WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.080 --> 00:00:06.000 You. Chilly Effect is sponsored by Wallstreet, Window dot Com and listeners liking 2 00:00:06.080 --> 00:00:15.199 you now and now atd Noise and in All Media. April three, twenty 3 00:00:15.480 --> 00:00:20.079 twenty four. Allegedly, according to that thing we call it Calender, I 4 00:00:20.120 --> 00:00:23.559 could have said Calendor. It kind of might have sounded like an old store 5 00:00:23.559 --> 00:00:27.000 that went out of business, Caldor. But anyway, let's not digress too 6 00:00:27.039 --> 00:00:31.039 much. Tonight. It is Wednesday, Wednesday, middle of the week, 7 00:00:31.120 --> 00:00:34.159 hump day. Some people call it a lot of things going on in the 8 00:00:34.200 --> 00:00:39.039 world, an upcoming eclipse. Apparently people that work for celebrity chefs might be 9 00:00:39.600 --> 00:00:44.640 legitimate accidental targets in a war zone. The presidential thing is still going on. 10 00:00:44.799 --> 00:00:48.640 Lots of stuff happening. Plus, I have a question from the chat 11 00:00:48.719 --> 00:00:53.200 room, because I did forewarn you, if you will, that Larryhancock would 12 00:00:53.200 --> 00:00:57.679 be on of me. Of course, Larry is accessible on the interwebs at 13 00:00:57.759 --> 00:01:03.280 Larrydashhancock dot com and you can find out about the many books that Larry has 14 00:01:03.280 --> 00:01:07.760 authored taking up a lot of space on my bookshelf, but not just taking 15 00:01:07.840 --> 00:01:11.400 up space. It's there because it's relevant, necessary, and a treasure to 16 00:01:11.599 --> 00:01:15.000 be displayed. So what do I have over there, lots of stuff. 17 00:01:15.040 --> 00:01:21.439 Someone would have talked shadow warfare, surprise attack, okay, creating chaos, 18 00:01:22.079 --> 00:01:27.439 educational, informational, historical relevancy, research of all sorts going into this. 19 00:01:27.920 --> 00:01:33.920 Plus he's a solid writer. How about that anyway, interesting guy, regular 20 00:01:34.000 --> 00:01:38.879 appearances here as a co host of sort, creator of series, and indeed, 21 00:01:38.239 --> 00:01:42.799 tonight we're gonna call this subset. We're going to christen a new subset, 22 00:01:42.799 --> 00:01:46.680 if you don't mind, And what are we gonna call it? Well, 23 00:01:47.159 --> 00:01:51.239 as per Larry's direction, I believe he's come up with the right way 24 00:01:51.239 --> 00:01:56.280 to describe the subset that we're going to have to continue because it is continuous? 25 00:01:56.400 --> 00:01:59.760 Which inquiry am I talking about? Is there a little bit of an 26 00:01:59.760 --> 00:02:06.280 O MO there to something else? Maybe? But let's see, how about 27 00:02:06.480 --> 00:02:09.479 this? Oh my goodness, I just had a note in front of me 28 00:02:09.759 --> 00:02:16.159 and my computer did something a little strange. So sorry about that, unidentified, 29 00:02:16.360 --> 00:02:23.000 just like one of the books by Larry Hancock's Unidentified, the continuous Inquiry. 30 00:02:23.560 --> 00:02:27.719 There you go. So this will be the beginning of a subset that 31 00:02:27.840 --> 00:02:31.039 really has a whole bunch of preamble to it. And many other shows where 32 00:02:31.039 --> 00:02:35.360 we've gone over unidentified. By the way, I didn't mention all the books 33 00:02:35.360 --> 00:02:38.400 that Larry wrote, or even all the topics Martin Luther King Junior's assassination. 34 00:02:38.759 --> 00:02:43.400 He's co authored stuff with Stu Wexler. I automatically think of that when I 35 00:02:43.400 --> 00:02:46.960 think of The Awful Grace of God and what is the name of the updated 36 00:02:47.080 --> 00:02:54.719 version of the Killing King book? Actually, Killing King was the most recent 37 00:02:54.840 --> 00:03:00.560 version of The Awful Grace of God. So Killing King is the more recent 38 00:03:00.680 --> 00:03:04.199 version of the MLK work. That's what I meant to say. Sorry about 39 00:03:04.240 --> 00:03:07.520 that, see that we were just talking about misstatements just before the show. 40 00:03:07.560 --> 00:03:09.800 By the way, off air. Yeah, so that is the more updated 41 00:03:09.879 --> 00:03:15.719 version of yours and Stew's work on the topic of the Martin Luther King junior 42 00:03:15.719 --> 00:03:20.240 assassination. Then is that correct? That's right? And I'm amazed that I 43 00:03:20.280 --> 00:03:23.560 remember that Chuck No Problem books, and by the way, I have both 44 00:03:23.560 --> 00:03:28.240 of those on my shelf. So just saying, oh, and Tipping Point, 45 00:03:28.319 --> 00:03:32.319 which again is a continuation but not an update of Someone would Have Talked, 46 00:03:32.439 --> 00:03:37.400 although Someone would Have Talked has been updated a few times. Why because 47 00:03:37.719 --> 00:03:42.719 Larry never seems to stop with his continuous research and all those things, those 48 00:03:42.719 --> 00:03:46.680 political intrigues and murder and all that not the topic of tonight's discussion, more 49 00:03:46.719 --> 00:03:52.599 along the lines of again the book Unidentified, and there's a subtitle to that 50 00:03:52.639 --> 00:03:59.479 one too, isn't there, Larry Unidentified? The national security problem of UFOs 51 00:03:59.759 --> 00:04:02.280 right there you go. Now it's not within arms reach, which is why 52 00:04:02.319 --> 00:04:06.039 I didn't grab it. And oh, by the way, of course, 53 00:04:06.080 --> 00:04:09.639 I have that one, you know, I have that one on my shelf. 54 00:04:09.639 --> 00:04:13.759 We've discussed it on the show various times. But you're doing more work 55 00:04:13.840 --> 00:04:16.600 that is not necessarily published with just your name on it. Indeed, there's 56 00:04:16.600 --> 00:04:20.680 a group of people involved there, and we've talked about the conferences and all 57 00:04:20.720 --> 00:04:27.120 that. So many many pre shows to this subset of shows do exist already, 58 00:04:27.959 --> 00:04:31.360 but we're gonna start going on a continuous inquiry, so Larry, before 59 00:04:31.360 --> 00:04:35.040 we go there, though, again, another piece of business I want to 60 00:04:35.079 --> 00:04:39.800 take care of is moments before when I was still setting things up, and 61 00:04:39.839 --> 00:04:44.040 it took me a little while to set the show up. We're a little 62 00:04:44.079 --> 00:04:46.600 late going to live, arey. You podcast listeners don't care because you're listening 63 00:04:46.680 --> 00:04:50.079 to it whenever you feel like it. But anyway, fact of the matter, 64 00:04:51.480 --> 00:04:56.319 there was a question in the chat room. So let's see if I 65 00:04:56.319 --> 00:04:59.839 can read this verbatim if you don't mind, And of course we're having the 66 00:04:59.839 --> 00:05:01.959 BLO line guy read, so it might take a second for it to make 67 00:05:02.079 --> 00:05:04.720 sense, at least in my head before I try to relate it to you. 68 00:05:05.759 --> 00:05:09.360 Uh not you, Larry, I mean you know the you, the 69 00:05:09.360 --> 00:05:13.560 the generic you that's out there, the the people that are listening to the 70 00:05:13.600 --> 00:05:16.360 show at their particular times a day if they're not hearing it live. Right, 71 00:05:17.399 --> 00:05:25.199 So anyway, Uh, here we go. Okay, So the whole 72 00:05:25.279 --> 00:05:32.240 question, why is the NSA talking about winning Johnson to their side? In 73 00:05:32.319 --> 00:05:38.800 quotes after gushing over Kennedy in this document, the writer says Johnson is a 74 00:05:38.839 --> 00:05:43.639 capitalist. Odd thing to say, and says they must win him over. 75 00:05:44.759 --> 00:05:49.639 Uh what the what the ns to? What the NSA question mark? The 76 00:05:49.680 --> 00:05:55.720 documents question mark, the c I A question mark? What is their side 77 00:05:55.959 --> 00:06:00.560 question mark? Uh so that is a question for Larry Hancock and of course 78 00:06:00.000 --> 00:06:04.759 citizen GX in the chat room, who we all know actually as caller Jimmy 79 00:06:04.800 --> 00:06:11.800 James on the show, regular caller, regular listener, appreciated contributor to the 80 00:06:11.839 --> 00:06:16.639 show, and supporter. Anyways, he provided us with a link to a 81 00:06:16.680 --> 00:06:21.879 Mary Farrell document which discusses this and all that. So I handed that over 82 00:06:21.920 --> 00:06:26.079 to Larry a couple of minutes before the show. Larry, what do you 83 00:06:26.120 --> 00:06:30.399 make of this? Sure after a quick scan of the document, and it's 84 00:06:30.399 --> 00:06:32.519 interesting because we don't see a whole lot of these, but I've seen some 85 00:06:32.600 --> 00:06:41.560 of them before. This is actually an NSA intercept. It's classified as top 86 00:06:41.639 --> 00:06:46.439 secret DINAR. The DINAR is a code for the source, So this is 87 00:06:46.920 --> 00:06:54.199 something that NSA is providing to other people the sources classified. It could be 88 00:06:54.240 --> 00:06:59.439 a radio intercept. It could be a cable intercept, it could be a 89 00:06:59.439 --> 00:07:04.639 cable see cable transmission, et cetera. Given the time frame, the Given 90 00:07:04.680 --> 00:07:09.959 the time frame and the length of the message, I would more likely think 91 00:07:09.959 --> 00:07:16.759 that it's probably a cable intercept. Again, we had the facilities to intercept 92 00:07:16.839 --> 00:07:26.560 cables uh under international transmission, and people did not realize it, certainly at 93 00:07:26.560 --> 00:07:31.360 the time that we were. We not only intercepted and collected information on our 94 00:07:31.399 --> 00:07:39.360 adversaries like Russia, but we also did it on even allies, French, 95 00:07:39.439 --> 00:07:44.240 British, whatever, just standard practice because we want to know what they're thinking 96 00:07:44.279 --> 00:07:48.519 about us. So to me, this reads and looks like a cable from 97 00:07:48.720 --> 00:07:56.560 an embassy in Washington, d C. And they're talking about the political state 98 00:07:56.600 --> 00:08:01.399 and affairs after the assassination and to to paint how it's going to change, 99 00:08:01.399 --> 00:08:07.000 and is pretty common stuff after any significant event, Usually an embassy in a 100 00:08:07.040 --> 00:08:15.000 country does a political analysis and wrap up and cables it back to their nation, 101 00:08:15.600 --> 00:08:18.000 right, frankly, this is yeah, frankly, really quickly too, 102 00:08:18.160 --> 00:08:22.920 just as a refresher to anybody who might be unaware fact of the matter. 103 00:08:24.040 --> 00:08:28.079 The NSA in and of itself, I mean, this is its function is 104 00:08:28.120 --> 00:08:33.320 to intercept these types of transmissions. That is like their literal core job to 105 00:08:33.440 --> 00:08:39.600 grab basically everything that's broadcast one way or another. Everything that is disseminated is 106 00:08:39.960 --> 00:08:45.960 supposed to be grabbed ally, enemy, neutral, oddity, it doesn't matter. 107 00:08:46.679 --> 00:08:50.240 That's pretty much their job the way that I understand it. I mean, 108 00:08:50.639 --> 00:08:54.120 would that be a fair statement. It's kind of interesting. During this 109 00:08:54.159 --> 00:08:58.759 period of time, during the early sixties, there were actually a number of 110 00:09:00.039 --> 00:09:09.799 infections, three or four defections of US personnel that were working for NSA doing 111 00:09:09.879 --> 00:09:13.399 intercepts. And I guess when they took the job. They didn't realize that 112 00:09:15.000 --> 00:09:20.759 they were actually going to be intercepting Allied traffic, and that really rubbed them 113 00:09:20.799 --> 00:09:24.919 the wrong way. And actually some of them defected and issued statements. So 114 00:09:26.039 --> 00:09:31.039 the US is horrible because it even spies on its allies, you know, 115 00:09:31.879 --> 00:09:35.480 and some of them ended up in Russia. But there were a couple of 116 00:09:35.519 --> 00:09:41.080 exposs Up until that time, you know, nobody really understood that we were 117 00:09:41.120 --> 00:09:46.240 doing this. But by this point in time, in the sixties, it's 118 00:09:46.360 --> 00:09:54.679 probably pretty common knowledge that just regular cleared traffic is intercepted by the NSA. 119 00:09:54.879 --> 00:09:58.879 And the best guess I can make from this and a quick reading, my 120 00:10:00.000 --> 00:10:05.320 I guess would be that it's either coming from the Israeli or the French embassy 121 00:10:05.360 --> 00:10:11.480 in Washington. Just a rough guess, fair enough. But as I said, 122 00:10:11.480 --> 00:10:15.000 you know, when it comes to loyalties and trying to describe, you 123 00:10:15.039 --> 00:10:18.960 know, because he asks there which side do they mean? What side are 124 00:10:18.960 --> 00:10:22.480 they referring to? Well, I think that's actually a fair question when it 125 00:10:22.519 --> 00:10:28.720 comes to the NSA, And because that's part of the summary, right, 126 00:10:28.759 --> 00:10:31.879 I mean, that's that's part of like, Okay, what we have to 127 00:10:31.919 --> 00:10:35.600 do with this is this good. The side is going to the side is 128 00:10:35.639 --> 00:10:41.519 in references. You know how closely is how closely is precedent Johnson going to 129 00:10:41.559 --> 00:10:46.360 come in on the side of the Israeli foreign policy, the French policy. 130 00:10:46.720 --> 00:10:52.559 US is this other government. You know, they're they're trying to predict how 131 00:10:52.320 --> 00:10:58.159 is he going to change? You know, we we've we've had a position, 132 00:10:58.320 --> 00:11:01.960 the US has had a position towards US towards you know, is this 133 00:11:01.120 --> 00:11:05.200 going to change? So the the S does it refer to the NSA taking 134 00:11:05.200 --> 00:11:13.639 a position. It really refers to the anticipated position of the Johnson administration vise 135 00:11:13.720 --> 00:11:18.120 of the France Israel whoever this is, which by the way, this is 136 00:11:18.120 --> 00:11:22.159 the thing that I find most you know, disconcerting or concerning, however it 137 00:11:22.240 --> 00:11:26.120 is you want to put it, when it comes to this idea where indeed, 138 00:11:26.159 --> 00:11:30.840 even if the president and his administration is not in you know, absolute 139 00:11:30.919 --> 00:11:35.159 control of everything, despite some people's readings of how the executive branch is in 140 00:11:35.320 --> 00:11:41.399 charge of all, they are very influential and being able to gauge that and 141 00:11:41.480 --> 00:11:46.440 understand how those interactions are going to go on. This affects things far outside 142 00:11:46.519 --> 00:11:50.840 of uh, just politics. You know that this really does have a real 143 00:11:50.879 --> 00:11:54.120 world effect. So it's a fair thing to at least, you know, 144 00:11:54.559 --> 00:12:00.840 intercept what you can collect, what you can even open source what people would 145 00:12:00.840 --> 00:12:07.039 call open source intelligence also commonly constantly collected by the NSA. There's actually a 146 00:12:07.080 --> 00:12:09.320 logic to this, you know, where some people just kind of go, 147 00:12:09.440 --> 00:12:15.960 okay, i'fbit agency bad, you know, but there's a functional reality to 148 00:12:16.039 --> 00:12:20.000 this that isn't always nefarious, oh not at all. And so in this 149 00:12:20.120 --> 00:12:24.679 case, another option might be Iran. And at this point in time, 150 00:12:26.639 --> 00:12:31.799 especially Israel and Iran very dependent on US arm sales. Yes, and the 151 00:12:31.919 --> 00:12:37.720 US then as now, always plays political games with this arm sales. So 152 00:12:37.759 --> 00:12:43.080 it's going to be very important to whatever government this is to anticipate whether or 153 00:12:43.080 --> 00:12:48.879 not the new administration may change their tax on Oh well, wait a minute. 154 00:12:50.679 --> 00:12:54.639 Kennedy was authorizing or not authorizing US certain types of weapons. What about 155 00:12:54.720 --> 00:13:01.039 Johnson is emore open And as it turns out, in reality, Johnson turned 156 00:13:01.039 --> 00:13:05.519 out to be much more open to certain types of foreign or arm sales than 157 00:13:05.600 --> 00:13:09.519 JFK had been. And although the document doesn't contain this, you know, 158 00:13:09.600 --> 00:13:15.120 my last word on it is pretty simple. This speaks to the operational end 159 00:13:15.320 --> 00:13:18.200 of the continuity of government. Now, I know that's a frightening phrase to 160 00:13:18.279 --> 00:13:22.399 a lot of people with good reason, but the continuity of government, this 161 00:13:22.639 --> 00:13:26.720 is what needs to be gauged, even you know, some people would say 162 00:13:26.759 --> 00:13:30.240 needs to be controlled and all of that, but this is what needs to 163 00:13:30.279 --> 00:13:33.720 be gauged. And what we get here is a little glimpse at that process 164 00:13:33.360 --> 00:13:37.799 that needs to be understood in a greater context, which we are not going 165 00:13:37.840 --> 00:13:43.240 to explore tonight because we have something that is outside of this scope and yet 166 00:13:43.759 --> 00:13:48.799 falls under the NSA's workload, or at least should in my mind, when 167 00:13:48.840 --> 00:13:54.799 it comes to what the concept UAPs you know, previously known as UFOs, 168 00:13:56.039 --> 00:13:58.320 right, I almost feel like it's that change in name like Prince did where 169 00:13:58.360 --> 00:14:03.399 he changed it to symbol, where it's like a lot of people are confounded 170 00:14:03.159 --> 00:14:07.519 by this being the label attached to it, but it's still the same thing. 171 00:14:09.080 --> 00:14:11.840 You know, UFO artist is formally known as ye. Yeah, the 172 00:14:13.000 --> 00:14:16.279 artist formerly known as UFO is now UAP. But still the study is worthy 173 00:14:16.759 --> 00:14:22.919 and obviously the collection of intelligence is worthy, and indeed that is part of 174 00:14:22.080 --> 00:14:26.559 what you and the group that you are working with are focused on. So 175 00:14:28.360 --> 00:14:33.679 let's talk about that. There there was a paper recently released for peer review, 176 00:14:33.519 --> 00:14:35.879 and what are we about a week behind on that? Now? I 177 00:14:35.879 --> 00:14:39.600 guess I intended to bring you on last week to discuss this, but I 178 00:14:39.600 --> 00:14:43.159 had a technical issue. So the thing is, uh, yeah, what 179 00:14:43.320 --> 00:14:48.279 about that? Tell us about the release of that paper, and I will 180 00:14:48.279 --> 00:14:52.000 provide links in with the show notes, And they're also in the live chatroom 181 00:14:52.000 --> 00:14:56.080 atochelli dot com, where even if you're not hearing the show live, you 182 00:14:56.080 --> 00:15:01.080 can always roll back and look at the various references that have been placed there 183 00:15:01.120 --> 00:15:05.360 by myself, listeners, guests sometimes, although I don't think Larry's ever placed 184 00:15:05.399 --> 00:15:09.879 anything in the chat room there, but he gives me stuff and sometimes I 185 00:15:09.919 --> 00:15:13.679 place things there for Larry. Anyways, tell us about this and what's happening 186 00:15:13.759 --> 00:15:18.840 and what might be upcoming regarding the UAP study if you don't mind. Yeah, 187 00:15:18.879 --> 00:15:24.799 Well, we actually and basically the group that I belonged to, the 188 00:15:24.919 --> 00:15:33.480 Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies, had initiated a project something over four years ago 189 00:15:33.600 --> 00:15:41.559 and we formed a team to do an intelligent study of UAPs and basically a 190 00:15:41.600 --> 00:15:46.799 strategic intelligence study. And we knew that it was going to be a major 191 00:15:48.159 --> 00:15:52.360 long term commitment because these types of studies, you know, you just they're 192 00:15:52.399 --> 00:15:56.480 not hit and run. You've got to collect a lot of data, do 193 00:15:56.519 --> 00:16:00.759 a lot of work, build a database, do a lot of analysis. 194 00:16:00.759 --> 00:16:04.759 So the team's actually been in existence going on four years and up to this 195 00:16:04.799 --> 00:16:10.200 point in time. Last week we published our third study, So as you 196 00:16:10.240 --> 00:16:18.159 can see, we're averaging a published study once a year, which kind of 197 00:16:18.159 --> 00:16:23.240 suggests how much work goes into the process. And the goal of the study 198 00:16:23.399 --> 00:16:30.799 is to basically look at UAP sidings during the height of the Cold War nineteen 199 00:16:30.279 --> 00:16:37.200 forty five nineteen seventy five. The reason for that particular length of time is 200 00:16:37.279 --> 00:16:42.519 that's the time most of that time up to nineteen seventy the Air Force was 201 00:16:42.759 --> 00:16:48.320 actually collecting and building a they didn't call it a database, but at least 202 00:16:48.320 --> 00:16:55.679 a big file of UFO sidings and investigating them. So you could count on 203 00:16:56.879 --> 00:17:03.200 cases that were reported being officially investigat if they were from the military. Military 204 00:17:03.279 --> 00:17:07.079 sources were held, you know, responsible. You don't get a lot of 205 00:17:07.160 --> 00:17:15.920 hoaxes within the military because they were reporting something according to official, sanctioned guidelines. 206 00:17:15.759 --> 00:17:22.759 And so we built a database primarily of military and law enforcement reports and 207 00:17:22.720 --> 00:17:26.359 kind of stepped back and said, all right, now, let's look at 208 00:17:26.680 --> 00:17:33.480 the patterns of activity for these UFOs UAPs. Do we see any Is this 209 00:17:33.519 --> 00:17:37.359 stuff just randomness? Everybody see them all over the place all the time, 210 00:17:37.200 --> 00:17:42.240 you know. And we started out looking at what was being reported from various 211 00:17:42.279 --> 00:17:48.599 types of military facilities, in particular atomic energy, the atomic energy complex, 212 00:17:49.920 --> 00:18:00.480 radiation production facilities, design weapons, design labs files. Did you have an 213 00:18:00.480 --> 00:18:07.359 intent initially to have a specific focus on atomic assets for lack of a better 214 00:18:07.400 --> 00:18:14.000 word, seemingly regarding these incidents? I mean, the concentration around those types 215 00:18:14.039 --> 00:18:17.960 of facilities has been discussed in public for a while. Which, by the 216 00:18:17.960 --> 00:18:23.039 way, I'm also going to provide you guys with another link to to a 217 00:18:23.079 --> 00:18:27.799 media story from about six months ago, if you don't mind, Larry, 218 00:18:27.880 --> 00:18:33.319 where there was a discussion and the group that you're part of, the you 219 00:18:33.359 --> 00:18:37.960 know, ever after we'll call it the SCU, all right, because that's 220 00:18:38.359 --> 00:18:44.200 the shortened version of it, right, yes, okay? So and anyway, 221 00:18:45.720 --> 00:18:48.000 what did they do? Well? The headline was calls on Congress, 222 00:18:48.079 --> 00:18:55.839 the SCU calls on Congress to pass these Schumer rounds Anyway, there was a 223 00:18:55.839 --> 00:19:00.160 bit of a call to action to the Congress from your group saying, look, 224 00:19:02.359 --> 00:19:06.279 we can do this, sure, but greater access, greater studies. 225 00:19:06.319 --> 00:19:08.200 I mean, what was the goal about six months ago? Just to put 226 00:19:08.240 --> 00:19:11.240 this in context, and I'll give you, guys a let's see, I 227 00:19:11.240 --> 00:19:17.240 guess from k R O N four. Yeah, k R O N four 228 00:19:17.400 --> 00:19:21.839 dot com, which is the website news organization that has one of the most 229 00:19:21.839 --> 00:19:26.160 prominently searched headlines regarding this, you might want to read it over you the 230 00:19:26.160 --> 00:19:30.599 listener, not you Larry to to get a feel for some of what's being 231 00:19:30.640 --> 00:19:37.960 offered here as solutions or answers to existing questions at least or maybe problems, 232 00:19:37.000 --> 00:19:41.920 depending on what the questions lead us to. So is that fair and no, 233 00:19:41.039 --> 00:19:45.799 Flarry you think? Or what should we look at regarding the sus for 234 00:19:45.839 --> 00:19:52.119 that Thress release, A Senator Schumer had had put legislation and the Defense Appropriations 235 00:19:52.200 --> 00:19:59.960 Bill to actually create a commission to collect UFO UAP cases for a study. 236 00:20:00.200 --> 00:20:03.759 And the important thing to us is we have data from nineteen forty five to 237 00:20:03.839 --> 00:20:10.000 nineteen seventy five. We don't have any more contemporary data, and there's no 238 00:20:10.119 --> 00:20:14.400 place to get it, and there's no place to get it out of military 239 00:20:14.480 --> 00:20:18.960 files or whatever. Well, Schumer's legislation would have created a commission to go 240 00:20:19.039 --> 00:20:25.400 out and get that data so one could see, if you know, if 241 00:20:25.440 --> 00:20:30.119 whatever we see going on during our period is still going on. Unfortunately, 242 00:20:30.640 --> 00:20:37.640 his legislation was defeated in Congress and stripped out, and basically the kind of 243 00:20:38.519 --> 00:20:44.200 commission that we had hoped for to retrieve these records just didn't happen. But 244 00:20:44.519 --> 00:20:48.079 that was our goal at the time, and now we are left with really 245 00:20:48.200 --> 00:20:53.279 no access to that data. Well and interesting too, because there was an 246 00:20:53.400 --> 00:20:59.880 uptick in interest in this per se pretty much inspired you know. The two 247 00:21:00.079 --> 00:21:04.839 major catalysts in my mind were the releases of these videos by the you know, 248 00:21:04.920 --> 00:21:10.480 the government right, which had been previously released, but they sort of 249 00:21:10.640 --> 00:21:15.000 you know, authenticated what had been previously released on the Internet regarding some of 250 00:21:15.039 --> 00:21:19.839 these images, which are exciting of objects which are behaving in a rather odd 251 00:21:19.880 --> 00:21:26.920 way, qualify as UAPs or UFOs if you're speaking from the older tongue, 252 00:21:26.920 --> 00:21:33.319 if you will. But but that in combination with some pretty sensational hearings that 253 00:21:33.359 --> 00:21:37.960 occurred where gentlemen who seemed to have, you know, bona fide connection to 254 00:21:37.480 --> 00:21:41.559 various organizations. And I'm not saying that he doesn't have those connections. I'm 255 00:21:41.599 --> 00:21:48.400 just saying what the appearance was at this point gave some pretty pretty interesting statements 256 00:21:48.400 --> 00:21:52.079 that have never been made before, stating that you know, there were active 257 00:21:52.079 --> 00:21:56.960 programs and alien seized and all this stuff. The stuff that you know, 258 00:21:57.200 --> 00:22:04.279 ordinarily is commonplace when it comes to capturing the attention of the public, at 259 00:22:04.359 --> 00:22:07.240 least during the entirety of my whole life. You know, I grew up 260 00:22:07.279 --> 00:22:12.440 at the time where what was it, Close Encounters of the Third Kind was 261 00:22:12.519 --> 00:22:18.000 a sort of national phenomena as a movie, right, got people thinking about 262 00:22:18.039 --> 00:22:22.799 it. Et the extraterrestrial would follow, whether it was family entertainment or sci 263 00:22:22.880 --> 00:22:27.079 fi or things meant to frighten people one way or another. This idea, 264 00:22:27.279 --> 00:22:33.079 this concept all becomes you know, quite relevant. I mean, the evolution 265 00:22:33.200 --> 00:22:37.359 of the imaginary, futuristic star trek universe. All of these things play a 266 00:22:37.400 --> 00:22:42.160 part in capturing the public's imagination, but don't necessarily do us a lot of 267 00:22:42.200 --> 00:22:48.480 favors when it comes to learning about the real world situation. Indeed, what 268 00:22:48.599 --> 00:22:52.319 you're looking at are real world studies of things that have happened, things that 269 00:22:52.359 --> 00:22:59.960 were accounted for by recognized bodies within our government, other governments, even made 270 00:23:00.000 --> 00:23:03.440 Maybe at some point, you know, all of this could be put into 271 00:23:03.480 --> 00:23:07.400 context and maybe create a database like you were talking about before, that might 272 00:23:07.440 --> 00:23:12.480 allow people to have a greater understanding of what's happening, at least regarding things 273 00:23:12.480 --> 00:23:19.519 that remain unidentified and unknown as far as their intent, et cetera, et 274 00:23:19.599 --> 00:23:23.480 cetera. Is any of that incorrect that I'm stating here, Larry? Is 275 00:23:23.559 --> 00:23:29.160 this this all makes sense to you? Well? No, and that's again 276 00:23:29.400 --> 00:23:38.240 that's no natural study. Period. The The problem was that the the phenomenon 277 00:23:38.279 --> 00:23:44.519 of the reports whatever were always taken one at a time. The Air Force 278 00:23:45.039 --> 00:23:49.599 took them one at a time, investigated them and came up with an explanation 279 00:23:51.279 --> 00:23:56.119 or didn't literally, and then they published their numbers. It's like, okay, 280 00:23:56.680 --> 00:24:00.400 for this year, we had this many reports, we investigated this many 281 00:24:00.960 --> 00:24:08.119 and eighty or ninety percent of them were identified or that were classified as misidentifications 282 00:24:08.160 --> 00:24:15.400 of whatever phenomena atmospheric, you know, aircraft whatever, and there were you 283 00:24:15.440 --> 00:24:19.160 know, ten percent left. And the good news is none of those ten 284 00:24:19.200 --> 00:24:25.240 percent did anything harmful, So we're good. Now we'll go on to the 285 00:24:25.279 --> 00:24:29.599 next set. So that's the way it was treated. There was never a 286 00:24:29.640 --> 00:24:37.400 strategic analysis done the way our team is doing it. What would have been 287 00:24:37.680 --> 00:24:41.640 good is that if we still have no sign, even now after those congressional 288 00:24:41.720 --> 00:24:48.480 hearings, are concerned Chuck, after everything that's happened over the last two years, 289 00:24:48.000 --> 00:24:56.359 there's no sign that the legislation that Congress passed, which created a group 290 00:24:56.440 --> 00:25:02.400 within the Department of Defense to look at the subject, there's still no sign 291 00:25:02.440 --> 00:25:07.920 that they're doing what I just described. What they're doing is they're taking reports 292 00:25:07.920 --> 00:25:11.480 that they're given. They have no authority to force them out of anyone. 293 00:25:11.559 --> 00:25:17.160 They're taking reports that they're given, and they're studying them one by one and 294 00:25:17.200 --> 00:25:21.400 then reporting back to Congress and saying, you know, we got two hundred 295 00:25:21.400 --> 00:25:27.480 reports, and again eighty or ninety percent of them are misidentifications and ten percent 296 00:25:27.559 --> 00:25:32.559 we're still investigating. And by the way, we're never really going to be 297 00:25:32.599 --> 00:25:36.920 able to do anything with them because there's not enough data. If we had 298 00:25:36.920 --> 00:25:40.279 more data, maybe we could tell you what they really were. Right now, 299 00:25:40.319 --> 00:25:45.240 they're just in a bucket called unidentified and that's that's the exact same language 300 00:25:45.279 --> 00:25:49.640 that you find in that was given to Congress a month ago by this group 301 00:25:49.680 --> 00:25:55.400 in twenty twenty four, that was generated by the Air Force back in nineteen 302 00:25:55.480 --> 00:26:02.119 sixty nine, exactly the same wording, exactly the same approach. So the 303 00:26:02.160 --> 00:26:07.720 government approach has not changed at all. We're trying to take a more strategic 304 00:26:07.759 --> 00:26:12.559 study approach, which is why we're seeing patterns and patterns and activity, and 305 00:26:12.599 --> 00:26:17.839 why we're really seeing things that they don't see because they don't look at them 306 00:26:18.039 --> 00:26:22.079 in that perspective. And you ask a question, did we start this study 307 00:26:22.640 --> 00:26:26.720 looking at the atomic warfare complex? And the answer is yeah, we did. 308 00:26:27.359 --> 00:26:33.799 We specifically wanted to look at what was going on in the general military, 309 00:26:33.880 --> 00:26:40.519 what was looking on in the conventional military at regular military basis, you 310 00:26:40.559 --> 00:26:45.319 know, of all types, as compared to the atomic warfare complex, to 311 00:26:45.400 --> 00:26:51.480 see if there was something anomalous going on in the atomic warfare complex, because 312 00:26:51.599 --> 00:26:53.720 that's the first question you've got to ask. I mean, first, is 313 00:26:53.799 --> 00:26:59.400 it kind of random? Everything everywhere? It does? Nothing fall out? 314 00:26:59.519 --> 00:27:04.160 Are all military basis seen the same quantity the same time? And as it 315 00:27:04.200 --> 00:27:08.200 turned out, no, there were some very definite patterns that fell out of 316 00:27:08.240 --> 00:27:17.279 that, and the patterns were time delimited. The UAP activity was focused on 317 00:27:17.279 --> 00:27:22.720 one particular type of facilities for three four years and then that stopped, and 318 00:27:22.759 --> 00:27:27.079 they moved to another type of facility for three or four years, and then 319 00:27:27.359 --> 00:27:33.440 that stopped. And the interesting thing about that point in time is at that 320 00:27:33.519 --> 00:27:40.079 point in time they moved strictly to a focus on deployed strategic atomic weapons. 321 00:27:40.119 --> 00:27:45.160 We're talking about h bombs, you know, city killers, whatever you want 322 00:27:45.200 --> 00:27:48.799 to call them, and they never went back and looked at those other places 323 00:27:48.839 --> 00:27:52.400 anymore. You don't see that pattern. And the interesting thing about that is 324 00:27:53.039 --> 00:27:59.519 that pattern continued through the end of our study to nineteen seventy five. What 325 00:27:59.559 --> 00:28:04.720 would really be fascinating would be a study that said did it continue beyond that 326 00:28:04.799 --> 00:28:11.480 point in time? And that's something that this AAR, which is this new 327 00:28:11.759 --> 00:28:17.519 government agency, could do. But in the report that they issued just last 328 00:28:17.599 --> 00:28:22.640 week or two weeks ago, now I guess there's actually a section in they're 329 00:28:22.640 --> 00:28:26.440 supposed to be doing history, right, so there's a section on what was 330 00:28:26.480 --> 00:28:33.680 happening at UAPs, at you know, atomic sites, and basically the commentary 331 00:28:33.720 --> 00:28:37.440 and the reports about a page long and says we couldn't find anything significant, 332 00:28:38.400 --> 00:28:42.559 and we're going, what, you know, all those people that testified to 333 00:28:42.599 --> 00:28:48.839 you, You guys are just failing to do this entirely. You're not even 334 00:28:48.000 --> 00:28:53.400 looking at this, which would probably be the most significant thing part of the 335 00:28:53.440 --> 00:28:57.960 history you'd look at. And I don't know. They're supposed to be extending 336 00:28:59.000 --> 00:29:04.759 that historical study into a second paper, and we're fascinated to see what they're 337 00:29:04.799 --> 00:29:08.400 going to come up with. But again it's already been pointed out that if 338 00:29:08.799 --> 00:29:12.960 if they were doing what had been inspected of them, they would be doing 339 00:29:14.119 --> 00:29:17.799 what we did right now. I ask you the check it, you know, 340 00:29:18.160 --> 00:29:21.640 but they're not right now. I exhaustively went over with you. The 341 00:29:21.680 --> 00:29:25.160 only contradiction I offered to all of what you just said is that you said 342 00:29:25.200 --> 00:29:27.440 the government basically did nothing. I would say, well, they kind of 343 00:29:27.440 --> 00:29:32.240 did something, because you and I went over what it is they've done. 344 00:29:32.400 --> 00:29:37.640 They had no place for anybody to hand over reports, to hand over observations 345 00:29:37.680 --> 00:29:44.960 about this, no specialized place for anybody theoretically, and we went over that 346 00:29:45.039 --> 00:29:47.960 last time, so we don't need to go over it again. But I 347 00:29:48.079 --> 00:29:52.279 urge people to listen back to the pre show to this series a bit, 348 00:29:52.759 --> 00:29:56.359 because I think it is significant, sorry to borrow that word, you know, 349 00:29:56.559 --> 00:30:00.519 to understand that, yeah, this is the move they made, but 350 00:30:00.559 --> 00:30:03.839 then take a look at the quality of that action and what it actually results 351 00:30:03.880 --> 00:30:08.039 in. I'll leave it there, you know, But that's the point to 352 00:30:08.079 --> 00:30:11.119 be heard, is that that was the only change is now there's a place 353 00:30:11.200 --> 00:30:18.640 to send your reports and your observations to think it. It's important for those 354 00:30:18.680 --> 00:30:25.680 that didn't catch it last time. The fascinating thing is that's a voluntary thing. 355 00:30:26.640 --> 00:30:30.200 You can send it to this group, which is a government organization which 356 00:30:30.799 --> 00:30:36.759 has a place to put it. But the US intelligence community is not connected 357 00:30:36.799 --> 00:30:42.519 to them. So a report that's generated anywhere into the dozen sixteen different agencies 358 00:30:42.519 --> 00:30:51.400 associated with US national security that can be circulated all through that network and never 359 00:30:51.519 --> 00:30:56.559 get to them because they're not part of the intelligence community. They're part of 360 00:30:56.559 --> 00:31:00.680 the Department of Defense, but not part of the intelligence community. If you're 361 00:31:00.720 --> 00:31:03.920 an engineer and you can, you know, relate to a system problem, 362 00:31:03.079 --> 00:31:07.279 this is a system's problem. Yeah, certainly, because oh it's great that 363 00:31:07.279 --> 00:31:11.000 that information is being collected, but now what gets done with it? If 364 00:31:11.039 --> 00:31:15.880 there is let's just say there is a potential threat connected to one of these 365 00:31:15.960 --> 00:31:21.960 reports. There's no place I mean, the military gets it, but there's 366 00:31:22.039 --> 00:31:29.720 no mechanism by which this is handed over to the CIA, the you know, 367 00:31:30.000 --> 00:31:33.359 some some group that could take action here, somebody the Department of Homeland 368 00:31:33.359 --> 00:31:38.759 Security, let's say, might might have some relevant action that could be taken 369 00:31:38.839 --> 00:31:48.400 defensively if something was found to be hostile or malicious directly, right potentially theoretically, 370 00:31:48.640 --> 00:31:51.960 but there's no place for it to go, right, I mean, 371 00:31:51.960 --> 00:31:56.799 that's and beyond that we even know. I mean, the intelligence community is 372 00:31:56.839 --> 00:32:02.039 classified and it's secure, but it's how it's organized is open. I mean, 373 00:32:02.480 --> 00:32:07.400 the point is to do this kind of strategic study, long term study 374 00:32:07.400 --> 00:32:10.119 that we're doing, look for patterns, it would have to be bumped up 375 00:32:10.640 --> 00:32:16.680 to an intelligence committee working under the National Security Council. It would actually have 376 00:32:16.799 --> 00:32:22.920 to be tasked to them. Congress can't even do that this, This Congressional 377 00:32:22.920 --> 00:32:28.799 Committee can't even they could ask ask the National Security Council to that. But 378 00:32:29.119 --> 00:32:37.039 we literally know that there is no intelligence tasking for that level of group to 379 00:32:37.119 --> 00:32:40.240 do the kind of study we're doing. It would have to show up. 380 00:32:42.279 --> 00:32:45.920 You say, they publish, actually publish, you know, you know, 381 00:32:45.000 --> 00:32:50.680 what are they what are they tasked to study terrorism? Certain types of terrorism, 382 00:32:51.119 --> 00:32:55.559 certain types of threats. Since this isn't a threat by definition, it's 383 00:32:55.640 --> 00:33:01.680 just like, okay, it's again another the systems from they deal with threats. 384 00:33:02.039 --> 00:33:07.319 Nobody wants to classify this as even a potential threat. So it's going 385 00:33:07.400 --> 00:33:10.519 to stay way down at this level of Oh, let's look at one at 386 00:33:10.519 --> 00:33:14.839 it one a time, one at a time, and see if we can't 387 00:33:14.880 --> 00:33:16.559 explain it, and if not, we'll just throw it in the bucket. 388 00:33:17.000 --> 00:33:22.519 Right, So there's never a point of collection that could absolutely long term. 389 00:33:22.599 --> 00:33:27.480 Yeah, absolutely, yeah, you can't. You can't see patterns of activity 390 00:33:27.480 --> 00:33:30.640 if you're looking at it one at a time. Well, right, it's 391 00:33:30.720 --> 00:33:37.599 like kicking pieces of a jigsaw puzzle and looking at each piece separately, and 392 00:33:37.640 --> 00:33:42.599 then when you don't find an immediate piece that fits the next to put it 393 00:33:42.640 --> 00:33:45.799 together, well just put that aside. Now let's look at the next singular 394 00:33:45.839 --> 00:33:49.319 piece. You're never gonna be able to put the jigsaw puzzle together, is 395 00:33:49.319 --> 00:33:52.039 what I'm saying. If you're only examining one piece at a time and then 396 00:33:52.160 --> 00:33:55.720 not keeping it on the table along with the other pieces. Right, I 397 00:33:55.720 --> 00:33:59.559 mean, well, and you don't know what is anomalous and what isn't. 398 00:33:59.640 --> 00:34:01.720 Let let's let's take it. This is a radical example, but just to 399 00:34:01.720 --> 00:34:08.039 give an example before nine to eleven, Okay, if and the FBI was 400 00:34:08.119 --> 00:34:13.800 the FBI actually was in touch with flight schools. If someone had been doing 401 00:34:13.840 --> 00:34:21.119 a long term study and asked themselves a question, how many private citizens have 402 00:34:21.360 --> 00:34:30.280 walked in to pay for lessons on flying a heavy aircraft, a heavy commercial 403 00:34:30.280 --> 00:34:38.079 aircraft, and that individual had no affiliation with a you know, commercial company, 404 00:34:40.119 --> 00:34:44.760 a nation States military. If they had been looking at as a pattern, 405 00:34:45.039 --> 00:34:50.760 it would have immediately popped out to them that there was a problem because 406 00:34:50.800 --> 00:34:54.760 this and they should have investigated it. And so you've got to have a 407 00:34:54.800 --> 00:35:01.440 long term set of data so you can see the anomalies. That's another important 408 00:35:01.440 --> 00:35:06.159 part of what we're doing because one of the things at that point you'd say, 409 00:35:06.400 --> 00:35:08.280 well, wait a minute, it was like this for ten years and 410 00:35:08.360 --> 00:35:14.440 suddenly this year it's like that, what changed? What's going on? Something's 411 00:35:14.480 --> 00:35:19.079 happening, what is it? Without without that long term study, you'll never 412 00:35:19.159 --> 00:35:24.719 see those kind of anomalies. Right, So continuing on, though, what 413 00:35:24.960 --> 00:35:30.159 specifically did this did this paper that you recently published, what did we do? 414 00:35:30.280 --> 00:35:34.480 Yeah, what did you do? What we did this third paper? 415 00:35:34.559 --> 00:35:40.920 So the first two papers looked strictly at reports from military facilities, military installations, 416 00:35:42.360 --> 00:35:50.440 whether they were atomic related or conventional or weapons testing facilities like White Sands. 417 00:35:51.079 --> 00:35:55.119 First two papers were focused on the military. We decided that we were 418 00:35:55.400 --> 00:36:00.559 comfortable that we had a technique in a database that sea patterns if they were 419 00:36:00.559 --> 00:36:06.199 there. So now we're engaged in a two part study looking at what happened 420 00:36:06.239 --> 00:36:09.840 with the public, not the military, during the same study, during the 421 00:36:09.880 --> 00:36:14.679 same period of time. So we switched to reports that are coming in from 422 00:36:14.679 --> 00:36:17.039 what we referred to as the public domain. You know, what was the 423 00:36:17.079 --> 00:36:21.840 public reporting and even if it was you know, it can be a military 424 00:36:21.880 --> 00:36:24.840 person in a public venue, you know, they're just not on a military 425 00:36:24.920 --> 00:36:30.039 So what was the public scene? What were what was happening? Did the 426 00:36:30.320 --> 00:36:37.760 types of activities change, did the locations change? And basically the study that 427 00:36:37.800 --> 00:36:43.760 we just published is a pattern study over this same period of time in terms 428 00:36:43.800 --> 00:36:49.440 of what was happening with public reports, and we did find some major patterns 429 00:36:49.599 --> 00:36:54.000 pop out of that. Patterns that were quite different from the military. So 430 00:36:54.159 --> 00:36:58.719 one of the things we did is we look for those patterns and then we 431 00:36:58.960 --> 00:37:05.199 compared the patterns in the public domain reports with the military domain, so we 432 00:37:05.239 --> 00:37:07.440 could kind of beat them against each other and say, well, was there 433 00:37:07.519 --> 00:37:13.639 really something different going on with the public and if so, you know, 434 00:37:13.679 --> 00:37:16.280 what's it going on consistently all the time. As it turns out, a 435 00:37:16.400 --> 00:37:22.559 major thing that the study revealed was no, there was a shift. It's 436 00:37:22.039 --> 00:37:27.840 in the graphs. It's as clear as you could possibly imagine that the UAP 437 00:37:28.039 --> 00:37:34.400 activity shifted from the military domain, a focus on the military domain, to 438 00:37:34.719 --> 00:37:42.800 a focus on the public and to activities like close and close approaches loitering. 439 00:37:44.719 --> 00:37:52.119 Basically a shift to UAP interest in individuals and small groups of observer of public 440 00:37:52.199 --> 00:37:59.800 observers, and actually shifted in geographically from all the areas of the military base 441 00:38:00.119 --> 00:38:07.280 is too fascinating. It shifted from west to east to the upper Midwest and 442 00:38:07.760 --> 00:38:15.280 upstate New York. M Okay. So yeah, you have a location shift, 443 00:38:15.360 --> 00:38:20.360 you have definite change. So you don't have a I mean, because 444 00:38:20.400 --> 00:38:25.400 the public could observe things that are around a military base, right, do 445 00:38:25.760 --> 00:38:31.599 you have like you just have a complete geographical shift. Is the nature of 446 00:38:31.639 --> 00:38:37.400 these things. You're good, sorry, right for against Sure the public, 447 00:38:37.880 --> 00:38:43.480 the public could have reported something over Albuquerque, New Mexico and San Dia Base, 448 00:38:44.480 --> 00:38:51.679 or over uh you know the Panax plant outside of Amarello where we assemble 449 00:38:51.719 --> 00:38:55.000 atomic weapons. Now, sure the public could could have reported that. Uh 450 00:38:55.320 --> 00:39:00.239 they didn't, I mean not only did not the person. Well, now 451 00:39:00.280 --> 00:39:04.599 that the locations didn't report it, the public didn't report it. The public 452 00:39:05.079 --> 00:39:12.199 the public reports are It's not a matter of neither the public or the military 453 00:39:12.360 --> 00:39:16.920 saw things over military facilities. With one great exception, and this is the 454 00:39:16.960 --> 00:39:23.199 one exception that continued throughout the course of the study. Wherever the most modern 455 00:39:23.599 --> 00:39:30.679 and the most capable and the most dangerous atomic weapons are located, that's where 456 00:39:30.840 --> 00:39:38.519 UAP activity continued. So, for example, you didn't see UAP activity at 457 00:39:38.159 --> 00:39:45.320 the early Atlas missile silos where you saw them or the Titan missile side of 458 00:39:45.360 --> 00:39:52.239 those facilities went away, missiles shut down. But just in terms of geography, 459 00:39:52.920 --> 00:39:59.800 the bases across the North and the Dakotas, the northern tier bases, 460 00:40:00.159 --> 00:40:07.239 that activity continued. So it pretty clearly shows that UAP activity followed the missiles, 461 00:40:07.800 --> 00:40:13.960 which is a pretty interesting thought. So okay, at least you've come 462 00:40:14.039 --> 00:40:16.960 up with some patterns here, and obviously there's a lot more in the study. 463 00:40:17.960 --> 00:40:23.440 And they can read this again by going to one of the websites that 464 00:40:23.480 --> 00:40:30.840 have described and also will provide the links for explore SCU dot org. By 465 00:40:30.880 --> 00:40:34.599 the way, is the main hub for your organization? Is that correct? 466 00:40:35.159 --> 00:40:38.360 Right? Okay? And it looks like coming up in May, all right, 467 00:40:38.400 --> 00:40:43.320 in Huntsville, Alabama, May thirty first to June second. There is 468 00:40:43.360 --> 00:40:47.079 going to be a bit of a conference too, So our annual conference will 469 00:40:47.119 --> 00:40:51.440 have a lot of speakers on the topic. I mean, we will be 470 00:40:51.480 --> 00:40:54.159 presenting our studies as well, but we have a lot of speakers on the 471 00:40:54.800 --> 00:41:00.639 topic in general and what's going on even from internationally. And I think again 472 00:41:00.679 --> 00:41:04.920 for your listeners, there is a it is a virtual it's in person and 473 00:41:05.039 --> 00:41:09.320 virtual as well, so it's possible to log in and follow the whole conference 474 00:41:09.719 --> 00:41:13.360 virtually. There is a there is a fee, of course, but it's 475 00:41:13.360 --> 00:41:20.760 a both both in person and virtual, and we an interesting We have a 476 00:41:20.800 --> 00:41:24.840 couple of speakers and in addition to ours our presentation on this study, our 477 00:41:25.599 --> 00:41:32.800 national security advisor will be going presenting a speech on doing a presentation again related 478 00:41:32.840 --> 00:41:40.360 to national security and UAPs and what's going on in that arena and how it 479 00:41:40.360 --> 00:41:45.119 should be dealt with, maybe not how it is being dealt with. So 480 00:41:45.320 --> 00:41:51.679 this aspect of national security will come into the conference in a couple of places, 481 00:41:51.679 --> 00:41:53.599 But it's not all about that. A lot of it is just literally 482 00:41:54.039 --> 00:41:59.400 about the phenomena, how to deal with the phenomena, who should be studying 483 00:41:59.440 --> 00:42:04.239 it, academia, who should be studying and you know, the overall phenomena. 484 00:42:04.280 --> 00:42:07.800 So I don't want to give the wrong impression. It's not just about 485 00:42:07.880 --> 00:42:12.039 what we're talking about here. It's much broader than that, right right. 486 00:42:12.079 --> 00:42:14.480 I mean, obviously there's going to be a lot more in the conference. 487 00:42:14.599 --> 00:42:17.679 I mean, are there any particular names that you already know that are that 488 00:42:17.719 --> 00:42:22.840 are booked, that are confirmed, that that you want to point out as 489 00:42:22.920 --> 00:42:25.519 highlights here? Well, the names probably would. I mean, these are 490 00:42:27.000 --> 00:42:34.800 I think all of our speakers are keynote speaker are whole doctorates. They are 491 00:42:34.920 --> 00:42:39.880 professionals. They are scientific professionals. They come from the hard sciences, from 492 00:42:39.960 --> 00:42:46.639 physics, they come from the softer sciences, psychology. You know that, 493 00:42:46.840 --> 00:42:53.639 so you might not recognize the names because in all honesty, we're not focusing 494 00:42:53.800 --> 00:43:02.679 on some of the subjects that are commonly covered in m UAP podcasting for that 495 00:43:02.760 --> 00:43:07.119 matter. I mean, there are dozens of speakers that focus on that subject 496 00:43:07.159 --> 00:43:14.480 and are really wrapped up and sent maybe the more sensational aspects of the phenomena. 497 00:43:14.599 --> 00:43:17.320 And that's just what we that's what we don't do. But Perfect or 498 00:43:17.400 --> 00:43:22.000 the organization all obvious is the names. If you look at the names, 499 00:43:22.039 --> 00:43:25.880 it'd probably be better if it's interested to look at the names and look at 500 00:43:27.000 --> 00:43:30.519 what they're you know, what their expertise is, rather than me throughout the 501 00:43:30.599 --> 00:43:36.639 name, because you're probably not going to recognize it. No fair enough, 502 00:43:36.679 --> 00:43:42.039 but look and it's also to my mind, perfect because a problem that was 503 00:43:42.079 --> 00:43:49.360 experienced with the release of your book Unidentified was that it fit into a genre 504 00:43:50.079 --> 00:43:57.079 but was atypical from what is generally perceived as you know, the latest new 505 00:43:57.119 --> 00:44:02.079 thing that's like a hot item, really really strange. Unidentified is not like 506 00:44:02.199 --> 00:44:07.400 you know, about alien abductions and little green men. It is about the 507 00:44:07.480 --> 00:44:14.320 national security response. Two, it's very similar to what this whole organization does. 508 00:44:14.400 --> 00:44:17.480 Is that book that. I'm pretty sure you weren't part of that organization 509 00:44:17.880 --> 00:44:22.199 till after you published this book. Yeah, that's right. As a matter 510 00:44:22.239 --> 00:44:28.880 of fact, that this whole intention study grew out of something that I brought 511 00:44:28.960 --> 00:44:31.400 up in the book, kind of like would it be possible to do this? 512 00:44:31.679 --> 00:44:35.960 And the book actually one of the things that the book does is to 513 00:44:36.039 --> 00:44:40.039 use this same technique to say, oh, during the nineteen forties and fifties, 514 00:44:40.239 --> 00:44:44.679 could it have been the Russians? Because everybody thought maybe it was the 515 00:44:44.760 --> 00:44:50.000 Russians. And the fun thing in the book was to go use the same 516 00:44:50.039 --> 00:44:53.800 techniques and say was it And the conclusion is, no, it wasn't and 517 00:44:53.840 --> 00:45:00.199 it couldn't have been. We just kind of carried that on. So it 518 00:45:00.199 --> 00:45:04.679 it was somewhat of the genesis of this project. Right. And the other 519 00:45:04.719 --> 00:45:07.400 interesting thing here is that, look, it's atypical in that, like the 520 00:45:07.960 --> 00:45:13.320 way to get public interest in this might have been, Look, this is 521 00:45:13.559 --> 00:45:16.039 possibly the Russians, And how did the Russians get it? Well, you 522 00:45:16.039 --> 00:45:21.239 know what, the Russians might have acquired assets post World War two? Right, 523 00:45:22.079 --> 00:45:24.840 whatever the Russian word is for paper clip? Here we go, right, 524 00:45:24.960 --> 00:45:28.639 you know, we got Werner von Braun, they got other people. 525 00:45:28.840 --> 00:45:32.880 This is the results of it. Even if you presented that as a possibility 526 00:45:34.360 --> 00:45:40.280 right for your book and followed that tract that might have been you know the 527 00:45:40.360 --> 00:45:45.800 key here, right, that would be typical of that genre, let's say, 528 00:45:45.039 --> 00:45:51.320 right, But that's not where you went. You went into this is 529 00:45:51.360 --> 00:45:54.079 what we know, by the way, being a Storian as per usual regarding 530 00:45:54.119 --> 00:45:58.400 the reactions of the national skill. I mean, look, don't take this 531 00:45:58.480 --> 00:46:00.719 the wrong way, Larry, but this is rather typical of Larry Hancock. 532 00:46:01.159 --> 00:46:07.199 What is the national security reaction? What is going on here while these other 533 00:46:07.280 --> 00:46:12.239 events are taking place? Does this sound familiar? Yet? It does because 534 00:46:13.320 --> 00:46:19.519 you know in the military actions, in covert and overt actions regarding the intelligence 535 00:46:19.519 --> 00:46:24.440 communities, in assassinations, you have focused on this. This It makes perfect 536 00:46:24.440 --> 00:46:28.599 sense. This is exactly what I would expect. If I never heard of 537 00:46:28.639 --> 00:46:31.599 any of this and somebody told me Larry Hancock is going to explore this, 538 00:46:31.639 --> 00:46:35.760 I would say, Oh, he's going to go after what is the National 539 00:46:35.800 --> 00:46:42.280 security apparatus doing? Behaving like, what is it doing that's resulting in other 540 00:46:42.320 --> 00:46:47.599 actions taking place? What is the effect that the National security apparatus has on 541 00:46:49.320 --> 00:46:54.599 the government has on the public. This would be Larry Hancock's wheelhouse, you 542 00:46:54.639 --> 00:46:59.159 know he is. And I guess maybe the loosest way of think of it 543 00:46:59.199 --> 00:47:02.760 is kind of like, so what are they doing as compared to what they're 544 00:47:02.800 --> 00:47:07.559 saying they're doing? You know, what's the public story? And then what 545 00:47:07.599 --> 00:47:10.079 do the documents tell us that there is the real story? Right? So 546 00:47:10.199 --> 00:47:15.880 yeah, that's that's pretty repetitive. I've got to say there's a theme there. 547 00:47:15.920 --> 00:47:17.639 There's kind of this theme to your writing, Larry. I'm not saying 548 00:47:17.639 --> 00:47:22.880 that you lack imagination, because you don't. What I'm saying is that you 549 00:47:22.920 --> 00:47:27.679 are very focused on exactly this, which is super important. So I'm going 550 00:47:27.760 --> 00:47:30.960 to ask you it's totally uh out of the box question here, and we're 551 00:47:30.960 --> 00:47:34.880 going to bring this to a close because I've kept Larry long enough for tonight. 552 00:47:35.320 --> 00:47:37.800 But I think the point has been made and I look forward to continuing 553 00:47:37.960 --> 00:47:43.199 this inquiry as we go forward, because I think it's uh, I think 554 00:47:43.199 --> 00:47:47.920 it's really very it's really quite valuable to explore this. Yes, it's fun 555 00:47:47.960 --> 00:47:52.199 to look at is the whistleblower telling you the truth about the alien bodies and 556 00:47:52.239 --> 00:47:57.119 all that? But let's let's bring it. Pardon the punt back down to 557 00:47:57.199 --> 00:48:00.320 earth? Okay, what is it that we got a deal with here regarding 558 00:48:00.960 --> 00:48:05.639 the actions? And by the way, there's other contexts to be offered here. 559 00:48:05.920 --> 00:48:08.960 If this is the way this is being handled, what other unconventional threats 560 00:48:09.599 --> 00:48:14.840 don't have a point of proper collection? You know? Is there potential for 561 00:48:14.920 --> 00:48:17.119 other things like this going on? What do you think about that? As 562 00:48:17.199 --> 00:48:21.360 just a loose thought here, Larry, I mean, does this mean that 563 00:48:21.480 --> 00:48:25.880 maybe just maybe certain questions need to be asked maybe some people that could inspire 564 00:48:28.320 --> 00:48:31.719 you know, the use of creation of a sub agency or something like that. 565 00:48:31.840 --> 00:48:35.960 I mean not saying that we need the X files, but for God's 566 00:48:36.000 --> 00:48:39.360 sakes, we need something. Well, even from a more yeah, from 567 00:48:39.360 --> 00:48:44.840 a more practical standpoint. One of the things that popped out of these studies 568 00:48:45.000 --> 00:48:52.159 is, let's say a Navy group off San Diego has a up encounter. 569 00:48:52.039 --> 00:48:57.119 Okay, Let's say it's four or five Navy ships. They're in a training 570 00:48:57.199 --> 00:49:01.800 exercise and suddenly they're approached by several dozen drones and I don't know where they 571 00:49:01.840 --> 00:49:07.440 came from. Now, the real question, the question nobody has answered, 572 00:49:07.519 --> 00:49:12.159 is is there a national security response to that or does it just set within 573 00:49:12.199 --> 00:49:16.119 the Navy. You know, let's say the same thing happened off the East 574 00:49:16.199 --> 00:49:22.400 coast. Is there really a national security mechanism to reach out, grab that, 575 00:49:23.119 --> 00:49:29.039 profile it and go, oh, we need a national defense against these, 576 00:49:29.400 --> 00:49:34.280 You know, we need an air defense system that's optimized for these. 577 00:49:35.679 --> 00:49:42.760 Right now, we have a system that's operator set up for missile defense, 578 00:49:43.079 --> 00:49:47.599 honestly, and we have missile interceptors in Alaska and California. We don't have 579 00:49:49.280 --> 00:49:57.960 a national defense network for low altitude, low speed drones. Is anybody really 580 00:49:58.039 --> 00:50:02.800 tackling that at the level of national command authority? Among all the services? 581 00:50:02.840 --> 00:50:08.320 We know they're each developing their own anti drone systems, but who's putting together 582 00:50:08.840 --> 00:50:14.840 the drone defense network? And Lord only knows. We see in both Russia 583 00:50:14.880 --> 00:50:21.679 and Ukraine that you need it. So I think it's a very relevant question 584 00:50:21.800 --> 00:50:27.199 for national security. Do these reports just do the Navy reports stay within the 585 00:50:27.320 --> 00:50:32.440 Navy and the No RED reports stay within No Red? To the homeland reports 586 00:50:32.480 --> 00:50:38.280 of drones over atomic power plants? Where did they go? And the question 587 00:50:38.360 --> 00:50:42.239 is what, not only where, but how far up do they go? 588 00:50:42.679 --> 00:50:47.760 And where's the response? I don't think I've seen any article on a national 589 00:50:49.239 --> 00:50:54.239 anti drone defense network, lots of articles about what the services are doing to 590 00:50:54.280 --> 00:51:02.280 protect troops and ships and maybe some installation ones, but you know, there's 591 00:51:02.360 --> 00:51:07.639 nothing. How who How does it get up? How does it get elevated 592 00:51:07.800 --> 00:51:12.679 as a national priority? I don't know? Right? Fair enough? And 593 00:51:12.719 --> 00:51:16.639 look again to the much broader and you know, let's just say less refined, 594 00:51:17.519 --> 00:51:22.480 look at this, one could easily ask the question. And I think 595 00:51:22.519 --> 00:51:28.840 it's a responsible thing to ask and a necessary thing to ask when a newer, 596 00:51:29.039 --> 00:51:35.719 exotic or less than conventional something appears, right, I mean, there 597 00:51:35.760 --> 00:51:37.760 needs to be a way to deal with it. I mean I can't put 598 00:51:37.760 --> 00:51:43.320 this in any simpler terms. You have to have a mechanism. You have 599 00:51:43.400 --> 00:51:49.400 to have something to answer for when something unexpected shows up, the potential for 600 00:51:49.480 --> 00:51:53.880 again an exotic technology, something that was not thought of before, you know, 601 00:51:54.000 --> 00:51:58.559 I mean at a certain point, if you go back in time to 602 00:51:58.719 --> 00:52:05.960 use the radio might have not been thought as a military you know mechanism, 603 00:52:06.159 --> 00:52:09.199 right, Radio in and of itself might have been not kept track of very 604 00:52:09.239 --> 00:52:13.079 well. As a matter of fact, you can see an evolution of how 605 00:52:13.199 --> 00:52:16.039 radio was used about broadcasts later on, you know, they figured out ways 606 00:52:16.039 --> 00:52:22.519 to piggyback things onto broadcast television, broadcasts that contained other ways of information. 607 00:52:23.159 --> 00:52:30.519 The only reason why these things don't become extremely lethal, weaponized, you know 608 00:52:31.519 --> 00:52:37.880 tools, when it comes to the defense of a nation, it is because 609 00:52:37.079 --> 00:52:43.480 they prepare for it. They foresee this, They collect information when something emerges, 610 00:52:44.599 --> 00:52:47.079 and it gets evaluated, it gets handled, it gets developed into what 611 00:52:47.119 --> 00:52:50.599 we got to be able to deal with. You know, at a certain 612 00:52:50.599 --> 00:52:53.920 point, the military didn't utilize air you know, we didn't have planes, 613 00:52:54.119 --> 00:52:58.960 right, We still had a military, but we didn't have planes. So 614 00:52:59.199 --> 00:53:01.159 when things started to fly, you had to adjust to that. You had 615 00:53:01.159 --> 00:53:06.760 to know about it. Now that doesn't seem very exotic nowadays because it's extremely 616 00:53:06.800 --> 00:53:12.280 commonplace, but at one point it wasn't. Right, So there is a 617 00:53:12.360 --> 00:53:17.199 need to continuously evolve as threats evolved. Or am I oversimplifying this, Larry, 618 00:53:17.400 --> 00:53:23.639 Yeah, there's and maybe maybe it's being done. But the point is, 619 00:53:24.280 --> 00:53:28.400 at this point in time, it's going to be a matter of how 620 00:53:28.480 --> 00:53:32.960 quickly can you learn because four years ago, nobody, I'm sure in either 621 00:53:34.039 --> 00:53:43.360 Russia or Ukraine would have realized that their entire infrastructure was at risk to small 622 00:53:43.440 --> 00:53:47.840 devices that fly at different altitudes and only a few hundred miles an hour at 623 00:53:47.840 --> 00:53:52.440 best. Now, you look around our country and the problem is, to 624 00:53:52.480 --> 00:53:57.159 a large extent, these devices are deniable. By the way, you don't 625 00:53:57.199 --> 00:54:02.079 know who sent them. Who you know you can immediately put your you can 626 00:54:02.239 --> 00:54:08.320 there now, okay, But what if one afternoon every major hydro electric dam 627 00:54:08.400 --> 00:54:15.559 in our country received you know, five drone strikes with high explosives on it 628 00:54:15.960 --> 00:54:23.760 and took out the backbone of our hydro power generation. You know, that's 629 00:54:24.119 --> 00:54:28.079 not to be a scare monger, but the point is that should be a 630 00:54:28.119 --> 00:54:31.840 threat that someone is looking at. Now. You aps may not be a 631 00:54:31.920 --> 00:54:37.800 threat, okay, but that doesn't mean there aren't aerial devices that are threats. 632 00:54:37.840 --> 00:54:43.440 So now I think I think the real answer to your your point there, 633 00:54:43.519 --> 00:54:46.280 Chuck, is that is to look at the process and question if the 634 00:54:46.360 --> 00:54:57.079 process is flexible enough to deal with with emergent technologies, if you were emergent 635 00:54:57.199 --> 00:55:00.480 threats, if you were and I don't know, the standard thing is always, 636 00:55:00.559 --> 00:55:05.159 well, you're planning, you're planning to defend against the threats from the 637 00:55:05.239 --> 00:55:09.559 last war, right, I mean, that's that's a standard mantra and you're 638 00:55:09.599 --> 00:55:15.199 fighting the last war now and you're behind the curve. I would just I 639 00:55:15.199 --> 00:55:20.199 would just not want to be in that position again. But I'm not reading 640 00:55:20.239 --> 00:55:24.599 those articles in the defense journals or you know, how how do we deal 641 00:55:24.639 --> 00:55:31.480 with this as a national issue, because that really is why Congress. Congress 642 00:55:31.519 --> 00:55:38.079 really created this group, not to look for aliens. They looked for foreign, 643 00:55:38.280 --> 00:55:44.960 new and novel foreign threats and get a hold on them because they weren't 644 00:55:45.119 --> 00:55:51.079 certain that anybody was doing it right. The Intelligence Committee there, I got 645 00:55:51.079 --> 00:55:54.159 to tell you, behind the scenes, I honestly don't think and the skiffs 646 00:55:54.679 --> 00:56:00.320 and in the classified briefing sessions, they're not talking about et No, they're 647 00:56:00.400 --> 00:56:05.519 talking about a totally different type of threat. No. And as you said, 648 00:56:05.559 --> 00:56:07.119 look, the military could be prepared like it was. I mean, 649 00:56:07.159 --> 00:56:12.400 look, drone technology. This is a very important thing because it's not the 650 00:56:12.440 --> 00:56:15.199 fact that drones are new. They're very old. Indeed, there's been drones 651 00:56:15.239 --> 00:56:21.440 in different unmanned aerial aircrafts and things like this for decades, many decades in 652 00:56:21.599 --> 00:56:24.880 use. But the fact is that stuff that might have been previously thought of 653 00:56:25.000 --> 00:56:30.960 as almost toys at best of public nuisance, right, people were going around 654 00:56:30.000 --> 00:56:35.159 with drones with cameras on them in the private sector, stuff like this, 655 00:56:35.360 --> 00:56:38.519 hobbyists right, involved in drone stuff. And yeah, of course there's big 656 00:56:38.559 --> 00:56:43.639 planes that could be unmanned, but no, the fact that these very small, 657 00:56:43.840 --> 00:56:49.760 very tiny, almost undetectable in some cases weapons could be deployed. I 658 00:56:49.800 --> 00:56:54.440 mean this has become a significant factor in Ukraine slash Russia and that conflict recently. 659 00:56:55.320 --> 00:56:59.280 A few years ago. If you would have said this to somebody publicly 660 00:57:00.039 --> 00:57:01.280 that people were going to be using, Like if we went back, say 661 00:57:01.320 --> 00:57:06.360 twenty years and said, look, you know these little toys you see, 662 00:57:06.679 --> 00:57:10.880 you know, they'd be great weapons, they might think you were crazy because 663 00:57:12.000 --> 00:57:14.840 you don't see that in public. Now, that doesn't necessarily mean the military 664 00:57:14.920 --> 00:57:17.400 is not protecting, you know, preparing for it and protecting against it. 665 00:57:17.960 --> 00:57:22.280 But we don't see it, and we certainly don't see the collection of information 666 00:57:22.480 --> 00:57:27.519 being handled on the particular issue that you're studying being handled properly. Now, 667 00:57:27.559 --> 00:57:31.639 is there a possibility that there is, you know, very super secretive something 668 00:57:31.719 --> 00:57:36.320 going on, Well, I guess so. I mean there's always hidden elements 669 00:57:36.320 --> 00:57:40.199 of the operational end of the intelligence community, right, So I mean it's 670 00:57:40.320 --> 00:57:46.320 possible, but right now we don't see anything publicly that shows that they're taking 671 00:57:46.360 --> 00:57:52.159 the potential for exotic threats. Forget about the off world you know issues here, 672 00:57:52.480 --> 00:57:58.199 but other unidentified aerial phenomena could be a serious problem. I mean, 673 00:57:58.559 --> 00:58:01.639 that is the overall point. And you know you're doing it on the civilian 674 00:58:01.719 --> 00:58:07.400 side, but it would be nice to see that demonstrated on the military side 675 00:58:07.039 --> 00:58:15.000 and you know, institutions of the intelligence community, et cetera. Right, 676 00:58:15.480 --> 00:58:19.360 I mean, that's the thing that just struck me is it's actually not encouraging 677 00:58:19.400 --> 00:58:23.239 to have someone from ar GO come on board and say the good news is 678 00:58:23.320 --> 00:58:30.239 we've identified these things and you know they're not alien spacecraft their enemy drones. 679 00:58:30.639 --> 00:58:32.840 Like wait a minute, was that the good news? That's the good news? 680 00:58:34.360 --> 00:58:36.920 Yeah, that's that's a little rough. And anyway, like you said, 681 00:58:36.920 --> 00:58:39.840 the names might not be recognizable at this upcoming conference, but you can 682 00:58:39.880 --> 00:58:45.480 sign up for it online and I will give you the link to go learn 683 00:58:45.519 --> 00:58:50.239 more and sign up for it again. It's a explore scu dot org. 684 00:58:50.360 --> 00:58:54.239 Now, if you type in slash about dash one, you'll go to the 685 00:58:54.239 --> 00:58:59.079 twenty twenty four conference page and you'll see Yeah, a lot of names that 686 00:58:59.079 --> 00:59:05.199 you might not recognize at all, but the different contributing members, speakers, 687 00:59:05.280 --> 00:59:09.000 et cetera, have all sorts of interesting yes, doctorates and all that. 688 00:59:09.559 --> 00:59:16.320 But also you know you're looking at physicists, astronomers, astrophysicists, you're looking 689 00:59:16.360 --> 00:59:22.239 at let's see, there's a journalist and author. You know, there's a 690 00:59:22.320 --> 00:59:30.719 science, communications, sciences, various people involved in various sciences and different disciplines 691 00:59:31.519 --> 00:59:37.280 all coming together in this twenty twenty four AAPC conference, which by the way 692 00:59:37.360 --> 00:59:44.159 stands for Anomalists Aerospace Phenomena. Okay, that's the AAP part of it, 693 00:59:44.519 --> 00:59:50.360 and the c IS conference. So the twenty twenty four AAPC conference again through 694 00:59:51.039 --> 01:00:00.000 the SCU okay, which one more time is this scientific Coalition for UAP study 695 01:00:00.679 --> 01:00:04.679 and all of that through Larry Hancock, and you can follow Larry at larrydish 696 01:00:05.000 --> 01:00:07.400 Hancock dot com. Of course, you can also click and go see his 697 01:00:07.480 --> 01:00:12.400 blog. Links to all of these things that I have just mentioned will be 698 01:00:12.440 --> 01:00:15.360 in with the show notes and at the live chatroom at o'chelly dot com. 699 01:00:15.800 --> 01:00:20.840 And again I recommend all of Larry's books, all of the ones I see 700 01:00:20.880 --> 01:00:23.440 published. I own all of them and urge you to do the same, 701 01:00:23.880 --> 01:00:28.519 whether it's in digital or physical form. I prefer the physical books, which 702 01:00:28.559 --> 01:00:31.760 is why I keep saying he takes up a lot of space on my bookshelf. 703 01:00:31.800 --> 01:00:36.039 But he's not just taking up space. He's definitely done a lot of 704 01:00:36.079 --> 01:00:38.519 great work. And I thank you again for being on the Ocelli effect. 705 01:00:38.599 --> 01:00:44.599 Larry. We'll see again in two weeks and we might continue this inquiry, 706 01:00:45.880 --> 01:00:51.920 right which you know, the new thematic title will now be you know, 707 01:00:52.280 --> 01:00:55.840 unidentified, just like Larry's book, except this will be the continuous inquiry. 708 01:00:57.599 --> 01:01:00.159 So and I think we should get credit check because like it's a word, 709 01:01:00.199 --> 01:01:05.519 there's no acronym, right, I mean, we've reduced this whole subject down 710 01:01:05.559 --> 01:01:09.719 to one word, So we should get points exactly unidentified with Larry Hancock. 711 01:01:09.760 --> 01:01:14.679 Maybe that's that's the best way to go unidentified the series. So this is 712 01:01:14.719 --> 01:01:16.880 part one. There's been plenty of a preamble, and you could have heard 713 01:01:16.880 --> 01:01:27.519 it all, or you can hear it all revelation through conversation. Wallstream Window 714 01:01:27.559 --> 01:01:38.679 dot Gold Silver, the stock market, wall Stream Window dott. Perhaps you're 715 01:01:38.719 --> 01:01:43.920 invested deeply, perhaps you're not in deep enough. Maybe you're thinking about getting 716 01:01:43.960 --> 01:01:49.239 started Wall Street Windows, don con doo, don km. Michael Swanson, 717 01:01:49.280 --> 01:01:53.519 the brilliant author of the War State, understood these trends professionally for many years, 718 01:01:53.559 --> 01:02:02.119 and now he gives you the benefit of his knowledge. Wallstreetot go there, 719 01:02:02.280 --> 01:02:06.920 now go there, now go there. Now? Do you like history? 720 01:02:07.159 --> 01:02:12.079 Real history that you were never taught in schools? Why the Vietnam War 721 01:02:12.360 --> 01:02:17.000 Nuclear Bombs in nation Building in Southeast Asia by author Mike Swanson, with new 722 01:02:17.079 --> 01:02:22.639 documentation never seen before that'll open your eyes to events that led up to this. 723 01:02:23.119 --> 01:02:30.719 Why the Vietnam War Nuclear Bombs in nation Building in Southeast Asia nineteen forty 724 01:02:30.760 --> 01:02:36.719 five through nineteen sixty one. Get your copy today at Amazon dot com. 725 01:02:36.920 --> 01:02:40.840 Why the Vietnam War by author Mike Swanson. Oh Chili dot com, Go 726 01:02:40.880 --> 01:02:45.880 ahead, car the truth about the Day assassination. Right, Well, what 727 01:02:45.920 --> 01:02:49.880 do you want to know? Judy Baker's wild claim Oswald girlfriends he knew Ruby 728 01:02:49.880 --> 01:02:52.360 and Barry handcy weapons. Really, I imagine I could claim I have four 729 01:02:52.360 --> 01:02:55.599 wheels. It doesn't make me a wagon. But okay, Oswald was on 730 01:02:55.719 --> 01:02:59.639 the building and trying to vent the murder of John Kennedy. Come on, 731 01:02:59.719 --> 01:03:02.599 now as a real effort on the DFA assassination book into her claims. Go 732 01:03:02.679 --> 01:03:07.920 to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker in her own words. You'll get the 733 01:03:07.960 --> 01:03:13.960 results for a digital copy of a book where Walt Brown utilizes her own words 734 01:03:14.000 --> 01:03:17.960 and the known evidence in the case to get at well a different perspective. 735 01:03:19.039 --> 01:03:22.239 Let's say you can get Judith Ary Baker in her own words from the author 736 01:03:22.320 --> 01:03:28.000 himself, signed if you request it by contacting doctor Brown at k I as 737 01:03:28.280 --> 01:03:32.960 jfk at aol dot com. It's a fun book and it actually dissects the 738 01:03:34.000 --> 01:03:37.880 many, many fantastic claims Judith very Baker in her own words, Thank you 739 01:03:37.920 --> 01:03:44.559 for all the great information Shelley dot com Radio Network. The War State by 740 01:03:44.599 --> 01:03:49.760 Michael Swanson explains the great national transformation that took place and put the Kennedy presidency 741 01:03:49.800 --> 01:03:53.639 in the context of the times and reveals never before published information about the Cuban 742 01:03:53.639 --> 01:03:59.119 missile crisis. President Kennedy would not have been assassinated if he had been president 743 01:03:59.159 --> 01:04:02.880 two hundred years. His assassination took place in the context of the Cold War 744 01:04:03.079 --> 01:04:06.639 and the rise of the national security state. Before World War II, the 745 01:04:06.760 --> 01:04:12.000 United States was a continental Republic. In the decade that followed it became an 746 01:04:12.039 --> 01:04:16.039 imperial superpower. Generals such as Curtis LeMay not only wanted to invade Cuba, 747 01:04:16.119 --> 01:04:20.239 but knew that there were short range missiles on the island arn't with nuclear warheads 748 01:04:20.360 --> 01:04:25.400 that they could not destroy because they were on mobile launchers. Their invasion could 749 01:04:25.400 --> 01:04:29.079 have led to a Third World War, and they wanted to go to war 750 01:04:29.320 --> 01:04:32.880 anyway. The War State by Michael Swanson reveals why and will show you what 751 01:04:32.960 --> 01:04:39.440 President Kennedy was up against. For more information, the Warstate dot Com to 752 01:04:39.519 --> 01:04:42.039 Viuse expressed, like Cohler stools, there anyone else who happens to get on 753 01:04:42.039 --> 01:04:45.159 the air of Jelly dot com if not necessarily reflect the views of Jelly dot 754 01:04:45.159 --> 01:04:47.440 com or job o'chilly, and we are not responsible for any stupidity which might 755 01:04:47.519 --> 01:04:53.440 ensue. Thank you. In Denial The Secret Wars with Air Strikes and Tanks 756 01:04:53.880 --> 01:04:59.559 by Larry Hancock. Secret Wars became a staple of US Covert Operations Center, 757 01:04:59.679 --> 01:05:04.199 still happening today. Larryhancock's book In Denial rips the cover off many of them, 758 01:05:04.480 --> 01:05:08.840 using new files. It exposes things about the Bay of Pigs that no 759 01:05:08.960 --> 01:05:13.000 one has ever written about before. It shows why it really failed and why 760 01:05:13.119 --> 01:05:16.280 the United States did not learn from it. It also shows why other countries 761 01:05:16.320 --> 01:05:21.079 today are doing secret operations with more success. This is the book that puts 762 01:05:21.159 --> 01:05:27.679 what some want to deny into the light. In Denial, Secret Wars with 763 01:05:27.840 --> 01:05:33.679 Air Strikes and Tanks Larryhncock. For more information, go to Larry hyphen Handcock 764 01:05:33.840 --> 01:05:38.880 dot com. Pick up your copy of In Denial at Amazon dot com. 765 01:05:39.119 --> 01:05:43.920 In digital or physical nuclear holocausts, you know what uranium is right? Think 766 01:05:43.960 --> 01:05:47.360 called nuclear weapons and other things like lots of you know what uranium is right? 767 01:05:47.679 --> 01:05:53.480 Bad things things are done with uranium in living, some bad things nuclear 768 01:05:53.559 --> 01:05:57.920 holocaust. You know what uranium is right? I have been brief Nuclear holocaust, 769 01:05:58.320 --> 01:06:01.960 Nuclear holocaust. Uranium is right, I think on nuclear weapons and other 770 01:06:02.079 --> 01:06:08.119 things like lots of you know uranium is right? Bad things things are done 771 01:06:08.320 --> 01:06:29.199 with uranium, including some bad things nuclear holocaut Yeah you still. You're sponsored 772 01:06:29.239 --> 01:06:34.440 by Walls the Window dot Com and listeners like you now and now the most 773 01:06:34.599 --> 01:06:42.239 underrated noise and in our media, Shock Shelley. In Denial The Secret Wars 774 01:06:42.440 --> 01:06:47.840 with Air Strikes and Tanks by Larry Hancock secret wars became a staple of US 775 01:06:47.960 --> 01:06:54.519 covert operations and are still happening today. Larry Hancock's book In Denial rips the 776 01:06:54.639 --> 01:06:58.480 cover off many of them, using new files. It exposes things about the 777 01:06:58.559 --> 01:07:01.519 Bay of Pigs that no one has ever written about before. It shows why 778 01:07:01.559 --> 01:07:05.440 it really failed and why the United States did not earn from it. It 779 01:07:05.559 --> 01:07:11.679 also shows why other countries today are doing secret operations with more success. This 780 01:07:11.880 --> 01:07:15.239 is the book that puts what some want to deny into the light. In 781 01:07:15.440 --> 01:07:23.679 Denial secret wars with air strikes and tanks Larryhncock. For more information, go 782 01:07:23.800 --> 01:07:28.320 to Larry hyphen Handcock dot com. Pick up your copy of In Denial at 783 01:07:28.400 --> 01:07:30.079 Amazon dot com in digital or physical