WEBVTT

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Hey guys, it's Jack. I
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at patreon dot com slash the Teamhouse. Hello everyone, Welcome to another episode

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of Eyes on, a reasonably well
informed discussion of geo political events and about

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the time it takes you to pet, drive to work, or whatever else

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it takes you to do. In
thirty minutes or so. I'm Andy Milburn

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for MA Marine Infantry and Special Operations
officer now toiling for the team House d

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Over to you. Thanks. Andy. Yeah, really excited about this one.

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It's kind of a continuation from our
last episodes, which I'd love for

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everyone to check out if they haven't
about our hits on, you know,

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the IRGC and their proxies in Syria
and Iraq, and we're gonna touch on

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like the continued strikes on the Houthis
and Yemen, and I think talk a

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little bit more about a broader sense
of like, you know, deterrence.

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And because I've had this, I've
been reading it like almost every day.

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There are some folks on Twitter and
Instagram who talk about deterrence and I don't

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even know exactly what it means in
terms of like deterring what's going on,

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because it doesn't seem, you know, we got the strongest military in the

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world by a lot, and it
doesn't seem we don't seem to be deterring

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much. No, that's a that's
a great point and a great question.

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Without making it a war college class, I've dive into and I'll give you

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a you know, kind of a
five minute answer on that and hopefully make

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it entertaining. But backtrack. Yes, So the Department of Defense just released

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the BDA, that's battle damage Assessment
on Twitter for the attacks in let me

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see, it was in Iraq.
Actually it was all together attacks Iraq,

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Syria and in Yemen. Okay,
so they report eighty This must be just

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Iraq and Syrious. Sorry about this
because they're talking about eighty five targets.

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Eighty of eighty five targets have suffered
serious damage or were totally destroyed. Casualties

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of militia members expected to be around
fifty to sixty. Okay, We've got

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to ask ourselves, right, how
come those fifty to sixty dudes did not

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get the word after a week of
publicly telegraphing that we were coming. Less

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surprising, no members of the IRGC
or Iranian nationals were killed. Okay,

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that was official DD release. Certainly
not in the strikes. Interestingly enough,

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though not not widely reported, but
one of a senior Iran backed figure within

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the MILITIASNR G L Kabi, was
assassinated by unknown gunmen in Mason, Iraq.

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Okay, coincidence, I don't know, totally don't I'm not right,

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But it's kind of interesting that,
Yeah, we didn't kill any guys in

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the strikes, but this one dude
did disappear, you know. But that's

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kind of a distraction, I think, and he can I cut in.

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What does I r g L mean? Sorry this for me because I'm a

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dumb No, I I r g
C. Right, he was an actual

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I r GC guy. Okay,
no, no, no, he was

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uh actually no, good good point, he was not he was he was

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a rocky, he was the but
he was a senior PMC member. Noticed

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in the strikes, no senior PMC
members were killed. Yeah, you know,

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so I think it was mostly kind
of remember when we we bombed the

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Chinese embassy in Belgrade and killed if
you know, I mean killed essentially the

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teening stuff. Yeah, I'm not
saying that that's what happened here, but

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certainly, you know, you wonder
about these guys. Maybe they would provided

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you know, maybe that was their
resume line. B d A, that's

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that's what that's your wrong anyway,
Yeah, I digress. My point is

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it's a distraction because we didn't kill
any senior members of the Islamic Revolution srik

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on core all right, I'm not
saying, you know, I'm not you

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know me. I mean, I'm
not saying never, never, extolling killing

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for the sake of killing. But
but it's hard to know how we can

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detract from capability without removing the guys
who are stly involved in the transfer of

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knowledge, you know, technical know
how. So yeah, and yeah,

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when you look at the list of
stuff destroyed, there's that dramatic, dramatic

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footage of the stuff cooking off in
ourchime, you know. I mean that

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whole area though, as is Yemen
is just one giant ordinance dump, and

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it's quite easy to have left some
order AMMO in a warehouse to give some

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some dramatic effect. So anyway,
yeah, I mean I don't and I'm

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getting somewhere on this day. I'm
not just diminishing the strikes by any means

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I am, but I'm saying that's
my job. I'll do it. Yeah,

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maybe that's a wider picture, but
you know, there's it's a tremendously

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difficult task. I mean, we're
trying to reduce capability in an area where

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there is just a massive amount of
ordinate so they're only reliant on the Iranians

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for certain key components, all right, for the missiles to come through,

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and it's very and these are relatively
small components and quite easy to smuggle.

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So it's not the yes, we
are destroying things, you know, and

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it looks great on video, But
as far as removing capability or even disabling

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the Iranians ability or rather these properci's
ability to act for even for a period

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of time, it's not. You
know, I don't think I don't think

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we're achieving it. Okay, So
anyway, to your so it doesn't look

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like we're achieving deterrence, I'm going
to come back to that specific question.

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But an answer to yours, I
can't remember the War College definition, and

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I have an abhorrence of people who
do read things out from doctrine. But

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it's but deterrence is very simply,
you know, it's a practice of discouraging

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or restraining someone in world politics that's
usually a nation state from taking unwanted actions,

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okay, And it involves an effort
to stop or prevent an action,

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as opposed to making someone or trying
to make a state do something, which

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is compellants, all right, which
is something different. Okay, this is

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more than this is slightly more than
semantics. Okay, and because they there's

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really when we talk about deterrence,
you may say, in fact, they

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should have primed you to say this, Hey, Andy, how are we

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deterring after the fact? Okay?
And a lot of people get confused by

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this. You know, something happens, we're really responding, and you'll see

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the military comes up with terms like
flexible deterrent option and flexible deterrent response,

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but they essentially they come down to
the same thing as far as objective.

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Because if you are responding and the
way that we are, our intent is

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to threaten escalation. Right, We're
not simply punishing. The implication is,

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hey, we will do this and
worse if you continue. All right,

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So response to terrence all wrapped into
one. It's meaningless to distinguish between the

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two. And these packages that the
military puts together involve various options for the

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president to decide between. You know, it's just like a sushi menu.

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All right. What's interesting now,
like deterrence by punishment, the other de

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terrence, but denial, that's when
you put a force, you know,

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you prevent you you make the enemy's
objective less attainable, all right, and

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it might be you know, sticking
US troops in Poland or all the Baltic

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states, you know, and so
they would be in the path of a

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Russian invading force, which makes it
less likely that the Russians are going to

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want to invade. Blah blah blah. The terrance by punishment historically is less

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effective. And then when I say
historically the last three decades, okay,

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but we United States use the term
to terrence all the time, and it

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is deeply embedded in our national security
strategy. You know, in Europe,

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it's the basis of our containment of
Russian adventurism, as well as actions in

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the Gray Zone. You know.
Of course, in Korea it's you know,

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it's policy to de tear North Korea, not just from invading, but

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just further provocations. And then throughout
Asia, of course we're trying to deter

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Chinese belligerents and Gray zone encroachment on
areas subject to territorial disputes. So,

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you know, de terrence is it
when when it comes to US, I

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would argue, I'll tell you what, you know, when the terrence fails,

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it's because one of the key components
is missing. This is not from

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doctrine. But you know, one
of the one of the things that I

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think we United States miss, and
it's perhaps the most important aspect of deterrence,

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is this critical fact, and it
is the perception of the potential aggressor.

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In other words, it is how
that guy views the world that matters,

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not not the actual prospects of success
I'm sorry, not yeah, not

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actual prospects of victory, of his
success or any other objective measurement. So

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we've got to be careful not mirror
imaging. Wow, this would really hurt

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us. Imagine, it's really hurting
the Iranian regime, you know. And

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and we've seen the terreance go awhyd
with Putin too, because we tend to

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mirror image and we haven't tried to
really understand our adversary. So, you

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know, any any strategy to prevent
aggression, you've got to understand your enemy.

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You know, his interest, motives, his imperatives. Because because when

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when an aggressor acts, it's not
it's usually not war opportunism. He's answering

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some other need. It may be
domestic, but it's an immediate need.

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We need to understand that need and
maybe find in some other way of delivering

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it to him, you know.
And the last part so so yes,

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you've got to you know, you've
you've got to step back from your ego,

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and you've got to look at things
from from the enemy's perspective, and

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you've got to take a combined arms
approach. Okay, or you know,

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a lot of our military guys will
it will understand what I mean about by

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this. What I mean is that
when you engage the enemy with a weapon,

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you don't want to just engage them
with one weapon. You want to

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engagement with a weapon that forces him
to do something that makes him vulnerable to

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another weapon. Classic cases, you
know, direct fire weapons and indirect fire

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weapons. Okay, same thing applies
to economic sanctions, all right. By

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imposing one sanction making them hurt there, you drive them in another area where

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you can hurt him even more,
which means that you can't compartmentalize dime or

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PERMISSI. All right. Dime is
diplomatic, information, military, economic.

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You know, it's a way that
we separate all the elements of national power.

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I'm saying when we approach the terrence, we've got to act as who

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all of this has to be fully
integrated and that is actually why you hear

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the term integrated de terrence as a
buzzword. I would argue, yes,

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we're very good at using that term. We're less effective than actually doing it.

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You know, I'll give you that's
a fair assessment. Yeah, okay,

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So the other thing we do,
you know what I mean? And

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I guess another principle, I'm just
making this stuff up. But you can't

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forget the carrot, all right,
you know, I mean we talk about

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karts stick. You can't just totally
forget about that. Preventing aggression, it's

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not all about making threats. It's
also about offering assurances. All right.

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Can you believe that's a marine saying
that? But it is. You know,

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you've got to leave him an open
door. You've got to leave him

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a face saving exit that's going to
make him look good to his domestic audience.

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And if you can get it enable
him to achieve his objectives otherwise,

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but in a way that doesn't hurt
your interest, then by all means,

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go ahead and do so. This
is what I mean about not standing on

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ego. But it again, it
involves very intensive strategic communication. That's another

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aspect where we often fall short.
With the terrence. Okay, it's everything

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is about Owaii. Ask me WHATAI
stands for? Already know? Do you

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already know from the team house?
What does it mean? Operations in the

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information environment. I'm very careful about
acronyms, so I now never try and

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spell out acronyms more than three letters
after my dreadful debacle with AOB But yeah,

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so operations in the information environment,
Okay, We've got to think about

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kinetic actions relationship to information as supporting
and supported, Okay, which means you

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know, typically we say, yeah, information operations support kinetic actions. But

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no, I mean we have to
think of military actions supporting operations in the

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information environment. Right, So you
know, moving a US brigade to Estonia,

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A brigade is not going to do
anything against Russian advance, but it's

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a it's a significant you know,
military although military terily negligible, Uh,

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it is a significant strategic right because
like, why would the Russians wipe out

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a brigade? Yeah and start a
Yeah, it's a it's a trip line.

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I mean, it's early morning,
whatever you want to call it.

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But the point is it's it's an
escalatory. You're pushing you're you're pushing uh,

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Russia can't can't threaten the Baltic States, for instance, without under war

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with the United States. Yes,
everyone may know that conceptually, but but

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by putting your blood on the line, you are really you know, you're

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literally putting skin in the game and
demonstrating that. Okay, which no,

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yeah, no worries in terms of
like what's going on now if Iraq Iran

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in their proxies and cuts force,
basically running amok in the region, and

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I would argue, asserting, uh
a lot of dominance. What do we

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docifically there to deter them from,
like, are trying to get them to

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reel their proxies in? Ah?
Yeah, So persuade who do you because

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we get into the crux of the
problem here. I mean, I guess

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it's Iran persuade wrong, Okay,
what do I know? People don't want

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to talk about like you know,
people are like you know, even when

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you when you hear everyone speaking,
okay, it's always Iran back to It's

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like a buzzword that people Well,
let me say, let me wrap up,

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let me wrap up very quickly,
your excellent question about the terrence.

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Okay, So because it leads into
an answer to your next question. So,

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so, successful deterrence typically involves combination
of taking, uh, you know,

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these combined arms actions, taking the
aggressive motivations, seriously understanding them,

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being clear clear about your intent what
you want to you know, the the

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aggressive to do. So all of
those things, and it's you know,

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think about the times it has worked. We've done all those things, and

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it's really you know, worked most
famously in the longest period of time in

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Korea since nineteen fifty three and during
the Cold War. All right, but

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it's not working here. Okay,
why isn't working here? One one answer?

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Maybe And this is not me,
you know, this is a US

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intelligence officials. I thought I'd never
use that term, but so so,

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you know, it's semi official.
They assessed that Iran does not exercise full

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control over the proxy and part of
militia groups that are attacking US personnel,

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so that by that it you know, neither the huthis nor all the constellation

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of Iranian backed militia groups in Iraq
are taking their orders directly from the head

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of Kotzwass. And there's probably a
combination of factors. Okay, the kind

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of the cult of personality of Sulimani
was able to exert these leaders is gone

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Ghan. He's a different type of
individual. And you know, the kids

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have grown up, they're ready to
leave home. They have been armed to

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a level of sophistication that was,
you know, it just couldn't be imagined

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five years ago. And I mean, look at the hoothis. The hoothis

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for God's sake. I mean,
are disabling oil refineries and bringing and you

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know, taking action that have global
reverberations far beyond the the Babe Mandebb and

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Iran cannot control it anymore. That's
that's pretty scary, right, you know.

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And and and so the attacks continue, I mean twice into Syria at

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Basis mission, you know, Mission
support site Euphrates. Are you the picture

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the picture of our militia attacks on
US base is in the chat. I

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always find it helpful to see a
map, but you'll see there that the

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attacks have been mostly focused on the
Middle Euphrates Valley, certainly in this last

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week to include an attack on on
the Alma oil fields, well on a

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I'm sorry, on a combat outpost
and the oil fields which killed seven members

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of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The
SDF, who are our partners and fighting

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the Islamic Islamic State. No US
casualties in that, So it does appear

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bottom line, as though the Iranians
have lost control of their proxies in there.

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But you know, there's a lot
of bluster going on too. They're

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not going to admit that, and
they're issuing. You know, they issued

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a warning yesterday, right, warning
the States against attacking their two surveillance ships,

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the Bashad and the Savies. So
you know, they what makes it

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worse is they're on the posturing platform
two and I'm not going to admit that

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that. They can't. You know, they can't lose the train, the

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train. The train has left the
station. Yeah, they can't lose face

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at home, right, they still
have to deal with their own internal politics

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and stuff like that. Still about
regime security at the end of the day

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for them, Yeah, one hundred
one hundred percent. And and while everything

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continues. You know, we haven't
we haven't talked about Gaza, and I'm

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not going to you know, get
into that topic today. But but as

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you know, I've I've been quite
I've got a contract to write a book

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about about it. And in fact
we're going to be doing a couple of

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episodes from from there towards the end
of this month, and so you know,

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and and I'll i'll least be able
to address the military campaign in more

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detailed there but elsewhere, you know, in the Middle East. So while

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all this is going on, our
adversaries are certainly certainly exploiting our absence or

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our weaknesses. I can't remember if
I already talked to you about this,

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d but it doesn't matter. We're
talking with the audience now. But the

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chairman, all right of the Popular
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee, the PMC and

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rock position. Remember I spoke about
him on I spoke about him last week.

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Yeah, he's he was involved allegedly
in the US on the attack on

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the US embassy in twenty nineteen.
Well, he met this week with the

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Russian Ambassador to Iraq Krusher chef and
met this week in Bagdad, and they

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talked about exchanging experiences, mutual yeah, and even mutual training. Okay,

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so who knows. Yeah, you
know, I mean how the Russians love

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having these PMC literally PMCs. Now
they've gone now I mean potential right there,

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influence in in Iraq that's I thought
that was fairly, fairly notable.

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And at the same time, the
Chinese visited as Beka Stan this week.

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You know, we've we us have
been courting as bekas Stan well, I

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mean obviously since ninety eleven, but
recently among the Stans, you know,

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as Bekastan has been one that we've
been working with most closely. Chinese we

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can launch out of right well number
of reasons. I mean it's politically,

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yes, it's a I mean,
it's a very it's a really viable position.

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It became increasingly important after we pulled
around Afghanistan. Ah, and you

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know, we provide I've been there
a few times. That ship's beautiful country,

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and we provide soft support training their
self military, which has become a

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little dodgy at times ahead of their
special operations. Guy's a guy we trained

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left to join the Islamic State.
So yeah, these things are always tough

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to manage. And here we are
now the Chinese have signed or signed an

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agreement, a strategic agreement and all
weather comprehensive strategic partnership. So I was

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looking for exactly what it was all
weather. Yeah, So the only other

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country in the region who's part of
this all weather agreement is Pakistan. Okay,

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So I mean it's a separate bilateral
agreement, but it's the only other

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country that China has has called an
all weather ally. So Bekistan all weather

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00:23:55.079 --> 00:24:00.079
ally to China, fair weather friend
in the United States. So is that

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that Pakistan they chose to do that, right, China aligning with Pakistan is

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to like kind of give it to
India a bit. I mean, it's

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a little bit out of like what
we're talking about, but that's my assumption,

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you know, say it again.
So the reason, the reasoning why

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China has done that all weather strategic
partnership with Pakistan is to deter or,

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for lack of a better word,
India's like power in the region. Yeah,

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I mean China and Pakistan have always
had close relationship is not quite the

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term, but it's a it's kind
of a mutually supportive relationship. Yes,

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they've had you know, they've gone
at it. I mean, they've had

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a arguments over the various things over
the years. But you know, is

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your way of China and India have
literally come to blows. Yeah, have

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caused you know, I mean,
have killed each other's soldiers several times.

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In the last year, often in
these extraordinary unarmed brawls, which which both

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sides seem to agree doesn't doesn't cross
any red lines. But yeah, I

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mean, certainly Pakistan's within China's closer, within China's sphere of influence, and

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yeah, they both have a lot
of mutual a lot of interests in Afghanistan.

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And those interests, of course are
not necessarily ours. Sure of course.

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Hey like hey, last thing though, the I like this from oddly

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enough from a dude in Tel Aviv
who you know, commented about the fact

300
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that that most that most American,
even US military officials privately saying that the

301
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capabilities of who these have not been
significantly degraded by the campaign. And this

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00:26:00.960 --> 00:26:06.920
this researcher, intel avised military researchers
says, you taking on the hoofis is

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00:26:07.000 --> 00:26:11.799
like fighting fog, you know.
Interesting. I mean the descriptions the same

304
00:26:11.839 --> 00:26:18.960
thing about hamas in Gaza. So
no, no new lessons here. But

305
00:26:19.079 --> 00:26:25.680
what's what what will make progress like
like, is it more of a covert

306
00:26:25.880 --> 00:26:30.799
thing? Is it more I don't
know, drones or you know, I

307
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don't know what strikes. Strikes can
be immensely effective, but they have to

308
00:26:36.039 --> 00:26:38.279
be, you know, if you
want them to have military effect, and

309
00:26:38.319 --> 00:26:42.240
by that I mean take away capability. Obviously you can't telegraph them, okay,

310
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absolutely, and uh and and they
you know, although thank god we

311
00:26:49.480 --> 00:26:56.799
got away from a traditional warfare and
adding up a number of people killed.

312
00:26:56.839 --> 00:27:00.759
But you do, you do have
to take off the board the guys with

313
00:27:00.839 --> 00:27:06.480
the expertise who cannot be replaced,
right, not the fifty or sixty guys

314
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who are too dumb to have forgot
the word that the US were coming.

315
00:27:11.079 --> 00:27:15.839
Right, And it's got to be
combined with other things, to include working

316
00:27:15.880 --> 00:27:19.200
with partners on the ground. You
know, you can't you can't do all

317
00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:23.920
this remotely. You've got to build
relationships on the ground too. And there's

318
00:27:23.960 --> 00:27:26.519
got to be a carrot. Remember
that, you know, I mentioned that

319
00:27:27.039 --> 00:27:30.200
we've got to start thinking how do
we offer the who he's a carrot?

320
00:27:30.880 --> 00:27:36.720
How do we provide them an incentive
because we can't deter them? Yeah,

321
00:27:36.759 --> 00:27:41.799
I mean what's going to deter them. They're not scared of particularly scared of

322
00:27:41.839 --> 00:27:45.799
death. They've been fighting all their
lives. I mean, they're going to

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keep shooting stuff until they stopped having
stuff the shoes, So let me ask

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00:27:49.799 --> 00:27:55.160
you something like in terms for like
the talking heads are like the opinion makers

325
00:27:55.200 --> 00:28:00.480
on Twitter, and no less of
that. That's what we are leader right,

326
00:28:00.480 --> 00:28:04.279
absolutely, but like the thought leaders, I mean it, I don't

327
00:28:04.319 --> 00:28:10.480
think that's going to brief so well, like offering the hohothi's, well that

328
00:28:10.559 --> 00:28:12.680
looks some kind Well that's the thing. Well that's the thing, you know,

329
00:28:12.759 --> 00:28:21.880
But posturing and ego just don't belong
into your politics. And yes,

330
00:28:22.160 --> 00:28:25.200
of course we played to a domestic
audience. But at the same time,

331
00:28:26.200 --> 00:28:33.400
ultimately our criteria for success are that
shipping is allowed to proceed unimpeded, you

332
00:28:33.440 --> 00:28:38.480
know, and that stability is restored. And if the Houthi's get something in

333
00:28:38.519 --> 00:28:44.880
that process that they wanted, yes, people can say oh, we gave

334
00:28:44.920 --> 00:28:48.680
in, or it can just you
know, it's it's just a sensible approach.

335
00:28:49.039 --> 00:28:53.079
Otherwise we're going to be ten,
fifteen, twenty years from now.

336
00:28:53.079 --> 00:28:57.880
Think about the cost in terms of
the US defense budget. You know,

337
00:28:59.079 --> 00:29:03.440
just merchant ships cannot defend themselves against
these missiles. There is no way you

338
00:29:03.519 --> 00:29:11.160
cannot. You cannot design a system
that is going to be economically viable.

339
00:29:11.559 --> 00:29:17.640
The cost of these ships having to
choose now between taking war insurance or going

340
00:29:17.640 --> 00:29:22.960
the long way round. The Cape
is driving global costs up, all right,

341
00:29:22.960 --> 00:29:27.319
And it doesn't matter if your supply
chain isn't directly affected by the Red

342
00:29:27.400 --> 00:29:34.400
Sea. Other supply chains that are
interrelated probably are. It affects every country

343
00:29:34.400 --> 00:29:38.160
in the world tremendous. So,
you know, do we want to salvage

344
00:29:38.599 --> 00:29:44.960
our sense of being America that strong
and just you know, keep keep dropping

345
00:29:45.000 --> 00:29:48.720
bombs until literally we have flattened Yemen. Or do we take a little more

346
00:29:48.759 --> 00:29:53.559
intelligent approach? Yeah, you would
think, you know, taking the intelligence

347
00:29:53.799 --> 00:29:57.279
and you know, I'm listen,
I'm all about killing the enemy, you

348
00:29:57.359 --> 00:30:00.599
know that. And I'm saying you've
got a throwing You've got to put an

349
00:30:00.599 --> 00:30:03.759
incentive in there too, by all
means scare the crap out of it,

350
00:30:03.920 --> 00:30:07.839
but do it by going after his
capabilities, hurting him, not not we'll

351
00:30:07.839 --> 00:30:11.400
be doing right now, which is
kind of pinging. Yeah, absolutely,

352
00:30:11.440 --> 00:30:17.920
thinking well the that's probably I lose
track of time here, but I think

353
00:30:17.920 --> 00:30:22.039
you're keeping us under there. I
have a question. I have one question

354
00:30:22.079 --> 00:30:25.079
about Okay, well, since you've
asked the question in terms of the Red

355
00:30:25.160 --> 00:30:27.400
Sea, we'll be enjoying talking to
me. So that's a good sign.

356
00:30:27.640 --> 00:30:32.279
No, I am yeah, this
is the best. So in terms of

357
00:30:32.319 --> 00:30:33.960
like the issues in the Red Sea
with the Houthis and stuff like that,

358
00:30:34.279 --> 00:30:40.400
does it make sense to bring in
a more broader coalition not just the UK

359
00:30:40.519 --> 00:30:44.759
because if it, I mean,
it seems to affect the europe right away

360
00:30:44.799 --> 00:30:48.119
in the short medium term and then
the rest of the world in the long

361
00:30:48.200 --> 00:30:52.519
term. Yeah, where's France,
where's Italy? Where are the other NATO

362
00:30:52.599 --> 00:30:56.960
countries? Well, where's Egypt too, Like, why is in Egypt doing

363
00:30:57.000 --> 00:31:02.480
anything? Yeah? Well, there
are a number of coalition countries involved in

364
00:31:02.480 --> 00:31:06.119
fact that there's a coalition Task Force. And I can't tell you all the

365
00:31:06.119 --> 00:31:11.000
countries that are involved in it,
but I want to say that it it

366
00:31:11.000 --> 00:31:19.440
it either falls under the direction of
H under nabsent direction or but but at

367
00:31:19.559 --> 00:31:26.359
least is coordinated with Nabsent And what's
n I'm sorry, it's Naval Commands Central

368
00:31:26.440 --> 00:31:30.519
so what naval forces and Middle least. But yes, there is a coalition

369
00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:37.559
task force. It is it has
largely and again you know, I know

370
00:31:37.599 --> 00:31:41.440
I'll be torn up if I'm wrong
on this, but it's largely too date

371
00:31:41.480 --> 00:31:48.680
being focused on the Somali piracy problem. But the but the but there's there's

372
00:31:51.000 --> 00:31:56.119
crossover membership or an interest obviously in
the Red Sea. So yes, coalition

373
00:31:56.200 --> 00:32:01.480
efforts are there are coalition coalition efforts
underway. But you know, escorting ships

374
00:32:01.559 --> 00:32:13.680
is it's it's an incredibly time intensive
and expensive proposition, you know, escorting

375
00:32:13.720 --> 00:32:15.799
ships. It's not like the sycon
Moore wall where you're traveling along and conboy

376
00:32:16.279 --> 00:32:23.039
you're covering them with your at offense
assets, right, which don't come cheap.

377
00:32:23.559 --> 00:32:28.240
Yeah, I mean, look at
you know the so the US canne

378
00:32:28.359 --> 00:32:31.319
is shot down fourteen drones, all
right, right, an SM two missile

379
00:32:32.480 --> 00:32:37.000
Okay, is you know I want
to say two million dollars? I know

380
00:32:37.039 --> 00:32:42.559
it's in the millions, all right, So you know, supposedly say it

381
00:32:42.759 --> 00:32:46.920
just fired fourteen missiles. I mean
we're talking twenty eight million dollars. Yeah,

382
00:32:47.119 --> 00:32:52.400
it's not exactly cost effective, right
term solution probably eight you know,

383
00:32:52.400 --> 00:32:57.759
don't even add up to a million
dollars. Yeah, So it's just not

384
00:32:58.400 --> 00:33:02.039
the way we're doing things right now. Is neither is just not cost effective

385
00:33:02.079 --> 00:33:08.599
and it's not militarily effective. Look
I'm not pretending to be smart here.

386
00:33:08.640 --> 00:33:13.200
Look I was part of the problem. I'm just saying, it's a hard

387
00:33:13.279 --> 00:33:16.920
it's hard to find a solution.
So please think I'm sitting here criticizing the

388
00:33:16.960 --> 00:33:21.960
guys who are just like me,
who are trying to figure out a way

389
00:33:22.319 --> 00:33:27.559
to curb the thread and do all
these things without bringing the United States into

390
00:33:27.599 --> 00:33:31.920
war. It's a tremendously hard problem. Yeah, it's an impossible needle to

391
00:33:32.000 --> 00:33:37.079
thread. You know, it's tough, but not impossible, but it's very

392
00:33:37.079 --> 00:33:44.599
difficult. Okay, but you know
that's always anyway, No, absolutely,

393
00:33:45.640 --> 00:33:47.160
And I just want to mention,
I know, like you know, you've

394
00:33:47.200 --> 00:33:51.440
served that. You know, Jack
and Dave have served. Everybody who's on

395
00:33:51.519 --> 00:33:53.160
the show served, and like a
lot of the folks that watch the show

396
00:33:53.160 --> 00:33:59.480
are veterans. Having said that,
I mean, and it's not their fault

397
00:33:59.599 --> 00:34:09.039
at all. The escapade in Iraq
is mainly to blame for Iran filling that

398
00:34:09.159 --> 00:34:15.400
power vacuum in the region. Yeah, I mean, I can't imagine that

399
00:34:15.440 --> 00:34:20.280
there's anyone out there who still thinks
that invading Iraq was a good idea from

400
00:34:20.280 --> 00:34:22.960
the point of view of Unite US
interest. I mean, if there is,

401
00:34:23.199 --> 00:34:31.360
we welcome of course, because we
welcome alternate views, but it yeah,

402
00:34:31.719 --> 00:34:36.400
I you know I would tend to
agree. Hey, you know before

403
00:34:36.400 --> 00:34:42.239
we sign off them when we talk
about the effect that because sadly, because

404
00:34:42.239 --> 00:34:45.360
of our intervention we've seen, you
know, we've left a bad taste as

405
00:34:45.400 --> 00:34:52.679
we leave for obvious reasons in Afghanistan
and now in Iraq, for reasons that

406
00:34:52.719 --> 00:34:57.119
are partly not our fault but partly
are. To be fair, you know,

407
00:34:57.159 --> 00:35:00.440
we've kind of said we kind of
allowed those conditions to come to fruition

408
00:35:00.679 --> 00:35:07.920
extremists or politicians and power in Iraq
who do not like us, know,

409
00:35:07.000 --> 00:35:10.960
and not talking about influencing elections.
I'm just saying, turn we turned a

410
00:35:12.000 --> 00:35:16.599
blind eye for a long time to
kind of the way the sheer power base

411
00:35:17.000 --> 00:35:23.840
was continuing to gather power there and
ignoring our ignoring our advice. Hey,

412
00:35:23.880 --> 00:35:29.719
So anyway, on the last thing, on a bright note, that picture

413
00:35:29.800 --> 00:35:36.679
and chat and throw it up.
That's as we talk about our adversaries and

414
00:35:37.239 --> 00:35:43.239
non aligned country is all kind of
making plans for a while in which United

415
00:35:43.239 --> 00:35:47.360
States doesn't dominate quite the same way
it has to date. And that photograph

416
00:35:47.480 --> 00:35:52.840
is of an Iranian military delegation to
read, yes, indeed, ladies,

417
00:35:52.880 --> 00:35:59.159
and gentlemen and an Iranian military delegation
to reacd unprecedented certainly in our lifetimes,

418
00:35:59.199 --> 00:36:06.280
I believe, and went very nicely
apparently, So that's probably not I mean,

419
00:36:06.320 --> 00:36:08.639
that's not something that the Saudis made
all that they did put that picture

420
00:36:08.679 --> 00:36:12.960
out on Twitter. But you see
what I'm saying. You know, there's

421
00:36:13.000 --> 00:36:17.119
no one. There's no one.
Very few countries aside from our traditional friends

422
00:36:17.159 --> 00:36:22.800
and European friends, are saying,
oh, yeah, you know, good

423
00:36:22.800 --> 00:36:28.320
point. We we do. We
should side with the United States because you

424
00:36:28.599 --> 00:36:34.039
still do represent democracy and liberal Western
values et cetera, et cetera. That

425
00:36:34.519 --> 00:36:42.440
is so yeah, so he even
said, yeah, sorry, even Saudi

426
00:36:42.480 --> 00:36:46.719
Arabia buddying up with Iran. Let's
say we did pull out of the Red

427
00:36:46.719 --> 00:36:52.119
Sea in the Middle East, and
the who he's keep going there. You

428
00:36:52.159 --> 00:36:54.920
know, eventually that peace dealer,
that cease fire with Saudi arab is going

429
00:36:55.000 --> 00:37:00.199
to end. Let's say we stopped
selling weapons like what happens when they're there's

430
00:37:00.199 --> 00:37:05.320
no free maritime travel in the Red
Seat because we're not there. No.

431
00:37:05.400 --> 00:37:07.960
I mean I get it though,
D because but everyone knows we're not going

432
00:37:08.000 --> 00:37:15.679
to do that, because ultimately global
trade is an orange. I mean,

433
00:37:15.320 --> 00:37:23.280
the free free flow of commerce and
global trade is definitely rock solid within our

434
00:37:23.320 --> 00:37:30.440
interests. In fact, you know, we've we're the one country that has

435
00:37:30.480 --> 00:37:36.239
so far not disappeared into a you
know, even a moderate recession. I

436
00:37:36.320 --> 00:37:42.400
mean, we're still an economic powerhouse. We dominate the world in that sense,

437
00:37:42.760 --> 00:37:46.119
very much so. And so we
more than anyone, stand again or

438
00:37:46.159 --> 00:37:50.800
lose by what happens to global trade. And I think some people, the

439
00:37:50.840 --> 00:37:58.360
isolationists, forget that. Yeah,
not for sure. It's just interesting,

440
00:37:58.400 --> 00:38:00.760
like, yeah, you know,
the Saudi Arabia flirting with Iran, or

441
00:38:00.880 --> 00:38:07.400
flirting with or Iraq flirting with the
Russian delegation. It's like, at the

442
00:38:07.519 --> 00:38:08.679
end of the day, it's like, oh, pay attention to us.

443
00:38:08.719 --> 00:38:12.400
It's like, you know, they
just it's like a cry for attention from

444
00:38:12.440 --> 00:38:15.599
them. I don't know, I
think this is. I think it's these

445
00:38:15.679 --> 00:38:22.559
are deliberate, long term decisions based
on an assessment of the of America's role

446
00:38:22.639 --> 00:38:28.880
in in the world. You know, I don't I'm not hopefully sounding like

447
00:38:28.960 --> 00:38:32.400
a you know, just banging extremists
here, but yes, that is I

448
00:38:32.440 --> 00:38:37.280
think that is clearly evident. I
mean, there's many other factors in play

449
00:38:37.360 --> 00:38:44.039
too, you know. But so
even though we may think of the world

450
00:38:44.119 --> 00:38:53.480
as been as as fitting into certain
patterns post you know, post Cobal right

451
00:38:53.639 --> 00:38:58.960
with you know, kind of the
axis of whatever you want to call it,

452
00:38:59.000 --> 00:39:02.079
the actually resistance on the access of
of evil or of just you know,

453
00:39:02.280 --> 00:39:08.079
the the angry men you know,
North Korea, Russia, China,

454
00:39:08.360 --> 00:39:19.880
Iran, but they yeah, I
mean absolutely the threat that it's not that

455
00:39:20.000 --> 00:39:23.280
any of them can supplant the United
States, but they can certainly undermine the

456
00:39:23.400 --> 00:39:28.840
US's ability to defend its own interests. And that's what's happening. Yeah,

457
00:39:28.960 --> 00:39:30.320
I think we need to look at
it like a market share of like any

458
00:39:30.440 --> 00:39:34.760
kind of market like if as long
as we have the dominating share of it,

459
00:39:34.840 --> 00:39:39.679
like we're okay, first view.
I think that's the way to look

460
00:39:39.679 --> 00:39:44.480
at it. That's a that's a
great that's a great comment. Hey be

461
00:39:44.559 --> 00:39:49.760
for we Yeah, well, i
mean we've got yes, absolutely, Hey,

462
00:39:49.800 --> 00:39:54.400
we've got we've got to get we've
got to get our email or something.

463
00:39:54.440 --> 00:39:59.119
I mean, I'm sorry, I
think for questions put up because someone

464
00:39:59.199 --> 00:40:02.920
sent me some really cool comments from
last Yeah, and it shows to calm

465
00:40:04.119 --> 00:40:07.039
I'll aggregate some of the questions and
we'll answer him at the tailor under Hey,

466
00:40:07.079 --> 00:40:10.840
I got this all right. I
thought it's by a drone drone dude

467
00:40:13.199 --> 00:40:19.039
in in uh in Ukraine. I
know him, in fact, he worked

468
00:40:19.079 --> 00:40:21.719
for me, all right, so
I know this sounds like a team audience,

469
00:40:21.760 --> 00:40:24.920
but we don't have a you know, we have to use my contact

470
00:40:24.960 --> 00:40:29.679
info until we get one. Anyway, he said, if we assume similar

471
00:40:29.719 --> 00:40:34.320
employment in Ukraine as in Ukraine,
all right, when we were we were

472
00:40:34.360 --> 00:40:43.960
out there. It seems the the
shah head is designed such that if even

473
00:40:43.960 --> 00:40:49.119
with GPS, even with the jammer, it can still it can revert to

474
00:40:49.159 --> 00:40:55.039
inertial navigation, which makes makes it
jam resistant. So unless he operated,

475
00:40:55.079 --> 00:41:00.079
this is this is my friend writing, So unless you operate, a mission

476
00:41:00.119 --> 00:41:06.639
planner had access to US flight plans
and knew where when to program the shah

477
00:41:06.719 --> 00:41:09.639
heads so it would follow the US
drone. It seems unlikely or was a

478
00:41:09.719 --> 00:41:15.440
crazy coincidence and timing, or they
employed a different type of drone with a

479
00:41:15.440 --> 00:41:19.840
pilot fully in control during a flight
and they had been observing US drone flights

480
00:41:19.840 --> 00:41:24.000
from the base. And then you
know on my comment about Stinger, Yeah,

481
00:41:24.079 --> 00:41:29.199
correct, it hasn't shut down a
drone. Neither has the Avenger and

482
00:41:29.320 --> 00:41:37.039
neither has the Sea Ram. But
this guy outing of his first name is

483
00:41:37.039 --> 00:41:42.440
A he's a Stinger officer by background, so of course he's almost lost his

484
00:41:42.480 --> 00:41:45.559
friendship over that comment. But he
does says say Stinger and theory should actually

485
00:41:45.639 --> 00:41:51.400
be very effective against shy Head type
drones, although not cost effective for the

486
00:41:51.400 --> 00:41:54.639
reason they just said. But it
would require a Stinger team ready to stand

487
00:41:54.639 --> 00:42:00.119
by receiving queuing from the sensor or
at least doing their own visual searching and

488
00:42:00.199 --> 00:42:02.800
scanning. And you know, those
of you who are air defense bubs and

489
00:42:02.840 --> 00:42:08.679
bore people at cocktail parties queuing as
you know that they're being able to queue

490
00:42:08.960 --> 00:42:16.760
to shoot or sort with man pads, setting setting that up at their tactical

491
00:42:16.840 --> 00:42:22.480
level is always a challenge and so
these things are difficult. Anyway, time

492
00:42:22.519 --> 00:42:28.639
about time to sign out at not
going on the world. Okay, everyone,

493
00:42:29.039 --> 00:42:31.920
thanks again for listening to this episode
of Eyes On. You can email

494
00:42:32.039 --> 00:42:36.199
or text your questions and comments to
do. You will provide something in the

495
00:42:36.320 --> 00:42:39.920
chat and we will answer them,
or depending on how many we get,

496
00:42:40.000 --> 00:42:44.960
we'll answer a selection of them.
So we're releasing a new episode now on

497
00:42:45.000 --> 00:42:49.400
Wednesday and Sunday. Right there,
yep, that's right. Yeah, And

498
00:42:49.440 --> 00:42:53.239
it's these these conversations focused on whatever
happens to be front and center and the

499
00:42:53.280 --> 00:42:57.400
news scent the time. If you
think we're talking too much about one particular

500
00:42:57.440 --> 00:43:01.480
topic or not enough about another,
please send in your comments and they will

501
00:43:01.519 --> 00:43:13.159
be Julie noted and perhaps or ignored. And yeah, please feel free to

502
00:43:13.199 --> 00:43:21.360
send me messages by Twitter or follow
me on Twitter. He's gonna post my

503
00:43:21.440 --> 00:43:24.679
address there, Okay, be over
to you. I'll throw it up on

504
00:43:24.719 --> 00:43:30.679
the Thanks and Andy, Yeah,
I'll throw all of Andy's info into the

505
00:43:30.719 --> 00:43:34.119
show notes and the descriptions of each
show, whether it's video or audio,

506
00:43:34.880 --> 00:43:37.360
whether you listen to us on video
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507
00:43:37.519 --> 00:43:40.480
or rate and review us five stars. It helps the channel big time.

508
00:43:42.239 --> 00:43:45.280
Uh. You can check out the
Patreon help support the show. You can

509
00:43:45.280 --> 00:43:50.000
get ad free episodes of this show
by going to the Patreon, so it's

510
00:43:50.039 --> 00:43:53.559
a little bit more streamlined. And
yeah, check out the team house.

511
00:43:53.880 --> 00:43:58.880
Yeah, we read all your comments
too, include yeah, and to include

512
00:43:58.880 --> 00:44:06.800
the YouTube comments. And someone went
on a drunken brant and people who gets

513
00:44:06.840 --> 00:44:10.440
so drunk they can't even spell,
but they there's quite a few anyway,

514
00:44:10.639 --> 00:44:15.880
Yeah, most of our listeners anyway. All right everyone, so you see

515
00:44:15.880 --> 00:44:17.000
you in a few days. Take
care,