WEBVTT

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The information economy as a rod.
The world is teeming with innovation as new

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business models reinvent every issue industry.
Inside Analysis is your source of information and

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insight about how to make the most
of this exciting new era. Learn more

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at inside analysis dot Comside Analysis dot
com. And now here's your host,

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Eric Kavanaugh. Keep welcome. It's
all right, gentleman, Hello and welcome

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back. Once again. It's the
only coast to coast radio show all about

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the information economy. It's time for
Inside Analysis. Yours truly is here with

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a very special guest. We're going
to talk about securities, a problem that

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never goes away. It never will
go away. It's always going to be

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a challenge. It's changing by day. We're talking to our Pergosian's a company

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called bright If it's b R I
T I V E. And alright,

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I'm gonna tell you security. It's
one of these issues that only a handful

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of people at the company, and
my British in this partner one time cracked

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a joke. He said there's only
one person who has about security and his

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name is scape goat, meaning the
person who was in charge of security just

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gets blamed when something goes wrong and
they fire that person and get another person,

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but they do the same kind of
stuff. But one of the more

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clever comments I've heard about security over
the years, and I think this is

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very, very true. I'm sure
you'll agree with this, is that security

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is not a thing. It's not
one object. It's not a technology,

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it's not a process. It's a
whole amalgam of education, of protocols,

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of technologies, of observability, and
just paying attention. You have to pay

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attention all the time with this stuff. And I can tell you, folks,

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in the last four or five months, I've had my corporate debit card

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hacked twice, which is annoying.
Once is okay, because that way I

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can see and remember all stupid things
I signed up for. You get all

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the emails that, oh, your
credit card was declined, like, yeah,

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I know, because it got hacked, and I didn't really want to

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go back to you guys. And
luckily the just laters around the country here

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in America at least have done some
good work in not allowing these organizations to

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keep hammering you with late fees after
it goes away. These days, you

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just don't get your service anymore.
And it goes away. But nonetheless,

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the security issue is so important,
it's never going to not be important,

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so you always need this cocktail of
technologies and processes. And then even still

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you're going to get hacked sooner or
later, So what's your path to remediation?

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There are lots of things to consider
here, but if you choice words

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or tell us a bit about how
you got into the space and what you've

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folctured. Yeah, thank you,
thanks for having me here. I got

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into security, and back then it
was more about network security or it security

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as they call it. It's certainly
involved quite a bit since then, it's

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become you know, arguably even at
board level issue that's you know that we

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see today. But you know,
hacks or attacks have gone from just a

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network breach to steal some data to
on cyber warfare or cyber crime, and

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ransomware is one that's is so lucrative
these days for the criminals and so disruptive

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for many companies in the industry.
Right, So it's a very different world

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today that we live in. National
experience before this company, before Bright,

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I've been in a space mostly from
consulting and services industry, in that industry

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and I started also another company about
ten years ago in identity and Access Spanish

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minsters Space, but eventually which led
you know, and exited that company led

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to forming by the UH and specifically
focusing on the problem in the cloud,

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you know, space or cloud public
cloud technologies and building a product to the

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market that hows security risks and vulnerabilities
that are preventing businesses from adopting and expanding

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their public clouds consumption or the clouds
adoption. Right, well, let's let's

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talk about how you do that,
because there are lots and lots of ways,

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and I do like that you're focused
on identity management because let's face it,

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if you're trying to log into a
system, the system is trying to

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understand, okay, are you the
person that you say you are? And

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historically that's been largely done by passwords, which of course is a pain because

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you have to remember the passwords,
and a lot of people use the same

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password for everything, and that of
course is putting yourself in jeopardy because then

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folks can hack in and do all
kinds of stuff. And you know,

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it was my business partner, doctor
Robin Blore, who years ago taught me

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that this whole crime network is not
just individuals. In fact, the whole

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narrative around guy and the foodie being
the one who's going in and hacking your

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system is very disingenuous. It's it's
not a guy in hoodie. Sometimes it

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is, but usually there's this whole
industry involved. There are people who specialize

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in getting access or people who specialize
in exploiting that access, and then we'll

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just kind of sell their access to
other players. And then you have cases

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like the Colonial Pipeline, which some
folks may recall a while back before the

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Russian invasion of Ukraine took down the
East coast's ability to get gas to gas

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stations. And you know, when
I saw that, I thought, I

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saw this is an active war.
This is not just some ransomware. And

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the government has never come out and
said that, but I believe it was

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an active war. And it goes
to show you so someone actually did the

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math and figured out, hey,
it's shut down distribution on the East Coast,

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and that would be a very significant
inconvenience and in fact put people jeopardy,

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right, ambulances, things that can't
get gasoline. That's a pretty big

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problem. So it's not just individuals. I mean, to your point,

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there is cyber warfare that goes on
state sponsored actors, and I think the

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folks at Google and Facebook and Who
and these other big organizations certainly worked very

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hard to stop all that. Your
role and how you fit into this bigger

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picture. What do you do to
enable and sort of provide to all these

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conproviders. Now that's that's very very
good background, just kind of how are

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you like the state of the world? Really? Uh, why why we

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decided to really invest in building in
technology? There's any important thing to talk

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about here. With the clouds technologies
and adoption of public cloud, there was

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a huge change in paradigm shifts really
in the world of you know, security

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and identity, specifically in the back
ald the critical know it ass when the

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data center. The security model was
to protect the data center from perimeter aside

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from the walls, of course,
but there was a perimeter security that work,

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you know, firewalls and ideas and
so on, and I identities existed

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inside the firewall. With public cloud, that was a complete opposite. Identity

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essentially became the first and last line
of defense when it comes to clouds,

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infrastructure and applications. It's fun.
That's why identity for us became the first

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and biggest security elements to protect and
what that means from like examples you gws,

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they all have pretty robust security controls
and identity models. The challenges for

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any organization operates across different technologies and
they also operate on top of the cloud

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providers infrastructure and security controls and security
model that goes across the different providers and

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they're not Security is very different than
AWS, especially when it comes to identity

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and how they protect. That's what
right That's why right of came to market

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with a solution that works across the
cloud providers. Another very important thing that

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we did, and this was something
that we saw as we were entering the

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market. We saw a huge issue
with what we call is overprivileged access.

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So a lot of times organizations with
intention to bring products and new applications to

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market to support their businesses and growth, we really had to do things from

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security standpoint in a way that we're
not ideal, like giving a lot of

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access to users assuming they're going to
need that or they may be needed at

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some point but no longer needed later. That created this exposure risk, exposure

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when access existed but nobody needed it. Of course, attackers love that situation.

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That's why you started seeing breach after
breaching. Capital Wana was one of

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the earliest, like clouds, privileged
access breaches that we came to know about.

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That speaks to one problem that we
know. What I mean by that

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is when you give somebody access with
assumption they needed twenty four by seven,

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that access always sits there and the
only thing that prevents somebody else to gain

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access is a login name and password. It's a terrible security and it's a

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very vulnerable security to protect, right, So we decided to change that with

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bred it. We really kind of
invented the newer a better way to do

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it to eliminate everything when the user
doesn't need that access. So when it

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comes to human users, none of
us can sit in front of a computer

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twenty four by seven by three sixty
five, right, We can do our

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job at certain hours, but after
that we don't need that access. So

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what bright it does is automatically grants
that access when the user needs but also

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removes automatically when that access is no
lover needed until the next time to use

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your needs it. That's a massive
reduction of the risk exposure and then attack

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surface. Yeah, well you would
mentioned something that's interesting. You talked about

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the models, the security models that
these different providers have, and I know

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if you could do to better secure
your environment is to identify where someone logs

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in, what office are they in, are they in a different office than

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they normally are in, and that
would be in a profile around the user.

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So the identity management of Chuck,
let's say, is that he dials

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in from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. That's
where he works. And if he goes

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traveling somewhere, you know, wouldn't
it be great to know that he's traveling.

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And of course these banks have systems
they don't always work very well,

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but they say, hey, are
you going to be traveling and you say,

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yes, I'll be traveling to Austria
next week. So if my credit

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card comes across in Austria, it's
me, So don't block me out when

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I'm trying to log into my systems
from Austria. Well that's a nice way

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to do it, but it's expensive, it's a bit time intense. But

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these days it seems to me it
should be relatively easy if you have the

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right technology in place to identify the
pattern of what is normal, and the

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normal pattern for Chuck would be he
logs in at nine am, he logs

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out at five pm kind of deal. And if he logs in at two

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o'clock in the morning, oh well, maybe you kick in an extra security

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loop to say, hmm, are
you really you? And of course people

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know these captures. The captors drive
me completely bonkers. I hate it,

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especially on my phone because I'm like, I just give up. I'm like,

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I won't go in. I don't
care, I'm not going to go

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Is this a bike? Is this
a bike? Is? Okay, It's

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very annoying. But the point I'm
making here is that you can build a

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profile around the user and then understand
who that person is and when they're doing

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things like they normally do, you
still have security, but at least it's

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a lower level of security when they're
doing things and not normally doing that's when

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you kick in a higher level of
security. Is out about right. That's

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harder to saying right, and you're
correct at Technology today has come a long

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way and being able to actually do
that and do it with a minimum disruption.

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To your point, captures were invented
in what twenty years ago, I

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think, uh, you know,
move that both in security and end users.

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Some of the things that we're doing
along those lines. When you look

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at a pretty significant a number of
users for Pride or involves cloud developers,

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DevOps engineers, swe they will just
have to do a lot of different things

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during the It's not a very static, sort of a linear pattern of work,

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so they jump around a lot of
doing this here and something else there.

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What we do, what we try
to do is gather activity across uh,

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you know, during the day,
across the environments that they were in,

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whatever an engineer could do with standing
up a storage you know, or

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compute instance or whatnot. So we
can actually look at that data from the

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from the pattern, stampo over time
and say, you know, over let's

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say ninety days, the normal pattern
for this type of user has been X,

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y and Z. Why that's important
is because we could also detect when

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something goes completely in a different direction
one day, right. That allows us

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to care alerts not looking and fear
right can quickly take a look and understand

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is it normal? Could they could
be a legitimate instance of that situation,

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but we'd rather verify that than let
it go right, So that helps us

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also enhance you know, the model
of like what we should give to home

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because that also has the data,
same data, and analyzing the data helps

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us understand what next time, next
patch of users, what is the normal

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pattern of access they shouldn't so we
can make those grants very easily and immediately.

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But basically, if I understand it, you're I mean security have to

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sit in between systems, right,
So someone is on the outside, they're

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trying to get in to a cloud
environment that may have eight, ten,

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twelve, twenty different applications. And
you know, you made a good point

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about developers. I have developer friends
and they tell me that the biggest pain

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in their job is just logging back
into the system. Logging back into that

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system. People in the consumer world, now you have all these different protocols.

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Oh, it's got to be ten
characters and a special character. It

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can't be two characters side by side, like you know, two characters in

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a row. All this these goofy
sort of bespoke rules that mean you have

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to go with different passwords. And
then of course Google allows you to do

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that password management feature and they're a
system and that's what I use. But

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of course if someone hacks into that, now they've got access to all your

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stuff. I mean, these security
issues the sorts both ways, right,

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the adage every sword cuts both ways. I always thought about the key fop.

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They're like, oh, key fop, that's great, unless someone gets

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your key fop and they can walk
through the parking lot just going like this

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till they find your car getting a
drive away. So it's like some of

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these security measures wind up being security
risks essentially. How do you balance that

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out and how do you sit in
between So when you actually deploy to a

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particular client, you're sitting sort of
at a layer outside of their environment.

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But can you also get in to
track what they're moving? Tell us about

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that quickly. Yeah, And early
in my career in the security space,

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somebody said this and it really stuck
in my head. The best security is

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invisible security, so the end user
can't see there. It's been very hard

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to actually get get to that stage, but I think we're getting getting Definitely

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we're moving in the right direction.
We're not quite there. I'm realizing I'm

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eight hundred two nine eight fifty seven
eighty three. Welcome back to Inside Analysis.

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00:20:44.359 --> 00:20:52.039
Here's your host, Eric Tavanaughture.
Okay, folks back in front Analysis

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or through the air Kabana with art
forgoes in of bright br Ike Ibe.

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We're talking now about security, getting
access to systems, how annoying security can

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be, but how important it is
because when someone gets in, especially with

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ransomware, and they hold all your
stuff hostage. Like I said, the

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Colonial pipeline shows you how much can
be held hostage. Major hospitals have been

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held hostage by these things and that. But argue, we're talking a moment

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ago about how ideal security, which
you know out of the covers, can

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be very powerful these days because you
can test all kinds of things. Right,

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where is this person? What device
is it? I mean to me

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that's one of the key characteristics,
right is like is this the device that

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the person normally uses? I think
that's why you see so much focus on

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these mobile devices these days, and
there it is because there's a signature,

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there's an IP addressed and there's the
unique signature of that device. I'm using

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that device and it's with me,
it's run that. Okay, that's probably

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a good a good person to grant
access too. But tell us more about

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this invisible security and how you folks
do it. Yeah, so how will

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you approach this? As certainly a
combination of different things, and it does

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include something you mentioned right, So
instead of constantly being the abruptive in forcing

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the user to re authenticate or prove
to the system who they are, we

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use data. We use some things
that we can gather without interfering with the

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user and their activity in the system
that helps us be a fairly user.

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There's also systems that we gather the
outside of writer that we gather that prompt

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so like the authentication service provider,
which can be anything from Microsoft Gator to

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Actor or what they do, have
data that that is very valuable. We

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also gather some of our own data
that helps us prove and validating the user.

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Ultimately, though I think there's definitely
enough awareness already even in the end

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user communities that security is very important. So if you are going to if

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we are going to centrally enforce certaincurity
rules along the way along the process,

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that we do it in a way
that they understand. And why this is

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important especially in communities like developers,
right, because they deal with a lot

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of very sensitive infrastructure and data.
So we do have some control in a

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place that when the when the time
and the trigger is there, we need

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to enforce. So one of them
would be to, let's say, have

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them re reauthenticate or step up authenticated
as we call it, to prove that

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there are still gemate users. Ultimately, the goal is to make it at

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least disruptive and allow them to do
their job. I would have to think

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that the vast majority of breach incidents
occur upon logging in. Other words,

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if someone's logged in already, you
know, usually they're going to be working.

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I suppose they could walk away and
not log out that kind of thing,

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and then someone could come up with
their machine. I mean, that

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does happen, but I'm just guessing
that the vast majority of breaches are at

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log in time. A fresh cold
breach, is that, right, Kenn

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We I don't know. What the
stats are truly about that, But that

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is definitely a very likely scenario.
It's a good guess. Yeah, it's

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it's you know, when what's users
in session, right, that that's now

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an active you know session that attacker
was able to you know, it used

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to be as type of a tackle
man in the middle. So if that

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was the scenario, then yeah,
the legitimate user wouldn't even know somebody else

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is piggybacking on that session, right. I think there's another very concerning trend

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in the growing type of attacks is
when the interactive user human users not even

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uh it's not even involved. For
example, again, when it comes to

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cloud technology, there's there's a lot
that's already uh you know, visible and

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accessible to APIs and attackers who would
love to just exploit that rather than trying

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to exploit a user session. Right, And that's what we also have again

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as an industry, we're playing a
catch up game here trying to protect these

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non interactive you know, doors and
access points into cloud data and cloud applications.

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So for example, how Brider does
that is we have this constant of

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non human you know or synthetic or
machine identity us and calling that we allow

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the customers to define any process,
any technology that requires access to their infrastructure

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and data to authenticate much like human
being, and provide the like validation that

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who who they as as a non
human identity, machine identity, who it

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is and or functionality? What API, what service they can access before they

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allow that? Right, So this
again adds another component of you know security

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here that instead of just assuming whoever's
access an API is legitimate, trust and

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verify. Yeah, I love the
trust and verify thing. And you pick

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up a really good point about API
access and just machine to machine conversations right

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constantly as APIs are hit twenty four
to seven. So is that a new

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security threat or a relatively new security
threat of people mimicking machine behavior in order

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to get behind an API, grabs
some information, pull it back out.

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It looks normal, It looks like
the normal call. It goes from into

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it quick book in my bank for
example, back and forth. I mean,

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those are the really precious connections to
infiltrate, right is when you're going

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from one place to another. And
I mean I remember I think targets fact

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system or something. So it's like, well, it wasn't some user,

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it was the machine to machine conversation
that was co opted, and that's just

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as dangerous as any human loss.
For an example, you know, the

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problem is a type of mindset and
approaches don't work when it comes to cloud

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what I mean, for example,
to detect a user human user breach,

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typically security would review the human logging
attempts. They wouldn't necessarily API log in

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00:26:52.880 --> 00:26:57.039
it. So it's a fundamental issue. Is there enough visibility? Is there

336
00:26:57.200 --> 00:27:03.200
enough data? It's being sort of
you know, view through security processes to

337
00:27:03.279 --> 00:27:07.559
detect all possible access points. Arguably
most organizations miss that, you know,

338
00:27:07.640 --> 00:27:11.519
miss something. That's that's why breaches
keep happening, right yeah, and that

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00:27:11.880 --> 00:27:15.480
as we suggest, that can be
all that's necessary to get into a system.

340
00:27:15.680 --> 00:27:19.240
What should in terms of the API
management stuff, how do you how

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00:27:19.279 --> 00:27:22.799
do you solve for that? I
mean, does your technology have a sort

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00:27:22.799 --> 00:27:27.000
of pattern recognition component where you can
watch normal behavior for a period of time

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and say, okay, doesn't want
you to define normal, you can define

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00:27:30.400 --> 00:27:34.839
what is abnormal? Is that kind
of how your security technology works. I

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00:27:34.960 --> 00:27:38.519
certainly don't want to sound like we
can do anything and everything. To be

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00:27:38.559 --> 00:27:44.279
honest with you, I think the
uh you know, the API type of

347
00:27:44.400 --> 00:27:48.799
use case is it's fair as much
mostly to try to standardize and make it

348
00:27:48.200 --> 00:27:55.599
similar to the human active model,
where security controls can be as a matter

349
00:27:55.680 --> 00:28:00.599
of a guard rail or a gay
or security control upon time of that access.

350
00:28:00.720 --> 00:28:03.799
Right, So that process that's going
to kind of has to prove and

351
00:28:03.880 --> 00:28:07.640
validate, you know, and be
sort of on the right list before they

352
00:28:07.759 --> 00:28:15.920
view up. When it comes to
really defining patterns for the human interactive that

353
00:28:15.039 --> 00:28:18.839
I would just kind of more of
a next, next stage problem. It's

354
00:28:18.839 --> 00:28:26.559
just because it's so much more complex
and tracking like the human activity and yeah,

355
00:28:26.720 --> 00:28:30.920
it's it's it's one of these one
of the most complex problems that needs

356
00:28:30.920 --> 00:28:33.039
to be solved. Talking about the
multi cloud side of the equation here.

357
00:28:33.279 --> 00:28:37.039
That is a very useful bit of
funkntionality. I can tell you from a

358
00:28:37.079 --> 00:28:40.400
business, I have to care about
the difference between as your and gu folks

359
00:28:40.480 --> 00:28:44.160
can care about that, and you
folks can care about adhering to their protocols,

360
00:28:44.200 --> 00:28:48.319
which I'm guessing they update on some
relatively frequent basis, so you have

361
00:28:48.440 --> 00:28:52.079
to stay on top of how their
protocols. Again, APIs ideally you don't

362
00:28:52.079 --> 00:28:53.720
want to have eyes that you want
them to stay the same such that everyone

363
00:28:53.759 --> 00:28:56.160
can use it the same way they
were using it. But in terms of

364
00:28:56.240 --> 00:29:00.039
these different cloud environments, how do
you tackle that? I mean, you

365
00:29:00.119 --> 00:29:03.319
have sort of a layer of abstraction
that can say, okay, this is

366
00:29:03.400 --> 00:29:07.920
for as your so use this functionality, this is for GCPU. Yeah,

367
00:29:07.960 --> 00:29:10.960
that's a great point actually that a
lot of people don't even think about the

368
00:29:11.039 --> 00:29:14.519
whole ongoing you know, ongoing aspect
of how do you maintain how do you

369
00:29:14.640 --> 00:29:18.720
keep up with a very dynamic world
of you know, cloud technologists. That's

370
00:29:18.720 --> 00:29:22.519
actually one of the inherent benefits of
what Brighte of offers that we are.

371
00:29:23.160 --> 00:29:30.920
We maintain that we we are constantly
monitoring and you know, detecting changes and

372
00:29:32.559 --> 00:29:37.160
the key functionality that that right of
itself relies only it's GCP or Azure or

373
00:29:37.200 --> 00:29:42.039
whatever opera function that's our job.
That's what the customers don't don't have to,

374
00:29:42.640 --> 00:29:45.960
you know, worry about that that
that you know, individually, they

375
00:29:47.000 --> 00:29:51.160
don't need to monitor because we do. And that's part of our limit of

376
00:29:51.240 --> 00:29:53.880
our IP, but our limit of
our IP of how we do that so

377
00:29:55.000 --> 00:30:00.960
we never we never becomes or the
point of destruction for the customer right right

378
00:30:00.039 --> 00:30:04.559
now, that's important. So basically
you are solving for the security challenge across

379
00:30:04.640 --> 00:30:10.480
these cloud environments for companies that have
people using a AWS for one thing,

380
00:30:10.599 --> 00:30:12.880
you do all of the three major
ones. More than that, we do

381
00:30:14.240 --> 00:30:18.920
four major ones, including Oracle Cloud
infrastructure okay, and there's a couple of

382
00:30:18.000 --> 00:30:25.599
dozen non infrastructure clouds like Snowflake Service. Now it's one mm. That's a

383
00:30:25.640 --> 00:30:27.000
full time job. Man. How
big is your company? How many people?

384
00:30:29.319 --> 00:30:36.799
We are? Fifty full time team
members. Yeah, it is what

385
00:30:36.880 --> 00:30:41.640
I'm in. More than that,
what what percentage are actual developers and engineers?

386
00:30:41.759 --> 00:30:45.559
Like, out of fifty people,
what percentage are people who are coders

387
00:30:45.680 --> 00:30:49.640
or engineers or people of that technical
nature. That sounds about right, because

388
00:30:49.640 --> 00:30:52.480
you can't you can't stay on top
every I mean these each one of these

389
00:30:52.599 --> 00:30:56.680
environments keeps changing. They have updates
all the time, and you have to

390
00:30:56.720 --> 00:31:00.759
stay on top of that stuff.
It's and it's changing happily these days.

391
00:31:00.799 --> 00:31:03.839
It seems to be up there.
How concerned are you about quantum computing and

392
00:31:04.279 --> 00:31:10.000
quantum going mainstream, which IBM I
guess indicate should be happening into five years

393
00:31:10.119 --> 00:31:14.160
or so, because one of the
concerns I've heard is that with quantum computing,

394
00:31:14.519 --> 00:31:18.160
all traditional encryption goes out the window
and you're gonna have a very hard

395
00:31:18.200 --> 00:31:19.559
time dealing with it. Now,
in my simple mind, I'm thinking to

396
00:31:19.640 --> 00:31:25.119
myself, well, there's still are
tactics you can put in place to rebuff

397
00:31:25.200 --> 00:31:29.000
those sorts of attacks, like distributed
to knowledge service attacks, things of this

398
00:31:29.119 --> 00:31:30.119
nature. There are things you can
put a place to you know, throttle

399
00:31:30.200 --> 00:31:34.400
those things. But overall, it
does seem to be a very significant risk

400
00:31:34.480 --> 00:31:37.279
that's coming down the pike. What
are your thoughts about quantum and what can

401
00:31:37.319 --> 00:31:41.359
we do about it? I'll be
very quick. So I think it's revolutionary

402
00:31:41.440 --> 00:31:45.799
for sure, right, and it's
going to definitely have a deep impact on

403
00:31:45.920 --> 00:31:49.400
security. But I also know a
lot of times the breaching, the attacks

404
00:31:49.440 --> 00:31:56.079
happen because of very basic issues and
like the hollow security heyme more than not

405
00:31:56.200 --> 00:32:00.960
having so I think as an industry
we need to eliminate like the for attackers

406
00:32:00.039 --> 00:32:04.319
to get in. But with quantum, I think it's also the benefit of

407
00:32:04.440 --> 00:32:08.279
having better technology for security as well, so the leverage property then we will

408
00:32:08.319 --> 00:32:13.359
also have better defense, right,
So it goes both ways. Basically,

409
00:32:13.440 --> 00:32:16.279
the good guys get the bad guys
get it. Yeah it is. You

410
00:32:16.400 --> 00:32:21.480
know that we're talking about a cashlest
society. Everyone's talking about a cashlest society

411
00:32:21.480 --> 00:32:22.680
to day. I'm not gonna lie. That does concern me. I know

412
00:32:22.799 --> 00:32:27.559
that you can counterfeit printed dollars,
but you can also hack into someone's account

413
00:32:27.599 --> 00:32:30.359
and make the money go away.
And our most recent attack on my debit

414
00:32:30.480 --> 00:32:34.640
card, it made it look like
it was Google ads, like we were

415
00:32:34.680 --> 00:32:37.400
just buying Google ads, and lucky
for me, we don't buy Google ads.

416
00:32:37.400 --> 00:32:38.480
So I'm like, hmm, that's
interesting to have a whole bunch of

417
00:32:38.599 --> 00:32:42.440
And they started small, and they
started ramping up. It was like twenty

418
00:32:42.480 --> 00:32:45.200
dollars, seventy dollars, forty two
dollars, one hundred and fifty dollars.

419
00:32:45.240 --> 00:32:46.880
I'm like, wait a minute,
why why am I broke again? I

420
00:32:46.960 --> 00:32:50.599
know I'm not that foolish, and
yeah, because I was hacked again,

421
00:32:51.400 --> 00:32:54.359
and just you know, it frustrates
the end user to have these experiences because

422
00:32:54.359 --> 00:32:58.400
you think, shouldn't the banks beyond
this kind of stuff. Shouldn't the banks

423
00:32:58.440 --> 00:33:00.519
be watching for these kinds of things. And if you get into the system

424
00:33:00.920 --> 00:33:05.119
where you can be in the banking
world, transferring money back and forth.

425
00:33:05.240 --> 00:33:08.200
Well, you have to have some
identity somewhere that can be trapped and managed,

426
00:33:08.319 --> 00:33:12.440
right, I mean, I just
I'm kind of fascinated at how affected

427
00:33:12.519 --> 00:33:15.519
these bad guys are at infiltrating banking
systems because there has to be a signature

428
00:33:15.559 --> 00:33:19.039
of where they came from, right, I mean, I know when the

429
00:33:19.119 --> 00:33:21.839
security were a lot of times they
use proxies to kind of bounce around from

430
00:33:21.839 --> 00:33:23.400
place to place, so you can't
tell where they came from. But when

431
00:33:23.440 --> 00:33:28.079
you're pulling money out, I mean
you're grabbing all kinds of metadata of what

432
00:33:28.240 --> 00:33:30.920
system was on, what the operating
system was, what the browser was,

433
00:33:30.039 --> 00:33:34.480
what the location was. All that
stuff gets captured. I'm kind of surprised

434
00:33:34.519 --> 00:33:37.319
we don't have more success Or maybe
we do and I just don't hear about

435
00:33:37.359 --> 00:33:39.640
it. What are your closing thoughts
on just the state of security in this

436
00:33:39.759 --> 00:33:45.599
world and why it's still such a
problem. Yeah, certainly this just come

437
00:33:45.640 --> 00:33:47.640
a long way, you know,
again, twenty years for me to see

438
00:33:47.720 --> 00:33:52.759
that. I really still think that, you know, security's job. It

439
00:33:52.880 --> 00:33:59.720
was an interesting, you know comment
made earlier is about the security being scapegoat.

440
00:33:59.799 --> 00:34:01.720
Right, it's it's it's a very
tough job to have because they always

441
00:34:01.759 --> 00:34:08.119
have to balance security versus you know, a business, you know, priorities

442
00:34:08.159 --> 00:34:14.760
and objectives and especially interfering anything that's
important for the business. Right so and

443
00:34:14.840 --> 00:34:19.159
there there's inevitably trade offs. Inevitably, it's always it always comes down to

444
00:34:19.239 --> 00:34:22.440
trade offs. I think, you
know, as an industry, you know,

445
00:34:22.519 --> 00:34:25.920
as the practitioners out there in the
field, you know, make decisions

446
00:34:27.039 --> 00:34:30.519
and sometimes, hopefully most of the
times are the right decisions. Sometimes they're

447
00:34:30.519 --> 00:34:36.920
not, and you see outcome.
Do you see consequences from the vendor community.

448
00:34:36.920 --> 00:34:42.639
I think we are really making some
really big, you know, headries

449
00:34:42.719 --> 00:34:47.159
into bringing technologies to to the practitioners, to the uses of the world to

450
00:34:47.320 --> 00:34:54.760
actually make that balance or decision easier
where security doesn't have to cost productivity,

451
00:34:54.800 --> 00:34:59.519
security doesn't have to cost the business
a jolly and industry with real secutors or

452
00:34:59.599 --> 00:35:04.760
this would be to be a huge
factor in how the how we food an

453
00:35:04.800 --> 00:35:08.800
overall posture about the industry and the
securities. Well that sounds good, Art,

454
00:35:08.840 --> 00:35:10.559
well, thank you so much for
your time. Folks. We talking

455
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That's eight hundred two nine eight fifty
seven eighty three. Welcome back to

501
00:39:00.119 --> 00:39:16.920
Inside Analysis. Here's your host,
Eric Kavanaugh. Okay, back here on

502
00:39:16.960 --> 00:39:22.920
Inside Analysis, talking all things identity
management these days, identity resolution. Who

503
00:39:23.000 --> 00:39:27.320
are we out of the systems we
use? Know who are invalidate us?

504
00:39:27.519 --> 00:39:30.360
Obviously it's a very huge issue.
We were just talking to Art from bright

505
00:39:30.400 --> 00:39:34.719
to all about that and I was
remind to some folks are doing and something

506
00:39:34.800 --> 00:39:37.880
that we're actually working on. So
a little special treat for our avid listeners,

507
00:39:37.920 --> 00:39:40.599
I'm going to give you a stick
preview of something that we've been working

508
00:39:40.719 --> 00:39:45.880
on here at Inside Analysis, at
the Blur Group with some of our partners.

509
00:39:45.320 --> 00:39:50.679
You. First of all was my
good buddy Sean Brem from Crowdpoint Technologies

510
00:39:50.840 --> 00:39:54.360
and what they've built so federated ID
is at the heart of their mission.

511
00:39:54.840 --> 00:40:00.639
What they've really built is a ecosystem, an e commerce ecosystem that's based upon

512
00:40:00.679 --> 00:40:06.079
a blockchain and proprietary blockchain that they've
built which also doubles as a database,

513
00:40:06.559 --> 00:40:12.480
so it's not just the traditional slow
blockchain style data structure. But they've done

514
00:40:12.519 --> 00:40:16.039
some very clever things in that regard. But what I find really compelling about

515
00:40:16.079 --> 00:40:22.239
their approach is the fact that there
are focused on giving value back to the

516
00:40:22.440 --> 00:40:25.760
end user for the used to train
algorithms. So if you look at all

517
00:40:25.840 --> 00:40:30.679
the hubbub around open ai, for
example, and these lawsuits that have been

518
00:40:30.719 --> 00:40:34.360
filed, what did they base at
the alleged They say that open ai went

519
00:40:34.440 --> 00:40:38.159
out and scraped all kinds of content, including copyrighted content, and they use

520
00:40:38.320 --> 00:40:44.280
all that material to build our model, their generative AI model. Well,

521
00:40:45.039 --> 00:40:51.119
it's a good argument. If I've
used someone's copyrighted material to train my engine,

522
00:40:51.239 --> 00:40:54.519
which I then make money from,
will shouldn't the people whose content was

523
00:40:54.639 --> 00:40:59.639
used get some piece of that action? And that's traditionally how these things work.

524
00:41:00.199 --> 00:41:02.840
I did see just the other day
that there was a judgment rendered in

525
00:41:02.880 --> 00:41:08.320
the court somewhere in the US that
basically said gen ai generated content cannot be

526
00:41:08.480 --> 00:41:15.960
copyrighted. Now, how they would
know what engine generated the content in the

527
00:41:15.039 --> 00:41:19.440
first place is beyond me, and
I think that's frankly an open question.

528
00:41:19.920 --> 00:41:22.199
But at least a standard has now
been set. So what does that mean,

529
00:41:22.360 --> 00:41:25.079
Well, it means that there's going
to have to be some more work

530
00:41:25.159 --> 00:41:30.400
to be done. I heard that
open ai also truncated their sniffing engine engine

531
00:41:30.559 --> 00:41:36.280
would determine whether or not content was
created by an open AI engine or a

532
00:41:36.400 --> 00:41:40.119
chat GPT or something like that,
which also is interesting. Students coming and

533
00:41:40.159 --> 00:41:44.280
they know there's something going to happen
here. So what does this all mean?

534
00:41:44.599 --> 00:41:46.559
Well, I can tell you that
these large language models, these foundational

535
00:41:46.599 --> 00:41:52.199
models, are absolutely amazing. They
are spectacularly powerful, very very interesting.

536
00:41:52.880 --> 00:41:57.880
Yes, we are worried about the
trust side of things, but nonetheless we

537
00:41:58.000 --> 00:42:00.480
have to be respectful the fact that
this is going to change how business gets

538
00:42:00.559 --> 00:42:04.519
done. So what does that all
mean? Well, getting back to Federated

539
00:42:04.599 --> 00:42:08.960
ID, that was Crowdpoints Vision,
and their idea is that they're going to

540
00:42:09.519 --> 00:42:13.719
pay attention to when your data is
used for something and then pay you for

541
00:42:13.960 --> 00:42:17.320
that small amounts of money first pennies, then dimes and dollars down the road.

542
00:42:17.840 --> 00:42:22.039
Is at least how the theory goes
pollution problem at least in their work

543
00:42:22.079 --> 00:42:24.840
here, and this is not going
to fuse these topics together here at the

544
00:42:24.920 --> 00:42:30.079
end of our show today, we're
creating something that we're calling the Rubric,

545
00:42:30.639 --> 00:42:36.199
and the Rubric is going to use
a large language model as its text generation

546
00:42:36.480 --> 00:42:40.559
tool or engine. But the moorings, the anchors of truth, the embeddings,

547
00:42:40.719 --> 00:42:45.360
if you will, Those are going
to come from trusted experts. And

548
00:42:45.480 --> 00:42:47.039
so what we're going to do is
reach out to folks and if you're interested

549
00:42:47.079 --> 00:42:51.639
in this semi email and so it
inside analysis down, if you're an expert

550
00:42:51.719 --> 00:42:54.039
in analytics in particular, these are
the folks we're looking to talk to.

551
00:42:54.239 --> 00:43:00.760
First, you could publish your papers
or your works, your articles, research

552
00:43:00.840 --> 00:43:06.119
reports, etc. In this system
that will then use them and other reports,

553
00:43:06.199 --> 00:43:10.519
other trusted reports as the anchors of
truth for the rubric to help folks

554
00:43:10.639 --> 00:43:15.480
make decisions about which analytic tool to
use, how to use it, what

555
00:43:15.559 --> 00:43:17.360
other tools can be used in conjunction
with it, How could you build a

556
00:43:17.400 --> 00:43:22.800
stack? Basically, what does the
modern analytics stack look like? And we're

557
00:43:22.000 --> 00:43:27.039
planning on building that out right now. So it actually uses a technology that

558
00:43:27.079 --> 00:43:30.840
I've already had built called media lens, and media lens I built it.

559
00:43:31.039 --> 00:43:36.119
It's a lens with a Z.
It runs a site inside opensource dot org

560
00:43:36.239 --> 00:43:40.599
right now, inside hyphen opensource dot
org, and it uses that right now.

561
00:43:40.920 --> 00:43:44.880
What I wanted was an engine that
I could use to spin up a

562
00:43:45.119 --> 00:43:50.159
highly focused stream of content that would
be useful for a researcher. So I

563
00:43:50.280 --> 00:43:52.280
wanted to stay on top of the
open source community. So that's where we've

564
00:43:52.320 --> 00:43:55.880
targeted first. And all I did
was went out and found all these different

565
00:43:55.880 --> 00:44:01.320
folks who tweet about open source technologies, who follow their handles media lens tracks

566
00:44:01.960 --> 00:44:06.400
that they track the different handles that
I've given them to watch out for.

567
00:44:07.000 --> 00:44:10.559
And then what it'll do is it'll
grab any URL that is shared by these

568
00:44:10.639 --> 00:44:16.840
folks with hashtags like open source or
drammio or apache or the other terms,

569
00:44:16.920 --> 00:44:22.039
the key terms that are associated with
that particular industry, and that publishes them

570
00:44:22.079 --> 00:44:25.800
as pending posts in my environment,
and then I can choose to post them

571
00:44:25.880 --> 00:44:30.840
or not. And every time I
post, what essentially doing is building out

572
00:44:30.920 --> 00:44:36.199
my content lake. And so this
is where we're going to use the engine

573
00:44:36.760 --> 00:44:40.960
to help find these anchors of truth
that will sort of pin down the truth

574
00:44:42.280 --> 00:44:49.199
and allow the generative AI functionality to
spin appropriate words around the concepts that DROMPT

575
00:44:49.360 --> 00:44:52.199
delivers. So what are we talking
about? I mean, really, if

576
00:44:52.239 --> 00:44:55.639
you think about Siri and these other
engines that are now currently used for these

577
00:44:55.679 --> 00:45:00.960
purposes, they're valuable. They can
sort find information for you, but they're

578
00:45:00.960 --> 00:45:07.280
not really trusted experts in a particular
domain, and one would be a big

579
00:45:07.800 --> 00:45:10.119
thing to chew off, to bite
off, if you will, for the

580
00:45:10.599 --> 00:45:14.760
current engine. So right now,
serries just kind of pointing you to different

581
00:45:14.800 --> 00:45:17.840
things on the web or giving you
information that is readily available, like the

582
00:45:17.920 --> 00:45:22.079
weather or what time of meeting is, things of that nature. But when

583
00:45:22.119 --> 00:45:28.679
you start getting into really dense areas
of content, like in trade press around

584
00:45:28.719 --> 00:45:31.880
analytics, for example, well you're
going to need more than that, and

585
00:45:32.000 --> 00:45:36.559
that's what we're focused on. So
we're focused on finding the right experts to

586
00:45:37.079 --> 00:45:43.320
provide their materials in a trusted fashion, and then whenever that material gets used

587
00:45:43.880 --> 00:45:49.360
via the rubric by a paying client, the people whose insights were used in

588
00:45:49.480 --> 00:45:53.159
that time mind meld, they will
get rewarded with credits. Now, it's

589
00:45:53.159 --> 00:45:55.760
going to take a while to build
this thing up, but the point is

590
00:45:55.800 --> 00:46:00.800
we're going to try to create a
center of gravity around the finite number of

591
00:46:00.880 --> 00:46:04.760
vendors or a finite number of people
who focus on this, and we're looking

592
00:46:04.840 --> 00:46:07.559
for help to do that. So, like I say, if you're hearing

593
00:46:07.599 --> 00:46:10.360
this and you think it sounds like
a good idea, send me email info

594
00:46:10.599 --> 00:46:15.440
at dm Radio dot biz or info
at inside Analysis dot com. Both of

595
00:46:15.480 --> 00:46:19.239
those come directly to me, and
we'll be curious to talk to you and

596
00:46:19.280 --> 00:46:22.039
maybe show you a preview of this
thing. But the idea is that you

597
00:46:22.239 --> 00:46:25.239
really right now, folks are paying
lots and lots of money for Gardner and

598
00:46:25.360 --> 00:46:29.840
Forrester and some of these other consultants
or Boston Consulting Group. A lot of

599
00:46:29.960 --> 00:46:32.760
very smart people at these companies,
but it's hard to get access to these

600
00:46:32.840 --> 00:46:37.360
people. And they are just finite
human beings, so they don't know everything,

601
00:46:37.840 --> 00:46:40.960
but they know a lot about a
particular domain for example. Well,

602
00:46:42.440 --> 00:46:46.599
if you think about the power of
these foundational models to piece together vectors of

603
00:46:46.719 --> 00:46:52.719
information from multiple sources, if you
get to a critical mass of embeddings,

604
00:46:52.920 --> 00:46:55.920
and this is the key, you
need a critical massive embeddings from trusted sources,

605
00:46:57.440 --> 00:47:01.800
then all of a sudden you have
a very interesting intelligent chat bond that

606
00:47:01.960 --> 00:47:07.519
you can counsel to find out information
about big decisions like which technology should we

607
00:47:07.639 --> 00:47:13.599
buy, like which technologies work well
with each other. That's another very important

608
00:47:13.639 --> 00:47:16.199
thing to understand. It's a lot
of times some technologies don't work together so

609
00:47:16.360 --> 00:47:22.480
well, and some do so knowing
which technologies work well in which environments also

610
00:47:22.760 --> 00:47:27.119
very useful stuff just best practices,
I mean, knowing how to go about

611
00:47:27.199 --> 00:47:30.559
setting up us certain pieces of information. I mean a lot of people know

612
00:47:30.679 --> 00:47:34.119
that, a lot of people understand
sequel, but nonetheless a lot of people

613
00:47:34.159 --> 00:47:37.480
don't. I think, so our
rubric is going to be an assistant to

614
00:47:37.559 --> 00:47:44.480
help folks understand enterprise technology and out
of the weeds do do some playing around

615
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and get some better answers faster and
less expensively. Right, Because if you

616
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bring together all these smart minds and
get good content from people who know what

617
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they're talking about, and find ways
to wait those scores, to wait the

618
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information and to align it to topically. And that's what these embeddings do.

619
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I mean, just to kind of
cap it off here, embeddings are mathematical

620
00:48:07.199 --> 00:48:12.960
representations of text strengths. That's really
what they boiled down to. And what

621
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the folks did building these large language
models is you know, they did some

622
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amazing work at being able to vectorize
information text so they turn it into numbers

623
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such that you can do statistical analysis
more easily in fine patterns in data.

624
00:48:30.159 --> 00:48:32.119
Okay, this word is us context. It's also used in that context.

625
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When does it mean this? When
does it mean that? These are the

626
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kinds of solutions that these large language
models can provide. They can give you

627
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really good information about what should be
in a certain context and what should not.

628
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The key again is the embeddings.
The embeddings allow you get to get

629
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closer and closer to the truth.
So I just wanted to tease that fund

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back in time to this time.
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cbstv's Captain Kangaroo sings a song on
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he did it once before and it's
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I've got an old mule runner name
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cheets good old worker and a good
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In nineteen eighty, Farah Fawcett and
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Ryan O'Neill was married to actresses Joeanna
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Fawcett was married to Lee Majors.
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my god, there she isn't because
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there's a Farrah Fawcett. Well,
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New York, New York clubs me
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the Monkey's debut on NBCTV and Last
Train to Clarksville is their first single.

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Take the last at the station because
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retailers who care about you. Shop
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see why they call it the mall
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invention of the wheel, people have
fixed, tinkered with, and improved every

679
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device they've possessed. It's been a
human right. But after several thousand years,

680
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suddenly legal clauses are being tucked in
purchase agreements, saying that today's owners

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of products must not even peak,
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our devices. Makers of anything with
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your car to your toothbrush. Have
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by outlawing our right to repair.
Yes, they assert, you own the

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thing, but we own the intangible
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the product malfunctions, you must return
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to repair it. Plus, they
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do it yourself, so trust us. Bovine excrement mark Steve Woseniac companies inhibit

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your rights so they can have power
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radical? No. Woseniac is the
co founder of Apple, the multibillion dollar

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global goliathe that is the world's biggest
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that Apple has now become a fierce
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we wouldn't have had an Apple except
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a very open technology world from the
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spread innovation and consumer demand. So
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industry, it also dissuades customers from
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away and buy a new one.
This is Jim High are saying. If

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you wonder where's such massive, deadly
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plastic, et cetera come from look
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profiteers like Apple. Tune into The
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one nine seven. Killistina KCAA,
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K two ninety three CF Burrito Valley, NBC News Radio. I'm Chris Garraggio.

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Families who lost loved ones in the
nine to eleven terror attacks will be

749
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gathering at the World Trade Center Memorial
in Manhattan for the twenty second anniversary of

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the attacks Monday. During the ceremony, names of the nearly three thousand victims

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killed will be read out loud.
There will be moments of silence, belltolls,

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and music as part of the ceremony. For the first time this year,

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there will be a tribute at the
memorial glade after the ceremony to recognize

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people who have died from, and
are still experiencing illnesses tied to the aftermath

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of the attacks. The glade was
dedicated in twenty nineteen on the seventeenth anniversary