WEBVTT

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Welcome to mid Rats with Sal from
Commander Salamander and Eagle One from Eagle Speak

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at Seer Shore your home for a
discussion of national security issues and all things

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Maritimes. And welcome board everybody.
I am the aforementioned Sal along with my

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co host, the Aborgini Eagle One
of Eagle Speak both with you today and

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we are live. So if you
are with that esteemed cohort that made the

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extra effort to arrange your schedules to
be with you, I'd like to be

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with us. I'll I'd like to
invite you to scroll down to the bottom

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of the show page. That's where
you will find a link to the chat

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room. We've already got four folks
in there that'll be glad to welcome you

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on board. And if that is
a great venue. In case you have

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any questions you would like for us
to address to our guests, or you

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just have some observations you'd like to
share with everybody else during the course of

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the show, that is the perfect
place to do it. And on today's

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show, it's going to be a
great mid Rats because we're having one of

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our friends come back to talk with
us and we're going to talk about a

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subject that if you ever find yourself
at a table full of navalists, if

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they're the right kind, you roll
out this one word and you got at

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least a forty five minute conversation out
of it, if not longer, depending

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on how many adult beverages you have
on the table. But we're going to

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talk about presence today. The know
everybody says it's a naval mission. It's

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gone by that various names for a
few thousand years, but in the modern

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context, that's what we refer it
to. We'll dig in a little bit

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of the history over the course of
the next hour about what it meant,

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what it means now, and what
we need to look at towards the future

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if this is something that is important
for the world's premier naval power, depending

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on how you measure it going forward
for the rest of the century. And

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we'll also probably touch on things that
you can do to properly resource that if

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it's not properly resourced the way you
want it to. Right now and join

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us today is returning to guest doctor
Jerry Hendrix, Captain US Navy, retired.

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He is a president of Hendricks and
Associates and on the show page,

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you'll find a link to the document
that he authored recently with some assistance with

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a good group of folks. You
can read about on the inside cover for

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the Sagamore Institute titled Measuring and Modeling
Naval Presence. Jerry, welcome back to

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Midrights. It's great to be here, and it's great to be with this

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particular audience talking about the report,
because I think that if anyone is going

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to have one a grasp of what
I was trying to accomplish, and also

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the ability to pick it apart,
it's not only these you two hosts,

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but also your your audience. Well, we will do our best to meet

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that high standard. But it's always
great when you have somebody who's authored a

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book, a report like this,
because the opening questions, at least the

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easiest for the hosts to do,
give you a chance to step the table,

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some tell us about your report?
What will the reader find it?

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Well, So I set out and
proposed almost two years ago now to actually

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the Smith Richardson Foundation that we find
a way of measuring the value of naval

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presence. We say it's important.
The Regional Combatant Commander says it's important we've

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written about it for the better part
of fifty years now as a mission of

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the Navy, and yet when we
say, well, what is it worth,

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how do you measure it? It's
it's it's so much as a hand

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wave or the ultimate These aren't the
drawings you're looking for type of moment,

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you know, it's it's more ephemeral, even than the idea of those definitions

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of a pornography that the Supreme Court
would say, you know, I'll know

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it when I see it. And
so I thought that there should be something

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more to this. And despite the
fact, as an analyst, I had

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been looking for, you know,
beyond just a definition of naval presence,

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but some means to measure it,
whether there was a model of it for

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the better part of the last five
years, and I did not find it.

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So I made this proposal that to
Smith Richardson Foundation, that I that

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I would set about to go and
try and create a model that could be

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you know, placed into a computer
simulation and we could then try to determine

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the value of various different platforms or
formations of Navy ships. Smith Richardson found

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it very intriguing. They enthusiastically embraced
it. I will tell you that we

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went back and forth several times on
this because originally I proposed that I would

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come up with a model of the
presence for the new Constellation class frigate,

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which has always intrigued me. But
due to members of the reviewing committee at

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Smith Richardson, we actually came back
and said, no, you will.

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You will model the arley Bird class
destroyer, the ubiquitous sort of centerpiece of

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the US Navy, and and and
then you know, go forward from there

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and also try to figure out,
you know how you know, if you're

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modeling, you know, you have
to model it against something else. And

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so we very carefully looked at the
lu Yang two from the People's Liberation Army

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Navy, and then the more I
got into it, began to realize that

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you can't really create a model without
also trying to find some way of measuring

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the environment, because there's various different
types. So anyways, I underwent about

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eighteen months of research where I reviewed
the historical literature associated with this. I

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interviewed six former regional combatant commanders,
three Navy, two Army, one Air

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Force to get their views on naval
presence and then also with several modeling and

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simulation experts, individuals from Purdue University, the Naval Postgraduate School, as well

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as the Santa Fe Institute of Modeling
and Simulation. I also talked with a

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sort of a very ancient wargamer who
had actually created some of the original Atari

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software and then did some models and
simulations in the nineteen nineties on diplomacy,

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and then out of that generated this
that's got, you know, an algorithm

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in it that runs through and we
were able to sort of run through the

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bird class versus the lou Yang in
several different environments, uh and sort of

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test some of these things. So
it was a very long drawn out process.

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It was very uncomfortable for me as
a humanities major to do this,

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but in the end I was quite
pleased with the final report. Yeah,

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I think, uh. I think
when I first looked at this, Jerry,

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that I was stunned by how audacious
you were and taking on this stas

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because I don't know, I didn't
see any way to measure presence uh as

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a as an end result of this. Now I think I think, uh,

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some of this was driven I guess
because I was reading Bob Work's uh

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piece from Proceedings about our our over
the navy's over over zealous approach to presence

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and and Adam Fogo's response to that. But I think what you've done is

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really provide a tool, as I
understand what your goal was. You're not

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necessarily a complete answer, but a
tool for someone to use. And who

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is that someone? Well, so
a great you know, first of all,

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great observation and if you you know, for those who get a chance

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to read the report, you will
note as I go through the literature review

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that I talk about those who are
for naval presents and there those against and

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and Bob Work gets about two and
a half pages of the report for his

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essay on the slave slavish devotion to
naval presence and how it's breaking the Navy,

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which which I I know mister Work. I respect him tremendously. I

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consider him a mentor and friend.
But I disagreed with that essay, and

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so in many ways, this proposal
Smith Richardson came out of my response somewhat

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knee jerk emotional response to that that
essay and Proceedings, But in reality and

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your your perceptive to point out,
I don't actually come up with the conclusion.

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In this report, I don't suggest
what the alternative fleet structure and architecture

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should look like because I wanted the
model to be there and in the hope

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that someone else would pick it up. Now, who is that someone else?

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I can tell you that the three
entities I would like is one N

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eighty one inside the Pentagon's OPNAV staff
that would they would pick up this model

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and fund having it run through a
succession of iterations. I would also suggest

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that either Fleet Forces Command or the
US Pacific Fleet pick up the model,

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fund it, adapt it, you
know, work with the staffs at the

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Naval Postgraduate School or or any other
modeling and simulation academic centers, you know,

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to build this out and then run
these tests. I was quite frankly

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frustrated that no one had done something
like this before, and then as I

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moved my way through this, I
came away somewhat suspicious that perhaps someone had,

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and that the results of running these
models in the past may have not

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come out in line with current fleet
architecture and budgetary decisions. So I believe

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that this type of work needs to
be done. I believe that the fleet

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could look significantly different and perhaps even
have a different price point. If someone

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were to pick this model up and
run with it and the three entities I

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mentioned. Quite frankly, I think
maybe the second half with his new analysis

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shop, could be another entity could
pick this up. But you know,

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I did this really with relatively little
financial resources, and I think you know,

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if someone took it and put a
larger team and more financial resources be

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it in a little time in a
supercomputer, they could come up with something

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that would be quite illuminating. Yeah, for those that have again, the

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link is at the show page.
If folks don't have the report up towards

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the end, we're maybe geting ahead
of ourselves. That's okay, it's our

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show. We do what we want
to. But you get to the modeling

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portion at the engineering I thought,
what was nice about this is, yes,

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there is math there that our friend
Mark Vandroff would would like to roll

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around in. There are little little
delta signs and a couple other Greek numbers

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in there, but it's understandable.
You don't have to have one hundred pound

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math head to understand it, because
you know, I'm like you, I

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come from the other side of the
brain. But in this discussion that we

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have about naval missions and presence.
I think what was nice about this and

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where this can be used as a
tool by others. There's a lot of

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this, and we talked about this
on other subjects and offline as well.

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A lot This is telling a story. And humans are right brain or left

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brain people. They're They're not better
or worse depend upon how they look at

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things. Are just different, which
is which is great. Some people they

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need to be told a story and
that's where you know, the liberal arts

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side of explaining things. But also
there is and especially in a highly technical

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area like like the Navy, there
are people who think in numbers, they

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think in graphs, and they need
to have it explained with some metrics.

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And this offers a tool. And
I think well meaning people can look at

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what's offered here and say, you
know this variable is off by you know,

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it's not four point six, it
should be a five point seven.

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Okay, fine, argument, But
you've created a structure here, and I

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think you're right that you know,
people can can take this model and they

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can customize it as they wish,
but at the end of the day,

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it can bring on additional conversations additional
storytelling, so you're able to communicate to

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people who think both ways, both
one side of the brain and the other,

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because you mentioned for the last forty
years, and another valuable part that

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you find in the early part of
the report is there's some history here.

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The Presence mission as it's modernly constructed
goes back to early nineteen seventies and Stansfield

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Turner, but you rightfully point out
and I like how you structured the errors

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of the last ers of the last
century, where we went from command of

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the Sea to the Cold Cold War
power projection era from the sea era and

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what we now call presence. Different
generations of people thinking about the navy and

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naval power. They use influence,
showing the flag, demonstrations and then finally

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at presence and the one thing that
came up, and I think it's a

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byproduct of the critique that you brought
on. I know Varney Rebel and Bob

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Work who you just mentioned, with
two of the critics of it, and

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having they both prior guests on mid
Rath, I might want to say up

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over the years and talk to them
a lot of their critique. I think

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a lot of the critique of the
presence mission really is, and please tell

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me if I'm off here. It's
almost a byproduct of the frustration that we

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can't do it simply because we don't
have the numbers and something if you do

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a letter search in the document,
but you don't have to because it's so

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obvious. A number comes up constantly, which I think is related to Rubbel

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and works critiques about, you know, wearing out a navy that goes from

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from readiness focus to a deployment focus. And that number is between one hundred

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and thirty and one hundred and fifty
ships at sea. That keeps coming up

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in your research and your discussions.
Talk a little bit about that number one

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two fifty and when you reverse engineer
that where that comes up with some numbers.

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It should be familiar to most listeners
here on the rests Well, I

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mean, the history of this is, first of all, naval presence as

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a mission has almost always inherently been
there. In fact, there is a

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great quote that I used from Oliver
Cromwell that a line of battleship is perhaps

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the nation's best ambassador. So this
idea of using ships as a means of

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messaging or influencing was right there.
I mean, obviously, you know,

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even Mahind's seminal work. The influence
of seapower upon history is about influence,

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this idea of our ability to manipulate
or massage the environment around us through the

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introduction of naval platforms and hints,
the introduction of our interests, demonstration of

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our interest in a particular region.
The reason my presence came out in a

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more articulate way in the early nineteen
seventies, first with Stansfield Turner and then

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also from Edward Loopwalch's early paper on
suasion. The idea of naval presence as

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a suasion is because the Navy leadership
at that time elmar Zumwalt and then his

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very close acolyte, Lieutenant Stansfield Turner, then president of the Naval War College,

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We're looking at these declining number of
ships, and so you know,

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we had come out of World War
Two with a thousand ships. Eisenhower sort

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of nexus down to about nine hundred. We kept that nine hundred through about

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nineteen sixty eight. But as the
cost of the Vietnam War started to mount,

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those ships also started to age.
We began to see the size of

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the fleet decline. Well, the
problem was is during the Cold War in

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the nineteen fifties, sixties and to
the seventies, the Navy either had signed

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up for or had been volunteered for
a number of these presence missions. You

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know, these regional combatant commanders,
whether it was Pacific Command, or whether

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it was Yukam, or whether it
was any other things that started to grow

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up, they all wanted these ships
to show up, and they'd set these

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schedules and put in their requests,
and so we had to maintain about one

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hundred and thirty to one hundred and
fifty ships at sea at any given time

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during this time period in order to
service these requests from the four Stars around

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the world. And also the political
leaders had begun to really lean on the

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Navy for messaging and you know,
and of course the ultimate case was the

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Cuban Missile crisis, where we used
the Atlantic Fleet combined second in six fleets

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so essentially send this dramatic message to
Khrushchev. And there was a lot of

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control over the political importance or the
tone that was set even with that.

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But there were all these other different
incidents where we were using ships to send

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signals and so in seventy three,
Turner and zoomwald A like, hey,

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look, the fleet's coming down.
I still got this demand signal to be

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out here with one hundred and thirty
of one hundred and fifty ships on any

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given day, and I don't have
the ships to do it. Something's going

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to have to give. And so, because we had never spoken of presence

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before, suddenly we start speaking about
it. It was a clarion call to

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the political leadership that if you find
value in this, in using the Navy

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in this way, you're going to
have to invest in the navy. Well

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pretty soon someone did you know,
when Ronald Reagan runs in nineteen eighty,

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you know he runs explicitly on a
six hundred ship, maybe because he had,

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you know, his trustee deputy there, John Lehman, who had spent

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the four years between the Carter administration
coming in and Reagan coming in sort of

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getting his ducks in a row about
what size the fleet we need and how

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we would use it. And so
we built that maybe back up to five

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hundred and ninety four ships, and
we were out there to meet that one

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hundred and thirty one hundred and fifty
ships. And this audience knows, you

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know, to keep you know,
one hundred and thirty one hundred and fifty

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ships at sea, you need about
four times in number ships, so that's

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six hundred. So that's the reason
why these arguments started being laid out,

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is that we had to come up
with the fleet behind the one hundred and

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thirty to one hundred and fifty per
day, and so that's that's where that

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came from. Well, let's talk
a little bit about a definition of presents

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and what you used to work through
to get to the formulas you developed in

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your work, because presence means a
lot of different things to different As you

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talked to your cocoons, they all
seemed kind of nonplussed, maybe the right

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word to have to answer that question. I mean, we assume a lot

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of stuff about presents, but what
did you find in your work is what

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a good definition of Well, before
I get into the good definition, let

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let's talk about the interview with the
co coms first, because that was an

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eye opener for me because when I
jumped into this, you know, one,

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I wanted to make sure I spoke
with several co combs. The second

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thing I wanted to do was I
was kind of interested to see how they

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viewed it based upon their service backgrounds. And so, you know, I

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interviewed three, you know, three
retired Navy admirals, William Fox Fallen,

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00:20:34.799 --> 00:20:42.279
Harry Harris, and Jim Stavardis.
But I also interviewed Mike Scaffriotti, Army

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General, Carter Ham, Army General, and Phil Breedlove Air Force General.

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What I found in asking them their
questions, and I gave the same twelve

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questions to each one of them in
order just to keep a standard in the

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way that I was approaching them,
was that in many ways the Navy guys

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gave with the exception of Savatus,
in many ways gave me sort of more

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of what I would almost turn canned
answers. And I don't mean that in

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a negative way. It's that they
had grown up in this culture, they

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had grown up with this terminology.
They were talking with me, a retired

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Navy captain who they are familiar with, and so in many ways there was

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sort of a hand wave and a
shorthand conversation back and forth about a lot

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of these talks. In many ways, the conversations with the Navy retired COCOMs

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were shorter in terms of length than
they were with the Army and Air Force.

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What I found with the Army and
Air Force was that because this was

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a new tool for them, this
was and it was something that they had

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had to study, they were much
more articulate about their answers to this.

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They had taken the time later in
their career intellectually to grasp the concepts of

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presence how they would use it.
When the Navy staff would come in and

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brief them about presence missions, I
got the sense that they were more engaged,

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and so they were taking the time
and not to mention they knew who

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I was, retired Navy Captain PhD. And I think they wanted to demonstrate

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to me that they had a grasp
of this topic that we were going to

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talk about in this hour hour and
a half long conversation. And so I

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found it interesting that they were willing
to dive down and again be much more

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articulate in this. Now, the
idea of the definition of naval presence,

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you know, is very much you
know, this idea of both you know,

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active and latent presence. This idea
the presence is there to provide influence

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in the region, to it,
and presence is really measured in the reaction

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of the environment to your arrival.
And so presence in many ways is is

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defined by you know, who you
are and what you're bringing to the area,

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and also whether you're you're coming in
a proactive or in a reactive manner.

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And so we get into that,
you know, within the literature review

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section of this, and it also
shows up later when we start building the

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model about because there's, you know, a physical characteristic to presence, but

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there's also an ephemeral characteristic to presence, and we had to find a way

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of sort of measuring both and then
integrating them along that vein you know of

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presence and showing up. One of
the things that that had me thinking about

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something I was like, God,
why not thought of that before? Is

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as you discussed about the reaction to
presence, it's it's not a binary thing

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where where you're there're not and
there's just a nuance, you know,

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the old argument, you know,
can submarines do the presence mission if you

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can't see them? Type of thing
is deeper than that, it's psychological.

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So it really is a multidisciplinary approach
to understanding this. Because you outline a

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bit that it's just not you're there
as a presence, but who you are.

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Are you from a nation that has
a three hundred ship navy? Are

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a fifty ship navy? You know, the Japanese versus the American Arlely Bird

294
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class destroyer. You know, on
paper, same ship. But you know

295
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what is that that addition to that
modifier. But you know, so that's

296
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what you bring with you when you
show up and where you're coming from.

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So a lot of the it sounds
harsh to call it a coping mechanism because

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I actually believe part of it.
But the discussions of a thousand ship navy

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are being able. You know,
yes, we only have X number ships,

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but our allies have navies like this. One does not equal one in

301
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that regard when you're looking at the
presence mission describe a little bit how those

302
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variables can change. When if you
look at a map it just says there

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are two blue destroyers there, that
doesn't mean that number really equals too.

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Yeah, So you just raised up
about four things there and let me kind

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of cycle back and go through them, because they're they're all interesting points of

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the conversation. The first point is
is sort of talking about the impact and

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the presence isn't just being there,
but in fact presidence has a bow wave.

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There's an anticipatory aspect of presence,
of temporal and it also has a

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residual that after a ship leads.
You know, I actually compared it to

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a radioactive height half life within it. There are incidents, you know,

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for instance, the visit of the
battleship Missouri to Turkey and Constantinople back during

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00:26:00.599 --> 00:26:06.400
the nineteen forties is still spoken of
today in that broader Black Sea region.

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Same thing with the passage of the
carrier Shrik groups through Taiwan Straits in the

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mid nineteen nineties. Although that occurred
some thirty five years ago, thirty eight

315
00:26:15.680 --> 00:26:21.160
years ago, that still has a
residual effect. So there's very much like

316
00:26:21.240 --> 00:26:26.359
this isotopial half life aspect of these
things, depending on how you do it.

317
00:26:26.240 --> 00:26:30.359
The second thing I would say is
interestingly enough, in a lot of

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00:26:30.359 --> 00:26:37.599
the research and review of the professional
literature is that a lot of the thinkers

319
00:26:37.640 --> 00:26:44.000
who had written about this in the
past made the point that the arrival and

320
00:26:44.039 --> 00:26:49.960
departure of ships almost always has a
bigger impact than ships that are just there.

321
00:26:51.640 --> 00:26:57.200
So Ken Booth and Edward Lukewalk both
in their treatments of presence, talk

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00:26:57.279 --> 00:27:03.599
about the fact that, for instance, the FDNF force in the Western Pacific

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00:27:03.240 --> 00:27:10.000
may not be as influential as let's
say, a fleet surging out from the

324
00:27:10.039 --> 00:27:14.680
from the west coast to surge over
and arrive into the arena, that that

325
00:27:14.720 --> 00:27:19.559
would have more presence because it's causing
a change in the environment, is perceived

326
00:27:19.640 --> 00:27:25.440
as a change in the background ambient
noise in the environment, rather than the

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00:27:25.519 --> 00:27:30.960
fact that Desron fifteen simply by its
existence there sort of has faded in the

328
00:27:30.960 --> 00:27:33.880
background noise. It is part of
the status quo, and that presence is

329
00:27:34.000 --> 00:27:40.319
very much about changing the status quo. And so you you know, you

330
00:27:40.319 --> 00:27:44.880
know, you get into a lot
of these different types of conversations about what

331
00:27:45.079 --> 00:27:49.559
is effective naval presence, you know, in the way that you present it.

332
00:27:51.400 --> 00:27:53.680
And we have to be in many
ways much more articulate about the way

333
00:27:53.680 --> 00:28:02.039
that we use our assets. Yeah. I'm sitting there looking at at a

334
00:28:02.079 --> 00:28:06.519
map that discusses one of that discuss
It shows where our ships are. And

335
00:28:06.759 --> 00:28:11.039
you know, right now we've got
the Ford and the Eisenhower in the Middle

336
00:28:11.079 --> 00:28:18.599
East. The Eisenhower was there or
any the ford showed up recently or vice

337
00:28:18.720 --> 00:28:23.480
versa. I can't remember the order, But did the impact of bringing that

338
00:28:23.759 --> 00:28:27.799
in your view of presence? Did
the impact of bringing that second carrier as

339
00:28:27.839 --> 00:28:32.720
a has a message to the neighborhood, is that that had more impact than

340
00:28:32.759 --> 00:28:36.240
just we had a carrier kind of
there already. Well, what was interesting

341
00:28:36.279 --> 00:28:41.359
about that is that Eagle one is
that the research showed, and this even

342
00:28:41.440 --> 00:28:45.160
predates in the nineteen seventies, there
was a number of studies on this,

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is that moving from one carrier in
an area to two carriers did not double

344
00:28:53.079 --> 00:29:00.319
your naval presence value in that region
that it was It was more it was

345
00:29:00.400 --> 00:29:04.440
more of like a moving from a
one point zero to a one point five

346
00:29:06.160 --> 00:29:11.039
in the way that it was perceived. However, three carriers in a region

347
00:29:11.480 --> 00:29:18.640
demonstrated in an exponential rise because there
was a perception or an understanding that three

348
00:29:19.440 --> 00:29:27.000
large deck aircraft carriers provided you with
an opportunity to go twenty four to seven

349
00:29:27.119 --> 00:29:30.599
with carrier operations, and the day
were aware of this. They knew that

350
00:29:30.640 --> 00:29:34.759
one deck had an ability to essentially
fly ten to twelve hours a day,

351
00:29:36.079 --> 00:29:38.559
two decks had the ability to perhaps
go twenty four hours a day, but

352
00:29:38.599 --> 00:29:42.599
perhaps only for five days. But
three decks gives you ability to cycle those

353
00:29:42.640 --> 00:29:45.799
carriers in such a way as that
you can now provide twenty four to seven.

354
00:29:47.599 --> 00:29:55.640
So when when we searched four strike
groups over to the Middle East after

355
00:29:56.119 --> 00:30:03.319
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in ninety
that was seen as a shout, very

356
00:30:03.400 --> 00:30:10.440
loud shout in the international environment.
But surging one carrier into a region is

357
00:30:10.480 --> 00:30:14.519
not necessarily a big deal. So
what I would say is that stationing the

358
00:30:14.559 --> 00:30:18.480
Ford off the east coast, off
the west coast of Israel certainly got someone's

359
00:30:18.480 --> 00:30:22.799
attention. But when the word was
out that the Ike was coming over the

360
00:30:22.920 --> 00:30:26.039
hill, well, then suddenly people
are beginning to get nervous. And then

361
00:30:26.160 --> 00:30:30.680
when I think it was Carl Vincent
took off from the west coast, that

362
00:30:30.799 --> 00:30:34.319
it's either Vincent or Stennis that started
moving out across the west coast, and

363
00:30:34.359 --> 00:30:38.680
everybody started to watch, i think
in the international arrival, to see what's

364
00:30:38.720 --> 00:30:41.599
the deal with that West coast carrier, what's going on with that deployer,

365
00:30:41.599 --> 00:30:47.200
where's it going? Because if the
Americans start showing up with three point zero,

366
00:30:47.400 --> 00:30:49.440
well hey, game on at that
point in time, and that's the

367
00:30:49.480 --> 00:30:56.559
way that's perceived even within the model. Yeah, I'll go ahead and quote

368
00:30:56.720 --> 00:31:00.960
from the report for you kiddies who
have your hymn handy. It's at the

369
00:31:00.000 --> 00:31:07.519
top of page forty seven. It's
a quote Modern policymakers understand that if four

370
00:31:07.599 --> 00:31:11.799
carrier strike groups operating together is a
war cry, one amphibious ready group is

371
00:31:11.880 --> 00:31:18.039
a growl, and a surfacing submarine
in the right place is a terrifying lethal

372
00:31:18.440 --> 00:31:22.400
whisper unquote. I thought that was
a great outline. I played on using

373
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that in the future. But you
also brought something something in that I think

374
00:31:26.680 --> 00:31:32.000
goes into that. Again. You
know, numbers don't matter what they are

375
00:31:32.039 --> 00:31:37.799
an intent, but also there's the
perception of it, and I believe it

376
00:31:37.880 --> 00:31:41.559
or not, there's there's something about
dinosaurs and everything. But you brought in

377
00:31:41.640 --> 00:31:45.480
the concept of something you learn from
your daughters that you I don't know if

378
00:31:45.519 --> 00:31:52.920
you coined it, but it's the
serotopian impact or in advanced Serotopian advantage I

379
00:31:52.960 --> 00:31:57.559
think it is. Yeah, so
this is actually I get more reaction to

380
00:31:57.680 --> 00:32:00.759
this part of the paper, this
one page that I wrote up about my

381
00:32:00.880 --> 00:32:07.240
daughters and their their online gaming community. Almost everyone notices it. So I

382
00:32:07.119 --> 00:32:13.440
have two daughters, both are adults, you know. One is a practicing

383
00:32:13.680 --> 00:32:16.640
paleontologist at a dinosaur museum in North
Dakota, and the other one is a

384
00:32:16.680 --> 00:32:22.599
sophomore this year studying wildlife biology up
in me And so, but these two

385
00:32:22.640 --> 00:32:29.000
sisters get together online like every night
and they play a game called the Visa

386
00:32:29.039 --> 00:32:31.799
Bermuda, which is a dinosaur and
they have dinosaur avatars in the game.

387
00:32:32.279 --> 00:32:36.839
And so I'm listening in on them
because they talk with each other on discord

388
00:32:37.240 --> 00:32:39.720
and no one, no one messes
with the Hendrickx squirrels in this in this

389
00:32:39.880 --> 00:32:44.359
environment. But one of the things
that they I found was that they first

390
00:32:44.559 --> 00:32:50.200
they prefer to play as ceratopsians,
essentially large horror fores, the the cows

391
00:32:50.240 --> 00:32:54.440
as it were, of the of
the dinosaur community, rather than sort of

392
00:32:54.440 --> 00:33:00.720
the larger, more sexy, more
lethal Tyrannosaurus wrecks or velociraptors with everyone seems

393
00:33:00.720 --> 00:33:02.119
to pay attention to. And I
finally said, well, why are you

394
00:33:02.200 --> 00:33:06.960
doing that? And they said,
well, because the ceratopsians, each one

395
00:33:07.000 --> 00:33:10.559
of them has a very inherent intimidation
or in tim score, and that if

396
00:33:10.640 --> 00:33:16.119
we operate together, everyone stays away
from us because, you know, acting

397
00:33:16.160 --> 00:33:20.720
as a herd, we can intimidate
them. And in fact, if someone

398
00:33:20.799 --> 00:33:23.440
messages with us, we get a
large enough herd and we'll just circle this

399
00:33:24.240 --> 00:33:30.799
carnivore diet or this carnivore dinosaur and
we will kill them through intimidation. And

400
00:33:30.839 --> 00:33:34.200
it's like, wow, that's pretty
amazing. So my key thing was is

401
00:33:34.240 --> 00:33:38.680
I wanted to know how in that
computer game did they mathematically model intimidation.

402
00:33:39.039 --> 00:33:45.039
How did they actually write the code
into that analogue to be able to do

403
00:33:45.119 --> 00:33:49.000
that? And I started trying to
work with them as well as the game

404
00:33:49.039 --> 00:33:52.200
designers to figure that out because they
found that really intriguing. But this idea

405
00:33:52.799 --> 00:34:00.160
of maintaining the piece through lethal you
know, intimidation, the ability that that

406
00:34:00.240 --> 00:34:02.359
I don't want you to mess with
me, but I need to be large

407
00:34:02.400 --> 00:34:06.279
enough and strong enough, and that
I need to combine my effects in such

408
00:34:06.319 --> 00:34:10.599
a way that you won't jump ugly
with me. And so that particular game

409
00:34:10.639 --> 00:34:15.880
really convinced me that in fact,
this thing naval presence, actually can be

410
00:34:15.920 --> 00:34:22.840
modeled, and so that had encouraged
me in my own research. Yeah,

411
00:34:22.000 --> 00:34:24.719
I was laughing at that part,
because I was thinking, you know,

412
00:34:25.320 --> 00:34:31.480
we often are sending things like lcs's
into areas where we want to intimidate,

413
00:34:31.519 --> 00:34:37.519
and I can't think of a less
intimidating ship right now. So you know,

414
00:34:37.639 --> 00:34:42.960
I think one of the good aspects
of your research is that somebody on

415
00:34:42.960 --> 00:34:45.480
one of these staffs has got to
think should be thinking, well, yeah,

416
00:34:45.519 --> 00:34:52.000
I got to add in intimidation,
and we need to add something bigger

417
00:34:52.199 --> 00:34:55.440
and better than an LCS out there
patrolling an area. Can I stopped you

418
00:34:55.519 --> 00:35:00.559
right there, because one of the
things that's important to understand is that,

419
00:35:00.679 --> 00:35:04.960
up until the early nineteen eighties,
in none of the literature dealing with either

420
00:35:05.559 --> 00:35:09.480
influence or presence or suasion or any
of the different words or phrases we used,

421
00:35:09.800 --> 00:35:17.199
no one spoke about the naval presence
value of destroyers or cruisers. Up

422
00:35:17.280 --> 00:35:22.920
until the nineteen eighties, it was
either if you talked about presidents, you

423
00:35:22.920 --> 00:35:27.360
were either talking about carrier strike groups
or you were talking about marine amphibious ready

424
00:35:27.400 --> 00:35:34.440
groups. Carriers are ours. And
then suddenly in the nineteen eighties, then

425
00:35:34.440 --> 00:35:40.679
we started talking about destroyers like Spruance
class destroyers or Titano Roga class cruisers or

426
00:35:40.960 --> 00:35:45.679
quite frankly, you talked about the
battleships as well, and why was that?

427
00:35:46.119 --> 00:35:50.880
And it was because, and I
went into the literature, I reviewed

428
00:35:50.920 --> 00:35:55.360
it, it was explicitly because of
the integration of the Tomahawk lot Land Attack

429
00:35:55.440 --> 00:36:00.760
missile into the inventory of those ships. And so the moment that you put

430
00:36:01.199 --> 00:36:07.559
a power projection weapon on board a
vessel, and then I would submit that

431
00:36:07.760 --> 00:36:14.079
lcs could actually have a presence capability
if in fact you had an ability to

432
00:36:14.079 --> 00:36:19.719
project power from it that actually held
your competitor's interests at risk. But if

433
00:36:19.719 --> 00:36:22.960
you have a vessel out there that
essentially is just a seagoing vessel that can

434
00:36:22.000 --> 00:36:28.920
only operate our influence the immediate water
area around it, it does not exert

435
00:36:28.960 --> 00:36:35.679
a presence on the environment. You
really need that power projection capability to,

436
00:36:36.320 --> 00:36:38.519
you know, to make the other
guy stood up and listen to you or

437
00:36:38.559 --> 00:36:43.480
pay attention to you. So it
was Tomahawk that I think changed the way

438
00:36:43.519 --> 00:36:46.599
that we valued presence in the fleet, and the spruit cans and then the

439
00:36:46.639 --> 00:36:52.159
typos and ultimately the birds are all
considered to be presence vehicles today, despite

440
00:36:52.159 --> 00:36:58.199
the fact that they would not have
been during the sixties and seventies. Yeah,

441
00:36:58.480 --> 00:37:00.320
it goes back to something that I
think we could do an entire show

442
00:37:00.360 --> 00:37:05.719
one And you know something you and
I Jerry talked about before range matters,

443
00:37:06.000 --> 00:37:13.000
it's it's it's underappreciated and so many
things involving the Navy, but we talked

444
00:37:13.039 --> 00:37:15.039
about, you know, let's go
back to the original seventies. And for

445
00:37:15.079 --> 00:37:21.199
the listeners, they're probably aware of
Stansfield Turner. They could remember to google

446
00:37:21.239 --> 00:37:25.119
some of the stuff that he wrote. It's all available online. We've discussed

447
00:37:25.280 --> 00:37:30.920
Zoomwalt, but there are two other
people who are part of this discussion.

448
00:37:30.920 --> 00:37:36.880
They're kind of on a similar school
that I would encourage the listeners to look

449
00:37:36.960 --> 00:37:39.119
up and I wanted to get your
your take on their perspective of it.

450
00:37:39.639 --> 00:37:46.559
And that was in nineteen seventy one. There was James Cable's Gunboat Diplomacy and

451
00:37:46.679 --> 00:37:53.159
also Commander James McNulty at the time, he had an initial reply to Stanfield

452
00:37:53.360 --> 00:38:00.440
Turner's earlier work on Presence Mission where
he argued, for you know, we

453
00:38:00.440 --> 00:38:07.920
can see echoes and influenced squadrons here. The value of more numerous ships for

454
00:38:08.119 --> 00:38:15.000
the mission vice just these large you
know, nuclear era Cold War units that

455
00:38:15.039 --> 00:38:21.880
most people were thinking about when they
talked about presence. Well, so Cable

456
00:38:22.119 --> 00:38:29.800
wrote an entire book on gunboat diplomacy
and did a really great study and mostly

457
00:38:29.840 --> 00:38:35.679
of the of the British Empire and
its use of small vessels and medium sized

458
00:38:35.760 --> 00:38:42.280
vessels and cruisers to sort of uphold
its diplomacy. And obviously he made the

459
00:38:42.320 --> 00:38:46.320
point that this term gunboat diplomacy cuts
both ways. It's a two edged sword

460
00:38:46.559 --> 00:38:52.719
because it was viewed both positively uh
and negatively. So you know, the

461
00:38:52.800 --> 00:38:54.320
idea that you know, we're going
to, you know, put these gunboats

462
00:38:54.400 --> 00:38:59.920
up on some of the rivers of
China. There's a lot of imperial over

463
00:39:00.079 --> 00:39:02.599
tones that go along with that that
were viewed very negatively. But I think

464
00:39:02.599 --> 00:39:09.880
he did a great job of fimly
historically sort of reviewing some of these policies.

465
00:39:09.880 --> 00:39:15.760
By the way, I think that
Captain VJ. Armstrong out of the

466
00:39:15.880 --> 00:39:22.840
United States Naval Academy has just recently
done this as well with his book about

467
00:39:22.199 --> 00:39:30.400
American naval operations in nineteenth and early
twentieth century and looking at presence missions there.

468
00:39:30.440 --> 00:39:35.519
I think that Vj's kind of come
alongside cables book and sort of provided

469
00:39:35.679 --> 00:39:39.119
an addendum, an annex further exploration
of it, which is not surprising because

470
00:39:39.199 --> 00:39:45.039
VJ and I actually worked on a
paper on naval presence almost a decade ago

471
00:39:45.079 --> 00:39:49.880
when I was at the Center for
New American Security called the Presence Problem,

472
00:39:49.920 --> 00:39:53.480
where we started to first map out
our interest in this topic. Now McNulty

473
00:39:53.880 --> 00:40:00.320
looks at this and again he's critiquing
this idea that you know, a out

474
00:40:00.360 --> 00:40:05.599
what the implications are here, which
is numbers, And you know, I

475
00:40:05.639 --> 00:40:10.559
think that he's actually calling calling us
out about that isn't just an argument for

476
00:40:10.559 --> 00:40:15.320
for for numbers at this point in
time. And then he also wants to

477
00:40:15.440 --> 00:40:22.079
understand that, you know that the
modern world was fundamentally different than the pre

478
00:40:22.320 --> 00:40:29.360
World War two world because of nuclear
weapons, and he wanted to make sure

479
00:40:29.559 --> 00:40:34.840
that we were understanding that the oceans
were no longer barriers but in fact part

480
00:40:34.960 --> 00:40:39.079
of a global environment that we're all
operating in. But he thought that the

481
00:40:39.199 --> 00:40:45.360
Navy was making wrong headed decisions.
Then that at presence was what we were

482
00:40:45.400 --> 00:40:52.920
going to be doing our our investment
in more technical, high end ships that

483
00:40:52.039 --> 00:40:57.320
we were starting to make huge investments
in in the Taekwondo roga and Egis at

484
00:40:57.320 --> 00:41:01.079
that time was going to price us
out of the ability to do the presence

485
00:41:01.159 --> 00:41:06.920
mission in the long run. That
we needed a force that had a lot

486
00:41:07.039 --> 00:41:10.440
of cheaper vessels that we can buy
in bigger numbers. If you're really going

487
00:41:10.480 --> 00:41:15.360
to do presents, you really needed
to pay attention to the low end of

488
00:41:15.440 --> 00:41:22.159
the high low mix. Yeah,
that that strikes me. I mean,

489
00:41:22.280 --> 00:41:27.639
here we are talking about surge being
important, that if you can surge forth

490
00:41:28.800 --> 00:41:30.960
power, you know, I'm thinking, well, you know, the easiest

491
00:41:31.000 --> 00:41:38.400
and least problematic way to have a
force that surges is if you have nuclear

492
00:41:38.440 --> 00:41:44.280
powered shifts, so the carriers the
days when we had power nuclear power cruisers,

493
00:41:45.199 --> 00:41:49.679
I think nuclear power destroyers a few
of them, but we had a

494
00:41:49.679 --> 00:41:52.800
whole bunch of of those new cruisers. You know, that seems to me

495
00:41:52.880 --> 00:41:58.920
you could if the concern is that
work had, which was that we can't

496
00:41:59.039 --> 00:42:02.960
maintain our force and use it at
the same time, that if you're gonna

497
00:42:04.000 --> 00:42:06.920
if you need a force you can
surge that you want a force that you

498
00:42:06.920 --> 00:42:12.760
can send that doesn't have a big
logistics train behind it. Those those types

499
00:42:12.800 --> 00:42:16.519
of ships would would be very important
to that. But and I would think

500
00:42:16.559 --> 00:42:22.519
that that somewhere would be worked into
your formula as a part of the environment.

501
00:42:22.000 --> 00:42:27.719
Yeah, so it's it's actually there. So in in the in in

502
00:42:27.800 --> 00:42:34.320
the formula there's an area that deals
with sustainability sustainment, so it's part of

503
00:42:34.360 --> 00:42:38.519
the ephemeral side of the equation,
but the ability of a nation to support

504
00:42:38.679 --> 00:42:45.440
it's it's four deployed forces at sea
for sustained periods of time. And I

505
00:42:45.519 --> 00:42:51.280
actually raised the point that the US
that that really the ability to do underway

506
00:42:51.320 --> 00:42:57.760
replenishment, specifically replenishment alongside is sort
of the you know, where you can

507
00:42:57.800 --> 00:43:01.079
figure out who the major LEA players
are versus Triple A and Double A,

508
00:43:02.239 --> 00:43:07.599
and that one of the things that
I'm really disturbed about is that China's increasing

509
00:43:07.679 --> 00:43:15.320
proficiency and underway replenishment and the growth
their ability to just add replenishment ships and

510
00:43:15.480 --> 00:43:21.920
tenders and sustainment because of their large
shipbuilding industry. So when I scored that

511
00:43:22.119 --> 00:43:24.360
out, you know, I made
the point that you know, while we

512
00:43:24.400 --> 00:43:30.960
are very good at underway replenishment and
we have a strong tradition with sustainment,

513
00:43:31.719 --> 00:43:37.480
we're facing the problem in that the
percentage of the sustainment part of our fleet

514
00:43:37.599 --> 00:43:42.199
is getting smaller and there's more stress
upon it, and that we're not paying

515
00:43:42.280 --> 00:43:46.360
enough attention to that side of the
fleet equation. And so you know,

516
00:43:46.480 --> 00:43:52.159
China is looking at that as much
as we are, and I'm looking as

517
00:43:52.239 --> 00:43:55.159
much at their the size of their
sustainment fleet and their ability to have overseas

518
00:43:55.199 --> 00:44:01.480
bases and hubs of logistical support hubs
UH to support their operations. So yes,

519
00:44:01.800 --> 00:44:07.639
sustainment and logistics is a is a
very large portion of the ephemeral side

520
00:44:08.039 --> 00:44:15.719
of the conversation. I think something
else, you know, we're talking about

521
00:44:16.239 --> 00:44:23.760
explaining this problem and we have the
war gaining, for lack of a better

522
00:44:23.760 --> 00:44:28.599
phrase, that that as you try
to work this out and gain the system,

523
00:44:28.639 --> 00:44:30.920
look at the different various variables that
were going in. But there's also

524
00:44:30.960 --> 00:44:37.480
trying to visualize it because it's part
of telling the story and an interesting way

525
00:44:37.519 --> 00:44:39.239
to look at it. A lot
of people who look at a variety of

526
00:44:39.239 --> 00:44:44.199
statistics. One way they graft things
is a thing you know, heat maps,

527
00:44:44.239 --> 00:44:46.280
looking at UH, you know,
crime rates, for instance. You

528
00:44:46.320 --> 00:44:50.559
can pull up a city and has
the various heat maps and you came an

529
00:44:50.599 --> 00:44:55.360
interesting way as you you know,
come through this this algorithm that you've developed,

530
00:44:55.360 --> 00:44:59.920
which you know people can be can
fiddle around with it. They want,

531
00:45:00.079 --> 00:45:01.320
you know, how do you visualize
this? How do you explain this?

532
00:45:01.880 --> 00:45:06.840
And you know, going back to
interdisciplinary ways of explaining things, you

533
00:45:06.960 --> 00:45:10.440
actually tapped into the meteorology side of
the house. What are other ways of

534
00:45:10.599 --> 00:45:16.840
visualizing the outcomes of this exercise you
think might be useful to help more people

535
00:45:16.960 --> 00:45:21.880
understand what you're trying to explain to
them. Well, ultimately, the model

536
00:45:21.960 --> 00:45:24.920
that I'm using is an agent based
model, and so there's a number of

537
00:45:25.000 --> 00:45:30.039
characteristics of that particular modeling that are
important. But the key thing is is

538
00:45:30.079 --> 00:45:36.639
that I settled on a concept that's
called emergence, which is that it's nearly

539
00:45:36.679 --> 00:45:43.719
impossible, you know, to one
for one model every aspect of of of

540
00:45:43.760 --> 00:45:49.360
an environment, and so you have
to focus on certain key characteristics of the

541
00:45:49.480 --> 00:45:52.480
environment and say that I'm going to
zero in on this, I'm going to

542
00:45:52.519 --> 00:45:55.920
measure that, and those factors will
be representative. So, for instance,

543
00:45:57.199 --> 00:46:00.400
you know, the weather is perhaps
you know, the most complex thing on

544
00:46:00.440 --> 00:46:05.280
the planet, very difficult, you
know, to try and model if you

545
00:46:05.320 --> 00:46:07.440
try to go one for one because
there's just so many variables. However,

546
00:46:08.199 --> 00:46:15.079
meteorologists for years have noted that if
you look at temperature and wind direction and

547
00:46:15.239 --> 00:46:22.760
speed and humidity, that in fact
you get a fairly representative model of the

548
00:46:22.800 --> 00:46:28.039
weather. And by you know,
so you get temperature, barometric pressure,

549
00:46:28.079 --> 00:46:30.760
whend direction. It's feed. So
so those things right there are going to

550
00:46:30.840 --> 00:46:35.039
tell you, you know, what
that weather looks like. And we see

551
00:46:35.079 --> 00:46:38.480
that every night on the six o'clock
news in the last ten minutes, so

552
00:46:38.719 --> 00:46:43.119
as I started to bring this out, and by the way, there's a

553
00:46:43.159 --> 00:46:45.719
couple of other things that emerge,
you know that would be very similar.

554
00:46:45.880 --> 00:46:51.519
Like there's a model that was done
on forest fires, and based upon the

555
00:46:51.559 --> 00:46:53.760
density of a forest and how many
trees and how close they are, you

556
00:46:53.760 --> 00:46:59.440
can create that and you can see
what the what the proclivity of a particular

557
00:46:59.519 --> 00:47:04.039
forest is to kind of have on
a flash fire that cannot be controlled,

558
00:47:04.400 --> 00:47:07.519
or for that matter, there's some
other things that do modeling dealing with earthquakes

559
00:47:08.199 --> 00:47:13.840
that based upon the number of volcano
reactions you can tell what the likelihood is

560
00:47:13.920 --> 00:47:17.880
of an earthquake in an area.
A lot of small volcano reactions will lead

561
00:47:17.920 --> 00:47:22.639
to a lesser of large earthquakes.
And vice versa. So there's a number

562
00:47:22.679 --> 00:47:28.400
of these emergence factors that I came
across when I was doing the reading,

563
00:47:28.800 --> 00:47:34.119
and so that allowed me to try
and form in my own mind both sort

564
00:47:34.119 --> 00:47:40.920
of broad categories of the physical characteristics
of naval presence and then also some broad

565
00:47:42.000 --> 00:47:46.679
categories of what we would call the
non corporeal or the ephemeral characteristics of naval

566
00:47:46.719 --> 00:47:52.280
presence and so and those were what
I used to kind of drill deep.

567
00:47:52.400 --> 00:47:55.840
So, for instance, you know, on the physical characteristics, I looked

568
00:47:55.840 --> 00:48:01.280
at the lethality, the awareness,
the rediness, and the range of the

569
00:48:01.320 --> 00:48:07.039
platforms of the navies carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes or the

570
00:48:07.079 --> 00:48:14.719
loatoral combat chip. Lethality is essentially
a measurement of how much ordinance you know

571
00:48:14.840 --> 00:48:19.440
is onboard, how much hurt can
that particular platform visit upon someone else.

572
00:48:21.280 --> 00:48:27.440
Its awareness is the sensory awareness around
it, both in the air, in

573
00:48:27.559 --> 00:48:30.039
space, under the sea, How
aware of its environment, how far can

574
00:48:30.039 --> 00:48:34.800
that awareness stretch out? And so
I assigned scores to that. The readiness

575
00:48:34.840 --> 00:48:37.800
of the platform obviously that goes to
training of the crew as well as the

576
00:48:37.840 --> 00:48:43.280
material condition of the vessel itself and
then of course range, so what is

577
00:48:43.320 --> 00:48:46.960
its ability to exert lethality at a
distance? And so I use that to

578
00:48:47.079 --> 00:48:52.480
generate platform scores for all these things
within it. And then you turn,

579
00:48:52.599 --> 00:48:57.679
because that's just the physical characteristics,
you have to then pass those characteristics through

580
00:48:57.719 --> 00:49:01.840
what I call the national lens,
which are these more ephemeral characteristics things like

581
00:49:02.079 --> 00:49:07.280
national will, combat credibility, the
size of the fleet, UH, the

582
00:49:07.360 --> 00:49:13.440
sustainment ability of that fleet, the
economic security of the nation, and ultimately

583
00:49:13.559 --> 00:49:16.679
an alliance score. So what what
can it draw upon in the international environment.

584
00:49:17.039 --> 00:49:22.119
And bringing all these things together with
way to to average across those characteristics,

585
00:49:22.639 --> 00:49:28.159
then you then you then take those
two things physical and non physical characteristics,

586
00:49:28.400 --> 00:49:31.320
and you have to compete them in
the environment. And I actually defined

587
00:49:31.760 --> 00:49:37.440
UH six environments on the ocean UH
in which we competed, and those environments

588
00:49:37.480 --> 00:49:42.159
have different levels of resistance or what
I would call viscosity, you know,

589
00:49:42.320 --> 00:49:45.400
that are helpful to us UH or
are helpful to the other guy, and

590
00:49:45.440 --> 00:49:49.519
you sort of have to factor in
those scores, you know, as we

591
00:49:49.559 --> 00:49:52.400
did. So, so that got
into that aspect of the model and agent

592
00:49:52.599 --> 00:50:02.760
based you know, characteristics of how
to approcess. Yeah, I was looking

593
00:50:02.800 --> 00:50:07.280
at it, at this stuff.
I'm thinking, Okay, where are the

594
00:50:07.280 --> 00:50:15.480
the the where do you add in
threats like the shore based anti ship cruise

595
00:50:15.519 --> 00:50:20.599
missiles that exist now? And what
factory? What factor do you use for

596
00:50:20.760 --> 00:50:25.320
our own air assets? You know
those Air Force guys who are worldwide operators.

597
00:50:25.360 --> 00:50:30.400
Of course you know in certain environments, where where does your factor those

598
00:50:30.400 --> 00:50:32.360
in? Is that also part of
the environment stuff? It is? And

599
00:50:32.400 --> 00:50:38.840
in fact that goes to the oceanic
environment. So you know, not everyone

600
00:50:38.920 --> 00:50:43.840
seeing this, but I just point
out to you Eagle one. You know,

601
00:50:44.199 --> 00:50:47.079
page sixty five of the report,
we started talking about the oceanic environment,

602
00:50:47.119 --> 00:50:51.760
and there's a graph there where we
talked about oceanic influence of viscosi and

603
00:50:51.840 --> 00:50:55.679
friction. And the idea is that
if I'm starting out in Pearl Harbor,

604
00:50:55.719 --> 00:51:00.960
Hawaii, and I'm beginning to move
towards the Chinese, you know, I

605
00:51:00.079 --> 00:51:06.239
moved from an environment that's very helpful
to me and my shifts or carrier strike

606
00:51:06.320 --> 00:51:13.079
groups or independent sailors. But as
I get closer that there is a turnover

607
00:51:13.159 --> 00:51:17.679
point, as it were, where
I'm entering China's sphere of influence and as

608
00:51:17.719 --> 00:51:22.960
I move deeper into that sphere of
influence, whether that's their range of their

609
00:51:22.960 --> 00:51:29.360
weapons or their sensory awareness, then
in fact I am encountering greater and greater

610
00:51:29.480 --> 00:51:34.760
resistance to the flow of my influence
into that region. And yes, there

611
00:51:34.800 --> 00:51:39.280
are aspects of you know, whether
I'm going to get support from inorganic assets

612
00:51:39.280 --> 00:51:45.400
and so on, that can lessen
that resistance or friction in support of me,

613
00:51:45.159 --> 00:51:50.000
But there also is an idea that
there's a temporal aspect of that that

614
00:51:50.000 --> 00:51:52.079
that's cyclic. They're not going to
be there always, and so that in

615
00:51:52.159 --> 00:51:58.559
many ways what determines my presence value
is simply my presence and how well I'm

616
00:51:58.599 --> 00:52:04.639
able to sustain that presence as I
get deeper and deeper into the influence of

617
00:52:05.280 --> 00:52:07.400
the Chinese environment. Now, the
one thing I can say, and it's

618
00:52:07.400 --> 00:52:12.199
and it's in the graph that deals
with this when I'm talking about the different

619
00:52:12.239 --> 00:52:16.920
oceanic is that when I'm operating in
proximity to an ally, even though that

620
00:52:17.039 --> 00:52:24.519
ally is based deep inside the other
guy's sphere. So for instance, Taiwan,

621
00:52:24.920 --> 00:52:30.960
let's let's view Taiwan or Japan as
an ally, that when I'm operating

622
00:52:30.960 --> 00:52:35.360
in close proximity to them and their
forces. To the degree that their interests

623
00:52:35.400 --> 00:52:38.559
are aligned with me, uh and
mine, then in fact I'm going to

624
00:52:38.559 --> 00:52:45.920
pick up some aided you know,
lessening of the friction to my presence there.

625
00:52:45.199 --> 00:52:50.760
I think certainly the idea of us
moving through the Taiwan Strait is aided

626
00:52:50.800 --> 00:52:54.800
by the fact that the Taiwan Taiwanese
are interested in us and supportive of those

627
00:52:54.840 --> 00:53:02.599
operations, and so that sort of
lessens the in those waters. Yeah,

628
00:53:02.679 --> 00:53:07.960
Lee and Commas just mentioned something that
kind of bounced off what you were just

629
00:53:07.960 --> 00:53:13.639
talking about, you know, those
things near in the far far western Pacific

630
00:53:13.639 --> 00:53:19.079
that are closed to China. And
it ties into a brief mention that Admiral

631
00:53:19.159 --> 00:53:25.840
Fallon had in your interview, is
there weren't any ships available at all,

632
00:53:25.960 --> 00:53:31.559
but he was trying to create some
positive effects in the Philippines not unimportant,

633
00:53:32.719 --> 00:53:39.199
especially in the early part of the
zero zeros of where I think we both

634
00:53:39.239 --> 00:53:44.679
have a mutual friend who was actually
there with the Special Forces in the Southern

635
00:53:44.719 --> 00:53:46.639
Philippines. There was a lot going
on there and he wanted to get some

636
00:53:47.039 --> 00:53:52.679
naval presence to get there, and
he wanted to send Well, if you

637
00:53:52.719 --> 00:53:55.719
can't do anything else? Can you
deploy a hospital that ship from San Diego

638
00:53:55.760 --> 00:54:00.760
to me? And he mentioned,
you know, big navy just quite get

639
00:54:00.800 --> 00:54:02.840
it, and it's not amorphous blob. You know, we talk about national

640
00:54:02.840 --> 00:54:08.119
will. A lot of national will
derives from understanding and we hear, you

641
00:54:08.119 --> 00:54:13.840
know, big Navy thrown around a
lot. And it's also it's fun to

642
00:54:13.920 --> 00:54:17.239
hear that phrase used by a four
star because to ninety eight point seven percent

643
00:54:17.280 --> 00:54:23.079
of people, he is big Navy. So when there are important leaders,

644
00:54:23.199 --> 00:54:30.239
like a Navy four star who's trying
to get an important ally further inside our

645
00:54:30.320 --> 00:54:34.679
lifeline, who's under stress not just
from an Islamic consurgency, but from a

646
00:54:34.760 --> 00:54:38.880
surgey in China and quote big Navy
unquote is throwing blocks in the way.

647
00:54:42.079 --> 00:54:47.280
Who is this big navy that can
thwart four stars who are trying to do

648
00:54:47.280 --> 00:54:52.039
the right thing in such important areas
well? I think the deck comes down

649
00:54:52.079 --> 00:54:58.960
to opnav staff or for that matter, of political leadership that that's involved in

650
00:54:58.960 --> 00:55:01.559
this. And yeah, that the
exis samples of using the hospital ships.

651
00:55:01.960 --> 00:55:06.679
You know, they bring a tremendous
amount of influence and they have a very

652
00:55:06.679 --> 00:55:14.400
strong form of presence and they influence
in the local environment. So yes,

653
00:55:14.480 --> 00:55:17.440
they still talk about the hospital ship's
visits to the Southern Philippines, and it's

654
00:55:17.440 --> 00:55:22.239
something that we've continue to do in
the years hence. So I don't mean

655
00:55:22.360 --> 00:55:28.239
to say that hospital ships don't have
presence because they don't have Tomahawk, but

656
00:55:28.280 --> 00:55:31.039
I would say that their presence,
you know, has a different flavor to

657
00:55:31.199 --> 00:55:37.559
it, and also the half life
or or or the impulse that comes off

658
00:55:37.559 --> 00:55:43.840
from that presence mission has a lower
amplitude than those the presence that comes with

659
00:55:43.960 --> 00:55:47.719
the ability to project power. So
I would fully use the two hospital ships,

660
00:55:47.719 --> 00:55:51.239
but I only have two hospital ships, and really I only have the

661
00:55:51.320 --> 00:55:53.800
crew for one hospital ship to send
it out there, which is one of

662
00:55:53.840 --> 00:56:00.599
the limiting factors, gentlemen, Because
I know that we're coming up the end

663
00:56:00.239 --> 00:56:04.079
of the hour here in just a
few more minutes, I didn't want to

664
00:56:04.159 --> 00:56:12.519
highlight that in the conclusion that this
report was deeply troubling to me as I

665
00:56:12.559 --> 00:56:17.079
got to the end, because you
know, I think it's suggestive in fact

666
00:56:17.280 --> 00:56:22.639
that the value of our naval presence
is really on on on a nice edge

667
00:56:22.719 --> 00:56:30.440
right now, that because of declining
perception of our national will and the combat

668
00:56:30.480 --> 00:56:35.199
credibility. Let's face it, it's
been, you know, seventy years since

669
00:56:35.239 --> 00:56:38.719
there's been a major Navy sea battle, and also the declining side of our

670
00:56:38.760 --> 00:56:45.679
fleet, that in fact, the
value of our presence may be coming to

671
00:56:45.719 --> 00:56:49.960
an end. And I think that
that that should be deeply troubling to policymakers

672
00:56:50.039 --> 00:56:58.280
and to navalists alike. Yeah,
that's that's a great point, and I

673
00:56:58.360 --> 00:57:01.599
think I think that from you and
Bob Work and a bunch of other folks

674
00:57:01.599 --> 00:57:06.840
have the same concern, which is, the overuse of the fleet is not

675
00:57:06.880 --> 00:57:09.760
the fleets from not the Navy's problem. It is a department or defense problem.

676
00:57:10.079 --> 00:57:14.239
Somebody has to say no to the
cocombs and that's the only guy that

677
00:57:14.280 --> 00:57:19.000
can do it, and that not
saying no is causing a lot of the

678
00:57:19.000 --> 00:57:22.880
problems that we're discussing, including the
one you just mentioned. Yeah. The

679
00:57:23.440 --> 00:57:29.760
thing that I worry now is that
we actually may have had the moment when

680
00:57:29.840 --> 00:57:34.000
naval presence declined to the point that
it no longer is effective. And that

681
00:57:34.039 --> 00:57:37.360
may have occurred some time ago and
we just haven't noticed yet, but it

682
00:57:37.400 --> 00:57:44.679
will quickly come to our attention.
The first time that tiny Chinese type fifty

683
00:57:44.719 --> 00:57:47.599
five cruiser comes alongside of Burke and
just push us us out of the way,

684
00:57:49.000 --> 00:57:51.280
and it says, what are you
going to do about it? You

685
00:57:51.320 --> 00:57:52.880
know, this is my water.
You need to go away and don't come

686
00:57:52.920 --> 00:58:00.559
back. The point here is that
we no longer have the numbers to to

687
00:58:00.199 --> 00:58:07.559
service all of the requests that are
out there for naval presence, and that

688
00:58:07.719 --> 00:58:10.800
yes, we are breaking the fleet
trying to do that. But until the

689
00:58:10.880 --> 00:58:15.760
Navy says no, are the CoCom
say more and more and more, give

690
00:58:15.800 --> 00:58:20.280
me more shifts, then political leaders
are not going to free up the funds.

691
00:58:20.280 --> 00:58:24.360
And right now, obviously you and
I and everyone else knows the industrial

692
00:58:24.400 --> 00:58:28.280
base is not there to just pour
it on and start, you know,

693
00:58:28.320 --> 00:58:31.679
building more destroyers and submarines tomorrow.
And so you know, we need to

694
00:58:31.800 --> 00:58:37.480
kind of come to grips with where
really is naval presence crucial? You know,

695
00:58:37.519 --> 00:58:42.360
I would submit that we need naval
presence in the Western Pacific quite consistently.

696
00:58:42.719 --> 00:58:45.119
We need to create a fleet to
provide presents in the Arctic, for

697
00:58:45.119 --> 00:58:49.719
instance, but we need to kind
of look at other regions of the world.

698
00:58:50.119 --> 00:58:52.119
You know, I think right now
eight of the eleven aircraft carriers are

699
00:58:52.119 --> 00:58:59.039
at sea, which means I am
burning aircraft carrier utility right now. Everyone's

700
00:58:59.079 --> 00:59:00.920
gonna have to go back in the
ure in order to be ready for a

701
00:59:00.960 --> 00:59:06.320
real contingency. If we don't start
hurling some airplanes and weapons at the Iranians

702
00:59:06.320 --> 00:59:08.480
soon, we're going to need to
get a reset in the carrier strike group.

703
00:59:08.480 --> 00:59:14.639
But we need a reset and across
the entire fleet, and Jerry kind

704
00:59:14.639 --> 00:59:16.760
of to end up the hour,
we actually have a caller here, a

705
00:59:16.800 --> 00:59:22.239
friendly neighbor from area code seven three. You might bring a little bit of

706
00:59:22.239 --> 00:59:25.920
a joint flavor Area code seven oh
three. You are with Jerry. I

707
00:59:25.960 --> 00:59:30.760
have a question, Thank you,
sir. I appreciate it. I kind

708
00:59:30.760 --> 00:59:35.280
of had too, and it's in
the same theme, the first being Captain

709
00:59:35.280 --> 00:59:39.800
Hendrick. Sure you pointed out of
how presence works episodically with a CSG or

710
00:59:39.960 --> 00:59:44.960
are coming and going into a given
the theater. But what about the persistent

711
00:59:45.039 --> 00:59:50.239
presence of either the Army's Multi Domain
Task Force or the MANE Force stand in

712
00:59:50.360 --> 00:59:54.559
force having those sensors intruders granted,
knowing that the range of certain systems might

713
00:59:54.599 --> 00:59:59.199
not necessarily always be in the best
interest of that Naval Task Force. But

714
00:59:59.320 --> 01:00:02.800
how does that kind of get pulled
into the calculations when they come online are

715
01:00:02.840 --> 01:00:07.400
truly deployed, especially in the first
island chain. Well, it's an excellent

716
01:00:07.480 --> 01:00:12.800
question, and it actually came up
in some of the studies of these operations

717
01:00:12.840 --> 01:00:17.360
other than war, and again there
was a growing perception that in fact,

718
01:00:17.760 --> 01:00:22.800
it's the mobility of the force that
sort of gives a sense of its fragility

719
01:00:22.880 --> 01:00:27.880
or its vulnerability as well as its
legality. And so the more land based

720
01:00:27.960 --> 01:00:32.000
you are, specifically in the archipeologic
areas of the Western Pacific, the more

721
01:00:32.119 --> 01:00:37.960
vulnerable you are perceived, and so
the idea of presence declines under those cases.

722
01:00:38.000 --> 01:00:40.519
So that's that's not just me.
That was actually there was these two

723
01:00:40.519 --> 01:00:45.559
studies that came out that looked at
these operations other than war that sort of

724
01:00:45.599 --> 01:00:52.199
suggested that, you know, the
concept of quote unquote army presence was stretched,

725
01:00:52.000 --> 01:00:57.679
you know, in terms of its
effectiveness, whereas the ability to rapidly

726
01:00:57.880 --> 01:01:02.039
enter and depart was viewed more positively. So the Navy and Marine Corps team

727
01:01:02.159 --> 01:01:08.360
was viewed as having more presence and
influence because of its mobility, whereas the

728
01:01:08.519 --> 01:01:15.400
Army in many ways was viewed as
less present and more of a factor of

729
01:01:15.559 --> 01:01:20.400
being there, and the hints fading
into the background noise because of the perception

730
01:01:20.719 --> 01:01:24.760
of their immobility. So to the
degree that the Army today demonstrates that can

731
01:01:24.840 --> 01:01:30.320
move and move quickly and remain mobile
while also operating that I think its presence

732
01:01:30.360 --> 01:01:39.559
score goes up. Well, Jerry, good answer. We've used up here

733
01:01:40.360 --> 01:01:45.400
the hour pretty pretty thoroughly. I
think. Before we go, though,

734
01:01:45.440 --> 01:01:49.360
tell us what you're working on,
where people can find what you're doing,

735
01:01:49.400 --> 01:01:54.119
and what's next. Well, you
know, the beauty of my situation as

736
01:01:54.199 --> 01:01:59.199
both a consultant and as a senior
fellow is you know, I've got about

737
01:01:59.519 --> 01:02:04.119
nine nine ms in the fire right
now. I'm currently working on another analytical

738
01:02:04.159 --> 01:02:09.599
product for an office inside the Pentagon. I'm also got some proposals out to

739
01:02:10.119 --> 01:02:15.400
some grant grant you know, issuing
agencies on some other things I would like

740
01:02:15.440 --> 01:02:20.199
to study. I'm actually trying to
broaden my base a little bit right now,

741
01:02:21.159 --> 01:02:22.920
looking not just at the industrial base
in the Navy, but looking at

742
01:02:22.960 --> 01:02:28.719
some of the larger questions about defense
policy and strategy. You know, you

743
01:02:28.800 --> 01:02:31.159
know, I'm getting I'm getting up
there in years, and I'm getting tired

744
01:02:31.159 --> 01:02:35.840
of talking about the same old thing. So I'm actually trying to grow and

745
01:02:35.880 --> 01:02:38.239
stretch as I tried to grow and
stretch with this paper by doing math,

746
01:02:38.280 --> 01:02:43.920
which was hard for me. So
so right now I've got a full book

747
01:02:44.400 --> 01:02:49.360
for not only this year but next
year of analysis and research. And I'll

748
01:02:49.440 --> 01:02:52.440
let you all know when the next
paper comes out, and make sure that

749
01:02:52.599 --> 01:02:59.280
sal and you get early copies of
it there there too. Well, Jerry,

750
01:02:59.280 --> 01:03:02.800
thanks a lot. It's been absolute
pleasure join you with you again,

751
01:03:02.880 --> 01:03:07.480
and I hope you and yours have
a great holiday season and look forward to

752
01:03:07.519 --> 01:03:10.840
next time. I look forward to
it. Thank you both, Eagle one

753
01:03:10.920 --> 01:03:14.840
and Commander Salamon. It's a pleasure
to talk with you and your audience.

754
01:03:15.360 --> 01:03:19.119
Well, Thank you, Jerry,
and thank you everybody for joining us for

755
01:03:19.159 --> 01:03:22.239
another edition of mid Rats. And
until next time, we hope you have

756
01:03:22.360 --> 01:03:39.840
a great Navy day. Cures Mike
my loney want to marry me and a

757
01:03:42.599 --> 01:03:52.280
friend of Becaumily, for you'll be
to blame love hold me, said folding

758
01:03:52.639 --> 01:04:03.280
all the name. It's a long
way. It's a long way. It's

759
01:04:03.360 --> 01:04:19.679
a long way to the enemy.
Pick it well lived, well, it's

760
01:04:19.760 --> 01:04:43.480
a long long way to differ.
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