testament. You know. Penrose says that

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when I looked into the advanced mathematics
of Penrose Tiling, he said, it

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looked to me like we're actually discovering
these mathematical principles, not socially constructing them.

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So if you know about fractals,
you know about mandelbrought sets. You

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know, they're very elaborate, right, They're not something that could just be

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a social construct, their actual mental
discoveries. So the point is that if

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that's the case, then I don't
think it's at all irrational to believe that

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all of these different kinds of categories
are transcendental preconditions could be explained perfect in

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a worldview where God exists, and
particularly the Christian view. So I'm here

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to defend Orthodox Christianity, not Southern
Baptist theology, not the fundamentalist stuff,

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not Roman Catholicism or any of the
other views. I have a very specific

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view in argument from Orthodox Christology and
theology. So when we have that conception

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of God, God as a divine
mind, omnipotent, omnipresent, etcetera,

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etce. What we then see is
that reality has its grounding in its basis

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in the mind of God. So
quite literally, everything that exists has a

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logo or a logi and exemplar,
as it's called in the West. This

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is kind of like Platonism, but
I want to be very precise because we're

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not Platonist, but we do believe
that the essences and the universals that exist

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are ultimately grounded in the mind of
God. And that makes perfect sense.

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That makes sense why there's regularity in
nature because of divine providence, because everything

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that exists is in a sense grounded
in the mind of God. Thus,

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truth has more than just a pragmatic
function and actually is a trans send in

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quality. Truth is actually objective.
It's not just a social construct. It's

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actually a reflection of the mind of
God. And specifically, I would argue

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that if we got into the nitty
gritty of it, it would be a

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defense of the orthodox view of God. Right getting down to the point of

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the one in the Mini for example, this is a classic problem in the

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history of Western philosophy. The one
of the Mini problem is solved by our

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doctrine of the Trinity, and more
specifically by the logos Christ and the logi

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right, the rational principles that are
operant in nature. Now, it's true

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that we could remove all that,
we could just say, well, none

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of that's true. I don't buy
any of that. Those are a bunch

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of logical crazy leaps, and I
just think that what exists out there is

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matter in motion. I don't know
Matt's heard this argument many times. I'm

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not going to rehash all the sort
of classic presubsitionalists quote unquote that he's debated,

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because I think my argument is a
little more precise, a little more

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fleshed out, better argued hopefully.
And then that as that all of these

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different transcend old categories, if you
were to sort of bundle them into a

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big pile, they make perfect sense
in a world created by God, in

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a world that unfortunately is fallen but
nevertheless still reflects to a degree the truth

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about God. If we're made in
the image of God, we understand how

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there's dignity. If we are made
in the image of God, we have

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the ability to know objective truth.
Right, God's world is regular, it

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operates on principles of regularity. If
the mind of God is the basis of

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all reality, we have a basis
for these really abstract and obtuse mathematical principles

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that we know are real that are
not strictly speaking physical. So all of

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these kinds of things right, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, they make perfect

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sense in a worldview where our God
exists and the kind of God that we

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argued for, in a worldview where
we have pure materialism, pure pragmatism,

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random chance, random chaos. There's
nothing like invariant, immaterial conceptual law like

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things. Where are they? What
are they? They're just social constructs.

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Now. I don't know if that's
Matt's opinion or view, but I have

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heard him say in previous discussions and
talks that he doesn't think that there is

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a justification, so to speak,
for logical laws, mathematical principles. He's

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sort of abstract conceptual things. He
thinks that they're just kind of things that

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we just use and they work.
But that would be, I would say,

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to be arbitrary, and when it
comes to debate, we're presupposing universal

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categories and laws, and that doesn't
allow us to be arbitrary. All right,

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thank you Jay, excellent, well
done, It was right on time.

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And over to Matt. Now let
me reset our timer here, okay,

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Matt, over to you, Hi
Hi, Yeah, yeah, So,

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first of all, thanks for having
me. I will say I'm not

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convinced that I actually heard an argument
in all of that. One of the

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things is is that, yeah,
I'm not necessarily requiring that we have you

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know, fully constructed syllogism, but
if we can get close to that,

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because you seem to be arguing for
in this is Hey, we all have

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a worldview and it includes all these
things and they're intertwined. I agree.

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But what I'm getting to is to
whether or not the things in our worldview

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are true. I mean, there
probably needs to be a side discussion about

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truth and whether or not we can
actually whether that we can attain it,

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because when you say that it's essentially
arbitrary to decide that we can't justify the

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things that we presuppose. I disagree. When we have, for example,

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the laws of logic, which I
would argue presupposes truth or presupposes reality,

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and so there's a number of things
that we're going to presuppose just to get

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work done, and but they're not. It's not just arbitrary. It's not

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like we decided, oh, a
thing is what it isn't and we'll just

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arbitrary accept that there are reasons why
we have justification to think that that's reasonable.

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But the recognition that we don't necessarily
know what guarantees that is not arbitrary.

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It's an acknowledgement that throughout all of
the time that we've been kind of

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pouring over these things. In philosophical
context, we haven't been able to come

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up with something that is demonstrably a
guaranteer of logic or a guaranteur of human

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dignity, or any of the things
that you might list, And so it's

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completely unsurprising to me that, and
I think it's true a worldview that includes

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a belief in a god that could
serve as a guaranteer for all of those

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things makes the world makes sense.
But that's about a belief in a god

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that does that. And you can
substitute the word god with anything. Belief

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that there is a justifiable foundation serves
as a justifiable foundation. It's virtually circular

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there. The problem here is that
you're assuming that, in fact, there

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is some sort of foundation, and
I don't know if you're doing it in

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a sort of causal sense, which
I would argue might be a mistake because

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causality, primarily, I think,
would deal with like physical physicality, and

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causality may not apply to the abstract, at least not without there being some

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physical thing. Like you know,
you have an abstract thought, you convey

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it to me, and that leads
to this, But that's still a physical

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process of what's happening in the brain, and that there may not be causality

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with regard to the abstract. And
so when I when I look at things

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like truth, yeah, I'm fine
with the you know, truth is that

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which comports with reality. But I
don't see any path to absolute certainty.

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I don't see any way to guarantee
or or point is something that says this

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guarantees that identity, non contradiction excluded, middle are always universally correct. They

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appear to be they are. Reliance
on them is because they continually demonstrate their

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reliability in the sense that we're not
all dead. If I, if I

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have a worldview that says that buses
are imaginary, all of a sudden becomes

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crossing the street becomes far more dangerous. And so the only thing that I

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can do is interact with the reality
that I have. And so I'm I'm

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a big proponent of Ockham's razor don't
multiply entity is unnecessarily And so I presuppose

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that there's a reality which I share
which I can't prove or justify. I

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do find I think there are some
potential arguments against hard solive sism, but

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only in the sense that they seem
satisfying us. There's there's no way to

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demonstrate, Like the one I've used
before is that I find it patently absurd

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that I've both written every wonderful song
that I've enjoyed, which I don't understand

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and it don't know the key of
or anything else but h and also the

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ones that I despise, or I've
been every caller who's called into this show

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with good points and all the callers
that have called in with bad points.

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That level of I am the only
thing I think, perhaps intuitively, if

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if no other justification, appears to
be far more absurd than the likelihood that

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Jay and I are sharing a reality. And so when I look through the

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opening here, I agree we have
worldview. I notice that among the abstract

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transitory items he didn't list truth.
Whether or not it's in there on his

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view is up to him. But
oh, there's a nope popped up there.

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Um. But so when it was
interesting because when Jay said, here's

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how I get from there to God, and we've gone through a long list

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of things, and it's here's how
I get from there to God, and

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then we heard about Russell and Quine
and just on and on and on about

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how uh, and some items about
mathematics, and the only thing that came

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close to how we get to a
God, as far as I can tell,

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is sort of I'm not gonna I'm
not gonna remember the right term,

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but essentially it's an it's it was
an expression that a worldview without a god

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leaves us without answers to this,
but a world view with a god gives

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us answers to this. And that
presupposes that the type of answers that you're

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getting from a god are actually answers, that there is some explanation the questions

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that I would have is tons of
them, which will get to at different

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points throughout this. But is it
possible for something to just be the way

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it is, that something X is
true without some sort of external justification,

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guaranteer or prescriber. Because if if
that's the case, and there's a whole

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bunch of philosophy about what truth is
and whether or not it's accessible, And

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you know, if I'd known we
were going to spend as much time as

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we likely are today, I probably
would have gotten high beforehand, because that

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makes those conversations at least a little
more fun, Except that I don't like

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to be high and certainly not in
a debate. But the question about truth,

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you could argue, for example,
let's take identity noncontradiction exclude the middle,

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which I used to say was the
only thing that I suppose, and

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then I realized, no, I
have to presuppose truth in order to be

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able to presuppose those The problem is
is that there's a little loop there automatically,

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which is, if I want to
justify that there is truth, that

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there is a reality, if I'm
using a compatiblest model of truth, I

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still have to exercise reason to reach
that conclusion. So we're back to the

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essentials of identity, non contradiction,
etc. And so when we talk about

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whether or not something is true,
we quite often is there must be some

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explanation for this, because we run
around the world and we see things and

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we look at it and say,
why is that the way it is?

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And I've said before that, you
know, people would argue that, well,

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science offers how questions, not why
questions. But that's that's semantics,

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because I can reward any question we
have as a how or why how did

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this come to be? Is essentially
the same as why does this exist as

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long as you're being content sextual.
And so this and this admission that I

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don't have an explanation for why there
is truth or is there truth, or

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why are the logical laws apparently absolute
and in viable isn't an admission of intellectual

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bankruptcy. It is an admission of
what appears to be the facts of the

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case, which is why you know
you've got the transcendental arguments for the existence

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of God, which I would argue, and you might have other arguments,

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I mean, planetics, modo,
logic, ontological, et cetera. And

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these are kind of held up amongst
incredibly smart and well read people as some

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of the best arguments for the existence
of God, and that may or may

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not be the case. I've been
asked many times what's the best argument for

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God? And I don't know,
but that they're being held up is this

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seems to be based on an idea
that there is in fact the next eplanation.

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And I have seen no argument or
evidence that there is in fact that

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sort of an explanation. And so, while you can phrase it is I'm

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admitting intellectual bankruptcy, I prefer to
view it as being intellectually honest that I'm

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not going to make more presuppositions than
necessary. I'm not going to say,

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you know what would be really nice
if there was something that could serve as

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a foundation for logic, And it
would also be really nice if there was

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something could serve as a foundation for
morality. There would also be something very

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nice if they could serve as a
foundation for human dignity, etc. That'd

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be really cool, except that I
don't know that there are foundations for those

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I don't know that it's impossible that
they couldn't. Just well, first of

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all, they may not all be
true, but I don't see that it's

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impossible. There's been no demonstration that
there must be some foundation beyond the laws

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of logic. And the curious thing
is, I think that even if you

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are that a God solves that problem, the only reason that it does is

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because modern theological definitions of God include
this thing that God doesn't need a justification

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as a bald assertion. So we
have these things that may or may not

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have a justification, we're not aware
of what that justification would be, and

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then we argue for something that hypothetically
could serve as that justification. And maybe

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even just believing it exists serves as
a satisfier but not a guarantee. And

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in spite of that, we're stuck
with how did we come up with this

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thing that serves as an exploitation for
nothing and needs no explanation of itself?

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Okay, times a good one,
going all right? Yeah, great comments

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there in questions from Matt. So
first he asked for a syllogism. So

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I think I can oblige this to
a degree and say that, yeah,

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I could state it like this.
There are many transcendental categories. List some

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of the ones that I think are
strong. And I don't mind that Matt

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included the idea of truth. I
don't have a problem including truth. There's

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there's plenty. Actually, it's just
that I was just kind of going off

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the top of my head and listening
some. But you could say something like

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identity of objects over time. You
could say value judgments. You could say

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interpretive frameworks. You could say the
problem of the one in the minute.

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You could say meaning in language.
You could say words themselves. You could

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say temporal spatial relations. You could
say the past. You could say numbers.

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You could say the idea of causality. You could say that the idea

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of t los rights, freedom,
all of these could be buddled together if

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we were to discuss those things.
They are presupposed not just in the process

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of scientific methodology, which I was
kind of focusing on in the opening statement,

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but in life in general. Right, I mean throughout life we assume

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these kinds of things. All throughout
we assumed the existence of a self.

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Right. This self, however,
is not something obviously that is empirically verifiable.

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We kind of assume it in the
process of our for it or against

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it. Now, I'm not saying
that people that argue about it or that

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there might not be in you know, some attempt to scientifically investigate the notion

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of a self. But even if
you were to find a pineal gland where

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you thought something like Descartes, where
the soul or the self or mind or

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whatever was howelsed or whatever, there's
still a distinction I would argue between brain

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and mind in my view. Now, that's why I'm saying that when we

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talk about reasoning, when we talk
about logic, when we talk about all

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these different categories, I think we're
talking about things that are outside the purview

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of mere sense, data, and
sense experience. That does it mean that

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they don't have any connection to material
sense data, and sense experience. They're

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interrelated, but they're not identical.
So I want to say that I don't

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think we have to fall into like
an either or unless we presuppose materialism.

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00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:52,799
I think if we did presuppose materialism, it would be self contradictory. So

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the argument, specifically in terms of
sollogism is that all of these transcendental categories,

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if they are to be made coherent
and sensible, and I do believe

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in a coherentist view of truth and
justifying claims, not a classical foundationalist type

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of view in terms of epistemology,
So I'm gonna be arguing for that school

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of thought. I would say that
that we would justify them in terms of

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their coherence in the worldview in which
there is a God that's presented according to

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orthodox Christianity. So that's the syllogism, if you want to boil down version

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of it, And that's a positive
statement of the argument that he's justified on

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the basis of being the grounds and
the coherence, if you will, what

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strings all these many pearls of transcendentals
together on a golden string, if you

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will, a pearl necklace is God
himself. God is the personal one who

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does this. And because he's personal, not an immaterial abstract force like a

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law of logic or gravity, or
the way the Greeks thought of God has

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thought thing in itself or its impersonal
force. He's actually personal. That then

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00:25:52,680 --> 00:25:56,680
makes reality at a fundamental level personal
and not dead matter. It's not a

352
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meaningless matter out there. It's actually
fundamentally at the very fabric and structure,

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at subatomic level. I would argue
a personal God that's there, that's present,

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that's staring us at the face in
the face in every action or predication,

355
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in every act in the world,
even in the midst of evil actions.

356
00:26:11,440 --> 00:26:14,640
If we think about the problem of
evil, I would argue that that

357
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presupposes some standard by which we had
judge good and evil. Now That's response

358
00:26:18,640 --> 00:26:23,680
was that can we even attain to
this truth? He's not convinced that we

359
00:26:23,759 --> 00:26:27,759
can. And so he went on
to sort of explicate that. As I

360
00:26:27,759 --> 00:26:32,640
wrote down what he was saying,
I don't want to misrepresent him that just

361
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because we believe that we sort of
constructed justifications for things in an abstract way

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doesn't necessarily mean that it perhaps matches
up to the external world. Maybe that

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00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:45,759
we just believe that we've attained justifications, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it

364
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is right that we can't move to
this, this abstracted realm into the realm

365
00:26:48,839 --> 00:26:52,759
of the here and the now out
there in the world. I could,

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00:26:52,799 --> 00:26:56,119
to a degree concede that, except
that I don't think that that's what my

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argument was, or was intended to
be. I wasn't trying to argue that

368
00:27:00,400 --> 00:27:03,279
just because we can find a rational
justification that it necessarily means that everything in

369
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the world conforms to a purely mental
structure, because I'm not just trying to

370
00:27:07,759 --> 00:27:11,720
map the external world with mathematics or
something like that. I'm actually looking at

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something that's even more fundamental, in
my view than numbers or mathematics. I

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00:27:15,799 --> 00:27:19,759
would argue that in our system,
yes, God is the ultimate presupposition.

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So Matt was correct to say that
it sounds like Jay's presupposing the existence of

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God, and yes I am,
and I know that Matt's debated presubsition before.

375
00:27:29,079 --> 00:27:32,119
I don't think they were very good
presenters of that argument. But yes,

376
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in effact, because I believe in
that sort of coherentist view of truth

377
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and of the world. It's impossible
for me not to have some final circular

378
00:27:40,839 --> 00:27:44,240
authority that I appealed to in my
belief, in my system, my worldview,

379
00:27:44,240 --> 00:27:48,079
it is ultimately going to be God. And that's not inconsistent with the

380
00:27:48,559 --> 00:27:55,400
system or the philosophy that I'm promoting. Right, coherentism, not classical foundationalism,

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00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:59,799
which out of the Enlightenment actually leads
to that kind of atheist materialist perspective.

382
00:28:00,240 --> 00:28:06,440
Say, but in fact, there's
nothing logically wrong or incoherent by saying

383
00:28:06,440 --> 00:28:10,160
that God is the ultimate foundation in
my worldview and that I am presupposing it,

384
00:28:10,400 --> 00:28:15,240
and that I'm comparing what I presuppose
to Matt's presupositions. Mass presuppositions are

385
00:28:15,599 --> 00:28:18,799
very pragmatic. As I said,
they're very They're skeptical, and they're pragmatic,

386
00:28:18,839 --> 00:28:22,200
and I understand that I don't necessarily
have a problem with it. I

387
00:28:22,240 --> 00:28:26,039
would just enjoy Matt to be more
consistent if he's going to go that route

388
00:28:26,079 --> 00:28:30,400
and go the route of hum and
go ahead and say that truth can't be

389
00:28:30,440 --> 00:28:34,759
justified, induction can't be justified,
and not only can it not be justified.

390
00:28:34,799 --> 00:28:38,680
We have to utilize all these things
that don't make sense on our worldview.

391
00:28:38,759 --> 00:28:42,440
So I wasn't just throwing out names
of Russell and williament or in Quine

392
00:28:44,319 --> 00:28:47,359
to be fancier or whatever. But
I'm actually making a specific point about the

393
00:28:47,359 --> 00:28:49,880
fact that Russell and Quine all the
way back to hum there's been a consistent

394
00:28:49,920 --> 00:28:55,359
pattern amongst the empiricists, the pragmatic
tradition to say, there's not a rational

395
00:28:55,400 --> 00:29:00,799
logical justification for these things that we
use in an empiricist worldview. And if

396
00:29:00,839 --> 00:29:06,000
there's not, then then we don't
really have a reason or a basis to

397
00:29:06,119 --> 00:29:08,160
go into debate. I'm not saying
that you can't debate. I'm glad that

398
00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:12,440
you did, but on the grounds
of logic, on the grounds of debate,

399
00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:15,759
which I think presupposes logic and truth, As you talked about, we

400
00:29:15,799 --> 00:29:21,319
don't really have the grounds to debate
itself, right, So debate presupposes some

401
00:29:21,400 --> 00:29:25,599
common notion of truth. It presupposes
the ability to communicate truths that are not

402
00:29:25,759 --> 00:29:30,039
merely material. I mean, I'm
speaking words that have meaning, that are

403
00:29:30,079 --> 00:29:33,000
conceptual in some way that go beyond
just the vocal chords. And just the

404
00:29:33,039 --> 00:29:37,920
electricity that actually convey information. We
look at information science, information science to

405
00:29:38,079 --> 00:29:44,640
suggest that we don't find information meaningful
information being transferred anywhere in the world that's

406
00:29:44,680 --> 00:29:48,079
not from a mind. So the
argument that I made was that even more

407
00:29:48,079 --> 00:29:53,839
fundamental than numbers or the concept of
information or words is all of these transcendal

408
00:29:53,920 --> 00:29:59,519
categories that are presupposed in communication,
in life and logic and ethics and whatever,

409
00:30:00,079 --> 00:30:03,759
and they make sense in a paradigm
and a complete worldview where we have

410
00:30:03,880 --> 00:30:06,599
the kind of God that we believe
in. That is the argument. Now

411
00:30:06,799 --> 00:30:11,200
one could conceivably say I don't accept
transcenental arguments, I don't believe that they're

412
00:30:11,240 --> 00:30:14,000
a valid form of logic. Well, one could do that, but I

413
00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:18,599
think that that would lead to again
more fundamental, self contradictory positions that are

414
00:30:18,680 --> 00:30:22,039
ultimately sort of destructive to philosophy as
a whole. I mean, I kind

415
00:30:22,039 --> 00:30:25,680
of appreciate that Matt was almost hinting
maybe that, well, maybe there could

416
00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:27,440
be some sort of sellipsism or something
like that. And I think that if

417
00:30:27,480 --> 00:30:32,319
one were to go down the logical
positivist Humian route, that would be the

418
00:30:32,359 --> 00:30:36,480
consistent way to go. You would
kind of be led to that whoa,

419
00:30:36,720 --> 00:30:38,119
you know, we live in the
matrix kind of view, like Neo or

420
00:30:38,119 --> 00:30:42,200
something, right, that this is
just sort of a projection of my subconscious

421
00:30:42,200 --> 00:30:47,680
of my mind. Because many in
the empiricist tradition actually did go down that

422
00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:49,200
way. They went down that route
by saying that, you know, if

423
00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:53,880
we're going to talk about justifying our
beliefs, being rational, giving a coherent

424
00:30:53,920 --> 00:30:57,039
account of our beliefs, we can't
really prove the existence of the past.

425
00:30:57,680 --> 00:31:00,839
Not only can we not do that, we can justify induction, the principle

426
00:31:00,880 --> 00:31:04,000
belief that the future will be like
the past. We can't really justify the

427
00:31:04,079 --> 00:31:07,720
self. I mean, we have
a suck maybe a bundle of memories,

428
00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:11,400
but that doesn't necessarily equate to a
quote self that there's a transcendental unity of

429
00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:15,960
a self, that that sort of
is underlying all these perceptions, right,

430
00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:21,880
all these these the sense data that
comes to us from our from empirical experiences.

431
00:31:22,640 --> 00:31:25,960
If we can't justify those things,
then some of them went in this

432
00:31:26,039 --> 00:31:27,319
route of a kind of radical sallipsism, and they said, yeah, the

433
00:31:27,359 --> 00:31:32,599
only thing that we can know is
what's immediately presented to our senses and even

434
00:31:32,640 --> 00:31:34,880
that we can't even know if that's
coming to us from an external world.

435
00:31:36,799 --> 00:31:40,279
It's just perhaps something that our mind
is presenting to our senses. Right,

436
00:31:41,039 --> 00:31:44,680
This would be eventually the debate that's
called indirect realism. And if you go

437
00:31:44,759 --> 00:31:47,920
the route of indirect realism, then
you don't even have a basis for an

438
00:31:47,920 --> 00:31:51,559
external world, and belief in the
external world actually as a transcendental category of

439
00:31:51,599 --> 00:31:53,319
transcenal truth, I would argue,
as all these other things that I listed

440
00:31:53,359 --> 00:31:57,039
are now if we're at that point
in our philosophy. And I don't fault

441
00:31:57,079 --> 00:32:01,880
Matt for going perhaps into and exploring
the realms of where these ideas lead.

442
00:32:02,400 --> 00:32:07,279
I think what they show us is
that when we don't have the presupposition of

443
00:32:07,279 --> 00:32:10,119
God, and when we don't start
with that, we're inevitably led down these

444
00:32:10,160 --> 00:32:15,839
paths to dead ends in philosophy,
total contradictions. And for example, if

445
00:32:15,839 --> 00:32:19,720
one would say, well, maybe
sillipsism isn't a contradiction, maybe everything is

446
00:32:19,759 --> 00:32:22,200
just a phenomena of my mind.
If we were to go to that route,

447
00:32:22,240 --> 00:32:25,880
then we would be led to the
conclusion that everything that's happening, everything's

448
00:32:25,920 --> 00:32:30,599
happening is essentially in some sense illusory
or just a figment, a phenomena of

449
00:32:31,039 --> 00:32:35,759
passing ghost, you could say.
And if that was the case, then

450
00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:38,839
my coming to know the truth of
sullipsism would also be part of the sullipsist

451
00:32:39,480 --> 00:32:45,480
maze and mirror, and it would
be self contradictory. All right, all

452
00:32:45,559 --> 00:32:49,079
right, and time. Thank you, Jay, very good, Very good

453
00:32:49,119 --> 00:32:52,200
everybody. If you're just joining us, you're at the Jay Dire YouTube channel,

454
00:32:52,200 --> 00:32:58,359
and we're having a friendly discussion slash
debate tonight between Jay Dire and Matt

455
00:32:58,480 --> 00:33:02,920
dillahunty. I am your co host, your guest host, your moderator,

456
00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:06,359
your timekeeper, my call sign as
Asher. Thank you for joining us for

457
00:33:06,359 --> 00:33:09,920
the show tonight, and all right, Matt, we'll pass it back over

458
00:33:10,000 --> 00:33:17,480
to you. The mic is yours. Yeah. So I'm a huge fan

459
00:33:17,559 --> 00:33:22,720
of Hume. Doesn't mean I agree
with my everything. I'm definitely not a

460
00:33:22,759 --> 00:33:27,319
logical positivist, but I think hum
on the foundations of epistemology is probably where

461
00:33:27,440 --> 00:33:31,880
most of my views either formed or
began and and for longest time. And

462
00:33:31,920 --> 00:33:36,119
I don't really go with labels when
we talk about a lot of things,

463
00:33:36,160 --> 00:33:38,960
like I'm fine with truth, is
that which comports the reality largely as opposed

464
00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:44,720
to a coherence view of truth.
When it comes to the foundations, I

465
00:33:44,759 --> 00:33:47,000
think probably one of my favorite ones, it comes closest to being a label

466
00:33:47,039 --> 00:33:51,599
that I could apply to myself,
is actually found hereintism, which is something

467
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:55,720
that's Susan Hawk but forth I don't
know, somewhere in the last twenty years

468
00:33:55,759 --> 00:34:02,000
or so. Maybe it's a combination
of foundationalism and coherentism, and yet none

469
00:34:02,039 --> 00:34:06,240
of it actually works because I don't
think we've completely cracked the problem, or

470
00:34:06,759 --> 00:34:09,880
it would be ridiculous of us to
pretend that we are all in agreement on

471
00:34:12,239 --> 00:34:15,000
the best epistemology. As a matter
of fact, I'm in an argument or

472
00:34:15,159 --> 00:34:17,280
about to be in an argument with
somebody else who argued for intuition as an

473
00:34:17,320 --> 00:34:21,880
epistemology, and I find that patently
absurd, especially when you say, oh,

474
00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:24,280
yeah, intuitions and epistemology, but
you can't really trust it. You

475
00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:28,119
have to go and test it,
and that means that testing is now your

476
00:34:28,159 --> 00:34:32,679
epistemology, and intuition is the process
by which you apply the results. But

477
00:34:32,760 --> 00:34:37,360
to say that my view means I
have no grounds to debate, because you

478
00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:39,960
know, we don't have a common
ground. We do have a common ground,

479
00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:45,599
we are in fact doing it.
We're debating concepts beyond what we already

480
00:34:45,599 --> 00:34:47,039
agree with. As far as I
can tell, Jay and I agree that

481
00:34:47,039 --> 00:34:51,840
we share a reality. Whether or
not we can justify that as independent of

482
00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:53,760
the fact that we agree that we
do. We seem to share the notion

483
00:34:53,800 --> 00:34:59,559
that identity, non contradiction, excluded, middle are as absolute as anything I

484
00:34:59,559 --> 00:35:04,440
can imagine. We begin with that
common ground and then we debate the things

485
00:35:04,480 --> 00:35:07,519
that aren't common And one of those
things is is there a foundation behind this?

486
00:35:07,760 --> 00:35:14,159
Is there some justification for thinking there's
a foundation or is this circular appeal

487
00:35:14,239 --> 00:35:17,519
to the God presupposition that Jay talked
about. Is that really something that we

488
00:35:17,639 --> 00:35:22,039
use to ease our discomfort Because one
of the one of the cool things that's

489
00:35:22,039 --> 00:35:25,840
happened over the years, and when
I've mentioned Akham's razor before, Akham's Razors

490
00:35:25,880 --> 00:35:31,360
often misrepresented is the simplest explanation is
often the best, and literally the formal

491
00:35:31,760 --> 00:35:37,199
phrasing of that is what I mentioned
earlier, which is don't multiply entities unnecessarily.

492
00:35:37,119 --> 00:35:43,519
The problem is is that when you
say God did it, that feels

493
00:35:43,559 --> 00:35:46,760
simple to people and so they think
they're consistent with God, with with Akham's

494
00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:50,840
razor, and so they're saying,
ah, well, you presuppose logic and

495
00:35:50,920 --> 00:35:53,639
dignity and morality and all these other
things, which isn't necessarily true. I'm

496
00:35:53,639 --> 00:35:57,440
just using those all as examples.
I find I think that some of them

497
00:35:57,440 --> 00:36:00,920
are derivative. But you presuppose all
those things, and all I have to

498
00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:02,920
do is presuppose God, so I
have fewer entities. And it's simple,

499
00:36:04,199 --> 00:36:07,480
except that that God presumption comes with
a load of baggage and a lot of

500
00:36:07,519 --> 00:36:12,840
manipulation, including getting it to be
the thing that does not require an additional

501
00:36:12,880 --> 00:36:17,119
justification. And there are questions,
well, let me let me finish this

502
00:36:17,159 --> 00:36:23,159
part. We're debating the part that's
not common now, whether or not we

503
00:36:23,159 --> 00:36:27,559
can justify those things that we agree
on. I don't. I'm not convinced

504
00:36:27,599 --> 00:36:31,000
that we can. Otherwise there wouldn't
be this debate. We just agree,

505
00:36:31,119 --> 00:36:35,800
Yep, we can or we can't. So I think what we're starting to

506
00:36:35,840 --> 00:36:38,840
talk to is about and this may
be a bit of a cheat on my

507
00:36:38,920 --> 00:36:46,480
part, but about certainty, because
that's the thing that seems to pervade this

508
00:36:46,639 --> 00:36:51,679
in the well, what is your
confidence level or what is your like if

509
00:36:51,719 --> 00:36:55,280
you were to try to quantify your
rational justification in X, and if you

510
00:36:55,320 --> 00:37:01,800
begin with a presupposition, nothing that
is derived from a standard can be more

511
00:37:01,840 --> 00:37:07,519
accurate than the standard. So if
I have a watch that doesn't keep good

512
00:37:07,519 --> 00:37:09,360
time, or I have a ruler
that isn't to a standard, all of

513
00:37:09,360 --> 00:37:13,440
my measurement, none of my measurements
with that can be more accurate than the

514
00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:17,239
standard that I'm going with. And
so we have this grand unknown about logic

515
00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:22,480
and whether or not it is in
fact absolute and inviable as it seems to

516
00:37:22,519 --> 00:37:30,519
appear. And even in pure pure
reasoning terms, you're automatically led to presuppositions.

517
00:37:30,519 --> 00:37:31,559
You would have to assume they were
true. In order to prove they

518
00:37:31,559 --> 00:37:35,400
weren't true, you would have to
And that gets us to the assumptions about

519
00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:42,159
truth. For me, what I
often see is this assertion that your worldview

520
00:37:42,159 --> 00:37:45,119
can't justify this, and therefore you
have no grounds to say anything or do

521
00:37:45,159 --> 00:37:49,239
anything else. And when I hear
that, it seems to me that somebody's

522
00:37:49,239 --> 00:37:52,360
saying you can't be absolutely certain,
even if you could be reasonably certain,

523
00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:57,079
And so what I don't think you
can be absolutely certain about anything. And

524
00:37:57,119 --> 00:38:02,679
I've in the past talked about what
I described as I'm fully acknowledge that I

525
00:38:02,719 --> 00:38:08,239
am adela times and not a degree
or credentialed person in this field at all,

526
00:38:08,320 --> 00:38:12,400
So I work things out on my
own based on others. But it's

527
00:38:12,440 --> 00:38:15,280
what I described as maximal certainty.
If I begin with there is a reality,

528
00:38:15,320 --> 00:38:20,239
and the laws of logic appear to
be inviolate, and I will revise

529
00:38:20,320 --> 00:38:23,199
that the second somebody demonstrates that the
laws of logic can be violated or don't

530
00:38:23,239 --> 00:38:27,320
always apply, I don't know how
they could do that. But then everything

531
00:38:27,320 --> 00:38:32,039
that is deductively arrived from those like
mathematics, I would say you can be

532
00:38:32,079 --> 00:38:37,719
maximally certain about because the deduction from
logic leads to essentially the same level of

533
00:38:37,760 --> 00:38:42,679
certainty, not in your actual results, because we can always forget to carry

534
00:38:42,719 --> 00:38:45,880
the one or something, but mathematics
itself is deductively derived from that, and

535
00:38:45,880 --> 00:38:51,199
so we can be maximally certain.
Other things are inductively derived, and so

536
00:38:51,239 --> 00:38:54,719
there's a lower standard of certain certainty
that doesn't approach to maximal, and maximal

537
00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:59,199
could be absolute. If the laws
of logical absolute, then maximal becomes absolute.

538
00:38:59,480 --> 00:39:01,360
It's just that I don't have any
way to demonstrate that. For everything

539
00:39:01,360 --> 00:39:05,320
else, we have a lower confidence
level, and I'll ah hume. The

540
00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:12,119
wise Man proportions is belief to the
evidence, and so recognizing that I live

541
00:39:12,119 --> 00:39:15,639
in a world and I don't think
I can be absolutely certain about anything,

542
00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:20,760
but that doesn't mean that I'm in
a state of chaos and can't determine anything.

543
00:39:21,159 --> 00:39:25,000
I live in a world that is
apparently reasonable, where we have scientific

544
00:39:25,039 --> 00:39:29,400
methods, which, by the way, science doesn't make any proclamations about truth

545
00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:32,639
or claim any sort of certainty.
Science is always about this is our tentative

546
00:39:32,639 --> 00:39:37,679
conclusions based on the best current evidence. It's always subject to revision. Nobody's

547
00:39:37,679 --> 00:39:42,159
claiming that you know the moon absolutely
well. All right, I was going

548
00:39:42,239 --> 00:39:45,559
to go with green cheese. But
there is the thing where you can you

549
00:39:45,599 --> 00:39:47,679
may not know what something is,
but you can still demonstrate what it Isn't

550
00:39:47,880 --> 00:39:52,119
you know that this doesn't apply.
So I have a belief in an external

551
00:39:52,159 --> 00:39:57,599
world. I agree that that is
a transcendental view. But as long as

552
00:39:57,639 --> 00:40:00,360
you and I agree that we share
the same reality, which we must do,

553
00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:04,880
Otherwise we wouldn't have agreed to reschedule
this debate and come on here and

554
00:40:04,920 --> 00:40:07,880
talk there. Then that's all we
need to then begin to have a discussion

555
00:40:08,079 --> 00:40:15,559
about whether or not we have foundations
beyond that. So there's a problem that

556
00:40:15,639 --> 00:40:19,960
was stated very early in the last
ten minutes or so, where you were

557
00:40:20,199 --> 00:40:22,239
going to try to put it in
some sort of syllogistic form. I don't

558
00:40:22,239 --> 00:40:24,920
think we really got there, but
I think I might have a better understanding,

559
00:40:25,199 --> 00:40:30,840
which is, there's a whole bunch
of transcendental categories, and if those

560
00:40:30,880 --> 00:40:35,480
categories are to be made coherent and
sensible, then they require justification. And

561
00:40:35,840 --> 00:40:38,480
you believe that you've found that justification. This is a problem that I have

562
00:40:38,559 --> 00:40:44,480
with the coherent model of truth,
and that is you're absolutely right, Jay,

563
00:40:44,960 --> 00:40:51,559
as long because the coherent model of
truth is one where you truth is

564
00:40:51,599 --> 00:40:55,119
coherent with a set of propositions.
And one of the propositions that you're including

565
00:40:55,320 --> 00:41:00,840
is these things have a foundation.
That is the proposition that I reject.

566
00:41:00,920 --> 00:41:05,000
I'm not saying it's false. I
can't demonstrate that they don't have a foundation.

567
00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:07,599
I'm just saying there's been no demonstration
that they do. I don't see

568
00:41:07,599 --> 00:41:12,880
any reason why these things aren't true
in and of themselves, in much the

569
00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:15,480
same way that people would argue that
God doesn't need a foundation in and of

570
00:41:15,519 --> 00:41:22,079
itself. To me, if there's
no demonstration, there's no way to demonstrate

571
00:41:22,079 --> 00:41:25,480
that this could have been any other
way, then we're on pretty good ground

572
00:41:25,480 --> 00:41:30,159
and saying the laws of logic have
to be absolute, or at least it's

573
00:41:30,199 --> 00:41:36,480
a reasonable not quite maximally certain inference
from the direct observations and the fact that

574
00:41:36,519 --> 00:41:42,280
these tools keep providing us with what
appears to be consistent understandings of reality.

575
00:41:43,159 --> 00:41:47,599
Now you can construct a justification for
anything. And this is why. If

576
00:41:47,599 --> 00:41:52,119
we're sitting at a card table full
disclosure, I'm a magician. I can

577
00:41:52,280 --> 00:41:57,559
cheat at cards, and I deal
out the cards and you get We're playing

578
00:41:57,559 --> 00:42:00,320
bridge and you get thirteen spage,
you get the perfect bridge Chand now,

579
00:42:01,159 --> 00:42:06,559
within the context of our understanding of
the world, you could make a reasonable

580
00:42:06,559 --> 00:42:08,519
conclusion that perhaps I cheated, especially
if you know you're sitting there with someone

581
00:42:08,559 --> 00:42:13,840
who's capable of dealing out pretty much
whatever they want, or seemingly dealing out

582
00:42:13,880 --> 00:42:19,280
whatever whatever they want, And it
would be easily argued that the worldview that

583
00:42:19,320 --> 00:42:24,159
includes Matt cheated would offer the best
explanation, the most likely explanation for how

584
00:42:24,159 --> 00:42:30,320
you wound up with all thirteen spades, But that doesn't tell us whether or

585
00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:34,400
not that's actually true at all.
Because we know at least a couple of

586
00:42:34,400 --> 00:42:37,880
times in actual bridge tournaments the perfect
bridge hand has been dealt and there's no

587
00:42:37,960 --> 00:42:40,880
evidence of any cheating. We also
know that it is possible as one of

588
00:42:40,920 --> 00:42:50,039
the many random outcomes of a shuffle
deck of cards. It's more comforting to

589
00:42:50,159 --> 00:42:52,719
say I don't know if he cheated
or not, but boy, sure would

590
00:42:52,760 --> 00:42:55,000
make a lot more sense if he
cheated. That's completely independent from whether it's

591
00:42:55,000 --> 00:42:58,480
true, which gets us back to
what I was saying earlier, that the

592
00:42:58,559 --> 00:43:00,960
belief that there's a God that serves
as a foundation may be comforting, but

593
00:43:01,079 --> 00:43:07,519
I see no demonstration that it's necessary
or true. Really good statements there,

594
00:43:07,679 --> 00:43:13,000
um. The first thing I would
point out is that when you said that

595
00:43:13,960 --> 00:43:21,119
we appeal to God to ease our
discomfort, my first argument would be that

596
00:43:21,119 --> 00:43:24,039
that is an appeal to motion.
That's not a valid argument. That's actually

597
00:43:24,119 --> 00:43:28,360
a fallacy to appeal to the fact
that the people that believe this or go

598
00:43:28,400 --> 00:43:30,639
down this route are doing it because
of psychological motivation. So I don't think

599
00:43:30,639 --> 00:43:36,400
that's a valid argument. I would
say next that the idea that you have

600
00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:40,800
the ability to distinguish between the categories
that are maximally certain, such as abstract

601
00:43:40,920 --> 00:43:46,119
numbers, etc. Versus the things
that are derived from induction, scientific experimentation,

602
00:43:46,159 --> 00:43:52,519
empiricism, the ability to make that
distinction itself presupposes some true category.

603
00:43:52,559 --> 00:43:55,880
Once again, So while I recognize
that you wanted to sort of qualify by

604
00:43:55,920 --> 00:44:00,320
moving into the category of maximally certain
and not absolutely certain, that's fine.

605
00:44:00,360 --> 00:44:04,480
You can use whichever terms you want
to use. From my perspective, it

606
00:44:04,480 --> 00:44:07,239
doesn't matter to me because I don't
believe that you would be able to have,

607
00:44:07,079 --> 00:44:13,280
in the pragmatic perspective a justification for
any kind of truth whatsoever. In

608
00:44:13,320 --> 00:44:19,159
fact, the whole system quite literally
should lead directly into syllipsism and total relativism.

609
00:44:19,159 --> 00:44:22,159
Now, I know that you don't
necessarily accept total relativism, because,

610
00:44:22,199 --> 00:44:28,559
as you said, we have a
common world, a something area where we

611
00:44:28,599 --> 00:44:30,360
can dialogue about these things and have
the debate, So we don't believe in

612
00:44:30,440 --> 00:44:35,320
total relativism. However, in order
to not believe in total word relativism,

613
00:44:35,320 --> 00:44:38,599
again, assumes these categories, assumes
these things that you seem to admit,

614
00:44:38,679 --> 00:44:44,159
but don't think that they necessarily presuppose
or lead to any kind of a personal

615
00:44:44,199 --> 00:44:46,480
God. And I understand why you're
saying that, So I want to stress

616
00:44:46,559 --> 00:44:51,480
that I don't think the appeal to
discomfort is a valid argument. I don't

617
00:44:51,480 --> 00:44:55,480
think that you have the ability to
have even maximal certainty, And I don't

618
00:44:55,519 --> 00:44:59,960
believe that you can construct a justification
for anything. So the example that you

619
00:45:00,079 --> 00:45:02,719
gay was a case where you could
you know, you cheated at cards,

620
00:45:02,719 --> 00:45:05,920
et cetera, et cetera, and
somebody could build a case or whatever.

621
00:45:06,760 --> 00:45:12,960
When it comes to normative day to
day kinds of activities or what you could

622
00:45:12,960 --> 00:45:15,039
call normative logic, that could be
true. Yes, there's a lot of

623
00:45:15,039 --> 00:45:20,159
situations where we would have, through
induction, limited amounts of certainty. But

624
00:45:20,480 --> 00:45:22,800
the strength of the transcendental argument,
the strength of the argument that's being presented

625
00:45:22,840 --> 00:45:28,880
here, is that there are some
things that are so fundamental that to deny

626
00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:32,559
them or doubt them, which theoretically
one could doubt them, but to actually

627
00:45:32,639 --> 00:45:37,159
live or to actually consistently try to
doubt them and not live according to them

628
00:45:37,280 --> 00:45:43,559
or not debate, according to them, would lead to such a fundamental breakdown

629
00:45:43,599 --> 00:45:46,800
of the coherence of one's belief system
or even the possibility of knowledge, the

630
00:45:46,840 --> 00:45:52,000
possibility of operating in the world,
predicating about objects in the world, of

631
00:45:52,400 --> 00:45:57,000
knowing things in the world, or
doing science at all. Those types of

632
00:45:57,039 --> 00:46:00,679
things are so fundamental that they're I'm
arguing even stronger as an argument, they're

633
00:46:01,000 --> 00:46:05,840
maximally certain to whatever degree you want
to pause it there. If you want

634
00:46:05,840 --> 00:46:07,239
to say absolute or not absolute,
that's fine, it doesn't matter to me.

635
00:46:07,800 --> 00:46:13,480
I don't have a problem using the
terms of warranted beliefs or highly warranted

636
00:46:13,559 --> 00:46:15,960
or maximally or whatever, because that
really those are just humanly derived terms that

637
00:46:16,000 --> 00:46:21,400
are trying to describe the strongest level
of certainty possible. So I believe that

638
00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:28,000
those kinds of transcendal categories are not
only maximally certain or necessary, but that

639
00:46:28,039 --> 00:46:31,880
they don't operate independently. They actually
presuppose and interact with one another, which

640
00:46:31,920 --> 00:46:36,360
is kind of why I started the
debate talking about the three branches of philosophy

641
00:46:36,400 --> 00:46:40,320
which make up a worldview. These
things all I believe cohere and kind of

642
00:46:40,360 --> 00:46:44,960
presuppose and are tied together with one
another. For example, it wouldn't make

643
00:46:45,000 --> 00:46:50,480
any sense to talk about the past
experiences, and can I have a rational

644
00:46:50,480 --> 00:46:54,599
belief in past experiences if I didn't
believe that there was a self that had

645
00:46:54,639 --> 00:46:59,760
those experiences. It seems that these
two things kind of go together. Being

646
00:46:59,800 --> 00:47:02,360
able to predicate about objects in the
external world, right, kind of assumes

647
00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:07,440
that objects in the external world have
identity over time. Right, that I

648
00:47:07,440 --> 00:47:09,639
can pick out one object amongst many
objects, and so that's the problem of

649
00:47:09,679 --> 00:47:13,800
the one in the many. Right, So any any kinds of examples like

650
00:47:13,840 --> 00:47:19,440
this tend to I would say,
kind of assume all these transcendental categories together,

651
00:47:19,519 --> 00:47:22,239
even if we're only focusing on maybe
one area here or there. Maybe

652
00:47:22,239 --> 00:47:25,079
we're only talking about linguistics. A
lot of modern philosophers P. F.

653
00:47:25,159 --> 00:47:30,639
Strawson call auto apple. They've done
a lot of work in transcendent arguments as

654
00:47:30,639 --> 00:47:32,639
they apply to language. In linguistics. How many things, It's kind of

655
00:47:32,679 --> 00:47:38,000
amazing, how many things we presuppose
just in communication, just in subject predicate

656
00:47:38,039 --> 00:47:43,480
relations and sentences, just in trying
to communicate that information to another bunch of

657
00:47:43,880 --> 00:47:49,760
gray matter. The intricacy, the
complexity in this is fascinating. It's it's

658
00:47:49,760 --> 00:47:53,840
phenomenal actually, And so what I
think is so strong about this argumentation is

659
00:47:53,880 --> 00:47:59,000
that we're not just arguing that it's
a kind of a model up here in

660
00:47:59,039 --> 00:48:02,559
the abstract that's pretty cool, like
some big world of warcraft scheme that we've

661
00:48:02,599 --> 00:48:07,480
we've invented that really doesn't have anything
to do with the external world. I'm

662
00:48:07,480 --> 00:48:09,440
saying that, No, when when
I have a friend who's a rocket scientist.

663
00:48:09,480 --> 00:48:14,239
He's done contract word for NASA,
he designs black hawks, right,

664
00:48:14,800 --> 00:48:20,119
he talks about the amazing complexity of
the algorithms that he works with. Now,

665
00:48:20,119 --> 00:48:22,239
I'm not a mathematician, right.
I know about math theory in terms

666
00:48:22,239 --> 00:48:27,639
of philosophy, but I don't do
the abstract, you know, calculus that

667
00:48:27,679 --> 00:48:30,880
he does to how to build you
know, black hawks. Right. But

668
00:48:31,320 --> 00:48:35,280
to him, at least in his
mind as an engineer and many other engineers

669
00:48:35,280 --> 00:48:39,039
and mathematicians who utilize math and engineering, is that they see the practical application

670
00:48:39,199 --> 00:48:44,159
of this very abstract realm into the
here and the now. And if something's

671
00:48:44,199 --> 00:48:45,880
wrong in the equation, the black
Hawk's not gonna fly, it's gonna crash.

672
00:48:46,000 --> 00:48:49,360
Right, So he has to be
very precise. He has to be

673
00:48:49,440 --> 00:48:52,599
very clear in the way that he
gets it all perfectly right. And so

674
00:48:52,679 --> 00:48:55,719
it's not just in the realm of
the abstract. It's also very present in

675
00:48:55,760 --> 00:49:00,280
the here and the now, and
that's just mathematics. So what I think

676
00:49:00,280 --> 00:49:04,400
if we reorient our perspective when we
look at the power and possibility of transcendental

677
00:49:04,480 --> 00:49:08,199
arguments, we're not just saying something
theoretical. We're actually mapping us onto reality

678
00:49:08,199 --> 00:49:12,079
and saying that all of reality kind
of presupposes this kind of a god,

679
00:49:12,320 --> 00:49:16,400
and that itself is the argument.
So again, one could conceivably say I

680
00:49:16,400 --> 00:49:20,559
don't accept transidental arguments, but I
think that that would lead to a bunch

681
00:49:20,639 --> 00:49:23,280
of dead ends and a reductive who
is a valid argument if we're led to

682
00:49:23,360 --> 00:49:27,119
dead ends when we deny this thing
over here? To me, I think

683
00:49:27,119 --> 00:49:31,000
that's one of the strongest possible arguments. A couple other last points on Matt's

684
00:49:32,039 --> 00:49:38,559
last statements there is that I think
when he says that coherentism. When he

685
00:49:38,599 --> 00:49:43,280
was listing coherentism, he talked about
how your beliefs don't have a foundation.

686
00:49:44,000 --> 00:49:45,840
Well, I'm not trying to fault
Matt as if he necessarily doesn't understand this.

687
00:49:45,880 --> 00:49:50,679
Maybe misspoke. But the coherentism is
not about foundations. It's actually about

688
00:49:50,719 --> 00:49:52,360
the coherence of the web of beliefs. Right. So there's two models.

689
00:49:52,400 --> 00:49:57,519
The foundationalist model is like self evident
maxims and then beliefs on top of the

690
00:49:57,519 --> 00:50:00,679
self evident maxims, and then beliefs
that lead to further believes that lead to

691
00:50:00,719 --> 00:50:04,679
further beliefs. Right. So that's
foundationalism, and it has foundations. We

692
00:50:04,719 --> 00:50:07,639
don't have that model right when it
comes to webs of beliefs and when it

693
00:50:07,639 --> 00:50:14,360
comes to paradigms and worldviews that are
justified in terms of coherentism. So that's

694
00:50:14,400 --> 00:50:19,639
because if I'm thinking about logic over
here in this arena, maybe I'm talking

695
00:50:19,679 --> 00:50:22,960
about the laws of logic. That's
not disconnected from who I am. That's

696
00:50:22,960 --> 00:50:28,440
not disconnected from my belief in God. It's not disconnected from ethics that we

697
00:50:28,559 --> 00:50:32,639
ought to be logical, that we
ought to reason from premise to valid conclusion.

698
00:50:32,760 --> 00:50:36,840
Right, So it's all connected in
our view, And I think that's

699
00:50:36,880 --> 00:50:42,280
a better method, a better way
of understanding truth propositions, beliefs, claims,

700
00:50:42,320 --> 00:50:45,639
etc. So I would say that
I think Matt's position, while he

701
00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:52,039
did ask some good questions kind of
misunderstood and made a couple of logical violations

702
00:50:52,079 --> 00:50:57,239
there, and the response that what
if there's no explanation, Well, I

703
00:50:57,239 --> 00:50:59,800
would say that if we're here to
debate, and if we want to to

704
00:51:00,159 --> 00:51:05,400
theism, I would say that if
Matt wants to say that there's all these

705
00:51:05,400 --> 00:51:09,920
things that he utilizes but doesn't necessarily
think that they're true in the external world,

706
00:51:10,000 --> 00:51:13,800
per se laws of logic and all
that truth with a capitalty or whatever,

707
00:51:14,440 --> 00:51:16,559
I would say that Matt's being arbitrary. And if Matt can be arbitrary,

708
00:51:16,599 --> 00:51:22,159
then I can say God just is
right. So if arbitrary is allowed,

709
00:51:22,239 --> 00:51:25,039
if we can be at hawk,
then I think that the debate is

710
00:51:25,079 --> 00:51:29,199
over, because that would be a
violation of the laws of debate. But

711
00:51:29,239 --> 00:51:30,760
of course we don't believe that we
can be arbitrary or at hawk, and

712
00:51:30,800 --> 00:51:34,280
so therefore we can't just say,
well, the laws of lodging just are

713
00:51:34,960 --> 00:51:37,599
I forget Matt's phrase. He said
that truth is what maps up to reality

714
00:51:37,719 --> 00:51:44,000
or belief that conforms to reality.
That's a metaphysical claim, right, That's

715
00:51:43,239 --> 00:51:46,880
a metaphysical statement about the external world. Right now, I'm not I know

716
00:51:46,920 --> 00:51:50,840
Matt's would only say that, well, that's maximally certain in a pragmatic sort

717
00:51:50,840 --> 00:51:53,880
of sense. Okay, fair enough, but it still doesn't work to say

718
00:51:53,920 --> 00:52:00,159
it just is, because once we've
admitted it just is, then that's being

719
00:52:00,199 --> 00:52:07,079
arbitrary in at hoc. Right,
All right, Jay, good one,

720
00:52:07,440 --> 00:52:10,000
you're right down there. I was
just about to give you a thirty second

721
00:52:10,039 --> 00:52:14,719
warning. So let's see where are
we at. That was your third one,

722
00:52:14,840 --> 00:52:17,039
Matt, this will be your third
one coming up? Am I right?

723
00:52:17,079 --> 00:52:22,079
Am? I on track here?
Folks? All right, I don't

724
00:52:22,119 --> 00:52:23,440
think this one will take the whole
ten minutes. All right, Well,

725
00:52:23,480 --> 00:52:29,159
feel free, the mic is yours, and then we'll switch gears into something

726
00:52:29,239 --> 00:52:36,159
else. Sure. So Jay's basically
just saying that if I can arbitrarily say

727
00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:38,840
the laws of logic just are,
then he can just arbitrarily say that God

728
00:52:38,960 --> 00:52:44,400
is. He's completely right. Except
that's not what's happening. I'm not arbitrarily

729
00:52:44,440 --> 00:52:47,320
saying the laws of logic just are. I'm not even asserting that they just

730
00:52:47,440 --> 00:52:52,880
are. I am recognizing that I
have no reason to think that they could

731
00:52:52,239 --> 00:52:58,360
be anything other than what they appear
to be, which is in violent and

732
00:52:58,519 --> 00:53:04,360
absolute. I'm not they are absolute. I'm saying it's my presupposition, and

733
00:53:04,440 --> 00:53:08,159
that presupposition is supported by the continued
reliability of these things. And yes,

734
00:53:08,960 --> 00:53:12,639
there's something in there that's always going
to be circular, which is why we

735
00:53:12,800 --> 00:53:15,079
call him a presupposition. But what
but when, Jay, what he's really

736
00:53:15,119 --> 00:53:21,760
doing is admitting that he's presupposing a
foundation to the thing that I'm presupposing.

737
00:53:22,599 --> 00:53:29,000
And okay, you can call it
an arbitrary you can call whatever I'm saying.

738
00:53:29,119 --> 00:53:31,599
The whole point of this discussion is
we both agree on the absolutes,

739
00:53:31,599 --> 00:53:36,079
and my view is I'm not aware
of any way that they can have a

740
00:53:36,119 --> 00:53:38,599
foundation. I'm not sure that there's
any way to demonstrate that they have a

741
00:53:38,599 --> 00:53:43,960
foundation, and presupposing a foundation,
you can say it's an emotional appeal.

742
00:53:44,159 --> 00:53:49,480
I don't what other reason would somebody
have to presuppose a foundation to something that

743
00:53:49,559 --> 00:53:52,320
can't be demonstrated or hasn't been demonstrated
to have a foundation, other than their

744
00:53:52,440 --> 00:53:59,199
discomfort with the lack of a foundation. Because I'm not convinced that even the

745
00:53:59,239 --> 00:54:01,000
foundation that they're resupposing can do what
they think of to do. And I'll

746
00:54:01,000 --> 00:54:05,760
get to that in just a second. He said, all of reality priests

747
00:54:05,760 --> 00:54:08,679
supposes a God. That's just a
bald assertion. I'm part of reality as

748
00:54:08,679 --> 00:54:12,039
far as I can tell, I
don't presuppose a god. So that's clearly

749
00:54:12,079 --> 00:54:15,039
false. But in the context of
what he was actually saying, he seems

750
00:54:15,079 --> 00:54:19,199
to be claiming that all of this
necessitates a god. And when he refers

751
00:54:19,280 --> 00:54:22,159
to you know, the use of
a reductio ad absurd him. I agree.

752
00:54:22,159 --> 00:54:24,199
I got no problem with a reductio, but no, finding a dead

753
00:54:24,360 --> 00:54:30,800
end in your constructed reductio doesn't mean
that your other proposition is correct. There

754
00:54:30,800 --> 00:54:32,679
are two things that need to happen
in order for that reductio it to be

755
00:54:32,679 --> 00:54:36,760
of any use. The first is
that you have to demonstrate that there is

756
00:54:36,800 --> 00:54:42,920
a necessity of an explanation for X, and then all other possible explanations for

757
00:54:43,199 --> 00:54:49,360
X fail, and that neither of
those has been has been done by any

758
00:54:49,360 --> 00:54:52,679
stretch of the imagination. I'm you
know, where's the demonstration that there must

759
00:54:52,719 --> 00:54:55,639
be an explanation that it couldn't just
be so. I'm not saying it is

760
00:54:55,719 --> 00:54:59,639
just so, which I was kind
of accused of, but I'm just going

761
00:54:59,679 --> 00:55:05,559
to say that was talking quickly and
that there was no malice misrepresenting it.

762
00:55:05,760 --> 00:55:08,079
I'm not saying it has to be
so. I'm saying, where's the demonstration

763
00:55:08,119 --> 00:55:13,519
that it that it is necessary?
That it can't be so? And we

764
00:55:13,599 --> 00:55:15,840
haven't gone through all other possibilities to
show that they lead to a dead end.

765
00:55:15,880 --> 00:55:22,519
We haven't even gone through the raw
theism versus non theism view to show

766
00:55:22,559 --> 00:55:25,480
that this doesn't have an explanation.
Because just because we don't have an explanation

767
00:55:25,559 --> 00:55:30,000
for something today that is consistent with
a worldview that doesn't include a god,

768
00:55:30,239 --> 00:55:34,239
doesn't mean that that's not going to
happen at a later time. This is

769
00:55:34,280 --> 00:55:37,800
the thing about skepticism. There may
be some things for which we will never

770
00:55:37,840 --> 00:55:44,159
have an explanation. That's incredibly we're
all uncomfortable with not knowing. I wasn't

771
00:55:44,159 --> 00:55:46,440
trying to make an emotional appeal.
I think that's how humans operate. Our

772
00:55:46,559 --> 00:55:50,639
discomfort with not knowing is what makes
us seek answers. It's the reason we're

773
00:55:50,679 --> 00:55:54,960
having this potential discussion today because if
Jay can successfully present something that convinces me,

774
00:55:55,199 --> 00:55:59,599
well, now there's another person ostensibly
on his side, and if I

775
00:55:59,639 --> 00:56:01,960
can, if I can show the
word Jay has made a mistake in assuming

776
00:56:01,960 --> 00:56:06,800
something that isn't necessary and can't be
demonstrated. Well, then maybe I have

777
00:56:06,840 --> 00:56:08,559
an ally on my side. I
don't think either one of us came into

778
00:56:08,599 --> 00:56:12,639
day thinking that we were going to
change the other person's mind. I don't

779
00:56:12,760 --> 00:56:15,320
do this. I mean, I'd
be happy if Jay and I wound up

780
00:56:15,320 --> 00:56:17,400
agreeing on stuff, But I do
it for the people who are listening so

781
00:56:17,440 --> 00:56:22,199
that they can hear a discussion about
this, and especially in areas like you

782
00:56:22,239 --> 00:56:28,119
know, deep philosophical concepts where I'm
not remotely an expert. I just think

783
00:56:28,159 --> 00:56:31,480
what I think and for my reasons, but I can do my best to

784
00:56:31,519 --> 00:56:36,039
explain it. I'm not as you
know, you talked about language. I

785
00:56:36,519 --> 00:56:38,920
would never assume that Jay and I
have the exact same understanding of word usage.

786
00:56:38,920 --> 00:56:40,920
As a matter of fact, I
would assume the exact opposite, that

787
00:56:40,920 --> 00:56:44,800
there are things where we're going to
have a different understanding of a word,

788
00:56:44,840 --> 00:56:47,519
a different understanding of a concept.
But my presumption coming in here is that

789
00:56:49,079 --> 00:56:53,920
we both speak English and have an
understanding of usage that is sufficient for us

790
00:56:53,960 --> 00:56:58,000
to be able to discuss things,
to find the areas where we agree,

791
00:56:58,079 --> 00:57:00,719
like, Hey, what do you
mean by this word mean by God.

792
00:57:00,480 --> 00:57:04,599
Okay, well, now we can
have this secondary discussion. I think you

793
00:57:04,639 --> 00:57:07,400
know that's the only assumption I'm making
is that there's a likelihood that we can

794
00:57:07,400 --> 00:57:12,480
come to an agreement on terms and
communicate ideas. And I think that it's

795
00:57:12,480 --> 00:57:16,320
evident that we're actually succeeding at that. But the notion that a God could

796
00:57:16,360 --> 00:57:21,639
serve as a foundation for the laws
of logic, in addition to no demonstration

797
00:57:21,679 --> 00:57:24,239
of necessity, and I'm not sure
what the warrant is apart from an assertion

798
00:57:24,280 --> 00:57:30,559
that there is a need and atheism
or a nontheistic view of the world doesn't

799
00:57:30,599 --> 00:57:36,360
fill that is this, can God
change, alter, or violate the laws

800
00:57:36,360 --> 00:57:39,119
of logic? Because if so,
then they're not guaranteed, and if not,

801
00:57:39,239 --> 00:57:44,159
then he's not the guaranteer. He
is now subject to those same laws.

802
00:57:44,760 --> 00:57:49,599
And the second problem is that we
all recognize I would hope that each

803
00:57:49,639 --> 00:57:53,760
of us is a flawed thinker,
that we not only have varying IQs and

804
00:57:53,840 --> 00:58:00,360
varying understandings and various biases that come
in and the process by which we learn,

805
00:58:00,480 --> 00:58:04,280
every single one of us makes mistakes, and we can't even guarantee that

806
00:58:04,320 --> 00:58:07,480
we're that the model of reality that
is in our head actually maps to an

807
00:58:07,519 --> 00:58:12,559
actual reality. That's a kind of
an assumption we're making as well when we

808
00:58:12,639 --> 00:58:16,239
were talking about solid system. And
so if we are flawed in our thinking,

809
00:58:17,159 --> 00:58:22,480
how can a god, even a
perfect God, make your flawed mind

810
00:58:22,559 --> 00:58:27,599
correct and warranted without making your mind
unflawed. It is like pouring clean water

811
00:58:27,639 --> 00:58:30,960
through a dirty filter. And so
the fact that you are convinced that there's

812
00:58:30,960 --> 00:58:34,960
a God out there that serves as
a foundation for logic doesn't mean there is

813
00:58:35,000 --> 00:58:38,320
one. And even if that God
does exist and does serve as the foundation

814
00:58:38,639 --> 00:58:43,719
for logic, there's no way for
that God to demonstrate that to you and

815
00:58:44,360 --> 00:58:50,760
to the point where you would have
the essentially absolute or maximal epistemic warrant,

816
00:58:51,360 --> 00:58:54,199
unless that God makes your mind completely
not flawed, at which case there would

817
00:58:54,199 --> 00:58:58,039
be no more debate or discussion.
It would just be hey, this is

818
00:58:58,039 --> 00:59:00,840
the way it works, and we
go Gosh, because we would have godlike

819
00:59:00,079 --> 00:59:05,760
mentality. And so I don't know
how, even you know, I don't

820
00:59:05,800 --> 00:59:09,280
know how to overcome those problems.
The laws of logic are our descriptions of

821
00:59:09,440 --> 00:59:15,400
abstract truths, which, okay,
I'll set aside the presupposing of truth or

822
00:59:15,440 --> 00:59:20,760
discussions about truth. And I don't
know that it's not the case that something

823
00:59:20,800 --> 00:59:24,159
can't simply be true, that this
is the way it is, and in

824
00:59:24,199 --> 00:59:28,000
fact it could not have been any
other way. If we look at the

825
00:59:28,079 --> 00:59:30,760
laws of logic and they could not
have been any other way, which is

826
00:59:30,760 --> 00:59:34,719
what it appears to be, even
though we can't be absolutely confident about that,

827
00:59:35,840 --> 00:59:39,280
then it would seem to me patently
absurd to suggest that there's something that

828
00:59:39,400 --> 00:59:43,920
must exist that serves as a guarantee
that it couldn't be any other way,

829
00:59:44,079 --> 00:59:51,679
if in fact it couldn't have been
any other way. All right, excellent,

830
00:59:52,559 --> 00:59:58,840
great discussion you guys. That concludes
the first hour of our talk here.

831
00:59:59,039 --> 01:00:01,679
So Jay over to you for you
know what you want to do next?

832
01:00:02,719 --> 01:00:09,639
Do we want to do like a
conversational now whatever, I'm up for

833
01:00:09,679 --> 01:00:13,760
whatever. I mean, if there's
questions from from the chat or super chat,

834
01:00:13,800 --> 01:00:15,840
we can do those if you have
questions for me. I mean,

835
01:00:15,880 --> 01:00:17,920
I asked a few questions there at
the at the end of dress so I'm

836
01:00:17,960 --> 01:00:22,920
sure we'll get to the super chats
here towards the last section. So,

837
01:00:23,119 --> 01:00:29,000
um, the first thing I would
say is that you talked about um.

838
01:00:29,119 --> 01:00:32,719
What what I was saying was that
when it comes to the domain of philosophy

839
01:00:32,760 --> 01:00:37,559
where we do debates, where we
do argumentation, to say, I mean,

840
01:00:37,559 --> 01:00:44,239
it's fine to say that you believe
that we seek justification for a beliefs,

841
01:00:44,559 --> 01:00:51,119
perhaps at times out of psychological motivations
for comfort, but that doesn't translate

842
01:00:51,159 --> 01:00:55,639
into an argument in a debate.
So just because and it could be entirely

843
01:00:55,679 --> 01:00:59,400
the case. It could be the
case that maybe maybe a person is only

844
01:00:59,480 --> 01:01:05,800
arguing for or the existence of God
because of psychological motivations, and they're weak

845
01:01:05,880 --> 01:01:07,239
people and they want they want to
have comfort. But I still think that

846
01:01:07,239 --> 01:01:12,280
that's a fallacious argument in terms of
strict logic, it's not valid to the

847
01:01:12,280 --> 01:01:15,679
truth or falsity of God's existence.
So when we're talking about logical necessity,

848
01:01:15,719 --> 01:01:20,239
we're talking about something that's a little
more forceful and it's a little more strict.

849
01:01:20,639 --> 01:01:25,719
And again, it doesn't matter if
we limit the certitude or the trueness

850
01:01:25,760 --> 01:01:30,039
to maximal certainty. It really doesn't
matter, because I think the argument that

851
01:01:30,079 --> 01:01:35,199
I'm trying to present is that if
we had the system of truth that you

852
01:01:35,239 --> 01:01:38,079
had, if we had your worldview, it would and should lead us down

853
01:01:38,159 --> 01:01:43,920
a certain path, a consistent path
of sallipsism, of total skepticism if we

854
01:01:43,920 --> 01:01:46,280
were to follow through with those conclusions. But that the point is that you're

855
01:01:46,320 --> 01:01:52,159
not really doing that. You're still
utilizing things that wouldn't make sense given your

856
01:01:52,159 --> 01:01:59,119
presuppositions, and that is itself the
argument. So, as a skeptic and

857
01:01:59,159 --> 01:02:02,000
somebody who essentially teaches about skepticism,
I often get asked this thing about can

858
01:02:02,039 --> 01:02:06,159
you be too skeptical? And of
course my answer is no, because what

859
01:02:06,239 --> 01:02:10,320
they're generally be talking about there is
not skepticism and cynicism. Skepticism is an

860
01:02:10,320 --> 01:02:15,199
ideology in an ideological sense. Is
I want my internal model of reality to

861
01:02:15,280 --> 01:02:21,079
match the reality I experience as best
as possible. And so you have a

862
01:02:21,119 --> 01:02:25,119
couple times now suggested that my worldview
should lead me down a path of total

863
01:02:25,159 --> 01:02:30,159
skepticism. Well, I am a
total skeptic in the sense that I have

864
01:02:30,400 --> 01:02:37,000
doubts about everything. I am not
absolutely certain about anything, But that doesn't

865
01:02:37,000 --> 01:02:39,519
mean that I don't have reasonable confidence
in things that are based on the foundation

866
01:02:39,800 --> 01:02:45,159
of logic. Now, if we're
gonna have the conversation about what's beyond logic,

867
01:02:45,320 --> 01:02:51,800
which is apparently what we're trying to
do. Criticizing the view is just

868
01:02:51,960 --> 01:02:54,199
one more attempt to say, oh, there must be a foundation. Well,

869
01:02:54,239 --> 01:02:59,239
where's the demonstration that there must be
a foundation? What are the consequences

870
01:02:59,639 --> 01:03:01,679
if there's not a foundation. Of
the argument is that you don't have a

871
01:03:01,719 --> 01:03:07,800
basis or ability consistently to appeal to
logic itself, Setting aside the justification of

872
01:03:07,800 --> 01:03:13,800
whether I have the same basis everybody
else does. I'm convinced that it is

873
01:03:13,840 --> 01:03:16,440
reliable, as are you. The
difference between us is that you are convinced

874
01:03:16,480 --> 01:03:22,000
that you found why it's liable.
That's not but but but that was why

875
01:03:22,039 --> 01:03:24,519
I asked that the Prince the question
about induction, Right, So induction and

876
01:03:24,960 --> 01:03:29,800
saying that you're convinced about it,
it would presumably mean that you think that

877
01:03:29,920 --> 01:03:34,199
it works. Right, it's pragmatic. Yeah, yeah, it works.

878
01:03:34,559 --> 01:03:37,760
We both agree with that. So, just pretty much else in the planets,

879
01:03:37,000 --> 01:03:42,199
something works is a value judgment,
right that you're using another category to

880
01:03:42,239 --> 01:03:45,320
try to say that that's why this
thing is true. But ultimately that would

881
01:03:45,320 --> 01:03:50,960
be circular. Yes, yes,
So the whole thing is I've acknowledged a

882
01:03:51,000 --> 01:03:53,000
presupposition. Why how on earth is
it as a counter to me to say,

883
01:03:53,039 --> 01:03:57,960
oh, you're presupposed because on the
world view that you have, those

884
01:03:58,039 --> 01:04:03,199
kinds of things shouldn't exists. That's
that's absolutely not true. So this is

885
01:04:03,199 --> 01:04:06,360
where we're always going to get in
trouble. You make an assertion about my

886
01:04:06,480 --> 01:04:13,559
worldview and about what shouldn't exist my
worldview is that I accept to this because

887
01:04:13,599 --> 01:04:16,559
of a demonstration of its continued reliability
called induction. I haven't. That's not

888
01:04:16,679 --> 01:04:21,320
a justification. That's just saying that
it is right. So in logical justification,

889
01:04:21,679 --> 01:04:24,800
that was why I pointed to Hume. All the way up to Quine,

890
01:04:25,199 --> 01:04:28,280
they still say that this is not
a belief or a view that can

891
01:04:28,280 --> 01:04:35,000
be justified. Yes, I agree, yes, and I agree, I

892
01:04:35,440 --> 01:04:40,239
see no justification. You're asserting there
is a justification, and when I ask

893
01:04:40,280 --> 01:04:43,679
for what it is, you're just
asserting that while my worldview collapses without it,

894
01:04:43,679 --> 01:04:46,039
and you even asserted that these sorts
of things shouldn't exist, stopped you

895
01:04:46,119 --> 01:04:49,719
sort of these short of things shouldn't
have existed in my worldview. Where's the

896
01:04:49,760 --> 01:04:55,639
demonstration that my worldview should not include
things that are just true or better yet

897
01:04:55,920 --> 01:05:00,039
that are reasonably presupposed because of their
continued demonstrate of effort, because they would

898
01:05:00,079 --> 01:05:02,920
be that would be being ad hoc
and being arbitrary. And I'm saying the

899
01:05:02,960 --> 01:05:06,639
justification is that in a world where
there is a god, the doctrine of

900
01:05:06,679 --> 01:05:12,159
providence actually makes sense. Why there's
induction and the regularity that's in nature.

901
01:05:12,679 --> 01:05:15,199
I'm not aware of. I'm not
aware of a girl where the world where

902
01:05:15,199 --> 01:05:16,440
there is a god. I'm aware
of a world where there are people who

903
01:05:16,440 --> 01:05:19,639
are convinced there's a god and who
are convinced it serves as a foundation right

904
01:05:19,679 --> 01:05:27,039
here, right right, And so
where's the demonstration for that other than in

905
01:05:29,440 --> 01:05:31,280
it's not. No, it's not
I mean, if we're just, if

906
01:05:31,280 --> 01:05:35,480
we're just going to make flat out
assertions, then you assert your rights.

907
01:05:35,320 --> 01:05:40,000
It's it's not an argument. You
haven't presented a single argument for the for

908
01:05:40,000 --> 01:05:45,199
the for the entire thing. You've
presented colloquial kind of loose arguments, but

909
01:05:45,239 --> 01:05:49,159
there's not the whole thing is you
just you claimed that this shouldn't exist in

910
01:05:49,159 --> 01:05:54,960
my worldview, that logical absolutes could
not be true under my worldview. The

911
01:05:55,000 --> 01:05:59,920
fact that I you're presupposing that there
is an explanation for why they're absolute,

912
01:06:00,480 --> 01:06:03,119
rather than just recognizing that they are. That would be being arbitrary and being

913
01:06:03,159 --> 01:06:11,119
at hawk, and typically in debates
that's not allowed. It's it's wow,

914
01:06:11,840 --> 01:06:14,760
hey, Jade, I'm sorry to
interrupt. Um. We are getting some

915
01:06:14,880 --> 01:06:17,639
complaints as you guys are doing the
more free form conversations, So if you

916
01:06:17,760 --> 01:06:20,960
can, if you guys can kind
of like, I hate to interrupt the

917
01:06:21,000 --> 01:06:27,519
flow, but we are getting some
echo on your mike j So, okay,

918
01:06:27,559 --> 01:06:33,719
cool, thanks. It's so it
would only be arbitrary if I were

919
01:06:33,760 --> 01:06:39,280
asserting these things are in fact absolute
and I viable. That is not my

920
01:06:39,320 --> 01:06:47,159
position at all. My position that's
not that's not all that, that's not

921
01:06:47,199 --> 01:06:51,119
all that's required to be arbitrary.
Being arbitrary or at hawk is just saying

922
01:06:51,199 --> 01:06:54,840
something simply is, and I can
appeal to this thing and I don't have

923
01:06:54,880 --> 01:07:00,199
to justify. I don't have to
give any reasons for here. I don't

924
01:07:00,199 --> 01:07:02,239
know how many times I can explain
the same thing I'm not saying and have

925
01:07:02,360 --> 01:07:06,559
never said, these are the way
things the logic clabslutes are the way things

926
01:07:06,559 --> 01:07:10,199
are, and I don't have to
justify it. I've not said that.

927
01:07:10,239 --> 01:07:14,280
I've not implied that or anything else. I'm saying I am convinced that they

928
01:07:14,360 --> 01:07:17,760
are, and I am not convinced
that they have or need a justification.

929
01:07:17,880 --> 01:07:23,599
So stop misframing what my position is
so that it is a straw man to

930
01:07:23,760 --> 01:07:27,400
knock down. I have never said
the logic lab well. I probably have

931
01:07:27,519 --> 01:07:30,920
said fifteen years ago or whatever,
but not throughout the course of this debate

932
01:07:30,960 --> 01:07:33,639
that the logic clabslutes are in fact
true and don't need justification. I'm saying

933
01:07:33,719 --> 01:07:39,079
I don't see a need or any
demonstration that they do need a justification.

934
01:07:39,480 --> 01:07:44,239
There's a huge difference. It's the
difference between I am not convinced this person

935
01:07:44,360 --> 01:07:46,960
is guilty and I am, in
fact convinced this person is innocent. Those

936
01:07:46,960 --> 01:07:55,239
are different things. So why is
that not being at hog or arbitrary.

937
01:07:53,400 --> 01:08:02,639
It's not arbitrary, You've got an
echo. Okay, it's not ad hoc

938
01:08:03,039 --> 01:08:09,000
because I'm not offering an explanation for
how they are. I'm not even I'm

939
01:08:09,039 --> 01:08:11,920
not even acknowledging that there could be
an explanation for how they are. There's

940
01:08:11,920 --> 01:08:15,760
been no demonstration that they require an
explanation. So it's not ad hoc in

941
01:08:15,800 --> 01:08:19,560
that sense of because ad hoc would
be providing a justification for something. I'm

942
01:08:19,600 --> 01:08:23,479
not providing a justification for it.
I'm saying I don't even know that there

943
01:08:23,560 --> 01:08:26,880
could be or that there is a
justification for it. Do you see how

944
01:08:26,920 --> 01:08:29,079
that's not ad hoc. Well,
I mean, you can say that that's

945
01:08:29,119 --> 01:08:30,960
not ad hoc, but I don't
see how it's not. Because typically when

946
01:08:30,960 --> 01:08:35,520
we talk about in the domain of
epistemology, justifying beliefs and justifying claims,

947
01:08:35,920 --> 01:08:40,880
it requires some kind of explanation.
Now you can do that. I understand

948
01:08:40,880 --> 01:08:43,439
you're doing that. You're saying that, but I don't think that that's a

949
01:08:43,479 --> 01:08:46,439
coherent answer, And I think that
you're led to that conclusion because of the

950
01:08:46,479 --> 01:08:49,880
beliefs in the rest of the system, because it would require the admission of

951
01:08:49,960 --> 01:08:55,920
other things that are not compatible with
the other beliefs that you have, namely

952
01:08:55,960 --> 01:09:01,279
the atheistic agnostic Tuch views. Make
try another way, How could it possibly

953
01:09:01,319 --> 01:09:05,479
be an ad hoc explanation to say
I am not aware that there is or

954
01:09:05,560 --> 01:09:10,800
needs to be an explanation, because
that's being arbitrary. It doesn't need one

955
01:09:12,640 --> 01:09:16,199
as so let me frame it this
way. So there's disciplines that are called

956
01:09:16,239 --> 01:09:21,680
metadisciplines, right, meta ethics,
meta mathematics, meta logic. These are

957
01:09:21,720 --> 01:09:25,520
real disciplines that people study. Now, one could say that they're not real

958
01:09:25,560 --> 01:09:30,159
disciplines and dismiss it or whatever.
But when we talk about giving a justification

959
01:09:30,279 --> 01:09:32,640
or giving an explanation for things,
or explaining how they could be in the

960
01:09:32,640 --> 01:09:35,800
rest of one's worldview, I don't
think that that's an invalid question. And

961
01:09:36,079 --> 01:09:42,159
you've said that you don't believe that
it needs a justification. Again, you

962
01:09:42,199 --> 01:09:45,079
can say that that's not arbitrary,
but to me, it sounds arbitrary.

963
01:09:45,239 --> 01:09:48,560
On the worldview where God exists,
there's regularity in nature because of providence,

964
01:09:48,600 --> 01:09:53,720
because God has said the world up
to be regular, and that's how we

965
01:09:53,760 --> 01:09:57,720
can do the scientific method, that's
how we can do logic, that's how

966
01:09:57,760 --> 01:10:00,920
we can do math. The world
operates in a reg other way. But

967
01:10:00,920 --> 01:10:04,039
when we don't have that and we
just say that we only have our immediate

968
01:10:04,039 --> 01:10:09,399
sense experience, we only have what's
pragmatic, then we're led to these foolish

969
01:10:09,399 --> 01:10:15,159
conclusions. Okay, I'm a fool. No, I'm not saying you're a

970
01:10:15,159 --> 01:10:18,560
fool in terms of a pejorative.
I'm saying, no, yes, yes

971
01:10:18,640 --> 01:10:24,479
you are. And this is the
problem. I'm not offering any ear echoing.

972
01:10:25,479 --> 01:10:28,880
I'm not offering an explanation, so
it can't be an ad hoc explanation

973
01:10:29,000 --> 01:10:31,520
what I and I'm not saying this
does not require justification. I'm saying,

974
01:10:31,520 --> 01:10:35,880
where's the demonstration that it does.
I'm not aware that. And I you

975
01:10:36,159 --> 01:10:41,840
you at least presuppose one thing that
you think does not require a foundation,

976
01:10:42,439 --> 01:10:49,479
right, correct, So you presuppose
one thing that you don't think requires a

977
01:10:49,479 --> 01:10:55,239
foundation, and yet you want to
criticize my presupposition, which does not say

978
01:10:55,319 --> 01:10:59,880
this does not require a foundation,
but instead says I am not yet convinced

979
01:11:00,159 --> 01:11:03,239
that it needs a foundation. I
haven't asserted that it doesn't. There could

980
01:11:03,239 --> 01:11:06,199
be. There could be some foundation, as far as I know. You

981
01:11:06,239 --> 01:11:10,119
could be right about the foundation,
as far as I know. It's just

982
01:11:10,159 --> 01:11:13,119
there's no demonstration that there is a
foundation, or that you have found the

983
01:11:13,199 --> 01:11:16,319
right one. What you've found is
one that is consistent and appears to serve

984
01:11:16,359 --> 01:11:20,199
as that. But only because if
anything, and I was going to go

985
01:11:20,199 --> 01:11:26,119
aoid doing this, you seem to
be making an ad hoc explanation for the

986
01:11:26,159 --> 01:11:31,720
foundation of logic in there's a personal
god agent who serves as the guaranteer for

987
01:11:31,760 --> 01:11:39,239
something which we haven't even demonstrated needs
a guaranteur or could be guaranteed And sorry

988
01:11:39,680 --> 01:11:43,800
lost it for a second there.
So there's an ad hoc explanation there,

989
01:11:43,800 --> 01:11:47,119
which is one step removed from the
thing that we both agree on. Yeah.

990
01:11:47,119 --> 01:11:48,880
Well, in a response to that, I would say that when you

991
01:11:48,960 --> 01:11:51,680
say that, down the road,
maybe we'll have an answer to these things.

992
01:11:51,720 --> 01:11:56,319
That seems to me to be kind
of a leap of faith, the

993
01:11:56,439 --> 01:12:01,039
idea that down the road we can
answer these things. Right again, that's

994
01:12:01,039 --> 01:12:05,560
probably the most frustrating thing is because
I did not say that you did say

995
01:12:05,720 --> 01:12:09,640
this down. I wrote it down
when you were talking down the answer down

996
01:12:09,640 --> 01:12:14,720
the rope. Perhaps we'll have an
answer to this justification. So the point

997
01:12:14,760 --> 01:12:19,479
here is that I don't know that
we won't have see you seem the point

998
01:12:19,520 --> 01:12:26,279
in my response, well, yes
it is, yes, it is saying

999
01:12:26,439 --> 01:12:32,880
okay, here we go. Your
your case is that a worldview without a

1000
01:12:32,920 --> 01:12:36,520
god cannot offer an explanation for the
logical absolutes. We'll just stick with that.

1001
01:12:36,520 --> 01:12:40,680
One and not all the other ones. My position is, and I

1002
01:12:40,720 --> 01:12:45,960
was talking specifically about your argument about
using a reductio essentially saying that you know,

1003
01:12:45,159 --> 01:12:50,720
under God there's an exploit or be
a screwpt. I'm gonna I'm gonna

1004
01:12:50,720 --> 01:12:56,039
skip that because I was looking for
the particular so disjunctive illogism, essentially showing

1005
01:12:56,399 --> 01:12:59,039
that you know, with God we
have an explanation. Without God, we

1006
01:12:59,039 --> 01:13:03,760
don't have an explanation there or got
what I said was in a reductio,

1007
01:13:03,920 --> 01:13:08,840
you have to demonstrate that there is
a necessity for an explanation in this case,

1008
01:13:09,239 --> 01:13:13,159
and simply getting to a dead end, which was your language which I

1009
01:13:13,319 --> 01:13:16,399
went down, does not mean you've
demonstrated the truth of the other one.

1010
01:13:16,520 --> 01:13:20,640
Because a dead end now does not
mean that there won't be an explanation down

1011
01:13:20,680 --> 01:13:25,560
the line. I did not say
we will find it. I didn't even

1012
01:13:25,600 --> 01:13:29,119
say, well, if I said
we might find it that I'm talking in

1013
01:13:29,159 --> 01:13:32,319
a philosophical sense. I'm not saying
that it's true we're likely to find it.

1014
01:13:32,600 --> 01:13:36,199
I also acknowledged we may never find
it, and I'm fine with that

1015
01:13:36,239 --> 01:13:41,920
one, because I don't have any
demonstration that there is an explanation well,

1016
01:13:41,920 --> 01:13:46,560
I would reply by saying that you
claim to be a proponent of the skeptical

1017
01:13:46,600 --> 01:13:50,159
tradition, that you're within that tradition
of skepticism, and I'm very read in

1018
01:13:50,199 --> 01:13:54,520
that tradition, and I respect a
lot of areas of the skeptical tradition.

1019
01:13:54,920 --> 01:13:58,560
But whether we go back to Descartes
and his meditations when he begins to question

1020
01:13:58,600 --> 01:14:02,079
things, or whether it's Hume or
whether it's the more modern skeptics, they're

1021
01:14:02,199 --> 01:14:09,840
very interested in questioning justification, questioning
epistemic claims, questioning metal level questions.

1022
01:14:09,880 --> 01:14:13,239
They're asking all those metal level questions. They're very interested in how we do

1023
01:14:13,359 --> 01:14:16,239
or can't justify laws of logic,
numbers, all those different things. So

1024
01:14:16,520 --> 01:14:21,600
it's not within it's not unfair to
bring those issues up because they're the heart

1025
01:14:21,600 --> 01:14:25,600
of the issue, especially in the
history of epistemology. I mean, you

1026
01:14:25,600 --> 01:14:30,560
can read epistemology textbook that's common bonjour
something like this, and you'll find that

1027
01:14:30,600 --> 01:14:35,039
the whole of the textbook is debates
about coherentism and foundationalism and justifying claims.

1028
01:14:35,359 --> 01:14:39,279
Now, one could say I don't
really care, or I don't it doesn't

1029
01:14:39,319 --> 01:14:43,199
matter to me, or whatever,
But in a debate. What's presupposed is

1030
01:14:43,359 --> 01:14:48,880
some question or some rule right by
which we go by these rules to confirm

1031
01:14:49,000 --> 01:14:53,880
or deny the case right. And
I think what you've missed or tended to

1032
01:14:53,920 --> 01:14:58,560
miss is that the transital argument is
not just an argument that's a reductio against

1033
01:14:58,640 --> 01:15:02,479
some other position. It's a positive
argument that's about all of those transcendental categories.

1034
01:15:02,479 --> 01:15:08,039
And if those transcendental categories are actually
necessary, and if they're actually very

1035
01:15:08,159 --> 01:15:13,399
strong arguments of themselves, then the
argument for God itself is also strong.

1036
01:15:13,479 --> 01:15:16,199
And it's also a positive argument.
It's not just a negative argument about,

1037
01:15:16,520 --> 01:15:19,399
well, I can find a flaw
in your worldview, therefore mind's true.

1038
01:15:19,479 --> 01:15:24,079
That's not the totality of the argument. The totality argument is that this worldview

1039
01:15:24,119 --> 01:15:29,560
is coherent because I can look at
all those different paradigmatic claims and preconditions and

1040
01:15:29,600 --> 01:15:32,520
they make sense. They're coherent.
When I look at the system over here,

1041
01:15:32,520 --> 01:15:34,239
and you can say I don't have
a system. You can say,

1042
01:15:34,279 --> 01:15:36,319
I'm not saying you said that,
But a person could say, as a

1043
01:15:36,319 --> 01:15:40,760
skeptic, I don't have a holistic
system. I just have the best that

1044
01:15:40,840 --> 01:15:45,439
I can go by with maximal certainty
and pragmatic approaches, but that still has

1045
01:15:45,560 --> 01:15:51,159
claims that are necessary and implicit about
metaphysics, about epistemology, and about ethics.

1046
01:15:51,199 --> 01:15:54,880
Even if you don't want to go
down any of those specific routes,

1047
01:15:54,920 --> 01:16:00,560
it's still has a necessary implication.
If I were to say I'm a total

1048
01:16:00,600 --> 01:16:02,920
skeptic and I don't think that I
know anything is true, that's still a

1049
01:16:03,000 --> 01:16:06,600
claim about metaphysics, about ethics,
and about epistemology, even if I don't

1050
01:16:06,600 --> 01:16:19,800
want it to go there. So
you're working. But the issue here is

1051
01:16:20,000 --> 01:16:25,479
whether or not there's a God,
and you're presenting an argument for the existence

1052
01:16:25,520 --> 01:16:30,920
of God based on the necessity of
an explanation for logic, among other things,

1053
01:16:30,560 --> 01:16:34,840
as a foundation for it. My
response is, you haven't demonstrated that

1054
01:16:34,880 --> 01:16:39,920
this is a necessity. You've just
asserted that the absence of such an explanation

1055
01:16:40,399 --> 01:16:44,640
leads to problems. But those problems
presupposed that there is an explanation. There's

1056
01:16:44,680 --> 01:16:47,119
been no demonstration that the laws of
logic could have been in any other way,

1057
01:16:47,199 --> 01:16:53,039
or that there's any case that they
that they need some sort of guarantee.

1058
01:16:53,600 --> 01:16:57,520
And when I try to point this
out, you've on a couple of

1059
01:16:57,560 --> 01:17:01,159
occasions completely misframed what I was talking
about. The card example, which I

1060
01:17:01,199 --> 01:17:04,960
agree is and I know you didn't
raise the subjection, but somebody I'm not

1061
01:17:05,000 --> 01:17:09,720
watching. I'm sure somebody out there
was complaining about you know this analogy that's

1062
01:17:09,720 --> 01:17:13,880
within you know the reality, and
you can provide evidence, and it doesn't

1063
01:17:13,880 --> 01:17:15,479
fit within the transcendental thing. Yes, it's an analogy, I get it.

1064
01:17:16,640 --> 01:17:21,279
The thing is, it would be
a coherent if you don't know whether

1065
01:17:21,399 --> 01:17:25,840
or not how you ended up with
thirteen spades, it would be a coherent

1066
01:17:28,399 --> 01:17:33,520
explanation to believe that I cheated.
Because if you're not sure whether I believe,

1067
01:17:33,560 --> 01:17:36,359
and I'm not sure whether or not
I cheated or whether somebody they're cheated,

1068
01:17:36,640 --> 01:17:40,520
then you're in this state of I
don't know. And this is why

1069
01:17:40,560 --> 01:17:43,520
I was talking about our discomfort with
not knowing. I wasn't using as it

1070
01:17:43,680 --> 01:17:47,359
is an emotional fallacy. It's just
a fact we are uncomfortable with not knowing.

1071
01:17:47,359 --> 01:17:50,159
It's the reason we see answers.
It's the reason why we presuppose in

1072
01:17:50,199 --> 01:17:55,479
some cases that something may have an
answer, when we might be wrong about

1073
01:17:55,520 --> 01:17:58,319
whether or not it has an answer. And so the card cheating example.

1074
01:17:58,359 --> 01:18:00,520
There, of course, if you
across from me at the table and you

1075
01:18:00,560 --> 01:18:06,279
get that, almost anybody is going
to be tempted to say, Wow,

1076
01:18:06,920 --> 01:18:12,319
I bet somebody cheated, because everything
makes a lot more sense if in fact

1077
01:18:12,359 --> 01:18:16,920
somebody cheated, and that might make
you more comfortable rather than not knowing that.

1078
01:18:17,000 --> 01:18:19,560
Maybe I'm not saying that is the
reason for doing it. You can

1079
01:18:19,600 --> 01:18:24,880
convince yourself in a worldview where Matt
cheated. Now all of a sudden,

1080
01:18:24,920 --> 01:18:28,479
this outcome makes a lot more sense. And you're right, I acknowledge that

1081
01:18:28,520 --> 01:18:31,119
at the outset of the debate,
at the very beginning, But that has

1082
01:18:31,159 --> 01:18:33,840
nothing to do with whether or not
I actually cheated. That has everything to

1083
01:18:33,840 --> 01:18:38,840
do with your comfort or discomfort with
not knowing. And if you're convinced that

1084
01:18:38,880 --> 01:18:42,319
I did cheat, then of course
that's going to be a satisfying answer,

1085
01:18:42,479 --> 01:18:45,680
and it would probably be satisfying for
almost anybody there, as long as they

1086
01:18:45,680 --> 01:18:48,239
didn't care whether or not it was
actually true. And I care whether or

1087
01:18:48,279 --> 01:18:51,560
not things are actually true to the
best that we can find out, and

1088
01:18:51,600 --> 01:18:55,560
so I can't make a leap to
oh, there must be a god that

1089
01:18:55,600 --> 01:18:59,479
serves as a foundation for logic because
I'm not yet convinced that logic needs a

1090
01:18:59,479 --> 01:19:01,800
foundation. I see, and I
think I see the point of departure now.

1091
01:19:01,920 --> 01:19:06,319
So basically, where I would disagree
where I think we're talking past,

1092
01:19:06,479 --> 01:19:12,000
is about the issue of different types
of proofs and different types of things.

1093
01:19:12,000 --> 01:19:15,039
So, for example, your your
analogy is fine when it comes to matters

1094
01:19:15,119 --> 01:19:19,760
of normative daily life, normative discourse, but when it's issues I would argue

1095
01:19:20,119 --> 01:19:27,600
that are so fundamental and paradigmatic that
they destroy the possibility of knowledge or predication

1096
01:19:28,000 --> 01:19:31,680
or logic ethics at all. They're
different from the kinds of claims or beliefs

1097
01:19:31,680 --> 01:19:35,920
that we have that speak to what
you're talking about with your example. So,

1098
01:19:35,960 --> 01:19:40,640
for example, if I deny the
laws of logic, there's there's something

1099
01:19:40,760 --> 01:19:47,079
very fundamental about argumentation, living,
speaking, communicating that's completely destroyed, right

1100
01:19:47,119 --> 01:19:50,039
if I if I deny them,
if I doubt them, I don't think

1101
01:19:50,039 --> 01:19:55,239
they have a true existence. If
they're not real, if they're just social

1102
01:19:55,279 --> 01:19:59,720
constructs, that's a much more damaging
thing to doubt. Then if I doubt

1103
01:19:59,760 --> 01:20:02,039
that little Wayne has moved in next
door to me, right, I might

1104
01:20:02,079 --> 01:20:05,319
see a dude with dreads and I
think it's little Wayne over there. Therefore,

1105
01:20:05,439 --> 01:20:09,880
little Wayne has Now, if I'm
wrong about that, it doesn't destroy

1106
01:20:10,000 --> 01:20:14,199
my whole worldview to be wrong about
that. If I deny basic laws of

1107
01:20:14,239 --> 01:20:17,119
logic, it does destroy my whole
worldview. And so not everything has proven

1108
01:20:17,159 --> 01:20:23,279
the exact same way. And so
because those kinds of things are much more

1109
01:20:23,920 --> 01:20:28,840
fundamental, much more powerful and paradigmatic, that's why it's such a strong argument,

1110
01:20:28,840 --> 01:20:31,439
and that's why they do require a
justification. I mean, the argument

1111
01:20:31,479 --> 01:20:35,640
that you gave about the cards,
you are giving a kind of justification.

1112
01:20:35,680 --> 01:20:39,359
You're saying that we can't always go
by the appearances of things, and I

1113
01:20:39,359 --> 01:20:44,560
would agree with that, but it's
different when we're talking about paradigmatic level presuppositions.

1114
01:20:44,600 --> 01:20:50,159
And that's why transcendentals are different than
normative argumentation and logic. Yeah,

1115
01:20:50,199 --> 01:20:53,680
first of all, I don't know
how that's special pleading. But going on

1116
01:20:53,800 --> 01:20:57,479
about the consequences, oh, you
need to mute going on about the consequences

1117
01:20:57,520 --> 01:21:00,880
of denying the laws of logic seeming
as completely irrelevant because I'm not doing that.

1118
01:21:01,520 --> 01:21:04,920
See, you're trying to argue for
a foundation behind the laws of logic.

1119
01:21:05,560 --> 01:21:10,640
That's the part that I'm denying,
but not the laws of logic themselves,

1120
01:21:10,880 --> 01:21:12,880
And so I would agree, if
you deny the laws of logic,

1121
01:21:12,920 --> 01:21:16,039
then we can't have any kind of
conversation, we can't do anything. We

1122
01:21:16,079 --> 01:21:20,039
are forced essentially to recognize these things, and denial of them would lead to

1123
01:21:20,199 --> 01:21:24,800
chaos, except that I'm not doing
that at all. I am denying your

1124
01:21:24,880 --> 01:21:29,840
bald assertion that there must be a
foundation. Yeah. But as a skeptic,

1125
01:21:29,880 --> 01:21:32,960
shouldn't we have a justification for things
that we believe in. Yes,

1126
01:21:33,479 --> 01:21:38,680
And That's why I've been so strong
on pointing out the difference between saying I

1127
01:21:38,720 --> 01:21:43,159
am convinced of X, I am
not convinced of X, and I am

1128
01:21:43,199 --> 01:21:45,479
convinced of not X. As a
skeptic, I want to believe as many

1129
01:21:45,479 --> 01:21:48,600
true things and as few false things
as possible, and I proportion my confidence

1130
01:21:48,680 --> 01:21:53,960
level in what I believe to the
available evidence for it, of which for

1131
01:21:54,399 --> 01:21:58,159
the evidence of a foundation for the
logic cloud lutes zero evidence. The evidence

1132
01:21:58,199 --> 01:22:01,239
that God serves as a foundation zero
evidence, as far as I can tell,

1133
01:22:02,039 --> 01:22:06,479
for any of these things. My
position is not the laws of logic

1134
01:22:06,560 --> 01:22:12,359
are in fact absolute and viable other
than they appear to be, And we

1135
01:22:12,439 --> 01:22:15,119
should operate as if they are until
there's such time as as a demonstration when

1136
01:22:15,159 --> 01:22:21,720
they're not. These things continually demonstrate
we can't have conversations without them. They

1137
01:22:21,760 --> 01:22:26,520
are as close to, if they're
not absolute, there as close as I

1138
01:22:26,520 --> 01:22:30,079
think any of us could possibly imagine. And so my position is not they

1139
01:22:30,119 --> 01:22:33,800
don't require a foundation, because that
would be an assertion that I would have

1140
01:22:33,880 --> 01:22:36,079
to defend it have a burden approof
How did you come to the conclusion they

1141
01:22:36,119 --> 01:22:40,359
don't need a foundation. I didn't
come to that conclusion. I am not

1142
01:22:40,439 --> 01:22:44,239
yet convinced that they do, because
I have not nobody's demonstrated that, and

1143
01:22:44,319 --> 01:22:46,479
you and I would agree, at
least within your worldview, there's at least

1144
01:22:46,479 --> 01:22:53,119
one thing that does not require a
foundation. And so given that you know,

1145
01:22:53,399 --> 01:22:56,640
I'm not sure whether or not there's
one thing that doesn't require a foundation,

1146
01:22:56,720 --> 01:22:59,520
or two things that doesn't require a
foundation, or zero things that doesn't

1147
01:22:59,560 --> 01:23:02,039
require nation. Those are things that
we can't don't seem to be able to

1148
01:23:02,039 --> 01:23:05,640
demonstrate. Well at that point,
I would say that when it comes to

1149
01:23:05,720 --> 01:23:13,000
the question of demonstration and how that's
been used in epistemology and philosophy, I

1150
01:23:13,039 --> 01:23:18,039
appreciate that admission, because if we're
believing in things because they work and they

1151
01:23:18,560 --> 01:23:24,520
don't have to be justified, that's
not skepticism. Skepticism is interested in asking

1152
01:23:24,560 --> 01:23:28,399
those questions. And I understand you're
what you're saying, and I appreciate the

1153
01:23:28,399 --> 01:23:31,439
attempt to be consistent, but I
don't think that it's ultimately consistent because you

1154
01:23:31,520 --> 01:23:34,520
can't just say, well, you
know, I just I don't see why

1155
01:23:34,600 --> 01:23:38,800
they have to be justified, because
that is being arbitrary. It's being at

1156
01:23:38,800 --> 01:23:41,279
hawk. And you can say it's
not being arbitrary because you don't see a

1157
01:23:41,319 --> 01:23:44,199
reasoning why it has to be.
But that's the whole skeptical truth. That's

1158
01:23:44,199 --> 01:23:47,079
why skeptics do what they do is
to try to justify claims, to try

1159
01:23:47,079 --> 01:23:50,920
to justify beliefs, to try to
justify systems and so and so. If

1160
01:23:51,000 --> 01:23:55,239
you can say, I don't we're
not going to do that. We try,

1161
01:23:55,640 --> 01:23:59,079
We try, and if we don't
find a justification, we keep trying,

1162
01:23:59,079 --> 01:24:02,880
and we're so echo but we yes. So first of all, I'm

1163
01:24:02,960 --> 01:24:06,239
sure, please people who watch this
later don't beat J up too much for

1164
01:24:06,319 --> 01:24:14,840
lecturing me about skepticism while arguing on
behind for a god. Skepticism is about

1165
01:24:15,039 --> 01:24:19,439
wanting your internal model from an idealistic
standpoint, modern scientific scan to match reality.

1166
01:24:19,600 --> 01:24:25,520
Modern scientific skepticism is about testing as
best we can. But that's that's

1167
01:24:25,520 --> 01:24:30,319
within the context of testing fact claims
about reality, so that modern scientific skepticism

1168
01:24:30,359 --> 01:24:33,319
isn't going to address whether or not
logic hows a foundation. You're talking about

1169
01:24:33,520 --> 01:24:41,119
almost an ancient Greek knowledge of skepticism
that has been discarded because it leads to

1170
01:24:42,800 --> 01:24:47,119
they're the very questions that human Quin
asked. Yeah. Yeah, that's not

1171
01:24:47,199 --> 01:24:53,279
ancient Greece. They ask questions,
they did not assert answers. That's the

1172
01:24:53,439 --> 01:24:57,479
difference. You're asserting an answer.
William van Orman Quine's essay Two Dogmas of

1173
01:24:57,479 --> 01:25:00,359
Empiricism. He says that they cannot
be logically to fight on empiricis's grounds.

1174
01:25:03,039 --> 01:25:06,800
That's why they're called two Dogmas of
empiricism. According to Quin's famous essay,

1175
01:25:09,279 --> 01:25:19,560
sure psher, yes sir, yes, sir. We want to read some

1176
01:25:19,600 --> 01:25:24,279
super chats. We're getting towards the
last fifteen twenty minutes. All right,

1177
01:25:24,359 --> 01:25:28,079
yeah, all right, yeah,
we are into the final segment here.

1178
01:25:28,159 --> 01:25:30,399
Great discussion, you guys. Yeah, let's do that. Jay, let's

1179
01:25:31,199 --> 01:25:35,239
yeah, I'm I'm really enjoying it
over here. And yeah, Jay,

1180
01:25:35,319 --> 01:25:38,840
if you have any super chats,
I guess now would be a good time

1181
01:25:38,920 --> 01:25:44,079
to round those out. Franklin chant, as one last clarification, you can

1182
01:25:44,119 --> 01:25:45,600
say whatever you want about quine.
I'm not beholding the quin. I'm talking

1183
01:25:45,640 --> 01:25:51,079
about my thing and this notion of
skepticism. I've already explained it over and

1184
01:25:51,119 --> 01:25:54,840
over and over again, and you
have yet to demonstrate any sort of problem

1185
01:25:54,880 --> 01:25:58,479
with it except to assert that I'm
not a skeptic in the same way whoever

1186
01:25:58,520 --> 01:26:01,000
the hell you reference is a skeptic. I don't care. Fair enough,

1187
01:26:01,359 --> 01:26:04,760
Definitely, one can take a different
track. But I'm just interested in the

1188
01:26:05,399 --> 01:26:10,000
history of different skeptics and how they
talk, and what they consider justification,

1189
01:26:10,079 --> 01:26:15,199
and how philosophy and epistemology typically speaks
of justifying claims. But so and I'm

1190
01:26:15,199 --> 01:26:18,720
not I'm interested in what's actually true
and demonstrable, which is why we're stuck.

1191
01:26:18,960 --> 01:26:23,479
Okay, so we'll go to Franklin
Chan. He says, thanks for

1192
01:26:23,520 --> 01:26:27,199
the debate, Thank you, Franklin. Joelene Kay says for the cause,

1193
01:26:27,239 --> 01:26:30,319
Thank you, gentlemen, Thank you. Joel Michael Flaherty one hundred dollars.

1194
01:26:30,319 --> 01:26:32,880
Thank you, Michael, Finally a
real debate. This is all ten or

1195
01:26:32,960 --> 01:26:40,840
Terry two dollars says Atheism saved dormant
three sixty says Jay, bringing up Hume's

1196
01:26:40,920 --> 01:26:46,079
argument about induction being unjustifiable in a
materials worldview. Why would the same why

1197
01:26:46,119 --> 01:26:50,119
would today be the same tomorrow for
no reason? Yeah, I mean that's

1198
01:26:50,199 --> 01:26:58,000
essentially the argument. Ten or Terry
five dollars to both debaters, what are

1199
01:26:58,079 --> 01:27:00,640
are we going to address some of
these? Some of the some of these?

1200
01:27:00,760 --> 01:27:03,319
I mean, you know when I
say I don't, I don't care

1201
01:27:03,359 --> 01:27:06,239
what Hume set or client set or
anybody else, because you know, I'm

1202
01:27:06,319 --> 01:27:10,720
going to take pieces from different things, and I'm certainly not as well versed

1203
01:27:10,760 --> 01:27:13,800
on some of those as they are. I'm talking about what my position is

1204
01:27:13,800 --> 01:27:18,880
and why when we talk about induction, we live our entire lives by inference

1205
01:27:18,880 --> 01:27:23,680
and induction. We begin with this
assumption that tomorrow is pretty much going to

1206
01:27:23,760 --> 01:27:29,079
be like today, because the entire
history of the world has continued to show

1207
01:27:29,079 --> 01:27:31,199
that that's going to be the case. But we also do it with the

1208
01:27:31,239 --> 01:27:35,640
recognition that tomorrow is not identical to
today and that there are trends. So,

1209
01:27:36,039 --> 01:27:39,920
yeah, you know, I don't
expect that the Earth's going to stop

1210
01:27:39,920 --> 01:27:43,000
spinning on its axis in the next
ten minutes, but I do it with

1211
01:27:43,039 --> 01:27:45,880
the understanding that it's very likely and
almost certain that it will stop spinning on

1212
01:27:45,960 --> 01:27:49,199
its axis at some point in the
future. And so when we talk about

1213
01:27:49,239 --> 01:27:55,720
induction, there's a reason. It's
it's not deduction. It's an approximation.

1214
01:27:55,800 --> 01:27:59,039
It is an estimation. It's an
inference about what things are going to be

1215
01:27:59,079 --> 01:28:03,680
like. But that is not the
same as wild ass guessing. I guess

1216
01:28:04,000 --> 01:28:08,199
is probably the best way to put
that, and it's the reason why we

1217
01:28:08,239 --> 01:28:13,279
rely on science, despite the fact
that science is virtually almost entirely an inductive

1218
01:28:13,279 --> 01:28:15,720
process. Yeah, and I would
agree with everything that Matt just said.

1219
01:28:15,720 --> 01:28:18,039
It is just that in the history
of this debate that I'm bringing up the

1220
01:28:18,119 --> 01:28:24,239
question of justifying the belief in induction
the entire history of skepticism and empiricism,

1221
01:28:24,279 --> 01:28:28,319
and from what I understand, Matt
is an empiricist at least to some degree.

1222
01:28:29,239 --> 01:28:31,239
The whole point of Quine's essay.
I'm not saying that Matt has to

1223
01:28:31,239 --> 01:28:35,560
agree with everything que argues, but
that Quine restated the argument from the time

1224
01:28:35,560 --> 01:28:40,640
of Hume that it's a belief that
can't be justified, and it's a belief

1225
01:28:40,680 --> 01:28:44,840
that undergirds science. So the point
is that science believes in things it cannot

1226
01:28:44,840 --> 01:28:48,520
be logically justified. Therefore, the
transmittal argument is the next logical step,

1227
01:28:48,560 --> 01:28:53,279
and that's what I've been trying to
argue throughout the debate. Tan Ortarry five

1228
01:28:53,279 --> 01:28:57,880
dollars to both debaters. What is
the consequence of one's epistemology breaking down due

1229
01:28:57,920 --> 01:29:06,119
to incoherence with their view of metaphysics
and axeology. I don't know that there

1230
01:29:06,239 --> 01:29:12,319
is. Well, one of the
consequences is that if if I'm wrong,

1231
01:29:12,439 --> 01:29:15,199
then oh well, now, actually
that's not even it. So if my

1232
01:29:15,319 --> 01:29:19,600
pistemology breaks down, I'd have to
know in what way it broke down and

1233
01:29:19,680 --> 01:29:24,359
know the consequences, because my position
is not the large coal absolutes don't have

1234
01:29:24,439 --> 01:29:27,239
a foundation. It's that I'm not
aware of one or a need for one.

1235
01:29:27,279 --> 01:29:30,039
If if it turns out somebody was
able to demonstrate that there is a

1236
01:29:30,119 --> 01:29:33,760
need for one, that doesn't crush
my worldview. All it does is add

1237
01:29:33,840 --> 01:29:39,479
something that I have yet to be
convinced of I become convinced of something new,

1238
01:29:39,520 --> 01:29:43,239
and so my worldview changes all the
time every time I become convinced of

1239
01:29:43,319 --> 01:29:46,279
something new across the board. And
if if there was a further demonstration that,

1240
01:29:46,359 --> 01:29:48,840
for example, not only do they
have a foundation, but it is

1241
01:29:48,880 --> 01:29:55,199
a God, and in particular the
God of the Orthodox Christian tradition, well

1242
01:29:55,279 --> 01:29:58,279
then I would now be I would
no longer be an atheist because I would

1243
01:29:58,279 --> 01:30:03,319
have to be convinced that the or
Christian model of God was real. It

1244
01:30:03,359 --> 01:30:08,359
may not change my view on that, being like I'm never going to worship

1245
01:30:08,880 --> 01:30:13,079
as out of an obligation or an
expectation, because I think that any being

1246
01:30:13,079 --> 01:30:16,720
that would be deserving of worship could
never demand it, because that, at

1247
01:30:16,760 --> 01:30:19,600
least to my understanding, would would
put in a position where we would no

1248
01:30:19,600 --> 01:30:23,880
longer be deserving. But that's kind
of off the track. But as far

1249
01:30:23,920 --> 01:30:29,840
as I was one, I redefined
knowledge. And I'm sure I'll get beaten

1250
01:30:29,920 --> 01:30:32,439
up for this, but I had
so many conversations about the nature of belief

1251
01:30:32,479 --> 01:30:34,960
and knowledge and how knowledge is a
subset of belief, and there were people

1252
01:30:34,960 --> 01:30:36,560
like no, no, no,
no, No. Beliefs are a subset

1253
01:30:36,560 --> 01:30:40,199
of knowledge, and no, no, you're wrong. Knowledge is a subset

1254
01:30:40,199 --> 01:30:42,920
of beliefs. They're the things you
believe, and then there's some subset of

1255
01:30:42,920 --> 01:30:45,680
that that you count as knowledge.
And by and large, in a kloqu

1256
01:30:45,800 --> 01:30:47,560
of sense, when people talk about
knowledge, not in a philosophical sense,

1257
01:30:47,600 --> 01:30:50,960
because there you get to justify true
belief and now there's arguments over what's justified

1258
01:30:51,000 --> 01:30:54,880
and what's true. In a cloqus
sense, when people say I know something,

1259
01:30:55,199 --> 01:30:58,720
and they're not just talking about like
familiarity or awareness, but they're talking

1260
01:30:58,720 --> 01:31:01,800
about knowledge in the sense of apismology, all they're really doing, from my

1261
01:31:01,880 --> 01:31:05,439
experience, is expressing a confidence level. They're saying, I really, really,

1262
01:31:05,439 --> 01:31:09,760
really really believe it. And so
my working definition of knowledge was to

1263
01:31:09,800 --> 01:31:14,000
say, belief is anything that you
are convinced is true or likely true,

1264
01:31:14,319 --> 01:31:17,880
and knowledge are those beliefs that if
you were to find out you were wrong,

1265
01:31:18,000 --> 01:31:25,479
it would be dramatically worldview altering.
You know, if I can claim

1266
01:31:25,520 --> 01:31:30,199
to know, I don't know whether
or not my phone is turned on.

1267
01:31:30,359 --> 01:31:33,479
But what I'm really saying is I'm
confident my phone is still turned on because

1268
01:31:33,560 --> 01:31:35,960
I haven't turned it off yet,
and I know the battery is pretty full,

1269
01:31:35,960 --> 01:31:39,279
and there's lots of good reasons,
and so I would argue that my

1270
01:31:39,279 --> 01:31:42,680
confidence level is really high and I
know this, but I'm not saying I

1271
01:31:42,720 --> 01:31:47,359
can't be wrong. And that's a
fundamental difference, because if in philosophy it's

1272
01:31:47,399 --> 01:31:50,319
justified true belief and it turns out
it's not true that my phone is on,

1273
01:31:50,359 --> 01:31:53,720
then I could never counted as knowledge, and I don't think that's the

1274
01:31:53,720 --> 01:31:57,159
way most of us use knowledge when
we're talking about it in general. So

1275
01:31:57,199 --> 01:32:00,560
I just went with knowledge or those
things we believe, so only that if

1276
01:32:00,600 --> 01:32:01,760
we were to find out that we're
wrong, it would be worldview altering.

1277
01:32:02,159 --> 01:32:06,880
And if I don't have a position, like if I'm not convinced that if

1278
01:32:06,920 --> 01:32:11,920
I had of you that the laws
of logic do not require a foundation,

1279
01:32:12,319 --> 01:32:14,720
then yes, that would be world
view altering to find out it was wrong.

1280
01:32:15,199 --> 01:32:18,159
But that's not my position. My
position is not being convinced of something.

1281
01:32:19,000 --> 01:32:24,039
It's a sacred for God. I'm
depending on God. I may be

1282
01:32:24,039 --> 01:32:27,560
convinced that God doesn't just depending on
how it's defined, but generally speaking,

1283
01:32:27,600 --> 01:32:30,119
I'm just not convinced that there is
one right. I would reply to the

1284
01:32:30,199 --> 01:32:32,960
question, what are the consequences of
ones epistemology of breaking down due to incoherence

1285
01:32:33,079 --> 01:32:38,600
in their view of metaphysics and axiology. I would say, it's devastating if

1286
01:32:39,079 --> 01:32:45,880
the arguments and the positions that you're
stating are so fundamentally unjustifiable, right,

1287
01:32:45,920 --> 01:32:49,119
I mean, if I can't give
an account for things in a philosophic,

1288
01:32:49,159 --> 01:32:53,479
any logical, reasonable sense, which
is often what we're required to do.

1289
01:32:53,520 --> 01:32:56,359
This was so kind of ironic is
in this kind of a debate, Is

1290
01:32:56,359 --> 01:32:59,520
that it's always pressed upon the theist, which fair enough, Yeah, we

1291
01:32:59,560 --> 01:33:01,279
are making pretty grandiose claims, right, so we ought to be able to

1292
01:33:01,359 --> 01:33:05,880
logically give an account, given a
justification for those kinds of claims. And

1293
01:33:05,920 --> 01:33:11,039
I think that the transmittal argument is
the case. It is the argument for

1294
01:33:11,239 --> 01:33:15,640
the existence of God, and so
it is pretty consistent with a coherent,

1295
01:33:15,039 --> 01:33:19,159
coherence type of view in terms of
epistemology. So I would say that if

1296
01:33:19,279 --> 01:33:25,159
one makes a fundamental paradigmatic flaw in
one's epistemology, then their worldview and their

1297
01:33:25,199 --> 01:33:28,760
system completely breaks down and it is
incoherent. Like, for example, if

1298
01:33:28,800 --> 01:33:30,680
I say I don't believe that there's
an external world right, or something like

1299
01:33:30,680 --> 01:33:33,359
this, This would be so fundamental
if I don't believe that there's logic right,

1300
01:33:33,439 --> 01:33:38,039
that would be so fundamental that our
whole system would collapse. And again,

1301
01:33:38,119 --> 01:33:44,199
historically, nobody's had a problem asking
can we investigate and justify these kinds

1302
01:33:44,199 --> 01:33:45,880
of claims. And I know that
Matt's not saying that you can't ask those

1303
01:33:45,920 --> 01:33:48,359
things, but he's saying that he's
not convinced that there is a need to

1304
01:33:48,399 --> 01:33:54,159
justify those kinds of claims and those
kinds of positions. And again, I

1305
01:33:54,279 --> 01:33:58,159
still think that it's arbitrary to say
that I don't know, and they don't

1306
01:33:58,159 --> 01:34:00,079
require it, because if you're going
to utilize things, if you're gonna believe

1307
01:34:00,119 --> 01:34:03,720
in things and act as if those
things are the case, there's nothing wrong

1308
01:34:03,760 --> 01:34:06,840
with me in a debate asking for
the justification for those kinds of things,

1309
01:34:06,840 --> 01:34:10,920
because it's the same kind of question
that you would ask about atheist. Now,

1310
01:34:10,960 --> 01:34:14,159
the argument is that in Matt many
times said, but yeah, but

1311
01:34:14,199 --> 01:34:15,800
you're saying that God is circular.
You don't have to give a justification for

1312
01:34:15,880 --> 01:34:19,920
God. I'm saying that God is
the justification for God is the transcendential argument,

1313
01:34:20,239 --> 01:34:25,439
and all systems ultimately are circular at
their root. Yes, absolutely,

1314
01:34:25,680 --> 01:34:30,159
because you can never ultimately get past
some final authority. Right. But to

1315
01:34:30,319 --> 01:34:32,640
say that that's not an argument as
I think, I think just flatly incorrect.

1316
01:34:32,720 --> 01:34:36,039
It is an argument. It's a
transcendental argument, and transit arguments are

1317
01:34:36,239 --> 01:34:41,359
valid arguments. Now again, one
could deny that, but the fact that

1318
01:34:41,399 --> 01:34:45,479
if we deny transcendental arguments leads us
to absurdities. That's the reduction, right,

1319
01:34:45,520 --> 01:34:48,800
and that would prove that they are
valid arguments in a logical sense.

1320
01:34:48,840 --> 01:34:54,119
If something leads to a reduct,
you right, Well, if you do

1321
01:34:54,239 --> 01:34:58,159
this again, maybe putting tag in
a in a syllogism, that can be

1322
01:34:58,159 --> 01:35:01,279
addressed. Okay, maybe we can
get closer to our But is it for

1323
01:35:01,600 --> 01:35:05,439
the third time now, just a
second ago, if you rewind you were

1324
01:35:05,479 --> 01:35:12,199
saying that that you think there was
a problem with saying I don't know and

1325
01:35:12,560 --> 01:35:16,720
they don't hang on. When you
were talking about whether or not the absolutely

1326
01:35:16,760 --> 01:35:19,159
out of foundation, you said,
do you think there's a problem with saying

1327
01:35:19,199 --> 01:35:24,079
I don't know and they don't require
it. I don't see any problem with

1328
01:35:24,079 --> 01:35:26,800
saying I don't know. I don't
say it's because that's almost always the right

1329
01:35:26,840 --> 01:35:30,000
answer. I don't see any problem
with asking a question. But at no

1330
01:35:30,039 --> 01:35:32,279
point did I say they don't require
it, which is once again you're you're

1331
01:35:32,319 --> 01:35:35,279
so phrasing, this is it,
and I know you weren't necessarily directing at

1332
01:35:35,279 --> 01:35:39,720
me that you were talking in general
about a problem. I would agree with

1333
01:35:39,760 --> 01:35:44,640
you. Anybody who says the laws
of logic don't require justification has adopted a

1334
01:35:44,680 --> 01:35:46,439
burden of proof that I don't know
how they could ever meet, and certainly

1335
01:35:46,479 --> 01:35:51,520
nobody's ever done it. Saying they
don't require it is a claim. Saying

1336
01:35:51,560 --> 01:35:56,000
I'm not convinced they do is not
a claim that they don't. Yeah,

1337
01:35:56,039 --> 01:36:00,680
but you utilize the things that you
say you don't know if any require justification.

1338
01:36:00,840 --> 01:36:04,680
Yes, as a pragmatic sense,
because they continue to work, and

1339
01:36:04,720 --> 01:36:08,960
you utilize the same things. The
one thing you utilize that I don't.

1340
01:36:09,600 --> 01:36:12,199
You don't utilize the laws of one
that when you say that you do it

1341
01:36:12,199 --> 01:36:16,640
because it's pragmatic and it works.
That's not a coherent response as to how

1342
01:36:16,680 --> 01:36:24,840
that's That's not a coherent justification just
because something works, whether or not it

1343
01:36:24,920 --> 01:36:28,840
works, with how it works or
why it works, that you can't saying

1344
01:36:28,840 --> 01:36:31,720
that something works. Presuppose is a
category of value judgment to say that this

1345
01:36:31,880 --> 01:36:34,399
is working, this is not working, this is good, this is bad.

1346
01:36:38,560 --> 01:36:43,720
Yeah, And those are metaphysical beliefs
and claims and truths. It's truth,

1347
01:36:43,840 --> 01:36:45,640
which is what I talked about at
the very beginning. That's only that's

1348
01:36:45,640 --> 01:36:49,720
the only thing that I'm presupposing here
when I talk about using laws of logic,

1349
01:36:49,760 --> 01:36:55,359
because it's pragmatic. We both use
them, and we are in agreement

1350
01:36:55,680 --> 01:37:02,960
that they are the reliable method and
apparently seem to be inviolent. That's the

1351
01:37:03,000 --> 01:37:08,399
thing that point we agree on.
You are now utilizing something that I don't

1352
01:37:08,520 --> 01:37:13,880
use, which is a god,
as a foundation for them. That's the

1353
01:37:14,000 --> 01:37:16,520
point at which we disagree. And
what you seem to be saying is that

1354
01:37:16,640 --> 01:37:21,439
unless I can provide an explanation for
why they work, I cannot have any

1355
01:37:21,479 --> 01:37:28,319
reasonable expectation that they are in fact
working. And that's a croc because I

1356
01:37:28,439 --> 01:37:30,600
can. I don't need to know
how my car works to know whether or

1357
01:37:30,640 --> 01:37:34,039
not it's working. I don't need
to know how we got to the moon

1358
01:37:34,079 --> 01:37:38,199
to know whether or not we actually
got to the moon. And logic,

1359
01:37:38,439 --> 01:37:41,840
the laws of logic or something that
all of us, well you and I

1360
01:37:41,880 --> 01:37:45,039
at least, let's not speak for
everybody on the planet, we're in agreement

1361
01:37:45,119 --> 01:37:47,359
of what they are and that they
work. And so there's no way to

1362
01:37:47,359 --> 01:37:51,640
criticize somebody for using something that works
just by saying you don't know how it

1363
01:37:51,680 --> 01:37:56,039
works. Well, I'm not against
I'm not convinced that you know either.

1364
01:37:56,600 --> 01:37:59,359
Yeah, but again, it's a
very specific and different question. And I

1365
01:37:59,439 --> 01:38:01,640
appreciate the honesty of saying that you
don't know that it can be justified,

1366
01:38:01,680 --> 01:38:05,279
and I want to phrase it right, So don't I don't miss that you

1367
01:38:05,439 --> 01:38:10,319
that you don't know that it's possible
and you don't know that it can be

1368
01:38:10,399 --> 01:38:15,319
justified. But I think that that
that's a weakness in the approach and the

1369
01:38:15,399 --> 01:38:20,319
argumentation, because as a skeptic,
you ought to be able to be asked

1370
01:38:20,439 --> 01:38:25,920
that question. And it's not an
unfair question because if if you're going and

1371
01:38:27,039 --> 01:38:30,439
I am, I am, and
the correct answer is you can ask me

1372
01:38:30,479 --> 01:38:32,119
whatever question you want is a skeptic, and you can ask what is your

1373
01:38:32,159 --> 01:38:36,800
justification for why the laws of logic
are seemed reliable? And my answer is

1374
01:38:36,880 --> 01:38:42,000
I don't know, because that is
the proper skeptical response. You keep Oh,

1375
01:38:42,119 --> 01:38:44,720
as a skeptic, you must do
X. And I'm sitting here telling

1376
01:38:44,760 --> 01:38:46,840
you, no, that's not what
skepticism is in the way that I and

1377
01:38:46,960 --> 01:38:50,520
most modern skeptics would use it.
Because you can ask me, what's your

1378
01:38:50,560 --> 01:38:54,279
justification for this, and my answer
is, I don't know. Because if

1379
01:38:54,319 --> 01:38:57,600
modern skepticism is about anything, and
I'll talk about this in the in the

1380
01:38:57,600 --> 01:39:02,039
Magic and Skepticism Show a Dragon conor
wherever. It is about recognizing our discomfort

1381
01:39:02,159 --> 01:39:06,720
with saying I don't know, and
how that is plaguing us to make logical

1382
01:39:06,760 --> 01:39:11,920
mistakes and make fallacious leaps, because, as I pointed out before, our

1383
01:39:11,960 --> 01:39:15,720
discomfort with not knowing when most of
the time I don't know is actually the

1384
01:39:15,840 --> 01:39:19,800
right answer, and the fact that
that answer isn't satisfying to people, it's

1385
01:39:19,840 --> 01:39:25,399
just too damn bad if it's the
right answer. The fact that it doesn't

1386
01:39:25,439 --> 01:39:29,479
satisfy it's frustrating. I know,
because as kids, you know when you

1387
01:39:29,520 --> 01:39:30,880
when you ask your parents why and
they say, because I said so,

1388
01:39:31,119 --> 01:39:34,880
that's a crappy answer. I mean, that's completely dissatisfying. That's that's never

1389
01:39:34,920 --> 01:39:41,319
appealing to anybody. And what I
see from from Tag and others is basically

1390
01:39:41,359 --> 01:39:45,279
a because guy said, so only
the eye is God. It doesn't explain

1391
01:39:45,359 --> 01:39:50,439
anything to us. The god God
has no explant, that god concept has

1392
01:39:50,479 --> 01:39:55,279
no explanant touring. And I've been
arguing this whole time how it does.

1393
01:39:55,359 --> 01:39:58,840
It does because of the fact that
there's a whole bunch of transcendental categories.

1394
01:39:58,840 --> 01:40:01,840
They are not material that we all
presuppose, that we all utilize. You

1395
01:40:01,880 --> 01:40:06,199
talk about utilizing the concept of truth
as a presupposition, but you don't know,

1396
01:40:06,279 --> 01:40:10,479
and you can't say if it's actually
out there. That is a fundamental

1397
01:40:10,640 --> 01:40:15,000
sophistry and absurdity. You can't utilize
these things. You can do it,

1398
01:40:15,159 --> 01:40:18,079
but you're doing it because the world
view of atheism is not true. That's

1399
01:40:18,119 --> 01:40:20,560
the argument. And you could say
that's not an argument, that's fine,

1400
01:40:20,920 --> 01:40:25,600
but it is an argument, and
it's a very powerful argument because all of

1401
01:40:25,600 --> 01:40:29,640
these trands and old categories are used
and to say that they're not real and

1402
01:40:29,640 --> 01:40:32,279
it can't be justified, well,
didn't say that they weren't real, and

1403
01:40:32,279 --> 01:40:35,920
I didn't say it can't be justified. This is like teenth time you've you've

1404
01:40:36,000 --> 01:40:42,600
used that phrasing. It's you don't
even understand what skepticism is. Is I

1405
01:40:42,640 --> 01:40:46,479
studied it intensely InCred school. I
argued what skeptical professors, I know what

1406
01:40:46,479 --> 01:40:50,039
skepticism is, and you can keep
qualifying it and saying that, well,

1407
01:40:50,600 --> 01:40:54,000
I just don't know. I just
don't know, And I understand that in

1408
01:40:54,159 --> 01:40:57,880
many you know. In a sense, it's fine to take the approach of

1409
01:40:58,319 --> 01:41:01,159
being willing to be correct, being
willing to say I don't know. But

1410
01:41:01,319 --> 01:41:08,880
that's different than being asked about justifying
claims. And a debate is about justifying

1411
01:41:08,920 --> 01:41:15,399
beliefs and claims, is it not, Well, you're making a claim which

1412
01:41:15,439 --> 01:41:17,920
you have to justify, and I'm
explaining why I don't accept it. I'm

1413
01:41:17,920 --> 01:41:21,039
not making it, but you are. That's something that you don't understand.

1414
01:41:21,079 --> 01:41:25,439
You are. No, you are, You're absolute. You can say I'm

1415
01:41:25,479 --> 01:41:30,399
not, but you logically necessarily do. That's what you don't get. No.

1416
01:41:30,920 --> 01:41:33,119
This is why I explain the difference
between saying I'm convinced that you're innocent

1417
01:41:33,239 --> 01:41:38,239
versus I'm not convinced that you're guilty. What claim did I make about the

1418
01:41:38,279 --> 01:41:42,239
logical absolutes other than I am not
convinced that they need a foundation? That

1419
01:41:42,319 --> 01:41:45,119
they work and you can use them, but they don't and perhaps cannot be

1420
01:41:45,199 --> 01:41:51,760
justified. You don't think, you
don't think. I don't know whether or

1421
01:41:51,840 --> 01:41:55,880
not they can be justified. But
claiming that they work is something that I'm

1422
01:41:56,039 --> 01:42:01,880
that you agree with. But is
that a metaphetic in any sense? Is

1423
01:42:01,880 --> 01:42:06,399
its well under the under the presuppositions
that I listed that I'm presupposing truth and

1424
01:42:06,439 --> 01:42:11,039
a reality and those absolutes, then
yes, those are all entailed in there.

1425
01:42:11,159 --> 01:42:15,119
My objection is that you are going, that's what I'm trying to say,

1426
01:42:14,479 --> 01:42:18,840
I met what you admit that there's
logical entailment in even saying that I

1427
01:42:18,960 --> 01:42:23,119
use these things, but I don't
know if they can be justified. That's

1428
01:42:23,159 --> 01:42:30,119
still claiming things about metaphysics and epistemology. I'm saying they're presuppositions, which by

1429
01:42:30,199 --> 01:42:33,239
definition are not justified. If they
were justified, we wouldn't freaking presuppose that

1430
01:42:33,359 --> 01:42:35,800
that's not true. You can't true. That's that's to say that there's no

1431
01:42:35,840 --> 01:42:42,359
such thing as a transcendental argument.
That's what the hell is a presupposition?

1432
01:42:42,399 --> 01:42:45,119
If if if we have a justification
or something, we don't need to presuppose

1433
01:42:45,159 --> 01:42:47,520
it. That's not right. That's
why you don't understand what a transcendental argument

1434
01:42:47,680 --> 01:42:50,640
is. It is a logical form
of argumentation. For example, let me

1435
01:42:50,680 --> 01:42:54,640
give an example from mathematics. I
mean, you can disagree with them,

1436
01:42:54,680 --> 01:42:59,000
but the denial of that kind of
an argumentation is what leads to the absurdity

1437
01:43:00,199 --> 01:43:03,840
by it. I don't know if
we should probably go back to the more

1438
01:43:03,840 --> 01:43:06,560
super check. You and I are
not speaking the same language at all.

1439
01:43:06,600 --> 01:43:12,239
I didn't deny that this wasn't an
argument or or logical Okay, anyway,

1440
01:43:12,920 --> 01:43:17,159
Midwave Productions fifty sek. Question for
Matt, is your belief that God doesn't

1441
01:43:17,239 --> 01:43:23,399
exist? Rational or determined? Is
your response to this question rational or determined?

1442
01:43:26,239 --> 01:43:29,560
When did I say so? Wow? This is the frustrating thing,

1443
01:43:29,880 --> 01:43:32,279
Matt. Is your belief that God
doesn't exist? When did I? When

1444
01:43:32,319 --> 01:43:35,560
did I express that? Because I'm
not convinced that a god. First of

1445
01:43:35,560 --> 01:43:38,760
all, we need to define a
god. What God are you talking about?

1446
01:43:38,840 --> 01:43:43,439
Which God? Because there are some
gods which by virtue of them conflicting

1447
01:43:43,479 --> 01:43:47,399
with observations from reality, and I
think we can be reasonably confident those gods

1448
01:43:47,399 --> 01:43:53,279
don't exist. If you say that
you're God makes the sky pink twenty four

1449
01:43:53,279 --> 01:43:56,119
to seven. Well, this guy's
not pink twenty four to seven. And

1450
01:43:56,199 --> 01:44:00,239
so there's a conflict either with whether
or not that God exists or whether or

1451
01:44:00,239 --> 01:44:02,239
not you're understanding that God is the
same thing. My position is, I

1452
01:44:02,239 --> 01:44:05,319
am not convinced that God exists.
So when you freeme it as if I'm

1453
01:44:05,319 --> 01:44:09,720
asserting that there isn't a God and
then asking whether or not it's rational,

1454
01:44:10,479 --> 01:44:13,039
well, it depends entirely on which
God we're talking about, and whether or

1455
01:44:13,079 --> 01:44:15,520
not I do actively believe that that
God doesn't exist. Yeah, I don't

1456
01:44:15,560 --> 01:44:19,319
think that there is such a position
as a skeptical neutrality that Matt would like

1457
01:44:19,439 --> 01:44:24,079
to have. I know that in
an existential sense, Matt takes the position

1458
01:44:24,079 --> 01:44:28,359
of skeptical neutrality, but I don't
think that he understands that even that position

1459
01:44:28,439 --> 01:44:32,960
necessitates logical claims and metaphysical claims and
claims about justifying things, whether he wants

1460
01:44:32,960 --> 01:44:38,479
it to or not. That's what
I think is the disparity here. Jay.

1461
01:44:38,479 --> 01:44:40,720
Do you believe I have a thousand
dollars in my wallet right now?

1462
01:44:41,319 --> 01:44:45,479
I don't know. Do you believe
that I don't have a thousand dollars in

1463
01:44:45,520 --> 01:44:49,159
my wallet right now believe either claim. Okay, thanks for refuting your own

1464
01:44:49,199 --> 01:44:53,880
point from a moment ago. Correct, But that's at the normative level of

1465
01:44:54,239 --> 01:44:59,560
interactions and not at the paradimatic level. And that's special things, two different

1466
01:44:59,560 --> 01:45:01,399
things. No, that's that's what
I've been argued pleading, special pleading,

1467
01:45:01,439 --> 01:45:06,039
because the whole time I've been arguing
for transcendental categories and arguments, not normative

1468
01:45:06,079 --> 01:45:11,920
logical claims. Yeah, it's called
special pleading. You're claiming the transcendental arguments

1469
01:45:11,920 --> 01:45:14,680
are special so they don't have to
apply. You just said a minute ago

1470
01:45:14,720 --> 01:45:18,560
that they're in they're presupposed there,
and that they're different. I said that

1471
01:45:18,600 --> 01:45:21,800
they're presupposed. That's with respect to
whether or not they can be justified,

1472
01:45:21,840 --> 01:45:26,000
not whether or not there they are
fundamentally different, and whether they follow.

1473
01:45:26,239 --> 01:45:29,560
Like, if you pres everything is
derived from logic. Once you presuppose that

1474
01:45:29,640 --> 01:45:32,079
is the thing that there's something there's
that if I deny the laws of logic,

1475
01:45:32,239 --> 01:45:36,560
that's more fundamental than whether I'm wrong
about the thousand dollars in your pocket

1476
01:45:36,600 --> 01:45:39,439
or a little way and living next
to orgment is it one of those more

1477
01:45:39,479 --> 01:45:43,760
fundamentally damaging to a world. Then
you at the point, that's the whole

1478
01:45:43,760 --> 01:45:47,399
point that I'm making about what a
transcendentalism? Why so more fundamentally periodomatic.

1479
01:45:49,000 --> 01:45:54,039
I agree that two things are different, I don't agree that your explain I'm

1480
01:45:54,039 --> 01:45:58,319
sorry again a time take to trash
out. I don't agree that your claim

1481
01:45:58,399 --> 01:46:03,319
that because they're different, they're no
longer subject to reason or the sort of

1482
01:46:03,359 --> 01:46:09,600
episdemic warrant. The fact that we
presuppose something is because we can't justify it

1483
01:46:10,119 --> 01:46:15,920
currently. Maybe you're you're offering a
justification and a justification without any episdemic warrant.

1484
01:46:15,920 --> 01:46:21,119
No, I'm not. It does
have episdemic warrant. Okay, I

1485
01:46:21,119 --> 01:46:25,399
mean the episodemic warrant is the arguments
I've been making for the last two hours.

1486
01:46:26,239 --> 01:46:29,279
Let's move on. So the next
one is Admiral squatbar. He says

1487
01:46:29,319 --> 01:46:30,760
two dollars. Jay scoots away from
the mic and the speakers. Okay,

1488
01:46:30,760 --> 01:46:36,760
I'll try John DeFranco ten bucks,
Thank you, John Vitali Chmelski five dollars.

1489
01:46:36,840 --> 01:46:44,760
His argument essentially actually proves God every
subposition is based on Christian philosophy,

1490
01:46:44,840 --> 01:46:46,800
whether he knows it or not.
That is the transnt argument in summation.

1491
01:46:46,880 --> 01:46:51,439
Correct, that's allD ass assertion.
So if that's what the transcendental argument is,

1492
01:46:51,479 --> 01:46:55,319
then congratulations. It's not an argument, it's an assertion. Well,

1493
01:46:55,399 --> 01:46:59,479
it's a summation of what the transcendent
argument is in a proposition. But not

1494
01:46:59,520 --> 01:47:02,920
every problem position isn't it's not every
assertion it's false or not. Actually,

1495
01:47:02,960 --> 01:47:06,720
it's about it's a summation of the
argument. It does require fleshing. It's

1496
01:47:08,119 --> 01:47:11,479
as certain h this assertion that I'm
not aware of it. The number of

1497
01:47:11,479 --> 01:47:14,439
times today that it's been suggested that
I'm just you know, an ignorant buffoon

1498
01:47:14,520 --> 01:47:18,279
today is rather staggering, which is
wife's check. Well, I you know,

1499
01:47:19,439 --> 01:47:26,920
I think. Uh. The next
one is Demetrios. Excuse me,

1500
01:47:26,920 --> 01:47:30,319
Tanetary U now we already did that
one. Excuse me, Tanertary. Matt,

1501
01:47:30,359 --> 01:47:34,560
you say you believe in the laws
of logic having a meaningful ontological status,

1502
01:47:34,600 --> 01:47:39,319
but you cannot tell us what the
grounds are of them in our world.

1503
01:47:39,399 --> 01:47:45,800
So how do you know that they
have any ontological status. I'm not

1504
01:47:45,840 --> 01:47:53,119
sure I understand what you mean by
ontological status other than so, what we're

1505
01:47:53,119 --> 01:47:56,279
talking about is the difference between whether
something works and how how or why it

1506
01:47:56,319 --> 01:48:01,439
works, or the ontology of what
it is, which i'm I actually took

1507
01:48:01,439 --> 01:48:08,520
some notes about this earlier because there's
some confusion about whether or not these sorts

1508
01:48:08,520 --> 01:48:13,439
of thing, whether abstracts can have
an ontology at all, and it's you

1509
01:48:13,479 --> 01:48:16,600
know, you can conceptualize anything,
but like if you removed every mind from

1510
01:48:16,680 --> 01:48:25,239
the universe, I would agree that
what we point to by the descriptive laws

1511
01:48:25,239 --> 01:48:29,840
of logic have not vanished. You
know, something still is what it is

1512
01:48:29,920 --> 01:48:31,960
or isn't what isn't, and that
I can't demonstrate that nobody ever could,

1513
01:48:32,000 --> 01:48:35,000
because we couldn't be there in a
universe without a mind. But this is,

1514
01:48:35,079 --> 01:48:39,880
this is what is implied by accepting
them now, whether or not they

1515
01:48:39,880 --> 01:48:43,560
have an ontology unto themselves of some
sort of characteristic I don't think that that's

1516
01:48:43,640 --> 01:48:46,199
necessarily the case. I think that
the language we use to describe these for

1517
01:48:46,279 --> 01:48:49,960
me, identity, non contradiction,
exclude a middle. Are summed up easiest

1518
01:48:50,279 --> 01:48:54,439
in a simple vend diagram with a
single circle, and everything is either in

1519
01:48:54,479 --> 01:48:58,359
the circle or not in the circle, and that's it. And so these

1520
01:48:58,399 --> 01:49:02,960
are these are the sorts of ways
that we straight the truth under the assumption

1521
01:49:03,000 --> 01:49:08,880
truth of these things. But I
don't think they're out there like they're not

1522
01:49:09,079 --> 01:49:13,880
prescriptive X must be the case.
I think they're just the way things are

1523
01:49:14,399 --> 01:49:17,279
and they're not something that exists unto
themselves, and so I don't think they

1524
01:49:17,279 --> 01:49:19,760
could have an ontology in that sense, but I could be wrong. Yeah,

1525
01:49:19,760 --> 01:49:23,520
I think that this would be another
weakness in that argument, which is

1526
01:49:23,560 --> 01:49:28,479
that this question is specifically about the
ontological status of those things, and the

1527
01:49:28,560 --> 01:49:33,079
argument that I've been giving is dealing
with proving the ontological status of those types

1528
01:49:33,119 --> 01:49:36,000
of things. Now Matt is free
to disagree with that and not accept the

1529
01:49:36,079 --> 01:49:40,680
argumentation, but I think what he's
missed is that a transcental argument is a

1530
01:49:40,720 --> 01:49:44,199
different type of argument. And that
doesn't mean that it's not an argument,

1531
01:49:44,319 --> 01:49:46,600
but it's a different type of argument, and it is a little counterintuitive to

1532
01:49:46,600 --> 01:49:50,600
the way that we do normative logical
than diagrams, as he mentioned, because

1533
01:49:50,600 --> 01:49:55,600
it's a meta question. So one
could theoretically say I'm not interested and I

1534
01:49:55,640 --> 01:49:59,439
don't accept or I don't want meta
level questions to be asked or dealt with.

1535
01:50:00,119 --> 01:50:01,880
But I don't think that that's a
that's I mean, I'm not saying

1536
01:50:01,880 --> 01:50:04,960
Matt's necessarily doing that. Matt says
he's open to any questions. But if

1537
01:50:05,000 --> 01:50:10,119
we take the route of saying that
I'm not going to accept transcendental arguments as

1538
01:50:10,159 --> 01:50:14,479
valid arguments, then I think that
leads us to very absurd conclusions. It

1539
01:50:14,560 --> 01:50:19,680
leads us to reductios, and reductios
are fallacies. So yeah, yeah,

1540
01:50:19,720 --> 01:50:23,520
I'm open to any questions, just
as long as the person who's asking the

1541
01:50:23,600 --> 01:50:27,720
questions doesn't rule out potential answers like
I don't know. And you've once again

1542
01:50:27,800 --> 01:50:30,000
said this is a weakness. You
think this is a weakness of the argument.

1543
01:50:30,079 --> 01:50:32,960
What argument is a weakness out?
Yeah, saying I don't know is

1544
01:50:33,000 --> 01:50:35,800
not an argument, And that's fine
that you don't want it to be an

1545
01:50:35,880 --> 01:50:40,680
argument, right, But that's the
weakness of it. But that's what debates

1546
01:50:40,680 --> 01:50:45,000
are. And so when I give
argumentation, you're essentially saying that presuppositions transcendols

1547
01:50:45,000 --> 01:50:47,479
can't be justified. You said they
can't be You said that we don't justify

1548
01:50:47,520 --> 01:50:50,840
them, we assume them. That's
not true, they can be justified.

1549
01:50:50,880 --> 01:50:58,520
So you are making arguments I did. I'm not aware of any way in

1550
01:50:58,520 --> 01:51:00,880
which they can be justified or if
they need a justification. You are convinced

1551
01:51:00,920 --> 01:51:04,079
that they do need a justification and
that you have the justification. But when

1552
01:51:04,079 --> 01:51:08,319
you start talking about what debates are, debates are not. One side shows

1553
01:51:08,359 --> 01:51:10,840
up and says X is true,
and the other side shows up and says

1554
01:51:11,000 --> 01:51:16,199
X is not true or X is
false. You don't have to have both

1555
01:51:16,279 --> 01:51:20,920
two different people asserting something. That's
classic debate, affirmation and negation. That's

1556
01:51:20,960 --> 01:51:25,920
classic debate. Okay, well,
I don't give a rats ask about classic

1557
01:51:25,920 --> 01:51:31,600
debate because you can't still have a
debate where one person presents their evidence for

1558
01:51:31,640 --> 01:51:35,159
their claim and the other person points
out flaws and the events for the claim.

1559
01:51:35,159 --> 01:51:39,199
It's not a demonstration that they're wrong. It's a demonstration that they are

1560
01:51:39,279 --> 01:51:43,880
not warranted in saying that they're correct. And you still have a debate there,

1561
01:51:45,079 --> 01:51:47,359
right, Yeah, And that can
still be formulated as an affirmation and

1562
01:51:47,479 --> 01:51:50,279
negation because I can ask you,
I mean, unless you don't want to

1563
01:51:50,319 --> 01:51:53,800
deal with those kinds of questions,
and that's fine if you don't want to,

1564
01:51:53,880 --> 01:51:57,399
but there's nothing wrong with asking those
questions back to you and pointing out

1565
01:51:57,479 --> 01:52:02,199
that to say that something is I
don't know that it's provable. That still

1566
01:52:02,239 --> 01:52:09,439
necessitates and implicates you in metaphysical and
epistemic claims even if you don't want it

1567
01:52:09,439 --> 01:52:13,880
to do. That's what you don't
understand, and that's why you don't understand

1568
01:52:13,880 --> 01:52:18,039
that a transcental argument is a logical
argument. It's valid. Keep it's going

1569
01:52:18,079 --> 01:52:23,680
to be fun, all right.
Next up torpedo fish five dollars. Atheist

1570
01:52:23,800 --> 01:52:29,760
empiricism provides no epistemic justification for universals, but theism does. Therefore, theism

1571
01:52:29,800 --> 01:52:33,520
has more explanatory power of reality.
I would say, I would phrase it

1572
01:52:33,560 --> 01:52:38,920
different, but not more explanatory power, but it does have the explanatory power

1573
01:52:39,000 --> 01:52:44,359
correct Yeah, and skeptical positioning of
not being aware of whether or not you

1574
01:52:44,479 --> 01:52:47,079
cheated does not have the explanatory power
of being convinced that I cheated. And

1575
01:52:47,279 --> 01:52:50,359
neither of them demonstrate whether or not
I anology is I do this ology because

1576
01:52:50,399 --> 01:52:56,079
it assumes that normative epistemic logical claims
are the same as paradomatic claims, and

1577
01:52:56,119 --> 01:53:00,680
they're not. That's what you don't
understand. Justin stand im ten bucks.

1578
01:53:00,680 --> 01:53:04,119
Excellent display of logic of atheists presubpositions, But again, we see outside the

1579
01:53:04,119 --> 01:53:10,439
format of a control setting in university, atheists lose the argumentation. I'm sure,

1580
01:53:10,800 --> 01:53:14,560
I'm sure Matto was cool that Randy
Churchill twenty bucks. Thank you,

1581
01:53:14,640 --> 01:53:17,319
Randy, Orthodox pilgrim fifty bucks,
Matt dillahuney. Why does some many atheists

1582
01:53:17,399 --> 01:53:21,079
go after Christians and not other religious
beliefs? Is there something about Christianity that

1583
01:53:21,159 --> 01:53:26,239
is infuriating to atheists? Look at
Orthodox Christianity. It is a better It

1584
01:53:26,359 --> 01:53:33,399
is better than watered down Southern Baptist
views. Well, why does some many

1585
01:53:33,439 --> 01:53:36,000
atheists go after Christianity? Well,
I do a call in show, so

1586
01:53:36,079 --> 01:53:41,680
I take whatever God claims people present
when they call in, and when I'm

1587
01:53:41,720 --> 01:53:46,319
doing debate, so I debate whatever
they're actually presenting. If you're an English

1588
01:53:46,319 --> 01:53:49,520
speaking person somewhere in the West.
Probably the reason you see atheists going off,

1589
01:53:49,680 --> 01:53:53,560
especially in the United States, why
you would see atheists going after Christians

1590
01:53:54,439 --> 01:53:58,119
and versions of Christianity more often,
is because that's the predominant religion that has

1591
01:53:58,159 --> 01:54:03,000
a privileged position that most people adhere
to. In some sense, it would

1592
01:54:03,119 --> 01:54:08,880
make I mean, I've I've gone
after Scientology, Islam, you name it.

1593
01:54:10,279 --> 01:54:15,439
But the it's kind of like saying, if where you live, seventy

1594
01:54:15,680 --> 01:54:21,279
people are dying from cancer, why
aren't you guys studying athletes foot Now?

1595
01:54:23,479 --> 01:54:30,159
Is Christianity the biggest religious problem worldwide? No? And actually what I go

1596
01:54:30,199 --> 01:54:35,520
after isn't necessarily Christianity unless that's what
the person's presenting or whatever version of theres

1597
01:54:35,640 --> 01:54:41,439
is. My My thing here is
to constantly go after whether or not a

1598
01:54:41,439 --> 01:54:45,560
belief's warranted. And this is where
one of the confusions, or in Jay's

1599
01:54:45,600 --> 01:54:49,479
case, I just don't understand you. I'm not when you show up and

1600
01:54:49,520 --> 01:54:57,199
say I'm convinced God exists for these
reasons. My response is not you're wrong,

1601
01:54:57,479 --> 01:55:01,399
God doesn't exist. It's you're wrong. Those reasons don't provide the evidentiary

1602
01:55:01,439 --> 01:55:05,880
warrant that you think it does.
I'm not challenging your conclusion. I'm challenging

1603
01:55:06,000 --> 01:55:10,279
your argument and evidence. And if
I'm not presented with an argument and evidence,

1604
01:55:10,319 --> 01:55:13,199
if I'm just presented with assertions,
then we just keep going back and

1605
01:55:13,239 --> 01:55:15,039
forth. And this is why when
people say, oh, well you're saying

1606
01:55:15,079 --> 01:55:18,840
this, No, I'm actually not
saying that. And it happens all the

1607
01:55:18,880 --> 01:55:21,479
time. Yes, and I understand
what you're saying. There Matt is just

1608
01:55:21,520 --> 01:55:27,600
that the claim for the transcendental argument
is different than most argumentation. It's a

1609
01:55:27,600 --> 01:55:30,920
different type of argument, and it's
an analysis of two different paradigms. So

1610
01:55:31,039 --> 01:55:34,079
one can say I don't want to
do that, and that's fine, but

1611
01:55:34,880 --> 01:55:40,640
that's part of my argument. My
argument necessitates doing that as well. So

1612
01:55:40,680 --> 01:55:45,640
that's why it's unique. And it's
unique because transcendental categories and preconditions themselves are

1613
01:55:45,760 --> 01:55:48,560
unique. They're a different type of
argument. Let me give you one example,

1614
01:55:49,159 --> 01:55:54,560
Gridell. Gridell famously did this type
of argument with mathematics when he argues

1615
01:55:54,600 --> 01:55:59,560
with Merchant Russell overset theory and he
does the incompleteness theorems. That's a mathematical

1616
01:55:59,680 --> 01:56:03,720
form of a transcendental argument. So
one could theoretically say that it's not valid

1617
01:56:03,800 --> 01:56:06,760
or they don't accept it, but
we use it in mathematics. It actually

1618
01:56:06,800 --> 01:56:11,600
does come into play in different disciplines. So I think their valid argumentation.

1619
01:56:11,760 --> 01:56:14,199
And I would say that if one
is at the I'm not saying you're saying

1620
01:56:14,239 --> 01:56:17,119
this, but if one is at
the point of saying that they're not justifiable,

1621
01:56:17,159 --> 01:56:20,039
they can't be justified. I don't
see why they would be justified.

1622
01:56:20,079 --> 01:56:25,479
I think that that is not a
solid critique, not a solid response to

1623
01:56:26,319 --> 01:56:30,960
the argument itself. And my concern
isn't whether or not the argument is valid.

1624
01:56:30,000 --> 01:56:31,840
Is so much is whether or not
it's sound. And if I'm not

1625
01:56:31,880 --> 01:56:38,520
presented with something some sort of syllogistic
form, I can't even in a conversational

1626
01:56:38,560 --> 01:56:44,760
thing. It is almost impossible the
way we speak and communicate to say that's

1627
01:56:44,800 --> 01:56:47,760
an invalid argument, because validity goes
to the structure, and in a colloquial

1628
01:56:47,840 --> 01:56:51,720
sense where we're using shorthand and we
haven't actually put things in premises, it's

1629
01:56:51,720 --> 01:56:55,960
really hard. You can easily hide
whether or not a structure is valid or

1630
01:56:55,960 --> 01:56:59,119
not. And that's why we prefer
to do things in syllogistic form. It's

1631
01:56:59,119 --> 01:57:03,239
also the reason that when we're evaluating
a claim and propositional logic, there's a

1632
01:57:03,279 --> 01:57:09,199
proposition and not two propositions. We
evaluate a single proposition. That's how you

1633
01:57:09,199 --> 01:57:12,800
get to reduct you premise one is
the thing that you're potentially going to show

1634
01:57:12,880 --> 01:57:16,239
is absurd. It's not premise one, is this premise two is the opposite

1635
01:57:16,239 --> 01:57:19,520
of it would happen. That's the
reason we do logic the way we do,

1636
01:57:19,600 --> 01:57:24,680
and that's almost always true, except
in the cases where we're asking questions

1637
01:57:24,680 --> 01:57:28,800
of metallogic. And the whole argument
about transcendental arguments is a metallogical question.

1638
01:57:29,159 --> 01:57:32,079
So you can say that we don't
want to go there, but I'm going

1639
01:57:32,119 --> 01:57:34,920
there, and that's what the argument
is. It's a question of meta logic,

1640
01:57:36,960 --> 01:57:42,439
all right. Next up is a
Doorman twenty bucks. Assuming the skeptics

1641
01:57:42,479 --> 01:57:47,319
that preceded us weren't interested in truth
displays a bit of conceit and bad faith,

1642
01:57:47,439 --> 01:57:53,039
especially when they tackled metaphysical questions so
profound that it threatened to destroy their

1643
01:57:53,039 --> 01:57:57,520
own worldview. I don't I'm not
saying that Hume or even Kant, or

1644
01:57:57,760 --> 01:58:00,159
people who were skeptical. I mean, Kant was events of Hume's argumentation.

1645
01:58:00,199 --> 01:58:04,439
I'm not saying that that they're in
bad faith. I'm saying that they were

1646
01:58:04,479 --> 01:58:09,840
consistent and they led. Hume went
to a certain degree of skepticism where he

1647
01:58:09,880 --> 01:58:13,479
admitted a lot of things that most
skeptics, maybe not with Matt, but

1648
01:58:13,560 --> 01:58:16,600
most skeptics won't admit. For example, Hume says there's no basis for causality,

1649
01:58:16,760 --> 01:58:20,159
there's no basis that you're not observing
causal relations. You're observing event a

1650
01:58:20,680 --> 01:58:26,319
event, be their discrete operations events, and you're just calling them causality.

1651
01:58:27,159 --> 01:58:30,279
I think that causality is real.
I think that's a transcendental category. Just

1652
01:58:30,359 --> 01:58:34,199
like t loas and the other things
that I've listed. The question about meta

1653
01:58:34,319 --> 01:58:39,520
issues is can they be justified?
And one can say I don't think so,

1654
01:58:40,079 --> 01:58:43,800
I don't know mass position. I
think they can. I think because

1655
01:58:43,840 --> 01:58:46,479
they point us to God is why
it's such a strong argument. And again,

1656
01:58:46,600 --> 01:58:50,680
Matt, I understand Matt doesn't buy
that argue that the way that was

1657
01:58:50,680 --> 01:58:54,159
phrased, I'm not sure that was
directed at you or me. But if

1658
01:58:54,159 --> 01:58:58,640
I gave in an impression that that
skeptics don't care about truth, that's that's

1659
01:58:58,680 --> 01:59:02,239
not remotely what I'm talking about.
There is the question of do we have

1660
01:59:02,319 --> 01:59:06,279
access to truth? And you know, the Salasism and all the other little

1661
01:59:06,279 --> 01:59:10,399
things we talked about planned to whether
or not we actually have access to truth.

1662
01:59:10,840 --> 01:59:15,600
And so when I look at the
world, I'm not I don't make

1663
01:59:15,760 --> 01:59:25,159
proclamations about absolutely certainty or truth in
anything other than a kind of compatibles or

1664
01:59:25,199 --> 01:59:27,640
I'm not compatables. But I think
I don't want to go down and get

1665
01:59:27,640 --> 01:59:32,239
people confusing free will. So if
I roll a diet and it comes up

1666
01:59:32,239 --> 01:59:34,640
before, I can look at that, and I can say, ah,

1667
01:59:34,680 --> 01:59:39,920
it's true that that die is rolled
afore, and if the population agree with

1668
01:59:39,960 --> 01:59:43,079
me, now I've got this independent
confirmation that we rely on, you know,

1669
01:59:43,159 --> 01:59:45,399
for testing epistemic claims and stuff like
that. But the fact that there's

1670
01:59:45,399 --> 01:59:47,720
one percent of the population that points
of that die and says no, no,

1671
01:59:47,720 --> 01:59:53,119
no, it's true that it's the
die roll to seventeen doesn't mean that

1672
01:59:53,159 --> 01:59:59,399
we're on any sort of shaky ground
in what we're talking about. But that

1673
01:59:59,560 --> 02:00:03,079
is truth at kind of this level. And the question is, oh,

1674
02:00:03,079 --> 02:00:06,359
how do you know that you're you
know, reality, your experience of reality

1675
02:00:06,439 --> 02:00:09,680
is true. How do you know
that the reality that you think you experience

1676
02:00:09,760 --> 02:00:12,600
is actually the true reality? And
I don't know that there's any solution to

1677
02:00:12,720 --> 02:00:15,880
those problems, And so rather than
pretending that there is, I'm just going

1678
02:00:15,920 --> 02:00:18,520
to say, Wow, that's an
incredibly intriguing, you know, question that

1679
02:00:18,560 --> 02:00:23,880
philosophers have toiled over for ages,
and I'm not convinced that anybody's come up

1680
02:00:23,920 --> 02:00:28,439
with the right answer yet. Benny
Redpill five Canadian Matt, would you why

1681
02:00:28,439 --> 02:00:31,359
do you refuse debate? To debate
Skeptico? He has an empirical he has

1682
02:00:31,399 --> 02:00:38,720
empirical data that destroys materialistic dogma.
I don't know that I'm aware of who

1683
02:00:38,760 --> 02:00:44,840
Skeptico is or that I've ever refused
to debate. I don't where did you

1684
02:00:44,920 --> 02:00:46,720
hear that I refuse to debate.
I'll tell you who I've refused debate.

1685
02:00:46,800 --> 02:00:50,159
I won't debate Sigh again, and
I won't debate Ray Comfort again, even

1686
02:00:50,199 --> 02:00:54,880
though I've debated both of them,
because Ray has expressed that he's not interested

1687
02:00:54,920 --> 02:00:58,640
in debate. He just wants to
come on and witness. And you know,

1688
02:00:58,720 --> 02:01:00,720
okay, if you're not going to
present an argument and you just want

1689
02:01:00,720 --> 02:01:02,920
to tell me that Jesus loves me, cool that you can do that anytime

1690
02:01:03,039 --> 02:01:08,079
and it's not a debate. And
Si is a genuinely terrible person who mistreated

1691
02:01:08,079 --> 02:01:11,600
somebody who was a friend of mine. Apart from that, I don't know

1692
02:01:11,640 --> 02:01:15,479
if there's anybody who I've refused to
debate. You could probably you can find

1693
02:01:15,479 --> 02:01:21,079
some people who refuse debate me,
like Bill Craig, But I take pretty

1694
02:01:21,159 --> 02:01:26,600
much any debate. Somebody wants to
do so. I don't know who the

1695
02:01:26,680 --> 02:01:29,800
skeptico is or anything. Maybe I
do, maybe in the course of the

1696
02:01:29,880 --> 02:01:31,279
years, once upon a time I
knew who it was. I don't know.

1697
02:01:31,479 --> 02:01:33,960
I debated Skeptico. You can find
my debate with him. It's pretty

1698
02:01:34,000 --> 02:01:39,880
amusing if anybody wants some entertainment.
But Demetrios Clado's twenty Jay as a scientist

1699
02:01:39,880 --> 02:01:42,840
and orthodox, I stopped debating with
an atheists a while back. Now I

1700
02:01:42,960 --> 02:01:45,560
just pray for them. However,
I appreciate watching your attempt to reason with

1701
02:01:45,680 --> 02:01:54,600
spiritually dead and the unreasonable God bless
that's thank you. I'm getting out spiritually

1702
02:01:54,640 --> 02:01:57,640
dead and unreasonable. That's getting on
a T shirt. I'm not going to

1703
02:01:57,720 --> 02:02:00,840
read the next one for gone.
That's not going to any rude comments.

1704
02:02:00,840 --> 02:02:03,319
Ten or Terry five bucks to both
debaters, How does your worldview deal with

1705
02:02:05,439 --> 02:02:10,439
ground types and classes of things?
I don't know what ground types are.

1706
02:02:12,880 --> 02:02:15,960
Well, that's two of us that
don't know classes of things. If you

1707
02:02:15,000 --> 02:02:19,920
mean like Aristotle's classes of kingdom hylum, I mean I don't have any problem

1708
02:02:19,960 --> 02:02:25,920
admitting the reality of classes of things. So Franklin Chan nine, thank you

1709
02:02:26,000 --> 02:02:30,399
for all your work. We do
a lot of categorizing, which we've done

1710
02:02:30,439 --> 02:02:32,479
in here. There's a difference between
something that's physical and something that's abstract,

1711
02:02:32,560 --> 02:02:35,000
something that's you know, you don't
want to confuse the map for the place

1712
02:02:35,079 --> 02:02:38,640
sort of thing, so we can
put things in. If that's what you're

1713
02:02:38,640 --> 02:02:43,239
talking about, I don't know how
much time I spend doing that. Franklin

1714
02:02:43,319 --> 02:02:46,239
Chan ten bucks. Thanks for all
the work you guys. Hans Laga five

1715
02:02:46,279 --> 02:02:51,960
bucks support for Jay. Thank you
Front, Hans hans Laga. Michael Flaherty

1716
02:02:53,000 --> 02:02:55,960
one hundred and fifty dollars. Matt, you have been a gentleman and the

1717
02:02:56,000 --> 02:03:00,920
best that we've seen with Jay.
Let's get off of the inter and onto

1718
02:03:00,079 --> 02:03:04,720
a stage with your buddy Sam Harris. I guess are you saying me or

1719
02:03:04,720 --> 02:03:09,239
are you saying Matt. Matt's been
on stage with Sam Harris must be you.

1720
02:03:09,359 --> 02:03:11,279
I've done quite a few events with
Sam. Now, yeah, I

1721
02:03:11,319 --> 02:03:15,760
would always. I don't turn down
debates either. I'm a like Matt,

1722
02:03:15,800 --> 02:03:18,520
I'm a debate hound, so I
would say yes to most debates. Seraph

1723
02:03:18,640 --> 02:03:23,479
m s five dollars. Matt said
that we should follow laws of logic.

1724
02:03:24,359 --> 02:03:27,960
This is an ethical claim. Why
should we follow the laws of logic in

1725
02:03:28,119 --> 02:03:32,680
his worldview, since this is a
question of metathic, Well, I don't

1726
02:03:32,720 --> 02:03:38,079
recall I don't recall making a statement
that we ought to but or at least

1727
02:03:38,079 --> 02:03:42,079
not in the context that you're saying. But you know, I talked about

1728
02:03:42,079 --> 02:03:45,279
it being a This is useful,
it's it provides truth. There's a presupposition

1729
02:03:45,359 --> 02:03:48,079
in order to say that you ought
to follow the laws of logic, and

1730
02:03:48,119 --> 02:03:51,359
that is that you ought to do
the thing. Well, it becomes circular,

1731
02:03:51,439 --> 02:03:54,880
right then, because you ought to
care about the truth and you ought

1732
02:03:54,880 --> 02:03:59,960
to work to be consistent with that. Any argument that I make for why

1733
02:04:00,079 --> 02:04:03,399
we should care about the laws of
logic necessarily depends upon them. You can't

1734
02:04:03,520 --> 02:04:10,279
have any sort of argument or reason
without beginning to assume them. And the

1735
02:04:10,439 --> 02:04:14,159
fact that we must do that.
Even this is why, this is why

1736
02:04:14,199 --> 02:04:17,560
I'm convinced to the highest confidence that
I can that they're absolute, is that

1737
02:04:17,560 --> 02:04:20,000
you would have to assume that they're
true to try to demonstrate that they're not

1738
02:04:20,039 --> 02:04:27,640
true. And my thing isn't so
logic tells you nothing. Logic itself tells

1739
02:04:27,640 --> 02:04:30,720
you nothing about the facts of reality. It is the tool that we use

1740
02:04:31,119 --> 02:04:34,079
to then categorize things to say this
is a and this is not a.

1741
02:04:34,279 --> 02:04:38,840
I mean, that's the nuts and
bolts of it. Why should we do

1742
02:04:38,920 --> 02:04:45,279
that? I would argue that the
evidence shows that remaining consistent with logic and

1743
02:04:45,319 --> 02:04:50,439
constructing logical arguments makes you avoid being
wrong or limiting your risk of being wrong,

1744
02:04:50,800 --> 02:04:55,520
and that if you stopped doing that, if you tossed out the laws

1745
02:04:55,520 --> 02:04:59,079
of logic, you would be dead. The world would descend into chaos.

1746
02:04:59,079 --> 02:05:01,960
As Ja was pointing out earlier,
that this is not only absurdity, but

1747
02:05:02,279 --> 02:05:05,920
as I would say, it's incredibly
dangerous. But now you're at a point

1748
02:05:05,960 --> 02:05:09,600
where the question becomes, oh,
well, what makes you think I need

1749
02:05:09,640 --> 02:05:13,760
to care about whether or not I
keep living. Well, that's entirely up

1750
02:05:13,800 --> 02:05:16,239
to you as to whether or not
you want to keep living. But if

1751
02:05:16,279 --> 02:05:19,359
you toss the laws of logic out, I think you probably will find out

1752
02:05:19,399 --> 02:05:25,960
you're probably not going to live that
long. Okay, yeah, I would

1753
02:05:26,239 --> 02:05:28,760
The one point where I would disagree
with Matt there is the claim that the

1754
02:05:28,840 --> 02:05:31,720
laws of logic don't tell us anything
about the reality or the real world.

1755
02:05:32,239 --> 02:05:35,560
I think that they do, and
I think that the meta level questions and

1756
02:05:36,479 --> 02:05:41,520
math related questions, questions that relate
to engineering, those kinds of things I

1757
02:05:41,520 --> 02:05:44,800
actually do teach us and tell us
things about the world, especially when we

1758
02:05:44,880 --> 02:05:47,960
actually go and test them. Taylor
Terry five bucks to both do we know

1759
02:05:48,119 --> 02:05:53,880
when something is convincing or has been
properly demonstrated? Is there some standard?

1760
02:05:54,319 --> 02:05:59,359
And if not, can anything be
convincing? I would say that we have

1761
02:05:59,439 --> 02:06:03,359
to assume that there is some intuitive
sense that humans are so constituted such that

1762
02:06:03,359 --> 02:06:10,399
they can recognize when something is coherent, when something is demonstrated and demonstrable,

1763
02:06:11,079 --> 02:06:14,279
and they can recognize those standards.
So it would be another one of those

1764
02:06:14,359 --> 02:06:16,560
kind of things that are assumed in
the process of learning, the process of

1765
02:06:16,600 --> 02:06:23,920
science, the process of truth and
mathematics, so the coherence between propositions and

1766
02:06:24,000 --> 02:06:28,800
truths, between words and concepts,
meanings, etc. That would be another

1767
02:06:28,840 --> 02:06:31,640
transcendental category that would be assumed in
the process and something that I don't think

1768
02:06:31,720 --> 02:06:38,359
you could empirically justify. But just
because something's not empirically justifiable, in my

1769
02:06:38,479 --> 02:06:41,560
view, does not mean that it
can't be argued for or justified. Hence

1770
02:06:41,680 --> 02:06:45,680
the meta questions. I don't know. This is the whole reason that there's

1771
02:06:45,720 --> 02:06:50,479
a debate is kind of what you're
asking is what quality and quantity of evidence

1772
02:06:50,479 --> 02:06:55,199
should be convinced. It should be
sufficient to know that you have a warranted

1773
02:06:55,199 --> 02:07:00,439
belief. And as saying, another's
pointed out, you know or Hume proportioned

1774
02:07:00,479 --> 02:07:04,520
your confidence to the evidence, and
Sagan would point out that extraordinary claims require

1775
02:07:04,520 --> 02:07:09,439
extordinary evidence. They answer to your
question is incredibly complicated. But the shortest

1776
02:07:09,479 --> 02:07:15,359
version is each claim is going to
have its own bar, and the quality

1777
02:07:15,359 --> 02:07:18,600
and quantity of evidence would have to
rise above that bar for that claim.

1778
02:07:18,640 --> 02:07:23,479
That the sort of evidence I would
need to believe that you just got a

1779
02:07:23,520 --> 02:07:27,720
new puppy is different from the sort
of evidence that might convince me you just

1780
02:07:28,079 --> 02:07:31,880
got a Bugatti Veyron, or even
worse, you have a pet unicorn.

1781
02:07:32,279 --> 02:07:35,840
Those three claims are of a slightly
different nature. But at the end of

1782
02:07:35,880 --> 02:07:42,239
the day, this is the terrible
dirty secret. It's up to each individual.

1783
02:07:43,399 --> 02:07:45,039
You're not in control of your beliefs. You're not in control. You

1784
02:07:45,399 --> 02:07:50,319
are either convinced or you're not.
And for many people there are roadblocks with

1785
02:07:50,359 --> 02:07:54,479
regard to biases and other things that
are hidden that you may not see.

1786
02:07:54,760 --> 02:07:58,279
And for others they may be far
more open when there are people we know

1787
02:07:58,359 --> 02:08:01,359
who are gullible and easily vinced of
things, or we would describe it that

1788
02:08:01,399 --> 02:08:05,319
way. Doesn't mean they're wrong,
but they can be easily convinced. And

1789
02:08:05,359 --> 02:08:11,159
so no, there's not any pick
any claim. There's not a set standard

1790
02:08:11,159 --> 02:08:16,399
of when we have this much evidence
of this type. Now we're on firm

1791
02:08:16,439 --> 02:08:20,720
ground, which is why we've always
had these arguments and debates about how much

1792
02:08:20,760 --> 02:08:24,880
and what quality of evidence is enough
and what Jay thinks is enough to warrant

1793
02:08:24,960 --> 02:08:28,479
belief is fundamentally different than I do
on some things, and yet we would

1794
02:08:28,520 --> 02:08:33,319
probably agree on lots of other things. Yeah, the one thing I would

1795
02:08:33,359 --> 02:08:37,640
say about the argument that Matt just
gave itself is a form of a universal

1796
02:08:37,680 --> 02:08:43,000
claim. Is a statement about a
universal state of affairs that relates to what

1797
02:08:43,199 --> 02:08:46,199
is universally the case about how we
can and can't know and what we can

1798
02:08:46,279 --> 02:08:52,079
and can't prove. And I would
say that that itself is inconsistent with a

1799
02:08:52,199 --> 02:08:56,399
pragmatic empiricism. But I don't know, we may not want to go down

1800
02:08:56,399 --> 02:09:01,600
that route. I don't know.
Anthony Magnavos two dollars, who is making

1801
02:09:01,600 --> 02:09:07,039
the most presuppositions. I would say
we both make all the same presuppositions because

1802
02:09:07,119 --> 02:09:13,359
the presuppose God and I don't.
So clearly that's not true. Well,

1803
02:09:13,520 --> 02:09:18,199
that's true in the case of the
normal transcendental categories of the past. The

1804
02:09:18,279 --> 02:09:22,319
self laws of logic numbers. That's
what I mean, we all have the

1805
02:09:22,319 --> 02:09:26,399
same presuppositions. I think that those
meta questions are solved by a God who's

1806
02:09:26,439 --> 02:09:33,720
a metaphysical being. It's a meta
question to talk about God. Metaphysics and

1807
02:09:33,800 --> 02:09:37,600
meta ethics and meta logic are very
similar in the way that they're demonstrated,

1808
02:09:37,600 --> 02:09:39,920
And of course one can refuse that, but I think it's a valid argument,

1809
02:09:39,920 --> 02:09:45,319
and that's what I've been trying to
present. I think it's kind of

1810
02:09:45,319 --> 02:09:48,279
strange because I would expected to say
that you make exactly one presupposition and that's

1811
02:09:48,319 --> 02:09:52,600
God, and everything else is derived
from that, because when you use God

1812
02:09:52,600 --> 02:09:56,399
as a foundation, you're no longer
presupposing logic, you are presupposing the foundation

1813
02:09:56,439 --> 02:09:58,399
for logic. No, I mean, I wouldn't say that those things are

1814
02:09:58,439 --> 02:10:01,479
either or. I mean, I
believe in all of those categories that we've

1815
02:10:01,479 --> 02:10:03,920
talked about. I think they're they're
very real, and I think that they

1816
02:10:03,960 --> 02:10:09,039
have a logical justification. And that's
what a transcendental argument is is a form

1817
02:10:09,079 --> 02:10:13,880
of logic. It's a logical argument. It's a logical it's a different type

1818
02:10:13,880 --> 02:10:16,760
of logic, but it is a
logical argument. Now one could again,

1819
02:10:16,800 --> 02:10:20,199
one could disagree with that and not
accept that. But I think then I'm

1820
02:10:20,239 --> 02:10:24,199
genuinely trying to understand this. I
presuppose the laws of logic. Would you

1821
02:10:24,199 --> 02:10:30,279
say that you presuppose the laws of
logic? Sure, and yet you think

1822
02:10:30,319 --> 02:10:33,920
you have a foundation for those,
which means that no supposition is required If

1823
02:10:35,560 --> 02:10:39,359
I have the argument, the argument
is not that a presupposition doesn't require a

1824
02:10:39,439 --> 02:10:48,359
justification. Wow, so there's a
word that perhaps I've been wrong about my

1825
02:10:48,520 --> 02:10:52,920
entire life, a thing tacitly assumed
beforehand, at the beginning of a line

1826
02:10:52,920 --> 02:10:56,319
of argument or course of action,
the action or state of presupposing or being

1827
02:10:56,359 --> 02:11:00,880
proposed. When I look at a
presupposition, when people talk about what they're

1828
02:11:00,880 --> 02:11:07,039
presupposing, if you have an explanation
for something, then I'm not presupposing it.

1829
02:11:07,039 --> 02:11:09,920
It is derived from that explanation.
I could because then I could just

1830
02:11:11,039 --> 02:11:18,279
argue, um, well, I
presuppose that I did not spontaneously come into

1831
02:11:18,319 --> 02:11:26,560
existence because my parents had sex and
I share genetic traits with them. Now,

1832
02:11:26,680 --> 02:11:30,680
I don't presuppose that. I just
pot that I didn't just pop into

1833
02:11:30,680 --> 02:11:33,760
existence. I'm convinced of that for
an actual reason. Now, I might

1834
02:11:33,800 --> 02:11:39,319
presuppose that my parents had sex and
the evidence shows genetics. But to me,

1835
02:11:39,359 --> 02:11:45,560
a presupposition to something for which you
presuppose it because you don't have an

1836
02:11:45,560 --> 02:11:48,239
evidentiary foundational warrant behind it, because
if you do, it's no longer press

1837
02:11:48,399 --> 02:11:52,920
presupposition. It is derived from that. No, That's why I was saying

1838
02:11:52,920 --> 02:11:54,439
that different things are proven in different
ways. So the way that we would

1839
02:11:54,439 --> 02:12:00,359
go about proving things that relate to
the natural world, what temperature to water

1840
02:12:00,439 --> 02:12:03,840
boil, the way that we prove
that is different than the way that we

1841
02:12:03,920 --> 02:12:07,119
prove things that are fundamentally different in
nature. Now, one could say that

1842
02:12:07,159 --> 02:12:11,439
I don't accept anything that's not material. But if I believe in things that

1843
02:12:11,479 --> 02:12:15,600
are immaterial, it stands to reason
that the way that I would prove them

1844
02:12:15,880 --> 02:12:18,640
would be different than the way that
I prove the material things. Because the

1845
02:12:18,640 --> 02:12:22,319
thing that we're talking about is immaterial. It's invariant, it's conceptual. It's

1846
02:12:22,359 --> 02:12:24,720
not going to be proven in the
same way that things that are material are

1847
02:12:24,760 --> 02:12:30,760
proven. Hence the transcendental argmentation and
transcendental arguments are arguments. That's the whole

1848
02:12:30,800 --> 02:12:33,880
point. Now again, you could
say I don't accept transcendent arguments. They're

1849
02:12:33,880 --> 02:12:37,960
not valid arguments, and the response
to why you don't know why you keep

1850
02:12:37,960 --> 02:12:39,000
going there, I never say it's
not valid. I didn't say I'm not

1851
02:12:39,000 --> 02:12:45,079
going to accept transcendental arguments. I'm
talking So this is only this little subtext

1852
02:12:45,159 --> 02:12:50,720
is only about presuppositions. It doesn't
matter that it's abstract. I don't presuppose

1853
02:12:50,880 --> 02:12:52,760
love. Well, that's I mean, you could say that. But but

1854
02:12:52,880 --> 02:12:58,119
again, all I'm trying to say
is that this is a branch of logic,

1855
02:12:58,199 --> 02:13:03,840
and it's a branch of argumentation that
deals with justifying presuppositions and preconditions for

1856
02:13:03,960 --> 02:13:07,359
things. Now, again, maybe
you're not saying that you don't accept them.

1857
02:13:07,399 --> 02:13:09,119
I don't understand that you're saying that
they make sense in a logical way.

1858
02:13:09,439 --> 02:13:13,680
But I'm saying it's not wrong to
ask the meta level, meta logic

1859
02:13:13,760 --> 02:13:16,319
question of can they be justified?
And how do we make sense of them.

1860
02:13:16,439 --> 02:13:20,960
In fact, it's the why are
you talking about the exact? This

1861
02:13:20,039 --> 02:13:22,560
has nothing to do what we're actually
talking about. By argument, you're saying

1862
02:13:22,600 --> 02:13:28,359
that I'm arguing for a thing that's
immaterial and invariant. I'm talking about what

1863
02:13:28,520 --> 02:13:31,640
is a pre subposition and whether or
not it's justified. So I could say

1864
02:13:31,680 --> 02:13:37,920
I presuppose logic, but here's the
reason why I think logic is real,

1865
02:13:37,199 --> 02:13:41,359
and here's my evidence for the thing
I think is that. Sorry, I

1866
02:13:41,600 --> 02:13:45,520
love here's you know, if I
then provide a foundation for it, I'm

1867
02:13:45,560 --> 02:13:48,880
no longer presupposing it. It is
now a warranted position based on my artre

1868
02:13:48,960 --> 02:13:52,479
subpositions of our presubpositions are not things
for which you have no warrant. They're

1869
02:13:52,520 --> 02:13:56,520
different types of arguments and different types
of things. They're just proven in a

1870
02:13:56,560 --> 02:14:01,479
different way, That's all we're saying. Then, a good junk of this

1871
02:14:01,560 --> 02:14:05,840
is going to be incredibly confusing,
because we mean two entirely different things by

1872
02:14:05,880 --> 02:14:09,720
presuppositions. For me, when I
say I presuppose something, this is something

1873
02:14:09,760 --> 02:14:15,359
that I am convinced is true,
but I cannot justify, and I'm not

1874
02:14:15,399 --> 02:14:18,560
convinced anybody else can justify or I
would have a justification and I would no

1875
02:14:18,600 --> 02:14:24,159
longer presuppose it. And I don't
ever say I presuppose love or any other

1876
02:14:24,199 --> 02:14:28,560
abstract and so I don't know what
the justification is for saying, oh,

1877
02:14:28,600 --> 02:14:33,439
I presuppose something, but here's its
evidential warrant. Right, So evidences can

1878
02:14:33,520 --> 02:14:37,279
be given and proven or demonstrated for
different types of things in different ways.

1879
02:14:37,319 --> 02:14:41,640
Again, the way that we would
do a courtroom drama and settle a dispute

1880
02:14:41,680 --> 02:14:46,159
over who was murdered so and so
did Bill Cosby do x y Z,

1881
02:14:46,600 --> 02:14:50,479
that's different than the way that we
would solve an abstract complex math problem.

1882
02:14:50,600 --> 02:14:54,159
Right, Two different types of things, two different types of arguments. One

1883
02:14:54,279 --> 02:14:58,720
is more abstract, more a priori, more immaterial and invariant in its nature.

1884
02:14:58,760 --> 02:15:01,560
The other one is more solid,
empirical, physical, Right, But

1885
02:15:01,640 --> 02:15:07,239
that doesn't mean that what we're arguing
for it in terms of transcendental categories aren't

1886
02:15:07,359 --> 02:15:11,199
arguable and aren't provable and aren't it's
just that they're proven in a different type

1887
02:15:11,239 --> 02:15:13,640
of way. So, for example, and I know that doctor Malpass disagrees,

1888
02:15:13,720 --> 02:15:18,600
but action and I'll make one last
point about this, this transcendental will

1889
02:15:18,640 --> 02:15:22,159
move on. But if you look
at John Damascus, a famous eighth century

1890
02:15:22,199 --> 02:15:26,880
Christian theologian, he wrote a book
called Fount of Knowledge, and he looked

1891
02:15:26,880 --> 02:15:30,039
back at Aristotle. I'm not saying
that true, because Arisota said, I'm

1892
02:15:30,039 --> 02:15:33,079
just giving an example from Aristotle.
M Aristotle argued with the sofis, and

1893
02:15:33,119 --> 02:15:37,720
the sofist said that if we deny
the law of noncontradiction, you can't prove

1894
02:15:37,720 --> 02:15:39,880
that. Aristotle, what if I
come along and I deny the law of

1895
02:15:39,880 --> 02:15:45,560
non contradiction. Aristotle responds with a
transcendental argument, and John Damascus backs us

1896
02:15:45,640 --> 02:15:48,800
up. And I hope that doctor
Malpass is watching, because that's a response

1897
02:15:48,840 --> 02:15:52,399
to his last essay that he wrote
about me. But he saw John Damatt.

1898
02:15:52,760 --> 02:15:56,479
John Damascus saw Aristotle as giving a
transcendental argument. And the argument is

1899
02:15:56,520 --> 02:16:01,520
that when you deny something that it's
fundamental and paradigmatic, the proof for that

1900
02:16:01,560 --> 02:16:05,119
thing is in the fact that it's
assumed in its denial. That is a

1901
02:16:05,119 --> 02:16:09,640
transcendental argument. That's it's that simple, and it is a positive proof.

1902
02:16:09,039 --> 02:16:15,319
It's just a different type of proof
than normal empirical claims or even normal logical

1903
02:16:15,319 --> 02:16:18,119
claims. And that's why because the
nature of the thing is unique due to

1904
02:16:18,199 --> 02:16:26,560
its paradigmatic level. The three of
you on stage, public forum. Can

1905
02:16:26,640 --> 02:16:30,640
Jordan come, Michael Flaherty, that's
out of my out of my range.

1906
02:16:30,640 --> 02:16:35,000
That's not up to me. I
can't read Arabic. Two dollars, Matt,

1907
02:16:35,040 --> 02:16:41,479
would you debate Steve McCray. Oh, that's a really good question.

1908
02:16:41,959 --> 02:16:48,920
Uh no, Zach, Zach,
two dollars, get it going, Jordan

1909
02:16:48,000 --> 02:16:54,000
Peterson Dyer Harris. Uh, you
know we're not gonna read any insults,

1910
02:16:54,520 --> 02:16:58,000
mister an Arctica twenty or one dollar, thank you, Nemo Utopian two dollars,

1911
02:16:58,639 --> 02:17:03,319
Jade. Does God generate logic or
obey it? That's actually one quick

1912
02:17:03,319 --> 02:17:07,040
thing I did want to touch on, which was if you know that,

1913
02:17:07,120 --> 02:17:09,159
like the transport argument for the non
existence of God from Michael Martin Tang,

1914
02:17:09,879 --> 02:17:13,040
what this does is that it basically
says that it assumes that the laws of

1915
02:17:13,040 --> 02:17:18,920
logic or arbitrary categories that God sort
of can change or play with it will

1916
02:17:20,000 --> 02:17:22,440
or whatever. We wouldn't say that, We would say that the laws of

1917
02:17:22,440 --> 02:17:26,239
logic, truth, etc. Are
reflections of God, the reflections of the

1918
02:17:26,280 --> 02:17:28,799
divine mind. So no, God
does not change the laws of logic,

1919
02:17:28,840 --> 02:17:33,479
and that's not a denial of his
omnipotence because within our paradigm, within our

1920
02:17:33,520 --> 02:17:37,879
worldview, the meaning of omnipotence would
be determined by the highest absolute metaphysical category

1921
02:17:37,920 --> 02:17:41,360
within the world view, which has
God himself. So omnipotence is not determined

1922
02:17:41,360 --> 02:17:45,920
by the guy who says, well, I think omnipotence must mean that you

1923
02:17:45,959 --> 02:17:48,399
can make truth into a lot.
We would reject that whole, that whole

1924
02:17:48,440 --> 02:17:52,440
definition of what omnipotence is. So
that's why we don't believe in the Tang

1925
02:17:52,520 --> 02:17:58,799
view Tan or Tarry five dollars.
Matt, would you agree that meta level

1926
02:17:58,920 --> 02:18:11,399
discourse deals with justifying presuppositions or while
normative level discourse does not. I don't

1927
02:18:11,399 --> 02:18:22,399
know. I I'm sorry, I'm
getting the echo thinking and um. Metal

1928
02:18:22,479 --> 02:18:28,520
level discussions are about understanding and attempting
to justify whatever the normative level is.

1929
02:18:28,559 --> 02:18:39,040
I mean, that's that's or the
metal level themselves. Okay, Lucid Locomotive

1930
02:18:39,079 --> 02:18:41,959
one ninety nine, and thank you, mister Antarctica. Are you bread though

1931
02:18:43,000 --> 02:18:50,000
on all? Right? Well?
Um wait, Matt Catholicism orthodox, Matt

1932
02:18:50,239 --> 02:18:54,760
is Catholicism. I don't know.
Why. I mean, all right,

1933
02:18:54,959 --> 02:18:56,920
it doesn't make any sense, Matt, is Catholicism or Orthodoxy more biblical or

1934
02:18:56,959 --> 02:19:05,360
Protestantism? Um? Well, I
would I would argue, first of all,

1935
02:19:05,399 --> 02:19:11,399
it depends on which Bible you're going
to point Tom, I think I

1936
02:19:11,440 --> 02:19:13,959
think the easiest way for me to
do this, And yes, I was

1937
02:19:13,000 --> 02:19:18,799
a Southern Baptist, but I've also
debated orthodox in Catholics as well. Catholics

1938
02:19:18,799 --> 02:19:22,079
have extra books that don't exist in
the Protestant Bible. So if you're going

1939
02:19:22,159 --> 02:19:24,920
to say which one's more Biblical,
then it depends on which books you're going

1940
02:19:24,959 --> 02:19:28,479
to include in your you know,
your liturgy there to say, oh,

1941
02:19:28,559 --> 02:19:31,799
this is what it's based on.
Um. I think there are Catholic beliefs

1942
02:19:31,840 --> 02:19:35,120
that fly in the face of what
is in, of course, the Protestant

1943
02:19:35,120 --> 02:19:39,680
Bible. Um. I think they've
added to it. Whether or not that's

1944
02:19:39,559 --> 02:19:46,319
justified or whatever, I don't know. It's I I remember growing up as

1945
02:19:46,360 --> 02:19:48,239
a Baptist, we were taught that
the Catholics were married, worshiping idol,

1946
02:19:48,280 --> 02:19:52,440
worshiping heretics who probably weren't going to
heaven. But that was obviously a Protestant

1947
02:19:52,520 --> 02:19:58,959
view, and so one of the
things is that occult is uh or the

1948
02:20:00,040 --> 02:20:03,840
it's the religion that's not yours and
perhaps not as popular. And so there's

1949
02:20:03,879 --> 02:20:09,000
been this constant conflict between you know, Protestants and Catholics, and I can't

1950
02:20:09,040 --> 02:20:13,719
tell you which one is more biblical
until we know what the Bible is and

1951
02:20:13,760 --> 02:20:18,799
what it's supposed to be, because
you know, I would argue that the

1952
02:20:18,840 --> 02:20:24,079
fact that there's a thousand or more
denominations that all identify as Christian and disagree

1953
02:20:24,120 --> 02:20:28,079
on every single point of doctrine is
probably one of the many potential death knells

1954
02:20:28,079 --> 02:20:31,799
for Christianity in general. But then
now we're into an argument basically from divine

1955
02:20:31,879 --> 02:20:35,440
hiddeness, and that's outside the scope
of this. Well, I would definitely

1956
02:20:35,440 --> 02:20:39,399
say Orthodox, he's more biblical,
And like Matt, I was raised Baptist,

1957
02:20:39,399 --> 02:20:43,079
so I can definitely understand Matt in
terms of where he's coming from.

1958
02:20:43,120 --> 02:20:46,719
Super Chat ten Bucks. To be
fair, I'm not as familiar with just

1959
02:20:46,760 --> 02:20:50,520
by having debated Orthodox people before,
I'm not as familiar with Orthodox doctrine how

1960
02:20:50,879 --> 02:20:58,840
how it differentiates from Prosestism or Catholicism. So I'm not the right guy to

1961
02:20:58,840 --> 02:21:03,239
ask super Chat ten Bucks Matt,
if you're a materialist, what makes you

1962
02:21:03,280 --> 02:21:07,639
believe that your brain's neural firings have
anything to do with truth on a metaphysical

1963
02:21:07,760 --> 02:21:15,840
level. I don't think I claim
that mister Antarctica to Z's Jay without God

1964
02:21:16,159 --> 02:21:22,959
is knowledge impossible if by knowledge you
mean justified true belief or giving a coherent

1965
02:21:22,000 --> 02:21:26,559
account for our beliefs. Um,
yes, I believe that it would lead

1966
02:21:26,600 --> 02:21:30,479
to absurdity. And ultimately that's kind
of what the argument is in summation.

1967
02:21:31,719 --> 02:21:35,000
Um, that's all the super chats. Great debate, two and a half

1968
02:21:35,040 --> 02:21:39,079
hours. Thank you very much,
Matt. Appreciate that I've got I've got

1969
02:21:39,120 --> 02:21:43,680
Matt's uh link there if anybody wants
to check out his channel there in the

1970
02:21:43,840 --> 02:21:50,159
description and a gentleman scholar. Thank
you, thank you, thank you.

1971
02:21:50,520 --> 02:21:58,600
I enjoyed it. Oh I'm getting
the ax yep. Oh uh yeah.

1972
02:21:58,639 --> 02:22:01,920
I just want to say, and
we'll get this posted, and I'm sure

1973
02:22:01,079 --> 02:22:05,559
we'll both get feedback from lots of
people, and I'm sure i'll be pointed

1974
02:22:05,559 --> 02:22:07,319
out, oh, you should have
said this, or you didn't say this,

1975
02:22:07,440 --> 02:22:09,239
or you were wrong here or whatever
else. And that's honestly one of

1976
02:22:09,280 --> 02:22:13,040
the biggest reasons I do this.
When I talked about before how I didn't

1977
02:22:13,040 --> 02:22:18,200
walk in here with any notion that
I'm likely to change Jay's mind about the

1978
02:22:18,239 --> 02:22:22,000
big issues. There's also this notion
that, you know, I perhaps might

1979
02:22:22,079 --> 02:22:26,399
change Jay's mind on some other issue, or that Jay might change my mind,

1980
02:22:26,479 --> 02:22:28,239
or by having the discussion, somebody
else might change both of our minds.

1981
02:22:28,559 --> 02:22:39,520
And so I liked the discussions.
I just I kind of wish every

1982
02:22:39,559 --> 02:22:41,639
single time. And there are people
who I know are very frustrated with debates.

1983
02:22:41,639 --> 02:22:43,879
I mean, I do people calling
to the show all the time.

1984
02:22:43,920 --> 02:22:46,959
I have my Atheist Debates Channel.
I talk about debates and debating and everything

1985
02:22:46,959 --> 02:22:50,280
else. I know there people who
frustrated because they don't think any good comes

1986
02:22:50,280 --> 02:22:54,440
of any of this. And despite
that, I have a number of friends

1987
02:22:54,559 --> 02:22:58,239
who agree and disagree about the God
thing, who engage in conversations, and

1988
02:22:58,559 --> 02:23:03,920
I have of thousands upon thousands of
emails from people who have benefited from those

1989
02:23:03,920 --> 02:23:07,879
conversations. A good chunk of them
have found their way out of one particular

1990
02:23:07,920 --> 02:23:11,879
religious belief or another, or gained
a better understanding of skepticism. And a

1991
02:23:11,879 --> 02:23:13,959
few of them have just said,
you know what, I listened to you,

1992
02:23:15,000 --> 02:23:18,360
and I walked away more confident and
firm in my beliefs than ever.

1993
02:23:18,959 --> 02:23:24,280
And while I don't know you,
I'm thankful that they at least listened and

1994
02:23:24,280 --> 02:23:28,200
considered, because I think that's probably
more than most people do in their lifetime.

1995
02:23:28,239 --> 02:23:30,920
I know that one of the reasons
it took me forever to kind of

1996
02:23:30,920 --> 02:23:35,000
find my way out of Christianity is
because there was no reason to consider it.

1997
02:23:35,399 --> 02:23:39,319
Everybody around me believed and it made
sense. And like I was saying

1998
02:23:39,360 --> 02:23:46,000
with Jay at the outset, yeah, if you want to be confident that

1999
02:23:46,040 --> 02:23:52,319
logic is reliable, then being convinced
that there's a God who guarantees that logic

2000
02:23:52,680 --> 02:23:58,559
is inviolate, that's very satisfying.
And it may be exactly the sort of

2001
02:23:58,559 --> 02:24:03,360
thing that but he needs to be
comfortable continuing to use logic. I don't

2002
02:24:03,399 --> 02:24:09,840
need that extra step because I haven't
seen a demonstration that it's necessary. And

2003
02:24:09,920 --> 02:24:13,879
I'm pretty much convinced that while Jay
and I agree that while as of logic

2004
02:24:13,920 --> 02:24:18,520
are absolute and viable or in violent
or as close to that as possible,

2005
02:24:20,760 --> 02:24:24,719
I'm not convinced that there is an
explanation or that there needs to be one

2006
02:24:24,719 --> 02:24:28,399
but I'm open to the possibility that
it might be the last couple of ones.

2007
02:24:28,440 --> 02:24:33,159
Grombeard. Thank you Matt and Jay
for courageously expressing beliefs. I enjoyed

2008
02:24:33,159 --> 02:24:35,280
the debate. I hope you get
back together for another session. Super curious

2009
02:24:35,360 --> 02:24:39,520
to twenty nine, what method do
you use to determine truth? I think

2010
02:24:39,559 --> 02:24:45,319
we've we've talked about that the whole
time. So he just said, you

2011
02:24:45,319 --> 02:24:48,879
know, Matt just gave a good
description of areas where we degree in terms

2012
02:24:48,920 --> 02:24:54,479
of laws of logic. Mister Antarctica
again, are aren't certain things self evident?

2013
02:24:54,600 --> 02:25:00,200
I don't believe in self evident maxims
in terms of foundationalism? Matt as

2014
02:25:00,239 --> 02:25:03,799
a question on that, Oh,
I'm sorry, I mean I thought you

2015
02:25:03,840 --> 02:25:11,680
were done there. Now the question
that what's your view on properly basic beliefs?

2016
02:25:11,719 --> 02:25:13,600
Because that to me feels a lot
like self evident but I wanted to

2017
02:25:13,680 --> 02:25:16,120
check. Yeah, No, I
would say that that's pretty much. Um.

2018
02:25:18,280 --> 02:25:24,920
The main attempt of classical foundationalism to
justify how they don't fall into a

2019
02:25:24,959 --> 02:25:31,840
circular regress is that they'll say that
there are beliefs that are just properly basic.

2020
02:25:31,360 --> 02:25:35,239
Um. I don't find that to
be a coherent answer when in the

2021
02:25:35,280 --> 02:25:41,600
history of philosophy, people actually,
especially after Descartes, they really started trying

2022
02:25:41,639 --> 02:25:46,000
to question things at the most fundamental
levels. So if you read the meditations,

2023
02:25:46,159 --> 02:25:50,399
um, you know, Descartes looking
for a way to find that certainty

2024
02:25:50,399 --> 02:25:52,079
that we've been kind of talking about, is it possible? And he questions

2025
02:25:52,120 --> 02:25:56,799
everything down to what he thinks is
the most basic thing. But and I

2026
02:25:56,840 --> 02:26:01,639
would agree with Burch and Russell on
this, that the very thing that Descartes

2027
02:26:01,680 --> 02:26:05,360
thinks is the most foundationally basic thing
to doubt his own existence in his own

2028
02:26:05,360 --> 02:26:11,680
consciousness. He actually doesn't go deep
enough, all right, So he says,

2029
02:26:11,879 --> 02:26:15,959
I think therefore I am, And
I think Russell is actually correct to

2030
02:26:16,000 --> 02:26:22,639
point out that that's that was logically
a non sequitor, because all Descartes claim

2031
02:26:22,760 --> 02:26:26,360
shows is that thinking is occurring.
I think that's true. And as many

2032
02:26:26,360 --> 02:26:31,159
philosophers afterwards have pointed out, Descartes
didn't think yet to doubt things like language,

2033
02:26:31,239 --> 02:26:35,280
like words having meaning. And that's
because that comes later in the in

2034
02:26:35,360 --> 02:26:41,239
the discourse of Western philosophy, after
Jean Patissa Vico, when people start doubting

2035
02:26:41,639 --> 02:26:43,559
linguistic philosophy, which all I think
is great, and that actually led people

2036
02:26:43,639 --> 02:26:48,159
into doing trans antal argumentation. Po
Strawson people like this have done a lot

2037
02:26:48,200 --> 02:26:52,879
of transcendental argumentation relation in relation to
language. So I would say that no,

2038
02:26:52,959 --> 02:26:58,079
I don't think the properly basic beliefs
can be coherently made sense of outside.

2039
02:26:58,239 --> 02:27:01,559
That's why it's one of the reasons
why coherentism, as I think,

2040
02:27:01,600 --> 02:27:07,360
a better view of truth than classical
foundationalism, is because my view, just

2041
02:27:07,399 --> 02:27:13,840
saying that some beliefs are properly basic
is just another restatement of circularity in the

2042
02:27:13,879 --> 02:27:18,959
classical foundationalist paradigm. That's incredible.
See, that's incredibly interesting that after two

2043
02:27:18,000 --> 02:27:20,600
and a half hours we get to
this, because I think you and I

2044
02:27:20,600 --> 02:27:24,440
are pretty much in agreement on that. I've a matter of fact, even

2045
02:27:24,479 --> 02:27:26,520
a week or so ago in the
show, somebody called in to ask me

2046
02:27:26,520 --> 02:27:28,920
about properly basic beliefs, and I
gave a kind of quick, glib answer

2047
02:27:28,920 --> 02:27:33,920
that I think it is a way
to obfuscate that there isn't a justification,

2048
02:27:33,959 --> 02:27:39,399
to just assert that we don't need
one, although I'd be interested in in

2049
02:27:39,120 --> 02:27:43,719
uh, Russell, you were for
everything. Russell pointing out the problem with

2050
02:27:43,760 --> 02:27:48,959
Descartes, but I thought it was
Hobbes that pointed out that that Descartes cogito

2051
02:27:48,159 --> 02:27:54,079
was contingent on logic and therefore was
not you know, I used to I

2052
02:27:54,159 --> 02:27:54,920
used to say, well, Descartes, you know, got all kinds of

2053
02:27:54,959 --> 02:27:58,159
stuff wrong, but at least it
got the one thing right. And then

2054
02:27:58,159 --> 02:28:01,399
I find out, you know,
after I think it was that he didn't

2055
02:28:01,479 --> 02:28:03,600
I mean to actually get that one
right. That it's basically you know,

2056
02:28:03,639 --> 02:28:07,120
I think therefore I am doesn't actually
demonstrate the thing. Yeah, I agree

2057
02:28:07,120 --> 02:28:09,120
with that, and you may be
right that it could have been housed before

2058
02:28:09,200 --> 02:28:16,040
Russell that made that point. Yeah, so that next question is about Descartes

2059
02:28:16,120 --> 02:28:22,159
Kogi tho. We just covered that
Compillow like, so yeah, good debate

2060
02:28:22,200 --> 02:28:24,159
from all sides. Thank you for
that dirty name, you filthy name,

2061
02:28:24,520 --> 02:28:28,680
Nemo Utopian ten bucks, How does
God explain the laws of logic if it's

2062
02:28:28,680 --> 02:28:35,760
simply if it is simply the fact
that God exists and has a logical nature

2063
02:28:35,000 --> 02:28:39,159
that makes laws sound descriptive of God, and it fails to explain why he

2064
02:28:39,200 --> 02:28:43,559
is logical. Actually, I would
agree with you, Utopian, and that's

2065
02:28:43,600 --> 02:28:46,079
one of the reasons why Orthodox theology
is unique. It's because we believe in

2066
02:28:46,079 --> 02:28:50,319
the essence energy distinction. So we
would not say that the laws of logic

2067
02:28:50,360 --> 02:28:54,760
are descriptors of the divine nature.
They would be descriptors of the energies the

2068
02:28:54,799 --> 02:28:58,680
actions the logi, as I mentioned
at the beginning from Saint Maximus. So,

2069
02:28:58,760 --> 02:29:01,319
yeah, are onto a good point
there, Nemo, that we don't

2070
02:29:01,360 --> 02:29:05,079
believe that they literally describe the divine
nature. That would be the Western doctrine

2071
02:29:05,079 --> 02:29:11,680
of divine simplicity. Mitchell day two
dollars. Congrats on winning, Matt.

2072
02:29:13,559 --> 02:29:18,159
I guess that's up for the audience
to decide. Well, maybe if this

2073
02:29:18,200 --> 02:29:20,959
is really bad English, what they
mean by winning, Matt is you beating

2074
02:29:22,000 --> 02:29:24,680
Matt, So you go either way. I guess we don't know what.

2075
02:29:24,719 --> 02:29:28,440
I don't know what Mitchell. I
don't know what Mitchell's view is. But

2076
02:29:30,079 --> 02:29:35,719
the ambiguity of that language there is
great doormat. It's funny for me because

2077
02:29:35,680 --> 02:29:39,479
legitimately I've said this a bunch of
times, and I know that there's people

2078
02:29:39,479 --> 02:29:41,760
who don't believe it, But there's
people who don't believe that I don't believe

2079
02:29:41,760 --> 02:29:43,200
in God, and they assert all
the time, Oh no, no,

2080
02:29:43,200 --> 02:29:45,440
no, you really know there's a
you know there's a God, and you're

2081
02:29:45,479 --> 02:29:48,479
denying it. And I'm just like, every time you say that, you

2082
02:29:48,559 --> 02:29:52,040
demonstrate to me conclusively that you're far
more about projection and telling me who you

2083
02:29:52,079 --> 02:29:58,360
are. And so this this notion. Um oh and I just completely lost

2084
02:29:58,360 --> 02:30:05,719
track of what he'd said. Um
crap, never mind sixty best debate on

2085
02:30:05,920 --> 02:30:09,399
the channel. Good job, Thank
you, Um, Hans Laga, five

2086
02:30:09,399 --> 02:30:13,159
bucks, Matt, You're a good
sport. Thank you for coming on.

2087
02:30:13,000 --> 02:30:18,079
Mister an article. Mister an article
again. Is God self evidence? Um?

2088
02:30:18,120 --> 02:30:20,440
In a sense? Yes, um, if you mean by self evident

2089
02:30:20,799 --> 02:30:24,799
classical foundationalism no. Um, all
right, I don't see any more super

2090
02:30:24,879 --> 02:30:28,559
chats, Great night. Uh.
I don't want to want to keep Matt

2091
02:30:28,600 --> 02:30:31,600
too long. Thank you for coming
on, Matt. And maybe in the

2092
02:30:31,600 --> 02:30:33,959
future we can have another chat on
some philosophy topics if you want to.

2093
02:30:35,239 --> 02:30:37,799
Yeah, yeah, and and not
necessarily in debate format, because I mean,

2094
02:30:37,799 --> 02:30:43,680
if you're there are certainly curiosities about
orthodox theology. Uh that I have

2095
02:30:43,760 --> 02:30:48,399
more than a passing interest that one
of the first, if not the first

2096
02:30:48,479 --> 02:30:52,440
public debate I did live in front
of a big audience was against father Hans

2097
02:30:52,520 --> 02:31:00,760
Jacobs, who's an orthodox priest about
morality, and while everybody's welcome to go

2098
02:31:00,799 --> 02:31:03,120
watch that, so that they don't
just trust my assessment,