1 00:00:11,279 --> 00:00:15,519 Everyone, I'm at and welcome to the Good Trouble Show. Today is going 2 00:00:15,599 --> 00:00:19,480 to be well, hopefully a special day. We'll see. We have UFO 3 00:00:19,640 --> 00:00:25,160 hearings happening in the Senate, so it is the Senate a Subcommittee on Emerging 4 00:00:25,160 --> 00:00:30,879 Threats and Capabilities that will be chaired by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand. But first let's 5 00:00:30,920 --> 00:00:34,399 get all of the promo stuff out of the way. Please give us a 6 00:00:34,439 --> 00:00:39,280 subscribe. If you're on YouTube, hit that smash that like button, hit 7 00:00:39,320 --> 00:00:42,799 the subscribe button. 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I 17 00:01:27,000 --> 00:01:34,319 can't say this deterministic experiences. Also, our super chats are open. It's 18 00:01:34,319 --> 00:01:38,480 a great way to show your financial support by giving us a little uh tip 19 00:01:38,560 --> 00:01:42,040 there. Anyway, this is going to be a lot of fun. So 20 00:01:42,719 --> 00:01:46,799 oh. Also manning our chat room is Uplifting Tweets. I know a lot 21 00:01:46,879 --> 00:01:49,319 of you folks know him from Twitter, so he's going to be moderating the 22 00:01:49,400 --> 00:01:55,519 chat room. And because we want to be paying attention to what's being said 23 00:01:55,519 --> 00:01:59,519 in the hearing, I'm not going to really be watching the chat so so 24 00:01:59,560 --> 00:02:02,319 we're like to have Uplifting doing that for us. So thank you Uplifting for 25 00:02:02,439 --> 00:02:07,199 doing that. Okay, So with that being said, let's welcome our guests. 26 00:02:07,599 --> 00:02:13,479 So on the middle screen there you have attorney joining us as Attorney Shan 27 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:21,680 Munger Sean is an attorney practicing law in Massachusetts and a Suffolk University Law School 28 00:02:21,759 --> 00:02:27,599 graduate. Sean has also served as an intelligence analyst with the United States Marine 29 00:02:27,599 --> 00:02:35,639 Corps and served with its war Fighting Laboratory and the twenty sixth Marine Expeditionary Unit. 30 00:02:35,800 --> 00:02:38,960 He can be reached at Sean at the debrief dot org, and all 31 00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:43,439 the way to the right, we have Daniel Miller. Daniel is an actor 32 00:02:43,520 --> 00:02:46,599 based out here in Los Angeles, a lover of all things space and science, 33 00:02:46,599 --> 00:02:52,719 which I would say that's pretty much everyone here watching today, and he 34 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:59,360 is also up loves UAP topic and whereas a political junkie, he focuses on 35 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:05,439 the movement and efforts within the US government and scientific community. Guys, thanks 36 00:03:05,439 --> 00:03:08,719 for joining us today. This is uh, this is I think it's going 37 00:03:08,759 --> 00:03:12,159 to be interesting one way or the other. I don't think there's going to 38 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:16,240 be any really big I don't think ET is going to come walking out and 39 00:03:16,319 --> 00:03:19,800 the hearing or anything like that. But I think it's going to be very 40 00:03:19,879 --> 00:03:23,800 educational. And yeah, I think it's going to be great. So just 41 00:03:23,879 --> 00:03:29,560 to give some folks, because a lot of our viewers are not not out 42 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:32,400 of the UFO crowd or track this topic. So just giving you a little 43 00:03:32,400 --> 00:03:38,000 bit of background of what we're going to see today. So Senator Jillibrandon and 44 00:03:38,280 --> 00:03:45,439 uh, quite a few other senators passed legislation that mandated that the Pentagon finally, 45 00:03:46,000 --> 00:03:49,800 you know, come clean and start doing the work of investigating this this 46 00:03:49,840 --> 00:03:53,759 phenomenon I'm kind of compressing this a bit. Uh. And as part of 47 00:03:53,759 --> 00:04:00,479 what what what came out in in the twenty twenty two National Defense of Thorization 48 00:04:00,560 --> 00:04:05,560 Act was the establishment of this office in the Pentagon. Now in twenty in 49 00:04:05,560 --> 00:04:11,240 the twenty twenty three NDAA it was renamed or might have been before, the 50 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:17,560 ARROW Office or All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office. And this office is essentially supposed 51 00:04:17,600 --> 00:04:23,519 to be the nexus for all of these different parts of government reporting their UAP 52 00:04:23,759 --> 00:04:29,720 experiences. And so this hearing that is going to be chaired by Senator Kirsten 53 00:04:30,639 --> 00:04:35,560 Kirsten Jillibrand, who has championed this subject. She will be interviewing doctor Sean 54 00:04:35,680 --> 00:04:39,680 Kirkpatrick. He will be the witness. He is the director of ARROW. 55 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:44,120 But I kind of gave it a sort of top line explanation here. So 56 00:04:44,319 --> 00:04:47,120 this hearing, it starts starts at ten thirty, so here in about ten 57 00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:50,600 minutes. So Sean, maybe just give us a bit of background on what 58 00:04:50,639 --> 00:04:55,879 we can expect on this, uh, this hearing. What you think, 59 00:04:56,120 --> 00:05:00,160 what the procedures will be? Just kind of in a nutshell, what what 60 00:05:00,199 --> 00:05:08,560 should what are we thinks? Coming up? Sorry? Started? Sorry, 61 00:05:08,240 --> 00:05:12,839 I thank you for having me on and in a good morning. So the 62 00:05:13,439 --> 00:05:17,079 Senate committees basically have the ability to hold hearings, and there are four types 63 00:05:17,079 --> 00:05:23,279 of hearings that they could have. There's legislative hearings will basically review and collect 64 00:05:23,279 --> 00:05:28,000 informations that they could draft legislation. And there's also oversight hearings, and from 65 00:05:28,000 --> 00:05:32,160 those they'll review, monitor, and basically help implement the public policy of which 66 00:05:32,199 --> 00:05:38,000 the legislation that they drafted before. There's also investigative hearings, and that's where 67 00:05:38,040 --> 00:05:43,079 the type of testimony you'll see will be much more adversarial or potentially adversarial. 68 00:05:43,399 --> 00:05:47,000 Usually the witnesses will be under oath. And then there's also confirmation hearings, 69 00:05:47,160 --> 00:05:54,800 and a confirmation hearing is when the Senate would basically confirm an executive member that 70 00:05:54,920 --> 00:05:59,079 was appointed or judicial member like the Supreme Court. Now what we're hearing we're 71 00:05:59,079 --> 00:06:03,439 going to be seeing today is an oversight sight hearing, which will probably lend 72 00:06:03,519 --> 00:06:08,600 to the fact that there's been a lot of discussions that I've seen that you 73 00:06:08,639 --> 00:06:15,920 know about doctor Kirkpatrick not being under oath. Now that would you likely see 74 00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:20,000 that more in a investigative type of hearing versus oversight, and even in the 75 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:25,360 there's the announcement for this hearing today, they had talked about that they're going 76 00:06:25,439 --> 00:06:30,040 to talk about Arrow's mission, the activities that I was conducting conduct oversight, 77 00:06:30,399 --> 00:06:36,040 as well as speak about the budget that the committee today will be holding. 78 00:06:38,240 --> 00:06:44,519 And and the budget I think was a Senator Jill Brand and fourteen other actually 79 00:06:44,720 --> 00:06:47,600 backing up a Senator Gillibrand in a hearing I don't remember exactly what it was. 80 00:06:47,639 --> 00:06:51,879 I think it was about two weeks ago. She asked the Secretary of 81 00:06:51,920 --> 00:06:58,439 Defense, Lloyd Austin about why ARROW was not properly funded. So that's something 82 00:06:58,480 --> 00:07:02,839 that will we will get into today. I would expect, Yeah, I 83 00:07:02,839 --> 00:07:09,399 would expect that there be some discussions about the budget, especially it's expressly written 84 00:07:09,519 --> 00:07:15,439 in the in the announcement and it is in hearings previously. UM, So 85 00:07:15,480 --> 00:07:19,439 it would be a potential, you know, focus of if if there are 86 00:07:19,480 --> 00:07:26,439 items that we're listed out as deliverables in the National Defense Authorization Act of twenty 87 00:07:26,439 --> 00:07:31,120 twenty three that doctor Kirkpatrick is not starting to deliver on UM, if he 88 00:07:31,240 --> 00:07:36,439 doesn't have, if he hasn't requested a budget to implement those, then we're 89 00:07:36,439 --> 00:07:43,639 trying to fall on who who is responsible for maybe these uh requested deliverables not 90 00:07:43,759 --> 00:07:48,000 being um presented. Right. So, so Daniel, what are your expectations 91 00:07:48,040 --> 00:07:51,439 of the hearing today? Do you think it will be underwhelming or over over 92 00:07:51,879 --> 00:07:57,480 overwhelming? Well, it probably depends on what your expectations are, you know. 93 00:07:57,560 --> 00:08:01,439 I think if if you're a UFO fan who is expecting disclosure today, 94 00:08:01,519 --> 00:08:07,439 I think you will be sorely disappointed. This hearing is, you know, 95 00:08:07,759 --> 00:08:11,199 a step, hopefully in the right direction. I think this hearing, my 96 00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:15,680 personal theory is that it is motivated a lot by the budget because, as 97 00:08:15,680 --> 00:08:18,160 you mentioned hereson, Jillibrand was I think in two separate hearings, but one 98 00:08:18,199 --> 00:08:22,199 with wood Austin and then one where I know Multrie was president from correctly and 99 00:08:22,240 --> 00:08:26,959 not Multuo was president. He the person they were talking to referred to Multrie. 100 00:08:28,439 --> 00:08:33,240 I think she wants to get to the bottom of why ARROW is not 101 00:08:33,279 --> 00:08:37,080 getting the funding that it seemingly requested. She mentioned that they requested it, 102 00:08:37,360 --> 00:08:41,240 and so I think getting that testimony both in the classified setting in publicly will 103 00:08:41,279 --> 00:08:46,600 help probably make her case as well as maybe, as Sean mentioned, why 104 00:08:48,320 --> 00:08:52,480 certain things that are in that NBAA maybe have not been addressed yet. So 105 00:08:52,519 --> 00:08:54,639 I think for those that are, you know, really into the inside baseball, 106 00:08:54,639 --> 00:08:58,519 those who are following closely, I think there will be lots of maybe 107 00:08:58,360 --> 00:09:01,320 little detail else that hopefully add some clarity. I'm really hoping to get some 108 00:09:01,320 --> 00:09:05,000 clarity. My biggest hope is that we maybe get a little more clarity on 109 00:09:05,080 --> 00:09:09,759 the the data that ARROW was working with, you know, and and whether 110 00:09:09,799 --> 00:09:15,679 they're going to focus on the incidents that maybe are easily identifiable, right or 111 00:09:15,720 --> 00:09:18,720 the ones that they are able to identify, versus the ones that maybe aren't 112 00:09:18,759 --> 00:09:22,519 as easily identified, you know, the other half of those cases. I 113 00:09:22,559 --> 00:09:28,399 know Representative Carson has mentioned that he is concerned that ARROW and those within the 114 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:33,080 d OD are focusing more on the former than the latter. And both are 115 00:09:33,080 --> 00:09:35,279 important, but I think, you know, you don't want to ignore the 116 00:09:35,360 --> 00:09:41,080 unknowns just to look good for your bosses for the knowns. So I just 117 00:09:41,120 --> 00:09:43,000 hope we get a little more clarity. Who knows, But I mean there's 118 00:09:43,039 --> 00:09:46,919 not much clarity we had now, so it wouldn't take too much to maybe 119 00:09:46,960 --> 00:09:50,519 get a little more details. The bar is very low. Yeah, yeah, 120 00:09:50,600 --> 00:09:54,159 it's uh well, I mean I think I think that that the hearing 121 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:58,039 in the house was a bit of a shit show. Ronald Moultrie and I 122 00:09:58,120 --> 00:10:03,320 forgot than a bray bray bray. Yeah that was They're like, oh, 123 00:10:03,360 --> 00:10:05,879 we don't know anything, but I'm like, yeah, right, you know 124 00:10:05,919 --> 00:10:09,879 a lot. And that's something that Kirkpatrick can't do right because he is the 125 00:10:11,440 --> 00:10:13,960 head of the office, the inter agency office that's dedicated to this topic. 126 00:10:15,039 --> 00:10:18,799 So I think it's not going to look as good if if he says, 127 00:10:18,840 --> 00:10:20,759 oh, I don't know that, let me look into that, because that 128 00:10:20,759 --> 00:10:26,840 shows maybe a level of incompetence that you know, the public is seeing this 129 00:10:26,879 --> 00:10:30,120 person who's getting paid our tax dollars to work on this issue. So a 130 00:10:30,120 --> 00:10:31,799 lot of his answers are I don't know. For that's good that then he 131 00:10:31,799 --> 00:10:35,559 should then work on figuring it out. But also, you know, if 132 00:10:35,559 --> 00:10:37,240 you say I don't know enough, and it's like okay, well why are 133 00:10:37,240 --> 00:10:41,480 you doing this, then yeah we should have somebody else, Yeah, why 134 00:10:39,799 --> 00:10:46,600 why are you in? I would hope that if, as doctor Sean Kirkpatrick 135 00:10:46,720 --> 00:10:50,440 is the only named witness, I would assume or hope that his deputy director, 136 00:10:50,759 --> 00:10:54,919 who was also supposed to be an appointed individual would be at least close 137 00:10:54,960 --> 00:10:58,080 by or next to him in order if he doesn't have the answer off the 138 00:10:58,080 --> 00:11:01,960 top of his head, in order to you know, put the piece of 139 00:11:01,960 --> 00:11:03,679 paper in front of him or you know, hey, you know, remind 140 00:11:03,759 --> 00:11:07,600 him of the of the correct answer. So if he doesn't have the answer, 141 00:11:07,879 --> 00:11:11,120 somebody who's hopefully near or close to him can feed him the answer so 142 00:11:11,159 --> 00:11:16,519 that he could be responsive to the senator's request for information. Yeah. So, 143 00:11:16,879 --> 00:11:20,399 so one thing that many people may not be aware of. So most 144 00:11:20,519 --> 00:11:24,480 most Senate and House hearings, Uh, you'll you'll have the public part, 145 00:11:24,679 --> 00:11:28,960 you know, where they talk about the things that are not secret. And 146 00:11:28,360 --> 00:11:35,559 if the if the senator congressman is asking a question that they cannot answer because 147 00:11:35,559 --> 00:11:41,720 it's deals with classification or state secret, they'll always say, oh, we'll 148 00:11:41,759 --> 00:11:46,480 discuss that in the closed session. And so after the the open hearing is 149 00:11:46,519 --> 00:11:50,320 done, they'll all scurry off to whatever skiff they're going to and then that's 150 00:11:50,360 --> 00:11:56,840 when they'll ask those questions. This hearing is completely different, which it's apparently 151 00:11:56,879 --> 00:11:58,960 not out of the question, but it is very rare. So Senator Jill 152 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:07,679 brand requested not requested, decided to have the closed hearing first, which should 153 00:12:07,679 --> 00:12:11,480 be going on now, unless they forgot to deliver coffee and donuts or something 154 00:12:11,480 --> 00:12:16,000 like that. So Sean, what do you what do you think about that? 155 00:12:16,320 --> 00:12:20,879 Do you think that's a good sign, bad sign? Any kind of 156 00:12:20,919 --> 00:12:24,679 thoughts as to why they may have done the closed hearing before the open which 157 00:12:24,679 --> 00:12:30,879 we're waiting on right now. I mean, I guess it depends on what 158 00:12:30,919 --> 00:12:33,519 they're trying to get out of the hearing. So it would allow the opportunity 159 00:12:33,559 --> 00:12:39,000 to ask the question and not waste time of asking a question in the open 160 00:12:39,039 --> 00:12:43,240 session that ends up just eating up some of the time that the center is 161 00:12:43,240 --> 00:12:46,679 allowed. But it would also allow the senator to ask the question in the 162 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:54,039 classified setting and potentially ask what specifically about this answer is classified and give them 163 00:12:54,080 --> 00:12:58,399 the opportunity to rework the question to try to elicit a response in the open 164 00:12:58,440 --> 00:13:03,279 session. I guess it it would really depend for me. I guess that's 165 00:13:03,320 --> 00:13:07,360 something that I would try to do. If I'm trying to get illicit a 166 00:13:07,399 --> 00:13:13,000 response from my witness, I want to get at least maybe the response that 167 00:13:11,720 --> 00:13:16,519 I that I know is the answer. And then if instead of allow them 168 00:13:16,519 --> 00:13:18,399 to get around it by just saying it's classified. I'll just rework the question 169 00:13:18,919 --> 00:13:22,360 to allow them to have an unclassified answer that at least, you know, 170 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:26,159 gives an answer that the public is looking for. I think that. I 171 00:13:26,200 --> 00:13:30,080 think that makes sense. Daniel, what do you think is this? Is 172 00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:33,840 this a good sign or a bad sign? Yeah? I think Sean said 173 00:13:33,840 --> 00:13:39,000 it well. I think it definitely is a good way to go in my 174 00:13:39,120 --> 00:13:43,320 opinion, because I mean the last year and you can remember I forgot who 175 00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:48,879 asked the question, but asked about incidents that are undersea and multi res response 176 00:13:48,000 --> 00:13:50,360 was that, well, we'll talk about that in the closed session, and 177 00:13:50,360 --> 00:13:52,919 you know, months later in the first draft of the I think is the 178 00:13:52,960 --> 00:13:58,360 IAA or the NDAA UM, they said, okay, so these aerial and 179 00:13:58,559 --> 00:14:01,559 undersea phenomenon, you know clearly there were. The answer was, yes, 180 00:14:01,559 --> 00:14:03,600 there are incidents undersea, but they couldn't answer that. And I think by 181 00:14:03,799 --> 00:14:09,240 doing the close session first, as Sean said, they can find out what 182 00:14:09,320 --> 00:14:13,320 will and will be said in a public setting and then hopefully be able to 183 00:14:13,480 --> 00:14:16,919 adjust their questions in the public setting and hopefully coming forth where they can get 184 00:14:16,919 --> 00:14:20,399 as much of an answer as possible rather than just let's talk about it later. 185 00:14:20,840 --> 00:14:26,960 Yeah, you knows, go ahead, Sean. I'm sorry. It 186 00:14:26,960 --> 00:14:31,559 would also I guess I'll allow the senator in a response to say that's not 187 00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:37,720 what you told me in the close setting, So it would again at least 188 00:14:37,720 --> 00:14:41,960 get the information out. But you know, yeah, yeah, it's just 189 00:14:43,919 --> 00:14:46,080 well, I guess we'll see how they're going to go with it. But 190 00:14:46,360 --> 00:14:50,679 I could see that being a potential reason for the why why they had the 191 00:14:50,720 --> 00:14:54,039 close session before the open session. You know, another thing that I think 192 00:14:54,039 --> 00:14:58,120 will be interesting as well is when when when they finally cut to the hearing 193 00:14:58,120 --> 00:15:03,639 and right now now it's uh uh put it up. This is uh, 194 00:15:03,679 --> 00:15:05,960 this is all they have up right now? This uh this splash screen, 195 00:15:07,559 --> 00:15:11,200 so uh yeah, coverage begins momentarily. But I think what will be really 196 00:15:11,279 --> 00:15:16,480 interesting is when we do finally see a live picture of the room. Excuse 197 00:15:16,519 --> 00:15:22,360 me, what the body language is like? Like Deshaun Kirkpatrick looked like he's 198 00:15:22,399 --> 00:15:24,879 in a state of shock because he just went through the gauntlet with the senator 199 00:15:26,720 --> 00:15:30,679 Jilla Brand calling him on the carpet. Will the will the senators are? 200 00:15:30,960 --> 00:15:35,519 They are they joking around and you know, slapping each other on the back 201 00:15:35,080 --> 00:15:39,600 or are they like really like solemn or like you know, oh, this 202 00:15:39,600 --> 00:15:43,360 this system serious business, which we all know that it is. That I 203 00:15:43,399 --> 00:15:46,440 think that's going to be really uh, that'll be a bit of a bit 204 00:15:46,480 --> 00:15:52,679 of a tell and excuse me, the program my throat, um, you 205 00:15:52,720 --> 00:15:58,000 know it's it's already seven thirty. Uh and we uh they are not back. 206 00:15:58,720 --> 00:16:03,840 Uh so so we're just uh, we're still waiting here, so that 207 00:16:03,000 --> 00:16:08,639 splash screen is still up. Uh. We on these on most of these 208 00:16:08,679 --> 00:16:14,360 hearings, these folks have a YouTube channel that allows us to check the feed 209 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:17,480 and all of that, check the sound. But these guys, they only 210 00:16:17,519 --> 00:16:21,679 have a website. So we're keeping our fingers crossed that there are no technical 211 00:16:21,720 --> 00:16:25,279 issues as the hearing comes up. But I think I think will be good 212 00:16:26,039 --> 00:16:29,639 anyway. Yeah, So I think that's going to be a really interesting thing, 213 00:16:29,759 --> 00:16:33,639 is to see what the tone is and then also as well the line 214 00:16:33,639 --> 00:16:38,840 of questioning excuse me, which we'll start with Senator Gillibrand. And does she 215 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:42,200 look happy like you know, she can look happy like, oh I got 216 00:16:42,240 --> 00:16:45,960 the answers I was looking for. Or is she gonna not look too happy 217 00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:49,720 because she wasn't pleased with what she got out of the out of the closed 218 00:16:51,240 --> 00:16:56,080 closed session anyway. UM so, so, Sean, what do you think 219 00:16:56,120 --> 00:17:02,960 if there's any chance we're going to see any new video or photos or anything 220 00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:10,680 that are better than the joke that Moultrie and Bray showed at the Senate oh 221 00:17:10,759 --> 00:17:15,480 sorry, at the House hearing. I guess that would maybe potentially fall under 222 00:17:15,279 --> 00:17:22,960 the activities portion of arrow of what they've discussed. I know that often times, 223 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:27,279 when you know somebody is bringing you before them, you'd want to flash 224 00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:30,720 something, you know, sexy and cool in front of the people that control 225 00:17:30,759 --> 00:17:34,799 your budget or control your oversight. I don't know how many military bases or 226 00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:38,880 units when somebody's coming in to do an inspection, they start, okay, 227 00:17:38,920 --> 00:17:44,119 everybody turned on the cool gadgets that usually you know, stored or tucked away 228 00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:48,599 somewhere. But this would be the opportunity for doctor Kirkpatrick to at least show 229 00:17:48,720 --> 00:17:52,720 something of you know, a public Hey, we are doing work. You 230 00:17:52,759 --> 00:17:56,680 know, we're not just sitting on our hands. We're doing work. We're 231 00:17:56,720 --> 00:17:59,680 trying to do what we're ordered to do. I'm doing my job. This 232 00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:03,720 would absolutely be an opportunity for them to do that how it falls under, 233 00:18:03,799 --> 00:18:08,160 how it's elicited or or and I guess that could be something that they they 234 00:18:08,200 --> 00:18:12,240 talk about in the close session is just unclassified. Why are we not going 235 00:18:12,319 --> 00:18:15,079 to talk Can we talk about this in the open session? Right? So 236 00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:18,640 that would be something that potentially could be worked out in the closed session. 237 00:18:19,079 --> 00:18:22,720 Daniel, what are your thoughts? Yeah, I agree, I think. 238 00:18:22,759 --> 00:18:26,279 I mean, I'm probably using this analogy because I am an actor, but 239 00:18:26,359 --> 00:18:30,240 this almost to me feels kind of like an audition for the public as well, 240 00:18:30,279 --> 00:18:33,400 you know, because at the end of the day, this is the 241 00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:37,640 topic that is still quite stigmatized, and I could foresee this becoming a well 242 00:18:37,640 --> 00:18:41,880 you're spending our tax dollars on this, right, So this in a way 243 00:18:41,079 --> 00:18:45,839 is an opportunity for not just a committee, but for Kirkpatrick in the office 244 00:18:45,880 --> 00:18:48,759 to say, hey, you know, this is important and there's a reason 245 00:18:48,799 --> 00:18:52,200 we're doing this, and so here are some examples. I think if you 246 00:18:52,319 --> 00:18:57,519 just keep mum and don't share any details, you know, obviously with an 247 00:18:57,519 --> 00:19:02,279 a safe and not a way that they're not obviously going to share classifyed information 248 00:19:02,359 --> 00:19:06,279 or anything that could affect national security. But there's plenty of room to share 249 00:19:06,319 --> 00:19:08,200 something. I think that show this is a real issue, this is what 250 00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:11,200 we're working on, and we're not just wasting your money. This is going 251 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:14,640 towards real efforts. Whether you actually will share anything, I don't know. 252 00:19:14,720 --> 00:19:19,200 I really hope he does, and that it's not just the a similar example 253 00:19:19,240 --> 00:19:23,839 that maybe Bray had last year. But I think it would be a wasted 254 00:19:23,880 --> 00:19:30,839 opportunity because this is his chance to make the case for this office. Right 255 00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:37,960 and the necess and how necessary is yeah, I completely agree with both both 256 00:19:37,960 --> 00:19:41,359 of you, gentlemen. One thing to keep in mind is I am quite 257 00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:47,720 certain I would be wildly surprised if in the closed session he has not presented 258 00:19:48,319 --> 00:19:52,880 compelling photos or video, which maybe that's why they're running late. Right now, 259 00:19:52,920 --> 00:19:59,319 He's showing them a bunch of stuff. One would hope the question will 260 00:19:59,359 --> 00:20:04,079 be what would be allowed in the open hearing. Obviously a big concern of 261 00:20:04,079 --> 00:20:10,440 these folks is they don't want to reveal source as a method, So there 262 00:20:10,720 --> 00:20:17,839 there are ways to scrub that confidential data, that secret data out of imagery 263 00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:21,680 that obviously we're not going to see anything from space or anything like that. 264 00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:30,079 But let's say like a gun camera footage which which that's easily, easily scrubbable. 265 00:20:30,880 --> 00:20:33,839 So anyone that you know, if they say, oh, we can't 266 00:20:33,880 --> 00:20:37,680 reveal it because it's going to reveal classified data, that's a bunch of bull 267 00:20:38,119 --> 00:20:41,039 uh. We've you know, we saw, for instance, the gun camera 268 00:20:41,039 --> 00:20:48,440 footage of the Reaper drone where that Soviet fighter near Ukraine flew over and blew 269 00:20:48,799 --> 00:20:52,039 h you know, blue fuel on it and then eventually collided with the drone 270 00:20:52,640 --> 00:20:55,519 and that was you know, that was probably four K footage. It was 271 00:20:55,559 --> 00:20:57,920 extremely clear. So that was done with him like a day. Yeah, 272 00:20:59,240 --> 00:21:02,079 yeah, it was like in a day. And I understand as well with 273 00:21:02,200 --> 00:21:06,559 the with the three balloons that were shot down. I'm sorry, the three 274 00:21:06,599 --> 00:21:11,440 objects that were shot down in addition to the Chinese balloon. No one in 275 00:21:11,559 --> 00:21:17,119 Congress on the Senate has seen this footage, which is that's just crazy. 276 00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:19,039 Um. Sorry, I'm going off on a bit of a bit of a 277 00:21:19,039 --> 00:21:23,400 tangent, but but yeah, I do think I'm hopeful that we will see 278 00:21:23,480 --> 00:21:27,160 something. But I will say this, so one friend of mine that works 279 00:21:27,160 --> 00:21:34,039 in the intelligence community, that has seen most of the compelling footage, the 280 00:21:34,079 --> 00:21:38,480 classified stuff, he said to me, he goes, if if they put 281 00:21:38,519 --> 00:21:44,559 that out. It's in many ways it's underwhelming. Anything that you can put 282 00:21:44,559 --> 00:21:49,200 out a someone will always say, oh at CGI or mcquest will say it's 283 00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:56,480 a seagull or whatever. But but I even like if they show some kind 284 00:21:56,519 --> 00:22:00,000 of video or whatever, I'm personally skeptical that it will convince a lot of 285 00:22:00,200 --> 00:22:03,839 minds. I think that there eventually will need to be some kind of show 286 00:22:03,839 --> 00:22:06,559 and tell to convince the public. Hopefully that would come in the way of 287 00:22:07,599 --> 00:22:14,279 revealing what crashed crashed goodies goodies that we have. So I mean, so, 288 00:22:14,799 --> 00:22:17,400 so, Daniel, do you think that there will be any big revelations 289 00:22:17,480 --> 00:22:21,200 or do you think this will be more formal budget that sort of thing. 290 00:22:22,880 --> 00:22:26,519 I think likely know, But if there is going to be one, I 291 00:22:26,559 --> 00:22:33,920 think it would be the acknowledgement of because the thing that everyone is dancing around, 292 00:22:33,960 --> 00:22:37,759 a lot of people inferring and even some members coming out of leaders, 293 00:22:37,799 --> 00:22:42,599 whether it be you know, THEOD officials or members the or the Senate or 294 00:22:42,720 --> 00:22:49,680 House, are kind of referring to these incidents that where things are showing anomalous 295 00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:55,039 flight characteristics that like we can't explain or recreate, right, And so I 296 00:22:55,079 --> 00:22:56,680 think if there's a revelation that's going to come out, it's going to be 297 00:22:57,400 --> 00:23:03,920 talking about those and maybe yes, we have multi sensor data showing this to 298 00:23:03,960 --> 00:23:07,559 be the case. Because I think one of the biggest questions right now is 299 00:23:07,559 --> 00:23:11,279 is this this one sensor showing these incidents and it could be an error or 300 00:23:11,279 --> 00:23:18,000 it's phenomenal what did they call in the little media roundtable, sensor phenomena something 301 00:23:18,119 --> 00:23:26,039 like that, or like phenom phenomenology the word um. So it's that's the 302 00:23:26,039 --> 00:23:30,920 big question, right because if you have multiple sensors showing that, the odds 303 00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:37,039 of all of those simultaneously having the same error as pretty slim. And then 304 00:23:37,119 --> 00:23:40,359 if the answer is then oh well, then someone's figured how to spoof all 305 00:23:40,400 --> 00:23:45,079 those sensors. Will that's another really big problem. So I think if revelation 306 00:23:45,160 --> 00:23:51,400 is going to come, it's gonna be from the concreteness in which our data 307 00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:56,319 shows something that truly is something that is caused for concern, whether it be 308 00:23:56,680 --> 00:24:00,920 an adversary or something else. It's a problem. Yeah, that's any thoughts 309 00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:04,519 on that. Yeah, I want to actually speak to something that you had 310 00:24:04,519 --> 00:24:10,720 said a couple minutes ago, talking about when you know source the methods, 311 00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:14,160 when I was in the Marine Corps. Most of all of our trigger polars, 312 00:24:14,200 --> 00:24:18,279 everybody that we support are don't have security clearances. And everything I worked 313 00:24:18,279 --> 00:24:22,319 in was secret and above or for the most part, unless it was open 314 00:24:22,319 --> 00:24:26,359 source, so we would have to feed them information somehow. So it's doable, 315 00:24:26,400 --> 00:24:30,720 and I guess I hope that maybe somebody's watching this because it's very simple. 316 00:24:30,759 --> 00:24:34,160 There's a definitely easy step that you could do. If you collect something 317 00:24:34,200 --> 00:24:40,720 with the classified you know, asset or system, just go on the open 318 00:24:40,759 --> 00:24:45,599 market and find a redundant, unclassified one that hacks coverage over that same area. 319 00:24:45,799 --> 00:24:52,079 Get that information. So, for instance, if something collects information or 320 00:24:52,119 --> 00:24:56,839 it collects something in the air in a certain geographical area and you know that 321 00:24:56,839 --> 00:25:02,039 that's there, go get commercially imagery. It's available all over the place, 322 00:25:02,200 --> 00:25:06,839 and there might be happen to be a you know something that caught it, 323 00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:11,920 and now you have an unclassified confirmation that you could put on the public and 324 00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:15,839 all you have to say is we collected this unclassified net systems and here here 325 00:25:15,960 --> 00:25:21,160 is this that you could easily do that with commercial imagery, commercial radar UH 326 00:25:21,799 --> 00:25:26,079 whether radar uh NOAH systems. There's all kinds of things that you could go 327 00:25:26,119 --> 00:25:32,920 out and purposely, Uh if you have you know, information that you know 328 00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:36,920 something something happens, but you could go out and get the unclassified version of 329 00:25:36,920 --> 00:25:40,200 that and get it to to the to the public. You can get it 330 00:25:40,200 --> 00:25:42,519 to people that or beat it. The scientists say, hey, we can't 331 00:25:42,519 --> 00:25:45,319 tell you what we know, but we know this is something. So here 332 00:25:45,319 --> 00:25:48,880 you go do what you can with it. Then it's it's it just needs 333 00:25:49,279 --> 00:25:52,559 uh, you know, the effort. They're just going to know how to 334 00:25:52,599 --> 00:25:56,559 do it. So hopefully they start putting somebody that are in these groups, 335 00:25:56,559 --> 00:26:00,720 in this organization that has a background in, you know, doing that kind 336 00:26:00,759 --> 00:26:06,519 of work, because if not many people that that grow up in these organizations, 337 00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:11,119 they're at agencies their whole life. So they're at you know, you 338 00:26:11,160 --> 00:26:15,160 know, the Starbucks barista has a secret clearance and then everything is higher so 339 00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:19,559 they're not used to trying to feed stuff to you know, lower organization or 340 00:26:19,599 --> 00:26:23,359 work with those. So get somebody that at least can think outside the box 341 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:29,759 of how can I invent this thing? You know, with information that's readily 342 00:26:29,759 --> 00:26:32,720 available, it's just going to take a little bit of purchasing power, which 343 00:26:33,119 --> 00:26:36,880 arrow potentially could have just go out by the commercial imagery going by, or 344 00:26:37,000 --> 00:26:42,039 task task a commercial satellite to take the imagery, or take the radar, 345 00:26:42,119 --> 00:26:47,880 or take whatever's available. Do you know if it's something I'm not really aware. 346 00:26:48,160 --> 00:26:52,079 I know one thing that's been discussed in the past. One of our 347 00:26:52,160 --> 00:26:56,640 satellite systems called Spears. I'm blanking on what the acronym is, but it 348 00:26:56,680 --> 00:27:04,359 basically is a satellite system that can detect several bands of infrared. And what 349 00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:11,440 I've heard from for a very long time is that these systems that can produce 350 00:27:11,519 --> 00:27:17,640 product on the infrared spectrum have seen these vehicles coming in and out of our 351 00:27:17,839 --> 00:27:25,359 atmosphere for a very long time. This particular satellite system is primarily used as 352 00:27:25,359 --> 00:27:32,839 an early warning satellite to detect nuclear launches. Now I know that the commercial 353 00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:38,480 satellite products have increased in resolution and capabilities as you just spoke about. Are 354 00:27:38,480 --> 00:27:47,359 you aware of any commercial platforms that have infrared detection capabilities that might be able 355 00:27:47,359 --> 00:27:52,559 to be tasked to look for these things. I would know the specifics. 356 00:27:52,599 --> 00:27:55,519 I was not an imagery analyst, however, I worked hand in hand with 357 00:27:55,559 --> 00:28:00,559 them during my time. I don't believe that we sought any of that out. 358 00:28:00,599 --> 00:28:06,359 We were just looking basically for imagery on the commercial side. But UM, 359 00:28:06,519 --> 00:28:10,240 I would I would assume that at this point it certainly exists, and 360 00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:14,880 there's other type of systems that are commercial that exists. I believe that, 361 00:28:15,680 --> 00:28:18,680 Again, I could absolutely one hundred percent be wrong. I believe that some 362 00:28:18,759 --> 00:28:25,319 of the uh they're the legislation that that covers them, might keep their resolution 363 00:28:25,359 --> 00:28:30,119 to a certain um like downgraded. They don't want it to get too good. 364 00:28:30,359 --> 00:28:36,799 So, but I mean, the systems are available, I don't. 365 00:28:36,880 --> 00:28:41,000 I don't know, but I just wouldn't be got it. I don't know 366 00:28:41,079 --> 00:28:42,880 enough about about that specific to talk about it. Yeah, I mean, 367 00:28:42,960 --> 00:28:47,359 yeah, obviously I don't as well. But yeah, you you would think 368 00:28:47,359 --> 00:28:55,359 with the prolifer proliferation, I can talk proliferation of commercial satellite products and even 369 00:28:55,400 --> 00:29:00,599 just like commercials space with UM you know, with the the the pocket that 370 00:29:00,960 --> 00:29:04,279 the Amazon rocket, the Jeff Bezos thing that looks like a giant dildo taking 371 00:29:04,319 --> 00:29:08,279 people up into space. You know. So I've often wondered if part of 372 00:29:08,279 --> 00:29:15,240 this seeming acceleration in UM, this disclosure effort, if you want to call 373 00:29:15,279 --> 00:29:22,000 it, that is due to the increased commercialization of space, Like you would 374 00:29:22,039 --> 00:29:27,319 think at some point these folks, somebody Elon Mosker or whoever, is going 375 00:29:27,400 --> 00:29:33,440 to film something that is very definitive or compelling. Daniel, what do you 376 00:29:33,440 --> 00:29:37,960 think do you think that could have anything to do with with why this whole 377 00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:41,240 thing seems to be moving moving along? And by the way, it's seven 378 00:29:41,480 --> 00:29:48,839 forty five, we still do not have anyone, We still do not have 379 00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:52,160 a live hearing feed up. So take that for what it's worth anyway, 380 00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:56,960 Daniel, going ahead, I guess they got lots of questions for Kirk Patrick. 381 00:29:56,519 --> 00:29:59,960 Um, I think so I will say this, Yeah, I mean, 382 00:30:00,160 --> 00:30:03,079 if there's a there there, there seems to be a there there. 383 00:30:03,680 --> 00:30:08,680 It's only a matter of time before the commercial technology catches up at the point 384 00:30:08,720 --> 00:30:14,880 where it's kind of gonna hard to not talk about it, right. Um. 385 00:30:15,000 --> 00:30:18,640 Absolutely, I mean not just in satellites, but just in I think 386 00:30:22,119 --> 00:30:26,039 any kind of sensor technology. It's not obviously the military has the best and 387 00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:30,240 the most late in the latest, but you know, plenty of scientific organizations 388 00:30:30,359 --> 00:30:34,960 use technology that for you know, whatever you weather or you know. NASA 389 00:30:36,039 --> 00:30:40,480 is like viewing a study right now trying to figure out what they can utilize 390 00:30:40,720 --> 00:30:45,359 that's in the public realm. Yeah, I think that definitely could be. 391 00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:51,920 Perhaps what's motivated some of this is just that there seems to be things going 392 00:30:51,960 --> 00:30:57,200 on and it's not really only going to be detectable within the classified world. 393 00:30:57,319 --> 00:31:00,559 If you know, as yours as yours on, I usually want to technology 394 00:31:00,559 --> 00:31:04,480 improves, we're gonna see the same things there, right, Yeah, I 395 00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:11,640 totally a go ahead, shoon I. I highly doubt that this is only 396 00:31:11,759 --> 00:31:15,680 detectable in the classified world. Again, I like like I said, and 397 00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:22,880 I think other people have said publicly that if you have the geolocation time and 398 00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:30,519 date, there is an abundance of sensored data available commercially that could be UM 399 00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:37,160 queried and UM potentially have some information. It's just sitting there and they don't 400 00:31:37,160 --> 00:31:41,759 know to look at it. They don't they don't know to look at this 401 00:31:41,799 --> 00:31:45,359 this time and data at this specific you know, you know location. But 402 00:31:45,440 --> 00:31:49,759 if if if you send that out to you know, Noah's satellite, even 403 00:31:49,759 --> 00:31:55,480 if it's a cloud dispersal or something that moves or or something anything or the 404 00:31:55,799 --> 00:32:00,960 overlapping radar systems that we have or UM again, the commercial imagery, it's 405 00:32:01,599 --> 00:32:05,359 they're taking those pictures, those things are those birds are in the sky. 406 00:32:06,160 --> 00:32:08,400 All are you going to do is at least see if it's there. Maybe 407 00:32:08,720 --> 00:32:13,880 maybe there's something that's picked up. Yeah, I have an unclassified picture of 408 00:32:13,960 --> 00:32:17,240 something right, Yeah, it's that's got to be around the corner, I 409 00:32:17,519 --> 00:32:22,359 would think. Now, on a totally different topic, uh we we put 410 00:32:22,359 --> 00:32:27,720 out a video a couple of days ago essentially making a direct case, direct 411 00:32:27,799 --> 00:32:34,359 message to doctor Sean Kirkpatrick, and the previous it wasn't in the center in 412 00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:38,200 the house hearing on UAP. I think everyone pretty felt, pretty much felt 413 00:32:38,200 --> 00:32:44,960 that there was a great degree of dancing around the subject and you know, 414 00:32:45,680 --> 00:32:50,720 shiny look over here at this really bad video, and everyone I think was 415 00:32:51,160 --> 00:32:54,880 I think was pretty disappointed. And part of the point of this video. 416 00:32:55,400 --> 00:33:01,000 We know some of the whistleblowers that have come forward to Arrow and testified directly 417 00:33:01,039 --> 00:33:07,759 to his office, and we were essentially addressing doctor Shanker Patrick saying, look, 418 00:33:07,000 --> 00:33:13,400 that is the data that you should be presenting to Congress. I mean, 419 00:33:13,480 --> 00:33:15,880 you can talk about science all day long or this paper we did with 420 00:33:15,960 --> 00:33:22,559 doctor Avie Loebe, but where I was sort of fearful that Shanker. Patrick 421 00:33:22,640 --> 00:33:28,279 was trying to reset the conversation and the scientific clock back to zero when he 422 00:33:28,440 --> 00:33:35,480 has eighty plus years of billions of dollars in government taxpayer funded, uh, 423 00:33:36,119 --> 00:33:39,599 you know, government information that he can build upon. My point in in 424 00:33:39,680 --> 00:33:45,240 that video, which did very well. I've heard a lot of people in 425 00:33:45,359 --> 00:33:52,759 DC watched it. Our point was the data that should be presented right now 426 00:33:52,119 --> 00:33:59,480 to Congress and to the American people is the whistleblower testimony. It's it's significant, 427 00:33:59,559 --> 00:34:01,799 It's it's I mean, I don't know the total number of hours, 428 00:34:01,799 --> 00:34:07,160 but it's tens of hours of you know, who knows. But there were 429 00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:12,920 a lot of whistleblowers that testified regarding to UFOs interfering with our nuclear weapons or 430 00:34:12,920 --> 00:34:19,039 disabling them completely for a period of time. There were people testifying, pilots 431 00:34:19,119 --> 00:34:25,079 testifying on their aerial encounters with UAP, and then you had people testifying regarding 432 00:34:25,760 --> 00:34:30,760 the crash retrieval programs that this country is run for decades down to telling them 433 00:34:31,039 --> 00:34:36,000 what the name of the SAP was and where all this stuff is stashed now. 434 00:34:37,239 --> 00:34:45,840 So I'm hopeful that we will hear some of the whistleblower maybe not everything 435 00:34:46,199 --> 00:34:50,880 Obviously it's a certain amount of data has to be classified, but hopefully we'll 436 00:34:50,920 --> 00:34:53,119 hear something about that. Sean, do you think that that's a possibility or 437 00:34:53,159 --> 00:34:58,679 do you think you'll skirt around it. I think it would be a possibility 438 00:34:58,679 --> 00:35:02,119 at least if you to call if the Senator wants to call them, DARTR. 439 00:35:02,199 --> 00:35:07,159 Kirkpatricks out because in the National Defense Authorization Act, they were supposed to 440 00:35:07,199 --> 00:35:12,599 have prompt sharing of information within seventy two hours of learning something. If the 441 00:35:12,639 --> 00:35:16,719 Congressional committees, by for partners of Evidence don't receive the information, but I 442 00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:21,639 don't already have the information, then ARROW was supposed to tell them. So 443 00:35:21,719 --> 00:35:28,440 if if the committee or a senator knows that somebody went to ARROW provided them 444 00:35:28,440 --> 00:35:35,599 information about a potential SAP or crash retrieval program within seventy two hours, they 445 00:35:35,599 --> 00:35:39,039 didn't make the report to the congress Congressional Committee, then they would be in 446 00:35:39,119 --> 00:35:44,199 violation of what they were ordered to do. So that would be a way 447 00:35:44,239 --> 00:35:46,280 to say that, you know, we didn't receive this information from you. 448 00:35:47,079 --> 00:35:51,960 We received it from them well after seventy two hours of you were receiving it. 449 00:35:52,719 --> 00:35:55,320 So what where was the breakdown here? Because and then so that that 450 00:35:55,440 --> 00:36:00,800 would be a way of oversight it could come in. Yeah, the uh, 451 00:36:00,320 --> 00:36:04,239 I think that makes sense. Just a quick going back here, we're 452 00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:09,199 still waiting. It's uh seven fifty, so they're already twenty minutes late. 453 00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:19,199 Uh somebody somebody uh uh dark uh and I because I'm trying to listen to 454 00:36:19,239 --> 00:36:22,719 the conversation and stay engaged. It's difficult for me to watch the chat room, 455 00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:27,639 which is why our friend uplifting Tweets is there. But dark Spark just 456 00:36:27,719 --> 00:36:36,320 commented Kirkpatrick is being revived. Lola could certainly be the be the case. 457 00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:39,800 I mean, I certainly hope not. I'm sure he's I'm sure he's okay. 458 00:36:40,199 --> 00:36:46,159 Anyway that I totally uh spent spend dub tracks as must be a hell 459 00:36:46,199 --> 00:36:51,800 of a closed hearing, uh, clearly. And we've had quite a few 460 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:57,000 donations on super chats. Uh. I can't really scroll back and see who 461 00:36:57,039 --> 00:37:00,639 all who all's donated, But thank you very much for supporting our work here. 462 00:37:00,800 --> 00:37:07,519 Anyway, back back to whistleblower testimony. So so, Daniel, what 463 00:37:07,519 --> 00:37:09,800 what do you think do you think do you think we would hear about crash 464 00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:14,079 retrieval? Some some people would would say that, well, that's you know, 465 00:37:14,119 --> 00:37:20,079 far too classified to to to even speak about that. But do you 466 00:37:20,119 --> 00:37:22,559 think that they're a well, I actually I have two questions for you. 467 00:37:23,480 --> 00:37:29,280 What do you would it surprise you that we've had a crash retrieval program that's 468 00:37:29,320 --> 00:37:36,000 been managed by fifty or so people that's been hidden from congressional oversight? And 469 00:37:36,039 --> 00:37:39,440 then two, do you think that that is something that could be discussed in 470 00:37:39,519 --> 00:37:46,840 an open hearing without national security implications? Sure, I'll do the I'll answer 471 00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:52,760 the first one. First. Um, so that's the age old question, 472 00:37:52,880 --> 00:37:59,599 right. Um, there are certainly documents that have been since declassified that point 473 00:37:59,639 --> 00:38:05,559 to that being a possibility, and there are people that I respect and trust 474 00:38:05,679 --> 00:38:09,719 who say that is the case. That being said, you know, I 475 00:38:09,760 --> 00:38:19,079 think that's certainly something that until that is something that is such a big story, 476 00:38:19,519 --> 00:38:22,840 you know, like that we're talking about the biggest story arguably of our 477 00:38:22,920 --> 00:38:29,360 species. That I really don't think and I'm probably like most people can't one 478 00:38:29,400 --> 00:38:32,840 hundred percent believe that until it's a proof or evidence. And I'm sure most 479 00:38:32,880 --> 00:38:37,280 people understand that as well. But people who are saying that that is the 480 00:38:37,320 --> 00:38:40,719 case and that people are coming forward and saying that are not people who you 481 00:38:40,760 --> 00:38:44,920 know, they're serious people, and that they're putting their credibility on the line, 482 00:38:45,159 --> 00:38:47,360 right, you know. So it leaves me kind of just like, 483 00:38:47,679 --> 00:38:51,679 I don't know what's going on. This is crazy. Um you know, 484 00:38:51,719 --> 00:38:57,159 I think people paying attention to who are are skeptic but curious. It's kind 485 00:38:57,159 --> 00:38:59,480 of like, man, this is nuts. I don't I don't really know 486 00:38:59,480 --> 00:39:02,360 where this is and agoum so I think it's definitely possible. I think I'll 487 00:39:02,360 --> 00:39:09,679 say this that if it exists, yes, it would be very very compartmentalized. 488 00:39:09,719 --> 00:39:15,639 And my theory is not even within oversight anymore, but probably you know, 489 00:39:15,760 --> 00:39:20,280 over at some contractor with like as the rules overset as possible, and 490 00:39:20,400 --> 00:39:23,440 that's a common popular theory as well. Um. So I because of that, 491 00:39:23,480 --> 00:39:27,840 I will say I don't think that will ever be mentioned, especially in 492 00:39:28,639 --> 00:39:30,920 not yet at least in this setting, if it exists, because I think 493 00:39:30,960 --> 00:39:36,599 that is a big national security you know you're talking about if that's if we 494 00:39:36,840 --> 00:39:39,920 pretend that's true for a moment um, that that that's that's just gard of 495 00:39:39,960 --> 00:39:45,280 all doubt. That's that's real. What's happening. Um, you're talking about 496 00:39:45,360 --> 00:39:49,920 us being a possession of the technology that could be technically you know, millions 497 00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:53,679 of years ahead about sunups, Like how can you even comprehend what extraterrestrial means 498 00:39:53,760 --> 00:40:00,400 or whatever presents or or nance terrestrials whatever other um. So whoever can crack 499 00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:07,280 that technology through reverse engineering has an advantage that would quite literally change the geopolitical 500 00:40:07,320 --> 00:40:15,159 situation. So I can't imagine anyone whatever talk about that willingly because of the 501 00:40:15,280 --> 00:40:19,840 national security implication. But that being said, I mean people are talking I 502 00:40:19,840 --> 00:40:23,360 don't know, like how can that leak? How long can that stay? 503 00:40:23,480 --> 00:40:27,360 Like why are people coming forward? Now? There's so many questions that kind 504 00:40:27,360 --> 00:40:30,239 of stem from that reality if that is what's happening, and people who I 505 00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:35,440 trust seem to be saying it is. But I will say that I do 506 00:40:35,519 --> 00:40:39,960 wonder, as Sean was mentioning whether Gillibrand might ask John Kirkpatrick, have witnesses 507 00:40:40,000 --> 00:40:45,079 come forward to talk to you? You know, that's the ess no question 508 00:40:45,119 --> 00:40:49,000 that I don't know if really would harm nation security. So and if you 509 00:40:49,039 --> 00:40:52,280 says yes to that, that's interesting, you know, and we know that 510 00:40:52,320 --> 00:40:57,800 certain people have like Robert Stalis, But I'm talking more about people referencing programs 511 00:40:57,840 --> 00:41:01,000 that are related to UAP that Congress did not know about. And I think 512 00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:07,599 there's worth mentioning that there are certain specific types of SAPs where Congress isn't notified, 513 00:41:07,679 --> 00:41:12,119 like I think they're called WAVED unacknowledged special access programs, So that is, 514 00:41:12,159 --> 00:41:16,360 who are the Secretary of Defense signs off on it? Even allowing Congress, 515 00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:22,159 even the Gang debate necessarily to be notified. So it's it's a it's 516 00:41:22,159 --> 00:41:27,239 a wishywashy area, but I think in most circumstances Congress legally it does have 517 00:41:27,280 --> 00:41:31,239 to be notified. And it is my suspicion that, no matter what's going 518 00:41:31,280 --> 00:41:35,440 on the government has been very interested in this topic for a long time. 519 00:41:35,760 --> 00:41:37,639 I would be very surprised that they haven't been looking into it. And I 520 00:41:37,760 --> 00:41:43,400 bet you they did not tell Congress Sean. Do you no, that's that's 521 00:41:43,480 --> 00:41:51,000 fantastic, Sean. Do you know if if WAVED waived special access programs, 522 00:41:51,599 --> 00:41:54,199 what the reporting requirements to Congress are on? In other words, is it 523 00:41:54,239 --> 00:41:59,840 only the gang? Can they are they mandated legally to report to the Gang 524 00:41:59,880 --> 00:42:01,599 of Ate and no one else, you know, for instance, on Sendate 525 00:42:01,679 --> 00:42:07,079 arm services? How does that work. Yeah, I would assume that, 526 00:42:07,119 --> 00:42:09,760 but I wouldn't be able to speak confidently about that. So I would assume 527 00:42:09,800 --> 00:42:15,760 that they would need to have budgetarian oversight through the legislative branch. So I 528 00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:20,480 would assume that that's how the chain of events would occur. However, again 529 00:42:20,639 --> 00:42:23,360 I don't think I'd be able to speak confidently about that, but I mean 530 00:42:23,360 --> 00:42:30,280 i'd like to if I could back up Daniel on this is the on the 531 00:42:30,320 --> 00:42:40,760 crash retrieval programs. The it already does exist because the United States has units 532 00:42:40,760 --> 00:42:45,639 that and this this is of course open stories, have units that recover, 533 00:42:46,599 --> 00:42:54,639 recover, you know, Russian aircraft or Chinese or technology, so that it 534 00:42:54,719 --> 00:42:59,320 already exists. So I don't know, it doesn't matter if it's a crash, 535 00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:02,920 Russian sty Delight or starship from Zata Articuli. If something went down, 536 00:43:04,000 --> 00:43:07,159 the United States would have a reason or a desire to go after it, 537 00:43:07,239 --> 00:43:09,079 get a hold of it. What it is, who knows. So I 538 00:43:09,119 --> 00:43:14,880 guess, yeah, that it already exists because we do acquire foreign technology and 539 00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:17,599 then we reverse engineering. So all you'd have to do is you just grab 540 00:43:17,639 --> 00:43:22,199 it. And the units that do that are just trying to get it secure 541 00:43:22,440 --> 00:43:25,440 and back to somewhere where somebody smarter can get a look at it. You 542 00:43:25,519 --> 00:43:29,639 got a you know, a bunch of you know, big guys that wear 543 00:43:29,639 --> 00:43:31,519 combat boots all the time that need to just go in there and you know, 544 00:43:32,280 --> 00:43:36,760 get it and then get it back or get it somewhere safe so that 545 00:43:37,039 --> 00:43:42,679 it does exist per se, you know, but it might not necessarily have 546 00:43:42,719 --> 00:43:45,639 to be the next level of us, some secret organization or some some you 547 00:43:45,679 --> 00:43:51,400 know, something crazy. It's just it does it already does exist something. 548 00:43:51,559 --> 00:43:57,440 If there's new technology somewhere, we have a reason to go after it and 549 00:43:57,559 --> 00:44:02,119 get it and reverse engineering. So you just gonna have to add that extra 550 00:44:02,719 --> 00:44:08,079 layer on it where they if the compartments, so the wave programs do exist, 551 00:44:08,960 --> 00:44:13,079 they acquire it, you tell everybody, oh, this is a classified 552 00:44:13,119 --> 00:44:16,239 aircraft or something. Those people go about doing their their thing, and then 553 00:44:16,280 --> 00:44:20,639 you stick it in the compartment, you know, and then and then it's 554 00:44:20,679 --> 00:44:23,639 gone, and then it's it doesn't have to be something really large and I 555 00:44:23,679 --> 00:44:30,760 guess conspiratorial, like. The mechanisms exist already. The only thing that we're 556 00:44:30,760 --> 00:44:38,119 missing is that the waved program or or who takes it after it's acquired because 557 00:44:38,199 --> 00:44:44,639 it would be the same as any other foreign tech. You know, you 558 00:44:44,679 --> 00:44:46,280 can get it, you acquire it. I mean that the CIA went into 559 00:44:46,360 --> 00:44:54,039 Russia and took a part of Russian satellite that so these organizations exist, if 560 00:44:54,079 --> 00:45:00,440 they have the capability to implement those types of visions, it's already the stories 561 00:45:00,440 --> 00:45:06,079 are out there and to do that, or you know, terrestrial technologies, 562 00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:10,320 they just add something came down, we don't know what it is, Okay, 563 00:45:10,559 --> 00:45:14,000 let's get in there and get it figure it out later, you know, 564 00:45:14,400 --> 00:45:16,960 so that the unit or the organization would go in, grab it, 565 00:45:17,119 --> 00:45:21,039 bring it back, and then where to go I don't know. I just 566 00:45:21,159 --> 00:45:22,800 my job is to get it, bring it back, and hand it off 567 00:45:22,800 --> 00:45:27,400 to the next person and then it's gone forever or gone, and whoever is 568 00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:30,239 looking at it is looking at it. So I would say that absolutely, 569 00:45:30,880 --> 00:45:37,880 even if even if they've never had captured craft or materials, the mechanisms exist. 570 00:45:37,239 --> 00:45:42,719 So this it's already there, right that that completely makes sense. And 571 00:45:42,920 --> 00:45:47,199 going back going back to what back to a little bit of what Daniel was 572 00:45:47,239 --> 00:45:54,639 talking about. So my personal belief is the only way that you're going to 573 00:45:54,639 --> 00:46:00,320 convince the public that we are being interacted with by non human and tell us 574 00:46:00,599 --> 00:46:02,880 it's not going to be Joe Biden getting up on a podium. He could 575 00:46:02,960 --> 00:46:07,440 he could go up there. Literally half the country will not believe anything that 576 00:46:07,480 --> 00:46:15,119 he's saying. The White House Press Office could air a video and say, 577 00:46:15,199 --> 00:46:17,519 yeah, this is real. Half the people are not going to believe it, 578 00:46:17,559 --> 00:46:23,079 maybe even more. I believe the only way that the only thing that 579 00:46:23,079 --> 00:46:28,639 will deliver the amount of ontological shock to the public to shake them, you 580 00:46:28,679 --> 00:46:31,800 know, to what's going on, is a show and tell. So if 581 00:46:31,840 --> 00:46:37,920 we have crashed recovery, if we have crashed vehicles, which all of my 582 00:46:37,000 --> 00:46:42,880 sources have said, yes we do, and it's more than one a show 583 00:46:42,880 --> 00:46:47,519 and tell, you could do a show and tell that would not jeopardize national 584 00:46:47,519 --> 00:46:51,079 security and what I mean by that. So, just recently, I think 585 00:46:51,079 --> 00:46:54,360 it was about two or three months ago, Northrop Northrop Grumman revealed the I 586 00:46:54,360 --> 00:46:59,840 think it's called a B twenty one Radar Raider, which is a long range 587 00:47:00,239 --> 00:47:06,800 nuclear capable uh bomber next generation stealth and and I watched the reveal. It's 588 00:47:06,800 --> 00:47:10,840 actually pretty cool, you know they Lloyd Austin did a did a speech and 589 00:47:10,840 --> 00:47:15,400 and uh In the background. You saw the you know, the hangar, 590 00:47:15,880 --> 00:47:19,360 and then ladies and gentlemen, here's our new kick ass bomber. And then 591 00:47:19,360 --> 00:47:25,039 the doors open up and the thing is silhouetted by a backdrop and they put, 592 00:47:25,079 --> 00:47:29,239 you know, a small amount of light on it. But that was 593 00:47:29,320 --> 00:47:32,119 the reveal. They didn't they said, Okay, here's our bomber. But 594 00:47:32,199 --> 00:47:36,599 they didn't say it does this, It does this, it has these types 595 00:47:36,639 --> 00:47:42,079 of countermeasures, it's got this type of stealth capability. So there's a way 596 00:47:42,079 --> 00:47:46,920 to reveal something like that without you know, giving away the whole um all 597 00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:52,440 of your secrets. Right. So um, I think that they could do 598 00:47:52,519 --> 00:47:59,119 this in a very similar fashion and not jeopardize national security. And I think 599 00:47:59,159 --> 00:48:05,239 that it will only be through a public reveal, a show and tell of 600 00:48:05,280 --> 00:48:09,320 what our country possesses, that people will go, oh shit, because we 601 00:48:09,360 --> 00:48:12,679 need to we need to figure out how we're going to deal with this, 602 00:48:13,039 --> 00:48:16,079 with this reality. Daniel, do you think that that would be enough to 603 00:48:16,079 --> 00:48:22,440 to would that convince the skeptics, the mcquests of the world and bunker boy 604 00:48:22,480 --> 00:48:27,639 a camp basement boy, camp blanket on his name Green Street, do you 605 00:48:27,679 --> 00:48:31,159 think that that would convince these folks or are you still going to have folks 606 00:48:31,159 --> 00:48:34,639 saying, ah, yeah, this is all a psi op or whatever. 607 00:48:36,400 --> 00:48:38,639 Both. I think it would givince mcwest and green Street because I will say 608 00:48:38,719 --> 00:48:45,559 they are right in the sense that if the government in the government right, 609 00:48:45,599 --> 00:48:47,519 who is the government, but let's just say, the government, for the 610 00:48:47,559 --> 00:48:52,880 sake of argument, is going to share pretty evidence evidence that's pretty hard to 611 00:48:52,880 --> 00:48:58,760 refute. I think that would change a conversation pretty quickly because re Street Mcwest 612 00:48:58,800 --> 00:49:00,679 are right in the sense that there's very little the sense of conclusive evidence of 613 00:49:00,719 --> 00:49:06,760 what the hecks going on, um publicly at least um. But yeah, 614 00:49:06,760 --> 00:49:08,559 so I think that would convince them. I think there is always going to 615 00:49:08,599 --> 00:49:13,320 be people who are saying this is just a psyop or a shell game and 616 00:49:13,400 --> 00:49:16,119 show of force to freak this is freak out our adversaries. And I will 617 00:49:16,159 --> 00:49:21,119 say too, you know, pushing back on this on this, what if 618 00:49:21,159 --> 00:49:24,599 a bit the B twenty one was revealed only once it was done, you 619 00:49:24,639 --> 00:49:28,679 know, and before then there were people talking about it, and you know, 620 00:49:28,719 --> 00:49:30,719 people knew it was existing, but there was very hush hush, And 621 00:49:30,800 --> 00:49:37,159 I think if if if we still don't know what this crashed vehicle is I 622 00:49:37,199 --> 00:49:40,559 don't know if we'd ever talked about it, because then what we're saying is 623 00:49:40,559 --> 00:49:43,800 we're tipping our hat that we have this thing, but we also have figured 624 00:49:43,800 --> 00:49:47,000 it out yet, right, Um, so this is all this big what 625 00:49:47,039 --> 00:49:55,280 ifs. So yeah, sorry, there's definitely a whole other analysis of the 626 00:49:55,400 --> 00:50:01,400 legal ramifications of everything that would would come out. So let say something, 627 00:50:02,360 --> 00:50:06,519 where's the I guess again the lawyer side, where's the liability on this? 628 00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:10,360 So again, so a national defense contractor as a board that governs it, 629 00:50:10,840 --> 00:50:15,440 now, they have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. So if all of 630 00:50:15,480 --> 00:50:20,760 a sudden they say they roll out this technology that they're reverse engineering, you 631 00:50:20,800 --> 00:50:22,119 know, what's that going to do from the bottom dollar that you know, 632 00:50:22,280 --> 00:50:25,760 is that going to give somebody else a technological advance that they would have had? 633 00:50:27,199 --> 00:50:30,199 Are they now open for lawsuits? Also? How did they acquire that 634 00:50:30,239 --> 00:50:35,280 technology? Did they steal it from someone? Did it fall on somebody's land 635 00:50:35,280 --> 00:50:37,639 and they now they're the owner and I came on your land, pretended to 636 00:50:37,639 --> 00:50:42,199 be an Air Force guy and stole it from you. So like there's there's 637 00:50:43,039 --> 00:50:46,679 levels of you know, lawsuit that could could occur that go back decade. 638 00:50:47,599 --> 00:50:53,079 So again, yeah, if if Broadswell happened and that piece of technology, 639 00:50:53,360 --> 00:50:58,159 which I guess if you look at property rights, landed on your property and 640 00:50:58,159 --> 00:51:00,639 you captured it, are you now the owner of it? So you the 641 00:51:00,679 --> 00:51:06,000 owner of that and then the Air Force took it from you and then handed 642 00:51:06,000 --> 00:51:09,760 it over somebody else? Do they owe you a trillion dollars in technology that 643 00:51:09,760 --> 00:51:14,679 that was derived from? That was their contract between any of the parties. 644 00:51:15,239 --> 00:51:20,159 Are they contractually obligated to keep this secret? You know? Are they not 645 00:51:20,239 --> 00:51:23,800 allowed to you know, tell anybody that this existed? So I guess there's 646 00:51:24,159 --> 00:51:30,599 there's a lot of the morality and the legality don't always align. I guess 647 00:51:30,599 --> 00:51:34,039 in our in our society, like you, there's things that are right and 648 00:51:34,079 --> 00:51:38,280 wrong but not necessarily legal. So they're gonna be held accountable for it. 649 00:51:38,320 --> 00:51:42,400 But yeah, they might be you know, a hero towards disclosure, but 650 00:51:42,440 --> 00:51:45,360 there you know, be poor and sit in jail the rest of their life, 651 00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:51,320 you know, so just not really or their decision might negatively impact other 652 00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:58,159 people that don't really care about disclosure. I think those those analysis should you 653 00:51:58,199 --> 00:52:00,920 know, at least come into play with this is if everything's tangled up in 654 00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:05,920 a legal mess, then you have to untangle that legal mess, which could 655 00:52:06,000 --> 00:52:09,199 also be something that going on in the background of this well you know, 656 00:52:09,280 --> 00:52:14,800 the you know, the other thing that's that's an interesting thought as well. 657 00:52:15,079 --> 00:52:20,920 So the Air Force recovers this technology and tells, you know, farmer Joe, 658 00:52:20,960 --> 00:52:22,000 oh, it's a weather balloon. We're just going to pick up the 659 00:52:22,039 --> 00:52:27,880 pieces and go on and go on. So the Air Force or whoever has 660 00:52:27,960 --> 00:52:34,480 this recovered craft, and they're probably not going to send this out to bid 661 00:52:34,519 --> 00:52:37,320 on who's going to reverse engineer it. So they're just going to say, 662 00:52:37,320 --> 00:52:40,559 okay, here, Northrop Grumman, you take it there, and excluding other 663 00:52:40,639 --> 00:52:46,519 potential bidders, I would think that there would be a lot of finance, 664 00:52:46,760 --> 00:52:52,280 sorry, legal ramifications for that, right, right, So all of a 665 00:52:52,280 --> 00:52:59,320 sudden, if you have if you have a um a company that existed at 666 00:52:59,360 --> 00:53:02,079 one point and then went under and a lot of shareholders lost their money but 667 00:53:02,119 --> 00:53:07,360 they were not allowed to openly bid, you know, there's there's you know, 668 00:53:07,239 --> 00:53:12,280 acquisitions as a whole, all the legalities that go around that, what 669 00:53:12,679 --> 00:53:16,760 the legal things that you have to do, uh to get contractual work and 670 00:53:16,760 --> 00:53:21,559 if they basically skirted that whole thing. And yeah, there might be legal 671 00:53:21,639 --> 00:53:25,920 ramifications, you know, there's there's probably there's things if if if, if 672 00:53:25,960 --> 00:53:30,880 everything we're hearing is true. This is a legal mess. There's a horrible 673 00:53:30,960 --> 00:53:37,000 legal mess, and it might not be in people's best interest to bring this 674 00:53:37,079 --> 00:53:40,400 out. Yeah, speaking speaking, this is the rotten fruit. Yeah, 675 00:53:40,519 --> 00:53:45,199 no, for sure, speaking a mass, there's a scheduling mass where eight 676 00:53:45,320 --> 00:53:52,920 ten and we still have not heard from the our our our friends over at 677 00:53:52,920 --> 00:53:57,159 the hearing it. I keep actually checking my phone. They just went on, 678 00:53:57,639 --> 00:54:00,519 went on, are you serious? Oh shit, here right now, 679 00:54:00,559 --> 00:54:04,719 all right, let's see it's not shown up here, so give me a 680 00:54:05,039 --> 00:54:07,280 second. Here, he will come to order. I'd first like to thank 681 00:54:07,320 --> 00:54:12,599 our witness, doctor Sean Kirkpatrick, for testifying here and in today's earlier close 682 00:54:12,639 --> 00:54:15,920 session, and for his long and distinguished career both in the intelligence community and 683 00:54:16,000 --> 00:54:21,719 in the Department Defense. Doctor Kirkpatrick is the director of the All Domain Anomaly 684 00:54:21,760 --> 00:54:25,800 Result Lucian Office or Arrow. Congress established this office in law to get to 685 00:54:25,800 --> 00:54:31,039 the bottom of the very serious problem of unidentified anomalist phenomenon or UAP. Doctor 686 00:54:31,079 --> 00:54:36,440 Kirkpatrick has a very difficult mission. While we have made progress, there remains 687 00:54:36,480 --> 00:54:40,119 a stigma attached to these phenomenon. There is a vast and complex citizen engagement, 688 00:54:40,320 --> 00:54:45,039 and there's also very challenging scientific and technical hurdles. So we appreciate the 689 00:54:45,039 --> 00:54:50,440 willingness of doctor Kirkpatrick to lean in on this issue and the work that he 690 00:54:50,519 --> 00:54:53,559 has accomplished thus far, and we look forward to both his opening statement and 691 00:54:53,639 --> 00:54:59,280 his presentation of examples of the work ARROW has done. In late twenty seventeen, 692 00:54:59,519 --> 00:55:02,400 media for its surfaced about activities set in motion by the late long serving 693 00:55:02,440 --> 00:55:07,719 Majority Leader Senator Harry Read more than a decade ago. We learned that there 694 00:55:07,800 --> 00:55:12,400 was strong evidence of advanced technology reflected in the features and performance characteristics of many 695 00:55:12,400 --> 00:55:16,679 objects observed by our hardly highly trained service members operating top of the line military 696 00:55:16,719 --> 00:55:22,840 equipment. We learned that for the at least the past eight years, military 697 00:55:22,880 --> 00:55:28,000 pilots frequently encountered unknown objects and controlled airspace off both the East and west coast 698 00:55:28,039 --> 00:55:32,159 across the continental United States in test and training areas and ranges. We don't 699 00:55:32,199 --> 00:55:36,559 know where they come from, who made them, or how they operate. 700 00:55:36,880 --> 00:55:40,280 As former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist observed, had any of these objects 701 00:55:40,280 --> 00:55:44,519 had the label made in China, there would be an uproar in the government 702 00:55:44,599 --> 00:55:47,039 and media. There would be no stone unturned and no effort spared to find 703 00:55:47,079 --> 00:55:51,119 out what we were dealing with. We can look at the recent incursion of 704 00:55:51,159 --> 00:55:55,559 the unidentified PRC hiot to balloon for as an example. But because of the 705 00:55:55,639 --> 00:56:01,559 UFO stigma, the response has been irresponsibly eMac and slow. Congress established ARROW, 706 00:56:01,679 --> 00:56:06,599 we made it clear that we expect vigorous action. We added very substantial 707 00:56:06,599 --> 00:56:09,920 initial funding for the office, but despite our best efforts, the President's budget 708 00:56:09,920 --> 00:56:15,199 for FISCUOS twenty three and twenty four requested only enough funding to defray the operating 709 00:56:15,239 --> 00:56:19,440 expenses of ERROW. It included almost no funds to sustain the critical research and 710 00:56:19,480 --> 00:56:22,760 development necessary to support a serious investigation. It took a letter to Secretary Austin 711 00:56:22,800 --> 00:56:28,360 from Senator Rubio and Me and fourteen other senators to get the office temporary relief 712 00:56:28,360 --> 00:56:30,960 for the current fiscal year. In this yearing I tend to probe a series 713 00:56:31,000 --> 00:56:36,119 of specific issues. In the recent incidents where multiple objects were shot down over 714 00:56:36,199 --> 00:56:39,320 North America, it seemed that Pentagon leadership did not turn to ARROW Office to 715 00:56:39,440 --> 00:56:44,079 play a leading role in advising the combatant commander. We need to know whether 716 00:56:44,119 --> 00:56:46,239 this will continue. We need to know whether the leadership and DoD will bring 717 00:56:46,400 --> 00:56:50,599 ARROW into the decision making process in a visible way, and we need to 718 00:56:50,639 --> 00:56:54,440 know what role ERROW will play an interagency coordination after the NSC Working Group disbands. 719 00:56:55,159 --> 00:57:00,000 In the fiscal year twenty twenty three National Defense and Intelligence Authorization Acts, 720 00:57:00,079 --> 00:57:04,679 Congress established a direct reporting chain from the ARROW Director to the Deputy Secretary of 721 00:57:04,679 --> 00:57:07,440 Defense. The role of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 722 00:57:07,440 --> 00:57:13,079 and Security is limited to providing administrative support. We need to know how this 723 00:57:13,159 --> 00:57:17,519 direction is being implemented. Uap are frequently observed flying in extremely high or very 724 00:57:17,559 --> 00:57:22,599 low speeds and come in various sizes and shapes. During the recent shootdowns over 725 00:57:22,639 --> 00:57:28,400 North America, disclosed that filters on radar systems were adjusted to allow for detection 726 00:57:28,400 --> 00:57:31,079 and tracking of diverse sets of objects for the first time. While opening the 727 00:57:31,079 --> 00:57:36,679 aperture can overload the real time analytic process, we cannot keep turning a blind 728 00:57:36,719 --> 00:57:39,719 eye to surveillance data that is critical to detecting and tracting UAP. We need 729 00:57:39,760 --> 00:57:45,320 to know whether doctor Kirkpatrick can achieve the necessary control over sensor filters and the 730 00:57:45,400 --> 00:57:50,000 storage and access to raw surveillance data to find UAP anomalies. Finally, one 731 00:57:50,000 --> 00:57:52,719 of the task Congress set for ARROW is serving as an open door for witnesses 732 00:57:52,719 --> 00:57:59,480 of UAP events or participants in government activities related to UAPs to come forward securely 733 00:57:59,519 --> 00:58:05,079 and what they know without fear of retribution for any possible violations of previously signed 734 00:58:05,119 --> 00:58:10,320 nondisclosure agreements, congressmandated that ARROW set up a publicly discoverable and accessible process for 735 00:58:10,400 --> 00:58:15,760 safe disclosure. While we know that AERO has already conducted a significant number of 736 00:58:15,760 --> 00:58:19,639 interviews, many referred by Congress, we need to set up a public process 737 00:58:19,719 --> 00:58:22,559 that and we need to know where that effort stands. With that, I'd 738 00:58:22,559 --> 00:58:25,519 like to turn a Senator Earns for her opening statement. Thank you, Madam 739 00:58:25,639 --> 00:58:30,559 Chair, and thank you doctor Kirkpatrick for your testimony today. I'll keep these 740 00:58:30,639 --> 00:58:36,519 remarks very brief so that we have maximum time for your briefing. The recent 741 00:58:36,599 --> 00:58:42,719 downing of the Chinese surveillance balloon and three other objects underscores the need for domain 742 00:58:42,920 --> 00:58:47,760 awareness. Adversaries like China and Russia are working to hold US interests, including 743 00:58:47,840 --> 00:58:53,000 our homeland, at risk. That's why your testimony is so important and I 744 00:58:53,079 --> 00:58:58,599 so look forward to a progress update on the establishment of your office. As 745 00:58:58,599 --> 00:59:04,159 members know, your office from the Navy led Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force to 746 00:59:04,280 --> 00:59:09,559 the All Domain Anomalous Resolution Office known as ARROW. Doctor Kirkpatrick, your extensive 747 00:59:09,599 --> 00:59:16,239 background in science and technology, research and development, and space makes you well 748 00:59:16,280 --> 00:59:22,079 suited to discuss these emerging challenges. My priority is that we understand the full 749 00:59:22,199 --> 00:59:28,559 range of threats posed by our adversaries in all domains. That is what the 750 00:59:28,639 --> 00:59:32,079 Joint Force needs to be prepared to fight and win in defense of our nation. 751 00:59:32,719 --> 00:59:38,199 This committee needs to know about Chinese or Russian advanced technology programs to exploit 752 00:59:38,280 --> 00:59:43,679 our vulnerabilities, and it needs to know whether your office, along with the 753 00:59:43,960 --> 00:59:49,880 IC, as detective potential Chinese or Russian capabilities to surveil or attack US. 754 00:59:50,280 --> 00:59:55,760 Finally, we need to ensure efficient interagency coordination. Multiple elements of the DoD 755 00:59:57,079 --> 01:00:02,119 and IC own a piece of this submission. To add value. ARROWS efforts 756 01:00:02,159 --> 01:00:07,559 cannot be redundant with others. Thank you again, we look forward to your 757 01:00:07,599 --> 01:00:15,000 testimony. Doctor Kirkpatrick, you can give your testimony. Thank you, Chairwoman 758 01:00:15,079 --> 01:00:20,400 Joel Brand, ranking member Ernst, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It's a 759 01:00:20,400 --> 01:00:24,840 privilege to be here today to testify on the Defense Defense's efforts to address unidentified 760 01:00:24,840 --> 01:00:30,280 animalist phenomena. First, I want to thank Congress for its extensive and continued 761 01:00:30,320 --> 01:00:35,320 partnership as the Department works to better understand and respond to UAP in an effort 762 01:00:35,320 --> 01:00:42,039 to minimize technical and intelligence surprise. Unidentified objects in any domain pose potential risks 763 01:00:42,039 --> 01:00:47,280 to safety and security, particularly from military personnel and capabilities. Congress and DoD 764 01:00:47,440 --> 01:00:54,119 agree that UAP cannot remain unexamined or unaddressed. We are grateful for sustained Congressional 765 01:00:54,159 --> 01:00:59,320 engagement on this issue, which paved the way for the DODS establishment of the 766 01:00:59,360 --> 01:01:04,559 All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office in July of last year. Though ERRO is still 767 01:01:04,559 --> 01:01:09,119 a young office, the spotlight on UAP in recent months underscores the importance of 768 01:01:09,159 --> 01:01:14,519 its work and the need for UAP to be taken seriously as a matter of 769 01:01:14,599 --> 01:01:19,559 national security. All leadership that I've had the pleasure of working with, whether 770 01:01:19,639 --> 01:01:24,159 DODIC, DOE, Civil, scientific, or industrial view Congress as a critical 771 01:01:24,199 --> 01:01:30,679 partner in this endeavor, ARRO has accomplished much in the last nine months since 772 01:01:30,679 --> 01:01:35,679 it was established. The ARROW team of more than three dozen experts is organized 773 01:01:35,719 --> 01:01:40,599 around four functional areas, Operations, scientific research, integrated analysis, and strategic 774 01:01:40,599 --> 01:01:46,480 communications. In the nine months since Arrow's establishment, we've taken important steps to 775 01:01:46,559 --> 01:01:53,599 involve and improve UAP data collection, standardize the Department's UAP internal reporting requirements, 776 01:01:54,079 --> 01:02:00,239 and implement a framework for rigorous scientific and intelligence analysis, allowing us to resolve 777 01:02:00,360 --> 01:02:07,719 cases in a systematic and prioritize manner. Meanwhile, consistent with legislative direction, 778 01:02:07,039 --> 01:02:14,159 ARROW is also carefully reviewing and researching the US government's UAP related historical record. 779 01:02:15,440 --> 01:02:19,719 ARROW is leading a focused effort to better characterize, understand, and attribute UAP, 780 01:02:20,719 --> 01:02:24,760 with priority given to UAP reports by DoD and IC personnel in or near 781 01:02:24,920 --> 01:02:31,719 areas of national security importance. DoD fully appreciates the eagerness from many quarters, 782 01:02:31,840 --> 01:02:37,039 especially here in Congress and in the American public, to quickly resolve every UAP 783 01:02:37,400 --> 01:02:42,559 encountered across the globe from the distant pass through today. It's important to note, 784 01:02:42,559 --> 01:02:47,960 however, ARROW is the culmination of decades of DoD intelligence community and congressionally 785 01:02:49,000 --> 01:02:54,360 directed efforts to successfully resolve UAP encountered first and foremost by US military personnel, 786 01:02:54,760 --> 01:03:00,960 specifically Navy and Air Force pilots. The law establishing a ROW is ambitious, 787 01:03:00,199 --> 01:03:05,760 and it will take time to realize the full mission. We cannot answer decades 788 01:03:05,760 --> 01:03:10,199 of questions about UAP all at once, but we must begin somewhere. While 789 01:03:10,239 --> 01:03:15,000 I assure you that ERRO will follow scientific evidence wherever it leads, I ask 790 01:03:15,039 --> 01:03:21,079 for your patients, as DoD first prioritizes safety and security of our military personnel 791 01:03:21,119 --> 01:03:25,760 and installations in all domains. After all, a UAP encountered first by highly 792 01:03:25,800 --> 01:03:32,320 capable DoD and IC platforms featuring the nation's most advanced sensors are those UAP most 793 01:03:32,320 --> 01:03:37,320 likely to be resolved by my office, assuming the data can be collected. 794 01:03:37,079 --> 01:03:42,800 If ARROW succeeds in first improving the ability of military personnel to quickly and a 795 01:03:42,960 --> 01:03:46,920 confidently resolve UAP they encounter, I believe that in time we will have greatly 796 01:03:46,960 --> 01:03:52,559 advanced the capability of the entire United States Government, including its civilian agencies, 797 01:03:52,599 --> 01:03:57,880 to resolve UAP. However, it would be naive to believe that the resolution 798 01:03:57,960 --> 01:04:01,880 of all UAP can be solely acomplished by the DoD and IC alone. We 799 01:04:01,960 --> 01:04:08,159 will need to prioritize collection and leverage authorities from monitoring all domains within the continental 800 01:04:08,239 --> 01:04:14,719 United States. Arrow's ultimate success will require partnerships with the interagency, industry partners, 801 01:04:14,760 --> 01:04:18,159 academia, and the scientific community, as well as the public. ARROW 802 01:04:18,239 --> 01:04:23,400 is partnering with the Services Intelligence Community DOE, as well as civil partners and 803 01:04:23,440 --> 01:04:29,079 across the US government to tap into the resources of the interagency. The UAP 804 01:04:29,320 --> 01:04:33,559 challenge is more an operational and scientific issue than it is an intelligence issue. 805 01:04:34,400 --> 01:04:39,599 As such, we are working with industry, academia, and the scientific community, 806 01:04:39,679 --> 01:04:44,559 which bring their own resources, ideas, and expertise to this challenging problem. 807 01:04:44,599 --> 01:04:49,599 Set Robust collaboration and peer review across a broad range of partners will promote 808 01:04:49,639 --> 01:04:56,599 greater objectivity and transparency in the study of UAP. I want to underscore today 809 01:04:56,639 --> 01:05:01,440 that only a very small percentage of UAP reports display signatures that could reasonably be 810 01:05:01,480 --> 01:05:10,239 described as anomalius. The majority of unidentified objects reported to ARROW demonstrate mundane characteristics 811 01:05:10,280 --> 01:05:15,519 of balloons, unmanned aerial systems, clutter, natural phenomena, other readily explainable 812 01:05:15,559 --> 01:05:20,599 sources. While a large number of cases in our holdings remain technically unresolved. 813 01:05:20,840 --> 01:05:26,840 This is primarily due to a lack of data associated with those cases. Without 814 01:05:26,840 --> 01:05:32,039 sufficient data, we are unable to reach defendable conclusions that meet the high scientific 815 01:05:32,079 --> 01:05:35,840 standards we set for resolution. And I will not close a case that I 816 01:05:35,880 --> 01:05:42,760 cannot defend the conclusions of. I recognize that this answer is unsatisfying to those 817 01:05:42,800 --> 01:05:45,920 who, in good faith assume that what they see with their eyes, with 818 01:05:45,000 --> 01:05:50,840 their cameras, and with their radars as incontrovertible evidence of extraordinary characteristics and performance. 819 01:05:51,519 --> 01:05:55,760 Yet, time and again, with sufficient scientific quality data, it is 820 01:05:55,840 --> 01:06:02,280 fact that UAP often but not always resolve to readily explainable sources. Humans are 821 01:06:02,320 --> 01:06:08,679 subject to deception and illusions, sensors to unexpected responses and malfunctions, and in 822 01:06:08,719 --> 01:06:13,800 some cases, intentional interference. Getting to the handful of cases that pass this 823 01:06:13,920 --> 01:06:17,039 level of scrutiny is the mission of error. That is not to say that 824 01:06:17,199 --> 01:06:23,119 UAP wants resolved are no longer of national security interest. However, on the 825 01:06:23,159 --> 01:06:27,639 contrary, learning that a UAP isn't of exotic origin but is instead just a 826 01:06:27,719 --> 01:06:31,320 quad copter or a balloon leads to the question of who is operating that quad 827 01:06:31,360 --> 01:06:38,400 copter into what purpose. The answers to those questions will inform potential national security 828 01:06:38,480 --> 01:06:43,480 or law enforcement responses. Arrow is a member of the department's support to the 829 01:06:43,480 --> 01:06:47,760 administration's Tiger Team effort to deal with stratospheric objects such as the PRC High Altitude 830 01:06:47,800 --> 01:06:56,119 balloon. While when previously unknown objects are successfully identified, it is Arrow's role 831 01:06:56,239 --> 01:07:00,519 to quickly and efficiently hand off such readily explainable object X to the intelligence, 832 01:07:00,639 --> 01:07:06,960 law enforcement, or operational safety communities for further analysis and appropriate action. In 833 01:07:06,960 --> 01:07:13,400 other words, ero's mission is to turn UAP into SEP somebody else's problem. 834 01:07:15,239 --> 01:07:18,840 The US government, the DoD and the IC in particular, has tremendous capabilities 835 01:07:18,880 --> 01:07:24,519 to deal with those encountered objects. In the wake of the PRC HAB event, 836 01:07:24,880 --> 01:07:30,480 the interagency is working to better integrate and share information to address identifiable stratospheric 837 01:07:30,559 --> 01:07:35,719 objects, but that is not Arrow's lane. Meanwhile, for the few cases 838 01:07:35,760 --> 01:07:42,880 in all domains space, air, and C that do demonstrate potentially anomalous characteristics, 839 01:07:43,000 --> 01:07:47,880 ERO exists to help the DODIC and Interagency resolve those anomalous cases. In 840 01:07:48,039 --> 01:07:53,719 doing so, Arrow is approaching these cases with the highest level of objectivity and 841 01:07:53,800 --> 01:08:00,159 analytic rigor. This includes physically testing and employing modeling and simulation to validate our 842 01:08:00,199 --> 01:08:03,960 analyzes and underlying theories, then peer reviewing those results within the US government, 843 01:08:04,400 --> 01:08:11,920 industry partners, and appropriately cleared academic institutions before reaching any conclusions. I should 844 01:08:11,920 --> 01:08:15,880 also state clearly for the record that in our research, ARROW has found no 845 01:08:15,960 --> 01:08:21,560 credible evidence thus far of extraterrestrial activity off world technology or objects that defy the 846 01:08:21,680 --> 01:08:28,640 known laws of physics. In the event sufficient scientific data were ever attained that 847 01:08:28,720 --> 01:08:32,880 a UAP encountered can only be explained by extraterrestrial origin. We are committed to 848 01:08:32,920 --> 01:08:39,600 working with our interagency partners at NASA to appropriately inform US governments leadership of its 849 01:08:39,640 --> 01:08:45,640 findings for those few cases that have leaked to the public previously and subsequently commented 850 01:08:45,640 --> 01:08:49,199 on by the US government. I encourage those who hold alternative theories or views 851 01:08:49,199 --> 01:08:55,399 to submit your research to credible, peer reviewed scientific journals. ARROW is working 852 01:08:55,479 --> 01:08:59,520 very hard to do the same. That is how science works, not by 853 01:08:59,560 --> 01:09:03,600 blog or social media. We know that there is tremendous public interest in UAP 854 01:09:03,800 --> 01:09:09,279 and a desire for answers from Arrow. By its very nature, the UAP 855 01:09:09,520 --> 01:09:15,199 challenge has for decades lent itself to mystery, sensationalism, and even conspiracy. 856 01:09:15,800 --> 01:09:19,880 For that reason, ARROW remains committed to transparency, accountability, and to sharing 857 01:09:19,920 --> 01:09:25,520 as much with the American public as we can, consistent with our obligation to 858 01:09:25,560 --> 01:09:30,960 protect and not only intelligence sources and methods, but US and Allied capabilities. 859 01:09:31,000 --> 01:09:34,600 However, Arrow's work will take time. If we are committed to do it 860 01:09:34,680 --> 01:09:40,520 right. It means adhering to the scientific method and the highest standards of research 861 01:09:40,560 --> 01:09:45,479 integrity. It means being methodical and scrupulous. It means withholding judgment in favor 862 01:09:45,520 --> 01:09:49,640 of evidence. It means following the data where it leads, wherever it leads. 863 01:09:50,239 --> 01:09:57,039 It means establishing scientific, peer reviewed theoretical underpinnings of observed data. An 864 01:09:57,159 --> 01:10:00,840 Arrow is committed to all of the standards. I'm proud of Arrow's progress over 865 01:10:00,880 --> 01:10:04,880 the last nine months months. Much remains to be done, but the hard 866 01:10:04,880 --> 01:10:10,119 work is under way. Thank you for your continued support. And before we 867 01:10:10,199 --> 01:10:14,039 turn to questions, I'm going to walk you through some of our analytical trends 868 01:10:14,039 --> 01:10:20,039 in a couple of cases that we've prepared. So one of the things that 869 01:10:20,239 --> 01:10:29,760 ARROW does is high integrity analysis. As I've said, this chart represents the 870 01:10:29,800 --> 01:10:36,000 trend analysis of all the cases in Arrow's holdings right to date. What you'll 871 01:10:36,000 --> 01:10:43,479 see on the left is a histogram of all of our reported sightings as a 872 01:10:43,560 --> 01:10:50,880 function of altitude. So most of our sightings occur in the fifteen to twenty 873 01:10:50,880 --> 01:10:56,000 five thousand foot range, and that is ultimately because that's where a lot of 874 01:10:56,039 --> 01:11:01,600 our aircraft are. On the far right upper corner, you'll see a breakout 875 01:11:01,720 --> 01:11:08,439 of the morphologies of all of the UAP that are reported. Over half about 876 01:11:08,520 --> 01:11:15,119 fifty two percent of what's been reported to us are round or spheres. The 877 01:11:15,199 --> 01:11:19,319 rest of those break out into all kinds of different other shapes. The gray 878 01:11:19,399 --> 01:11:26,800 box is essentially there's no data on what its shape is, either it wasn't 879 01:11:26,840 --> 01:11:31,920 reported or the sensor did not collect it. The bottom map is a heat 880 01:11:31,960 --> 01:11:36,720 map of all reporting areas across the globe that we have available to us. 881 01:11:39,359 --> 01:11:44,359 What you'll notice is that there is a heavy what we call collection bias, 882 01:11:44,520 --> 01:11:49,720 both in altitude and in geographic location. That's where all of our sensors exist, 883 01:11:50,960 --> 01:11:55,840 that's where our training ranges are, that's where our operational ranges are that's 884 01:11:55,840 --> 01:12:00,720 where all of our platforms are in the middle. What we have done is 885 01:12:01,159 --> 01:12:11,319 reduce the most typically reported UAP characteristics to these fields, mostly round, mostly 886 01:12:11,319 --> 01:12:18,199 one to four meters white silver translucent metallic ten thousand and thirty thousand feet with 887 01:12:18,239 --> 01:12:26,640 apparent velocities from stationary to MOK two. No thermal exhausts usually detected. We 888 01:12:26,760 --> 01:12:32,319 get intermittent radar returns, we get intermittent radio returns, and we get intermittent 889 01:12:32,359 --> 01:12:38,880 thermal signatures. That's what we're looking for and trying to understand what that is. 890 01:12:41,319 --> 01:12:48,199 Next LT so I'm going to walk you through two cases that we've declassified 891 01:12:48,279 --> 01:12:56,159 recently. This first one is an MQ nine in the Middle East observing that 892 01:12:56,199 --> 01:13:00,920 blow up, which is an apparent spherical object via EO censors. Those are 893 01:13:00,960 --> 01:13:04,720 not i R. If you want to go ahead and click that and play 894 01:13:04,760 --> 01:13:11,760 it, you'll see it come through the top of the screen. There it 895 01:13:11,800 --> 01:13:16,119 goes, and then the camera will slew to follow it. You'll see it 896 01:13:16,199 --> 01:13:21,119 pop in and out of the field of view there. This is essentially all 897 01:13:21,159 --> 01:13:28,199 of the data we have associated with this event from some years ago. It 898 01:13:28,279 --> 01:13:33,000 is going to be virtually impossible to fully identify that just based off of that 899 01:13:33,159 --> 01:13:38,399 video. Now, what we can do and what we are doing is keeping 900 01:13:38,439 --> 01:13:45,319 that as part of that group of fifty two to see what are the similarities. 901 01:13:45,439 --> 01:13:48,479 What are the trends across all of these Do we see these in a 902 01:13:48,680 --> 01:13:54,560 particular distribution, do they all behave the same or not. As we get 903 01:13:54,600 --> 01:13:59,119 more data, we will be able to go back and look at these in 904 01:13:59,159 --> 01:14:02,079 a fuller content. Next, how are we going to get more data? 905 01:14:02,399 --> 01:14:08,039 We are working with the Joint staff to issue guidance to all the services and 906 01:14:08,079 --> 01:14:13,920 commands that will then establish what are the reporting requirements, the timeliness and all 907 01:14:13,960 --> 01:14:17,960 of the data that is required to be delivered to us and retained from all 908 01:14:18,039 --> 01:14:24,479 the associated sensors. That historically hasn't been the case, and it's been happenstance 909 01:14:24,560 --> 01:14:33,600 that data has been collected. Next, let this particular event South Asia MQ 910 01:14:33,840 --> 01:14:40,840 nine looking at another MQ nine and what's highlighted there in that red circle is 911 01:14:40,880 --> 01:14:46,079 an object that flies through the screen. Unlike the previous one, this one 912 01:14:46,159 --> 01:14:51,119 actually shows some really interesting things that everyone thought was truly anomalous to start with. 913 01:14:51,760 --> 01:14:56,479 First of all, it's a high speed object that's flying in the field 914 01:14:56,520 --> 01:15:02,039 of regard of two. MQ nine's second appears to have this trail behind it 915 01:15:03,239 --> 01:15:10,520 right which at first blush you would think that looks like a propulsion trail in 916 01:15:10,640 --> 01:15:15,159 reality. If you want to play the first slide, we'll show you what 917 01:15:15,239 --> 01:15:17,920 that looks like in real time or first video. So we're looking at that 918 01:15:18,039 --> 01:15:25,840 there it goes once you play it again and then pause it halfway through right 919 01:15:25,840 --> 01:15:29,560 there, all right, if you might be able to see that trail there 920 01:15:29,640 --> 01:15:36,600 behind it, that's actually not a real trail. That is a sensor artifact. 921 01:15:36,840 --> 01:15:42,119 Each one of those little blobs is actually a representation of the object as 922 01:15:42,159 --> 01:15:48,760 it's moving through and later in the video as the as the camera slews, 923 01:15:48,920 --> 01:15:55,119 that trail actually follows the direction of the camera, not the direction of the 924 01:15:55,399 --> 01:16:00,279 object. We pulled these apart frame by frame, we were able to demonstrate 925 01:16:00,319 --> 01:16:05,920 that that is essentially a readout overlap of the image. It's a shadow image, 926 01:16:06,119 --> 01:16:12,239 right, it's not real. Further, if you later follow this all 927 01:16:12,239 --> 01:16:16,079 the way to end, it starts to resolve itself into that blob that's in 928 01:16:16,119 --> 01:16:19,359 that picture in the top of the right, and if you squint, it 929 01:16:19,399 --> 01:16:23,760 looks like an aircraft because it actually turns out to be an aircraft. Go 930 01:16:23,800 --> 01:16:30,159 ahead and put that on so you'll see the tail sort of pop out there. 931 01:16:30,239 --> 01:16:33,119 And so what you're looking at is this is in the infrared. This 932 01:16:33,279 --> 01:16:39,319 is the heat signature off of the engines of a commuter aircraft that happened to 933 01:16:39,319 --> 01:16:44,840 be flying in the vicinity of where those two mq nines were at. Why 934 01:16:44,880 --> 01:16:47,079 am I showing you this? So the first one that I showed you we 935 01:16:47,119 --> 01:16:51,680 don't have resolved yet, right, that is an unresolved case. We are 936 01:16:51,720 --> 01:16:57,600 still studying this one we can resolve, but this is the kind of data 937 01:16:57,640 --> 01:17:00,159 that we have to work with. Then the type of analysis that we have 938 01:17:00,279 --> 01:17:04,039 to do, which can be quite extensive when you have to pull these apart 939 01:17:04,520 --> 01:17:11,439 frame by frame. Further, we're now matching all of this with the models 940 01:17:11,479 --> 01:17:15,600 of all of those imaging sensors so that I can say I can recreate this. 941 01:17:15,800 --> 01:17:20,359 I can actually show how the sensor is going to respond. All of 942 01:17:20,399 --> 01:17:27,079 these sensors don't necessarily respond the way you think they do, especially out in 943 01:17:27,119 --> 01:17:31,960 the world and in the field. And I believe that's all I have, 944 01:17:32,079 --> 01:17:35,800 and I will open it up for your questions. Thank you so much, 945 01:17:35,920 --> 01:17:42,840 doctor Kirkpatrick, Can you just give us some raw numbers of how many UAPs 946 01:17:42,960 --> 01:17:46,600 you've analyzed, how many have been resolved and sort of in what buckets, 947 01:17:46,640 --> 01:17:49,760 and then how many are still left to be resolved? Just an update from 948 01:17:49,760 --> 01:17:55,560 your January public report where it was three sixty six or something and about one 949 01:17:55,640 --> 01:18:00,600 hundred and fifty were balloons and about two dozen words owns, you know, 950 01:18:00,640 --> 01:18:03,039 just give us an update if you have sure. So, as of this 951 01:18:03,159 --> 01:18:10,079 week, we are tracking over a total of six hundred and fifty cases. 952 01:18:12,039 --> 01:18:16,039 Now, the report in January basically said about half of the ones at that 953 01:18:16,119 --> 01:18:20,199 time, about one hundred and fifty were balloon, were likely balloon like or 954 01:18:20,239 --> 01:18:25,840 something like that. That doesn't mean they're resolved. Oh so what Let me 955 01:18:26,000 --> 01:18:30,600 let me walk everyone through what our analytic process looks like. We have an 956 01:18:30,760 --> 01:18:35,840 essentially a five step process, right, so we have we get our cases 957 01:18:35,880 --> 01:18:43,600 in with all the data, we create a case for that event. My 958 01:18:43,720 --> 01:18:47,880 team does a preliminary scrub of all of those cases as they come in, 959 01:18:48,000 --> 01:18:54,039 just to sort out do we have any information that says this is in one 960 01:18:54,079 --> 01:18:57,920 of those likely categories. It's likely a balloon, It's likely a balloon, 961 01:18:58,239 --> 01:19:04,600 a bird, it's likely some other object or we don't know. Then we 962 01:19:05,479 --> 01:19:11,840 prioritize those based off of where they are. Are they attached to a national 963 01:19:11,880 --> 01:19:18,520 security area, Does it show some anomalous phenomenology that is of interest If it's 964 01:19:19,039 --> 01:19:24,920 if it's just a spherical thing that's floating around with the wind and it has 965 01:19:24,960 --> 01:19:28,760 no payload on it, that's going to be less important than something that has 966 01:19:28,760 --> 01:19:31,159 a payload on it, which will be less important than something that's maneuvering. 967 01:19:32,159 --> 01:19:36,560 Right, So there's there's sort of a hierarchy of just binning the priorities because 968 01:19:36,640 --> 01:19:42,239 we can't do all of them at once. Once. We do that and 969 01:19:42,279 --> 01:19:45,079 we prioritize them when we take that package of data in that case, and 970 01:19:45,159 --> 01:19:48,880 I have set up two teams. Think of this as a red team, 971 01:19:48,920 --> 01:19:55,199 Blue team, or a competitive analysis. I have an intelligence community team made 972 01:19:55,239 --> 01:19:59,800 up of intelligence analysts, and I have an S and T team made up 973 01:19:59,840 --> 01:20:02,239 of of scientists and engineers and the people that actually build a lot of these 974 01:20:02,239 --> 01:20:05,720 sensors, or physicists because you know, if you're a physicist, you can 975 01:20:05,760 --> 01:20:14,920 do anything right. But they're not associated with the intel community. They're not 976 01:20:15,000 --> 01:20:19,119 Intel officers. They look at this through the lens of the censor of what 977 01:20:19,199 --> 01:20:25,399 the data says. We give that package to both teams. The intelligence community 978 01:20:25,439 --> 01:20:28,520 is going to look at it through the lens of the intelligence record and what 979 01:20:28,560 --> 01:20:33,119 they assess and their intel tradecraft, which they have very specific rules and regulations 980 01:20:33,119 --> 01:20:38,399 on how they do that. Scientific community technical community is going to look at 981 01:20:38,399 --> 01:20:41,600 it through the lens of what is the data telling me, what is the 982 01:20:41,600 --> 01:20:46,159 sensor doing, what would I expect a sensor response to be, and back 983 01:20:46,239 --> 01:20:51,760 that out. Those two groups give us their answers. We then adjudicate. 984 01:20:53,880 --> 01:20:58,159 If they agree, then I am more likely to close that case. If 985 01:20:58,199 --> 01:21:00,840 they agree on what it is. If they disagree, we will have an 986 01:21:00,840 --> 01:21:04,319 adjudication. We'll bring them together, We'll take a look at the differences, 987 01:21:04,720 --> 01:21:10,399 will adjudicate what why do you say one thing and you say another. We 988 01:21:10,479 --> 01:21:16,920 will then come to a case a recommendation that'll get written up by my team 989 01:21:17,000 --> 01:21:24,159 that then goes to a senior technical advisory group, which is outside of all 990 01:21:24,199 --> 01:21:30,760 of those people, made up of senior technical folks and intel analysts and operators 991 01:21:30,880 --> 01:21:40,960 from retired out of the community, and they essentially peer review what that case 992 01:21:41,319 --> 01:21:46,279 recommendation is they write their recommendations, that comes back to me. I review 993 01:21:46,319 --> 01:21:49,279 it, we make a determination, and I'll sign off one way or the 994 01:21:49,319 --> 01:21:56,199 other, and then that will go out as the case determination. Once we 995 01:21:56,279 --> 01:22:00,039 have an approved web portal to hang the unclassified stuff, we will do, 996 01:22:00,239 --> 01:22:03,399 you know, we will downgrade and declassify things and put it out there. 997 01:22:04,159 --> 01:22:09,520 In the meantime, we're putting a lot of these on our classified web portal 998 01:22:09,960 --> 01:22:13,359 where we can then collaborate with the rest of the community so they can see 999 01:22:13,399 --> 01:22:18,359 what's going on. That's in a nutshell. That is the process, right 1000 01:22:18,439 --> 01:22:29,560 So because of that, that takes time. So of those over six hundred 1001 01:22:29,560 --> 01:22:35,640 and fifty, you know, we've prioritized about half of them to be of 1002 01:22:39,039 --> 01:22:44,000 anomalous interesting value. And now we have to go through those and go how 1003 01:22:44,079 --> 01:22:47,560 much do I have actual data for? Because if all I have is an 1004 01:22:48,000 --> 01:22:54,239 operator report that says I saw X, Y or Z, my assessment is 1005 01:22:54,680 --> 01:22:58,520 a B or C, that's not really sufficient. That's a good place to 1006 01:22:58,600 --> 01:23:01,600 start. But I have to have data. I have to have radar data, 1007 01:23:01,640 --> 01:23:03,920 I have to have EYEO data, I have to have thermal data, 1008 01:23:03,960 --> 01:23:10,439 I have to have overhead data and we need to look at all that now 1009 01:23:10,760 --> 01:23:15,159 from a big picture perspective. I still have that's all still very valuable data, 1010 01:23:15,199 --> 01:23:20,720 and we're looking at applying a lot of things new tools, analytic tools 1011 01:23:20,760 --> 01:23:27,239 like natural language processing, so I can go across all of those reports and 1012 01:23:27,359 --> 01:23:32,079 look for commonalities. How many of them are being described as round spherical objects 1013 01:23:32,159 --> 01:23:35,119 that are maneuvering, how many of them are not maneuvering, how many of 1014 01:23:35,159 --> 01:23:42,159 them seem to have a plume to it, or note that's also going to 1015 01:23:42,199 --> 01:23:45,920 be very valuable to give us more of a global picture and a trends analysis 1016 01:23:45,000 --> 01:23:50,960 of what are we seeing and help us get to the determination. So go 1017 01:23:51,000 --> 01:23:58,600 back to your question, ma'am. We have this next quarterly report will be 1018 01:23:58,640 --> 01:24:04,239 coming out here pretty soon. Our next annual report you all have given us 1019 01:24:04,920 --> 01:24:10,800 moved it up to June July. We're going to be having that done about 1020 01:24:11,159 --> 01:24:15,319 that timeframe, and we will have a we'll be combining a whole number of 1021 01:24:15,359 --> 01:24:25,840 reports into that one. I think we're currently sitting at around if I remember, 1022 01:24:25,880 --> 01:24:30,159 Craig, we were around tenty to thirty ish, are about halfway through 1023 01:24:30,199 --> 01:24:34,279 that analytic process. A handful of them have made it all the way out 1024 01:24:34,319 --> 01:24:40,159 to the other side gone through peer review. We've got case closure reports done 1025 01:24:40,199 --> 01:24:45,199 and signed. We're going to get faster as we get more people on board 1026 01:24:45,800 --> 01:24:49,960 and we get more of the community tools to automate some of the analysis that 1027 01:24:50,079 --> 01:24:56,880 has to be done. Yeah, thank you, Madam, Chair and doctor 1028 01:24:56,960 --> 01:25:02,680 Kirkpatrick. The O D and I Annual Threats states that China's space activities are 1029 01:25:02,760 --> 01:25:11,239 designed to erode US influence across military, technological, economic, and diplomatic spheres. 1030 01:25:11,399 --> 01:25:15,840 Likewise, Russia will remain a key space competitor. In the course of 1031 01:25:15,880 --> 01:25:21,079 your work, have you become aware of any Chinese or Russia technical advancements to 1032 01:25:21,119 --> 01:25:28,840 surveil or attack US interests? So that's a great question. Part of what 1033 01:25:28,880 --> 01:25:32,600 we have to do as we go through these, especially the ones that show 1034 01:25:33,800 --> 01:25:42,680 signatures of advanced technical capabilities, is determined if there's a foreign nexus. That's 1035 01:25:42,800 --> 01:25:47,319 really hard if what we observe doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag on the 1036 01:25:47,359 --> 01:25:59,520 side of it. Now, I think it is prudent to say of the 1037 01:25:59,640 --> 01:26:04,560 case is that are showing, you know, some sort of advanced technical signature 1038 01:26:04,720 --> 01:26:11,079 of which we're talking single percentages of the entire population of cases we have. 1039 01:26:13,199 --> 01:26:20,079 I am concerned about what that nexus is, and I have indicators that some 1040 01:26:20,319 --> 01:26:28,520 are related to foreign capabilities. We have to investigate that with our IC partners, 1041 01:26:29,479 --> 01:26:32,560 and as we get evidence to support that, that gets then handed off 1042 01:26:32,600 --> 01:26:40,319 to the appropriate ICE agency to investigate. Again. It becomes an SEP at 1043 01:26:40,319 --> 01:26:43,880 that point. Yeah, somebody else's problem, right, very good, thank 1044 01:26:43,920 --> 01:26:50,680 you. Yes, it is it possible that the Chinese or Russian advanced technologies 1045 01:26:50,680 --> 01:26:57,159 could could be causing some of these anomalous behaviors, said, and you said, 1046 01:26:57,199 --> 01:27:03,680 there seems to be some indicators. So just for us today, could 1047 01:27:03,680 --> 01:27:11,800 you describe potential threat that might exist out there if they are foreign nexus. 1048 01:27:13,479 --> 01:27:19,840 In order to do this research appropriately, we have to also be cognizant of 1049 01:27:19,840 --> 01:27:24,439 what is the state of the art and development across the S and T community. 1050 01:27:25,560 --> 01:27:30,119 Is what are the darpness of the world doing. What's the horizon scanning 1051 01:27:30,399 --> 01:27:39,079 of emerging technologies appropriate to this subcommittee? What is happening out there and if 1052 01:27:39,079 --> 01:27:44,359 somebody could accelerate that capability, how would that manifest itself and what would it 1053 01:27:44,399 --> 01:27:49,640 look like? And do those signatures match what we're seeing? There are emerging 1054 01:27:49,720 --> 01:27:59,199 capabilities out there that in many instances, Russia and China, well China in 1055 01:27:59,239 --> 01:28:04,640 particular, are on par or ahead of us in some areas. Right, 1056 01:28:04,720 --> 01:28:10,840 So, previously I used to be the Defense Department's intelligence officer for Science and 1057 01:28:10,880 --> 01:28:15,199 Technical Intelligence. That was our job was to look for what does all that 1058 01:28:15,239 --> 01:28:23,039 look like? And then my last several years of course in Space Command doing 1059 01:28:23,279 --> 01:28:34,319 space the adversary is not waiting. They are advancing, and they're advancing quickly. 1060 01:28:35,319 --> 01:28:38,760 If I were to put on some of my old hats, I would 1061 01:28:38,760 --> 01:28:46,119 tell you they are less risk averse at technical advancement than we are. Right, 1062 01:28:46,159 --> 01:28:49,960 They are just willing to try things and see if it works. Are 1063 01:28:50,000 --> 01:28:55,279 there capabilities that could be employed against us? In both an ISSR and a 1064 01:28:55,319 --> 01:29:00,439 weapon's fashion? Absolutely? Do I have evidence that they're doing it in these 1065 01:29:00,520 --> 01:29:09,479 cases? No, but I have concerning indicators. Thank you. I appreciate 1066 01:29:09,520 --> 01:29:13,279 that, and that's that is why it's so important that you are working with 1067 01:29:13,319 --> 01:29:17,960 the intelligence community as well, because you have the science, the data background, 1068 01:29:18,000 --> 01:29:26,239 but you also need to know from various sources what adversaries may be working 1069 01:29:26,279 --> 01:29:29,880 on exact correct. Okay, thank you, thank you very much, thank 1070 01:29:29,920 --> 01:29:35,560 you, Madam cher Well, thank you. Cheer jillibrand ranking member Ernst This 1071 01:29:35,640 --> 01:29:40,520 is a really important hearing. I'd like to thank you, doctor Kirkpatrick for 1072 01:29:40,600 --> 01:29:45,800 your service to the country and as a former systems analyst myself, I really 1073 01:29:45,840 --> 01:29:49,359 appreciate your flow chart, the description of the process, and particularly the trends 1074 01:29:49,439 --> 01:29:54,640 analysis going forward. How that's going to help us. And you've talked about 1075 01:29:54,840 --> 01:29:59,439 language, the large ms, the large language models of artificial intelligence. That's 1076 01:29:59,439 --> 01:30:03,840 really going to help us in the hunt forward predictive analysis. I think to 1077 01:30:03,920 --> 01:30:08,239 some of your point what we're worried about, but I want to focus on 1078 01:30:08,319 --> 01:30:13,560 Nevada because I want to talk about the impact of UAPs on aviation safety. 1079 01:30:13,920 --> 01:30:18,520 So when it comes to unidentified aerial phenomenal phenomena, excuse me, one of 1080 01:30:18,560 --> 01:30:24,359 my first concerns is really about the safety of Nevada's military aviator. So we 1081 01:30:24,399 --> 01:30:28,760 have airmen stationed at Nellis Air Force Base, naval aviators flying at Naval Air 1082 01:30:28,800 --> 01:30:33,880 Station Fallon, and service members across from across the world training at the Nevada 1083 01:30:33,920 --> 01:30:38,000 Test and Training Range. I know you know all this, and unfortunately, 1084 01:30:38,039 --> 01:30:44,680 the existence of advanced UAPs in the US airspace and over US military installations not 1085 01:30:44,800 --> 01:30:48,880 a new phenomenon. The Navy's officially acknowledge that between two thousand and four and 1086 01:30:48,960 --> 01:30:56,119 twenty twenty one, eleven near misses occurred involving UAPs. It required pilot action 1087 01:30:56,399 --> 01:30:59,840 and follow up reports. As a result, in twenty nineteen, the Navy 1088 01:31:00,039 --> 01:31:04,039 established a protocol for pilots to report on their dangerous encounters. So, could 1089 01:31:04,039 --> 01:31:10,239 you speak to any ongoing efforts within DD to ensure the safety of our aviators 1090 01:31:10,239 --> 01:31:15,640 with a potential m UAP encounter? And what's your relationship with Northcom nor ad 1091 01:31:15,640 --> 01:31:20,640 space Com when it comes to this immediate real time response and how they're they're 1092 01:31:20,680 --> 01:31:26,720 they're right there in the moment right. That's a great question. So let 1093 01:31:26,760 --> 01:31:30,319 me start with you know, my relationship with the commands are very good. 1094 01:31:30,600 --> 01:31:34,640 I just came back from sitting down with General van Hirk and all the all 1095 01:31:34,680 --> 01:31:40,039 the jay's staff out at Northcom a couple of weeks ago talking through exactly what 1096 01:31:40,079 --> 01:31:45,079 we need to do to help them get their arms around us. We are 1097 01:31:45,119 --> 01:31:49,439 also working very closely with Joint Staff, and the Joint staff has just been 1098 01:31:49,560 --> 01:31:56,119 very outstanding and helping work through policy and guidance issues to the forces and to 1099 01:31:56,199 --> 01:32:02,439 the services and I would like to just make sure that we message back to 1100 01:32:02,479 --> 01:32:10,279 all of the operators the importance of their reporting and the fact that you're about 1101 01:32:10,319 --> 01:32:15,119 to get a bunch of new requirements that we're issuing through the Joint Staff on 1102 01:32:15,279 --> 01:32:19,000 all of the data that we're going to need you to save and report back 1103 01:32:19,039 --> 01:32:25,920 to us. It is invaluable and we are working to try to take the 1104 01:32:25,960 --> 01:32:29,239 most advantage of that to learn what it is that we're trying to mitigate. 1105 01:32:29,920 --> 01:32:34,720 To get directly to your question, first thing that we're doing is normalizing our 1106 01:32:34,760 --> 01:32:40,119 reporting, right, We're standardizing our reporting and the requirements associated with that. 1107 01:32:41,039 --> 01:32:45,600 Guidance from the Joint Staff I think goes out maybe this week, maybe next 1108 01:32:45,640 --> 01:32:47,880 week, that we've been working with them for some months. That does exactly 1109 01:32:47,880 --> 01:32:51,279 what I just said. It gives them timelines, it gives them requirements, 1110 01:32:51,319 --> 01:32:56,720 it gives them here's all the data you have to have, and you've got 1111 01:32:56,720 --> 01:33:01,079 to retain it. The next thing that after that as a plan ord that 1112 01:33:01,119 --> 01:33:06,880 will go out to the commands for mitigation and response. So there's a couple 1113 01:33:06,960 --> 01:33:13,199 of things that we have to do. One, I need to work with 1114 01:33:13,760 --> 01:33:18,399 the commands and with the IC and our outside of our d D and IC 1115 01:33:18,600 --> 01:33:25,760 partners to extend our collection posture targeted at some of these key areas that you 1116 01:33:25,760 --> 01:33:30,600 saw on that heat map that have a lot of activity, so that we 1117 01:33:30,680 --> 01:33:35,760 can turn on extra collection when an operator sees something. So part of this 1118 01:33:35,880 --> 01:33:43,319 is generating as a response function and what we call a tactic technique and procedure 1119 01:33:43,479 --> 01:33:47,520 for an operator when he sees something calls back to the operations floor, they 1120 01:33:47,520 --> 01:33:53,079 can turn on additional collection. What does that collection look like? How do 1121 01:33:53,079 --> 01:33:56,079 I bring all that together so I can get more data on what is that 1122 01:33:56,159 --> 01:34:00,039 thing? Can I ask really quickly to have the authority you need to extend 1123 01:34:00,039 --> 01:34:06,079 your collection posture between agencies or branches of the military, because that seems to 1124 01:34:06,119 --> 01:34:10,760 me to maybe be a sticking point. I know, my time's just about 1125 01:34:10,840 --> 01:34:14,800 up. I'd love to follow up about your risk management methodologies for some of 1126 01:34:14,800 --> 01:34:18,359 these. But do you need any authorities that you don't have to get the 1127 01:34:18,399 --> 01:34:21,800 day? There are some authorities that we need. We currently are operating under 1128 01:34:21,840 --> 01:34:28,600 Title ten authorities, but we have good relationships across the other agencies, but 1129 01:34:29,000 --> 01:34:32,720 having additional authorities for collection, tasking, counter intelligence, that's something. Those 1130 01:34:32,720 --> 01:34:36,560 are all things that would be helpful. Yes, thank you to follow up, 1131 01:34:36,560 --> 01:34:40,680 doctor Kirkpatrick, will you help us write that language so we can put 1132 01:34:40,720 --> 01:34:43,399 it in the defense bill this year, so that we know what authorities you 1133 01:34:43,439 --> 01:34:46,920 need, we can do them. Thank you. We're gonna start second round, 1134 01:34:47,000 --> 01:34:48,880 so if you want to stay, you can ask another round. I 1135 01:34:48,920 --> 01:34:54,039 have at least three more questions. So do you want to do? You 1136 01:34:54,079 --> 01:34:56,439 want to go right now? So you engage, you have to leave? 1137 01:34:57,520 --> 01:35:12,880 Yeah, go ahead, right space. It's by balloon. It did cross 1138 01:35:12,880 --> 01:35:16,880 through the US airspace shot down by a sidewinder missile fired from an F twenty 1139 01:35:16,880 --> 01:35:24,720 two. Sidewinders cost US close to half a million dollars each. So given 1140 01:35:24,760 --> 01:35:28,000 the cost of these missiles, the cost per flight, all of these other 1141 01:35:28,039 --> 01:35:30,279 things, like I said, follow up on the authorities or methodologies, the 1142 01:35:30,359 --> 01:35:33,760 data collection, they can help us in other ways. But how do you 1143 01:35:33,800 --> 01:35:40,199 think we can develop a sustainable, affordable response to UAPs where we need to 1144 01:35:40,920 --> 01:35:45,600 um that may that will definitely violate our airspace, not may definitely violate our 1145 01:35:45,600 --> 01:35:49,720 airspace every chance that they can get because there are adversaries and they want this 1146 01:35:49,840 --> 01:35:55,199 information. So what do you think some cost effective measures might be that we 1147 01:35:55,359 --> 01:35:59,800 can get what we need out of that, or take them down whatever's appropriate. 1148 01:35:59,840 --> 01:36:02,680 Whatever the appropriate measure is, let's put it that that is actually wrapped 1149 01:36:02,720 --> 01:36:06,119 into the plan ord that we're working with Joint Staff to send out. What 1150 01:36:06,199 --> 01:36:13,640 are the commands need from both a capabilities perspective for kinetic and non kinetic engagements, 1151 01:36:14,159 --> 01:36:19,960 What are the response functions of the of the particular wings or or Navy 1152 01:36:20,439 --> 01:36:26,600 what have you, and then what authorities do they need. So one of 1153 01:36:26,600 --> 01:36:30,199 the one of the challenges that we've seen is is, you know, there's 1154 01:36:30,199 --> 01:36:35,600 an authorities issues with the with the owners operators of those ranges that they need 1155 01:36:35,640 --> 01:36:40,279 to work through, and we're working that with Joint Staff and n OSD. 1156 01:36:40,520 --> 01:36:45,600 So big picture, we need to do all that. If you want to 1157 01:36:45,600 --> 01:36:48,119 get down to the specifics for you know, there are non kinetic options to 1158 01:36:48,239 --> 01:36:54,880 engage pretty much everything, right, whether it's electronic warfare, whether it's you 1159 01:36:54,920 --> 01:37:00,359 know, laser technology, I mean the good data collection, predicted analytics. 1160 01:37:00,720 --> 01:37:04,560 You can in simple form make some assumptions on possibilities that's right, and we 1161 01:37:04,600 --> 01:37:11,119 will inform recommendations back to the department on here's what could work, Here's what 1162 01:37:11,159 --> 01:37:14,680 we've seen work, here's what doesn't order. Thank you so much, Thank 1163 01:37:14,720 --> 01:37:16,319 you, Mada. I'm sure I appreciate it. Thank you very much. 1164 01:37:17,239 --> 01:37:20,279 Can I just wanted to just talk a little bit about your logistics, who 1165 01:37:20,279 --> 01:37:26,760 you report to, how that's going, whether you need different reporting lines by 1166 01:37:26,800 --> 01:37:30,560 congressional legislation. Your office is administratively located with the Office of the Under Secretary 1167 01:37:30,600 --> 01:37:35,279 of Defense for Intelligence Security, but you're not substantively subordinate to the Undersecretary. 1168 01:37:35,359 --> 01:37:39,880 Rather, you are a direct report to the Deputy secretary. Are you taking 1169 01:37:39,920 --> 01:37:43,159 direction directly from the deputy secretary? Are you able to meet and brief the 1170 01:37:43,159 --> 01:37:49,279 Deputy secretary? Is the Office of usd IONS working with you to have the 1171 01:37:49,399 --> 01:38:00,920 right framework? So USDON S and I currently report to usd IONS until they 1172 01:38:00,960 --> 01:38:09,479 come up with the plan for how they're going to implement legislation DoD and D 1173 01:38:09,640 --> 01:38:13,199 and I are working through that. Now. I'd have to refer you back 1174 01:38:13,239 --> 01:38:21,279 to USD I and S on what their plan is. Do I need to 1175 01:38:21,399 --> 01:38:26,079 update your reporting structure in the next defense bill or is this something that you 1176 01:38:26,119 --> 01:38:29,159 think will work its way out or does it need further clarity. I think 1177 01:38:29,239 --> 01:38:32,319 they're planning on coming back to you with an answer on what that plan is, 1178 01:38:32,720 --> 01:38:36,680 and I think at that time that will inform what you want to do. 1179 01:38:38,279 --> 01:38:43,239 Okay, thank you. As you know, doctor Kirkpatrick, Congress has 1180 01:38:43,279 --> 01:38:48,359 mandated that your office establish a discoverable and accessible electronic method for potential witnesses of 1181 01:38:48,520 --> 01:38:55,720 UAP incidents and potential participants in government up related activities to contact your office and 1182 01:38:55,760 --> 01:39:00,159 tell their stories. Congress will also set up a process whereby people subject to 1183 01:39:00,239 --> 01:39:04,560 nondisclosure agreements preventing them from disclosing what they may have witnessed or participated in, 1184 01:39:04,640 --> 01:39:09,840 could tell you what they know without risk of retribution from the or violation of 1185 01:39:09,840 --> 01:39:14,560 their NDAs. Have you submitted a public facing website product for approval to your 1186 01:39:14,600 --> 01:39:18,159 superiors? And how long has it been under review? I? Have we 1187 01:39:18,359 --> 01:39:26,880 submitted the first version of that before Christmas? And do you have an estimate 1188 01:39:27,000 --> 01:39:30,319 from them when they will respond and when you'll have feedback on that? No? 1189 01:39:30,479 --> 01:39:34,479 I don't, okay, we will offer a letter asking for that timely 1190 01:39:34,560 --> 01:39:42,680 response to your superiors. Oh, when do you expect that you will establish 1191 01:39:42,680 --> 01:39:47,479 a public facing, discoverable an access portal for people to use to contact your 1192 01:39:47,479 --> 01:39:54,720 office as the law requires, so I would like to first say thank you 1193 01:39:54,760 --> 01:39:59,800 all very much for referring the witnesses that you have thus far to us. 1194 01:40:00,079 --> 01:40:04,319 I appreciate that we've brought in nearly two dozen so far. It's been very 1195 01:40:04,680 --> 01:40:09,560 helpful. I'd ask that you continue to do that until we have an approved 1196 01:40:09,640 --> 01:40:16,800 plan. We have a multi phased approach for doing that that we've been socializing 1197 01:40:16,800 --> 01:40:25,279 and have submitted for approval. Sometime Once that happens, then we should be 1198 01:40:25,279 --> 01:40:28,880 able to push all that out and get get this a little more automated. 1199 01:40:29,239 --> 01:40:32,800 Great. What I would ask though, is as you all continue to refer 1200 01:40:32,880 --> 01:40:36,399 to us and refer witnesses to us, i'd appreciate if you do that. 1201 01:40:38,640 --> 01:40:42,199 Please try to prioritize the ones that you want to do because we do have 1202 01:40:42,239 --> 01:40:47,840 a small research staff dealing with that. Thank you. And then do you 1203 01:40:47,880 --> 01:40:53,039 have any plans for public engagement that you want to share now that you think 1204 01:40:53,039 --> 01:40:57,479 it's important that the public knows what the plan is. So, we have 1205 01:40:57,560 --> 01:41:06,319 a number of public engagement recommendations according to our strategic plan. All of those 1206 01:41:06,399 --> 01:41:11,880 have been submitted for approval. They have to be approved by usd S. 1207 01:41:12,800 --> 01:41:15,359 We are waiting for approval to go do that. Okay, I will follow 1208 01:41:15,479 --> 01:41:23,800 up on that, and then my last question is about the integration of departments 1209 01:41:23,880 --> 01:41:30,399 UAP Operations, Research, analysis, and strategic communications. During the recent UAP 1210 01:41:30,640 --> 01:41:33,239 incidents over North America. It didn't appear that you were allowed to play that 1211 01:41:33,319 --> 01:41:38,359 role. Do you agree that the public perception is generally that you and your 1212 01:41:38,359 --> 01:41:41,319 office did not appear to play a major role in the department's response to the 1213 01:41:41,359 --> 01:41:45,279 detection of objects over North America. What can you tell us that's going on 1214 01:41:45,359 --> 01:41:50,039 behind the scenes from your perspective and in the after action assessment process? Is 1215 01:41:50,079 --> 01:41:54,720 their awareness that there is a need to operate differently in the future and a 1216 01:41:54,720 --> 01:42:01,359 commitment to doing so when the objects refers to did I got called by Joint 1217 01:42:01,399 --> 01:42:10,840 Staff leadership to come in late one night to review events as they were unfolding 1218 01:42:10,880 --> 01:42:15,119 and to give them, you know, an assessment based on what we knew 1219 01:42:15,119 --> 01:42:19,720 at that time. I did that, worked with the Director, Joint Staff, 1220 01:42:19,840 --> 01:42:24,720 the J two, and the J three that night and over the couple 1221 01:42:24,720 --> 01:42:29,760 of following days on what are the types of things that we are tracking from 1222 01:42:29,760 --> 01:42:34,439 an unidentified object perspective? What databases do we use those sorts of things for 1223 01:42:34,439 --> 01:42:44,119 form for known objects known tracking. Beyond that the response I would have to 1224 01:42:44,600 --> 01:42:46,920 I would have to refer you back to the White House for the decision on 1225 01:42:46,960 --> 01:42:53,039 how they did the response. We did not play a role in what you 1226 01:42:53,079 --> 01:42:59,199 would respond other than that initial you know, advice on what we are seeing 1227 01:42:59,239 --> 01:43:04,680 and how we are seeing. Thank you, Matt, Thank you, Madam 1228 01:43:04,800 --> 01:43:12,800 Chair Doctor Kirkpatrick. I know that your office has gotten a lot of attention 1229 01:43:13,560 --> 01:43:18,119 recently, and of course any new agency there tends to be a push to 1230 01:43:18,199 --> 01:43:24,239 increase size and funding. Um, we want to make sure that you're able 1231 01:43:24,359 --> 01:43:28,359 to meet your goals. But what I also need to ensure is that we're 1232 01:43:28,399 --> 01:43:36,239 not duplicating or replicating existing functions and creating redundancy within d D and the inner 1233 01:43:36,319 --> 01:43:42,920 agency. So what steps are you taking right now to make sure that your 1234 01:43:43,119 --> 01:43:51,319 particular office and function is unique to any of the other agencies that might be 1235 01:43:51,479 --> 01:43:56,039 involved in these types of cases. Yeah, that's a that's a great question. 1236 01:43:56,079 --> 01:44:00,800 So I would like to lay down here's here's what you know of my 1237 01:44:00,840 --> 01:44:05,079 mission and my goal and my vision here. So the vision is at one 1238 01:44:05,119 --> 01:44:10,359 point, at some point in the future, you should not need an arrow 1239 01:44:11,119 --> 01:44:15,800 If I'm successful in what I'm doing. We should be able to normalize everything 1240 01:44:15,840 --> 01:44:20,520 that we're doing into existing processes, functions, agencies, and organizations and make 1241 01:44:20,560 --> 01:44:25,239 that part of their mission and their role. Right now, the niche that 1242 01:44:25,279 --> 01:44:30,760 we form is really going after the unknowns. If I think you articulated it 1243 01:44:30,800 --> 01:44:35,800 early on, this is a hunt mission for what might somebody be doing in 1244 01:44:35,800 --> 01:44:40,760 our backyard that we don't know about? All right, well, that that 1245 01:44:41,399 --> 01:44:44,960 is what we are doing, right but at some point we should be able 1246 01:44:44,960 --> 01:44:47,800 to normalize that. That's why it's so important the work we're doing with joint 1247 01:44:47,840 --> 01:44:56,039 staff to normalize that into POLDIOD policy and guidance. We are bringing in all 1248 01:44:56,119 --> 01:45:00,159 of our interagency partners, so NASA is providing a lee for US. I 1249 01:45:00,239 --> 01:45:08,079 have FBI liaison, of OSIRE liaison, I have service liaisons. The half 1250 01:45:08,079 --> 01:45:13,520 of my staff come from the IC, half of my staff come from other 1251 01:45:13,560 --> 01:45:17,000 scientific and technical backgrounds. I have d OE. And so what we're trying 1252 01:45:17,039 --> 01:45:25,199 to do is ensure again as I make UAP into SEP, they get handed 1253 01:45:25,239 --> 01:45:29,920 off to the people that that is their mission to go do, so that 1254 01:45:30,000 --> 01:45:33,359 we aren't duplicating that I'm not going to go chase the Chinese High altitude balloon 1255 01:45:33,399 --> 01:45:36,800 for example. That's not my job. It's not an unknown and it's not 1256 01:45:36,880 --> 01:45:42,920 anomalous anymore. Now it goes over to them. Very good, Thank you, 1257 01:45:42,960 --> 01:45:48,840 Madam chair. I want to just follow up on the filters for surveillance. 1258 01:45:49,279 --> 01:45:55,880 Outside observers has speculated that DD sets filters on certain sensors to eliminate objects 1259 01:45:55,880 --> 01:46:00,000 that are moving really fast or slow, because what we are looking for military 1260 01:46:00,079 --> 01:46:05,039 terrely our conventional aircraft of missiles up that doesn't fit into these programs would thereby 1261 01:46:05,079 --> 01:46:10,279 be weeded out and never noticed. The spec speculation was proven to be true 1262 01:46:10,359 --> 01:46:14,720 during the UAP incidents over North America, where DoD publicly acknowledged that we were 1263 01:46:14,760 --> 01:46:19,439 able to start seeing these ups only when we opened up these filters. Obviously, 1264 01:46:19,439 --> 01:46:24,680 our military operators cannot be overloaded with objects that are not conventional aircraft or 1265 01:46:24,720 --> 01:46:27,960 missiles. Can you, nonetheless, make sure that the raw data is being 1266 01:46:28,000 --> 01:46:32,399 captured and subsequently process that your office knows what's really out there? And is 1267 01:46:32,439 --> 01:46:35,079 that going to cost money? Will you expect to pay for that money out 1268 01:46:35,079 --> 01:46:42,680 of aero's budget. One of the key tenants that we're trying to do in 1269 01:46:42,720 --> 01:46:47,319 our science plan is understand what those signatures are. So we get all the 1270 01:46:47,520 --> 01:46:55,319 raw, for example, radar data prior to the scrubbing and filtering to allow 1271 01:46:55,319 --> 01:47:00,640 it to enter into our weapons systems and our detection systems. We are now 1272 01:47:00,920 --> 01:47:05,479 taking all that data and cross correlating it to what pilots are saying they're seeing 1273 01:47:05,640 --> 01:47:13,640 or other observations from other operators. What that allows us to do is then 1274 01:47:13,720 --> 01:47:17,520 see if there are any any signatures in that data that I can pull out 1275 01:47:18,159 --> 01:47:26,279 generate what we'll call automatic target recognition algorithms that allow us to then use that 1276 01:47:26,399 --> 01:47:33,720 signature associated with a observed UAP, whatever that UAP. Maybe we will then 1277 01:47:33,760 --> 01:47:40,039 make those recommendations of what those changes should be back to the department. So 1278 01:47:40,079 --> 01:47:45,239 the Deputy Secretary asked me last October to make those recommendations. What changes do 1279 01:47:45,239 --> 01:47:51,279 we need to make the radars to platforms, to detection systems and algorithms to 1280 01:47:51,720 --> 01:47:57,079 pull on those algorithms. Make those changes. That's going to take some time. 1281 01:47:57,119 --> 01:48:00,079 That's where the research and development comes in, right is not. It's 1282 01:48:00,119 --> 01:48:06,239 not instantaneous right now. A lot of the I won't say, you know 1283 01:48:06,319 --> 01:48:12,880 a lot of the the things that fall outside of the ranges of those filters 1284 01:48:12,920 --> 01:48:16,199 have been identified by people in the loop, and you can't have people in 1285 01:48:16,239 --> 01:48:20,000 the loop all the time, you know, it's just not cost effective. 1286 01:48:21,199 --> 01:48:26,760 So part of our budget is working through what does what does that look like 1287 01:48:27,520 --> 01:48:31,000 and then making those recommendations back to the big program offices for them to put 1288 01:48:31,079 --> 01:48:40,600 into changes in the acquisition. My last questions about the academic community. Can 1289 01:48:40,600 --> 01:48:43,800 you give us an update on sort of how you collaborate with the academic community 1290 01:48:44,239 --> 01:48:49,520 and whether how the independent study being done by NASA compliments ARROWS work. Sure, 1291 01:48:51,239 --> 01:48:56,880 two questions, so I try to make it quick. The nineteen seventy 1292 01:48:56,960 --> 01:49:04,439 nine Carl Sagan said extra claims require extraordinary evidence. I would go one step 1293 01:49:04,479 --> 01:49:11,239 further and I would say extraordinary claims require not only extraordinary evidence, but extraordinary 1294 01:49:11,279 --> 01:49:14,119 science. And so how do you do that? You do that with the 1295 01:49:14,199 --> 01:49:19,000 scientific method right, And so, as ARROW is developing and implementing its science 1296 01:49:19,039 --> 01:49:25,960 plan, it has to do so grounded in a solid foundation of scientific theory 1297 01:49:26,079 --> 01:49:32,560 across the entire range of hypotheses that have been presented for what UAP are. 1298 01:49:34,720 --> 01:49:43,920 That range spans adversary breakthrough technology on one hand, known objects and phenomena in 1299 01:49:43,960 --> 01:49:49,000 the middle all the way to the extreme theories of extraterrestrials. All of that 1300 01:49:49,760 --> 01:49:57,399 has physics based signatures associated with it, whether it's theoretical from the academic community, 1301 01:49:58,720 --> 01:50:05,880 known from things like hypersonic weapons or adversary breakthrough technologies as we've talked about 1302 01:50:05,920 --> 01:50:12,760 before, or the known objects that we have to go measure. The idea 1303 01:50:13,000 --> 01:50:18,520 is across that entire range. You have to come up with peer reviewed scientific 1304 01:50:18,560 --> 01:50:24,600 basis for all of it. The academic community plays a very big role on 1305 01:50:24,680 --> 01:50:29,319 the one end of the spectrum, the intelligence community on the other end of 1306 01:50:29,319 --> 01:50:33,600 the spectrum, and then measurement in the middle. Once I have those signatures 1307 01:50:33,920 --> 01:50:42,359 identified in validated, peer reviewed documents, then I have something to point to 1308 01:50:42,760 --> 01:50:45,439 for all that data, because all that data is going to match one of 1309 01:50:45,439 --> 01:50:49,079 those signatures, right, and then I can go, well, it's that 1310 01:50:49,239 --> 01:50:55,039 and not that, or it's that, and that helps us go through all 1311 01:50:55,079 --> 01:51:01,119 that. Where NASA comes in and the study that they're doing, which I'm 1312 01:51:02,479 --> 01:51:14,119 supporting, is really looking at the unclassified data sources that might be used to 1313 01:51:14,159 --> 01:51:19,399 augment our classified data sources to understand if there's a signature there we can pull 1314 01:51:19,439 --> 01:51:27,640 on so very similar to the radars, but civil capabilities. So for example, 1315 01:51:27,680 --> 01:51:30,279 we have a lot of climate science satellites, for example, that look 1316 01:51:30,319 --> 01:51:38,319 at Earth, lots of them. How many of those is the data valuable 1317 01:51:39,520 --> 01:51:46,600 in seeing these kinds of objects. The challenge in that is those platforms don't 1318 01:51:46,640 --> 01:51:51,319 necessarily have the resolution you need. So if you remember the slide I put 1319 01:51:51,399 --> 01:51:56,199 up there with the trends, the size of the objects we're looking for are 1320 01:51:56,279 --> 01:52:00,720 typically reported to be one to four meters. Well, the resolution of many 1321 01:52:00,760 --> 01:52:09,079 of the climate science civil civil satellites was much larger than that, which means 1322 01:52:09,159 --> 01:52:14,079 you'd have a hard time picking out something that's smaller than a pixel on the 1323 01:52:14,119 --> 01:52:17,039 imagery on the data. That's not to say all of it's not useful, 1324 01:52:17,079 --> 01:52:20,359 and there are ways of pulling through that data and going through that is what 1325 01:52:20,479 --> 01:52:26,560 NASA is focus on right now is what are some other data sources that could 1326 01:52:26,560 --> 01:52:32,439 be used in addition things like open source and crowdsourcing of data. We're exploring 1327 01:52:32,640 --> 01:52:36,319 public private partnerships, ma'am, as you know we've talked about in the past 1328 01:52:38,159 --> 01:52:45,760 to look at is there a way to smartly crowdsource additional data that might be 1329 01:52:45,880 --> 01:52:53,159 useful to augment some of my classified sources and what does that look like and 1330 01:52:53,319 --> 01:52:57,399 how would we do it so that we're not overwhelmed by you know, everybody 1331 01:52:57,399 --> 01:53:05,039 who wants to take a picture of everything. I'd like to tell the committee 1332 01:53:05,079 --> 01:53:09,039 before we close. O't you have another round? Yeah? Do you have 1333 01:53:09,039 --> 01:53:12,319 anything else you'd like tell the committee before we close? Thank you very much 1334 01:53:12,359 --> 01:53:15,520 for allowing us to come and share a little bit of insight into what arrows 1335 01:53:15,600 --> 01:53:18,079 up to and what we're doing. I hope to be able to share a 1336 01:53:18,079 --> 01:53:21,840 whole lot more in the future. We have a lot of work to do, 1337 01:53:23,279 --> 01:53:27,039 so if you don't hear from me outside, it's because we've got a 1338 01:53:27,039 --> 01:53:30,479 lot of work to do. Well. Thank you so much, Doctor Kapatrick, 1339 01:53:30,520 --> 01:53:39,159 Thank you for the hearing. Thank you. Wow, hold on second 1340 01:53:39,159 --> 01:53:44,800 here, it's making a little adjustment in the audio. Okay, Well, 1341 01:53:45,199 --> 01:53:51,000 let's see. That was our Senate hearing. That was on giving testimony there. 1342 01:53:51,319 --> 01:53:58,640 That was doctor Sean Kirk quad Copter. He holds a doctorate in balloons 1343 01:53:59,239 --> 01:54:03,039 from a Seagull University in swamp Gas, Ohio. All I can say is 1344 01:54:03,039 --> 01:54:10,560 what a load of ships? So uh yeah, so uh, first of 1345 01:54:10,600 --> 01:54:15,560 what what I've been getting some text messages. Sean, what's your take on 1346 01:54:15,560 --> 01:54:19,840 on what we just witnessed? Oop? Not hearing you? Hold on one 1347 01:54:19,880 --> 01:54:26,279 second, let's see Daniel, can you need to say something nasty? One? 1348 01:54:26,399 --> 01:54:29,439 There we go. Okay, yeah, so uh Sean, I'm not 1349 01:54:29,520 --> 01:54:31,680 not hearing you, so check check your mic please. So we'll start with 1350 01:54:31,680 --> 01:54:35,319 you, Daniel, what did you think about that? Sure? And yees 1351 01:54:35,560 --> 01:54:40,439 I solo here you just see them? Um? Well, uh there we 1352 01:54:40,439 --> 01:54:46,960 go. I'll be quick. Um. I I'll say this from so my 1353 01:54:46,960 --> 01:54:54,920 my perspective comes from more of a academic background and scientific background, and wanting 1354 01:54:56,560 --> 01:55:01,000 the work on this topic to come from that perspective. And two, further 1355 01:55:01,159 --> 01:55:04,680 the conversation in a more mainstream way. I want academia involved in this. 1356 01:55:05,039 --> 01:55:09,960 I think academics should be involved in this. I don't want this topic relegated 1357 01:55:10,000 --> 01:55:15,159 to just the classified world because that doesn't really further transparency. And I will 1358 01:55:15,199 --> 01:55:23,600 say that what he said in terms of the methodology is sound. I like 1359 01:55:23,800 --> 01:55:28,600 what I heard in that regard. I think having separate teams, you know, 1360 01:55:28,680 --> 01:55:32,279 working on the same cases, and which is then said to him, 1361 01:55:32,319 --> 01:55:34,840 which is sent to another group that you know, this is pure view. 1362 01:55:34,960 --> 01:55:41,000 This is this is the process in which. I am glad to see these 1363 01:55:41,039 --> 01:55:47,159 incidents being evaluated in that manner because I think it is important that whatever results 1364 01:55:47,199 --> 01:55:54,560 that I come, they are defendable because if further down the line something because 1365 01:55:54,840 --> 01:55:58,359 the one thing I'll get too too is that I do wish they spoke more 1366 01:55:58,359 --> 01:56:02,159 about that that single percentage of cases that work quite anomalous, because that does 1367 01:56:02,239 --> 01:56:06,439 track with the the data over the decades. Right it's always about like what 1368 01:56:06,560 --> 01:56:10,920 is like five percent of cases, you know, and the question and like 1369 01:56:11,079 --> 01:56:14,840 back in Project blue Book days where there were the percentage of cases where they 1370 01:56:14,840 --> 01:56:16,840 had a lot of data but still were highly anomalous, right, Like that 1371 01:56:17,039 --> 01:56:20,960 number keeps coming up, and that's what I'm most interested in. Um, 1372 01:56:23,960 --> 01:56:31,800 if they apply that analysis to these cases, those answers are are more defendable 1373 01:56:31,960 --> 01:56:38,680 because they are not just arrived by three people who think think that you know, 1374 01:56:38,800 --> 01:56:42,840 it's gone through more of a rigorous scientific approach. So in that aspect, 1375 01:56:43,399 --> 01:56:47,239 I'm happy to see that the process in which they're analyzing cases it would 1376 01:56:47,279 --> 01:56:54,239 hold up to I think scientific scrutiny better. But yeah, I you know, 1377 01:56:54,319 --> 01:56:59,239 my one really big hope was more elaboration upon those more anomalous cases, 1378 01:56:59,359 --> 01:57:01,800 and they hint it out a little bit. But I really do feel we 1379 01:57:01,920 --> 01:57:04,359 got a little more clarity in that front that end, but not as much 1380 01:57:04,359 --> 01:57:13,159 as I personally would have. But I was pleasefully suppressed. Sean, Yeah, 1381 01:57:12,640 --> 01:57:16,920 I would agree. I would agree. Um. I did like that 1382 01:57:17,000 --> 01:57:19,720 the way he presented it, some of the key some of the words that 1383 01:57:19,760 --> 01:57:25,119 he said as well definitely aligned with the I guess intelligence community, which means 1384 01:57:25,119 --> 01:57:29,319 to me that he's doing his work and he's uh, he's building. I 1385 01:57:29,319 --> 01:57:32,520 mean, it cannot be easy to stand up a brand new office, So 1386 01:57:32,600 --> 01:57:35,319 I guess i'd have to give him some points on that, not just that 1387 01:57:35,319 --> 01:57:40,359 though he was wearing the same tie class as me, though I think I 1388 01:57:41,159 --> 01:57:45,399 got he got some of some points on that as well. But yes, 1389 01:57:45,479 --> 01:57:49,000 the methodology, UM is good in the fact that he is keeping the two 1390 01:57:49,479 --> 01:57:54,920 organizations, the intelligence in the scientific side, separate from each other. I 1391 01:57:55,000 --> 01:58:00,359 thoroughly UH like it's just because because each has it, it's it has a 1392 01:58:00,359 --> 01:58:06,640 similar approach but extremely different, and that each would then give their own evaluation 1393 01:58:08,199 --> 01:58:10,720 and then they would sit down up they agree, you can cancel it out. 1394 01:58:11,479 --> 01:58:15,319 Um. I like that he's bringing technology in again, but this is 1395 01:58:15,359 --> 01:58:18,439 also in theory, okay, right, so in pactum things might not necessarily 1396 01:58:18,479 --> 01:58:23,319 be the same. So yeah, the car can work you know, amazing 1397 01:58:23,680 --> 01:58:27,800 on the road and breakdown on the tracker or whatever it is. So I 1398 01:58:27,840 --> 01:58:31,840 guess it does seem that he's you know, doing what needs to be done. 1399 01:58:32,359 --> 01:58:35,840 So the one percent, I guess would probably you know, bring people 1400 01:58:35,920 --> 01:58:41,279 up in arms in the in the in the community. But um, I 1401 01:58:41,279 --> 01:58:45,159 guess if you go to any police department in any town, they get a 1402 01:58:45,239 --> 01:58:50,000 million gunshot calls and ninety nine point of them are fireworks, you know, 1403 01:58:50,079 --> 01:58:55,720 So they're just so you have to filter out all of those things that are 1404 01:58:55,760 --> 01:58:59,479 not necessarily anomalous and you only need one. Why do you need is one? 1405 01:59:00,159 --> 01:59:03,720 Right? So again I guess we didn't really come to any of the 1406 01:59:04,039 --> 01:59:08,680 any you know, the crash retrieval talk that's very popular in the community right 1407 01:59:08,720 --> 01:59:12,720 now and the things that we're hearing. Um, but it does I guess 1408 01:59:12,720 --> 01:59:17,039 I would say that Gillibrand had brought up sorry he Kirkpatrick had brought up thank 1409 01:59:17,039 --> 01:59:21,239 you for bringing witnesses to us, and you know, please prioritize those, 1410 01:59:21,279 --> 01:59:27,880 So he may have been talking to that aspect and then they might not have 1411 01:59:27,920 --> 01:59:33,319 been able to track down those things. Also, I think he did he 1412 01:59:33,359 --> 01:59:38,039 did touch on in the end there when he was talking about NASA is pulling 1413 01:59:38,039 --> 01:59:42,039 the available commercial data that's out out there, that NASA is going to be 1414 01:59:42,039 --> 01:59:45,000 doing that, which is what we had talked about that before this. There's 1415 01:59:45,000 --> 01:59:48,279 an abundance of information that's out there that if you could you know, you 1416 01:59:48,399 --> 01:59:55,640 basically have some unclassified information that go off the public. And then talking about 1417 01:59:55,680 --> 02:00:00,000 the scientific methods. He is an academic himself, that's his own language, 1418 02:00:00,000 --> 02:00:02,479 that's his own bias. Is the only way that you know, he's only 1419 02:00:02,479 --> 02:00:05,439 going to be able to, you know, speak on any subject. So 1420 02:00:05,560 --> 02:00:09,960 those are the elements that I did gather from this. And I know a 1421 02:00:09,960 --> 02:00:15,159 lot of people are probably going to be not happy about which has happened there 1422 02:00:15,199 --> 02:00:18,600 and understandable, but I guess if you know, if you're gonna if you're 1423 02:00:18,640 --> 02:00:20,800 gonna ask a doctor to talk to you, they're going to talk to you 1424 02:00:20,880 --> 02:00:25,399 in doctor language. So it's not really that's that's a that's a very good 1425 02:00:25,399 --> 02:00:29,600 way of putting it. Yeah, yeah, no, for sure. So 1426 02:00:29,800 --> 02:00:34,479 while this was going on, I was receiving texts from some someone that works 1427 02:00:34,680 --> 02:00:41,159 uh in the intelligence community, as someone that has worked this particular portfolio, 1428 02:00:41,760 --> 02:00:45,159 and uh, and I have to say, uh, I'll just kind of 1429 02:00:45,159 --> 02:00:50,800 read some of some of the messages uh that uh that came from him and 1430 02:00:50,840 --> 02:00:56,079 some other folks uh in that area. One of the things that he noted 1431 02:00:56,359 --> 02:01:00,680 right off the bat was a complete disregard of humans or human human and intelligence, 1432 02:01:01,920 --> 02:01:05,079 which I think I think that's well, we'll get into that. I 1433 02:01:05,079 --> 02:01:11,880 think I think that's mainly on the crash retrieval side. And when he was 1434 02:01:11,920 --> 02:01:15,119 talking about not showing anything advanced as far as data, he pointed out this 1435 02:01:15,920 --> 02:01:20,800 intelligence official pointed out easy, easy to scrub, censor feed and show us 1436 02:01:20,800 --> 02:01:29,439 the display of advanced tech. Um. He noted if this tasking were given 1437 02:01:29,479 --> 02:01:31,680 to a private company, they would have been so much more further along on 1438 02:01:31,760 --> 02:01:38,359 meeting mission requirements. He has seems to be setting himself up for a lifetime 1439 02:01:38,439 --> 02:01:44,800 job with basically saying we need more time and money and power, and in 1440 02:01:45,319 --> 02:01:49,279 another really interesting point, him saying, I report to USDI and S, 1441 02:01:49,319 --> 02:01:56,760 which is the under Secretary of Defense or Intelligence and Security, and as Louielizondo 1442 02:01:56,840 --> 02:02:00,359 and other folks have have stated many times, this has the organization that is 1443 02:02:00,520 --> 02:02:08,920 engaged in administrative terrorism, harassing people that have come forth about UAPs uh trying 1444 02:02:08,960 --> 02:02:14,960 to uh jeopardize their security clearance, other other sort of harassment. And um 1445 02:02:15,159 --> 02:02:17,760 and the new legislation changed that, and it seems to have not changed yet. 1446 02:02:17,960 --> 02:02:21,439 It has not changed. It's supposed to have changed, it it has 1447 02:02:21,479 --> 02:02:29,399 not changed from the folks that I have spoken with that have continue to receive 1448 02:02:29,560 --> 02:02:34,439 this uh, this harassment. Um uh yes, and you know, and 1449 02:02:34,920 --> 02:02:40,279 this is some good points too, I I and again maybe it's the scientist 1450 02:02:40,319 --> 02:02:43,680 thing, but I thought he had a couple of Dick's statements in there, 1451 02:02:44,239 --> 02:02:47,479 uh you know, please prioritize who you send forward, you know, basically 1452 02:02:47,880 --> 02:02:51,600 just uh you know saying, you know, telling Congress, don't tell me 1453 02:02:51,680 --> 02:02:57,319 what uh uh you know what I should do. Um, you know. 1454 02:02:57,399 --> 02:03:00,439 And it's interesting too. You know another point that was brought up. You 1455 02:03:00,479 --> 02:03:03,960 know, he indicates he only wants certain evidence and data and doesn't want resources 1456 02:03:04,079 --> 02:03:10,279 used on others. And I think that would be the case with human intelligence 1457 02:03:10,680 --> 02:03:15,159 and uh one person when first and said f off with peer review. That 1458 02:03:15,199 --> 02:03:20,399 doesn't matter considering We've been lied to for eighty years. And another person in 1459 02:03:20,439 --> 02:03:25,159 the Intel community, I never want to hear peer review again. We just 1460 02:03:25,319 --> 02:03:30,680 spent eighty years being lied to by multiple organizations. Peer review means nothing anymore. 1461 02:03:30,880 --> 02:03:35,560 And the last couple of the one thing he did say towards the end, 1462 02:03:36,039 --> 02:03:39,600 he goes, if if I don't tell you what I'm doing, it's 1463 02:03:39,640 --> 02:03:44,800 because I'm busy. I mean, seriously, you're gonna tell sitting senators that. 1464 02:03:45,640 --> 02:03:49,159 Oh and one interesting point too that, uh, this Intel official noted 1465 02:03:50,279 --> 02:03:57,039 the video that was shown of the ORB that was not the mosal ORB video. 1466 02:03:57,760 --> 02:04:02,079 This was taken more recently, yet they both appear to show the same 1467 02:04:02,119 --> 02:04:06,399 object. And one statement that somebody noted in the chat that I didn't catch. 1468 02:04:08,279 --> 02:04:13,239 I guess at some point he said something about quote, extreme theories of 1469 02:04:13,359 --> 02:04:18,560 extraterrestrials, which I don't know if you guys caught that. Yeah, he 1470 02:04:18,680 --> 02:04:21,920 was like talking about a spectrum like from this thing to the extreme end, 1471 02:04:21,960 --> 02:04:26,359 which is extraterrestrials, got it. Yeah, So I wasn't quite sure if 1472 02:04:26,399 --> 02:04:30,439 that was meant. In a disparaging remark, one whistle blower that I did 1473 02:04:30,479 --> 02:04:41,600 have a private conversation with that from the DoD. He testified for quite a 1474 02:04:41,680 --> 02:04:46,520 number of hours to a Lieutenant colonel in Arrow, and one thing that he 1475 02:04:46,560 --> 02:04:53,760 did mention was that he felt and he didn't elaborate why, but that Kirkpatrick 1476 02:04:53,880 --> 02:05:00,359 does not believe in the extraterrestrial theory now just comes from one individual. That 1477 02:05:00,479 --> 02:05:02,359 was his impression. I didn't ask him to elaborate on it anyway. Those 1478 02:05:02,399 --> 02:05:08,359 are just kind of some things that that you know that I I, uh, 1479 02:05:08,399 --> 02:05:12,560 you know that that was getting messages on. I mean, I do 1480 02:05:12,640 --> 02:05:16,279 agree, you know, Daniel absolutely uh in in Sean as well, there 1481 02:05:16,319 --> 02:05:21,920 has to be a scientific approach to this. But I think, you know, 1482 02:05:23,560 --> 02:05:28,960 I think there there was a good opportunity to talk about the whistleblowers that 1483 02:05:29,079 --> 02:05:32,399 have been testifying, even if he were to just generally describe some of the 1484 02:05:32,439 --> 02:05:39,760 reports that he's he has received, and I know that the whistleblower reports that 1485 02:05:39,840 --> 02:05:44,840 he's received has been pretty extensive. So he seemed to gloss over that or 1486 02:05:45,079 --> 02:05:47,199 or just not want to go down that path. Sean, what do you 1487 02:05:47,279 --> 02:05:50,760 what do you do? You have any thoughts on that? Yeah, I 1488 02:05:50,800 --> 02:05:55,199 mean again, I'm I'm speaking again not from personal belief, but I'm sure 1489 02:05:55,399 --> 02:06:01,039 I'm using this intelligence and the legal lends on this um. If he talked 1490 02:06:01,159 --> 02:06:09,399 about um whistle blow is coming forward and saying extraordinary things, then that would 1491 02:06:09,439 --> 02:06:14,159 almost be confirmatory to be true of whatever they said without him having the ability 1492 02:06:14,359 --> 02:06:18,920 or if they have to confirm that those things were true. So if if 1493 02:06:19,159 --> 02:06:23,760 I was his attorney or what if involved, I would say, just stay 1494 02:06:23,800 --> 02:06:28,279 away from that now until we can actually track track everything down, you know, 1495 02:06:28,479 --> 02:06:31,720 until it's until it's you know, yes, then it's it's a potential. 1496 02:06:32,159 --> 02:06:34,560 You know it could be a potential. Yes, But just to keep 1497 02:06:34,600 --> 02:06:39,359 it out of the spotlight right now, because that would you know, open 1498 02:06:39,479 --> 02:06:43,720 up for more damage for credibility down the road. If but they they say, 1499 02:06:43,760 --> 02:06:46,199 oh, a whistle player came forward, they said in this and this 1500 02:06:46,319 --> 02:06:51,520 hanger is this object and then they track it down it's not it will be 1501 02:06:51,560 --> 02:06:58,119 forever in UFO books that up they hit it again. So if either you 1502 02:06:58,159 --> 02:07:01,239 know, confirm it is true or just I wouldn't talk about it at not 1503 02:07:01,319 --> 02:07:05,199 at this stage. Again that the fact that you know, at the end 1504 02:07:05,199 --> 02:07:11,640 there it's still it's still open, you know. Again the language that he 1505 02:07:11,720 --> 02:07:15,119 uses this are we need to create the basis of us to be able to 1506 02:07:15,159 --> 02:07:17,159 even talk about this. You need, if you're gonna you need to create 1507 02:07:17,199 --> 02:07:21,600 the language to use the language so that you can. Again, I need 1508 02:07:21,640 --> 02:07:27,760 to write the paper so when we see those signatures in UAP, it's like, 1509 02:07:27,800 --> 02:07:32,399 oh, that is this. So without doing that, you really you're 1510 02:07:32,439 --> 02:07:38,479 you're getting made ahead of yourself for again, for somebody with the scientific background 1511 02:07:38,560 --> 02:07:42,640 to be running this organization. So I mean, if you if you want 1512 02:07:42,680 --> 02:07:45,039 people that you know kick kick down doors their whole life, they'll just drive 1513 02:07:45,079 --> 02:07:47,479 there and kick down the door that they're just going to kick down every door 1514 02:07:47,520 --> 02:07:50,880 of everything, and that's that's who they are. But we have a scientist 1515 02:07:50,920 --> 02:07:54,199 that's in charge of this. They're going to write science, scientific papers, 1516 02:07:54,239 --> 02:07:57,159 and they're going to make a scientific process and they're going to follow it. 1517 02:07:57,760 --> 02:08:01,359 So it's just I mean, I can't fault him for being the person that 1518 02:08:01,399 --> 02:08:05,399 he is. I can either I can figure out a way to get them 1519 02:08:05,399 --> 02:08:07,239 to do what I want them to do, you know, certain ways, 1520 02:08:07,319 --> 02:08:15,359 or but it can't be discip I can't expect it from them versus um you 1521 02:08:15,439 --> 02:08:18,840 know, it was it would be very much expected. And again I was 1522 02:08:18,880 --> 02:08:24,319 pleased by the process that are set up that too, I guess maybe address 1523 02:08:24,359 --> 02:08:30,479 the your individual they I was talking about humans being completely dismissed. I would 1524 02:08:30,479 --> 02:08:33,000 say, I don't. I don't think that it sounded like it's not dismissed. 1525 02:08:33,760 --> 02:08:37,520 They're not closing any of the reports unless they know what that object is, 1526 02:08:37,600 --> 02:08:45,439 and they're keeping those singular reports alive because and they're extrapulating, extrapolating language 1527 02:08:45,439 --> 02:08:50,079 trends for later analysis. So if you have thirty people that that round object, 1528 02:08:50,159 --> 02:08:54,840 round object, round object, if there's only one singular report, that 1529 02:08:54,960 --> 02:09:00,960 information is staying alive within their scientific process because that information they okay, we 1530 02:09:01,000 --> 02:09:05,560 have thirty reports, we got one or video that is something. It's like, 1531 02:09:05,560 --> 02:09:07,760 okay, now we're now we're seeing trends. Now we're doing trend analysis 1532 02:09:09,199 --> 02:09:13,159 and that and that would be aligned with not just I guess maybe the science. 1533 02:09:13,159 --> 02:09:16,039 I'm not a scientist, but that's why I'm a scientific community that's sure 1534 02:09:16,039 --> 02:09:18,640 as hell is aligned with the intelligence community, and that's exactly what we do. 1535 02:09:18,039 --> 02:09:24,039 So I would I would say that the process seems that if it, 1536 02:09:24,079 --> 02:09:28,159 if it continues to exist for long enough, you can get you can get 1537 02:09:28,880 --> 02:09:35,439 you know, censored data and imagery data only one or two, but then 1538 02:09:35,560 --> 02:09:41,439 fifty uh you know, human or human reports, and then it's like, 1539 02:09:41,479 --> 02:09:45,119 okay, that aligns with what they just said. And now you have a 1540 02:09:45,199 --> 02:09:48,439 larger population, so it quite possibly be could be the you know, the 1541 02:09:48,520 --> 02:09:50,960 right way to do this. You know, it's not gonna you know, 1542 02:09:52,039 --> 02:09:56,279 feel good for us because it's not you know, uh, gourmet meal through 1543 02:09:56,279 --> 02:09:58,479 a fast food window. But it seems that it's it's setting it up pretty 1544 02:09:58,520 --> 02:10:03,560 well, right. Yeah, No, I definitely hear you just real quick. 1545 02:10:03,199 --> 02:10:07,239 Wanted to say thank you at Chris Wolford from the super chat. There 1546 02:10:07,239 --> 02:10:13,800 were other super chats as well. Fig you seventy seven sixteen said question for 1547 02:10:13,840 --> 02:10:20,520 Sean, given that whistle blowers are allegedly saying they aren't feeling protected, that 1548 02:10:20,600 --> 02:10:24,079 there isn't a hotline or even email to seek help should they be harassed, 1549 02:10:26,359 --> 02:10:31,720 what amendment to the NDAA would you recommend to tighten any loophole that will ensure 1550 02:10:31,720 --> 02:10:39,319 whistle blower protection. I believe that if they're working within the resource, it 1551 02:10:39,399 --> 02:10:43,000 within the It seems that right now, it seems that if they are outside 1552 02:10:43,000 --> 02:10:46,800 of the DoD community or the intelligence community, that they would have to potentially 1553 02:10:46,800 --> 02:10:52,520 contact an elected official that on one of those committees and get fed either filtered 1554 02:10:52,520 --> 02:10:56,880 out as doctor Kirkpatrick was saying, of prioritize the people you're bringing to us 1555 02:10:58,199 --> 02:11:01,560 when he qualified as statement of thank you for bring us, you know that 1556 02:11:01,640 --> 02:11:03,800 was kind of a backhanded thank you for bring us witnesses, but please prioritize 1557 02:11:03,800 --> 02:11:09,920 them. Yeah, that would be the potential way to do that. Um, 1558 02:11:09,079 --> 02:11:15,520 total dick move. But just protect your to to avoid being you know, 1559 02:11:15,560 --> 02:11:18,079 I guess discovered you have to protect your own identity at that point, 1560 02:11:18,720 --> 02:11:22,720 right, So I guess if you if you're if you're telling everybody you're coming 1561 02:11:22,720 --> 02:11:28,680 forward, then you're you're opening yourself up for attack. Yeah for sure. 1562 02:11:28,000 --> 02:11:35,319 So so what so supposedly there are hearings in the works for June on the 1563 02:11:35,319 --> 02:11:39,119 House side. Of course, we'll have Tim Broschett, who's no wall flower 1564 02:11:39,159 --> 02:11:43,960 when it comes to this this particular thing, Daniel, do you think do 1565 02:11:43,000 --> 02:11:48,600 you think a house hearing will be any more different than this one. I'm 1566 02:11:48,640 --> 02:11:52,840 sure they'll it'll be. I'm sure they'll call doctor Kirkpatrick. I'm hoping they 1567 02:11:54,079 --> 02:11:58,159 actually call these whistleblowers forward because I uh, you know, at the end 1568 02:11:58,159 --> 02:12:01,239 of the day, I think, in my personal view, I think this 1569 02:12:01,319 --> 02:12:03,560 was a bit of a slap in the face to the whistle blowers that have 1570 02:12:03,600 --> 02:12:09,439 been coming to his office and providing tons of test testimony. So Daniel, 1571 02:12:09,439 --> 02:12:11,520 what do you what do you think you think it'll be any different in June? 1572 02:12:11,640 --> 02:12:18,159 If that's indeed when these things happen. It really depends on which committee 1573 02:12:18,199 --> 02:12:20,880 is doing it, you know, because as far as I know, while 1574 02:12:20,960 --> 02:12:24,119 timber Chet might be very vocal on the issue, I don't believe he's on 1575 02:12:24,119 --> 02:12:26,600 any of the pertinent committees that actually do any oversight on this issue. So 1576 02:12:30,199 --> 02:12:33,640 it kind of just depends on who is holding the hearing, I guess. 1577 02:12:35,479 --> 02:12:41,359 So it's really hard to tell. Um, they're definitely trying to think of 1578 02:12:41,399 --> 02:12:43,880 who. I mean, I don't know if it would be the same committee 1579 02:12:43,920 --> 02:12:48,000 as before. Yeah, it just really depends on who. It's homeless hard 1580 02:12:48,000 --> 02:12:50,680 to theorize. I would say, I don't know if they'll bringing Kirkpatrick again, 1581 02:12:50,720 --> 02:12:54,640 because he already came in and they might feel he's not going to give 1582 02:12:54,640 --> 02:12:56,600 any new answers. So maybe in this instance they would bring forth what's the 1583 02:12:56,600 --> 02:13:01,760 blowers? And that was the blowers. Sorry, it's just like witnesses themselves. 1584 02:13:01,800 --> 02:13:07,239 Maybe they have the public hear their stories. Yeah, I think that 1585 02:13:07,319 --> 02:13:11,119 might be a better use of their time, because I have a feeling Kirkpatrick's 1586 02:13:11,159 --> 02:13:15,920 is going to really give the same answers he was given before and just a 1587 02:13:15,920 --> 02:13:18,920 briefly touch upon I know what your intelligence sources said, I think, and 1588 02:13:20,039 --> 02:13:24,000 Sean can go more into this too, as he was a former intelligence professional. 1589 02:13:24,039 --> 02:13:26,920 But I think we're really getting at here is kind of the different ways 1590 02:13:28,600 --> 02:13:33,079 in which the scientific community and the Intelligence Committee a community kind of try to 1591 02:13:33,279 --> 02:13:37,199 address and resolve issues. Right. This is a different it's a different mission. 1592 02:13:37,199 --> 02:13:39,359 It's a different way to go about it, you know, like intelligence 1593 02:13:39,800 --> 02:13:45,720 community is, you know, it's about trying to protect this country and keep 1594 02:13:45,800 --> 02:13:50,079 us safe, and they work in probabilities and just the best available estimate of 1595 02:13:50,079 --> 02:13:54,840 the situation, right while while the scientific community they really are all about drafting 1596 02:13:54,840 --> 02:13:58,600 papers and getting peer review and like nothing is set in stone until like every 1597 02:13:58,479 --> 02:14:01,880 like there's such a unanimous you know, consent. So it's I feel like 1598 02:14:01,920 --> 02:14:05,920 what we're experiencing now is kind of the tension between those two communities and how 1599 02:14:05,960 --> 02:14:11,039 they really do go about they they do what they need to do in their 1600 02:14:11,119 --> 02:14:16,000 environment, and now we have two kind of separate entities trying to kind of 1601 02:14:16,039 --> 02:14:18,920 go about resolving something, even though they both kind of addressed it in different 1602 02:14:18,920 --> 02:14:22,039 ways. Because human intelligence very important. But I can tell you, you 1603 02:14:22,119 --> 02:14:26,760 know, from the scientific community, Sean was saying, patterns are as data 1604 02:14:26,800 --> 02:14:31,399 set, but human intelligence, probably you know, for better for worse, 1605 02:14:31,439 --> 02:14:33,760 in their opinion, just subjectively, is rather lower on the totem pole in 1606 02:14:33,880 --> 02:14:39,039 terms of you know, evidentiary. So that's just so yeah, it's kind 1607 02:14:39,039 --> 02:14:45,479 of like as it's tough. So I could say that again, I was 1608 02:14:45,520 --> 02:14:48,720 out. I've been out of the intelligence community for quite some time now. 1609 02:14:48,840 --> 02:14:52,560 However, my experience in it, sorry I wasn't human intelligence. I was 1610 02:14:52,560 --> 02:14:56,800 an analyst, but my experience with human intelligence people would say that that bias 1611 02:14:56,960 --> 02:15:01,600 against them exists. Also within the intelligen community. You could come to them 1612 02:15:01,640 --> 02:15:05,960 with you know, five sources and say they're all saying X, and the 1613 02:15:07,000 --> 02:15:09,319 commander would say, well, I want a picture of X. It's like, 1614 02:15:09,359 --> 02:15:11,399 well, I don't have a picture of X. I have five people 1615 02:15:11,479 --> 02:15:16,439 without you know, that don't know each other saying X exists. But until 1616 02:15:16,520 --> 02:15:18,159 it's just probably maybe the human experience. I want to hear it, I 1617 02:15:18,159 --> 02:15:20,640 want to see it, you know, or but I you know, it's 1618 02:15:20,680 --> 02:15:24,520 like I, you know, just telling me it exists, like, uh, 1619 02:15:24,640 --> 02:15:28,640 I'm not going to thank you for your information, but I need something 1620 02:15:28,920 --> 02:15:33,199 coupled on top of that, and that bias existed through my deployment in my 1621 02:15:33,279 --> 02:15:37,319 experience. So, you know, what I to defend Kirkcatric a little bit 1622 02:15:37,439 --> 02:15:41,920 is the fact that if it's a single source, it seems that the way 1623 02:15:41,920 --> 02:15:46,000 that he represented it was that he's not dismissing that case. That case is 1624 02:15:46,000 --> 02:15:48,960 still open. And then we're going to extrapolate language used in that report to 1625 02:15:50,000 --> 02:15:52,800 see if they we can make uh, you know, usable data you know 1626 02:15:54,039 --> 02:15:58,560 later on. So I guess it's it's not easy being a CI person sometimes, 1627 02:15:58,600 --> 02:16:01,680 I guess. So, So, Sean, what do you what do 1628 02:16:01,720 --> 02:16:07,960 you think about upcoming house hearings? You agree with Daniel, it's probably won't 1629 02:16:07,960 --> 02:16:13,119 be him, maybe maybe witnesses, even if we don't have Burchet on. 1630 02:16:15,960 --> 02:16:20,399 If if I guess the people asking the questions are listening or it goes somewhere, 1631 02:16:20,880 --> 02:16:24,439 I would ask they said that there we are and the one percent that 1632 02:16:24,520 --> 02:16:28,920 still exists. There are indicators of potential far in tech, So okay, 1633 02:16:30,319 --> 02:16:33,959 what are the Are there indicators that there are not par intech? So hit 1634 02:16:35,000 --> 02:16:39,120 them with the question of okay, is you're closing the cap here? Is 1635 02:16:39,120 --> 02:16:41,680 the cap still open or is a quote like oh wait no, there is 1636 02:16:41,719 --> 02:16:46,159 There are indicators that this is something that there are some that are still anomals, 1637 02:16:46,719 --> 02:16:50,159 because that's I guess the root of this effort is, Okay, I 1638 02:16:50,159 --> 02:16:54,520 don't need one hundred, I need a thousand, I need one. Is 1639 02:16:54,520 --> 02:17:00,760 there indicators with multiple centers and multiple reporting that something is doing something thing somewhere 1640 02:17:00,879 --> 02:17:05,760 that is just it it's not explainable right now, right? So I asked 1641 02:17:05,760 --> 02:17:09,079 that specifically, are there indicators that there's something that is not bar in tech 1642 02:17:09,360 --> 02:17:13,239 doing something anomalous? So yeah, no, got it? Yeah, well 1643 02:17:13,719 --> 02:17:18,879 yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely. Excuse me. Well, you know, 1644 02:17:18,920 --> 02:17:20,840 we had doctor Gary Nolan on our show a couple of weeks ago, 1645 02:17:20,920 --> 02:17:26,000 and I think somebody had asked him what he expected of this hearing and he 1646 02:17:26,399 --> 02:17:28,799 said, it's just going to be a song in dance, and it was, 1647 02:17:28,079 --> 02:17:33,479 in my view, is definitely quite a bit of that. But but 1648 02:17:33,159 --> 02:17:39,719 you know, nonetheless, I think this hopefully moves the ball forward and generates 1649 02:17:39,719 --> 02:17:43,399 more interest in getting to the bottom of this. But yeah, well, 1650 02:17:43,840 --> 02:17:46,959 I want to thank you guys for joining us. Sean, how can folks 1651 02:17:46,200 --> 02:17:52,040 find you on your social media? You find me a snake point nine and 1652 02:17:52,280 --> 02:17:56,719 on Twitter, or you can hit hit my email at Sean at the debrief 1653 02:17:56,319 --> 02:18:03,040 Great, Daniel, you can find me on Twitter at Psychopic's si ccop one 1654 02:18:03,719 --> 02:18:07,319 awesome. Great, well, guys, thanks for joining us, and folks, 1655 02:18:07,440 --> 02:18:09,680 if you enjoyed our coverage of this, we always appreciate, as we 1656 02:18:09,760 --> 02:18:15,040 said a retweet, subscribe all that good stuff. And again we always look 1657 02:18:15,120 --> 02:18:20,520 for folks on Patreon to bias cup coffee help us keep the lights on www 1658 02:18:20,719 --> 02:18:26,680 dot patreon dot com forward slash at the Good Trouble Show. Anyway, guys, 1659 02:18:26,719 --> 02:18:30,079 thank you so much for your time and your patience. Most folks here 1660 02:18:30,120 --> 02:18:33,479 don't don't know this, but we were on way before we went on the 1661 02:18:33,559 --> 02:18:37,760 air to prep for this, so I really appreciate everyone's everyone. So all 1662 02:18:37,840 --> 02:18:43,000 right, I'm Matt's Good Trouble Show and we will have more for you soon. 1663 02:18:43,440 --> 02:18:43,200 Thanks for joining us.