WEBVTT

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Welcome to mid Rats with sal from
Commander Salamander an Eagle one from Eagle Speak

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at Seer Shore your home for a
discussion of national security issues and all things

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maritime. And good day everybody.
We appreciate you coming on board for another

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edition of mid Rats, and if
you are with UH, if you're with

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us live, I like the extended
invitation for you to scroll down to the

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bottom of the show page. That's
where you will find it. Ink to

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that room. Got it up and
running. We've already got ne C Lee

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and Paul sending the quarterdeck to welk
you on board. And during the course

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of the show, if you have
some observations you'd like to share, or

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if there's a question you would like
for us to direct to our guests,

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that is the perfect place in which
to put it. And today we're going

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to hit on one of the topics
that since the doing show and twenty ten

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any chance we have to go back
to we like it. We sometimes call

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it the unsexy but important because it's
guilty on both charges. But what we're

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going to do today is we're going
to look at some of the challenges involved

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with combat logistics because when you have
a maritime power like the United States,

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and this navy that is looking for
ways to sustain a fight against the land

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power that has four times the population
as of last year or two years ago,

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a larger navy and is located on
the other end of the huge pacific.

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Logistics are simply going to be a
cornerstone to any operation you do,

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always has been, always will be. But as we'll talk about today,

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sometimes if you don't mention the obvious
long enough, it can be forgotten or

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can be found inconvenient because the only
reliable way you can get the amount of

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fuels, weapons and supplies that it
takes to have a robustly sustainable force is

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by sea. And with your warships, combat logistics ships, do we have

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the force we need right now?
And does our budget and our plans have

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some realistic requirements? And today we
got a returning guest, doctor James Holmes,

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the J. C. Wilie Chair
of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War

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College and a distinguished Fellow at the
Brute Krulac Center for Innovation of Future Warfare

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at Marine Corps University. And we're
going to use as a touchstone today and

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we'll go it's on the show page, but we'll put in the chat room

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too, an article that he recently
had up at the Center for Maritime Strategy

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titled more combat Logistics four Ships.
Yes please, James, welcome back to

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me. Threats gentlemen. Always a
pleasure. It's been it's been way too

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long, it surely has, and
it's just going to be a pleasure having

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you on board for the next hour
to talk about the un sexy and important

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that we always like talking about here, and just to kind of kick things

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off. I mentioned the article that
tapped me on the shoulders. Back man,

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we got to get James back on
to talk about this. What what

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brought you to to put out a
page worth a thought on combat logistics sports

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ships. Well, it's it's pretty
it's pretty straightforward. I very seldom pushed

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material, let anybody any board,
but whenever somebody asked me for material,

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I always give it to them.
The Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy

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League has been it's it's a fairly
new creation. They are very they are

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very aggressive and so forth. And
they got in touch and asked me if

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I would say something about the size
of the of the combat logistics fleet,

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which I think is uh which I
think is well. I always have to

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say it's way too small. I
mean it's the the the I guess the

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the theme of the pieces. Basically, if you lose the merchant fleet,

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if you lose the logistics fleet,
you lose the war. The uh.

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So I did some scattering around and
tried to estimate. I think I came

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up with an accurate figure of how
many ships we have available for sea left

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in wartime. I can't I can't. I can't swear. I can't swear

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that it's an accurate figure. But
nobody, nobody's been in touch to say

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I'm wrong. So I just so
I take it that I'm at least in

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the ballpark. And you know what, we we lost it that we lost

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about twice as many ships as we
currently have in the inventory in the first

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six months of World War two,
uh A damaged or song. And that's

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just so, that's just we are
in We are in serious danger, in

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a serious danger zone on the ability
to rete stage forces forward and then to

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sustain them once once they're out there. So it's so if it if it

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does anything to to help wake up
wake up people in Washington, and elsewhere

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in the country. I think it's
I would be very pleased with that.

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Well. I think one of the
things you've touched on in your article that

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it's important is that the Chinese have
learned from the Japanese. We think they've

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learned from the Japanese experience of not
attacking the US logistics train, and you

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point out that that that may be
a rather large issue for us to address.

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Kind of talk about that a little
bit, because before we get into

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the the combat logistics for a shortages, let's just talk a little bit about

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the threats that they may face.
Yeah, that's absolutely right. I mean,

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it's it's one of the it's one
of the perennial mysteries that we talk

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about, especially in our intermediate level
course here in Newport, which is which

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is pitched at the operational level.
Going into going into World War two in

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the Pacific, Japan had a had
a force of fleet submarines roughly comparable to

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our own, and yet they did
not do what we did, which was

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so basically, I mean literally,
on December seventh, the Admiral Stark,

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the Chief and Naval Operations, Orders
the orders the submarine fleet out into the

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Pacific to attack anything flying a Japanese
flag where they're it's a battleship, whether

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it's a carrier or especially if it's
a merchantman, a merchantman basically carrying supplies

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to and fro within the Japanese Empire. I mean that's literally the center of

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gravity. Literally, the merchant fleet
was the center of gravity for the Japanese

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Empire simply because it was an island
empire with possessions that had conquered overseas,

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and it simply had to have simply
had to have that sort of connectivity along

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the sea lanes in order to in
order to supply the economy and all the

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things that the japan needed to do. But they simply did not use they

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did not use it determinedly in order
to attack our logistics train. As you

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pointed out, I don't. I
mean there's a lot of there's a lot

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of potential reasons for that. It
seems totally I've always had a hard time

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making sense out of it. But
there was something, there was certainly something

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in the Japanese warrior culture which inhibited
them from thinking about thinking a merchantman as

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as being something an important thing.
Japanese submarines were all a submarine skippers and

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crews were all about trying trying to
sink warships and it just didn't work out

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for them as very well, whereas
the US Submarine Force sub did quite well.

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Thank over eleven hundred vessels of all
types that by the time of World

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War two wound down, including not
just I mean so eleven hundred merchantmen and

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then various warships and then and it
was just a it's just a devastating blow

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to Japan. One thing. One
thing. My friend and co author Toshiyoshahar

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did a he recently did a monograph
down at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary

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Affairs basically looking at the lessons that
Chinese strategists, Chinese analysts have drawn out

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of the Pacific War. And I
guarantee you that's a that's a big one

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is go after that, go after
the logistics train, and dust impose a

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cost on the United States. That
way, if you gave me command of

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the PLA today, I would take
that anti access in the area denial network

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they have that they have constructed over
the last twenty five years. I would

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actually target the logistics fleet and ignore
the battle fleet in a sense something because

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as people as people in this audience
well know as well as as well as

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you do. If you if you
take away the logistics, the fleet goes

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away within a few days. Even
a nuclear power come back and is I

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mean it's still in these regular resupply
if it's especially if it's an aircraft carrier

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that has an air wing that is
that is thirsty for fuel. So even

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even even carriers are not going to
be able to sustain their presence in their

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Western Pacific, in China's backyard,
it deprived of that logistical supports. It's

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so I think that's uh. I
think the historical, the historical element element

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is huge. Our Chinese friends are
ardent students of history. I don't always

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agree with the conclusions they draw from
studying it, but they oftentimes do draw

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conclusions that are very helpful for them
in the operational sense. And I think

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this is one of those. And
it doesn't just apply to the sea and

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going back to World War two,
you know, that's one of the you

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know, constant lessons through all of
written history and the the Chinese culture has

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a longer history than ours do.
They were they were writing stories while my

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ancestors were still chasing sheep around Scotland
barefoot and mud huts. But yeah,

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if if you have a strong force
that you don't want to fight, you

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starve it to death. You don't
let it feed itself, you don't let

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it get fresh water. And that
translates into to combat effect in this and

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even short term history. I was
I was thinking as I was getting ready

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for the show. A real good
friend of mine from college, you graduated

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a couple of years behind me,
But he made the mistake of going Air

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Force Rozzi as opposed to Navy Rozzi. But he's about to retire after thirty

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two years of active duty, and
he joined right after Desert Storm. And

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that you have an entire generation of
officers who as Jo's when you're so,

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they weren't even thinking in the nineteen
nineties because they were just trying to get

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their getting their calls and getting up
on step. But we have an entire

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generation of leaders who grew up in
that post Cold War end of history.

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Six sigma just in time delivery,
and we have saw an incredible shrinking of

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our logistics force, and we had
a lot of our resupply ships went from

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USS to us NS, which is
almost a great argument to get in with

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people after a few beers, But
we find ourselves having to look again at

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what it means. You know,
we don't have the Red Band or Northern

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Fleet of the Soviet Union to run
things again. But the People's Republic of

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China, their navy and their rocket
forces, they have it snuck up on

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everybody. But as the distractions of
the dust of all the distractions in Central

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Asia start to fade, even though
we're now worried about Ukraine and Israel and

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everything else, when you look at
the force the Chinese have, and you

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bring this up in your article,
it's not just your nineteen nineties NBA just

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in time delivery of peacetime supplies and
training supplies. We need to think about

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what we need for sustained operations,
but also to do something that people don't

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like to talk about. But you
mentioned it right in your opening, that's

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combat loss. That means we can't
have a quote efficient combat logistics force.

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We need something that is resilient and
for lack of a better phrase, had

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a lot of redundancy. And you
know, those numbers I think could be

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really interesting to play out absolutely and
I hope. I certainly hope as we're

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doing wargaming. I don't do any
classified work at also, so I can't

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say with any real precision of what's
going on in wargaming. I know I

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know that I know that war gaming
here in Newport is going on all the

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time, and I'm sure it is
that at similar places around the country.

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I've I'm contested logistics in particular,
but I certainly hope that we were building

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in that look like like you said, you don't you don't need to be

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efficient. You need to be effective, and that means redundancy. And that's

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for anybody who's ever been an engineer, as you all have. As you

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all have, you always want to
have a spare at least one's fare for

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everything, simply because you're going to
probably the chances are being what it is,

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you're gonna you're gonna need that spare
and you're gonna lose the primary the

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uh and you sort of hit it. In fact, you and I have

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been you and Buy for a long
time have been running on parallel tracks on

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the you're talking about that basically that
forgetful Are era right after the Cold War,

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at the end of his the end
of history esus. You saw it.

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I saw it when I was teaching
here in swats I was back after

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Desert Storm. I was back in
Newports. It's just to teach engineering.

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And in nineteen ninety two I remember
being handed a copy of a little book

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called From the Sea, which was
basically the Navy and the Marine corps first

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effort to make strategy for the post
Cold War era. And the preamble to

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that literally says, we own the
sea for all time. I mean exaggerating

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slightly, but you can look online
and it's it basically says the Soviet Navy

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is gone and there's no challenger on
the horizon, and therefore we should reinvent

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ourselves into a force that no longer
has to worry about fighting for command of

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the sea. We can basically assume
that we can project power from the sea

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as a safe haven. And that's
I think that's where you saw the just

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in time logistics and all that,
and all those those sort of fads from

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the business, from the business world
make their way into into naval operations.

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I think I think we've always been
a little bit and you mentioned doctor Deming

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once in a while. I think
that for some reason, the military services

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are very prone to to to leap
at business fads. But that way,

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it felt like that was that was
on steroids. If you did If you

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do that, if you say that, you own the seat and you don't

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have to worry about it being challenged
at See at that point, at that

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point, you don't have to worry
about the challenges to your logistical system.

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And if you if you stop worrying
about that, preparing for that, building

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assets for that, you're really you're
really setting yourself up for failure, because

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the next challenger is coming along,
even if you don't know who it is

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or when it's coming. See better, you better, you better be ready,

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You better be fatalistic about about these
things. If we get through this

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competition with China and Rossia, Iran
and everybody else, I certainly hope we

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take that lesson away and put it
to work for us in the future.

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Yeah. I having been on the
on the Service Force Fleet during the Vietnam

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War off the coast of Vietnam,
people do not understand how rapidly you go

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through a munitions I mean there were
three or four carriers there, so we

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were I was on an amyship amoship. So we were re arming them at

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night and we were re arming destroyers
during the day. And you know,

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we weave the country. Uh we
ran out of ready ammunition, even though

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we had Subic Bay, which had
a fairly large inventorious stuff in its bunkers.

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Uh, we ran a five and
two. They were bringing that stuff

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in in C fives and and then
we you know, they there were like

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two am ships on online. We
had AoE S, we had AO R

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S, we had a brunch of
oilers out there, and we were all

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busy as all get out. I
don't I'm just convinced that people who didn't

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were weren't around, and we weren't
contested either. I mean, this was

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this was just US bombing. We
were contested a couple of times, but

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uh, this is just US bombing
or shooting at Vietnam. I don't even

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I don't think anybody who hasn't gone
through that kind of think gets glimpse or

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has an idea of how how bad
things can be when everybody goes Winchester,

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especially since we have all these these
ships now that thank goodness for trying to

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do something about it, but can't
load their vertical lot cells. I think

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you know we're we are way short
of what we need and way short of

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the capabilities we need to keep the
fleet and action. And I'm sure you

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have thoughts on that. Yeah,
it's and it's it's almost a what we're

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seeing today is almost a rhyme from
the nineteen fifties. And and people out

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in the audience who haven't read this
before, it's a nice short article from

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Samuel Huntington, who was a professor
at Harvard, very very famous in the

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nineties for his for his book on
the Class of Civilizations. But he in

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nineteen fifty four he wrote a book
of the name, or not a book,

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but an article for the Naval Institute
Proceedings, calling for the Navy after

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World War Two to reinvent itself as
a transoceanic navy. And it almost feels

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like from the sea. He basically
says, look, you get this huge

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fleet coming out of World War Two, You've sunk all your major competitors.

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Why don't you, Why don't you
really? And you need a reason for

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being. You have to be able
to put it to Congress and the American

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people and presidential administrations. Why do
we need it? Why do we need

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a battle fleet, but he basically
says the Navy should rein reinvent itself as

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a as a as a powered projection
for uce that doesn't have to worry too

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much about about fighting for command of
the seed. The Soviet Navy didn't really

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start becoming a thing until Admiral Gorshkov's
era in the nineteen sixties, so for

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at least a few years there,
we were sort of in the same mode

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that we've been. We've been in
well for thirty years now. At this

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point, it's over over thirty years
since the Cold War ended, so it

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feels like we have so it feels
like that was sort of a sort of

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a premonition of what we have now, except that it's gone on way too

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far now. But yeah, I
mean, and I think the Cold War,

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the course of the Cold War sort
of confirmed what Huntington said, In

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the minds of most people there was
that we didn't have to worry about we

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didn't have to worry too much about
contested contested logistics or being challenged at see

241
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off Korea, Vietnam, or so
forth. Into the nineteen seventies. At

242
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that point, at that point,
people started getting religion, especially especially during

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the Arab Israeli War of nineteen seventy
three, when it's when it became obvious

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that that the Soviet Navy had become
a force to be reckoned with. At

245
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that point, the the the different
Administration's President Ford, President Carter and so

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forth started getting started getting serious about
that. And then of course we had

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the sixteen one hundred it's the six
hundred ship navy build up in the nineteen

248
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eighties, and and that got us
through. But it does feel like it

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does feel like history has repeated itself, except in a more virulent form.

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It's and you also, I think
you have sometimes we can be our own

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worst enemy. And I think there
can be well intentioned people, smart people

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who just have bad ideas. But
sometimes bad ideas can have knock on effects.

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And I think the tide is receding
here. You probably have a better

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view of it up at the War
College, and we do down here in

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the provinces. But one thing that
one of the windmills I tilt against whenever

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I get a chance is two of
the higher profile advocates or sells people of

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this way of thinking is Bob Work
and Michelle Flornoy and the whole thought that

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the best way to think about war
in the Pacific was the seventy two hour

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war, where we have to prove
and make it clear that if any war

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comes up first, seventy two hours
would be so dramatic and so destructive that

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nobody would dare try to do that. Well, if you run your entire

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operation based upon assuming that you're only
going to go seventy two hours, you

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can quickly talk yourself into not wanting
or not seeing a requirement for a large

264
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merchant marine not to have requirements for
a large combat sustainment force, because you

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say, well, everything's forward,
and everything's going to go forward, and

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we'll be done in seventy two hours. Have you seen things similar to that

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that have helped people justify the state
not just of our combat logistics sports,

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but in the merchant marine that we
have that is supposed to back it up

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and defeat it. Yeah, that's
a great question. I mean, you're

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not going to get to me to
say the thing a negative about Bob Word,

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who's a friend of mine, was
I think the idea of the seventy

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two hours at least I hope that
this is the case. I mean,

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it's it's a great idea, but
as you know, I mean, it's

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we hopefully live in the world in
which the scientific method still holds. Way,

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I mean, that's to me,
that's a proposition. It's a hypothesis

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that you should then rigorously test,
I mean, be skeptical of it.

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Can we actually can we actually do
that? And I think I think I'm

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with you on the on this particular
one, because I mean, how many

279
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times or how many times in military
history have you seen seen powers go and

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go into a conflict and assume,
you know, make assumptions that were actually

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not not things that were self evident, they were simply a sort of me

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sort of mean is that that shape
a particular combat and went into a into

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a conflict. So my answer is, if it's possible to do that,

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that's a very powerful deterrent. But
to deterrent if you can communicate it to

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the other side. But I think
that's uh. I mean, think about

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nineteen fourteen when all the powers thought
that they were going to march off to

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a shoot to a short and inglorious
war in Western Europe, and and and

288
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when the First World First World War. You gotta be very skeptical about that

289
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kind of stuff. If we can
do it, if it's actionable, then

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fine, if we can't, but
I think that but I think the we

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we ought to air on the side
of skepticism just because so often what you

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think is going to happen. I
mean, the adversary is going to change

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the nature of the war around you. I mean there's just furious things that

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can happen because your antagonists gets a
vote in how you in how your war

295
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plans and your operations work out,
and he's getta cast in against you.

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There's no question about that. Yeah. I think one of the other things

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that's kind of disturbing to me is
that the the Red Hill Petroleum Facility in

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Hawaii is being closed. I'm not
sure we have any kind of adequate system

299
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coming online it's going to take its
place, except we're going to rent some

300
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big tankers and have them do something. But that just points out the necessity

301
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of having since most of the ships
in the carriers now operate on some kind

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of fuel, having a system to
get that fuel go forward. And uh,

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that means we have to protect seed
lines. We talked about this a

304
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little bit, but you know,
if if the bad guys have submarines that

305
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are capable of reaching to mid ocean
or to the coast of Hawaii. Uh,

306
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then we're going to have to have
escort ships, some kind of vessels

307
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that commandment. We could probably do
something with phs and unmanned systems, but

308
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this, you know, this is
much more complicated than just saying, okay,

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we need we need you know,
five new AOEs and and then we'll

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solve all the problems. I mean, this is this is some some uh

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some brain poweries to be put on
this. And and I'm assumed someone somewhere

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is running numbers, but I'm as
a marine sergeant taught me one time,

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assuming is a very dangerous thing.
Yeah. Well, you know what they

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say about the assumptions that make an
ass out of you and me. I

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mean, that's that's that's that's that's
concentrated wisdom right there. Yeah. And

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by the way, so I think
of all the things of yours that I've

317
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read and in a long time,
that was the most effective, the most

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effectives to me, that you that
you that you did a few a few

319
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weeks ago when we had I can't
even remember who it was, somebody had

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some of the Depentagon test is essentially
testifying that closing the fuel dog, the

321
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fuel storage facility in Hawaii made no
really didn't have any impire impact on our

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operations in the end of Pacific.
I mean, that simply cannot be true.

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So it's the I mean, it's
I mean, possibly it's true that

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we could work around it, but
it seems really hard to really hard to

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believe. I mean that's I mean, that was one of the whatever.

326
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Whenever and Limits showed up and showed
up on in late December of nineteen forty

327
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one, to take charge of the
Pacific fleet, he looked around, and

328
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he looked around at the things that
Japanese had done wrong, and that was

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one of them. They spent so
much time working over the battleship fleet that

330
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they that they had not attacked the
fuel storage facilities, which ended up being

331
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absolutely critical to our ability to stage
and sustain operations in the Western Pacific against

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Japan. They simply had their they
simply had their their centers of gravity wrong,

333
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and they went after the wrong thing
something by attack, attacking things that

334
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were gonna I mean, battles were
about to be so support assets and not

335
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the not the primary bearers of the
battle fleet. But it's yeah, it's

336
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and I have not heard anybody.
In fact, I'm not entirely sure i've

337
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heard anybody addressed to address that.
It seems that we seem to be just

338
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sort of waving aside that reality that
you're talking If you're talking about a massive

339
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increase on demand demand for shipping to
transport to fuel and stores and ammunition and

340
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what not to the Western Pacific,
so that has actually made things much worse.

341
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Yeah, Slim Mar Cogliano, I
know you're familiar with and we've had

342
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them on here before. Right before
the show, he mentioned a thread of

343
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his that he had up there,
and uh, the second part of the

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thread, he has a demonstration about
how those supplies ultimately get to a four

345
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deployed strike group or amphibious Readiness group
is if not just your fast about support

346
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ship. That's stage three. And
if you've you know, moving the stuff

347
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on to the warships, you can
call that a fourth stage. But the

348
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second stage are the shuttle ships.
And then you have the first age,

349
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which are those merchant ships which move
it from the ports to where it needs

350
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to be, whether they're tankers or
cargo ships, and if you know,

351
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we lose red hills like I.
One of the things always frustrating me is

352
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I wish everybody didn't have an online
you know, Google Earth Map, they

353
00:25:32.160 --> 00:25:36.480
had an actual physical globe in their
office, because you really cannot appreciate the

354
00:25:36.519 --> 00:25:40.799
distance of the Pacific until you physically
put your hands on a globe and have

355
00:25:40.920 --> 00:25:48.079
to rotate it. But that distance
from La San Diego, Seattle to Hawaii

356
00:25:48.599 --> 00:25:53.000
is long enough. But if you
can't even get what you need in Hawaii,

357
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then you've got to do that distance
from the west coast of the US

358
00:25:59.079 --> 00:26:02.359
to Guam. That the heck of
a reach. And to do that math

359
00:26:02.839 --> 00:26:06.839
you know, your your first aid
and your second stage ships that just screens

360
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whatever you have. It's not enough
because you've got another half of the ocean

361
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you simply have to cover. Yeah, absolutely, if it's sort of too

362
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it's sort of two things. I
once the geograt once the geographic thing.

363
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I would, yes, everybody please
get a globe. Yeah, I get

364
00:26:22.839 --> 00:26:26.279
an actual Globe's that I have one
on my desk. I have one next

365
00:26:26.279 --> 00:26:30.799
to my next next to Archie Bunker's
chair, here and here and here in

366
00:26:30.839 --> 00:26:34.000
Barrington that I that I use when
I'm working at home. But if you

367
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don't have a globe, I want
you to get out there and google Richard

368
00:26:37.200 --> 00:26:44.440
ads Harrison, Richard Aids being ed
E. S Uh And the title of

369
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the book is The Fortune Atlas of
Worlds of World Strategy, and it dates

370
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from the Second World War. He
was he was a master. He was

371
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an absolute master of political cartography.
If you get out there and you look

372
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at you look at those maps.
A lot of those relief too, obviously

373
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because he was writing for a World
War two audience. But he does things

374
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like he will zoom in and and
he will show you what exactly I mean.

375
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For example, one of my favorites
is that if you're looking from the

376
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Solomon Islands in nineteen forty two or
forty three towards Japan, you're basically seeing

377
00:27:11.759 --> 00:27:15.680
just water and but but but anyways, there's just a lot of a ton

378
00:27:15.759 --> 00:27:19.000
of great imagery that will shape how
you how you look at these at these

379
00:27:19.039 --> 00:27:23.039
problems, these problems of strategy,
operations and tactics. So that's so,

380
00:27:23.119 --> 00:27:26.319
yeah, that's so, that's I
mean, that's he was great at conveying

381
00:27:26.400 --> 00:27:30.720
ideas visually. And the other the
other thing is, yeah, I mean,

382
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it's I mean, it's it's kind
of disturbing. I don't you guys

383
00:27:34.359 --> 00:27:38.839
may be more plugged into this was
but the Navy what was probably a couple

384
00:27:38.880 --> 00:27:42.359
of years ago that Admiral gil Day
came out and came out and said that

385
00:27:42.359 --> 00:27:45.640
that these very these various merchant vessels, they're gonna go. They're gonna go

386
00:27:45.680 --> 00:27:51.359
without convoys. You don't because we
don't have enough escorts to provide them with

387
00:27:51.599 --> 00:27:55.200
protection to get submarines or air attack
or whatever whatever might be brought against them.

388
00:27:55.240 --> 00:27:57.839
I mean, that's really it seems
like that's if you look back over

389
00:27:59.480 --> 00:28:02.799
certainly so that's certainly the last couple
of centuries of history. It seems like

390
00:28:02.839 --> 00:28:07.000
that's one of the most forgetful areas
is convoys. It seems like we're always

391
00:28:07.000 --> 00:28:08.440
that. It seems like we in
the Royal Navy before us, are always

392
00:28:08.480 --> 00:28:11.319
forgetting the lesson that you have to
have. You have to you have to

393
00:28:11.359 --> 00:28:15.880
do convoys, You have to supply
convoy escorts in or in order for those

394
00:28:15.920 --> 00:28:18.960
things to get through. If anybody
doesn't, if anything, the body doesn't

395
00:28:18.160 --> 00:28:22.960
believe that. I tried to find
a copy of Greyhound with with Tom Hanks

396
00:28:22.960 --> 00:28:26.240
which of course takes place during World
War Two. A wonderful film. It's

397
00:28:26.279 --> 00:28:30.160
not a lot of dialogue in it, but it really conveys exactly what it

398
00:28:30.200 --> 00:28:33.480
was like to do convoy escort duty
and also in just also how critical it

399
00:28:34.200 --> 00:28:37.160
was, especially if you didn't have
air cover in order to in order to

400
00:28:37.160 --> 00:28:42.559
to help fend offs submarines at see. But but yeah, I could Yeah,

401
00:28:42.559 --> 00:28:48.559
I couldn't agree more. Yeah,
a few weeks ago, maybe months

402
00:28:48.559 --> 00:28:51.640
ago, I did a I just
kind of was thinking about that. That

403
00:28:51.880 --> 00:28:56.440
exact issue is how do you if
you don't have escort hips, uh like

404
00:28:56.920 --> 00:29:02.400
gray Ound, how do you how
do you keep track of of your and

405
00:29:02.480 --> 00:29:06.240
what's the threat? I mean the
the that the the churity of time and

406
00:29:06.279 --> 00:29:08.680
distance work both ways. With the
Chinese they've got they've got the same issue

407
00:29:08.680 --> 00:29:14.039
we have in reverse. So where
where do you have the where do you

408
00:29:14.039 --> 00:29:17.799
have the need for these escort vessels
or or some kind of system. And

409
00:29:17.839 --> 00:29:19.680
that's that was what I was saying
earlier, that that with the P eight

410
00:29:19.799 --> 00:29:23.720
and the range that has, you
can probably cover most of the distance between

411
00:29:23.759 --> 00:29:30.640
Guam and Hawaii have provided you also
have some kind of sensors out there keeping

412
00:29:30.720 --> 00:29:33.880
track, you know, like the
unmanned stuff that could go along at the

413
00:29:33.880 --> 00:29:41.799
same speed as the is that some
kind of uh uh supply force and as

414
00:29:41.839 --> 00:29:48.759
long as you had helicopters that are
capable of of taking care of submarines.

415
00:29:48.079 --> 00:29:53.000
I mean, that's your that's your
best hope, I guess. But uh,

416
00:29:53.839 --> 00:29:57.400
you know, I don't know if
anybody else is thinking along those lines.

417
00:29:57.440 --> 00:30:00.559
I didn't get much feedback on that
on that thing piece, and uh,

418
00:30:02.200 --> 00:30:06.240
maybe you don't have to write a
stronger one down the road. Yeah,

419
00:30:06.240 --> 00:30:08.319
I mean it's a well, like
I said, I I haven't done

420
00:30:08.319 --> 00:30:11.119
any well, I have done wargaming, but not on these on these topics

421
00:30:11.119 --> 00:30:15.960
and anytime recently. But the but
yeah, if you do here, you

422
00:30:15.960 --> 00:30:18.799
you do hear disturbing rumors out of
out of different war games that we're basically

423
00:30:19.559 --> 00:30:22.799
we're basically assuming that whatever you need, whatever stuff you need, whether it's

424
00:30:22.799 --> 00:30:26.440
fuel, oil or a fuel or
ammunition or stores, is there at the

425
00:30:26.440 --> 00:30:30.359
time when you need it. And
that's if that's the case. If that's

426
00:30:30.400 --> 00:30:33.359
a if that's if that's an assumption
built into what we are telling ourselves,

427
00:30:33.359 --> 00:30:37.359
that's a that's a really dangerous thing. But yeah, so I mean,

428
00:30:37.559 --> 00:30:41.160
these are all hypotheses. I mean, it's you mentioned on manned I love

429
00:30:41.200 --> 00:30:44.880
the P I love the P eight, it's it seems like a wonderful airframe,

430
00:30:44.960 --> 00:30:48.200
and so and so forth. But
if we are just assuming that these

431
00:30:48.200 --> 00:30:49.880
things are going to work as design, I mean, that's always I mean,

432
00:30:49.880 --> 00:30:52.440
that's that's just a hypothesis. You
have to try to vet it,

433
00:30:52.480 --> 00:30:56.720
you have to try to falsify it. As Carl Popper told us a century

434
00:30:56.720 --> 00:31:00.000
ago, these these things are all
theories, and theories theories exist to be

435
00:31:00.079 --> 00:31:03.559
debunked. If you can't debunk it, then at that point yet that sort

436
00:31:03.559 --> 00:31:08.119
of becomes your work, your working
model. But I certainly hope we are

437
00:31:08.160 --> 00:31:12.319
being very ruthless with ourselves about trying
to debunk our ideas about how we're going

438
00:31:12.359 --> 00:31:15.319
to do things in the end of
Pacific. Because we don't do that,

439
00:31:15.400 --> 00:31:21.640
reality might do it for us.
Yeah, it's the kind of what we

440
00:31:21.720 --> 00:31:26.200
mentioned before is well meaning people,
smart people. They can have ideas,

441
00:31:26.279 --> 00:31:29.400
they're just not the they're not the
right ideas. And it is that.

442
00:31:30.240 --> 00:31:34.759
I like how you mentioned the scientific
method because I think one of the things

443
00:31:34.759 --> 00:31:44.279
that can can be a weakness is
a a misuse of a very honorable characteristic

444
00:31:44.319 --> 00:31:48.920
we have in the military is a
difference to seniority and being supportive of people

445
00:31:49.000 --> 00:31:52.440
up high. And you have very
senior people if they don't work inside of

446
00:31:52.440 --> 00:32:02.359
a culture that encourages questioning and encourages
wrecked challenging of ideas. You can have

447
00:32:02.640 --> 00:32:06.880
good ideas that they go forward,
go forward, go forward, but they

448
00:32:06.880 --> 00:32:10.519
are because they're never really asked the
hard questions. The hard questions are just

449
00:32:10.680 --> 00:32:15.119
kind of hand waved away. And
you brought up something in your article that

450
00:32:16.640 --> 00:32:20.519
I hadn't really thought. I hadn't
made the connection before, but when I

451
00:32:20.559 --> 00:32:23.039
saw it, I went, yeah, somebody needs to really work on that.

452
00:32:23.079 --> 00:32:28.440
And you can see hints for people
have and that's the acronyms or us

453
00:32:28.480 --> 00:32:36.440
e ABO, the Marine Corps Expeditionary
Advance based operations. If we are going

454
00:32:36.519 --> 00:32:44.480
to have a bunch of Marines scattered
about the Pacific making a nuisance of themselves,

455
00:32:45.079 --> 00:32:51.559
that just creates a not just a
more numerical challenge to keep them supplied,

456
00:32:52.200 --> 00:32:54.440
much less to get where they need
to be. But that's where I

457
00:32:54.480 --> 00:32:59.359
think people are thinking about it,
but also a different classes shit because what

458
00:32:59.400 --> 00:33:05.680
we have seen is therese combat support
logistics ships that we have now they're huge.

459
00:33:06.079 --> 00:33:09.160
They're because they're big, they're very
efficient in peace. But we've gotten

460
00:33:09.160 --> 00:33:14.279
to the point in some of our
warship classes, like our anthems, that

461
00:33:14.799 --> 00:33:19.599
the loss of just one unit,
it's not a tactical era, it's not

462
00:33:19.680 --> 00:33:23.200
even an operational concern. It can
become strategic. So, okay, if

463
00:33:23.200 --> 00:33:29.119
we're going to do this with the
Marines, where are the combat logistics support

464
00:33:29.279 --> 00:33:32.319
that will enable it. That's a
hard question. I don't think anybody's answered

465
00:33:32.359 --> 00:33:39.119
yet. Yeah, I mean that's
a well, let me let me make

466
00:33:39.119 --> 00:33:44.119
a philosophical point and then I'll come
to the war operational point that you were

467
00:33:44.119 --> 00:33:45.599
talking about. Ideas. I mean, that's absolutely critical. I mean we

468
00:33:45.720 --> 00:33:50.240
we we really need to be self
critical. It really in all phases of

469
00:33:50.240 --> 00:33:53.039
life, but especially in military affairs, just because the consequences are so great.

470
00:33:53.480 --> 00:33:55.960
Every every every term, when I
have a new class come in,

471
00:33:57.000 --> 00:34:00.799
I bet, in fact, we
just started. We just started Thursday.

472
00:34:00.799 --> 00:34:04.119
I want to say. On a
new term. I always we sort of

473
00:34:04.119 --> 00:34:07.000
have an admin session where we say, you know, well, welcome to

474
00:34:07.039 --> 00:34:08.400
Newport. You know, here's where
the here's where the head is here's where

475
00:34:08.400 --> 00:34:12.360
the here's where the food is,
and so forth. But I always,

476
00:34:12.400 --> 00:34:15.480
I always tell my my new students
that I have a hidden agenda for them

477
00:34:15.480 --> 00:34:19.760
that's not very hidden. Actually,
I want to make the devil's advocates.

478
00:34:20.199 --> 00:34:22.039
And the reason I say that is
because we need we need, we need

479
00:34:22.079 --> 00:34:25.880
opposition, we need to be skeptical
of ourselves. In the in the medieval

480
00:34:25.880 --> 00:34:31.320
Catholic Church, the church, their
church fathers, when they were considering a

481
00:34:31.360 --> 00:34:36.440
candidate for sainthood, they would appoint
a liar to basically go out and dig

482
00:34:36.519 --> 00:34:40.320
up dirt on the candidate is and
basically argue against the candidacy by by fair

483
00:34:40.440 --> 00:34:45.440
means or foul don't, and thus
provide the church fathers the maximum amount of

484
00:34:45.480 --> 00:34:49.480
information they could have in order to
make a wise choice about whether to make

485
00:34:49.519 --> 00:34:51.760
this person a saint. I mean, that's that's where the term this the

486
00:34:51.840 --> 00:34:54.840
devil's advocate comes from. Be the
devil look or look for reasons that the

487
00:34:55.119 --> 00:35:00.920
that the prevailing idea or the our
theory or hypothesis is not true. So

488
00:35:00.960 --> 00:35:02.880
I and so so I hope we
were I hope we are grooming a generation

489
00:35:02.960 --> 00:35:08.360
of skeptic systems out there, and
into the force, and just because I

490
00:35:08.360 --> 00:35:13.559
think even even even if the criticism
is wrong, it doesn't really matter because

491
00:35:13.599 --> 00:35:16.719
it makes us think and it makes
us smarter as a whole. So that's

492
00:35:17.360 --> 00:35:21.039
so, that's that's kind of my
that's kind of my agenda for for all

493
00:35:21.039 --> 00:35:23.480
the younger generations. We're you and
I, you and I and and you

494
00:35:23.559 --> 00:35:27.440
and I are and all of us
are trying to raise the next generation.

495
00:35:27.800 --> 00:35:31.920
I hope we're raising a generation like
that. But uh, but yeah,

496
00:35:31.960 --> 00:35:35.880
I mean, I mean, just
all these ideas about how to support how

497
00:35:35.880 --> 00:35:38.199
to support forces of forces. I
mean, you're quite right, and I

498
00:35:38.239 --> 00:35:42.039
have to once once again, I
have no idea what the gaming is showing.

499
00:35:42.039 --> 00:35:45.079
But if you're gonna just if you're
gonna do distributed operations, if you're

500
00:35:45.079 --> 00:35:49.679
gonna do expeditionary, advanced based operations
and basically scattered forces all all over the

501
00:35:49.679 --> 00:35:52.559
theater, cases are you're not going
to be able to rely on a on

502
00:35:52.400 --> 00:35:55.840
a on a huge on a huge
job on a huge JEV logistics ship to

503
00:35:55.880 --> 00:35:59.280
go out there and supply all those
things. Can you do it? On?

504
00:35:59.440 --> 00:36:00.280
Man? Can we can? We
can? We have a new a

505
00:36:00.320 --> 00:36:04.519
new smaller class of ship. I
mean exactly what there are the answers,

506
00:36:04.679 --> 00:36:07.079
and I don't have a clear sense
of this. I mean, I hope

507
00:36:07.079 --> 00:36:09.119
it's going on in the classified world, but but I simply don't have a

508
00:36:09.119 --> 00:36:13.960
lot of competence that that's the case. Yeah, I was. I was

509
00:36:14.000 --> 00:36:15.679
amused by an article the other day. In fact, I did a blog

510
00:36:15.679 --> 00:36:20.920
post on it where not really amusing, but it's interesting. Uh. They

511
00:36:20.960 --> 00:36:25.639
had an oiler out refueling an unmanned
ship. Uh, and the way they

512
00:36:25.639 --> 00:36:30.840
did that was it was a but
yeah, it's pretty interesting. Uh.

513
00:36:31.440 --> 00:36:36.840
They put a team of sailors from
the oiler on board the unmanned vessel and

514
00:36:36.840 --> 00:36:39.719
they rig up a hose that was
towed to stern of the oiler for a

515
00:36:39.719 --> 00:36:45.440
stern refueling while underway. Interesting.
Okay, yeah, I mean it wasn't

516
00:36:45.480 --> 00:36:49.960
alongside, But I guess, you
know, you don't have a whole lot

517
00:36:50.000 --> 00:36:52.280
of choices if you're gonna do this
operation. But I thought, well,

518
00:36:52.280 --> 00:36:57.800
somebody is thinking, you know,
somebody is somebody has actually put two and

519
00:36:57.800 --> 00:36:59.559
two together and going, you know, if we're going to use these things,

520
00:36:59.559 --> 00:37:00.880
they're gonna out of fuel. We're
going to have to find a way

521
00:37:00.920 --> 00:37:07.800
to refuel them. So that that
that was good news. And despite what

522
00:37:07.920 --> 00:37:12.679
Lee says, he says unmanned logistics
is an absurd concept. I don't think

523
00:37:12.679 --> 00:37:15.360
it is. I think you can
do all kinds of things if you're creative

524
00:37:15.480 --> 00:37:17.800
enough, and we certainly have enough
creative people. I agree with you.

525
00:37:17.800 --> 00:37:21.719
You know, somebody asked us,
think, okay, what if we had

526
00:37:21.960 --> 00:37:28.159
very large semi submersible tankers that just
popped up and somebody from the gets on

527
00:37:28.199 --> 00:37:30.239
board and sets up a fuel rig
and you go from there. I mean,

528
00:37:30.280 --> 00:37:36.320
it's it's uh. Is that absurd? Is that totally impossible? You

529
00:37:36.320 --> 00:37:38.199
know? I think we need to
think out I hate to say this because

530
00:37:38.400 --> 00:37:42.440
thinking outside the box is such a
cliche, but we really need to think

531
00:37:42.800 --> 00:37:45.280
a little a little better about what
the concerns are. What are how we're

532
00:37:45.280 --> 00:37:51.119
going to solve these problems, especially
in days of limited manning and people who

533
00:37:51.119 --> 00:37:53.000
don't need to be interested in serving
some you know, if we're going to

534
00:37:53.320 --> 00:37:57.119
grow the force, take care of
the marines on the beach and all that,

535
00:37:57.159 --> 00:38:01.199
we really do need to look at
at unmanned operations and and stealthy systems

536
00:38:01.199 --> 00:38:05.559
to get to get equipment ashore.
I sure hope somebody is looking at that.

537
00:38:06.920 --> 00:38:08.679
Yeah, so why, I mean
we that's from In fact, I

538
00:38:08.719 --> 00:38:12.239
would say this is not just a
military thing. I think it applies a

539
00:38:12.280 --> 00:38:15.000
cost to all society these days.
I mean, we we really need to

540
00:38:15.000 --> 00:38:17.159
get back to an experimental ethos in
which in which we don't just sort of

541
00:38:17.159 --> 00:38:21.559
wave away difficulties. Because it feels
like it feels like you read the daily

542
00:38:21.599 --> 00:38:24.519
news and just about just about every
day, somebody somebody's just sort of making

543
00:38:24.559 --> 00:38:29.079
a leap from a from an idea
to to a conclusion that this is what

544
00:38:29.079 --> 00:38:32.039
we should do. But yeah,
absolutely, yeah, I could not agree,

545
00:38:32.119 --> 00:38:36.000
could not agree more with that.
We just have to be critical of

546
00:38:36.000 --> 00:38:38.719
ourselves because if you've i mean,
if you if you just assume the way

547
00:38:38.760 --> 00:38:44.199
difficulties you're you're asking for trouble and
it's and again that's just it seems like

548
00:38:44.239 --> 00:38:49.079
that's just a proven reality across military
and diplomatic history over the last however many

549
00:38:49.159 --> 00:38:52.480
years that we've been studying, at
to twenty five hundred years or however long

550
00:38:52.519 --> 00:38:57.400
we've you know, pick pick your
favorite start day. But uh, yeah,

551
00:38:57.559 --> 00:39:00.480
that's I mean, I think they're
related to the related question you raise

552
00:39:00.559 --> 00:39:05.079
is probably a bit it's a bigger. It's a bigger one. The logistics,

553
00:39:05.119 --> 00:39:07.639
I mean, And I don't know, actually I don't actually know what

554
00:39:07.760 --> 00:39:10.000
to think about unmanned. I mean, it's when we talk about unmanned and

555
00:39:10.079 --> 00:39:14.400
artificial intelligence and all that kind of
stuff, those seem to be like possibly

556
00:39:14.480 --> 00:39:19.239
fledged factors as well. And this
is another another area in which I hope

557
00:39:19.239 --> 00:39:22.519
we are being very self critical about
this, because I mean, it's I

558
00:39:22.519 --> 00:39:25.159
always look back to the twenties and
thirties, the Inner War era, in

559
00:39:25.159 --> 00:39:30.000
which you saw this experimentation going on
with military aviation, with aircraft carriers,

560
00:39:30.000 --> 00:39:36.679
with submarines and so forth. And
the tendency is, the tendency is at

561
00:39:36.719 --> 00:39:39.960
first to see new technologies and new
ways of doing things, as in auxiliary

562
00:39:40.000 --> 00:39:45.199
to what we already do well,
which I think was the case with the

563
00:39:45.199 --> 00:39:50.199
aircraft carrier in the nineteen twenties before
military aviation caught up in aircraft became a

564
00:39:50.280 --> 00:39:54.119
legitimate striking platforms on their in their
own right. But it just feels like

565
00:39:54.119 --> 00:39:58.679
we're in another one of those areas
eras here a century later. I don't

566
00:39:58.679 --> 00:40:02.679
I don't actually see what the what
the revolutionary contribution on mand makes, uh.

567
00:40:04.320 --> 00:40:06.480
I mean, I mean executly,
what what's the What's what's the actual

568
00:40:06.519 --> 00:40:09.719
tactical and operational and strategic value of
that? Maybe it reduces costs. I

569
00:40:09.760 --> 00:40:13.480
mean, the Air Force likes to
talk about affordable mass. Mass is a

570
00:40:13.480 --> 00:40:15.679
good thing. We have to have
mass. But but the executive does that

571
00:40:15.760 --> 00:40:21.159
actually constitute a revolution in how we
are doing things? And I think I

572
00:40:21.199 --> 00:40:27.079
wish we should be asking ourselves at
just about every day. Yeah, especially

573
00:40:27.079 --> 00:40:35.360
if you're dealing with logistics involving fuel. I think between the the Greens and

574
00:40:35.400 --> 00:40:43.920
the attorneys, the risk of having
tens of thousands of barrels of petroleum products

575
00:40:44.000 --> 00:40:46.400
to and around there with no one
to be strictly held accountable could be an

576
00:40:46.440 --> 00:40:52.480
issue. Uh. And I think
also there's there's the problem of something that

577
00:40:52.519 --> 00:40:58.039
we've been reminded of this weekend.
Is again if you keep them at high

578
00:40:58.079 --> 00:41:02.239
seas as one thing, but you
know you have off of Yemen they have

579
00:41:02.440 --> 00:41:09.880
seized two merchant ships. Is you
know you mentioned the statement by Gilday and

580
00:41:09.920 --> 00:41:14.960
I know if you want to get
John Conrad face to turn beat red and

581
00:41:15.000 --> 00:41:17.039
the clause to come out, you
know you mentioned that scenario to them where

582
00:41:17.079 --> 00:41:22.440
you tell our merchant ships yet just
get underway. We can't escort you.

583
00:41:22.760 --> 00:41:25.159
It's a dangerous planet out there,
especially if you're going to be engaged.

584
00:41:25.480 --> 00:41:30.039
And if we do ever find ourselves
we kind of touched on this earlier.

585
00:41:30.800 --> 00:41:36.159
If we find ourselves engaged in a
major conflict with the People's Republic of China

586
00:41:36.239 --> 00:41:40.880
west of the International Dateline, the
smart money will tell you not just it's

587
00:41:40.920 --> 00:41:45.800
not going to be short, it's
not going to be localized. It will

588
00:41:45.000 --> 00:41:52.000
one way or another metastasize into a
global conflict that will affect all ships on

589
00:41:52.119 --> 00:41:55.360
water. And you know, it's
one thing in peacetime. I was I

590
00:41:55.400 --> 00:42:00.559
asked somebody earlier today, what are
the insurance rates right now going through the

591
00:42:00.599 --> 00:42:04.280
Red Sea, Because I think the
folks at Lloyd's aren't going to like their

592
00:42:04.280 --> 00:42:09.880
ships being taken by the hoothies.
But that's that's a legitimate problem to look

593
00:42:09.960 --> 00:42:17.280
at. You maybe you could use
unmanned in theory to be phase stage two,

594
00:42:17.320 --> 00:42:22.920
a four stage operation, but again
without a person in the loop,

595
00:42:23.280 --> 00:42:29.400
it doesn't solve the larger problem of
the fact that you need merchant sheep ship.

596
00:42:29.800 --> 00:42:34.000
You need merchant ships, you need
redundancy, and you also need reliable

597
00:42:34.159 --> 00:42:39.599
nationals to man them and operate them, which again is another thing that we

598
00:42:39.639 --> 00:42:45.000
haven't been strong of in our lifetime
is having enough American citizens or Allied citizens

599
00:42:45.480 --> 00:42:49.679
that you could really rely on in
time of war to really Yeah, you

600
00:42:49.719 --> 00:42:52.719
actually raised two very good points there. I mean, one is the I

601
00:42:52.719 --> 00:42:57.320
mean, that's just the idea that
insurance firmsploids. I'm not even sure who

602
00:42:57.320 --> 00:43:00.519
else does that. Bro time insurance
Loyds seems to be the domin there's a

603
00:43:00.559 --> 00:43:02.039
player in the player in that field
and has been for a long time.

604
00:43:02.079 --> 00:43:05.760
But I mean if they're I mean, if there's a risk to shipping,

605
00:43:05.880 --> 00:43:07.440
if if it's surance rates goes up, I mean, that's that is that

606
00:43:07.480 --> 00:43:12.440
didn't that affects what shippers are willing
to do. And we thought we saw

607
00:43:12.480 --> 00:43:15.880
this very clearly back in the back
in the in the two two thousand and

608
00:43:15.880 --> 00:43:20.400
eight to ten time frame or thereabouts
when when the piracy off Somalia was it

609
00:43:20.440 --> 00:43:22.000
was. It was a major thing
that at that point, at that point,

610
00:43:22.000 --> 00:43:25.760
you had shippers thinking about sending sending, sending cargoes all the way around

611
00:43:25.800 --> 00:43:30.719
the southern tip of Africa into the
South Atlantic and then and on that way

612
00:43:30.800 --> 00:43:34.880
up rather than rather than risk sending
them through the Red Sea or through the

613
00:43:34.920 --> 00:43:37.880
Gulf of mon and into the Red
Sea. And so it's so it's the

614
00:43:37.920 --> 00:43:42.920
economic aspect aspect is actually I mean
it's really it's really huge. It's and

615
00:43:42.960 --> 00:43:45.320
I think it sort of goes on. I mean, it's just not something

616
00:43:45.320 --> 00:43:49.320
you normally think about. We'd like
to think about guns and AMMO and taxics

617
00:43:49.360 --> 00:43:53.280
and whatnot. But though the economic
dimension is actually huge. So that's a

618
00:43:54.159 --> 00:43:59.199
so, yeah, it's I think
I think I lost my train. I

619
00:43:59.199 --> 00:44:00.760
thought there was a second point in
there, but I seem to seem to

620
00:44:00.800 --> 00:44:10.679
have lost what it was finding the
mariners that either are oh yeah, Americans

621
00:44:10.880 --> 00:44:15.159
or Allied that you can rely on
in time of war. Yeah, I

622
00:44:15.199 --> 00:44:16.400
was actually we haven't mentioned the hand
today. I was just gonna I was

623
00:44:16.400 --> 00:44:20.599
just gonna bring up a Mahonian point
when you when you look at in the

624
00:44:20.639 --> 00:44:23.679
Hand and is in his book The
Influence of Seapower upon History of his his

625
00:44:23.760 --> 00:44:28.480
signature work. I mean, that's
the first ninety pages of thereabouts of that

626
00:44:28.519 --> 00:44:31.719
he I mean, he's been talking
about the fundamentals of seapower, What does

627
00:44:31.719 --> 00:44:36.360
the nation possess the right stuff to
go to see and make itself a seafaring

628
00:44:36.440 --> 00:44:38.760
power of note and what like you
mentioned one of those is I mean one

629
00:44:38.760 --> 00:44:43.840
of those is I mean it's basically
demographics. Do you have enough people for

630
00:44:43.880 --> 00:44:45.519
the for the size of your territory, but that's but also do you have

631
00:44:45.639 --> 00:44:52.320
enough specialized people to support just to
support seafaring industries, include the including merchant

632
00:44:52.320 --> 00:44:54.119
mariners, including and including ship building. I mean, these are these are

633
00:44:54.119 --> 00:44:58.480
things in which we are way behind
our Chinese friends. I mean, if

634
00:44:58.599 --> 00:45:01.480
there's been a there's been a light
out of a PowerPoint presentation floating around out

635
00:45:01.480 --> 00:45:05.360
of the out of the Office of
Naval Intelligence the last couple of months,

636
00:45:05.360 --> 00:45:09.039
that's uh, that contends that China
has two hundred times our our our shipbuilding

637
00:45:09.079 --> 00:45:13.440
and industry. I mean that they
simply build a ton of ships and we

638
00:45:13.480 --> 00:45:16.880
simply don't. Anymore. Good news
is our allies do Japan and South Korea.

639
00:45:16.880 --> 00:45:21.000
But with the fact is that we
have by American laws that that inhibit

640
00:45:21.039 --> 00:45:23.719
our ability to go out and actually
procure ships from them. And I think

641
00:45:23.719 --> 00:45:28.519
that's something we need to get to
consider as we as we progress in this

642
00:45:28.599 --> 00:45:37.159
competition with with with China. Yeah, that's it's an very important issue.

643
00:45:37.960 --> 00:45:42.000
We would last I think last time
we had a guest on, we had

644
00:45:42.039 --> 00:45:45.480
Claude Barraby who was talking about his
book about Rickover. One of the things

645
00:45:45.519 --> 00:45:50.840
in the in that book which is
basically Ricover's work, uh memos and letters

646
00:45:50.840 --> 00:45:54.480
and stuff as he talks about uh
he he was sent originally to Okinawa to

647
00:45:54.880 --> 00:46:00.960
uh set up a name, uh
maybe repair facility on you because he was

648
00:46:00.000 --> 00:46:05.840
an engineering duty office, right and
uh and he took a look at that,

649
00:46:05.880 --> 00:46:07.719
and the think got wiped out by
a typhoon. But he took a

650
00:46:07.719 --> 00:46:10.039
look at it and said, I
really don't think we need to have this

651
00:46:10.320 --> 00:46:15.639
stuff on shore. We ought to
have a floating system to take care of

652
00:46:15.639 --> 00:46:20.719
the ships as they get damage and
all that. And even before the show

653
00:46:20.760 --> 00:46:23.239
started we talked a little bit about
about the bullets beans and black oil and

654
00:46:23.639 --> 00:46:28.599
Henry eccles. But you know that
in those days of the large, very

655
00:46:28.679 --> 00:46:34.840
large drydox that could hold up to
battleships and all that, Uh, you

656
00:46:34.880 --> 00:46:37.599
know, should should Is this another
concern which you had was let's not get

657
00:46:37.639 --> 00:46:43.480
dependent on shore basis and all these
let's let's have mobile platforms for for repair

658
00:46:43.519 --> 00:46:46.760
and all that. Yeah, I
would. I would love to see more

659
00:46:46.800 --> 00:46:51.719
tenders and in floating DRYDOCKX. And
whatn't I mean? I mean you mentioned

660
00:46:51.880 --> 00:46:54.519
you mentioned Eckyl's Uh. You mean
you mentioned Eckyl's uh. And by the

661
00:46:54.519 --> 00:46:58.880
way, if anybody wants to know
about logistics of it, he wrote a

662
00:46:58.880 --> 00:47:02.159
book called The Just in the National
Defense, which is an absolute must read

663
00:47:02.199 --> 00:47:07.440
if you're interested in this field.
But yeah, I mean recently, the

664
00:47:08.239 --> 00:47:10.480
well, it was probably during COVID, that was a couple of years ago

665
00:47:10.480 --> 00:47:15.519
that the Naval Institute reissued a book
from the nineteen eighties called the I think

666
00:47:15.559 --> 00:47:20.599
it was called the Pacific War We
Considered or remember I can't exactly remember the

667
00:47:20.639 --> 00:47:22.119
title, but it was it was
really great. It was it was.

668
00:47:22.239 --> 00:47:27.000
It was a collection of essays from
from protagonists who had taken part in the

669
00:47:27.039 --> 00:47:30.119
Pacific War maybe, and they were
all really great. I mean, there

670
00:47:30.159 --> 00:47:34.000
was an article Jimmy Jimmy Thatch talking
about how he invented the Thatch weave and

671
00:47:34.119 --> 00:47:37.920
sort of fighter tactics to compensate with
the Japanese zero and so forth. But

672
00:47:37.039 --> 00:47:40.039
you know what, the vast majority
of the vast majority of the articles in

673
00:47:40.079 --> 00:47:45.239
there were about not necessarily logistics,
but unsexy stuff. It was about the

674
00:47:45.440 --> 00:47:49.800
beach preparations, if you're as if
you're a if you're a c be and

675
00:47:49.840 --> 00:47:52.719
maybe it was it was about all
those things that you do to enable the

676
00:47:52.760 --> 00:47:54.840
battle fleet and and the and the
and the Marines and the army to go

677
00:47:54.880 --> 00:47:59.719
and do to go and do their
thing. And that really that really,

678
00:48:00.079 --> 00:48:04.440
that really stuck with me just because
it's I guess I hadn't put any serious

679
00:48:04.440 --> 00:48:07.199
thought into it, but you know, the end glamorous stuff is really the

680
00:48:07.599 --> 00:48:10.199
absolute necessary stuff. In fact,
I've been, in fact, as I

681
00:48:10.239 --> 00:48:13.400
was getting ready for the show to
that, I've been looking back to some

682
00:48:13.480 --> 00:48:16.280
of my some of my some of
my favorite reads on logistics. One of

683
00:48:16.280 --> 00:48:21.559
my favorites that comes from Martin van
Craifeld, who is a he's still alive.

684
00:48:21.639 --> 00:48:22.760
He must be very old at this
point. He's in this Rael Israeli

685
00:48:23.079 --> 00:48:28.400
military historian. But it's called the
Supplying War and what he does, it's

686
00:48:28.400 --> 00:48:30.280
and it's all about armies. So
it's so in that sense it so it's

687
00:48:30.400 --> 00:48:34.119
very much a ground warfare thing and
not a naval thing. But but he

688
00:48:34.159 --> 00:48:36.920
goes back and he looks he goes
way all the way back to the Thirty

689
00:48:36.960 --> 00:48:39.239
Years War and comes up through World
War Two and looks at the key determinants

690
00:48:39.320 --> 00:48:45.119
of logistics, and he talks about
change the changing character of war from for

691
00:48:45.119 --> 00:48:49.480
a, for example, back in
the in the Napoleonic era, armies basically

692
00:48:49.519 --> 00:48:52.639
pray that they basically plundered their way
across the countryside rather than relying on extra

693
00:48:53.079 --> 00:48:59.320
on external supply. He moves into
the mechanized age, especially especially after especially

694
00:48:59.320 --> 00:49:02.840
after eighteen seventy one and into the
World one one era, when when the

695
00:49:04.079 --> 00:49:07.920
warfare becomes mechanized, and at that
point ammunition becomes huge, whereas in the

696
00:49:07.960 --> 00:49:10.719
previous in the previous era, and
it all then about food stuffs and then

697
00:49:10.920 --> 00:49:15.039
what the army needed to live on
as it's as it roamed across the country.

698
00:49:15.320 --> 00:49:17.320
Just just just just a wonderful book. It was it was reissued,

699
00:49:19.320 --> 00:49:22.159
I goesha, Actually, I think
this edition is now twenty years old,

700
00:49:22.159 --> 00:49:24.639
but it's a but it's still it
still reads very fresh, and I think

701
00:49:24.639 --> 00:49:28.320
that I think there's a lot of
goodness in there for people who are interested

702
00:49:28.360 --> 00:49:30.840
in the logistic. I mean,
he talks about the quantity, the quantity

703
00:49:30.960 --> 00:49:36.519
of of of different supplies that's demanded, whether it's precision guided to musicians or

704
00:49:36.559 --> 00:49:39.840
all the things that we need today. And also and also just the complexity,

705
00:49:40.599 --> 00:49:45.199
and so he spends a lot of
time talking about mobility of forces simply

706
00:49:45.199 --> 00:49:47.800
because of the friction that involved in
the in the logistical system. I mean

707
00:49:47.800 --> 00:49:51.719
that that imposes a limit on what
a force can do, where it can

708
00:49:51.760 --> 00:49:52.840
go, how far I can go, what it can do when it gets

709
00:49:52.840 --> 00:49:57.599
there. So wonderful, a wonderful
book and one that I would commend to

710
00:49:57.639 --> 00:50:06.440
everybody. Gonna pull together a few
different thread threads here the mentioned Claude Brave

711
00:50:06.719 --> 00:50:09.840
and I also mentioned earlier about well
I didn't mention, I just put it

712
00:50:09.920 --> 00:50:14.800
up on Twitter. Salmore Cogliano tapping
on the shoulder. He has a nice

713
00:50:14.840 --> 00:50:17.440
little thread that I think is a
good companion to our show. He didn't

714
00:50:17.440 --> 00:50:21.440
know we were doing this topic,
but it does flow together pretty well there.

715
00:50:22.159 --> 00:50:27.360
And Mark mentioned earlier about thinking outside
the box. You know, what

716
00:50:27.480 --> 00:50:34.400
do we do should we find ourselves
inside? Everybody but Admiral Davidson's favorite phrase,

717
00:50:34.400 --> 00:50:37.079
the Davidson window, where we've got
to do what a nation has to

718
00:50:37.079 --> 00:50:43.199
do, and you know, we
can look back to the First World War

719
00:50:43.880 --> 00:50:50.280
and the OP NOV. Back in
January of twenty eighteen, they formed what

720
00:50:50.400 --> 00:50:59.000
was called the Naval Overseas Transportation Service, and one of their jobs was to

721
00:50:59.039 --> 00:51:02.440
look at how we can and seize
German ships to make up for the US

722
00:51:02.480 --> 00:51:08.440
merchant marine shortfall. And the People's
Republic of China does have a huge fleet,

723
00:51:09.000 --> 00:51:14.760
and our friend Claude has a good
fiction writer's mind. I'd like to

724
00:51:14.760 --> 00:51:20.000
get him and a few overcaffeinated and
underemployed helo pilots and service warfare officers and

725
00:51:20.039 --> 00:51:23.039
go, okay, guys, put
on your ipatch and grab your parrot.

726
00:51:23.320 --> 00:51:28.719
How are you going to go out
there and seize for me one hundred Chinese

727
00:51:28.760 --> 00:51:34.239
flag merchant ships. Go. That's
an interesting concept that we've actually looked for

728
00:51:34.400 --> 00:51:38.320
before in quasi recent naval history.
I don't know if the lawyers up at

729
00:51:38.320 --> 00:51:44.400
the War College have looked at that
option at some point. Yeah, I

730
00:51:44.920 --> 00:51:46.800
actually don't know. I actually don't
know either. I certainly hope that all

731
00:51:46.840 --> 00:51:51.679
these questions are being asked. Actually
hope Claud's actually listening. I actually have

732
00:51:51.719 --> 00:51:53.079
a story to tell him that he's
going to make it. Very jealous.

733
00:51:53.159 --> 00:51:58.199
I've always I've always wanted a copy
of the nineteen forty three version of Edward

734
00:51:58.280 --> 00:52:02.039
vide Earl's book Makers of Modern Strategy, and I finally got one. It

735
00:52:02.079 --> 00:52:06.280
was very expensive, but you know
what, but I look on Amazon and

736
00:52:06.320 --> 00:52:09.239
it said it belonged to Admiral Rickover, and I thought that was the coolest

737
00:52:09.239 --> 00:52:13.119
thing in the world. Apparently is
the second wife died last year and somehow

738
00:52:13.199 --> 00:52:15.599
Amazon got got hold of his book
collection. So at that point I pulled,

739
00:52:15.760 --> 00:52:19.559
I pulled the pulled the trigger on
that stuff, on that on that

740
00:52:19.719 --> 00:52:22.280
very cool book. I don't have
many first editions in the house, but

741
00:52:22.280 --> 00:52:27.119
but I thought that was really a
great a great edition from one of the

742
00:52:27.159 --> 00:52:30.159
greats. I mean, as far
as when you, I think the bigger

743
00:52:30.159 --> 00:52:34.639
point you're actually talking about in in
fact you mentioned fiction. I think that's

744
00:52:34.679 --> 00:52:37.159
uh. I mean, fiction is
a way of imagining things. Yeah,

745
00:52:37.320 --> 00:52:40.159
I would like to I would love
to ask claud Claude about this. Get

746
00:52:40.199 --> 00:52:44.559
him in the room with Peter Singer
and with August Cole and so forth.

747
00:52:44.840 --> 00:52:46.079
I mean, start thinking. And
Apple's for redis, by the way,

748
00:52:46.079 --> 00:52:49.920
who's become a fiction writer in his
own right, in his own right?

749
00:52:50.000 --> 00:52:53.800
They they h August and August and
Peter call it fac fiction intelligence, and

750
00:52:53.840 --> 00:52:58.159
it's basically the use of its basically
the use of imagination, sort of the

751
00:52:58.239 --> 00:53:01.000
use of fiction to imagine alternative futures
and figure out how we might prepare for

752
00:53:01.039 --> 00:53:04.639
them. And that's really that's really
what the I mean, that's really what

753
00:53:04.719 --> 00:53:07.679
it's all about. Trying to figure
out what the nature of the coming conflict

754
00:53:07.800 --> 00:53:10.519
is, what your adversary is likely
to do, how how you might adapt

755
00:53:10.519 --> 00:53:15.639
to that, and and and basically
defeat that. And I think it's a

756
00:53:15.760 --> 00:53:19.760
very I think it's a very powerful
way of of of thinking about the future.

757
00:53:20.079 --> 00:53:22.639
I find that I find that you
know, I didn't. I sort

758
00:53:22.639 --> 00:53:24.039
of wandered into this over the last
few years. I read more and more

759
00:53:24.039 --> 00:53:28.800
fiction and less and less sort of
a drive you know, political science and

760
00:53:28.800 --> 00:53:30.840
and history and so forth, just
because I get more benefit out of it.

761
00:53:30.880 --> 00:53:32.960
And I also get to get a
lot of benefit out of it in

762
00:53:32.960 --> 00:53:37.239
the classroom because students really respond to
it. So yeah, trying to whatever

763
00:53:37.280 --> 00:53:39.840
you can do to catalyze your imagination, I think is a good thing.

764
00:53:43.639 --> 00:53:47.880
Yeah. I think that that's when
we were doing the Navy con stuff,

765
00:53:47.960 --> 00:53:54.199
the the science fiction thing that that
Clod actually put together initially, and people

766
00:53:54.199 --> 00:54:00.840
were talking about you know, uh
Honor Harrington series and and Star Wars start

767
00:54:00.920 --> 00:54:07.599
Star Trek and all that stuff.
Yeah, I mean, I whatever whatever

768
00:54:07.639 --> 00:54:10.440
else. You know, if you've
got great ideas because people are thinking about

769
00:54:10.440 --> 00:54:14.880
the future, well I don't understand
why we're not. We're not paying more

770
00:54:14.920 --> 00:54:16.679
attention to it. And I know
for a while we had groups of people

771
00:54:16.679 --> 00:54:20.800
who were looking at that and trying
to go, well, this is totally

772
00:54:21.079 --> 00:54:24.119
unfeasible. Uh, you know this, this might work, but we're never

773
00:54:24.159 --> 00:54:28.840
gonna get funded kind of stuff.
But you know, yeah, we've that

774
00:54:29.360 --> 00:54:32.159
is thinking in a different in a
different frame of reverence than well, you

775
00:54:32.199 --> 00:54:37.159
know, historically we did this and
we'll just keep plodding along that path.

776
00:54:37.320 --> 00:54:40.159
Yeah, I mean, and I
love science fiction, by the way,

777
00:54:40.159 --> 00:54:44.079
I've had the last few years i've
been I discovered I was kind of a

778
00:54:44.119 --> 00:54:46.000
late comer to Audible, but I
discovered it maybe five years ago. And

779
00:54:46.039 --> 00:54:50.800
I started off by listening to classic
science fiction that I hadn't listened to or

780
00:54:51.000 --> 00:54:52.360
I hadn't read since I was a
kid. I mean, I read,

781
00:54:52.400 --> 00:54:57.159
but when I read, when I
listened to the Foundation series. I was

782
00:54:57.199 --> 00:54:59.480
like, man, you know,
this is actually this is actually a series

783
00:54:59.480 --> 00:55:01.679
about green strategy. It's about history, it's about that, it's about really

784
00:55:01.719 --> 00:55:04.880
big themes, and it's it.
It just sort of struck me. And

785
00:55:05.119 --> 00:55:07.920
I didn't know anything when I was
a kid in high school, so it

786
00:55:07.000 --> 00:55:10.360
just struck me in an entirely new
way. But I would actually, I

787
00:55:10.400 --> 00:55:14.760
mean, I would actually, I
mean it's just sort of it's not necessarily

788
00:55:14.840 --> 00:55:17.639
even science fiction, but I would
say just fiction, just fiction in general,

789
00:55:19.000 --> 00:55:22.079
or even poetry. Sometimes you can
you can glean a lot of insight.

790
00:55:22.480 --> 00:55:24.360
I'm a I'm a huge Joseph Conrad
fan, So you're gonna, you're

791
00:55:24.360 --> 00:55:28.280
gonna, you can I'm gonna that's
sort of my go to person to look

792
00:55:28.320 --> 00:55:31.800
at on big themes about you know, about human nature and society and so

793
00:55:31.840 --> 00:55:36.559
forth. It's a it doesn't have
anything to do to do with my name,

794
00:55:36.559 --> 00:55:38.039
but Lord Jim is sort of my
sort of my favorite novel. But

795
00:55:38.400 --> 00:55:42.239
I get insights out of that at
all times. So I would urge people

796
00:55:42.320 --> 00:55:45.440
to just basically decide what they're I
mean, decide what your intellectual capital is.

797
00:55:45.639 --> 00:55:47.239
I mean, if it comes out, if it comes out of your

798
00:55:47.280 --> 00:55:52.239
favorite your favorite fiction book if you
want to know about Russia, and I

799
00:55:52.239 --> 00:55:54.559
mean read Dostoyevsky or a Pushkin or
what I mean. It's just so you

800
00:55:54.639 --> 00:55:59.719
just have to have to tailor tailor
your own intellectual capital to help you to

801
00:55:59.760 --> 00:56:02.639
help you see what may come and
what we might do about it. Yeah,

802
00:56:02.679 --> 00:56:07.079
I think we've got to be careful. Evidently, Salimor Cogliano's listening to

803
00:56:07.119 --> 00:56:10.480
the show and he just sent me
a note. And I'll know about you,

804
00:56:10.559 --> 00:56:15.360
but this is I have not used
this term before. If you're looking

805
00:56:15.440 --> 00:56:21.639
at something to wake up your students
up there at the War College. He

806
00:56:21.719 --> 00:56:27.480
mentioned to me the right of angry
if I'm pronouncing it incorrectly, which I

807
00:56:27.480 --> 00:56:32.360
probably am. A n gary and
I'll read the definition for you from the

808
00:56:32.360 --> 00:56:39.119
Oxford Public International Law. You'll appreciate
that mark angry is a white belligerate states

809
00:56:39.400 --> 00:56:45.800
enjoy in times of war or international
arm conflict, to use or destroy in

810
00:56:45.840 --> 00:56:52.639
case of necessity and subject to indemnification, neutral property present and there are in

811
00:56:52.760 --> 00:56:57.920
occupied territory, such as merchant vessels
and civil aircraft, their cars or other

812
00:56:58.039 --> 00:57:02.519
objects. And we use that during
the First World War to seize neutral Dutch

813
00:57:02.800 --> 00:57:07.480
merchant ships that happened to be in
our port. So my question would be,

814
00:57:07.679 --> 00:57:14.079
I think I know the answer if
things click off, do we have

815
00:57:14.119 --> 00:57:17.599
anything for the coastguard to stop neutral
shipping from leaving our ports that happened to

816
00:57:17.880 --> 00:57:22.719
find themselves there. Because I don't
know about you, I'd rather apologize after

817
00:57:22.840 --> 00:57:28.000
war than to be at a D
plus one and be about one hundred and

818
00:57:28.039 --> 00:57:30.280
fifty merchant ships short. That's an
interesting idea. I need to think more

819
00:57:30.280 --> 00:57:37.000
about the right of hungry a n
G A R Y. That's an interesting

820
00:57:37.039 --> 00:57:38.519
one. I'm not sure I'm familiar
with that one either. I mean,

821
00:57:38.519 --> 00:57:43.639
I guess if I wanted to get
some traction on that, I would probably

822
00:57:43.639 --> 00:57:46.360
have sort of our standards, sort
of our standard Texas and the international relations

823
00:57:46.360 --> 00:57:52.239
and political science fields on the laws
of war is Michael Waltzer's book book Justin

824
00:57:52.280 --> 00:57:54.920
and Unjust Wars, which talks about
you know, just an unjust resorts the

825
00:57:54.920 --> 00:57:59.599
war and how you actually conduct yourself
in war and so forth. But yeah,

826
00:57:59.639 --> 00:58:01.800
that's the that's kind of an inter
It's been so long since I've said

827
00:58:01.840 --> 00:58:06.000
the maritime international law that I think
I think I might have to take a

828
00:58:06.000 --> 00:58:08.320
pass on that one and see what
I mean, it makes sense. I

829
00:58:08.320 --> 00:58:13.599
mean, there's there's what I mean, there's rules of expediency in wartime that

830
00:58:13.679 --> 00:58:16.480
don't exist in peace time. But
but yeah, well, and actually,

831
00:58:16.480 --> 00:58:20.400
in the sense our Chinese, our
Chinese friends are trying to repeal the laws

832
00:58:20.400 --> 00:58:23.079
of the the law to see and
water is close to them. So in

833
00:58:23.119 --> 00:58:27.199
the sense it might almost be paidback
if you if you had such a precedent.

834
00:58:29.119 --> 00:58:32.159
Yeah, it's it's fun to contemplate
that. James. We've We've kept

835
00:58:32.239 --> 00:58:37.920
you for an hour. It's been
most amusing and interesting and scary. Uh

836
00:58:37.239 --> 00:58:40.320
what are you working on now?
When can we get you back to talk

837
00:58:40.360 --> 00:58:45.440
about it? Uh? You you
can welcome back anytime. But the what

838
00:58:45.519 --> 00:58:49.480
I'm working on right now is,
and I'm not, for various reasons,

839
00:58:49.480 --> 00:58:52.599
personal reasons, I'm not making very
fast progress on it. But the Naval

840
00:58:52.599 --> 00:58:57.239
Institute earlier this year asked me to
ask me to do a what they are

841
00:58:57.239 --> 00:59:00.840
what they're calling it basically a primer
on China as a as a as a

842
00:59:00.880 --> 00:59:04.239
contender. Basically what you would like
to everybody in in the navy uniform to

843
00:59:04.280 --> 00:59:07.800
do about China as an antagonist and
how we might go how we might go

844
00:59:07.880 --> 00:59:13.000
about how we might go about handling
that challenge. So it's a it's it's,

845
00:59:13.000 --> 00:59:15.079
it's, it's it's basically just sort
of a back to basics. Look

846
00:59:15.119 --> 00:59:20.000
at China, looking at look at
looking out of a Mahania of a Mahanian

847
00:59:20.039 --> 00:59:24.000
metrics that does trying to possess all
the possess all the the the metrics that

848
00:59:24.079 --> 00:59:27.760
led it to go see go to
sea and make itself a great seapower.

849
00:59:27.880 --> 00:59:30.079
And I think the answer, I
think the answer is yes, But I

850
00:59:30.119 --> 00:59:32.159
guess we'll see how it comes out, uh, sometime next summer when I

851
00:59:32.199 --> 00:59:37.119
actually finish it. Well, hey, don't don't feel like you need to

852
00:59:37.199 --> 00:59:40.679
jump into it now if you're heading
into the holiday season. And it's just

853
00:59:40.679 --> 00:59:45.000
been a pleasure having you on for
the last hour. And yeah, I

854
00:59:45.079 --> 00:59:47.920
think I'm coming out a little more
scared than I did coming in. That's

855
00:59:47.960 --> 00:59:52.760
that's good for me. Uh,
that eats me juiced. And I look

856
00:59:52.800 --> 00:59:54.239
forward to the next chance to talk
to you, James, and I hope

857
00:59:54.239 --> 00:59:59.440
you and yours have a great holiday
season. And yeah, you as well.

858
00:59:59.559 --> 01:00:05.119
And thanks for everybody for listening in, and thank you everybody for joining

859
01:00:05.159 --> 01:00:07.159
us. For another edition in midrat
and unil next time. We hope you

860
01:00:07.159 --> 01:00:24.360
have a great navy day. Cheers. Want to marry me and leave a

861
01:00:24.599 --> 01:00:35.239
friend of Becdilli for you being to
blame for love love me, said Faulding

862
01:00:35.559 --> 01:00:46.320
you the tame. It's a long
way. It's a long way. It's

863
01:00:46.400 --> 01:01:07.199
a long way. Be Condi well
list. It's a long long way.

864
01:01:07.559 --> 01:01:17.159
But Floridians, do you know how
close you are to freshness? It's not

865
01:01:17.280 --> 01:01:22.400
a plane or a ship right away. It's not across the ocean or over

866
01:01:22.440 --> 01:01:25.800
the equator. It's not even a
far drive. The peak of freshness is

867
01:01:25.840 --> 01:01:30.920
at your grocery store, and it's
called Fresh from Florida. Fresh from Florida

868
01:01:30.119 --> 01:01:35.360
is local produce grown by farmers right
here in our own state, meaning it's

869
01:01:35.440 --> 01:01:39.360
always fresh, always in season,
and always mouth wateringly good. Look for

870
01:01:39.400 --> 01:01:43.559
the sunny Fresh from Florida logo or
ask for it by name where you shop.

871
01:01:44.000 --> 01:01:47.280
There's no way to prepare for the
impact and accident makes on your life.

872
01:01:47.599 --> 01:01:52.800
That's why we've spent forty years getting
ready for that moment when you need

873
01:01:52.880 --> 01:01:59.119
compassion and immediate action. The right
doctors, investigators, our team of experienced

874
01:01:59.119 --> 01:02:04.480
attorneys and your free consultation is already
in place. So if you've been hurt,

875
01:02:04.679 --> 01:02:07.559
remember the Farra safety net is right
here to catch you. All you

876
01:02:07.639 --> 01:02:13.679
have to do is call Phara and
Farah. It's what we built. Jacksonville

