WEBVTT

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about special operations. Cobert ask me the

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Team House with your hopes. Jack
Burphy like David Park. Hey, guys,

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welcome to episode two forty three of
The Team House. I'm Jack Murphy

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here with Dave Park and our guest
on tonight's show. Is the author of

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Common Sense Leadership Matters. This is
book three in the series Toxic Leadership Destroys

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by Pete Labor. Pete served as
a officer in Ranger Battalion and then in

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Delta Force and has gone on to
have a successful career after the military,

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and we're really excited to have him
here on the show to talk about his

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series of books and his career,
especially his most recent book, which is

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about the operation in which Pat Tillman
was tragically killed. So, Pete,

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thank you for joining us tonight.
Thanks for having me, guys. So

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as usual on the show, we'll
start off at the beginning. Pete,

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tell us a little bit about what
your upbringing was like and that what led

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you towards military service. Sure so, born and raised o Park, Illinois,

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suburb outside of Chicago. Great place
to grow up. I was a

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middle kid of nine kids. Still
to this day, I amazed my parents

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and how the heck they did it. But my mom was an amazing task

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master. She used to have a
big matrix of jobs that we had three

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days a week. I usually had
to wash them, clean the bathrooms,

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and mop the floors, swabbing the
decks. At an early age and you

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know, just a normal upbringing.
Played baseball, football, hockey, probably

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my favorite pastime. Favorite what I
think should have been a sport was bombing

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cars, throwing snowballs at cars.
You know, it's the beginning of my

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I think infantryman life. I realized, I, you know, loved both

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the thrill of the hunt and the
thrill of the chase. And so you

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know, I took it pretty seriously. UH and probably again UH caused my

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parents quite a few heartaches, you
know, running home, hiding. Why

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are you hiding? Some guy would
come flying through the yard, UH search

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it for us. In high school, I ran across country. UH,

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played hockey and ran cross country,
and you know, the cross country was

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kind of an extension of that bombing
cars. Uh, I used. People

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would go, why why are you
running cross country? Uh? I said,

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well, I want to. I
want to get to a state where

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nobody can catch me. And uh, I just I can run forever and

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and no one has any chance of
catching me. And UH. You know,

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I think cross country does that.
It gives you an incredible endurance.

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UH. You know, teaches you
to deal with pain, uh in your

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own way. And you know it, it was, unbeknownst the time,

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one more step uh in the process
on the way to uh, you know,

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join in the military and becoming an
infantryman. I was not you know,

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like a lot of guys you talked
to on the show. I certainly

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was not a model of scholastic excellence. Uh you know, I just just

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being in a classroom. All that
stuff was not for me. My brothers

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and sisters were you know, super
smart, straight A students, So you

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know, I was like the uh
you know, the unspoken, semi retarded

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brother. Uh, you know,
special led guy. You know. It

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was really just I could not stand, had no academic discipline, and just

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did not like being in the classroom. So I graduated high school, it

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was time to go to college.
I went to Southern Illinois University, which

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is at the bottom of Illinois.
It's the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi

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rivers. And I chose Southern Illinois
not for its athletic programs, certainly not

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for its academic programs. I chose
it because it was surrounded by the two

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hundred and seventy five thousand acres Shawnee
National Forest. And you know, my

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first time down there, coming from
a suburb of Chicago, I was,

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you know, just it was like
Nirvana, you know, just this endless

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rolling hills, a place you could
get lost in. You know, camp

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out, do whatever you wanted.
And it was pretty much the you know,

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the focus of my college career too. Every weekend I was out hiking

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in places like Panther's Den and Devil's
Kitchen. Uh, you know, just

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wilderness in every direction, explored it, and you know, just learned to

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navigate things like that. You know, right when I graduated high school and

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got into my first year of college, that was the Iran hostage rescue mission.

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And from that point on, you
know, that was that was the

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thing that turned me towards the military. As I mentioned, I didn't know

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anything about the military. There was
no military around Illinois. I don't think

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I ever even saw a camouflage truck
when I was growing up, So I

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really knew nothing about it. But
when that happened, and you know,

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the news came out about what up, and it just had an incredible effect

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on me. That that eight you
know, American heroes died in the middle

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of desert one. They gave their
life to save to save the hostages in

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Iran. And so, you know, I was again a runner. I

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was doing triathlons in college by that
point. So I would just go on

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long runs and and think about my
future and think about, you know,

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what a great country I lived in, what an unbelievable upbringing I had,

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And you know, my conclusion was, I need to pay something back to

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the country. And you know,
in my last two years of college,

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I started going to recruiters to try
to figure out what, you know,

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what was out there. And you
know, Jack, I heard you on

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one of your podcasts say you didn't
know anything, and I was the same

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way. I just did not know
a thing about the military. So the

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first someone told me to go,
you know, to the Air Force and

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fly jets, and I didn't want
to do that, but there was an

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Air Force recruiter right there, and
I went down talk to him, and

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it didn't take long for me to
come to the conclusion that I was in

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the wrong recruiting office. So I
started going to army recruiters and I put

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plural because it took me four recruiters
to get one that would just give me

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what I wanted. They were all
trying to get me to sign up for

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things I never heard of. And
you know, I will add that I

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was shocked at the time because I, for some reason, I thought everyone,

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if you're in the Army. You're
an infantryman. So when they started

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talking about tankers and artillery and medical
corps and I was like, what,

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who does that? You know?
And that's what they all they tried to

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get me into. And that's why
I kept going to new recruiters and I

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finally found one. I still remember
his name. The name was Terry's Story

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and he said, what do you
want to do? And I said,

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well, I want to join Delta
Force and he goes, well, you

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can't do that. You can't sign
up for that. You could do that

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when you get in, but you
got to have an MOS. And I

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said, well, like what and
he said, well, you probably should

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go infantry and I said, yeah, that's what I want to do.

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So I signed up. My contract
was for Infantry OCS, that's what it

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was called back then. And you
know, when I graduated, I hopped

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on a train and it took me
off the basic training. You have to

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make it through basic in order to
go to o CS and then you know

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you're a PF. And if you
make it through OCS, you get commissioned.

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If you don't, you go back
to being a PFC. And you

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know OCS is at Fort Benning,
so I would have gone, you know,

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across the post uh to a I
T but I didn't. I made

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it through uh OCS. It was
also a great experience, Like I said

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it was. It was torturous,
but I was a an endurance athlete,

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so I could do like a thousand
push ups at the time and uh and

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you know, never even wins,
so it was uh. It was fun

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for me to go to o c
S. And then of course my first

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while I was there, I started
picking brains of prior service guys or guys

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who were going to o CS prior
enlisted. They were. There were a

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couple of E seven's in there,
and uh, I would ask them,

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Hey, how do I get I
want to go to the rangers so that

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I can get to the unit.
How do I get to the rangers?

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And they said, yeah, well
you can't go to the rangers. You

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got to go somewhere else first.
And I said, well where? And

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I said the quickest way is to
go to Korea. Do a year in

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Korea and you can get to the
regiment. And I did that. I

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went to first of thirty eighth Infantry
CAMPOVI, Korea. Again amazing first tour

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of duty. I had, you
know, great battalion commander, great Company

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commander Freddie Ruolf, great first sergeant, First Sartin Johnson, Vietnam veteran,

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did my three months on the DMZ. You know, you get to patrol

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with live ammal and layout live claymores. So really a cool thing, you

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know, in nineteen eighty six to
be able to do that. And you

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know, I say that because in
the eighties the prevailing was and was there

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would never be a war again.
You know, you'd kind of missed everything,

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and a lot of us didn't really
accept that, but you know,

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in the back of our heads we
were like, oh my gosh, you

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know, I may never get to
do see combat in my time in and

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so being able to patrol with live
animal and layout live claymores was was a

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really really cool thing. And sure
enough, you know, I applied to

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go to the regiment, I got
accepted, came right back from Korea to

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Oakland, and then drove up to
Fort Lewis, Washington. I was assigned

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to second Ranger Battalion. And back
then they didn't have you know, RASP

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or RISP or whatever it's called now. You just went right to the battalion

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and you know I went there.
I served four years. It was an

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incredibly formative period of my life.
Uh. The both the battalion commanders I

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had, we were amazing. Uh. Colonel Ellis was my first one.

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My second one was Colonel John J. Mayer and uh, you know,

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he had an effect on me that
would stay with me for my entire military

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career. Uh. He was just
a fantastic battalion commander. Approachable. He

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would talk to PFCs the same way
he would talk to the regimental commander when

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he when he came down. I
was a you know, a junior lieutenant.

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Uh. And you know in the
in the regiment, junior officers usually

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fear there battalion commander. I had
no fear of my battalion commander. He

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was funny, he was full of
wisdom. Uh. You know, he

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would he would uh he would correct
you when you were wrong. But he

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was just an amazing guy and that
permeated the entire battalion. It taught me

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what a command climate is. You
know, command climate is based on the

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sum total of choices made by the
leaders in that climate system. And it's

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a leader's job to monitor that climate. And he did that incredibly well.

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You know he would he would fire
bad people, get rid of them right

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away. And you know, everything
he did he had kind of a principle

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to And he once told me,
you know, you could be the funniest,

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best guy to hang around with in
the world as a commander, but

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if you turned a blind eye to
toxic, tyrannical subordinates, you guys will

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despise you just as much as they
despised that tyrant. And he said,

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one of your primary jobs is to
get rid of those guys. That's what

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the guys are depending on you.
They're going home every night miserable, going

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man, I hope the boss does
something about this. And again, you

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know that stuck with me my whole
career. He was incredibly tactically astute.

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You know, he taught me you
never moved with any element without leaving us

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stay behind ambush, And my entire
military career, I was always leaving stay

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behind ambushes. But his the real
wealth of knowledge was not so much military

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but life knowledge and a spree to
core knowledge. He would say, the

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best formal welfare for the troops is
to get them home in time to eat

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dinner with their families. And has
both been in the range of regiments.

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So you know, the tracks a
lot of these, you know, borderline

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psychotic type A personalities who you know, they'll stay till ten thirty at night,

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you know, pushing pencils, pushing
papers, uh, and trying to

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stay a little later than the guy
you know in the next the next company

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or whatever. Uh. And so
he would he not only said that,

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he enforced it. He would go
around at six o'clock and and go,

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why why are you still here?
You know, who's telling you to stay

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here? And he'd kicked you know, guys out of their out of their

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company areas, and you know,
everyone, not just me. Uh loved

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that about him. Uh. You
know. The other thing he caught me

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was to always talk calmly on the
radio and uh, you know he did

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that during a big FTX where we
were searching for you know, precious cargo.

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It was a nuclear device and I
was a platoon leader and we found

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it and I got so excited.
I got on the radio and squeeched,

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you know, I found the precious
cargo. And you know it's embarrassing,

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uh to say the least, but
only retrospectively. When he pointed it out

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to me, you know, after
the mission was over, and he he

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said to me, look, it
happens everybody. Just remember any time you

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go to push that, you know, you push the talk button, take

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a deep breath first, and speak
calmly. When we speak calmly, we

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calm the way we act and calm
like. Panic is contagious. And you

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know he's right, that's that's been
proven by science. But you know,

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in aggregate again, Uh, it
just had this amazing effect on me.

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My everywhere I went after that,
I tried to you know, not mirror,

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but recreate that dynamic, that positive
you know, command climate dynamic.

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And you know, along with that, you know, be in my behavior

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b like he was, which is
you know, humble, unassuming you're not

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the center. It's these guys,
the guys on the ground. Your job

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is to take care of them.
And it served me well. My company

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command was the seventh Infantry Division,
ford or At, California. Again one

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hundred and thirty of the greatest guys
I could ever have asked for in a

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00:18:42.079 --> 00:18:48.039
company. My first sergeant, another
Vietnam veteran, first sergeant Carba Hall,

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fantastic guy. Taught me a lot
two months into my command, we invaded

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Panama and we were seventh I das, so we didn't jump in. We

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flew in, uh and you know, I ended up in the center of

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the city. I got the mission
to protect the new presidential uh palace president

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and Darrow was the president who had
been in exile. He took over Panama

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and all of his exiled subordinates,
and we just ran missions for about four

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or five days straight using the intelligence
from these guys who were in exile.

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They just come to us and say, hey, you need to go over

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here to this uh, this grid, this location. Uh some of uh,

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some of Noriega's lieutenants are hiding there, and we captured a number of

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his subordinates. On one mission we
were going it was a tipper that Noriego

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was hiding in the Communist Party headquarters
and uh, you know, to get

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to our targets, we basically jogged
down the street. We didn't have hum

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V's, and even if we did, I probably wouldn't have used them.

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You know, imagine trying to get
a bunch of light infantrymen in and out

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of Humby's in a city. It
was much quicker to just move it a

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fast pace. And it was on
that mission that we were I had a

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platoon plus and then me and the
first sergeant in the back, and we

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were about halfway there and all of
a sudden, all held broke loose,

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you know, a firefight. Every
guy in the platoon was firing his weapons.

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We were in the back, you
know, so probably at that point

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strung out like an accordion, about
a block and a half behind the lead

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guys. And you know, I
was taught be patient, don't get right

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on the radio and start yelling sit
rep. Let the front guys figure out

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what they got. Give him some
time. So you know, I gave

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00:21:06.039 --> 00:21:11.200
him, uh what seemed to me
like a minute. Uh and uh and

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I just said, you know,
one to six, this is zero six?

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What he got up there? And
no answer. I tried it again,

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no answer. So me and the
first sergeant started making our way to

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the front, which is incredibly difficult
to do, uh in an urban environment,

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Uh, in a firefight, because
you know, you're not a line

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of troops anymore. Everybody is all
over the place. There's guys under cars,

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guys in doorways, guys behind garbage
cans. Uh, and they're all

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shooting, so you know, the
the potential to get shot was pretty high,

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but we weaved our way forward and
until I came to the lieutenant and

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00:21:52.319 --> 00:21:56.400
he was the front guy, laying
down, you know, shooting his M

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00:21:56.480 --> 00:22:00.640
sixteen, and uh, you know, I tapped him on the shoulder and

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I said, hey, man,
what's going on? What do you got?

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00:22:02.759 --> 00:22:04.240
What do you got? He goes, I'm not sure, sir,

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there's an enemy up there? And
I go where and he's up there?

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And I said what do you mean
up there? And he said that window

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over there. I said, you
mean one of those curtains are flapping and

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he goes, yeah, he's behind
that curtain. I said, you know

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they don't have air conditioning here that
they keep their windows over that. That's

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just a curtain flapping in the wind. He goes, oh, I didn't

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know that. I said, why
didn't you get on the radio and give

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me a sit round? And he
said, well, it's too busy shooting

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my gun. So we immediately called
ceasefire to the platoon, and you know,

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I didn't think much of it.
I will add the building burned down,

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but we went to our target dry
hole, got back and about four

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years later I was in the unit
at the time. I was in an

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airport and I ran into a guy
who I knew from the se with Ida

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and we started talking, and you
know, you always search for common ground

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when you when you meet somebody.
He was like, yeah, and I

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was in Panama and I was like, wow, I was too, and

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he said yeah, I was in
the city and I was like, yeah,

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me too. And they started talking
about this massive firefight he was in.

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I was like, where was it? And he gave me the intersection

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and that was the intersection between our
two elements, the demarcation line. And

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from talking to him, I realized
that it was his company on the other

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side of that building. I don't
know if someone had an ad or someone

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saw something, but you know,
one shot started it and it was a

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you know, friendly firefight. Very
luckily no one was injured or killed in

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it. But you know, I
totally at the school off it. It

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00:24:00.359 --> 00:24:08.599
changed my mindset about firefights from that
day forward, including you know all I

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was in the unit at the time, so it really changed every every situation

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I looked at differently and you know, asked hard questions of myself if I

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00:24:22.599 --> 00:24:26.240
was in it or you know,
if it was a kind of lesson learned

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historical thing, and you know,
I started realizing how common friendly fire was

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and how easy it is in a
combat environment to get into a friendly firefight.

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Pete. Let me let me just
take a quick moment. We got

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00:24:41.240 --> 00:24:45.279
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it, and please also take a
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description if you want to get these
episodes ad free. We also want to

295
00:25:22.359 --> 00:25:25.720
do a couple of quick shouts Posterity
side of works. Thank you very much.

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00:25:25.720 --> 00:25:27.759
We were drinking you last show and
we didn't call you out because we

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00:25:27.759 --> 00:25:32.279
were too busy and enjoying your cider. But it's posterity side of works.

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This one. It's like I think
small best sider, right, like it's

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00:25:36.119 --> 00:25:41.279
good cider, kind of homemade in
a way. It's this is in the

300
00:25:41.319 --> 00:25:45.359
garden and it's it's actually dedicated to
our friend Dave Man who is on the

301
00:25:45.440 --> 00:25:48.319
show, who recommended this brand to
us. And also want to thank Brett

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00:25:48.319 --> 00:25:52.720
Allen for sending us his books Slide, Fox, Hollow and Coroy is here.

303
00:25:52.839 --> 00:25:56.119
We have not had a chance to
read these yet. They have great

304
00:25:56.160 --> 00:25:59.960
resoot views on Amazon, so check
them out if you look for something good

305
00:26:00.079 --> 00:26:03.400
to read. Thanks Brett. Actually
I wanted to because a lot of your

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00:26:03.400 --> 00:26:07.759
books are your books are about leadership, and you know, and you've talked

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00:26:07.759 --> 00:26:11.839
about a couple of the influences,
but I want to ask you, sort

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00:26:11.839 --> 00:26:18.240
of going back in your leadership journey, what is it like showing up uh

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00:26:18.880 --> 00:26:25.160
As as a butter bar, you
know, lieutenant in an infantry unit in

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in Korea, which is at the
time was the hottest thing going right,

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00:26:29.920 --> 00:26:34.319
the like like you said, live
ammunition and you like, were you given

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00:26:34.400 --> 00:26:37.480
guidance in terms of because a lot
of these guys are as old, if

313
00:26:37.480 --> 00:26:41.240
not older than you in you know, in your you know, in your

314
00:26:41.240 --> 00:26:45.480
platoon things like that. How does
how does a young lieutenant manage that?

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00:26:45.680 --> 00:26:52.160
Or were there things that you learned
while you were there. It's got to

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00:26:52.200 --> 00:26:56.480
be challenging, right, Yeah,
yeah, it's you know, it's a

317
00:26:56.480 --> 00:27:00.359
great question, Dave. It's I
mean, I think it's the right of

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00:27:00.440 --> 00:27:06.839
passage, and it's it's a little
tougher on those new guys for a reason.

319
00:27:06.960 --> 00:27:11.359
You've got to prove yourself. You've
got to earn your credibility. And

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00:27:11.880 --> 00:27:15.519
you know, I always felt that
way. I always felt, you know,

321
00:27:17.079 --> 00:27:22.119
not not like deficient, but I
knew I didn't have experience. And

322
00:27:23.319 --> 00:27:30.079
you know, my upbringing taught me
I'm wrong more than I'm right. So,

323
00:27:30.759 --> 00:27:37.880
you know, in order to flip
that ratio, you tap into this

324
00:27:37.200 --> 00:27:44.640
wealth of knowledge around you. And
you know, I mentioned my first sergeants

325
00:27:44.799 --> 00:27:48.160
for a reason. I when I
talked about my tour as a lieutenant at

326
00:27:48.160 --> 00:27:53.440
two seven five, I did not
mention that the start major there was the

327
00:27:53.480 --> 00:27:57.039
same sergeant major for my whole four
and a half years. Start Major Leon

328
00:27:57.079 --> 00:28:02.559
Guerrero, and he took it upon
himself. You know, his job is

329
00:28:02.599 --> 00:28:07.400
to train all the n c os
in the battalion and to mentor them.

330
00:28:07.880 --> 00:28:12.000
But he he took it to another
level. He also, I believe,

331
00:28:12.839 --> 00:28:17.640
saw that his duty was to train
the lieutenants, and he did. And

332
00:28:17.680 --> 00:28:22.960
I think that should be in you
know, most certain majors should include that

333
00:28:22.039 --> 00:28:27.000
in their in their duty description.
He's the guy who taught me, don't

334
00:28:27.039 --> 00:28:30.720
be in a hurry to die,
you know. That's what happened on l

335
00:28:30.799 --> 00:28:37.160
Z x Ray. That lieutenant ran
off his helicopter into the jungle. He

336
00:28:37.240 --> 00:28:42.119
saw a vietcom right on the edge
of the jungle who took off running,

337
00:28:42.240 --> 00:28:47.720
and he ran after him, and
his whole platoon ran after him. He

338
00:28:47.799 --> 00:28:52.480
never told them what he was running
after. And when he finally stopped,

339
00:28:52.559 --> 00:28:56.839
they were surrounded. And l Z
x Ray was really the you know,

340
00:28:56.920 --> 00:29:00.440
the battle to save the wayward platoon. And he taught us that, you

341
00:29:00.440 --> 00:29:03.880
know, and he would say to
me all the time, and I was,

342
00:29:03.359 --> 00:29:07.440
I was that lieutenant. I was
overly aggressive, uh, you know,

343
00:29:08.400 --> 00:29:14.960
subject to my aggressive impulsiveness. And
he taught me, you know,

344
00:29:15.160 --> 00:29:19.559
don't be in a hurry to die. Leaders who are impulsive lead their people

345
00:29:19.599 --> 00:29:25.200
to their deaths. And uh,
I never forgot that. You know,

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00:29:25.440 --> 00:29:29.440
I packed that with me through my
whole career and it saved me and my

347
00:29:29.519 --> 00:29:33.160
guys countless times. So, you
know, as a butter bar, it's

348
00:29:33.240 --> 00:29:37.000
kind of the same thing. You
got. You've got to earn your credibility

349
00:29:37.559 --> 00:29:44.319
obviously physically tactically, but you got
to listen and you know, you've got

350
00:29:44.359 --> 00:29:48.440
the wealth of knowledge around you.
Uh so it's only a matter of tapping

351
00:29:48.519 --> 00:29:52.880
into it, asking the right questions, and you know, be impatient because

352
00:29:52.880 --> 00:30:00.000
you're not gonna you're not gonna be
a combat you know, hardened wise veteran

353
00:30:00.119 --> 00:30:04.200
in a few months or even a
few years. You just got to keep

354
00:30:04.240 --> 00:30:10.480
building on that knowledge. Yeah,
were there, whether it was in Korea

355
00:30:10.640 --> 00:30:15.279
or RAI battalion You've mentioned like some
good leadership examples, were there, some

356
00:30:15.440 --> 00:30:18.880
blatantly whether it was on the officer
side or in coside, some blatantly bad

357
00:30:18.920 --> 00:30:26.640
examples that were learning experiences for you. Well all my I think all my

358
00:30:27.000 --> 00:30:33.079
battalion commanders. I was very lucky. So my battank commander in Korea was

359
00:30:33.480 --> 00:30:41.079
an amazing Vietnam veteran. Uh you
know, just I can't say anything but

360
00:30:41.160 --> 00:30:44.119
good things about him. Same thing
when I got to the Ranger Regiment.

361
00:30:45.200 --> 00:30:51.960
Both my battalion commanders were great,
you know, probably peers. You know,

362
00:30:52.000 --> 00:30:56.240
I learned more from peers and as
a lieutenant captains, and there were

363
00:30:56.240 --> 00:31:00.920
plenty of those. There were you
know, guys who were hypocras's, guys

364
00:31:00.000 --> 00:31:06.519
who you know, were a holes
to their people. Uh, guys who

365
00:31:06.519 --> 00:31:11.960
were tactically incompetent. And you know, you learn vicariously from those guys,

366
00:31:11.039 --> 00:31:15.200
just like you do from the good
guys. You you know, I'm never

367
00:31:15.279 --> 00:31:18.680
going to be that way. I'm
never going to do that. I'm never

368
00:31:18.720 --> 00:31:22.720
going to treat people that way.
And you know, you can really go

369
00:31:22.799 --> 00:31:27.400
to school off of off of those
incompetent people, just like you can off

370
00:31:27.440 --> 00:31:33.519
of the incredibly competent ones. So, you know, most of my early

371
00:31:33.640 --> 00:31:37.480
military career, though, I'd have
to say, I was just blessed with

372
00:31:37.680 --> 00:31:45.119
great senior leadership and senior noncommissioned officers. And by the the time, so

373
00:31:45.279 --> 00:31:51.160
you were in seventh IDA a company
commander, when does when does the idea

374
00:31:51.160 --> 00:31:53.440
of like going to selection kind of
come come to your head and you start

375
00:31:53.440 --> 00:31:59.839
thinking about going and making the leap. Yeah, so it was it was

376
00:31:59.839 --> 00:32:01.599
already in my head. I knew, you know, the criteria was you

377
00:32:01.680 --> 00:32:07.200
had to have a successful company command
as an officer to go to selections.

378
00:32:07.319 --> 00:32:10.920
So you know, I was I
would have stayed in that company for as

379
00:32:10.960 --> 00:32:14.880
long as they'd let me stay.
But you know, the military, it's

380
00:32:14.920 --> 00:32:20.480
two years and out. And so
as my two years were coming up,

381
00:32:20.839 --> 00:32:25.960
I started the process contacting the unit, you know, going through all the

382
00:32:27.000 --> 00:32:32.640
prerequisite stuff, and you know,
seventh Idea was at Ford or so about

383
00:32:32.920 --> 00:32:40.880
a month before I finished command,
the unit selection team was came out to

384
00:32:40.960 --> 00:32:49.519
California and I did my psych and
PT test at the Presidio of San Francisco.

385
00:32:49.640 --> 00:32:53.400
It was still open as a military
base. I ran my two mile

386
00:32:54.519 --> 00:32:59.440
part of the PT test underneath the
Golden Gate Bridge with boots on, and

387
00:33:00.160 --> 00:33:02.559
you know, I was kind of
a running machine at the time, so

388
00:33:02.680 --> 00:33:07.119
I was, you know, going
to max Vio two, trying to set

389
00:33:07.680 --> 00:33:12.160
you know, my personal best record. But I can still remember running under

390
00:33:12.160 --> 00:33:15.640
that bridge, just going, man, I love the military. It's just

391
00:33:15.680 --> 00:33:22.559
such an amazing place to be.
And you know, sure enough things worked

392
00:33:22.559 --> 00:33:27.160
out for me with the psyche and
the PT test. I went to selection

393
00:33:27.720 --> 00:33:34.240
right after I got finished command.
I think I'd finished command in August or

394
00:33:34.559 --> 00:33:38.079
September, and then I went to
select the next selection, which was I

395
00:33:38.160 --> 00:33:45.039
believe October, and again fortunate didn't
get injured, made it through that.

396
00:33:45.319 --> 00:33:50.880
And you know, I was in
the unit in nineteen ninety one, so

397
00:33:51.519 --> 00:33:57.440
it was I was only at ord
for the shortest possible period of time.

398
00:33:57.559 --> 00:34:01.119
I didn't have to serve as a
staff officer. It was just command,

399
00:34:02.599 --> 00:34:07.239
go to tryouts, and then you
know, off to the unit. And

400
00:34:07.719 --> 00:34:10.639
for a long time, I was, you know, the only one who

401
00:34:12.119 --> 00:34:15.639
in the unit from the Seventh Idea. Two more guys came a few years

402
00:34:15.719 --> 00:34:22.199
later before they shut it down,
But yeah, that was that was my

403
00:34:22.280 --> 00:34:27.119
transition. I you know, it
was because I I was influenced by Desert

404
00:34:27.159 --> 00:34:30.199
One before I even got in.
I knew that was dealt on the ground.

405
00:34:30.320 --> 00:34:37.519
So even though I knew nothing about
really what they were or how they

406
00:34:37.559 --> 00:34:40.679
operated, I knew from that day
on that that's where I wanted to go

407
00:34:40.840 --> 00:34:45.400
in the military. So, you
know, it worked out. So in

408
00:34:45.760 --> 00:34:49.840
nineteen ninety one, you get there, I mean, tell us a little

409
00:34:49.880 --> 00:34:52.760
bit about like what the vibe was
in the unit at the time, what

410
00:34:52.800 --> 00:34:54.199
the mission was like, I mean, like if you can take us a

411
00:34:54.199 --> 00:34:58.119
little back in time, you know, to the mission and the culture of

412
00:34:58.119 --> 00:35:02.079
that era. Yeah. Yeah,
it's an interesting time and it's uh,

413
00:35:02.719 --> 00:35:07.920
you know, it's it's there are
some senior n CEOs who can explain it

414
00:35:07.000 --> 00:35:10.679
much better than me. They've explained
it to me and you know, enlightened

415
00:35:10.719 --> 00:35:15.360
me on it. It was kind
of a transitionary time, uh, because

416
00:35:15.400 --> 00:35:20.719
the military was still kind of transitioning. You know, you had the old

417
00:35:20.840 --> 00:35:24.559
the old school guys who were there
in the early early days and you know,

418
00:35:25.280 --> 00:35:30.760
fire and MP fives and wearing those
black watchcaps things like that. Uh.

419
00:35:31.159 --> 00:35:36.960
And this was definitely, you know, the step into the future.

420
00:35:37.480 --> 00:35:43.719
Everything was modernized, you know,
weapons, como nods, uh had you

421
00:35:43.760 --> 00:35:49.320
know, we're taking those massive leaps
in the nineties. So it was it

422
00:35:49.360 --> 00:35:53.039
was a really cool transitionary time.
Uh. You know, my first I

423
00:35:53.079 --> 00:35:58.159
went right to a troop. I
was a troop commander of my first job.

424
00:35:59.559 --> 00:36:02.280
And again, because I've seen a
number of your episodes, two of

425
00:36:02.280 --> 00:36:07.760
the guys in my troupe, Harry
Harrington and Dale Comstock, were both in

426
00:36:07.840 --> 00:36:13.559
there at the time, and I'm
sure many more that you'd recognize, but

427
00:36:13.639 --> 00:36:19.760
those are the two I saw on
your program. Just you know, A

428
00:36:20.079 --> 00:36:24.519
I think the unit was kind of
you know, finding its its new way

429
00:36:25.000 --> 00:36:30.199
at the time. And uh,
you know, missions were changing, uh,

430
00:36:30.480 --> 00:36:35.559
but a lot were staying the same. That you know, aircraft hostage

431
00:36:35.599 --> 00:36:39.440
rescue, aircraft takedown, those type
things were the same. But you know,

432
00:36:39.559 --> 00:36:47.360
new missions were coming on the counter
narcotics was you know, became the

433
00:36:47.440 --> 00:36:52.639
biggest mission for the military. A
lot of people don't know that, but

434
00:36:52.880 --> 00:36:59.679
Bill Clinton you know, signed a
Presidential decision directive making that the number one

435
00:36:59.719 --> 00:37:06.000
prior already uh for the military,
and uh inevitably, you know, showing

436
00:37:06.039 --> 00:37:12.320
the changes. Uh, that's what
ended up driving my first big missions.

437
00:37:12.840 --> 00:37:19.480
Uh. I went down into Colombia
with the first groups after Pablo escaped.

438
00:37:20.400 --> 00:37:28.599
I did uh four tours in Colombia. I spent two Christmases there, uh

439
00:37:28.840 --> 00:37:35.880
and again incredibly incredibly formative. Uh, just you know, learning how to

440
00:37:35.920 --> 00:37:40.559
deal with embassy people, uh,
learning up close how the CIA operates.

441
00:37:43.400 --> 00:37:46.719
You know, I was I was
still a I was a senior captain at

442
00:37:46.719 --> 00:37:52.440
the time, which is rare and
you'd usually the junior officers are majors.

443
00:37:52.519 --> 00:37:58.280
But because I had that you know, fast paced through command. I was

444
00:37:58.320 --> 00:38:01.639
still a senior captain. But here
I was down in Colombia, you know,

445
00:38:01.719 --> 00:38:07.559
working out of an embassy. Uh
I, you know, blending anywhere

446
00:38:07.679 --> 00:38:10.519
as one of the principals. So
you know, I would wear a suit

447
00:38:10.800 --> 00:38:14.960
in the embassy and then I'd go
out, you know, to visit my

448
00:38:15.039 --> 00:38:22.079
guys and spend time with them operationally. Uh in Metagine and Cali and all

449
00:38:22.119 --> 00:38:27.280
over that country. It was incredibly
dangerous time to be down there. Pablo

450
00:38:27.440 --> 00:38:30.079
was blowing the ship out of the
country. Uh So, you know,

451
00:38:30.159 --> 00:38:36.480
there were there were car bombs,
there were mailbox bombs. We were armed

452
00:38:36.760 --> 00:38:40.679
all the time, you know,
uh, even whether you're in a grocery

453
00:38:40.719 --> 00:38:46.599
store in Bogata or you know you're
you're down in Medazine or or Cali.

454
00:38:49.400 --> 00:38:53.679
And so you know, again,
just the building blocks I think of the

455
00:38:53.679 --> 00:39:00.559
future of the unit we're there,
you know, forming teams based on you

456
00:39:00.599 --> 00:39:07.480
know, competencies, so you know, teams like a homogeneous team was not

457
00:39:07.599 --> 00:39:12.159
sent down there. Guys were picked
from different squadrons. Language was a big

458
00:39:12.199 --> 00:39:16.440
part of that, but disposition was
a big part of it too. You

459
00:39:16.440 --> 00:39:21.360
guys know this, you know,
you get the full spectrum of people in

460
00:39:21.400 --> 00:39:25.360
any unit you go to. Uh, some guys are just not really capable

461
00:39:25.519 --> 00:39:31.159
or wired to be, you know, interacting in an embassy or interacting with

462
00:39:31.280 --> 00:39:39.480
foreign you know generals kernels, and
you know, other guys are incredible at

463
00:39:39.480 --> 00:39:44.239
it. They're just you know,
you you watch them in awe as they

464
00:39:44.280 --> 00:39:49.280
deal with these people. And so
I learned a lot down there. Mostly

465
00:39:49.320 --> 00:39:52.119
it was it was about, you
know, human hunting. Most of the

466
00:39:52.199 --> 00:39:58.719
lessons were how you find people who
don't want to be found, you know,

467
00:39:58.800 --> 00:40:05.960
this tireless search for clues, and
always tapping into anyone who has any

468
00:40:06.039 --> 00:40:10.119
kind type of information. Uh,
you know, totally open mind about it,

469
00:40:10.679 --> 00:40:15.599
uh, not getting caught up in
you know, a military approach to

470
00:40:15.719 --> 00:40:21.239
things. We saw ourselves down there. We we would often talk about,

471
00:40:21.840 --> 00:40:27.079
you know, what a cops do
in America when they when they find you

472
00:40:27.079 --> 00:40:32.119
know, a futative they don't you
know, call in uh two swat teams

473
00:40:32.239 --> 00:40:37.320
surround the place and then you know, begin an aerial attack. They just

474
00:40:37.880 --> 00:40:42.239
two or three guys, you know, figure out what they got. If

475
00:40:42.239 --> 00:40:45.039
it's a if it's a fleeting opportunity, they go in there and they and

476
00:40:45.079 --> 00:40:52.000
they interact with the environment. And
that's what that was the big lesson for

477
00:40:52.119 --> 00:40:57.760
me, you know, and also
patients. It takes time to find people

478
00:40:57.960 --> 00:41:01.199
is very difficult. You gotta have
guys on the ground and you've got to

479
00:41:01.280 --> 00:41:08.039
listen to those guys uh religiously or
you're never gonna You're never gonna find who

480
00:41:08.039 --> 00:41:14.000
you're looking for. Uh So just
uh again, great tours I went.

481
00:41:14.199 --> 00:41:21.920
Uh, I actually went left Colombia
on one tour, flew to New York

482
00:41:21.960 --> 00:41:30.920
and then flew to Mogadishu, Somalia
for Somalia, and then when that ended,

483
00:41:30.840 --> 00:41:37.000
I flew back to Colombia, uh
for another tour going after I believe

484
00:41:37.039 --> 00:41:43.199
the Cali cartel on that one did. Did did some of those like man

485
00:41:43.320 --> 00:41:47.199
hunting techniques that you your unit was
developing and Colombia kind of transfer over to

486
00:41:47.440 --> 00:41:52.320
the the hunt for a deed and
all those guys in mogod issue. Yeah,

487
00:41:52.440 --> 00:41:58.159
totally. And now you know again
you had kind of uh, you

488
00:41:58.159 --> 00:42:01.599
know, your question about the the
and the transition. You had, you

489
00:42:01.599 --> 00:42:08.360
know, these competing schools of thought
and so you know, my school of

490
00:42:08.400 --> 00:42:15.079
thought in Mogadishu was different than you
know, the Special Operations Command above us

491
00:42:15.280 --> 00:42:22.039
and the way they wanted that prosecuted, which was helicopter centric. And you

492
00:42:22.079 --> 00:42:25.800
know, if you talk to guys
who were there at the time, they

493
00:42:25.840 --> 00:42:31.119
know, you know, I was
already anti helicopter. And that's not anti

494
00:42:31.159 --> 00:42:37.159
helicopter pilot or anti get on a
helicopter. I just don't believe. I

495
00:42:37.199 --> 00:42:42.320
believe it's the last resort as an
assault platform. If you can get there

496
00:42:42.360 --> 00:42:46.320
on the ground, if you can
sneak up and achieve surprise, do not

497
00:42:46.480 --> 00:42:54.840
default to the helicopter. And so
my thing with Somalyu was, these helicopters

498
00:42:55.199 --> 00:42:58.480
are going to get us, are
going to get blown out of the sky.

499
00:42:58.719 --> 00:43:04.000
We did before anyone went over there, before Sea Squadron went over there,

500
00:43:04.400 --> 00:43:09.239
we all did rehearsals, and in
our nighttime rehearsals we did we timed

501
00:43:10.400 --> 00:43:15.239
infilling on a black op and infilling
on a little bird. And you know,

502
00:43:15.320 --> 00:43:22.360
a little bird can break flair and
hover in about five seconds. So

503
00:43:22.639 --> 00:43:25.280
if it's a roof or a balcony, you can unask those guys in about

504
00:43:25.280 --> 00:43:31.079
a total of ten seconds. A
black op it takes forty five seconds for

505
00:43:31.199 --> 00:43:37.440
the best pilots to blake, break
flare and hover, get the ropes down,

506
00:43:37.760 --> 00:43:40.679
or you know, land and so
it's a huge amount of time,

507
00:43:42.880 --> 00:43:46.480
and you know, you're dealing with
in a place where everyone has a gun.

508
00:43:47.079 --> 00:43:51.960
So our thinking was, you know, we should be going to the

509
00:43:52.000 --> 00:44:00.280
targets hidden inside. They were called
SST's shit sucking trucks because they drove throughout

510
00:44:00.519 --> 00:44:05.159
Somalia and they were like garbage trucks. No one bothered them because they were

511
00:44:05.199 --> 00:44:08.880
sucking up all the shit. And
uh, you know, my thought was

512
00:44:08.960 --> 00:44:14.119
in a bunch of the guys,
It wasn't my idea, a number of

513
00:44:14.679 --> 00:44:16.519
a number of my guys came up
with. It was, you know,

514
00:44:16.639 --> 00:44:22.920
let's let's go in low Viz,
let's swing all the way around. Mogadishu

515
00:44:22.079 --> 00:44:28.920
is like an island, uh very
abruptly turns into scrub desert. So you

516
00:44:28.960 --> 00:44:30.760
know, if we need to get
to the other side of the city,

517
00:44:30.840 --> 00:44:36.559
let's make all huge arc around and
then come in through the desert on the

518
00:44:36.639 --> 00:44:43.519
other side. But you know,
the helicopter mentality, the the kind of

519
00:44:43.599 --> 00:44:49.920
Vietnam direct assault mentality was very prevalent
with senior ranking people at the time,

520
00:44:50.039 --> 00:44:55.119
and and and you know that that
kind of one out, but it was,

521
00:44:55.960 --> 00:45:00.039
you know, the same thing the
guys uh were amazing. I know

522
00:45:00.119 --> 00:45:05.239
you've talked to guys before. You
know, when we were in Mogadishu,

523
00:45:05.280 --> 00:45:10.280
we had pro tech helmets, plastic
protech helmets. So the unit's always been

524
00:45:10.599 --> 00:45:16.760
at the forefront of research and development. You know, most of the you

525
00:45:16.760 --> 00:45:22.760
know, equipment and rigs that you
see today were developed by guys in the

526
00:45:22.840 --> 00:45:27.559
unit, either sewing them up themselves
or buying them off the shelves and then

527
00:45:27.599 --> 00:45:31.760
sewing and modifying them, which is
the way the whole army should be in

528
00:45:31.800 --> 00:45:37.599
my opinion. And you know that
was the other thing going back and forth

529
00:45:37.639 --> 00:45:44.960
between the Unit and the Rangers.
I always thought the Rangers should go back

530
00:45:45.239 --> 00:45:51.159
to you know, the old school
Rangers of the of the you know,

531
00:45:51.280 --> 00:45:54.840
early eighties, where they still had
five point fifty cord in their boots,

532
00:45:54.880 --> 00:46:00.800
and you know, they too were
allowed that leeway to uh, you know,

533
00:46:00.840 --> 00:46:07.400
where their equipment to different ways.
And I know there's probably some senior

534
00:46:07.000 --> 00:46:12.960
ragers gas feed with me saying that, but I really believe that, you

535
00:46:13.000 --> 00:46:17.400
know, guys should be allowed to
modify their equipment so that it's ergonomic.

536
00:46:17.599 --> 00:46:23.679
You maximize that ergonomic efficiency. You
know, everyone's chest is different their arms,

537
00:46:23.719 --> 00:46:30.800
so uh, you know, let
guys h explore, invent, you

538
00:46:30.840 --> 00:46:37.960
know, and let them build better
equipment constantly, and that's what the unit

539
00:46:37.000 --> 00:46:42.440
did, uh, And that's what
we did start even in Mogadishu, you

540
00:46:42.480 --> 00:46:45.960
know, the that was the last
of the pro tech helmet modishu. They

541
00:46:46.000 --> 00:46:50.800
were never worn again. Pete.
Uh. You know, just one thing

542
00:46:50.840 --> 00:46:53.239
I wanted to ask you, why
have you here? Is something I was

543
00:46:53.360 --> 00:46:58.960
told ways back, but I never
really got the whole story on was about

544
00:46:58.960 --> 00:47:05.360
Columbia and that before Pablo Escobar was
eventually you know, killed by the Colombians,

545
00:47:06.199 --> 00:47:10.280
that we made like several attempts to
like ramp up capture kill missions for

546
00:47:10.400 --> 00:47:14.480
him. I was just wondering if
you had any like visibility on that.

547
00:47:17.199 --> 00:47:22.880
Yeah, you know, I'm not
sure what exactly there might have been times

548
00:47:23.519 --> 00:47:29.760
that guys in metagine thought that was
you know, the best course of action.

549
00:47:30.760 --> 00:47:35.719
But what I remember, uh is
we were and no one told us

550
00:47:35.760 --> 00:47:39.960
this. We were being micromanaged down
there by SOUTHCOM, which was in Panama

551
00:47:40.039 --> 00:47:45.320
at the time. So you know, you had a four star general in

552
00:47:45.360 --> 00:47:52.280
Panama with a bunch of two star
general underlying staff officers and again you know

553
00:47:52.320 --> 00:47:57.760
there's no combat, so uh,
this is like the only show in town,

554
00:47:57.840 --> 00:48:01.760
and they could not keep their fingers
off it. But you know,

555
00:48:02.119 --> 00:48:08.480
we still operated very freely down there, and we came to the conclusion ourselves

556
00:48:08.719 --> 00:48:15.840
that uh, you know, unless
it can't be avoided, we should stay

557
00:48:15.880 --> 00:48:22.000
out of any direct contact, direct
action like mission. And that doesn't mean

558
00:48:22.000 --> 00:48:25.760
we can't take them all the way
up to the breach point. We can't

559
00:48:25.800 --> 00:48:30.199
advise them. We had we had
shared radios with them, uh, the

560
00:48:30.239 --> 00:48:37.920
a group on their HRT. But
we, you know, in our own

561
00:48:37.239 --> 00:48:44.039
minds decided, hey, we're here
to lead them, and these guys need

562
00:48:44.079 --> 00:48:47.000
to be the ones to get Pablo. And it makes the most sense for

563
00:48:47.079 --> 00:48:52.000
them, it makes the most sense
for the mission and for their country.

564
00:48:52.239 --> 00:48:59.000
If it's us, it's going to
open up Pandora's box of problems. So

565
00:48:59.079 --> 00:49:04.519
we were we were very much you
know, said on that, and ultimately

566
00:49:04.559 --> 00:49:07.719
that's what happened, you know Pablo. People still are not clear on that,

567
00:49:07.800 --> 00:49:15.280
but that was one of percent you
know Colombian mission. Those the young

568
00:49:15.360 --> 00:49:20.800
captain who was the son of the
colonel who was in charge. He was

569
00:49:20.840 --> 00:49:24.559
out there. He was using you
know, us provided direction finding equipment,

570
00:49:24.639 --> 00:49:30.480
but it was not any kind of
magical technology. It was, you know,

571
00:49:30.639 --> 00:49:36.599
literally driving around helping you pick up
a frequency and helping the voice on

572
00:49:36.679 --> 00:49:43.239
that frequency, the you know,
the the troughs and the peaks on it

573
00:49:43.400 --> 00:49:47.320
match up to his voice profile that
we had already embedded in the system.

574
00:49:47.400 --> 00:49:52.119
And that's what happened. And they, you know, they direction found him

575
00:49:52.159 --> 00:49:57.519
on his phone. Then they happened
to see him up in an upstairs window

576
00:49:58.039 --> 00:50:00.920
called in the rest of the Colombians
and uh and they they did that one

577
00:50:01.000 --> 00:50:06.519
hundred percent on their own. And
then bouncing back to Somalia. I mean,

578
00:50:06.559 --> 00:50:09.679
were you there when the battle took
place. We got there that night,

579
00:50:09.880 --> 00:50:14.920
so I was in a and that
was c so we were it was

580
00:50:15.000 --> 00:50:19.440
actually the change overnight. We were
there to relieve them. They were going

581
00:50:19.519 --> 00:50:24.400
home that next day, so we
were there and then we took over.

582
00:50:24.519 --> 00:50:30.000
They were pretty much you know,
decimated by the mission, so we took

583
00:50:30.039 --> 00:50:36.360
over the uh you know, hostage
rescue mission to find Durant and rescue him.

584
00:50:37.679 --> 00:50:39.920
We flew, uh, you know, I don't know how many missions

585
00:50:40.039 --> 00:50:44.679
in and out of there, all
on little birds. We didn't use any

586
00:50:44.920 --> 00:50:51.639
black Hawks. And you know,
again a lot of breakthroughs and technology there

587
00:50:52.840 --> 00:51:01.400
lasers. We learned just how incredibly
lethal and valuable lasers were, you know.

588
00:51:01.480 --> 00:51:07.360
I we were flying on one mission. We had four little birds.

589
00:51:07.039 --> 00:51:12.039
I was the second little bird,
offset from the first, and we were

590
00:51:12.079 --> 00:51:16.039
flying nap of the earth and I
looked forward. It was it was it

591
00:51:16.360 --> 00:51:20.039
just dark, you know, it
just turned dark. And so I had

592
00:51:20.039 --> 00:51:25.639
my nods on and I saw ahead
of the first helicopter this person run out

593
00:51:27.039 --> 00:51:31.440
of a house into the yard,
and you know, it was a woman.

594
00:51:31.519 --> 00:51:35.800
She had something in her hand,
and you know, I didn't know.

595
00:51:36.280 --> 00:51:37.719
I knew it wasn't a gun,
but she had something in her hand.

596
00:51:37.760 --> 00:51:40.360
It could have been a spear or
anything. And you know, with

597
00:51:40.400 --> 00:51:45.679
a helicopter at that height, you
never know. And she pulled it back.

598
00:51:45.880 --> 00:51:51.039
It turned out it was a black
frying pan, probably her most valuable

599
00:51:51.400 --> 00:51:57.159
possession. And she pulled this thing
back to throw it, and I put

600
00:51:57.199 --> 00:52:00.559
my laser on it, and at
the exact second I put on it,

601
00:52:00.719 --> 00:52:06.400
three other lasers zeroed in on it, and somebody shot and that frying pan

602
00:52:06.599 --> 00:52:09.880
flew out of her hand as she
tried to throw it at the lead little

603
00:52:09.920 --> 00:52:15.440
bird. And I'll never forget that
shot. I'll never forget, you know,

604
00:52:15.559 --> 00:52:20.760
seeing it that I could still see
that picture in my nods and see

605
00:52:20.800 --> 00:52:27.239
those lasers converge on the frying pen. And so, you know, a

606
00:52:27.320 --> 00:52:31.559
lot of that technology was experimental at
the time but just took off after that,

607
00:52:32.519 --> 00:52:37.960
and you know today every four as
a laser on it. I don't

608
00:52:37.000 --> 00:52:42.079
think we ever have really talked about
this aspect of Somalia. But so you

609
00:52:42.079 --> 00:52:45.639
get there right after the big battle, and were you guys like trying to

610
00:52:45.679 --> 00:52:49.320
keep the pressure obviously looking for Mike
Durant, but also keeping the pressure on

611
00:52:49.360 --> 00:52:52.599
the militias. Was that the mission
at the time, Yeah, it was.

612
00:52:53.760 --> 00:52:59.039
You know, it was crazy because
there was a lot of political pressure

613
00:52:59.079 --> 00:53:01.480
coming down on the whole thing.
If you guys remember, uh, you

614
00:53:01.519 --> 00:53:06.519
know, we wanted to go after
our deed, but we didn't want,

615
00:53:06.679 --> 00:53:09.039
you know, to kill anybody or
get anybody killed. It was crazy.

616
00:53:09.079 --> 00:53:15.880
There was no AC one thirty up. Uh, you know, just senseless

617
00:53:15.920 --> 00:53:22.199
decisions made at the national level.
So it was kind of a flux period.

618
00:53:22.320 --> 00:53:25.800
No one knew what was going to
happen with the mission. Uh,

619
00:53:25.840 --> 00:53:30.039
and so we just did what you
know, any military guys to do.

620
00:53:30.119 --> 00:53:35.480
We just uh, Charlie Mike,
let's let's continue with the same thing and

621
00:53:35.760 --> 00:53:42.119
search for both Adeed and Durant at
the same time. You know, we

622
00:53:42.159 --> 00:53:46.519
had some there were just some amazing
lessons learned on interoperability there. Uh,

623
00:53:47.079 --> 00:53:52.519
you know, a lot of things
happened, uh with the rangers. They

624
00:53:52.559 --> 00:53:57.679
created a lot of uh, you
know, a lot of conflict with those

625
00:53:57.719 --> 00:54:01.199
guys and uh, you know those
interoperability things and a lot of them were

626
00:54:01.320 --> 00:54:08.360
personality driven. Again. You know, leaders who instead of being open and

627
00:54:10.079 --> 00:54:17.639
you know, accommodating, were rigid
and narrowly focused on, you know,

628
00:54:17.840 --> 00:54:20.960
what they were going to do and
how they were going to do it.

629
00:54:21.079 --> 00:54:25.199
And I think that ended up causing
a lot of the chaos that occurred during

630
00:54:25.239 --> 00:54:30.960
that firefight. What so, do
you think of a lot of that was

631
00:54:31.039 --> 00:54:37.400
personality driven? And again, and
I'm gonna like throw some stuff out which

632
00:54:37.400 --> 00:54:44.480
may or may not be true,
but were there like, were there officers

633
00:54:44.519 --> 00:54:47.760
that were of the rank higher whichever
unit that thought that that should be respected.

634
00:54:47.960 --> 00:54:51.960
Were there rangers that were sort of
the old school, were the best

635
00:54:52.039 --> 00:54:54.880
light infantry and you guys are long
hairs and that should be respected. Were

636
00:54:54.920 --> 00:55:00.119
there any Delta personalities that were like
we're Delta, shut the fuck up and

637
00:55:00.119 --> 00:55:04.079
and do what we say? Like
what what were some of the elements that

638
00:55:04.119 --> 00:55:07.960
were going on if you if you
know them? Yeah, I think you

639
00:55:07.000 --> 00:55:13.519
know the most were going on with
the There was a company commander, ranger

640
00:55:13.519 --> 00:55:15.960
company commander, and the ranger battalion
commander, and you know, the movie

641
00:55:15.960 --> 00:55:22.199
alludes to it a little bit,
but uh, you know they were they

642
00:55:22.199 --> 00:55:25.360
were just they were they were I
guess you said old school. They were

643
00:55:25.440 --> 00:55:30.360
old school. Uh. If we're
going to do it our way, and

644
00:55:30.800 --> 00:55:37.760
that's it. And you know the
rangers. Uh, when the firefight started,

645
00:55:37.800 --> 00:55:40.559
we're out there in a in a
convoy, parked in a convoy and

646
00:55:40.719 --> 00:55:45.840
uh, you know, just everything
was set up to go wrong. The

647
00:55:45.880 --> 00:55:52.480
battalion commander in his vehicle is leading
that convoy. You know, that makes

648
00:55:52.519 --> 00:55:59.079
no sense when you know who puts
a battalion commander in the front vehicle,

649
00:55:59.599 --> 00:56:06.320
you know, as a navigator and
as a convoy commander. Nobody and that

650
00:56:07.119 --> 00:56:12.880
you know that, Uh, that
caused a lot of the problems, certainly

651
00:56:12.920 --> 00:56:15.119
a lot of the casualties. Uh. They went back and forth through that

652
00:56:15.360 --> 00:56:20.960
kill zone I think three times.
Uh, because he could not figure out

653
00:56:20.960 --> 00:56:24.159
he was getting he was being told
where to go from a helicopter. So

654
00:56:24.960 --> 00:56:29.760
you know all of us have been
in helicopter circling. No, you can't

655
00:56:29.800 --> 00:56:32.599
tell a guy in a city to
take a left turn or a right turn

656
00:56:35.320 --> 00:56:37.679
and then you know, make your
arc around to come around the other way.

657
00:56:37.760 --> 00:56:42.920
They they took a bunch of wrong
turns. Uh. I think that

658
00:56:42.960 --> 00:56:46.719
front vehicle split from the convoy.
Uh, you know, on its own,

659
00:56:46.880 --> 00:56:52.239
went down an alley away from the
convoy. Uh. The only thing

660
00:56:52.280 --> 00:56:57.920
that stopped it was Uh, a
Somali with an RPG at the far end

661
00:56:57.960 --> 00:57:00.159
of the alley popped out. So
they threw the reverse and went back,

662
00:57:02.000 --> 00:57:07.400
and you know then there was just
I'm not I can't speak credibly about the

663
00:57:07.440 --> 00:57:14.079
personality at the at the company level. I just know that there were unit

664
00:57:14.159 --> 00:57:20.800
guys in in that same building and
that company commander would not answer his radio

665
00:57:22.159 --> 00:57:27.159
when guys were calling. Uh.
One in one ranger bled out in there,

666
00:57:28.599 --> 00:57:34.679
and uh Scott Miller was the troop
commander at the time. Uh,

667
00:57:34.760 --> 00:57:37.239
he was trying to call him and
he wouldn't answer his radio. Uh.

668
00:57:37.239 --> 00:57:43.239
So you know who, I'm not
being judgmental here, I'm just saying it

669
00:57:43.320 --> 00:57:49.960
was a huge interoperability problem. Yeah, and you know personalities. You can't

670
00:57:49.960 --> 00:57:53.719
come to any other conclusion than personalities
because you know, in those situations,

671
00:57:54.840 --> 00:58:00.480
you know, rank means nothing.
Your job is to make the best decision

672
00:58:00.039 --> 00:58:06.840
and solve any problem using logic and
common sense that comes up. And if

673
00:58:06.880 --> 00:58:10.840
you've got to subordinate yourself to someone
of lower rank or of another unit,

674
00:58:10.880 --> 00:58:15.320
who cares. You know, you're
doing it in the name of of you

675
00:58:15.360 --> 00:58:22.800
know, the mission and your men. And so it always just amazes me

676
00:58:23.320 --> 00:58:27.800
when I hear stuff like that.
And that had a big impression on me

677
00:58:27.840 --> 00:58:31.360
too. You know, I went
to school off Somalia. It was the

678
00:58:31.400 --> 00:58:37.159
final nail for me. On helicopters, it was, you know, also

679
00:58:37.239 --> 00:58:44.079
a nail for you know, always
search for that asymmetrical approach, that auto

680
00:58:44.159 --> 00:58:50.760
box approach. Do not default to
what every enemy in the world expects America

681
00:58:50.800 --> 00:58:54.880
to do, which is to come
in on our shiny helicopters and fast rope

682
00:58:54.920 --> 00:59:00.679
on the targets. Yeah, you
know, just like Jack and I saw

683
00:59:00.719 --> 00:59:05.360
this in the in the g Y
and I'm sure you know everybody else that

684
00:59:05.480 --> 00:59:10.360
too. How Like tactics evolved,
like things that used people used to think

685
00:59:10.400 --> 00:59:15.239
where the standard sort of went by
the wayside. Did you see that happen

686
00:59:15.320 --> 00:59:19.480
with Somalia too? Were there are
just some like wake up calls uh in

687
00:59:19.760 --> 00:59:23.400
the community for you for you guys, Yeah, I think, uh,

688
00:59:23.639 --> 00:59:30.840
you know, our our professors,
which is all the you know, troops

689
00:59:30.880 --> 00:59:36.079
are majors and team leaders. They
totally went to school off on CQB.

690
00:59:37.079 --> 00:59:42.679
A number of things changed on CQB
tactics and techniques. Uh, certainly,

691
00:59:43.119 --> 00:59:45.519
you know, you know, the
probably one of the biggest lessons was,

692
00:59:46.119 --> 00:59:52.400
you know, never go on a
daytime mission without your nods and without expecting

693
00:59:52.400 --> 00:59:57.639
you're going to be going on a
nighttime mission. So you know, a

694
00:59:57.679 --> 01:00:00.679
lot of little things, a lot
of equipment things I already mentioned the pro

695
01:00:00.760 --> 01:00:06.480
tech changed after that. And you
know, I think the I think in

696
01:00:06.599 --> 01:00:13.039
general, the mindset because you know, it's very clear that that was the

697
01:00:13.079 --> 01:00:17.039
most intense combat since the Vietnam War, and it was kind of a wake

698
01:00:17.119 --> 01:00:22.199
up call, you know, to
everybody that this is the new way,

699
01:00:22.239 --> 01:00:28.639
this is the you know, insurgent
warfare. Total you know, asymmetrical sounds

700
01:00:28.679 --> 01:00:32.760
trite, but it's true. You're
fighting against guys who aren't they don't have

701
01:00:32.880 --> 01:00:38.519
doctrine and they don't have tactics,
techniques and procedures, and why you know,

702
01:00:38.599 --> 01:00:45.400
while you can smoke those guys and
you know incomprehensible numbers, they're still

703
01:00:45.519 --> 01:00:51.920
very effective. They're swarming you,
and you've got to be ready to defeat

704
01:00:51.960 --> 01:00:57.639
the swarm. And you know,
there were a number of teams, unit

705
01:00:57.719 --> 01:01:05.039
teams who did that. They they
did not stay put, which I which

706
01:01:05.159 --> 01:01:07.800
I also went to school off of. They they said, well, I'm

707
01:01:07.840 --> 01:01:13.880
not staying in this place. Let's
go out and just move and destroy the

708
01:01:14.000 --> 01:01:19.360
enemy instead of letting them creep up
and uh and destroy us. And they

709
01:01:19.360 --> 01:01:23.360
did that. Paul Howe who wrote
a book about it, but he's an

710
01:01:23.360 --> 01:01:31.400
incredible warrior. And to me,
did you okay? So he he I

711
01:01:31.559 --> 01:01:37.719
never forgot him. He gave a
aar. He wasn't in my UH squadron,

712
01:01:37.760 --> 01:01:40.280
so I didn't know him that well. But you know, my my

713
01:01:40.599 --> 01:01:46.480
lesson from Samaria was almost everything he
said about it and uh, and he

714
01:01:47.360 --> 01:01:53.000
the way he prosecuted, the way
he reacted, the way he adapted with

715
01:01:53.119 --> 01:02:00.199
his team was the way I thought
everyone should have should have performed why they

716
01:02:00.199 --> 01:02:02.320
were there, and uh, you
know, he's you guys know, because

717
01:02:02.360 --> 01:02:10.639
you know him. He's an unbelievable
warrior, unincredibly competent, incredibly intelligent and

718
01:02:10.760 --> 01:02:17.000
uh. And his his approach to
me was the takeaway, never sit against

719
01:02:17.000 --> 01:02:21.360
the swarm. You know, it's
like when you're being swarm by bees,

720
01:02:21.440 --> 01:02:24.280
you don't just sit still. Uh, you swat them back, you move

721
01:02:24.320 --> 01:02:29.840
around, you haul ass away from
the swarm. Uh. And he did

722
01:02:29.840 --> 01:02:31.599
that. He took the fight to
the enemy. And you know, he's

723
01:02:31.840 --> 01:02:37.760
very modest guy, but uh,
you know what they what they did accounted

724
01:02:37.840 --> 01:02:45.840
for a lot of the casualties that
the Somalis took there. And so after

725
01:02:45.400 --> 01:02:49.840
Somalia, you make it, you
said, you went back to Columbia one

726
01:02:49.840 --> 01:02:53.480
more trip looking at the college cartel
after the whole Escobar thing was settled,

727
01:02:54.199 --> 01:02:58.000
and and sort of what what was
like the rest of your duration there before

728
01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:01.639
moving on to the next assignment.
Yeah, so just you know, we

729
01:03:01.679 --> 01:03:07.519
went right from Colombia. Bosnia popped
up next. And so you guys asked

730
01:03:07.519 --> 01:03:14.840
earlier about you know, influences on
GAT. To me, the you know,

731
01:03:15.159 --> 01:03:19.079
the PhD in human hunting came in
Bosnia. We called it the Living

732
01:03:19.159 --> 01:03:27.079
Laboratory. We now technology. We
were able to operationalized technology. So there

733
01:03:27.079 --> 01:03:30.199
were no Google Maps at the time, but you know, there was special

734
01:03:30.280 --> 01:03:37.440
mapping software that you could put on
a laptop, a Mini Libretto laptop and

735
01:03:37.760 --> 01:03:42.039
you know, hook it in inside
your vehicle in a low vis way.

736
01:03:43.119 --> 01:03:49.000
We you know, we learned how
to rig Lovis satellite antennas on top of

737
01:03:49.000 --> 01:03:53.719
our vehicles. The blending thing was
huge. You know. You you were

738
01:03:53.920 --> 01:04:00.800
always basically undercover and you know,
same thing just like just like police,

739
01:04:01.400 --> 01:04:06.400
you're not going to be successful unless
you're out there hunting for clues. Uh,

740
01:04:06.960 --> 01:04:14.159
you know, piecing together clues,
just like it's a case uh going

741
01:04:14.239 --> 01:04:19.119
back sharing everything you learn with your
team, you know, picking up the

742
01:04:19.679 --> 01:04:28.079
knowledge, the understanding of the environment
collectively, not individually, and you know,

743
01:04:28.199 --> 01:04:32.239
doing it while undercover in a you
know, it was it was dangerous,

744
01:04:32.440 --> 01:04:39.320
but it was a fairly forgiving environment. So you know, we we

745
01:04:39.360 --> 01:04:44.760
could test anything out and test any
concept out and we did and you know

746
01:04:44.920 --> 01:04:48.880
that went all right up really till
nine to one one. Uh, that

747
01:04:49.039 --> 01:04:55.159
living laboratory. And so I've said
this, I'm sorry to interrupt, but

748
01:04:56.000 --> 01:04:58.840
I get you to scoot like a
little closer to the camera and do you

749
01:04:58.920 --> 01:05:00.760
have like a white and front of
you if you can flip that around or

750
01:05:00.760 --> 01:05:03.639
something, because you're just like so
washed out. I'm afraid we got you

751
01:05:03.679 --> 01:05:10.239
looking like a space alien on this
uh, which I guess we could talk.

752
01:05:10.480 --> 01:05:15.440
I don't mind that. That's much
that's much better. We can we

753
01:05:15.440 --> 01:05:19.039
can actually see you now. Yeah, okay, yeah, yeah, thank

754
01:05:19.079 --> 01:05:27.360
you for the yep. So what
were we what were we talking about there

755
01:05:27.679 --> 01:05:32.199
about how things evolved during the Bosnia
campaign and all the TTPs and technologies that

756
01:05:32.239 --> 01:05:39.079
you guys evolved. Yeah, so
you know that's where we learned the Lovaz

757
01:05:39.159 --> 01:05:45.079
comms, the operating in a Lov's
environment, and you know, guys on

758
01:05:45.159 --> 01:05:48.519
a continuous mission. We were there
for a couple of years, two or

759
01:05:48.519 --> 01:05:55.440
three years, so you were rotating
in and out and it was all pretty

760
01:05:55.480 --> 01:06:00.880
much n c O run our Our
certain majors were the guys ran the safe

761
01:06:00.880 --> 01:06:04.519
houses. And it was very complex
because you had all these low viz vehicles,

762
01:06:04.960 --> 01:06:11.199
you had a lot of weapons.
A lot of us were you know,

763
01:06:11.719 --> 01:06:20.280
under aliases, so it took a
lot of of of highly involved organization

764
01:06:20.480 --> 01:06:27.039
to keep things from you know,
falling apart and to keep the continuity because

765
01:06:27.079 --> 01:06:30.800
you had to go out of your
way to pass on knowledge. Uh,

766
01:06:31.320 --> 01:06:36.280
with each tour, each you know, new team that came over, we

767
01:06:36.400 --> 01:06:42.239
ended up settling on ninety to one
hundred and twenty day tours, which we

768
01:06:42.320 --> 01:06:45.800
thought was you know, about the
right number. Anything less was a little

769
01:06:45.840 --> 01:06:51.079
too short. Anything more, you
know, started really burning guys out.

770
01:06:53.199 --> 01:06:58.119
But it really everything you know that
I did with AFO, or a lot

771
01:06:58.159 --> 01:07:03.599
of what I did with AFO in
Afghanistan was based on knowledge I learned in

772
01:07:03.679 --> 01:07:09.360
low V's Environment in Bosnia, and
I, uh, you know, I

773
01:07:09.480 --> 01:07:12.840
want to turn to your book soon
here, so I'm not going to go

774
01:07:12.960 --> 01:07:19.079
too deep into Afghanistan. But when
that, uh, are you in Sean

775
01:07:19.159 --> 01:07:25.599
Naylar's book Not a Good Day to
Die? Yes? Okay, so yeah,

776
01:07:25.840 --> 01:07:29.280
I'm I'm friends with Sean, So
I mean maybe I can direct people

777
01:07:29.280 --> 01:07:32.239
towards his book because I not that
I wouldn't love to talk to you about

778
01:07:32.280 --> 01:07:35.039
it here, but since like an
hour and ten minutes in, I want

779
01:07:35.039 --> 01:07:38.800
to make sure that we have plenty
of time to you know, unpack everything

780
01:07:38.880 --> 01:07:42.559
in your book. But before moving
on, I mean, is there any

781
01:07:42.719 --> 01:07:46.599
anything about about the Bosnia campaign?
Is there any particular operation that you'd like

782
01:07:46.639 --> 01:07:53.119
to highlight before we move on to
the next thing. You know, I

783
01:07:53.239 --> 01:07:57.960
yeah, I think, uh,
the the one of the big ops that

784
01:07:57.960 --> 01:08:01.840
I write about in my first book. Uh, the highlight is just how

785
01:08:01.880 --> 01:08:09.199
important humor is to imagination. And
this kind of goes back to, uh,

786
01:08:09.760 --> 01:08:14.639
the climate that I talked about initially, and how important having that kind

787
01:08:14.679 --> 01:08:17.720
of climate is. Uh. You
know, you guys know this. Every

788
01:08:17.720 --> 01:08:23.960
military guy who's watching this knows this. You know, we we survive off

789
01:08:24.039 --> 01:08:29.840
laughter, and you know, without
laughter, Uh, you know, you're

790
01:08:29.880 --> 01:08:31.520
going to be stressed out, you're
going to be a zombie, You're going

791
01:08:31.600 --> 01:08:38.079
to be frustrated. Uh. Military
guys are you know, like a bunch

792
01:08:38.119 --> 01:08:44.920
of uh amateur comedians, you know, always trying to get a laugh out

793
01:08:44.920 --> 01:08:49.560
of even the you know, some
of the darkest circumstances. And so when

794
01:08:49.560 --> 01:08:55.239
you're trying to plan an out,
you know, one of the most famous

795
01:08:55.359 --> 01:09:01.720
uh you know bits of advice that
old school senior leaders always give you is

796
01:09:02.199 --> 01:09:05.000
they say, all right, knock
off the crap, we got to get

797
01:09:05.039 --> 01:09:12.199
serious. It's time to plan.
And it turns out that's exactly opposite of

798
01:09:12.359 --> 01:09:15.920
the way our brains work, you
know, humor and insight are indelibly linked.

799
01:09:16.479 --> 01:09:23.880
So humor makes you think of creative
ideas and insights you'd never come up

800
01:09:23.920 --> 01:09:27.720
with unless you were laughing. And
a lot of that has to do with

801
01:09:27.880 --> 01:09:33.319
contrarian thinking. The brain natural is
a natural contrarian like machine. If I

802
01:09:33.399 --> 01:09:41.199
say black, you think white,
just naturally. So what that emphasizes is

803
01:09:41.680 --> 01:09:50.119
even some of the dumbest, like
most foolish ideas in history probably gave birth

804
01:09:50.239 --> 01:09:55.920
to some of the greatest and insightful
ideas, especially in the military. And

805
01:09:57.520 --> 01:10:00.760
you know, we kind of I
kind of knew that just from experience,

806
01:10:00.880 --> 01:10:04.119
that was always the way we operated, but Bosnia we took it to another

807
01:10:04.239 --> 01:10:09.000
level. And so, you know, trying to figure out how to stop

808
01:10:09.079 --> 01:10:16.039
a vehicle with a very one of
the top three principles that we were going

809
01:10:16.079 --> 01:10:21.199
after over there, who is in
the vehicle with this security detail and his

810
01:10:21.359 --> 01:10:27.479
daughter, you know, how do
you stop it in a non kinetic way

811
01:10:28.479 --> 01:10:32.119
that will ensure that you're not going
to kill that daughter while you're trying to

812
01:10:32.199 --> 01:10:36.000
capture this guy. And you know, we sat in a safe house,

813
01:10:36.039 --> 01:10:41.760
it was probably two three in the
morning, and we just started brainstorming,

814
01:10:41.960 --> 01:10:46.279
and any idea was a good idea. And you know that's where I talk

815
01:10:46.319 --> 01:10:54.560
about like the idea of you know, a gorilla costume, and the idea

816
01:10:54.600 --> 01:10:59.920
was get some guy out there who
just you know, makes them go,

817
01:11:00.000 --> 01:11:02.720
so pull their face up to the
front windshield and go what in the fuck

818
01:11:02.840 --> 01:11:06.760
is that? And it's that moment
where we had a special round. It

819
01:11:06.800 --> 01:11:11.039
was called a slam round. And
I don't know what happened to this thing.

820
01:11:11.640 --> 01:11:15.199
It's a fantastic device. I believe
the Austrians came up with it.

821
01:11:15.199 --> 01:11:21.800
It's like an RPG round. It's
about that big the round, but it

822
01:11:21.840 --> 01:11:27.520
has a stick on it that fits
right into your M four barrel and you

823
01:11:27.600 --> 01:11:31.520
fire that thing just like you fire
a normal round. And it's called a

824
01:11:31.560 --> 01:11:38.880
slam round. It's like a RPG
concussion grenade, so when it hits something,

825
01:11:39.479 --> 01:11:45.399
it's like a flashbang. It creates
a concussive effect that knocks people out

826
01:11:45.439 --> 01:11:49.800
for about ten to fifteen seconds or
knocks them incoherent. And you know,

827
01:11:50.359 --> 01:11:54.880
that ended up being the concept we
came up with. The mission ended up

828
01:11:54.960 --> 01:12:00.239
changing based on whether and a few
other things, but only through lap after

829
01:12:00.920 --> 01:12:05.640
and hilarity did we come up with
that concept. And you know, anybody

830
01:12:05.760 --> 01:12:09.720
could come up. One of the
one of the great ideas was came from

831
01:12:09.720 --> 01:12:15.560
one of the most junior guys in
the group, which again shows that you

832
01:12:15.600 --> 01:12:20.439
know, you know, making good
choices is about options, and the more

833
01:12:20.760 --> 01:12:25.439
options you have to choose from,
the better your choices are going to be.

834
01:12:26.079 --> 01:12:29.920
And that's what we learned on that
mission. It really that too stayed

835
01:12:29.920 --> 01:12:34.439
with me all through Afghanistan Iraq.
If you're planning, you know, get

836
01:12:34.479 --> 01:12:40.359
comfortable, be like you guys are
right now, sitting down in a good

837
01:12:40.439 --> 01:12:44.800
chair, having something to sit on, seriously and just you know, laugh

838
01:12:44.960 --> 01:12:48.079
because humor and insider and double link. So next time you hear someone say

839
01:12:48.199 --> 01:12:53.479
knock off the ship, it's time
to get serious and start planning, you

840
01:12:53.479 --> 01:12:57.119
know, raise your hand and tell
them that's not how the human brain works.

841
01:12:58.039 --> 01:13:00.239
I also like before we move in
the book, because the book is

842
01:13:00.640 --> 01:13:03.960
you know, a lot of it
has to do with later on the Gwat

843
01:13:04.119 --> 01:13:11.560
Uh well with uh Pet with Tilman. But I want to say that from

844
01:13:12.039 --> 01:13:15.479
from the unit, you went back
to Ranger Battalion UH and you happened to

845
01:13:15.520 --> 01:13:19.239
be there at the same time I
was. And I remember, like the

846
01:13:19.279 --> 01:13:24.520
whispers around the chow Hall because you
know there was Pistol Pete, the guy

847
01:13:24.680 --> 01:13:28.199
you know who had you know,
who was who was there. But also

848
01:13:28.279 --> 01:13:31.840
I think that your presence because that
was a time when when Ranger Battalion was

849
01:13:32.479 --> 01:13:36.079
in the regiment, but particularly I
think second Battalion, and I think part

850
01:13:36.119 --> 01:13:41.000
of it had to do with you
being there and your influence is like you

851
01:13:41.000 --> 01:13:45.119
you mentioned like you got Jerry Barnhart
there, you know, which was you

852
01:13:45.159 --> 01:13:50.520
know, a resource that Rangers hadn't
had access to up unto that point in

853
01:13:50.560 --> 01:13:55.920
time. You know, the grace
is like bringing civilian experts for these things

854
01:13:56.119 --> 01:13:59.800
that when you were there was also
when we were allowed to go to the

855
01:13:59.840 --> 01:14:04.039
town actual Taylor and have Wooly Pete
bags so in sewn into our rucksacks and

856
01:14:04.319 --> 01:14:09.600
you know, and have our web
gear like altered. But that wasn't something

857
01:14:09.600 --> 01:14:13.760
that Rangers were that. That was
something that there were people in range of

858
01:14:13.760 --> 01:14:19.760
Battalion that were actively resisting and fighting
because it wasn't dress right dress. Yeah,

859
01:14:20.159 --> 01:14:25.840
now it's a great point. And
uh, you know I was fortunately

860
01:14:25.880 --> 01:14:30.119
going back there because I knew now
the you know, platoon sergeants and first

861
01:14:30.159 --> 01:14:34.479
sergeants were guys I was who were
team leaders and squad leaders when I was

862
01:14:34.479 --> 01:14:40.079
there the first time, and so
knowing them and being able to connect to

863
01:14:40.159 --> 01:14:43.960
them and uh and talk to them
about you know, hey, what do

864
01:14:44.039 --> 01:14:48.119
we really need? What what do
you what does the battalion need to you

865
01:14:48.119 --> 01:14:53.479
know, take that next step?
Uh? So their feedback was amazing.

866
01:14:53.800 --> 01:14:58.880
Uh. Ted Kennedy, who's in
my book, was incredible influence on me.

867
01:15:00.319 --> 01:15:03.159
You know, just one of these
guys. You just cannot believe the

868
01:15:03.199 --> 01:15:06.920
wisdom that comes pouring out of them. So, you know, most of

869
01:15:08.119 --> 01:15:14.760
those things you mentioned, Dave were
you know were uh ended up being executed

870
01:15:14.800 --> 01:15:20.079
because of feedback I got from those
NCOs. You know. On the equipment

871
01:15:20.159 --> 01:15:26.640
side, since we've been talking about
that, you know, I came back

872
01:15:26.680 --> 01:15:31.520
and showed did a demo of why
the Rangers need to switch to an AK

873
01:15:31.720 --> 01:15:35.720
forty seven vest, which is you
know what we used to wear before it

874
01:15:35.800 --> 01:15:40.199
was part of the mole system,
before it was part you know, embedded

875
01:15:40.239 --> 01:15:45.960
in your body armor. We did
a demonstration of trying to imt trying to

876
01:15:45.960 --> 01:15:51.800
get magazines and just showing you know
this thing that the only reason the Rangers

877
01:15:51.800 --> 01:15:57.359
didn't have AK vest was because you
know, they were too cool. And

878
01:15:57.760 --> 01:16:02.920
this is where the rangers, you
know, the old school NCOs begin working,

879
01:16:03.159 --> 01:16:06.960
some of them against the system.
You know, they just do not

880
01:16:08.119 --> 01:16:12.000
want to change. And you know, these guys would tell me that,

881
01:16:12.039 --> 01:16:15.720
they're like, hey, we've been
telling them, you know for the last

882
01:16:15.800 --> 01:16:18.920
couple of years, we need to
do CQB, we need to do target

883
01:16:18.960 --> 01:16:27.760
discrimination. And you know it's the
sergeant majors who regiment and whatnot who come

884
01:16:27.800 --> 01:16:30.520
back and say, no, no, no, we're rangers. We kill

885
01:16:30.600 --> 01:16:32.960
everything on the target. We don't
need to learn how to you know,

886
01:16:33.560 --> 01:16:40.039
discriminate targets. We don't need to
shoot and move. And that was one

887
01:16:40.079 --> 01:16:44.199
of the other things that we did
while I was there. We set up

888
01:16:44.239 --> 01:16:49.680
the first maneuver live fire shoot and
move maneuver live fire range on Fort Lewis,

889
01:16:50.159 --> 01:16:55.319
where you know, you started on
a fast rope that was between two

890
01:16:55.439 --> 01:16:59.399
trees about one hundred meters apart.
You had to crawl that thing and whatever

891
01:16:59.600 --> 01:17:03.079
technique you wanted with your weapon.
You came out. You shot from one

892
01:17:03.159 --> 01:17:08.720
hundred meters down a road at a
target. You shot ten rounds, you

893
01:17:08.800 --> 01:17:14.079
picked up, you sprinted forward,
you climbed up on top of what used

894
01:17:14.119 --> 01:17:17.760
to be. You know, they
had those sheds over all the shooting positions.

895
01:17:18.159 --> 01:17:23.600
You climbed up on top of that, you took shots from Annealy position

896
01:17:23.720 --> 01:17:27.199
on that, you climbed back down, ran over, went through a pipe,

897
01:17:28.359 --> 01:17:32.319
and you know it was the purpose. When we brought in the regimental

898
01:17:32.319 --> 01:17:36.319
commander and the regimental staff, they
were like, yeah, well, why

899
01:17:36.319 --> 01:17:41.199
do we need to do this?
And the reason you need to do it

900
01:17:41.239 --> 01:17:46.159
is because you need to teach yourself
how to shoot when you're out of breath,

901
01:17:46.199 --> 01:17:50.439
how to find that respiratory pause.
And like, so we've been training

902
01:17:50.520 --> 01:17:55.720
all those years, we the entire
military, you know, laying on ranges

903
01:17:55.760 --> 01:17:59.960
in a prone position, which is
not how you shoot. You're all amp

904
01:18:00.199 --> 01:18:03.760
up when you're shooting, and that's
the way you should train. And so

905
01:18:03.880 --> 01:18:09.159
we did. And again, you
know, everything we did there was based

906
01:18:09.199 --> 01:18:14.840
on feedback from those senior n CEOs. Same thing with Barnhardt. You know,

907
01:18:14.920 --> 01:18:19.119
they've been trying to get someone to
come and teach them shooting techniques,

908
01:18:19.600 --> 01:18:24.359
advanced shooting techniques for a while and
so when I came, you know,

909
01:18:24.439 --> 01:18:27.760
they said, hey, how can
we do this? And I was like,

910
01:18:28.159 --> 01:18:30.880
you know, we can do it. And since I was the S

911
01:18:30.920 --> 01:18:34.760
three. You know, it was
only like twenty grand to get Barnhart or

912
01:18:34.760 --> 01:18:40.159
something, and we were spending you
know, one hundred grand to rent them

913
01:18:40.159 --> 01:18:46.079
out site, you know it some
obscure post and so you know, I

914
01:18:46.239 --> 01:18:51.399
just use that money to spend on
Jerry Barnhart and new equipment and stuff like

915
01:18:51.439 --> 01:18:55.359
that, and so, you know, I think more than anything, it

916
01:18:55.399 --> 01:19:00.359
speaks of you know, the value
of of you know, going back and

917
01:19:00.439 --> 01:19:08.079
forth between units, you know,
especially on the NCO level. Greg Birch

918
01:19:08.159 --> 01:19:12.279
did that at the end of his
career. He was the battalion and regimental

919
01:19:12.760 --> 01:19:15.920
I believe he was regimental stars major
two. Yeah, he was in small

920
01:19:16.039 --> 01:19:21.279
in Afghanistan. So he he did
that of his own accord. You know,

921
01:19:21.399 --> 01:19:27.439
he had already accomplished everything you could
accomplish at the unit, and he

922
01:19:27.520 --> 01:19:31.319
did it because he started, you
know where I started a company two seven

923
01:19:31.439 --> 01:19:34.720
five, and he wanted to go
back. He's still to this day.

924
01:19:35.399 --> 01:19:43.520
You know, he loves rangers and
sot Why because we see them, you

925
01:19:43.560 --> 01:19:47.520
know, as the future of the
warrior class in the military, and so

926
01:19:48.159 --> 01:19:54.479
you know, they need they need
sanity. Most of the time, rangers

927
01:19:54.800 --> 01:20:00.000
have all the right ideas. They
just can't get those ideas and operation and

928
01:20:00.159 --> 01:20:03.680
uh, you know, sometimes you
need a little bit of help to Yeah,

929
01:20:04.000 --> 01:20:08.880
it was a fascinating time because it
was being pulled like taffy, you

930
01:20:08.920 --> 01:20:11.880
know, where you would have people
like you come in and sort of be

931
01:20:12.000 --> 01:20:15.840
innovators and these other people who understood
what needed to happen. And at the

932
01:20:15.960 --> 01:20:18.199
same time I had a platoon sergeant
who said, we don't need to be

933
01:20:18.239 --> 01:20:23.000
doing this CQB. We need to
do patrol based activities, right, that's

934
01:20:23.039 --> 01:20:28.319
what rangers do, you know,
And it was a fascinating time for rangers.

935
01:20:28.920 --> 01:20:32.119
Yeah, yep, Pete. I
would love to have you back again

936
01:20:32.199 --> 01:20:35.760
at some other time to talk about
the rest of your career. I just

937
01:20:35.840 --> 01:20:39.600
don't I know if we get into
it or I'm not gonna have any time

938
01:20:39.680 --> 01:20:43.359
left to talk about your book here, which I definitely want to get into.

939
01:20:44.359 --> 01:20:47.479
But if people your first book is
The Men, the Mission in Me,

940
01:20:47.960 --> 01:20:50.079
Mission the Men and Me. Yep, the Mission of the Men and

941
01:20:50.159 --> 01:20:53.960
Me, So people can go and
check that out if they want to hear

942
01:20:54.000 --> 01:20:58.079
a bit more about Afghanistan, and
maybe I'm sure we can have you get

943
01:20:58.119 --> 01:21:00.800
a lot and if I remember right, you did a lot about Bosnia in

944
01:21:00.840 --> 01:21:04.960
there too, right and yes,
yeah, big Bosnia. That that story

945
01:21:04.960 --> 01:21:10.159
that I just told is in there, and uh and then and then Nail

946
01:21:10.239 --> 01:21:14.920
Arts book is uh not a good
day to die. So but what we

947
01:21:14.960 --> 01:21:18.840
didn't have peepe back again to talk
about that stuff. So let's launch into

948
01:21:18.880 --> 01:21:24.199
this into book three common sense Leadership
Matters. Tell us about like what was

949
01:21:24.239 --> 01:21:27.000
the genesis of this book, Like
how did it come about? And why

950
01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:31.960
did you write it? Yeah?
Thanks, it's uh so you know indirect

951
01:21:32.520 --> 01:21:39.560
strange thing, but uh, you
know it started for me uh in Bagdad

952
01:21:39.560 --> 01:21:45.760
International Airport two thousand and three.
Uh we Uh, I was actually commanding

953
01:21:45.800 --> 01:21:49.800
the unit. I went over to
uh you know, our staging area for

954
01:21:50.159 --> 01:21:57.920
a RAQ as the ops officer.
The unique commander had a brain aneurysm while

955
01:21:58.159 --> 01:22:02.359
jogging on like the second day we
were there. So I became the unit

956
01:22:02.439 --> 01:22:11.840
commander for Iraq. And you know, of course Jaysuck was you know,

957
01:22:12.479 --> 01:22:17.920
waiting with baited breath as that happened. And you know, we ended up

958
01:22:17.960 --> 01:22:27.880
in filling into Iraq a huge indirect
route into Iraq after the invasion, which

959
01:22:28.119 --> 01:22:31.800
was I don't know we were we
were behind enemy lines and out in the

960
01:22:31.800 --> 01:22:38.319
field for I think twenty twenty six
or twenty eight days, something like that.

961
01:22:38.359 --> 01:22:41.520
And when we came in, we
went to Baggan International Airport, so

962
01:22:41.600 --> 01:22:45.199
it had just been taken you know, by the thunder run. We occupied

963
01:22:45.199 --> 01:22:50.359
that to begin going after you know, high value targets in the city,

964
01:22:50.680 --> 01:22:58.279
specifically Saddam and his henchmen. And
so I was commanding, you know,

965
01:22:59.000 --> 01:23:05.880
in byapp and we were conducting NonStop
ops. And the reason I you know,

966
01:23:05.960 --> 01:23:10.319
I recounted in the book, the
reason I remember it so clearly is

967
01:23:10.359 --> 01:23:18.439
because on the thirtieth, yeah,
thirtieth of May, we had what ended

968
01:23:18.520 --> 01:23:25.119
up being the biggest casualty producing you
know op that we had had up to

969
01:23:25.159 --> 01:23:29.920
that point. Neither war and nobody
died, but four guys were injured,

970
01:23:29.960 --> 01:23:35.800
two of them seriously on a target. And it was a target that you

971
01:23:35.840 --> 01:23:40.560
know, is they did everything right. They got in there, they took

972
01:23:40.680 --> 01:23:45.800
out the first four or five guys, and then you know, some craze

973
01:23:45.840 --> 01:23:49.920
dude came running out with his ak
on automatic and spraying everybody and he hit

974
01:23:49.960 --> 01:23:57.760
four guys on that target. So
those guys were flown back to Buyapp that

975
01:23:58.000 --> 01:24:02.279
night, and it was you know, a typical unit staff. I had

976
01:24:02.359 --> 01:24:06.520
like three guys with me, and
so we ran out to the helicopters to

977
01:24:08.319 --> 01:24:13.560
take those four guys off the helicopters, and obviously, you know, we

978
01:24:13.600 --> 01:24:17.279
couldn't get four stretchers off quickly.
And all of a sudden, all these

979
01:24:17.359 --> 01:24:26.560
rangers ran out, twelve rangers and
started helping us, and we transloaded.

980
01:24:26.600 --> 01:24:30.880
We brought them into we had a
j MOL set up there. We brought

981
01:24:30.880 --> 01:24:34.319
them in to be triaged. They
were going to be flown out to Germany

982
01:24:35.399 --> 01:24:41.399
Critical Care Unit. But they were
three iged right there. And you know,

983
01:24:41.520 --> 01:24:46.119
before one of the guys was put
under with anesthesia, he said to

984
01:24:46.159 --> 01:24:50.479
me a panther, we sure could
have used a few extra guys on the

985
01:24:50.560 --> 01:24:55.000
target. Some of these rangers for
security would have would have been helpful.

986
01:24:55.119 --> 01:24:59.520
I was like, got it,
Chris hanging in there, and I'll get

987
01:24:59.600 --> 01:25:02.319
working on that right away. So
I you know, they put him under.

988
01:25:02.399 --> 01:25:10.279
I went back immediate request to Joint
Special Operation Command. Hey, we

989
01:25:10.359 --> 01:25:16.279
would like a minimum of a couple
squads put a platoon worth of rangers to

990
01:25:16.399 --> 01:25:24.119
help us out to isolate these targets. And you know that was I sent

991
01:25:24.199 --> 01:25:30.439
that mission up that night. Now, those guys carrying the stretchers in unbeknownst

992
01:25:30.479 --> 01:25:32.319
to me, and as they came
out, I thank each one of them.

993
01:25:32.399 --> 01:25:35.800
I shook their hands, said,
hey, really appreciate it. And

994
01:25:35.880 --> 01:25:44.159
you know when you when a unique
guy like talks to a junior ranger there,

995
01:25:44.319 --> 01:25:47.319
you know they think it's they They
were taken back. They were like,

996
01:25:47.359 --> 01:25:53.600
wow, this guy's thanking us.
But I was genuinely appreciative of it.

997
01:25:54.319 --> 01:25:59.319
And that turned out to be.
They were all from second Platoon,

998
01:25:59.359 --> 01:26:02.359
a company, and Tillman was one
of the guys who was there. Wow.

999
01:26:03.600 --> 01:26:09.159
So the next night I was I
was, you know, we were

1000
01:26:09.159 --> 01:26:12.640
doing more ops. I was on
the radio and I saw a ranger come

1001
01:26:12.680 --> 01:26:18.680
in to our area. I was
coincidentally, my top was set up in

1002
01:26:18.720 --> 01:26:25.399
the Delta ticket counter area and so
I heard his voice and I was like,

1003
01:26:26.079 --> 01:26:28.680
I know that voice, and it
was, you know, one of

1004
01:26:28.720 --> 01:26:33.279
the guys I mentioned. I'm not
gonna say his name because he's still active

1005
01:26:33.319 --> 01:26:38.760
with another government agency, but I
knew his name. He was a guy

1006
01:26:38.840 --> 01:26:43.079
I work with in both my tours
in two sem five and you know,

1007
01:26:43.119 --> 01:26:45.560
I'll call him STARTINXT and I was
like, startin next are you. You

1008
01:26:45.600 --> 01:26:51.079
know, I was really happy to
see him because not like personality wise,

1009
01:26:51.119 --> 01:26:55.359
I was happy to see him because
I thought it meant he was coming over

1010
01:26:55.520 --> 01:27:00.039
as the lead NCO to be my
isolation force. But that's not why he

1011
01:27:00.159 --> 01:27:02.800
was over. He just looked at
me and he said, Sir, can

1012
01:27:02.840 --> 01:27:05.479
I talk to you in private?
And I was like, yeah, sure.

1013
01:27:05.920 --> 01:27:10.239
So I grabbed my long gun and
we went out and walked, you

1014
01:27:10.319 --> 01:27:14.159
know, along the inactive runway,
and I said, what's on your mind?

1015
01:27:14.159 --> 01:27:19.800
And he just went into this long
litany of about the command climate in

1016
01:27:19.880 --> 01:27:25.600
the second Battalion and how toxic it
was. And you know, he gave

1017
01:27:25.640 --> 01:27:30.479
me in numerous examples. They're in
the book, and you know, he

1018
01:27:30.600 --> 01:27:35.159
was very clear it wasn't it wasn't
just one individual, so you know,

1019
01:27:36.359 --> 01:27:40.960
and I try to get that across
in the book. This is why climate

1020
01:27:41.119 --> 01:27:47.600
is so so important to understand.
It was multiple and you know, I

1021
01:27:47.640 --> 01:27:49.880
said to him, well, what
can I do to help. I've been

1022
01:27:49.920 --> 01:27:54.359
out of the Rangers. You know, I left Dave while you were there.

1023
01:27:54.359 --> 01:27:57.680
I left in ninety eight, so
this is two thousand and three,

1024
01:27:57.800 --> 01:28:00.600
so I've been out five years.
I was like, you know, sur

1025
01:28:00.760 --> 01:28:02.840
next, what can I do?
And I'll do anything, but what do

1026
01:28:02.880 --> 01:28:05.560
you need me to do? And
he said, I don't know. Can

1027
01:28:05.600 --> 01:28:10.239
you just talk to someone in our
higher headquarters, maybe get someone to come

1028
01:28:10.239 --> 01:28:15.680
down and take a look. Anything
will help. And he was very apologetic,

1029
01:28:15.760 --> 01:28:16.960
you know, about bothering me.
I'm like, dude, you're not

1030
01:28:17.039 --> 01:28:23.680
bothering me. Senseless leadership in a
combat zone is as deadly serious as it

1031
01:28:23.760 --> 01:28:27.760
gets. And so I told him
I had to go back. We had

1032
01:28:27.760 --> 01:28:31.640
a mission going going on on a
target, so I had to go back.

1033
01:28:31.880 --> 01:28:34.960
And I said to him, hey, look, you have my word.

1034
01:28:35.119 --> 01:28:39.399
I will. I don't know what
I'm going to do or how I'm

1035
01:28:39.399 --> 01:28:42.000
going to do it, but I
will find someone and I'm going to make

1036
01:28:42.039 --> 01:28:45.439
it known, and we're going to
get someone over there to check out what's

1037
01:28:45.520 --> 01:28:48.960
going on. And you know,
again back to this theme, because we've

1038
01:28:48.960 --> 01:28:55.000
talked to two seven five, We've
talked about, you know, our initial

1039
01:28:55.039 --> 01:28:58.640
battalion. Like when he told me
that it wasn't just a thing, you

1040
01:28:58.680 --> 01:29:02.119
know, all these faith is,
you know, went flying through my brain.

1041
01:29:02.199 --> 01:29:05.840
I could see them and I just
was like, man, you know,

1042
01:29:05.960 --> 01:29:12.079
those guys are struggling, they're sucking. Those are good people. They

1043
01:29:12.079 --> 01:29:16.239
don't deserve that. And again,
you know, it's deadly serious when that

1044
01:29:16.359 --> 01:29:24.600
shit happens in a combat zone.
So and after him, two more NCOs

1045
01:29:25.199 --> 01:29:27.840
grabbed me on the way to the
chow hal and said the same thing.

1046
01:29:27.920 --> 01:29:34.600
So that's three senior NCOs crossing command
lines to tell someone about a problem.

1047
01:29:34.680 --> 01:29:39.720
So you know, internally, I
only thought about this later, not at

1048
01:29:39.760 --> 01:29:43.560
the time, but it, you
know, it tells you how serious it

1049
01:29:43.640 --> 01:29:47.600
is, right because ranger NCOs,
I mean, you got to be like

1050
01:29:48.600 --> 01:29:55.000
waterboarding them to get them to complain
about anything. They don't complain. H

1051
01:29:55.159 --> 01:29:59.880
you know, you got to coerce
a ranger NCO to tell you what's bothering,

1052
01:30:00.279 --> 01:30:02.720
because you know, you learned to
suck it up, and you learned

1053
01:30:02.720 --> 01:30:09.920
that, you know, you don't
complain. And so I knew, because

1054
01:30:09.960 --> 01:30:14.680
I understood that about about you know, ranger noncommissioned officers, I knew this

1055
01:30:14.800 --> 01:30:19.720
had to be pretty serious for them
to do what they did. And you

1056
01:30:19.760 --> 01:30:28.439
know, two nights later, I
saw a senior ranger officer and I'm anonymizing

1057
01:30:28.520 --> 01:30:32.880
him just because I anonymize a lot
of the guys in the book with rangers.

1058
01:30:32.920 --> 01:30:36.159
Know who he is, and I
approached him. And I had a

1059
01:30:36.199 --> 01:30:42.279
great relationship with this guy, you
know, I had. I had been

1060
01:30:42.279 --> 01:30:45.800
in l and O with him when
I when I was the S three of

1061
01:30:45.039 --> 01:30:49.439
the Rangers five years earlier. I
knew him then he was in the Rangers,

1062
01:30:49.479 --> 01:30:55.359
then he was a rank above me, and I knew him that whole

1063
01:30:55.399 --> 01:31:00.319
time leading up to that. Uh
never you know, I never served with

1064
01:31:00.399 --> 01:31:02.520
him or anything like that, but
I knew him and had a very good

1065
01:31:02.560 --> 01:31:06.279
relationship. And I saw him and
I said, he was the most senior

1066
01:31:06.359 --> 01:31:13.119
guy and he was the only guy
who was at byapp from our higher headquarters.

1067
01:31:13.720 --> 01:31:15.840
So I said, hey, can
I can I talk to you?

1068
01:31:15.039 --> 01:31:19.840
And I pulled him aside and I
said, look, here's I want to

1069
01:31:19.840 --> 01:31:27.359
tell you what three very competent NCOs
told me. And I think it's pretty

1070
01:31:27.359 --> 01:31:30.239
serious, and you know, you
can tell me what you think. And

1071
01:31:30.319 --> 01:31:34.920
I laid out very carefully, trying
to use their words, not to you

1072
01:31:34.960 --> 01:31:42.479
know, in any way, throwing
anything that wasn't said to me, anonymizing

1073
01:31:42.520 --> 01:31:49.000
their names because I understood the ramifications
and how you know, the regiment sometimes

1074
01:31:49.199 --> 01:31:57.840
reacts when people complain, So you
know, I told him all the examples.

1075
01:31:57.880 --> 01:32:00.359
And he wasn't saying a thing,
and it was dark eye and he

1076
01:32:00.439 --> 01:32:03.560
was smoking a cigar at the time. I couldn't see his face. So

1077
01:32:03.680 --> 01:32:06.880
I just stopped and said, you
know, to let him talk, and

1078
01:32:06.960 --> 01:32:11.479
he, you know, took another
hit off his cigar, you know,

1079
01:32:12.039 --> 01:32:15.600
blew the smoke out, hit me
in the face, and then he stuck

1080
01:32:15.640 --> 01:32:19.600
his finger in my chest and said, you don't know, you've been out

1081
01:32:19.600 --> 01:32:23.920
of the regiment for five years,
and you don't know anyone in that chain

1082
01:32:23.960 --> 01:32:30.399
of command, So go back and
tell your anonymous NCO sources to stay in

1083
01:32:30.399 --> 01:32:33.600
their lane, to do what they're
told to do. And if I did

1084
01:32:33.600 --> 01:32:39.640
a nickel for every time a ranger
in CEO complained about what he was told

1085
01:32:39.680 --> 01:32:42.840
to do, I'd be a rich
man. And he turned and walked away.

1086
01:32:43.640 --> 01:32:48.319
And you know, I was not
like, I had no expectation of

1087
01:32:48.359 --> 01:32:53.079
what was going to happen there.
I'd never done that before in that type

1088
01:32:53.079 --> 01:32:57.720
of situation. But I was confident, you know, I felt like that

1089
01:32:57.840 --> 01:33:01.479
was an emotional reaction by him,
and I was confident that even the most

1090
01:33:01.479 --> 01:33:10.359
selfish leader would with time consider what
he had just said and consider the imp

1091
01:33:10.680 --> 01:33:15.079
the implications of doing nothing, and
from a selfish standpoint, go, hey,

1092
01:33:15.600 --> 01:33:18.920
I probably need to look into this
because you know, this guy could

1093
01:33:18.920 --> 01:33:25.479
make me look bad. Uh,
And so you know that's what I just

1094
01:33:25.800 --> 01:33:29.840
I just trusted that something would happen, he would do something. Well,

1095
01:33:30.319 --> 01:33:35.159
you know, I went back to
commanding the unit. Within a week or

1096
01:33:35.159 --> 01:33:38.960
two, Uh, someone came up
and told me, hey, you know

1097
01:33:39.039 --> 01:33:44.760
two some five just redeployed. By
the way we are, request for augmentees

1098
01:33:44.920 --> 01:33:48.319
was denied by a higher headquarters.
So, uh, these guys were sitting

1099
01:33:48.359 --> 01:33:55.439
around doing nothing. They they ended
up doing nothing, but for some reason

1100
01:33:56.159 --> 01:33:59.880
we you know, they weren't allowed
to come and do missions with us.

1101
01:34:00.199 --> 01:34:04.039
Wow, and they redeployed back to
Fort Lewis. And my thinking at the

1102
01:34:04.079 --> 01:34:10.199
time was that he must have looked
into it, must have found this was

1103
01:34:10.239 --> 01:34:14.239
going on, and that's why,
because why else would you leave in the

1104
01:34:14.279 --> 01:34:17.600
beginning phases of the Iraq War.
Why would you fly back to Fort Lewis,

1105
01:34:18.079 --> 01:34:24.079
especially when you know I've got guys
getting shot because we don't have enough

1106
01:34:24.119 --> 01:34:29.960
guys to isolate targets. So that
was my conclusion, and I didn't think

1107
01:34:30.000 --> 01:34:36.840
anything of it, you know,
anytime after that, I did a tour.

1108
01:34:36.920 --> 01:34:41.399
It was my war college year.
After that, I was I was

1109
01:34:41.960 --> 01:34:46.399
promotable to full colonel. I you
know, pinned on when they gave me

1110
01:34:46.439 --> 01:34:51.600
command of the unit. So I
had to do my one year off and

1111
01:34:51.960 --> 01:34:58.079
I so I basically was off the
grid. And that next year I didn't

1112
01:34:58.079 --> 01:35:04.359
know, you know what, if
anything happened. And it was many many

1113
01:35:04.439 --> 01:35:10.239
years later after I got out where
you know, Krakauer wrote that book.

1114
01:35:10.600 --> 01:35:15.800
And I finally read that book in
twenty fifteen. And as I was reading

1115
01:35:15.840 --> 01:35:19.840
it, and I didn't read it
because a friend of mine said it was

1116
01:35:19.960 --> 01:35:25.199
too political, don't waste your time
with it. But I read it in

1117
01:35:25.239 --> 01:35:32.199
twenty fifteen and I came across this
passage where crack Hour had Pat Tillman's diaries,

1118
01:35:33.520 --> 01:35:40.359
and he printed three of his passages
from his diary and they were a

1119
01:35:40.439 --> 01:35:45.279
byapp and so I'm reading it,
and you know it's they're in the book.

1120
01:35:45.600 --> 01:35:51.680
But he says, last night we
helped carry in four wounded Delta Force

1121
01:35:51.760 --> 01:35:58.520
guys. Somehow, you know,
combat became more real. I never thought

1122
01:35:58.560 --> 01:36:04.880
it would happen ever, know.
And then his next passage was we're flying

1123
01:36:04.920 --> 01:36:10.359
home at zero three point thirty tomorrow. I'm not sure at the time,

1124
01:36:11.600 --> 01:36:15.279
thank fucking God. And so I
read this and I was like, holy

1125
01:36:15.479 --> 01:36:19.760
shit, Pat Tillman was. I
didn't even know he was in second rate

1126
01:36:19.880 --> 01:36:25.159
in battalion at the time when they
were in Iraq, much less did I

1127
01:36:25.239 --> 01:36:28.199
know he was one of the guys
who carried the stretcher in. So,

1128
01:36:28.800 --> 01:36:33.279
you know, I started talking to
Ranger NCOs and going back and trying to

1129
01:36:33.600 --> 01:36:39.520
piece this back together. Hey,
whatever happened you know during that time,

1130
01:36:39.600 --> 01:36:45.760
And again one of the guys I
mentioned, Ted Kennedy, was you know,

1131
01:36:45.960 --> 01:36:49.840
a huge source of enlightenment for me. He told me about you know,

1132
01:36:50.319 --> 01:36:57.000
them returning to Fort Lewis what happened. And he also told me for

1133
01:36:57.039 --> 01:37:01.640
the first time that the same chain
of command that those guys came and complained

1134
01:37:01.640 --> 01:37:09.399
about to me was in place in
Afghanistan one year later. And that's when

1135
01:37:10.159 --> 01:37:14.479
you know, I kind of realized, hey, wow, this is you

1136
01:37:14.479 --> 01:37:16.920
know, what do I do with
this information. He also told me that

1137
01:37:17.039 --> 01:37:23.680
Missus Tillman was still investigating what happened. She was, you know, talking

1138
01:37:23.720 --> 01:37:28.279
to a bunch of the guys.
She she wanted to know anything anyone knew

1139
01:37:28.279 --> 01:37:32.840
about it, And so I felt
compelled to provide her with this information,

1140
01:37:33.279 --> 01:37:38.880
not thinking it was some key clue
or anything. I just felt compelled to

1141
01:37:38.880 --> 01:37:42.560
tell her, you know about it, and to tell her that Pat carried

1142
01:37:42.560 --> 01:37:46.800
my guys in and you know what
a great guy was in Iraq. So

1143
01:37:48.279 --> 01:37:55.319
you know, that conversation led to
her reading my book and then saying to

1144
01:37:55.359 --> 01:38:00.760
me, hey, you know,
can you I have this these investigative documents.

1145
01:38:00.960 --> 01:38:04.079
I know you were in Afghanistan,
you were a ranger, you know

1146
01:38:04.199 --> 01:38:08.399
all these people. Could you take
a look at it and tell me what

1147
01:38:08.479 --> 01:38:12.960
you think? And I said,
you know, the only thing any of

1148
01:38:13.039 --> 01:38:15.680
us could say to the mother of
a fallen comrade, I said, you

1149
01:38:15.720 --> 01:38:20.760
know, of course, And I
drove up there that next day, four

1150
01:38:20.840 --> 01:38:27.199
hundred miles and picked up the investigative
documents, met her. You know,

1151
01:38:28.520 --> 01:38:32.880
my first words to her were an
apology for the army, and you know,

1152
01:38:33.920 --> 01:38:39.640
just to tell her that we're not
You know, everyone I've ever talked

1153
01:38:39.680 --> 01:38:44.760
to is embarrassed about that. And
you know, I have no idea what

1154
01:38:44.880 --> 01:38:48.319
happened. But I'll read these documents
and I'll tell you what I think,

1155
01:38:48.479 --> 01:38:54.039
even if it's not what you may
want to hear. Because at the time

1156
01:38:54.199 --> 01:39:00.239
she was you know, she had
been twisted into, you know, just

1157
01:39:00.159 --> 01:39:06.960
wild ideas about what happened, and
not not because she was delusional or something,

1158
01:39:08.000 --> 01:39:13.199
but because she'd been lied to multiple
times. She'd been told multiple stories

1159
01:39:13.319 --> 01:39:17.239
about what happened. And so you
know, that's human nature anytime, you

1160
01:39:17.279 --> 01:39:20.600
know, when you're punching the nose. Once you learn when you're punching the

1161
01:39:20.600 --> 01:39:24.239
nose twice, right, you know, it was like, hey, I'm

1162
01:39:24.319 --> 01:39:29.079
done right, yeah, And so
she was. And so I started reading

1163
01:39:29.079 --> 01:39:32.960
the documents, talking to every ranger
I could talk to. That was twenty

1164
01:39:33.079 --> 01:39:41.439
seventeen. And you know, Jack, I think I said this to you

1165
01:39:41.720 --> 01:39:46.520
in a separate conversation. You know
what was a very difficult thing. I

1166
01:39:46.600 --> 01:39:49.720
knew when I told her I'd look
at it. When I got home.

1167
01:39:50.000 --> 01:39:54.720
You know, three thousand, five
hundred pages of documents. I spread them

1168
01:39:54.760 --> 01:39:58.359
out my office and I just was
like, hey, you know, I

1169
01:39:58.399 --> 01:40:01.800
might as well get started, and
I started reading one binder, and nine

1170
01:40:01.840 --> 01:40:09.760
hours later and about one hundred sticky
notes later, I was like just captivated

1171
01:40:09.800 --> 01:40:13.680
by it. Uh, And I
knew there was something there. I knew

1172
01:40:13.720 --> 01:40:18.159
I needed to go talk to the
rangers who were involved, and uh,

1173
01:40:18.520 --> 01:40:25.560
you know that began my journey uh
talking to those guys and and you know

1174
01:40:25.720 --> 01:40:31.880
that that you know, uh,
collectively both talking to her uh and talking

1175
01:40:31.960 --> 01:40:38.560
to those rangers, UH just became
one of the most rewarding things that I've

1176
01:40:38.560 --> 01:40:44.720
ever done in my career. And
you know, along the way, UH

1177
01:40:45.479 --> 01:40:50.880
just fascinated by you know, the
terrain, the circumstances, everything we've talked

1178
01:40:50.880 --> 01:40:58.079
about already in this Uh, you
know, was was very obvious. Uh

1179
01:40:58.560 --> 01:41:01.960
was very obviously going on on the
ground that day. You know, guys

1180
01:41:02.680 --> 01:41:11.079
making great recommendations, common sense recommendations, being denied, being told no,

1181
01:41:11.319 --> 01:41:15.840
you can't do that, or not
even being answered on the radio, you

1182
01:41:15.880 --> 01:41:23.119
know. And so as I accumulated
that knowledge, it kind of came together

1183
01:41:23.279 --> 01:41:29.560
with what I already knew about bad
leadership and toxic leadership. And the more

1184
01:41:29.640 --> 01:41:32.720
guys I talked through, the more
it became, you know, just completely

1185
01:41:32.800 --> 01:41:40.079
obvious. But the real breakthroughs,
you know, were we're from talking to

1186
01:41:40.119 --> 01:41:45.880
them and then just diving into the
terrain, the timing, the radio logs,

1187
01:41:46.840 --> 01:41:51.880
seeing what people really said, and
you know, I started talking to

1188
01:41:51.920 --> 01:41:57.079
the guys. It was a slow
process at first because not many guys wanted

1189
01:41:57.119 --> 01:42:01.119
to talk about it. It was
difficult to find most of but with each

1190
01:42:01.199 --> 01:42:06.000
guy I found, that guy led
me to a couple more guys, and

1191
01:42:06.359 --> 01:42:13.880
you know, patterns started to evail, just shocking patterns. You know,

1192
01:42:14.680 --> 01:42:18.720
I don't have PTSD, so to
me, it's I don't know what I

1193
01:42:18.760 --> 01:42:24.119
can't like imagine what it is,
just like depression. You know, people

1194
01:42:24.239 --> 01:42:28.119
used to think depression is fake.
We know it's not now and you can't

1195
01:42:28.119 --> 01:42:32.279
imagine depression if you don't have it. And what shocked me was how many

1196
01:42:32.279 --> 01:42:40.079
of these guys were absolutely devastated by
what happened. And most of that devastation

1197
01:42:40.960 --> 01:42:48.039
was built on guilt and frustration.
And the frustration was they had no idea

1198
01:42:48.119 --> 01:42:55.000
what happened. They never were allowed
to see any of the investigative documents.

1199
01:42:55.279 --> 01:42:59.000
They didn't know these decisions were being
made behind the scene. They didn't know

1200
01:42:59.039 --> 01:43:02.039
their opportunity was being told, no, you can't blow up the vehicle,

1201
01:43:03.119 --> 01:43:09.439
keep going, uh, you know, just senseless ship on top of senseless

1202
01:43:09.439 --> 01:43:13.720
ship. And uh, you know
it had an effect on me, it

1203
01:43:13.920 --> 01:43:19.600
really uh you know, instead of
detouring me, it you know, hardened

1204
01:43:19.640 --> 01:43:27.199
my uh resolve to get to the
bottom of it and UH and help these

1205
01:43:27.199 --> 01:43:30.880
guys out, Pete, can you
because I think a lot of people now

1206
01:43:30.920 --> 01:43:38.039
are very familiar with with UH Patowman
being killed in fractricide. But can you

1207
01:43:38.199 --> 01:43:43.960
lay out what the mission was,
what the scenario was, and where these

1208
01:43:44.000 --> 01:43:49.680
command decisions and the refusals of certain
IT requests work. Can you sort of

1209
01:43:49.880 --> 01:43:55.359
lay out what the scenario was for
us? Yeah? Sure, so terrain.

1210
01:43:55.399 --> 01:44:00.159
It starts with terrain. And you
know, coincidentally, this area that

1211
01:44:00.239 --> 01:44:05.800
the rangers were driving around looking for
weapons cachets is what I believe. There

1212
01:44:05.880 --> 01:44:10.760
might be another one. It might
be tied, but there's probably no more

1213
01:44:10.880 --> 01:44:18.560
dangerous hostile place in Afghanistan tribally terrain
wise, same thing. There might be

1214
01:44:18.800 --> 01:44:27.199
another chunk of terrain somewhere equally arduous
as this area, but not more arduous.

1215
01:44:27.399 --> 01:44:31.079
So both the terrain and the enemy
are as bad as you can get

1216
01:44:31.159 --> 01:44:34.800
at any time. And how do
I know that? Because I thought,

1217
01:44:35.199 --> 01:44:40.720
you know, the Battle of Shahikot
known as Anaconda, and when we chased

1218
01:44:40.920 --> 01:44:45.560
the foreign fighters, me and my
RECKI guys followed the trail of tears on

1219
01:44:45.600 --> 01:44:50.479
the thirteenth day as they the last
remnants of the l KAEDA fighters fled.

1220
01:44:50.800 --> 01:44:55.720
They fled west and it turned out, you know, I figured this out

1221
01:44:55.840 --> 01:45:00.439
about a month in looking at the
map. Where kat Tillman was killed was

1222
01:45:00.479 --> 01:45:05.199
eight kilometers west of Takergar, which
is, you know, the mountain where

1223
01:45:05.239 --> 01:45:10.159
all those guys died in the you
know, the medals of honor and everything.

1224
01:45:10.640 --> 01:45:14.600
So we chase them right to the
border, right through this area.

1225
01:45:14.840 --> 01:45:17.479
And is we were in that area, we knew from intelligence, but we

1226
01:45:17.560 --> 01:45:24.560
knew firsthand from being in it how
hostile that area was. I had a

1227
01:45:24.560 --> 01:45:30.159
safe house in Oregon as the AFO
commander, and I also had waned Coust.

1228
01:45:30.399 --> 01:45:33.720
So to get from Oregon to Coust, the straight line is to go

1229
01:45:33.800 --> 01:45:38.359
right through this area. We would
not go through it, and when we

1230
01:45:38.479 --> 01:45:43.800
had to, which was twice,
i'd go through twice. We only had

1231
01:45:43.840 --> 01:45:47.479
one rule. Never go through in
a convoy. Go through in lobiz vehicles

1232
01:45:48.520 --> 01:45:54.520
by as much time as you can
get through quickly, but do not look

1233
01:45:54.640 --> 01:46:00.359
like an enemy convoy. Because these
are the hardest core posh dunes that there

1234
01:46:00.359 --> 01:46:05.560
are, and it's a smuggling haven
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. So it's not

1235
01:46:05.640 --> 01:46:11.720
just those tribes. There's other people
passing through there all the time, and

1236
01:46:11.760 --> 01:46:15.439
so I knew how dangerous and daunting
it was. And so when I read

1237
01:46:15.479 --> 01:46:20.159
their mission, you know, I
still remember the moment. It was actually

1238
01:46:20.239 --> 01:46:24.720
in this office, all the papers
were on the floor. I dropped the

1239
01:46:24.720 --> 01:46:29.880
binder that it was in, and
just you know, shook my head in

1240
01:46:30.720 --> 01:46:36.840
disgust that they were just randomly driving
around to find weapons cachets and hoping that

1241
01:46:38.279 --> 01:46:42.399
Osama bin Laden might be out back
feeding one of the goats or something.

1242
01:46:43.680 --> 01:46:47.760
And you know, it was the
exact opposite thing we should have been doing.

1243
01:46:47.840 --> 01:46:53.159
And it's not even so much the
Rager's fault as it is the overall

1244
01:46:54.720 --> 01:46:59.680
Afghanistan you know, strategy. Just
the fact they were allowed to go in

1245
01:46:59.720 --> 01:47:06.720
there to do that for no specific
intelligence is mind boggling. And so these

1246
01:47:06.760 --> 01:47:15.359
guys, the platoon and second Battalion, flew into flew into Bogram and within

1247
01:47:15.520 --> 01:47:21.399
three days they were in their vehicles
out driving around in the field without coming

1248
01:47:21.439 --> 01:47:28.159
back into their base. What ended
up being eight days. So these are

1249
01:47:28.279 --> 01:47:31.399
brand new guys, most of them, a few of them had a prior

1250
01:47:31.479 --> 01:47:38.520
tour. They were there for a
couple of weeks in November of two thousand

1251
01:47:38.520 --> 01:47:43.760
and three. But other than that, no real on the ground knowledge,

1252
01:47:44.199 --> 01:47:50.800
and not just that the baseline ground
elevation of this area is six thousand feet.

1253
01:47:51.079 --> 01:47:56.640
So you know, lesson learned from
Battle of Shahi code is you don't

1254
01:47:56.640 --> 01:48:01.279
go into any area above three thousand
feet unless you're proper acclimated. And you

1255
01:48:01.319 --> 01:48:09.279
know, unknown lesson from that battle
is most of those follow on forces that

1256
01:48:09.359 --> 01:48:15.039
came in were also flown out with
altitude sickness. And that's a lot of

1257
01:48:15.039 --> 01:48:20.520
these foreign forces, the you know, other units, conventional units, and

1258
01:48:20.560 --> 01:48:24.039
we were telling people that, we
were saying, look, you need to

1259
01:48:24.039 --> 01:48:29.399
come to gardens first and acclimate.
It's you know, it's right at I

1260
01:48:29.439 --> 01:48:34.520
think foury eight hundred feet and acclimate
and then go in. But you know,

1261
01:48:34.600 --> 01:48:38.760
we were blowing that off. So
I would have stopped them just for

1262
01:48:38.880 --> 01:48:45.079
lack of acclimation. But to go
into that area and not understand how dangerous

1263
01:48:45.119 --> 01:48:50.319
it was was, you know,
already a formula for disaster. And when

1264
01:48:50.359 --> 01:48:56.640
you read the interview notes, you
know, you read the S three,

1265
01:48:56.880 --> 01:49:01.880
the commander, these guys talking,
they talk about this firefight they got in.

1266
01:49:01.960 --> 01:49:06.960
They say, well, you know, it was just a you know

1267
01:49:08.159 --> 01:49:13.279
happenstance. We had been in that
area for eight days and all dry holes,

1268
01:49:13.560 --> 01:49:17.600
you know, no enemy contact,
and I feel comfortable sending guys back.

1269
01:49:17.880 --> 01:49:23.199
Five hum v's back in there today. Well again, I dropped my

1270
01:49:23.239 --> 01:49:28.359
binder when I read that, because
in Afghanistan, if you're a history you

1271
01:49:28.359 --> 01:49:32.239
know, if you've read the history
of Afghanistan, you understand that eight days

1272
01:49:32.520 --> 01:49:39.600
of no contact means they've been studying
you for eight days and you are eight

1273
01:49:39.760 --> 01:49:45.119
times more likely to be ambush because
that's the only tactic they were using at

1274
01:49:45.119 --> 01:49:49.159
the time. That's their tactic of
choice, the far ambush. You know,

1275
01:49:49.199 --> 01:49:53.640
you can go look online at the
videos of how they did it to

1276
01:49:53.680 --> 01:49:59.279
the Soviets. They are sizing you
up, and you bet you can bet

1277
01:49:59.319 --> 01:50:03.319
they were s those rangers up.
So you know, on the day this

1278
01:50:03.359 --> 01:50:09.479
mission happened, they had an inoperable
hum V and they were at a border

1279
01:50:09.520 --> 01:50:14.800
control point called Border Control Point five, right on the Pakistani Afghan border,

1280
01:50:15.439 --> 01:50:18.800
and the platoon leader called it in
and said, hey, this thing's deadlined,

1281
01:50:18.920 --> 01:50:24.239
it won't start. Recommend we leave
it here, or you can come

1282
01:50:24.319 --> 01:50:30.439
pick it up in a helicopter and
take it back to Couse. You know,

1283
01:50:30.560 --> 01:50:34.159
deny, drag it with you.
You guys have been your behind schedule,

1284
01:50:35.560 --> 01:50:41.159
and you know the sink matrix,
your platoon on the sink matrix is

1285
01:50:41.199 --> 01:50:47.000
all red and we need to get
back green. So you know, common

1286
01:50:47.039 --> 01:50:55.279
sense and the response is senselessness.
So these guys hooked up a deadlined hum

1287
01:50:55.399 --> 01:51:02.159
V to another hum V using nylon
straps and took off from that border control

1288
01:51:02.239 --> 01:51:06.399
point five with a helipad, which, by the way, you know,

1289
01:51:06.479 --> 01:51:13.359
a helicopter flew in the last spare
part flew in the company commander and the

1290
01:51:13.479 --> 01:51:15.880
is XO to tell the platoon leader, hey, you need to get back

1291
01:51:15.920 --> 01:51:20.079
on schedule. The old man's really
getting pissed, so off they go,

1292
01:51:20.720 --> 01:51:26.920
and you know, guys, you
can watch the video online. I've posted

1293
01:51:26.960 --> 01:51:32.039
it online. It was the fourth
investigation video the entire canyon. When you

1294
01:51:32.119 --> 01:51:39.960
see this canyon, they literally were
dragging a Humby through the equivalent of the

1295
01:51:40.039 --> 01:51:44.000
Grand Canyon, like trying to get
through the Grand Canyon with a Humby.

1296
01:51:44.680 --> 01:51:48.880
And by this time it had no
front wheels. It couldn't be steered,

1297
01:51:49.079 --> 01:51:55.359
so it was elevated. It was
just two wheels rolling and anyone who's done

1298
01:51:55.359 --> 01:52:00.119
off roadwork knows. You know,
trying to get a jinga truck with a

1299
01:52:00.279 --> 01:52:04.279
hum vy on two wheels through that
stuff is an exercise in futility. So

1300
01:52:05.000 --> 01:52:10.920
their requests to blow the vehicle,
you know, I should say they dragged

1301
01:52:10.960 --> 01:52:15.680
it for four and a half hours
that morning. Their average speed was one

1302
01:52:15.760 --> 01:52:20.960
point five miles an hour, So
you know that's important not just for understanding

1303
01:52:21.000 --> 01:52:25.920
the futility of it, but think
of the stress levels in those guys.

1304
01:52:26.119 --> 01:52:31.079
You're in enemy territory going one point
five miles an hour in the middle of

1305
01:52:31.159 --> 01:52:36.079
mountains. Yeah, and to paint
it for people, because those BCPs were

1306
01:52:36.119 --> 01:52:41.239
generally on elevated locations. So when
you say, like the Grand Caynans like

1307
01:52:41.279 --> 01:52:47.159
they're they're towing something down switchbacks.
Hand carved roads, yes, like that,

1308
01:52:47.880 --> 01:52:53.279
hand carved roads that are one vehicle
wide that when you're in the driver's

1309
01:52:53.279 --> 01:52:57.319
seat or the past one one Toyota
Tacoma wide, not one home right right

1310
01:52:57.520 --> 01:53:01.520
exactly, you can look over the
edge and see like the precipice, like

1311
01:53:02.319 --> 01:53:09.279
it's right there was was the was
the no to blow it in place and

1312
01:53:09.359 --> 01:53:13.279
no to HeLa back it out?
Was that coming from the battlespace owner was

1313
01:53:13.279 --> 01:53:15.680
that coming from their direct chain of
command? Where was that coming from?

1314
01:53:17.279 --> 01:53:26.239
Yeah, so again important lesson year, which you know, was illuminated to

1315
01:53:26.279 --> 01:53:32.720
me once again by these senior NCOs
who whose comment was, if you want

1316
01:53:32.800 --> 01:53:38.960
to know what went wrong in Afghanistan, start with the way we tried to

1317
01:53:38.960 --> 01:53:43.760
command and control it. And in
this case, here they were they had

1318
01:53:43.920 --> 01:53:46.840
just switched this. Remember this is
only two thousand and four, so we're

1319
01:53:46.960 --> 01:53:53.600
only really two years into it,
and we've already pretty much lost our way

1320
01:53:53.680 --> 01:53:58.399
because I was, you know,
with the first guys in in the winter

1321
01:53:58.520 --> 01:54:01.520
of two thousand and one two.
This is the spring of two thousand and

1322
01:54:01.760 --> 01:54:08.159
four. And here's how the command
and control was set up at the time.

1323
01:54:08.359 --> 01:54:12.680
It was called the CFT concept,
the cross functional team concept, and

1324
01:54:13.319 --> 01:54:19.319
the cross functional team stipulated every staff
was exactly the same around Afghanistan, and

1325
01:54:19.359 --> 01:54:26.439
there were no more company talks,
battalion talks. There were just these CFTs

1326
01:54:26.640 --> 01:54:31.239
where everybody you brought all your staff
officers, everybody was in one place.

1327
01:54:32.079 --> 01:54:40.159
They lived off their VTCs that drove
their schedule every day. So this platoon

1328
01:54:40.479 --> 01:54:44.880
who on this day is they leave
Border Control Point five, is the only

1329
01:54:44.960 --> 01:54:48.159
platoon or so we thought out in
the field at the time, the only

1330
01:54:48.279 --> 01:54:54.520
rifle platoon, the other eight rifle
platoons are back in planning the next dry

1331
01:54:54.560 --> 01:54:59.840
hole. Their chain. The way
they report is back to the first CFT,

1332
01:55:00.119 --> 01:55:03.239
which is at Salerno and Cowst And
it looks like all of them.

1333
01:55:03.239 --> 01:55:08.680
There's ten everyone has a U table. There's ten staff officers on each side.

1334
01:55:09.279 --> 01:55:12.520
Ten of them are supposed to be
working on current ops and ten on

1335
01:55:12.640 --> 01:55:15.840
future ops. Don't ask me how
that, ever, was explained to anyone.

1336
01:55:16.039 --> 01:55:20.760
I don't know. Every op is
future in my opinion. So ten

1337
01:55:20.840 --> 01:55:27.920
and ten and then the CFT commander
behind him is the lower level command.

1338
01:55:27.960 --> 01:55:31.960
So the CFT is a battalion commander
or battalion S three in this case it

1339
01:55:32.000 --> 01:55:38.119
was the S three, and behind
him is the company commander and company XO.

1340
01:55:38.800 --> 01:55:43.079
So when the platoon leader he drove
I told you the four and a

1341
01:55:43.119 --> 01:55:46.000
half hours out of BCP five,
they pull into this town called Magara.

1342
01:55:47.159 --> 01:55:53.800
It's a Pashtun town, you know, something out of the history books.

1343
01:55:53.840 --> 01:55:58.720
One hundred years back. They've you
know, barely ever seen a Westerner.

1344
01:55:59.159 --> 01:56:06.439
And suddenly this convoy of ten vehicles
with rangers in space age combat gear get

1345
01:56:06.439 --> 01:56:12.920
out with a busted up vehicle,
and that's where he's calling back for help

1346
01:56:13.119 --> 01:56:15.960
and his you know, his first
call is, hey, we got a

1347
01:56:15.000 --> 01:56:21.720
deadline vehicle. It cannot go any
further. Recommend we either blow it or

1348
01:56:23.239 --> 01:56:29.279
you bring in a forty seven to
lift it out. They said, Roger,

1349
01:56:29.399 --> 01:56:35.920
got it. They reply an hour
later. Okay, so you know

1350
01:56:36.600 --> 01:56:41.960
this is another binder dropping moment for
me as I'm reading it. One hour

1351
01:56:42.079 --> 01:56:47.479
later they reply, you know,
permission to blow the vehicle denied, and

1352
01:56:47.520 --> 01:56:53.479
we don't have any helicopters. Well, you know, in the interviews,

1353
01:56:53.600 --> 01:56:59.399
remember I'm reading present and you know
future, I'm reading the interviews of what

1354
01:56:59.800 --> 01:57:04.800
the chain of commands said about their
decisions to investigators. In that interview,

1355
01:57:06.000 --> 01:57:10.319
you know, the battalion commander said, hey, we don't blow vehicles.

1356
01:57:10.479 --> 01:57:15.479
It's against army policy. You know, it's a it just provides propaganda to

1357
01:57:15.520 --> 01:57:20.960
the enemy. And so you know
that's why we denied it. Well,

1358
01:57:21.640 --> 01:57:28.680
that's you know, preposterous. I
had just blown up an M one a

1359
01:57:28.800 --> 01:57:34.279
two tank, four point five million
dollar tank in Iraq one year earlier because

1360
01:57:34.319 --> 01:57:39.079
it flipped over and we were it
would take about a week to get that

1361
01:57:39.159 --> 01:57:43.159
thing out of the hole that was
in right so I knew right away that

1362
01:57:43.279 --> 01:57:47.640
was BSU and the helicopter. You
know, no investigator could ever find a

1363
01:57:48.199 --> 01:57:51.399
record of a request for a helicopter. I just told him no, keep

1364
01:57:51.479 --> 01:57:57.000
dragging it. You know. It's
very clear they were mad at this platoon

1365
01:57:57.560 --> 01:58:02.920
because it had fallen behind scale and
you guys know the sync matrix. And

1366
01:58:02.960 --> 01:58:06.720
this is where I go back to. These are lessons we have to internalize

1367
01:58:06.760 --> 01:58:14.560
for the future. This modern command
and control model is not modern, it's

1368
01:58:14.800 --> 01:58:20.199
antiquated, and in my opinion,
this is an example of the first time

1369
01:58:20.279 --> 01:58:26.439
in modern military history where we've gone
backwards, and we've gone backwards because of

1370
01:58:26.560 --> 01:58:30.920
technology in Vietnam, if those guys
were out there driving around with those hum

1371
01:58:31.000 --> 01:58:36.560
vis, their company commander, his
FO, his two rtos and a small

1372
01:58:36.640 --> 01:58:44.840
security team would have been on the
highest centrally located hill, camping out until

1373
01:58:44.880 --> 01:58:48.119
they came back in with a PRC
seventy seven radio. But he would have

1374
01:58:48.159 --> 01:58:53.439
been on that radio all the time
and anything they needed he'd be giving him

1375
01:58:53.479 --> 01:58:57.920
guidance or relaying it the hire to
help them out. And in this case,

1376
01:58:58.439 --> 01:59:03.560
this CFT concept looked exactly against that, because, as it turns out,

1377
01:59:03.680 --> 01:59:10.880
many of these these lags in responses
are in part due to the fact

1378
01:59:11.119 --> 01:59:15.840
they've got these vtc's going on with
the commanding General. So they're sitting in

1379
01:59:15.920 --> 01:59:25.079
this talk Tactical Operation Center, you
know, just enthralled with the VTC hanging

1380
01:59:25.119 --> 01:59:29.079
on every word of the general.
Right, these guys are struggling with the

1381
01:59:29.159 --> 01:59:32.560
real world combat problem in the field, and they're either not answering them or

1382
01:59:32.640 --> 01:59:36.119
going tell them to keep dragging it. Right, then, you know what

1383
01:59:36.119 --> 01:59:41.239
I mean? What are they pussies? Right? And so and so these

1384
01:59:41.279 --> 01:59:45.920
guys are told, no, you
can't blow it, we can't lift it.

1385
01:59:45.640 --> 01:59:48.920
We can get a wrecker out there, but the wrecker is not allowed

1386
01:59:48.960 --> 01:59:55.479
to go off the KG highway.
Again, some obscure someone made a sop

1387
01:59:55.760 --> 01:59:59.800
for the wreckord, which is a
tow truck, that it could not leave

1388
01:59:59.840 --> 02:00:06.159
the Colsta Gardez Highway, which was
fifteen kilometers from these guys. So what

1389
02:00:06.279 --> 02:00:13.560
they come back and tell them after
four and a half hours in Magara being

1390
02:00:13.640 --> 02:00:17.359
sworn by civilians. It's hot,
there's biting flies, they're out of water,

1391
02:00:17.479 --> 02:00:24.359
they're low on food. And again
for both you two and anyone watching

1392
02:00:24.439 --> 02:00:29.159
this, you know, you can
just imagine they're also probably red hot pissed

1393
02:00:29.199 --> 02:00:33.439
off at this chain of command for
the senselessness. They're told, not only

1394
02:00:33.479 --> 02:00:39.359
do you got to keep tolling that
vehicle, we want you to split the

1395
02:00:39.359 --> 02:00:44.760
platoon because we need half the platoon
to get to this other town called Mana

1396
02:00:44.880 --> 02:00:48.319
as quickly as possible. No reason, no enemy. You know, it

1397
02:00:48.359 --> 02:00:55.199
wasn't like they just saw Ubl there
or one of his underlines. It was

1398
02:00:55.359 --> 02:00:59.920
because the sink matrix was still red
for Mana. So they told them,

1399
02:01:00.039 --> 02:01:03.680
rush off, get the Mana.
And you know that's it. We don't

1400
02:01:03.680 --> 02:01:08.800
want to hear anything else out of
you. And the lieutenant, you know,

1401
02:01:10.800 --> 02:01:15.720
in my opinion, did a fantastic
job. He gave three reasons why

1402
02:01:15.760 --> 02:01:19.399
that didn't make sense. And one
of the things I recommend in my book

1403
02:01:19.520 --> 02:01:25.399
is we go to a new concept
called logic of why that you don't just

1404
02:01:25.439 --> 02:01:29.399
give an order. You always have
to explain the logic of why it makes

1405
02:01:29.439 --> 02:01:33.319
sense. And that's how our brains
work. You can't persuade anyone unless they

1406
02:01:33.399 --> 02:01:39.840
understand the logic of why. And
that's usually threefold. Firstly, Secondly,

1407
02:01:39.920 --> 02:01:44.560
thirdly, and the lieutenant, this
is why it's a case study. He

1408
02:01:44.680 --> 02:01:48.319
did exactly that. He said,
here's why it doesn't make sense. First

1409
02:01:48.399 --> 02:01:53.520
of all, we'll be splitting up
the platoon and we don't have enough.

1410
02:01:53.560 --> 02:01:57.159
We only have one satcom radio,
so we're going to have we're not going

1411
02:01:57.239 --> 02:02:00.199
to be able to talk to each
other, and if something happens, one

1412
02:02:00.239 --> 02:02:01.319
of them is going to be one
of us is going to be left out

1413
02:02:01.359 --> 02:02:08.199
there without any comms. Second of
all, we can get to the target.

1414
02:02:08.920 --> 02:02:13.119
Second of all, we can't even
clear Mana until tomorrow morning, as

1415
02:02:13.159 --> 02:02:16.680
per Battalion SOP. So why are
we in a rush to get there before

1416
02:02:16.720 --> 02:02:20.720
the sun goes down just so we
can sit outside the town to clear it

1417
02:02:20.760 --> 02:02:26.439
the next day. And thirdly,
it's much faster if we all move together,

1418
02:02:26.960 --> 02:02:30.359
go drop the vehicle off at the
KG Highway, then turn around and

1419
02:02:30.439 --> 02:02:36.039
come back and clear the town.
And the answer was no, no logical.

1420
02:02:36.079 --> 02:02:41.880
Why just know, do what you
were told to do and continue mission.

1421
02:02:42.119 --> 02:02:47.840
And so they did. They split
the platoon up. It's a random

1422
02:02:48.000 --> 02:02:53.840
split. They wanted certain guys back
in the rear for planning. They wanted

1423
02:02:53.880 --> 02:03:00.439
the mortars, the snipers, and
a couple other specialty guys back. Well,

1424
02:03:00.520 --> 02:03:05.680
the problem with that is when you're
doing motorized ops, every vehicle is

1425
02:03:05.760 --> 02:03:11.920
set up in a certain way with
certain guys doing certain tasks. You know,

1426
02:03:12.000 --> 02:03:15.479
there's gunners, there's guys who sit
in the seats next to the gunners,

1427
02:03:15.840 --> 02:03:20.279
and over time they come up with
their SOPs of how to operate.

1428
02:03:20.720 --> 02:03:25.760
They're also organic. You know,
squads are together. There's half a squad

1429
02:03:25.800 --> 02:03:30.560
in one vehicle, half in another. So when they split the platoon and

1430
02:03:30.159 --> 02:03:40.039
they had to split it based on
random criteria, they just disintegrated the organic

1431
02:03:40.720 --> 02:03:46.520
nature of these teams. So now
you had team leaders working for squad leaders

1432
02:03:46.560 --> 02:03:54.000
they'd never worked for before. You
had soldiers like Pat Tillman working for different

1433
02:03:54.039 --> 02:04:00.439
team leaders and squad leaders. You
had guys attached to different groups. Look,

1434
02:04:00.479 --> 02:04:02.760
we trained to do that. That's
not a kiss of death, but

1435
02:04:03.000 --> 02:04:14.159
it's a very subtle yet important degradation
of that unit's ability to deal with chaos

1436
02:04:14.319 --> 02:04:18.760
and complexity, and in a in
a situation where there's no time to even

1437
02:04:18.840 --> 02:04:23.239
rehearse, to sit there and go
okay, you you know, squad leaders,

1438
02:04:23.239 --> 02:04:26.279
you're gonna do this. If this
happens, you do that. They

1439
02:04:26.279 --> 02:04:30.079
didn't even have time for that.
They just took off because they had to

1440
02:04:30.119 --> 02:04:35.600
get to Mana before sundown. And
uh and you know that that takes us

1441
02:04:35.640 --> 02:04:41.600
into the canyon at that point.
What I don't understand, you know,

1442
02:04:41.920 --> 02:04:45.920
from a leadership position, is how
can you have an element out there?

1443
02:04:45.039 --> 02:04:49.199
If you've only got one Satcom radio
for this element? How can you have

1444
02:04:49.520 --> 02:04:53.399
whether you're you know, your lead
element or the element the stay behind.

1445
02:04:53.640 --> 02:04:57.039
How can you have an element out
there? Do you have no idea,

1446
02:04:57.920 --> 02:05:00.520
no idea in the world, what
their situation, you know, what their

1447
02:05:00.520 --> 02:05:04.960
set rep is, they've on you
know, same thing. That's why I

1448
02:05:05.000 --> 02:05:13.880
said it's another binder dropping moment important
And that's why you know, that's why

1449
02:05:13.920 --> 02:05:17.479
the book is important, because it's
a tactical book, and we've got to

1450
02:05:18.279 --> 02:05:23.760
not just in this incident, but
others like it. We've got to memorialize

1451
02:05:23.800 --> 02:05:29.319
those lessons. You know, this
is basic stuff, you know, transplanted

1452
02:05:29.399 --> 02:05:34.279
into modern warfare. But it tells
you that these principles are unassallable. You

1453
02:05:34.359 --> 02:05:42.680
cannot divide your force randomly and arbitrarily. You can't send someone out to a

1454
02:05:42.720 --> 02:05:47.840
place that doesn't make any sense just
because you want to change a color on

1455
02:05:47.920 --> 02:05:53.760
a sink matrix. You can't ignore
your men in the field, you know,

1456
02:05:55.640 --> 02:05:58.880
in the unit. When I got
to the unit, one of the

1457
02:05:58.920 --> 02:06:01.760
start majors gave me a briefing on
it, and he said, hey,

1458
02:06:01.760 --> 02:06:04.880
look, you know right now,
we're not a war, but we send

1459
02:06:04.920 --> 02:06:11.680
out a lot of singleton missions.
When one guy is out is deployed,

1460
02:06:12.039 --> 02:06:15.920
everybody back here in the rear is
in support of that guy. So you

1461
02:06:16.000 --> 02:06:20.840
might get a call at zero three
in the morning to come in and it

1462
02:06:20.920 --> 02:06:28.720
might be something incredibly you know,
minimalistic, like this guy might need special

1463
02:06:28.800 --> 02:06:32.800
laces for his boots that are in
one of his kit bags in his locker,

1464
02:06:33.319 --> 02:06:36.319
and we need to get them on
a FedEx plane as quick as possible.

1465
02:06:36.800 --> 02:06:41.359
When that happens, you you that's
your mission, and you take it

1466
02:06:41.399 --> 02:06:45.000
as serious as possible. And because
I served in Columbia, I understood that.

1467
02:06:45.199 --> 02:06:49.039
I understood both ends of it,
you know, between my tours and

1468
02:06:49.119 --> 02:06:55.319
while I was out there, and
the unit always lived by that everybody in

1469
02:06:55.359 --> 02:07:00.239
the rear is there to support the
guys in the field. So this is

1470
02:07:00.640 --> 02:07:05.000
one rifle platoon is in the field
these CFTs, which I'm sorry, I

1471
02:07:05.760 --> 02:07:12.079
you know, we got distracted.
The command and control Arrangement's important to understand.

1472
02:07:12.640 --> 02:07:17.279
You've got this CFT ten ten command
in Salerno, which is COUST.

1473
02:07:17.960 --> 02:07:25.199
They can't do anything unless the main
CFT in Bogrum, which is set up

1474
02:07:25.199 --> 02:07:30.279
the exact same way but on steroids
because it's regimental headquarters, they can't do

1475
02:07:30.319 --> 02:07:36.560
anything without its permission. And it
doesn't stop there. They're connected with the

1476
02:07:36.600 --> 02:07:43.079
CFT in ballod Iraq, which is
our Joint Special Operations headquarters, and they

1477
02:07:43.079 --> 02:07:48.800
can't do anything without the CFT in
Blode telling them it's okay. So you

1478
02:07:48.840 --> 02:07:55.600
know, it's untraceable, but it's
it's not you know, it's it's not

1479
02:07:55.840 --> 02:08:01.439
speculation to say that each of these
requests, we're not just going to cows.

1480
02:08:01.840 --> 02:08:03.760
They were going back to Bogram,
back to Ballade, back down to

1481
02:08:05.199 --> 02:08:09.520
Bogram, back down to cows,
back out to these guys in the field.

1482
02:08:09.920 --> 02:08:15.720
Yeah, and no, and it's
uh and this is where you know,

1483
02:08:15.800 --> 02:08:22.439
it becomes to me such a historic
lesson. And you know, Jack,

1484
02:08:22.479 --> 02:08:26.840
I saw a podcast you did where
you talked about when you joined uh,

1485
02:08:26.920 --> 02:08:31.319
you know, motivated by nine to
one one and you know, I

1486
02:08:31.319 --> 02:08:35.520
think you said on it people forget
after nine one one, it was like

1487
02:08:35.600 --> 02:08:39.520
World War three. Uh, you
know, everyone was like, hey,

1488
02:08:39.119 --> 02:08:43.319
we're at war. We're a war
with the world. You know, this

1489
02:08:43.399 --> 02:08:46.479
is this is it? Well,
it was also like World War two,

1490
02:08:46.760 --> 02:08:52.159
right, it was like Pearl Harbor. And it was also like Vietnam Gulf

1491
02:08:52.199 --> 02:08:58.439
of Tonken, you know when when
the ship hits the fan. In America,

1492
02:08:58.520 --> 02:09:03.039
we're a freedom loving country, and
most of us grow up like you

1493
02:09:03.079 --> 02:09:05.079
did, Dave, like you did, like I did. We have our

1494
02:09:05.079 --> 02:09:13.399
hardships, but we we have an
unbelievable upbringing and we appreciate the freedom we're

1495
02:09:13.439 --> 02:09:18.000
given. So when the time calls
for someone to come protect those freedoms,

1496
02:09:18.479 --> 02:09:24.560
patriots rise up and they say send
me. And you know, I didn't

1497
02:09:24.560 --> 02:09:30.640
fully appreciate it till I did this
research. How two thousand and one did

1498
02:09:30.680 --> 02:09:35.920
the same thing. And many of
the members in this platoon were those guys,

1499
02:09:35.039 --> 02:09:39.880
were those patriots, including Pat Tillman. And you know we're all young

1500
02:09:39.960 --> 02:09:43.319
at that age. Okay. So
I've heard people say, you know,

1501
02:09:43.920 --> 02:09:48.960
you were a fool if you volunteer
for Vietnam, And whenever I read that,

1502
02:09:48.079 --> 02:09:52.359
I was like, man, I
would have volunteered for Vietnam in a

1503
02:09:52.520 --> 02:09:58.159
second, you know all the way
through, and not because you know of

1504
02:09:58.239 --> 02:10:07.960
some like policy principle, but because
we want to protect freedom, and so

1505
02:10:07.800 --> 02:10:15.239
you cannot understand the logic of why
war happens or why our country goes to

1506
02:10:15.319 --> 02:10:22.760
war. We trust that our civilian
and military leaders are thinking those thoughts and

1507
02:10:24.239 --> 02:10:28.560
are telling us the truth that we're
going to war for a good reason and

1508
02:10:28.640 --> 02:10:33.479
that this makes sense. So it's
a contract. And those guys, those

1509
02:10:33.479 --> 02:10:37.640
guys like that, those guys like
Jack, that's our national treasure. These

1510
02:10:37.720 --> 02:10:43.680
are the finest humans in our country. You know. There's only certain guys

1511
02:10:43.720 --> 02:10:50.119
who will raise their hand to protect
freedom, especially the freedoms of those who

1512
02:10:50.199 --> 02:10:56.199
won't stand up and protect it themselves. So it's a small cohort. And

1513
02:10:56.279 --> 02:11:00.880
when they do that, they don't
really know what they're getting into. And

1514
02:11:01.039 --> 02:11:05.920
that's just reality. It's not you
know, it's not like a reflective of

1515
02:11:07.560 --> 02:11:11.439
any of our intelligence. We have
no idea whether you're eighteen, nineteen or

1516
02:11:11.479 --> 02:11:16.439
twenty five when you're joining, and
let's face it, when you're forty five

1517
02:11:16.640 --> 02:11:22.319
in the military, you still don't
fully understand why we're doing what we're doing.

1518
02:11:22.720 --> 02:11:24.760
But at that age, you have
no idea and you're trusting. So

1519
02:11:26.520 --> 02:11:31.319
that's a contract with the leaders,
the military and civilian leaders that from here

1520
02:11:31.359 --> 02:11:35.560
on out, you're going to make
good decisions and to the best of your

1521
02:11:35.560 --> 02:11:43.359
ability, solve complex problems. That
enabled those individuals that was national treasure to

1522
02:11:43.840 --> 02:11:48.920
accomplish their purpose. And that was
not the case here in Afghanistan and not

1523
02:11:50.039 --> 02:11:54.000
the case here. And so when
you hear about Pat Tillman, and you

1524
02:11:54.039 --> 02:11:58.560
know, you can go on and
look at his videos and they you know,

1525
02:11:58.680 --> 02:12:03.039
your eyes of water as you listen
to this great American after nine one

1526
02:12:03.159 --> 02:12:07.359
one saying, Hey, my grandfather
served, my uncles served. You know,

1527
02:12:07.439 --> 02:12:11.279
my family has served throughout history.
I love this country. I love

1528
02:12:11.359 --> 02:12:16.359
the freedom it's given me. You
know, my job is just it doesn't

1529
02:12:16.359 --> 02:12:20.159
matter. And he was a pro
football player and he joined he left that

1530
02:12:20.239 --> 02:12:26.479
behind and he joined up and same
thing. He's he's a metaphor for all

1531
02:12:26.560 --> 02:12:31.760
the rest of us. That contract
was in place there. But in order

1532
02:12:31.800 --> 02:12:35.800
to make that contract legitimate, we've
got to start holding these decision makers feet

1533
02:12:35.840 --> 02:12:41.079
to the fire with accountability. And
they have a job to do. And

1534
02:12:41.239 --> 02:12:46.359
like I said, it's to make
good decisions and solve complex problems in a

1535
02:12:46.439 --> 02:12:50.439
way that takes care of the people
that have volunteered, and that did not

1536
02:12:50.760 --> 02:12:54.840
happen in this case. Pete,
you mentioned, Sorry, Jack, Pete,

1537
02:12:54.840 --> 02:12:58.439
you mentioned before the show that you
know, people will raise issues,

1538
02:12:58.520 --> 02:13:03.960
saying that the only people the only
reason people care about this issue is because

1539
02:13:05.039 --> 02:13:07.359
Tullman was a professional football player,
he was a national figure, he was

1540
02:13:07.520 --> 02:13:11.039
known. That's the only reason people
care. And like you said, it's

1541
02:13:11.079 --> 02:13:15.840
like, yeah, maybe, like
that's a good thing though in the sense

1542
02:13:15.840 --> 02:13:22.680
of there there's a personality that's showing
the issues. Because if it weren't somebody

1543
02:13:22.680 --> 02:13:26.640
who were known, these things happen. These things happen, you know,

1544
02:13:26.800 --> 02:13:31.159
on a on a more regular base, on a more regular basis, that

1545
02:13:31.279 --> 02:13:35.760
we would like and that and that
people know, and the fact that there's

1546
02:13:35.840 --> 02:13:41.399
a celebrity that is sort of like
leading the way I was about to say,

1547
02:13:41.479 --> 02:13:46.560
Dave, like, maybe the reason
why it's so well known is because

1548
02:13:46.560 --> 02:13:50.039
the government lied about it. Right, Then you're you're absolutely you're absolutely right

1549
02:13:50.159 --> 02:13:54.800
that the government unfortunately lies about a
lot of things. And maybe the reason

1550
02:13:54.800 --> 02:13:58.760
why this story came to the prominence
was because the government lied about someone who

1551
02:13:58.840 --> 02:14:05.279
has had a level of notoriety and
fame, right, Yeah, no,

1552
02:14:05.239 --> 02:14:11.159
guys, that's that's it. And
you know, he he's a great American.

1553
02:14:13.000 --> 02:14:16.880
You know, he was already a
great American before he joined. But

1554
02:14:16.479 --> 02:14:20.000
you know what he did when he
joined. That's why I used the comparison

1555
02:14:20.039 --> 02:14:26.720
of World War Two, where you
had you know, professional baseball players joining

1556
02:14:26.800 --> 02:14:31.720
up, you know, flying bombers
and stuff. That's a sacrifice. You

1557
02:14:31.760 --> 02:14:35.119
know, he made a sacrifice.
And you know, you can go back

1558
02:14:35.159 --> 02:14:41.680
and look on YouTube. He never
gave another interview after that interview he gave

1559
02:14:41.039 --> 02:14:46.319
before he signed up. Even while
he was in the Rangers, they were

1560
02:14:46.399 --> 02:14:50.560
constantly pestering him. The battalion commander
would call him in, and in fact,

1561
02:14:50.640 --> 02:14:56.359
right before they deployed the Afghanistan,
he called him in and and said,

1562
02:14:56.399 --> 02:15:01.000
hey, look, got a great
opportunity. We'd really like you to

1563
02:15:01.039 --> 02:15:05.359
be in the army calendar. And
you know, Tilman turned that down.

1564
02:15:05.800 --> 02:15:09.000
And don't ask me what the army
calendar is. I have no idea.

1565
02:15:09.159 --> 02:15:13.399
I can't even imagine what it is
today. But he didn't give an interview.

1566
02:15:13.479 --> 02:15:16.640
He never wanted any attention, right, And when you talk to the

1567
02:15:16.720 --> 02:15:22.399
guys, you see he's like,
you know, he's one of the guys.

1568
02:15:22.399 --> 02:15:28.000
He's but he's a guy everybody liked
to talk to. Even the NCOs,

1569
02:15:30.079 --> 02:15:37.800
the staff sergeant's squad leaders will tell
you, you know, you he

1570
02:15:37.920 --> 02:15:41.800
was just one of those guys.
He was a great conversationalist. He was

1571
02:15:43.479 --> 02:15:48.399
not a problem in any way.
Uh, as I mentioned with myself,

1572
02:15:48.439 --> 02:15:50.399
and I'm sure you guys were the
same way. He was a warrior.

1573
02:15:50.520 --> 02:15:56.880
He was aggressive by nature. He
wanted to take the fight to the enemy.

1574
02:15:56.479 --> 02:16:01.840
Uh. But you know, this
guy made made an incredible sacrifice and

1575
02:16:01.880 --> 02:16:07.479
he didn't want any credit, very
humble, and so again it's not so

1576
02:16:07.560 --> 02:16:13.159
important that he was a pro football
player or you know anything about his background.

1577
02:16:13.640 --> 02:16:18.560
He's a metaphor for all of these
guys who joined to stand up for

1578
02:16:18.640 --> 02:16:22.920
freedom. And if it weren't for
him, if he was just Joe Schmidlap,

1579
02:16:24.239 --> 02:16:28.039
we wouldn't have learned the lessons we
learned from this, and we wouldn't

1580
02:16:28.039 --> 02:16:35.280
have learned that. You know,
toxicity destroys toxic leadership, and we've got

1581
02:16:35.280 --> 02:16:39.799
to stop sticking our heads in the
sand around toxic leadership. You know,

1582
02:16:39.879 --> 02:16:43.399
how many of us and how many
conversations have you had where guys go.

1583
02:16:43.520 --> 02:16:50.000
Yeah, at that time, my
Battalian commander was a fucking asshole beyond belief.

1584
02:16:50.559 --> 02:16:54.040
Well, that guy should have been
fired. Someone should have done something

1585
02:16:54.079 --> 02:16:56.319
about that guy. Same thing,
sergeant majors. You know, it doesn't

1586
02:16:56.319 --> 02:17:01.079
matter what level for TOOM leaders,
sergeants, it doesn't matter. Yeah,

1587
02:17:01.239 --> 02:17:07.319
if you're toxic, you need to
be out of here, because toxic leadership

1588
02:17:07.399 --> 02:17:13.520
destroys. And that's what happened here. They just bad decision on top of

1589
02:17:13.639 --> 02:17:20.239
bad decision, which just led these
guys into chaos, into a situation where

1590
02:17:20.239 --> 02:17:24.000
they you know, by the time
it happened, there was really no hope

1591
02:17:24.040 --> 02:17:28.639
for getting out of it. So
can you, to the best of your

1592
02:17:28.680 --> 02:17:33.840
ability, can you walk us through
the events of that day. Yeah,

1593
02:17:33.879 --> 02:17:39.360
So they took off, you know, at eighteen hundred exactly the so they

1594
02:17:39.399 --> 02:17:43.239
split the platoon, as I said, into what they called two cereal Serial

1595
02:17:43.319 --> 02:17:48.719
one, Serial two. Serial one
took off first, they were that Pat

1596
02:17:48.760 --> 02:17:54.159
Tillman was with them, the platoon
leader was there, and they had to

1597
02:17:54.159 --> 02:17:58.280
get the man out. So you
know, I have maps in the book,

1598
02:17:58.399 --> 02:18:01.959
and when you come on the comes
to a y intersection, you got

1599
02:18:01.959 --> 02:18:09.520
to go left to go to Mana
and they took the left, and about

1600
02:18:09.079 --> 02:18:13.920
a kilometer and a half after the
y intersection, you come to the mouth

1601
02:18:13.959 --> 02:18:20.200
of a canyon and it's one of
the most dramatic terrain features you can imagine.

1602
02:18:20.520 --> 02:18:26.520
You can watch it live on my
YouTube channel. Just go to Pete

1603
02:18:26.559 --> 02:18:33.719
Labor dot com or go to firefight
dot Pete Labor dot com and you can

1604
02:18:33.799 --> 02:18:39.040
watch a drive through during the investigation
of the entire canyon and you just will

1605
02:18:39.079 --> 02:18:46.000
not believe this terrain. You will
not believe how difficult it is to drive

1606
02:18:46.360 --> 02:18:50.239
any vehicle through it, much less
a Jinga truck with a hum Vy.

1607
02:18:50.840 --> 02:18:56.120
So they take off, they pass
through that canyon, it's uneventful, nothing

1608
02:18:56.159 --> 02:19:01.959
happens. They come out the other
end of the canyon, Horseshoe Canyon,

1609
02:19:01.120 --> 02:19:07.319
and they're at another creek intersection.
If they go left, they're going down

1610
02:19:07.319 --> 02:19:11.159
to Mana. They go right,
they're going back up toward the KG Highway.

1611
02:19:11.520 --> 02:19:16.959
They were a little bit disoriented,
which is totally understandable. They did

1612
02:19:16.959 --> 02:19:20.159
what all infantrymen do, They did
a map check. While they were sitting

1613
02:19:20.239 --> 02:19:26.600
there in their vehicles with their map
check, the second platoon had taken off

1614
02:19:26.639 --> 02:19:33.200
about seven to ten minutes after them. So they flew through the canyon Serial

1615
02:19:33.239 --> 02:19:37.120
one. But Erio two, remember
is got a Jinga truck dragging a humbe

1616
02:19:37.280 --> 02:19:43.040
and they're in the lead in this
cereal And now I don't even think they

1617
02:19:43.040 --> 02:19:46.239
were going one point five miles an
hour. I think it's less than that

1618
02:19:46.360 --> 02:19:52.000
because some of the to get through
this creek bed, you literally have to

1619
02:19:52.159 --> 02:19:58.520
make right angle turns back and forth. And just imagine a Jinga truck to

1620
02:19:58.799 --> 02:20:03.440
viewers who ever seen one, is
the same as a dump truck, same

1621
02:20:03.520 --> 02:20:07.479
size as the dump truck or the
garbage truck that picks your garbage up each

1622
02:20:07.559 --> 02:20:11.760
day. That's how big it is. And the weight's about the same.

1623
02:20:13.399 --> 02:20:18.120
It's pulling a Humbye on its back
wheels, so there's no maneuverability there,

1624
02:20:18.719 --> 02:20:22.120
and so they're struggling to get through. But they were barely into the canyon

1625
02:20:22.319 --> 02:20:31.159
Serial two when two explosions happened off
to their right, which is cardinal direction

1626
02:20:31.360 --> 02:20:37.559
north on the slope. There's you
know, no one knows what those were.

1627
02:20:37.639 --> 02:20:41.799
They could have been RPGs, they
could have been mortars. If you

1628
02:20:41.920 --> 02:20:46.319
read everyone's account, some guys say
one, some say the other. It

1629
02:20:46.319 --> 02:20:52.120
doesn't matter two explosions. One of
them dislodged a rock you know, about

1630
02:20:52.159 --> 02:20:58.120
the size of a humbee came flying
down and so you can imagine watching this

1631
02:20:58.319 --> 02:21:05.159
rock make its way down the side
of this canyon wall, and you know,

1632
02:21:05.760 --> 02:21:09.159
they they use common sense and and
zeroed in on it, and it

1633
02:21:09.440 --> 02:21:16.280
ended up going right between two vehicles. And about thirty seconds later RpK fire

1634
02:21:16.440 --> 02:21:22.280
opened up from the ridge line,
and you know, there's there's numerous accounts

1635
02:21:22.399 --> 02:21:28.200
guys saw guys moving up there.
Five guys in zero two and seven in

1636
02:21:28.319 --> 02:21:33.520
zero one said they saw the guys
running around. So Serial two's in the

1637
02:21:33.520 --> 02:21:41.920
canyon. They're lined up behind this
jinga truck TONAHMBE and they return fire.

1638
02:21:43.159 --> 02:21:46.639
You know, deploy, suppress,
report, that's what you're doing in ambush.

1639
02:21:46.680 --> 02:21:52.159
But remember your first immediate action in
an ambush is to drive out of

1640
02:21:52.200 --> 02:21:54.719
the ambush or run out of the
ambush if you can. They couldn't do

1641
02:21:54.799 --> 02:22:03.120
that. So you know, all
of that accumulated rests from BCP five through

1642
02:22:03.239 --> 02:22:09.360
Magara is already you know, flooding
their brains. Now the worst, the

1643
02:22:09.799 --> 02:22:16.440
most traumatic stress inducing event that can
happen to the human brain is occurring,

1644
02:22:16.440 --> 02:22:20.360
and that's claustrophobia. They can't go
left, they can't go right, they

1645
02:22:20.399 --> 02:22:22.879
can't turn around, and they can't
go forward. They can't even see forward,

1646
02:22:24.319 --> 02:22:28.040
and they can barely see the tops
of the canyon. Only around certain

1647
02:22:28.120 --> 02:22:33.600
bends can they even see the trees
that outline the crest of this canyon.

1648
02:22:35.079 --> 02:22:39.600
So they do what they should do, which is, you know, suppressed

1649
02:22:39.799 --> 02:22:43.639
the target to get them to stop
shooting. Most of the guys just thought,

1650
02:22:43.879 --> 02:22:48.159
you know, we're walking dead men, We're trapped. And literally when

1651
02:22:48.200 --> 02:22:54.360
you watch the video, you can
see that the enemy could have killed them

1652
02:22:54.200 --> 02:23:01.079
with rocks instead of bullets. They
could have just started avalanches and dislodge large

1653
02:23:01.120 --> 02:23:05.959
boulders to do the same thing the
bullets would have done. But they,

1654
02:23:07.159 --> 02:23:11.040
you know, rangers being you know, expert machine gunners, they opened up

1655
02:23:11.079 --> 02:23:18.799
with everything they had. Now it's
important the terrain is just like every military

1656
02:23:18.799 --> 02:23:24.280
engagement always comes back to terrain.
So when I did my research on this,

1657
02:23:24.399 --> 02:23:30.319
I spent over one hundred hours on
Google Earth. And I don't want

1658
02:23:30.399 --> 02:23:35.319
to make that sound like it was
some really hard thing that I had to

1659
02:23:35.440 --> 02:23:41.559
suck up. I was addicted to
it. And if you go on Google

1660
02:23:41.600 --> 02:23:45.440
Earth, and look at this slot
canyon. You'll get addicted to it too,

1661
02:23:45.559 --> 02:23:50.520
because it's absolutely amazing. But what
you see in the slot canyon is

1662
02:23:50.600 --> 02:23:56.200
it's shaped like a mushroom. So
it goes up, over comes back and

1663
02:23:56.319 --> 02:24:00.520
down, so exactly like a mushroom, up, out and over. And

1664
02:24:00.559 --> 02:24:07.479
so they're driving and these are remember
non gyro stabilized weapon systems. They're just

1665
02:24:07.680 --> 02:24:15.280
on a stiff anchory, right,
So the vehicle is in the toughest off

1666
02:24:15.399 --> 02:24:20.879
road terrain on the planet, which
means it's bouncing up and down. The

1667
02:24:20.000 --> 02:24:24.719
driver is, you know, scared
shills. He's doing what he should do,

1668
02:24:24.799 --> 02:24:28.639
which is drive, but he's got
to navigate left right, like you

1669
02:24:28.680 --> 02:24:33.760
know, literally like a Formula one
driver to get around these rocks and foulders

1670
02:24:33.319 --> 02:24:39.399
strapped behind this jinga truck. So
the guys in zero two, you know,

1671
02:24:39.040 --> 02:24:43.520
it's it's when you understand what they
went through before they came out,

1672
02:24:43.680 --> 02:24:48.280
you begin to understand what happened when
they came out, and you also understand

1673
02:24:48.680 --> 02:24:54.879
what was happening to their fires.
You know, the brain can't keep track

1674
02:24:56.159 --> 02:25:01.479
of directions unless it has a known
point to base it off of. So

1675
02:25:01.319 --> 02:25:09.799
the you know, our neocortex.
Our thinking brain has these things called grid

1676
02:25:09.920 --> 02:25:13.559
cells that tell you where you're at
based on a known location. So think

1677
02:25:13.799 --> 02:25:20.639
north Star, snowcaped Peak off in
the distance. It has to have that.

1678
02:25:20.760 --> 02:25:24.520
But they're in a canyon, so
they have no known point. They

1679
02:25:24.600 --> 02:25:28.840
really can't tell anything unless they're looking
at the risk compass, which you can't

1680
02:25:28.840 --> 02:25:33.079
do because you're being shot at.
So as they go around this mushroom,

1681
02:25:33.760 --> 02:25:41.959
their bullets are, you know,
going in directions where you know, they

1682
02:25:41.319 --> 02:25:46.040
can't really predict where they're ending up. Now, let's cut. Let's leave

1683
02:25:46.079 --> 02:25:50.280
those guys in the canyon to go
to Serial run At one. Remember they

1684
02:25:50.479 --> 02:25:54.159
were doing a map check when they
heard those mortar or RPG rounds. As

1685
02:25:54.159 --> 02:25:58.799
soon as they heard them, they
hopped out of their vehicles and they were

1686
02:25:58.840 --> 02:26:01.559
like, what the hell is that. They didn't know, but they could

1687
02:26:01.600 --> 02:26:05.040
see the tracer fire arcing up out
of the canyon. They knew it was

1688
02:26:05.079 --> 02:26:11.879
coming from the canyon. Some of
the guys just suspected it was Serio two,

1689
02:26:11.920 --> 02:26:16.239
but most of them had no idea
Serio two had turned around and was

1690
02:26:16.280 --> 02:26:22.079
coming back in the same direction as
them, So nobody knew that The other

1691
02:26:22.120 --> 02:26:26.000
half of the platoon was the one
in that firefight. Some guys suspected it,

1692
02:26:26.040 --> 02:26:30.879
but no one knew it. So
in the heat of the moment,

1693
02:26:31.239 --> 02:26:35.360
they said, hey, let's go
up to a position where we can get

1694
02:26:35.440 --> 02:26:41.760
overwatch, where we can see what's
happening and conduct overwatching fire in case it

1695
02:26:41.799 --> 02:26:46.239
is Serial two to support them.
So they ran up this path that was

1696
02:26:46.360 --> 02:26:52.959
right next to their vehicles, a
smoker run. It was about seven hundred

1697
02:26:52.959 --> 02:26:58.799
feet and they ran until the path
petered out, and then they had to

1698
02:26:58.840 --> 02:27:03.520
stop because they were taking fire.
They could see the enemy on the same

1699
02:27:03.639 --> 02:27:09.040
northern ridge line that Seial two was
shooting at, so they started shooting two.

1700
02:27:09.239 --> 02:27:15.159
But as they did that, they
began taking unbelievably heavy fire, which

1701
02:27:15.680 --> 02:27:20.479
you know, the first investigation suspected
was Serial two. And in my analysis,

1702
02:27:20.639 --> 02:27:26.079
I believe the majority of those fires
that were raining down on them were

1703
02:27:26.280 --> 02:27:33.959
the crossfires from Serial two. Remember
fifty KL two, forty G and saw

1704
02:27:33.239 --> 02:27:39.959
along with mortars eighty fours. So
all this ordinance is, you know,

1705
02:27:39.520 --> 02:27:46.360
flying up and over these ridge lines, we can't discern which is enemy which

1706
02:27:46.399 --> 02:27:52.479
is friendly, But they were definitely
underneath the crossfire from Serial two. So

1707
02:27:54.479 --> 02:27:56.680
these guys were in the canyon for
about twelve minutes. You know, I

1708
02:27:56.719 --> 02:28:01.639
told you it was less than one
point five miles an hour. They're literally

1709
02:28:01.680 --> 02:28:05.079
moving that slowly. The stress is
building up. Zero one now is up

1710
02:28:05.200 --> 02:28:11.319
on this spur, this elevated high
ground. Unfortunately, the way the terrain

1711
02:28:11.479 --> 02:28:15.719
is, you cannot see into the
canyon from the top of this spur.

1712
02:28:16.280 --> 02:28:22.200
And unfortunately if you do a line
of sight analysis, their line of site

1713
02:28:22.319 --> 02:28:28.120
radios also did not work, so
they still had no comms. There are

1714
02:28:28.120 --> 02:28:31.799
two purposes for running up there,
to make comms with Serial two and to

1715
02:28:31.840 --> 02:28:39.959
provide overwatch fire support were now you
know, mixed by the terrain. But

1716
02:28:39.040 --> 02:28:43.719
they didn't have a lot of time
there wasn't you know, they were smoked.

1717
02:28:46.000 --> 02:28:48.040
Remember I talked about equipment. They
ran up there with flat bests and

1718
02:28:48.120 --> 02:28:54.040
helmets. I believe you know that
was the sop that anytime you left the

1719
02:28:54.120 --> 02:28:58.639
vehicle you had to have that on. I would never you know, U

1720
02:28:58.719 --> 02:29:05.920
less and should be. If you're
running up into mountains after an insurgent enemy,

1721
02:29:05.360 --> 02:29:09.200
you do not wear a flat best
or a helmet unless you want to.

1722
02:29:09.360 --> 02:29:13.600
You know, I think it should
be personal choice, but you can't

1723
02:29:13.680 --> 02:29:18.319
run up a mountain at six thousand
and six thousand, five hundred feet with

1724
02:29:18.360 --> 02:29:20.639
a flat best and helmet. So
they were smoked when they got to the

1725
02:29:20.680 --> 02:29:28.079
top of that ridge. Remember now
they'd split the platoon. So Pat Tillman,

1726
02:29:28.360 --> 02:29:31.399
he's a team leader. He's got
one guy that's with him from his

1727
02:29:31.479 --> 02:29:37.319
team and Afghan who decided to follow
them up to the spur. And that's

1728
02:29:37.319 --> 02:29:41.440
who he's in charge of. This
squad is not his squad. He hasn't

1729
02:29:41.479 --> 02:29:48.040
worked with them before. Squad leaders
amazingly competent guy, you know, as

1730
02:29:48.079 --> 02:29:54.639
good as they come. And Pat
got up there, he assessed situation.

1731
02:29:54.959 --> 02:29:58.879
The squad was already a raid by
its two fire teams as per their wrestle.

1732
02:30:00.639 --> 02:30:03.479
You know. That left Pat's team. What am I gonna do?

1733
02:30:03.760 --> 02:30:09.920
Pat said, Hey, I'm gonna
go down this this south side. There's

1734
02:30:09.920 --> 02:30:13.760
a couple of big rocks over there. We're gonna get behind those and see

1735
02:30:13.799 --> 02:30:16.079
what we can see in the squad
leader. Yeah, sure sounds good.

1736
02:30:16.520 --> 02:30:20.959
Uh he you know, he looked
up. It looked like a good position

1737
02:30:20.520 --> 02:30:28.959
and uh, Pat, a young
private named O'Neill, and one Afghan ran

1738
02:30:28.000 --> 02:30:33.079
down there and they took position behind
a boulder, two boulders. As soon

1739
02:30:33.120 --> 02:30:37.639
as they got there, they started
taking fire from the south and Pat directed

1740
02:30:37.680 --> 02:30:43.520
fires south. So this is now
the opposite direction, other side of the

1741
02:30:43.559 --> 02:30:48.600
canyon. Then everyone else is firing
on the north side, and they're firing

1742
02:30:48.639 --> 02:30:54.600
at it, you know, to
no avail. Pat turns around he said,

1743
02:30:54.600 --> 02:30:56.319
hey, I got an idea.
When back up to the squad leader

1744
02:30:56.360 --> 02:31:01.040
said hey, you mind if I
drop my we drop our gear, we

1745
02:31:01.239 --> 02:31:05.680
run down to the canyon and go
up the other side to see if we

1746
02:31:05.719 --> 02:31:09.600
can engage that enemy. Now,
he never would have gotten up the other

1747
02:31:09.719 --> 02:31:15.079
side. But as I point out
the book, his idea to drop his

1748
02:31:16.520 --> 02:31:20.360
you know, his helmet and his
flat best and to go down to the

1749
02:31:20.440 --> 02:31:26.239
canyon road, which is a creek, was actually a good idea, and

1750
02:31:26.520 --> 02:31:31.680
you know, especially in retrospect,
because the spot they were in was the

1751
02:31:31.680 --> 02:31:37.520
most dangerous and deadly spot you know
that could have been chosen. So the

1752
02:31:37.559 --> 02:31:41.399
squad leader told him, no,
you know, we don't. Those guys

1753
02:31:41.399 --> 02:31:45.399
don't know where you're at. Stay
put, and he did. So their

1754
02:31:45.559 --> 02:31:52.040
imposition, they're they're down the spur
about twenty five meters from this squad.

1755
02:31:52.520 --> 02:31:58.239
The squad had stopped behind the military
crest of the spur. Pat went over

1756
02:31:58.280 --> 02:32:03.559
the military crest down to these boulders. No way, you know, for

1757
02:32:03.680 --> 02:32:07.760
him to know what was about to
happen, or the squad leader. So

1758
02:32:07.959 --> 02:32:13.399
it's it's only a lesson, a
retrospective lesson for infantrymen in the future,

1759
02:32:13.840 --> 02:32:20.639
you know, in uncertainty. Uh, never give up that military crest always,

1760
02:32:20.840 --> 02:32:26.200
you know, stay behind it,
stay protected because you got options.

1761
02:32:26.559 --> 02:32:30.840
And the problem with going down off
the military crest is you have no options.

1762
02:32:31.040 --> 02:32:37.920
And so they were down Pat Private
O'Neill and the Afghan. Now the

1763
02:32:37.959 --> 02:32:43.120
Afghan had just joined him that morning. No one knew him, no one

1764
02:32:43.159 --> 02:32:48.239
knew anything about him. He would
not he obviously didn't speak English, but

1765
02:32:48.760 --> 02:32:54.559
you don't need to speak English in
a firefight. There were thousands of rounds

1766
02:32:54.559 --> 02:32:58.639
at this point, including mortar rounds
arcing over their heads. Uh. You

1767
02:32:58.639 --> 02:33:03.440
know, you could hear the sonic
crack, which we all know. When

1768
02:33:03.440 --> 02:33:07.239
you hear the sonic crack, that
means the bullets under fifty meters above you.

1769
02:33:09.120 --> 02:33:13.920
That's the noise it makes is it
breaks the sound barrier. So these

1770
02:33:13.000 --> 02:33:18.680
rounds are arcing over their heads mortar
and two of three rounds are blowing up,

1771
02:33:18.040 --> 02:33:22.639
and this Afghan is ten feet in
front of the boulders, standing there

1772
02:33:22.639 --> 02:33:28.440
with his AK forty seven, just
unloaded with his magazines. And Pat and

1773
02:33:28.520 --> 02:33:33.520
O'Neill tried to get them to come
back to no avail. You know,

1774
02:33:33.879 --> 02:33:39.760
they tried waving, which again is
universal. They tried using their weapons,

1775
02:33:39.840 --> 02:33:43.120
you know, to get them back, but he would not come back.

1776
02:33:43.559 --> 02:33:48.079
He stood out ten feet directly in
front of those two boulders, standing up,

1777
02:33:48.360 --> 02:33:52.680
firing his AK across the road.
Well, now we go back to

1778
02:33:52.760 --> 02:33:58.479
Serio two in the canyon. They've
been in there ten minutes, changing out

1779
02:33:58.520 --> 02:34:05.239
barrels. Some guys have fired their
basic load. They're coming out now going

1780
02:34:05.440 --> 02:34:11.479
west, so they they've gone in
every cardinal direction inside the canyon, so

1781
02:34:11.280 --> 02:34:16.680
they're they're you know, uncertain of
which way they're pointing. And remember they

1782
02:34:16.680 --> 02:34:20.760
have no idea where Sereal one is
and Serio one has no idea. That's

1783
02:34:20.799 --> 02:34:24.079
even Serial two. So when they
come out of the canyon, it suddenly

1784
02:34:24.120 --> 02:34:31.760
opens up and the creek turns around
a small spur that is, you know,

1785
02:34:33.120 --> 02:34:37.319
a finger off of this larger spur
they'reon, and that's the first time

1786
02:34:39.000 --> 02:34:43.879
they turn and look in the same
direction they've been shooting at the same main

1787
02:34:43.959 --> 02:34:50.200
direction, which is north. They
look north again and there's this Afghan bearded

1788
02:34:50.239 --> 02:34:56.959
Afghan AK forty seven firing on auto
right over their head. And as the

1789
02:34:56.959 --> 02:35:01.879
first investigator says, he might even
have been fired at that mistaking them as

1790
02:35:01.639 --> 02:35:07.120
you know Taliban. So the squad
leader, you know, comes around that

1791
02:35:07.200 --> 02:35:11.799
corner and he's in that front passenger
seat, in my opinion, and in

1792
02:35:11.959 --> 02:35:16.440
a lot you know, a lot
of the other squad leaders said the same

1793
02:35:16.520 --> 02:35:22.600
thing. You know. He did
what almost anyone would do. Who's been

1794
02:35:22.600 --> 02:35:26.440
shooting at an enemy on the northern
high ground for ten to twelve minutes and

1795
02:35:26.559 --> 02:35:33.079
season Afghan on the northern high ground
shooting in AK forty seven. He looked

1796
02:35:33.079 --> 02:35:39.000
through his a COG site and dropped
that guy. Unfortunately, his crew were

1797
02:35:39.040 --> 02:35:46.479
all guys who hadn't worked with him, so they have no preset verbal and

1798
02:35:46.600 --> 02:35:52.879
handing arm signals. All infantrymen know
this. You shoot where your team leader

1799
02:35:52.959 --> 02:35:54.680
or squad leader shoots. Went a
dout, shoot where your team leader or

1800
02:35:54.680 --> 02:36:00.239
squad leader shoots. So all of
the cruiser weapons in the back turn earn

1801
02:36:00.760 --> 02:36:03.479
to where the squad leader's shooting,
which is at the Afghan who is ten

1802
02:36:03.559 --> 02:36:07.440
feet directly in front of Pat Tillman
and the range of private, and they

1803
02:36:07.479 --> 02:36:13.639
open up and in that fuselage.
Which happened. You know, I don't

1804
02:36:13.680 --> 02:36:18.040
even think it was a full minute
that they were shooting in that fuselage.

1805
02:36:18.319 --> 02:36:26.200
Right at the end they Pat was
hit and killed. And so in the

1806
02:36:26.239 --> 02:36:33.040
investigative documents, you know, there's
all this conjecture about you know, Pat

1807
02:36:33.079 --> 02:36:37.840
and the private. They were yelling, they were waving their hands. Well,

1808
02:36:39.559 --> 02:36:45.319
every guy in Serial two was deaf
at this point. So you know,

1809
02:36:45.399 --> 02:36:48.719
in the book, I point out
that they had no ear protection on.

1810
02:36:48.799 --> 02:36:52.239
They didn't have Pelkors on, which
would have saved them. But the

1811
02:36:52.319 --> 02:36:58.680
human ear can only take sound waves
that are over one hundred and twenty seven

1812
02:36:58.719 --> 02:37:05.719
deaths for thirty seconds. Anything beyond
thirty seconds at one hundred and twenty seven

1813
02:37:05.760 --> 02:37:11.600
decibels leads to temporary deafness. And
that temporary deafness can last depending on the

1814
02:37:11.719 --> 02:37:16.600
length and how far over one on
twenty seven decibels you go, can last

1815
02:37:16.639 --> 02:37:22.440
from a minute to an hour,
to a day to a week. And

1816
02:37:22.639 --> 02:37:28.399
so remember they're they're shooting everything they
had for twelve minutes and with no ear

1817
02:37:28.479 --> 02:37:35.680
protection. So they're all deaf,
and in there it's right in all of

1818
02:37:35.719 --> 02:37:41.600
their you know comments to investigators,
you know, squad leaders saying well,

1819
02:37:41.639 --> 02:37:45.600
and then I turned to you know
Jones, but Jones was death, so

1820
02:37:45.680 --> 02:37:48.399
I had to shake him, and
every guy says the same thing. My

1821
02:37:48.399 --> 02:37:54.200
my hearing didn't come back for five
hours. You know. Some guy's ears

1822
02:37:54.280 --> 02:37:58.040
were bleeding when they came out,
So they're deaf. That's number one.

1823
02:37:58.440 --> 02:38:03.200
So these guys on the spur,
when you look down at the creek bed

1824
02:38:03.280 --> 02:38:07.239
they came out of, it's clear
as day because the creekbed is you know,

1825
02:38:07.399 --> 02:38:13.719
all one, one monochromatic color.
It's all can So the hum by,

1826
02:38:13.879 --> 02:38:18.120
you can see that humb clear as
day. When you look from the

1827
02:38:18.159 --> 02:38:22.879
creek bed back at the spur,
it's the exact opposite. The spur is

1828
02:38:22.959 --> 02:38:31.280
this modeled rock formation of you know, both sandstone and lava. It's got

1829
02:38:31.399 --> 02:38:35.239
black rock. It's all cracked up, so it's got shadows in between the

1830
02:38:35.319 --> 02:38:41.200
cracks, and it's full of foliage, you know, rare in Afghanistan,

1831
02:38:41.280 --> 02:38:46.879
but it's it's covered with foliage,
green foliage. And so when I got

1832
02:38:46.920 --> 02:38:50.079
to this part you know, I
was, you know, up till I

1833
02:38:50.120 --> 02:38:54.600
researched that part of it, I
was pretty much yeah, you know,

1834
02:38:54.760 --> 02:38:58.440
it sounds like then they made a
mistake. They didn't do proper target discrimination.

1835
02:38:58.600 --> 02:39:03.360
But what you learn when you see
the video and you see the pictures

1836
02:39:03.440 --> 02:39:09.399
that CID took, these high resolution
pictures, you cannot see anybody on that

1837
02:39:09.520 --> 02:39:13.520
spur. They're invisible, totally camouflage, even at one hundred, even at

1838
02:39:13.639 --> 02:39:18.159
seventy five meters, even at thirty
five meters. And then you add in

1839
02:39:20.159 --> 02:39:24.559
the human eye. When the human
eye is moving rattled up and down,

1840
02:39:24.639 --> 02:39:28.520
left and right, it can't lock
on to a specific target. So they're

1841
02:39:28.639 --> 02:39:33.920
bouncing in a creek bed, firing
their weapons, looking up at something that's

1842
02:39:33.959 --> 02:39:39.479
completely camouflage, and all they can
make out is in its last light.

1843
02:39:39.040 --> 02:39:43.440
So that's the final thing. It's
minutes before you had to flip your noods

1844
02:39:43.520 --> 02:39:48.399
down and all they can see is
this bearded Afghan fired is Aka, and

1845
02:39:48.840 --> 02:39:52.959
they just did what they had been
doing for twelve minutes and fired. And

1846
02:39:54.200 --> 02:39:58.719
it's not you know, it's not
saying they did the right thing or anything

1847
02:39:58.840 --> 02:40:03.600
like that. It's not making excuses, it's just reality. And you have

1848
02:40:03.760 --> 02:40:09.319
to apply reality in combat, especially
if you're going to be judgmental about it.

1849
02:40:09.799 --> 02:40:15.040
And you know, the chain of
commands seized on that. It was

1850
02:40:15.440 --> 02:40:18.319
a fat a company. It was
an open and shutcase from the beginning.

1851
02:40:18.840 --> 02:40:24.399
These guys fucked up. They they
should have known, they they should have

1852
02:40:24.040 --> 02:40:30.680
target discriminated, They should have seen
them. How can you not see and

1853
02:40:30.840 --> 02:40:37.000
hear someone yelling from one hundred meters
away without doing any of the you know,

1854
02:40:37.239 --> 02:40:45.000
the research, without applying practical common
sense to a firefight. You know,

1855
02:40:45.280 --> 02:40:50.719
they convicted these guys and set off, you know, a series of

1856
02:40:50.799 --> 02:40:56.040
lies because I believe the chain of
command saw it is Hey, this is

1857
02:40:56.079 --> 02:40:58.680
the easy out. You know,
it's not our decisions. It's not us

1858
02:40:58.719 --> 02:41:03.959
telling to drag it, to split
the platoon, to go to Mana for

1859
02:41:03.000 --> 02:41:07.120
no reason. Uh you know,
in the middle of the night. It's

1860
02:41:07.280 --> 02:41:15.280
in the middle of the dusk.
It's them for not properly. I told

1861
02:41:15.319 --> 02:41:18.920
this to Steven Elliott, who he
wrote that book Worse Story. He was

1862
02:41:18.959 --> 02:41:26.159
on this mission. And I mean
they fried the lowest ranking guys possible,

1863
02:41:26.639 --> 02:41:33.479
the pl and a couple of privates
and e fors right they did, and

1864
02:41:33.479 --> 02:41:41.479
and so The really sad thing Jack
about that is you know, I'm not

1865
02:41:41.520 --> 02:41:46.000
a psychologist, but it's my belief
from talking to all these guys that the

1866
02:41:46.079 --> 02:41:52.040
majority of the PTSD in Steven's book, I think is a is a great

1867
02:41:52.639 --> 02:41:56.639
uh you know, a piece.
If you want to understand what happened,

1868
02:41:56.639 --> 02:42:01.120
to read what he wrote in it. The peat TSD is more about the

1869
02:42:01.159 --> 02:42:07.360
investigations and what happened to those guys
because they got back to battalion. Remember

1870
02:42:07.760 --> 02:42:16.000
Pat Tillman, the most famous soldier
since you know, Elvis Presley was killed

1871
02:42:16.120 --> 02:42:20.000
and they they fucking killed him.
And you know, two guys who are

1872
02:42:20.159 --> 02:42:26.440
unwitting and who don't have the knowledge, they end up doing the chain of

1873
02:42:26.479 --> 02:42:33.120
commands dirty work and you know,
basically ostracizing and outcasting this platoon. Uh

1874
02:42:33.520 --> 02:42:35.520
you can read it in the book. Uh. You know my interviews with

1875
02:42:35.559 --> 02:42:39.719
these guys, no one would talk
to him, no one would look at

1876
02:42:39.760 --> 02:42:48.280
him. Uh. They immediately began
disintegrating. Guys you know who weren't forced

1877
02:42:48.280 --> 02:42:52.920
out of the regiment left because you
know, they couldn't They just you know,

1878
02:42:54.000 --> 02:42:58.680
couldn't take the the that ostracization and
the guilt that came along with it.

1879
02:43:00.959 --> 02:43:05.879
So you know, on top of
everything else, you know, these

1880
02:43:05.920 --> 02:43:11.879
guys became additional casualties. And because
you know, to a man, the

1881
02:43:11.920 --> 02:43:18.399
guys I've talked to are you know, incredible human beings. They do what

1882
02:43:18.440 --> 02:43:24.559
incredible human beings do, and they
take that responsibility. They know they didn't

1883
02:43:24.559 --> 02:43:30.760
do it, but they can't explain
why it wasn't their fault. But even

1884
02:43:30.760 --> 02:43:35.680
though they can't, they still take
responsibility because they were there, they fired,

1885
02:43:35.159 --> 02:43:39.159
they should have known, and then
they got to live with that.

1886
02:43:39.600 --> 02:43:43.000
And as the months and years go
on, the only way you can live

1887
02:43:43.040 --> 02:43:46.920
with that is through a bottle,
is through drugs, is through depression.

1888
02:43:46.520 --> 02:43:52.000
And you know that guilt adds up
to PTSD. And you know, when

1889
02:43:52.000 --> 02:43:58.319
I would talk to these guys and
you know you can talk to Stephen about

1890
02:43:58.360 --> 02:44:01.559
this, you know they'd be going
along. I go, wait a minute,

1891
02:44:01.959 --> 02:44:07.399
did you read any of the investigations? No, okay, let me

1892
02:44:07.440 --> 02:44:11.360
tell you what was going on.
Let me tell you what happened to set

1893
02:44:11.399 --> 02:44:16.200
that up. And then I go
through step by step and tell them,

1894
02:44:16.559 --> 02:44:20.799
and then you know, I always
ended up telling them you have nothing to

1895
02:44:20.840 --> 02:44:26.120
be ashamed of. You were put
into a situation where you had no way

1896
02:44:26.159 --> 02:44:30.200
to get out of it. You
had no way to figure out what was

1897
02:44:30.200 --> 02:44:33.680
happening. You did what you were
trained to do, and unfortunately you were

1898
02:44:33.680 --> 02:44:39.040
put into a box that once you
were in that box by the time they

1899
02:44:39.040 --> 02:44:43.399
came out of that canyon. You
can watch that video that I referenced and

1900
02:44:43.440 --> 02:44:46.520
then ask yourself would I have fired? Because in the video it's a re

1901
02:44:46.680 --> 02:44:54.079
enactment. The Humby comes around that
last mini spur, looks up at the

1902
02:44:54.079 --> 02:44:58.440
spur where the Afghan is in front
of Pat Tillman, and they have a

1903
02:44:58.479 --> 02:45:03.559
guy standing there, you know,
an Afghan role player firing his weapon.

1904
02:45:03.639 --> 02:45:07.200
You'll hear the weapon firing. It's
an a k uh firing away. You

1905
02:45:07.239 --> 02:45:13.520
cannot see anything, You have no
idea what's up there, and so you

1906
02:45:13.600 --> 02:45:16.479
have to ask yourself would I have
shot? And you know, when I

1907
02:45:16.559 --> 02:45:22.760
asked myself, uh, my answer
is almost assuredly I would have shot.

1908
02:45:22.680 --> 02:45:28.760
I can't and ylied to the American
public. And then they kick these young

1909
02:45:28.799 --> 02:45:33.479
men out of the regiment. Yeah, told them that they were being released

1910
02:45:33.479 --> 02:45:41.040
for standards. Yeah, and ruined. Just again. The casualties jack are

1911
02:45:41.159 --> 02:45:48.079
still occurring. You know, two
of the guys still have suicidal thoughts.

1912
02:45:48.559 --> 02:45:50.040
Uh, there's a number of them
who can't work. They're in the prime

1913
02:45:50.079 --> 02:45:54.399
of their life, they're in the
prime of their earning life. These are

1914
02:45:54.000 --> 02:45:58.879
go back to what we started with. These are are you know, national

1915
02:45:58.959 --> 02:46:05.239
treasure. These aretriots who signed up
after nine to one one And that's where

1916
02:46:05.280 --> 02:46:09.120
that contract comes in. And that's
why accountability. There should be accountability,

1917
02:46:09.239 --> 02:46:13.959
and we need to make it the
standard for the future. Yeah, you

1918
02:46:15.079 --> 02:46:20.760
can be you can be a commander, you can be a general officer.

1919
02:46:20.120 --> 02:46:24.399
But let me tell you, and
you'll get all the accouterman that comes along

1920
02:46:24.440 --> 02:46:28.280
with that, But let me tell
you something. Something else comes wrong with

1921
02:46:28.360 --> 02:46:31.040
it. Accountability. You better make
good decisions, You better be able to

1922
02:46:31.079 --> 02:46:37.600
solve complex problems, or you're going
to pay the price as you deserve to.

1923
02:46:37.319 --> 02:46:43.719
And that needs to happen because my
suspicion is there's one hundred more examples

1924
02:46:43.760 --> 02:46:48.479
of this or more in Afghanistan,
in Iraq. And I've had a number

1925
02:46:48.520 --> 02:46:54.760
of guys contact me. I've had
Canadians contact me and say, you know,

1926
02:46:54.920 --> 02:46:58.600
hey, this was the most enlightening
thing I was in this firefight,

1927
02:46:58.000 --> 02:47:03.000
this friendly firefight, and that's exactly
what caused it to it was a toxic

1928
02:47:03.120 --> 02:47:09.040
chain of command. You know,
I've had guys from other units call and

1929
02:47:09.079 --> 02:47:15.520
say the same thing, and you
know, it's it's cathartic for them to

1930
02:47:15.639 --> 02:47:18.319
hear this, But you know,
the rest of us got to quit sticking

1931
02:47:18.360 --> 02:47:24.120
our heads in the sand and start, you know, accepting that toxicity has

1932
02:47:24.200 --> 02:47:28.840
no place in the military. It
needs to be the number one priority for

1933
02:47:28.920 --> 02:47:35.600
eradication. When you see toxicity,
it needs to be reported. You have

1934
02:47:35.680 --> 02:47:39.000
a duty to report that, you
have a duty to do something about it.

1935
02:47:39.440 --> 02:47:43.479
And we got to weed these people
out before they kill more of our

1936
02:47:43.559 --> 02:47:46.360
national treasure. That's that's the first
aspect of it. But then in the

1937
02:47:46.479 --> 02:47:54.840
aftermath of it, you have that
the cover up is worse than the incident

1938
02:47:54.879 --> 02:48:00.799
itself. Right that had they come
out and said we made mistakes and this

1939
02:48:00.840 --> 02:48:07.159
is what really happened this, this
would have been a very different thing then

1940
02:48:07.319 --> 02:48:09.719
had they lied about it for so
long and tried to cover it up.

1941
02:48:11.000 --> 02:48:13.799
And that's what as you mentioned earlier, you know, after you've been lied

1942
02:48:13.840 --> 02:48:18.719
to once, it sets off the
sort of perpetual feeling of like, well,

1943
02:48:18.959 --> 02:48:22.479
what is the truth? Like am
I lying to you? Now?

1944
02:48:22.639 --> 02:48:26.600
Like? What what's going on?
Here. Yeah, I know sput on

1945
02:48:26.799 --> 02:48:33.719
and uh, you know there's a
there's a moment in this it's you know,

1946
02:48:33.079 --> 02:48:39.079
a huge crossroad. It's when Kevin
Tillman, who's part of Serial two,

1947
02:48:39.879 --> 02:48:45.600
uh and you know, his best
friend and his brother in arms and

1948
02:48:45.719 --> 02:48:50.120
brother in blood, he finds out
he's been killed. He's back at Seleno.

1949
02:48:50.280 --> 02:48:56.479
He's flown back with the bodies and
the injured platoon leader and RTO and

1950
02:48:56.520 --> 02:49:03.239
he's about to accompany patch by he
backed to Bogram before it goes back to

1951
02:49:03.799 --> 02:49:09.000
Germany and then the States. And
he's standing on the ramp of the helicopter

1952
02:49:09.239 --> 02:49:16.239
and the battalion commander and the S
three come up and talk to him and

1953
02:49:16.000 --> 02:49:24.399
they don't say anything about friendly fire. And this is forty hours after the

1954
02:49:24.479 --> 02:49:33.360
event, and everyone suspected immediately,
and within twenty four hours knew pretty much

1955
02:49:33.399 --> 02:49:37.040
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Within thirty six hours in the er,

1956
02:49:39.000 --> 02:49:43.760
you know, the squad leaders who
did not shoot him were all taking responsibility

1957
02:49:46.040 --> 02:49:50.639
for what happened. And so you
know, in the initial hotwash, they

1958
02:49:50.719 --> 02:49:56.719
knew that somehow they killed Pat Tillman. They could not describe it, but

1959
02:49:56.760 --> 02:50:01.200
they knew it. So these guys
know it, the battalion commander, the

1960
02:50:01.280 --> 02:50:05.920
S three, and what do they
do. They, in conjunction with the

1961
02:50:05.959 --> 02:50:11.319
regimental commander, who they've already talked
to and agreed, hey, don't tell

1962
02:50:11.440 --> 02:50:16.440
Kevin, not yet, we don't
know enough. They send him off without

1963
02:50:16.479 --> 02:50:20.360
telling him everything they know. And
all they had to do right there was

1964
02:50:20.399 --> 02:50:26.000
go Kevin. You know, first
off, there's nothing I could say that's

1965
02:50:26.079 --> 02:50:31.719
gonna suage the sorrow that you have
and you know, for the death of

1966
02:50:31.760 --> 02:50:35.040
your brother. But I want you
to know everything I know about what happened.

1967
02:50:35.079 --> 02:50:41.520
Right now. The man next to
your brother is convinced that he was

1968
02:50:41.600 --> 02:50:46.559
killed by friendly fire. We don't
know because this was a massive, chaotic

1969
02:50:46.600 --> 02:50:50.639
firefight. We won't be able to
confirm that until we get the ballistic the

1970
02:50:50.680 --> 02:50:56.200
forensics back from the autopsy. But
right now we believe that Pat was killed

1971
02:50:56.200 --> 02:51:01.360
in the crossfire between zero one Serial
two in the enemy. As soon as

1972
02:51:01.360 --> 02:51:05.120
I get more information, I will
call you and tell you what it is.

1973
02:51:05.040 --> 02:51:11.719
And you know, good news bad
news doesn't get any better with age.

1974
02:51:11.360 --> 02:51:15.319
The only thing that could happen right
there was you know, Kevin would

1975
02:51:15.319 --> 02:51:20.760
have gone Buck And if anyone could
understand the chaos. It was Kevin Tillman.

1976
02:51:20.840 --> 02:51:26.280
He was in the rear of Serial
two. His primary weapon malfunctioned,

1977
02:51:26.399 --> 02:51:31.280
his secondary weapon had its butt stock
torn off by the wall of the canyon,

1978
02:51:31.719 --> 02:51:37.200
so he was firing his nine millimeter
in the canyon up at the enemy

1979
02:51:37.280 --> 02:51:41.239
fired eight rounds from a nine to
mil. So if anyone could understand the

1980
02:51:41.360 --> 02:51:46.399
chaos of that moment, it would
have been him. And instead, you

1981
02:51:46.440 --> 02:51:50.040
know, they didn't tell him.
And you know, these are guys who

1982
02:51:50.120 --> 02:51:54.200
loved to quote the Ranger Creed,
but I'm pretty sure there's a line in

1983
02:51:54.200 --> 02:51:58.680
the Ranger Creed where a ranger never
lies through another ranger. And so to

1984
02:51:58.760 --> 02:52:05.879
me, Robert Rogers standing orders.
Yeah, so not telling Kevin right there

1985
02:52:05.159 --> 02:52:11.399
is to me beyond comprehension, Like, you know, that's the moment.

1986
02:52:11.440 --> 02:52:13.959
And if they'd done that, as
soon as Kevin got back to Bogram,

1987
02:52:15.319 --> 02:52:18.840
he got on the phone to his
mom, Pat's wife Marie, he would

1988
02:52:18.840 --> 02:52:22.040
have told them. You know,
they want to know everything he know,

1989
02:52:22.239 --> 02:52:24.959
which he told them at the time. You know what he knew, which

1990
02:52:26.120 --> 02:52:33.239
was the beginning of this fake story, you know about what happened, and

1991
02:52:33.719 --> 02:52:39.280
so even he was given you know, unwittingly giving misinformation. But he would

1992
02:52:39.319 --> 02:52:46.040
have been able right there to tell
you know, his mom, Pat's wife

1993
02:52:46.440 --> 02:52:50.680
what really happened. And you know, they deserved that, They had every

1994
02:52:50.760 --> 02:52:56.319
right to that knowledge, just like
anyone else did. But they were deprived

1995
02:52:56.360 --> 02:53:00.520
of it. And then somehow the
chain of command thought it was a good

1996
02:53:00.520 --> 02:53:05.959
idea to keep it secret for another
thirty five days. So you know,

1997
02:53:05.360 --> 02:53:11.399
this, this adds to the problem. You know, the platoon has internalized

1998
02:53:11.719 --> 02:53:16.200
that they shot him, but they
have no connect they have no contact and

1999
02:53:16.319 --> 02:53:20.079
communication with Kevin, so they can't
tell him. They've been told. The

2000
02:53:20.120 --> 02:53:24.319
one guy that flew back to accompany
Kevin and the body he was told do

2001
02:53:24.440 --> 02:53:31.680
not say anything about friendly fire till
we get all the facts. And you

2002
02:53:31.680 --> 02:53:33.479
know, it just went on and
on, got worse and worse, and

2003
02:53:35.200 --> 02:53:41.719
you know, thirty five days turned
into thirty five months, turned into almost

2004
02:53:41.760 --> 02:53:46.959
twenty years because you know, this
book just came out, it's nineteen years

2005
02:53:46.000 --> 02:53:50.799
from when had happened. And the
truth was always there, it was always

2006
02:53:50.840 --> 02:53:56.479
in the guys, and you know
there that's the added casualties. So none

2007
02:53:56.520 --> 02:54:01.079
of these guys, there might be
one two guys who had PTSD from this,

2008
02:54:01.879 --> 02:54:11.399
not twenty or twenty plus guys,
some who've had nervous breakdowns blaming themselves,

2009
02:54:11.600 --> 02:54:18.479
were not allowed access to the truth, the information, and like good

2010
02:54:18.079 --> 02:54:26.719
soldiers, took responsibility themselves and you
know, had to live with that guilt

2011
02:54:26.760 --> 02:54:33.159
and that frustration for almost twenty years. You know, we mentioned what happened

2012
02:54:33.200 --> 02:54:39.239
to the pl and the enlisted that
we're on that has there ever been any

2013
02:54:39.239 --> 02:54:46.159
blowback for the senior leadership that were
not on the mission that created these conditions?

2014
02:54:46.559 --> 02:54:50.120
Did they just are they still getting
promoted or were they still getting promoted

2015
02:54:50.120 --> 02:54:56.200
through the system? Yeah? So
the commanding general, so you know,

2016
02:54:56.639 --> 02:55:00.200
the commanding general who was in charge
of the investigation, the JASA command or

2017
02:55:00.239 --> 02:55:05.040
read every had access to everything I
had access to. So when you read

2018
02:55:05.120 --> 02:55:11.280
those, you can read you can
pick one investigation all except the one done

2019
02:55:11.280 --> 02:55:15.719
by Regimental headquarters, So you can
pick any of the other three. And

2020
02:55:15.760 --> 02:55:22.639
you can't read that without going what
the f man? How who makes these

2021
02:55:22.680 --> 02:55:26.920
decisions? You can't not come to
the conclusion that this chain of command was

2022
02:55:26.920 --> 02:55:33.639
was toxic, uh, and that
these guys were put into a situation that

2023
02:55:33.840 --> 02:55:37.920
there was no way to come out
of other than you know, the luckiest

2024
02:55:39.360 --> 02:55:43.600
of luck in happenstance. I mean, they were set up to fail right

2025
02:55:43.639 --> 02:55:50.040
there, and you know they didn't. They didn't say anything. They had

2026
02:55:50.040 --> 02:55:54.559
the same information, they didn't say
anything about it. And to me,

2027
02:55:54.360 --> 02:56:00.000
you know, they went on the
the The Jasi commander became a four star

2028
02:56:00.079 --> 02:56:03.239
general, the regimental commander became a
one star. Battalion commander became a two

2029
02:56:03.319 --> 02:56:07.840
star. So they were not just
promoted once or twice, some four or

2030
02:56:07.879 --> 02:56:15.200
five times. And yeah, there
was no accountability on any of them.

2031
02:56:15.719 --> 02:56:18.959
And you know, still to this
day what I would always you know,

2032
02:56:20.879 --> 02:56:24.879
if I was to meet one of
them face to face, I would say

2033
02:56:24.920 --> 02:56:30.639
to him, Okay, even if
you claim somehow ignorance, how could you

2034
02:56:30.799 --> 02:56:33.760
never check up on the rest of
the guys in this platoon. Anyone who

2035
02:56:35.040 --> 02:56:43.799
hears this story knows how devastating this
was. Anyone who honestly understands Pat Tillman

2036
02:56:43.840 --> 02:56:46.479
in his place in this platoon in
that he wasn't just admired, he was

2037
02:56:46.559 --> 02:56:52.520
revered. And he was revered because
he was a guy who was doing what

2038
02:56:52.719 --> 02:56:56.479
all the rest of these guys did
from all kinds of backgrounds. He had

2039
02:56:56.479 --> 02:57:00.200
options, he had a multi million
dollar contract. He gave it all up.

2040
02:57:00.559 --> 02:57:03.920
And did he ever act condescending toward
them, did he ever act like

2041
02:57:03.959 --> 02:57:07.239
he was superior. No, he
would go out of his way to help

2042
02:57:07.399 --> 02:57:11.799
anyone out there, to give him
advice, to give him some water,

2043
02:57:11.000 --> 02:57:16.040
some food. Again. Steven Elliott's
book, My favorite part of it is

2044
02:57:16.120 --> 02:57:22.079
when he arrived in the regiment in
two seven five. His first day,

2045
02:57:22.120 --> 02:57:26.760
he's wandering through the battalion trying to
find someone to tell him where to go,

2046
02:57:26.120 --> 02:57:30.639
and he runs into the Pat Tillman
and the stairwell, and you know,

2047
02:57:30.760 --> 02:57:33.760
Pat's I can eat flour at the
time, who normally would smoke the

2048
02:57:33.799 --> 02:57:37.399
shit out of you, but Pat's
like, hey man, welcome to the

2049
02:57:37.440 --> 02:57:43.239
battalion. What do you need.
Hey stand stairwell, come up, I'll

2050
02:57:43.239 --> 02:57:45.959
show you where your room is.
I'll get you in there. So no

2051
02:57:46.040 --> 02:57:50.319
it sees you, so you get
smoked. I mean, when you read

2052
02:57:50.399 --> 02:57:56.639
this, you know your admiration for
the guy just skyrockets. He was the

2053
02:57:56.799 --> 02:58:03.479
kind of leader we need in the
military, carrying humble, all those things.

2054
02:58:03.879 --> 02:58:09.399
And you know, yet we we
go and we we treated these leaders

2055
02:58:09.440 --> 02:58:13.159
treated this thing. Uh, you
know the way they did and allowed this

2056
02:58:13.280 --> 02:58:18.440
to happen, and unfortunately it happened
to a guy, uh you know who

2057
02:58:18.799 --> 02:58:24.680
we have questions epitomized everything good about
our military. Yeah, do you do

2058
02:58:24.760 --> 02:58:28.319
you see a you know, as
I think that you know, we've we've

2059
02:58:28.360 --> 02:58:33.319
read and we've talked about the idea
they're more like staff flag officers. They're

2060
02:58:33.399 --> 02:58:37.280
more generals now than there ever have
been. And and you know, the

2061
02:58:37.399 --> 02:58:41.959
number of like you know, officers
and Jay Socket, you know, at

2062
02:58:41.000 --> 02:58:46.600
the at the staff level is incredible
and stuff like that is there. Obviously

2063
02:58:48.799 --> 02:58:52.280
offser you know, offscers are very
important. Quality officers are very important.

2064
02:58:52.559 --> 02:58:58.280
Officers make all the difference in those
elements. But we also, like you

2065
02:58:58.280 --> 02:59:03.000
know, we'll about the treatment of
ofscers versus enlisted a lot of times in

2066
02:59:03.000 --> 02:59:07.239
the sense of nobody's getting a SilverStar
unless the officer gets a SilverStar. And

2067
02:59:07.280 --> 02:59:11.159
then you know, wars are often
based on rank. And then then we

2068
02:59:11.280 --> 02:59:18.760
see times where these senior level officers
can do no wrong right that that their

2069
02:59:18.799 --> 02:59:22.360
careers are not going to be inhibited
by any mistakes they made. Do you

2070
02:59:22.559 --> 02:59:30.399
see a solution for sort of bringing
the officer core and not all offscers?

2071
02:59:30.600 --> 02:59:33.959
And I don't want to say this
because a lot of officers are war fighters.

2072
02:59:33.479 --> 02:59:39.120
But is there a solution to the
admin officer, the political officer,

2073
02:59:39.959 --> 02:59:46.959
to that kind of equation. Yeah, I think it's cultural. You know,

2074
02:59:46.680 --> 02:59:50.040
we have to change the cultural where
we look at it. To your

2075
02:59:50.040 --> 02:59:56.520
point, in World War Two,
I believe there were four four star generals

2076
02:59:58.079 --> 03:00:05.120
in the army and today they're forty
four. In World War Two we had

2077
03:00:05.079 --> 03:00:09.840
I don't know the exact number.
I believe it was like four million soldiers.

2078
03:00:11.040 --> 03:00:15.319
Today we have four hundred and twenty
five thousand, So we definitely have

2079
03:00:15.440 --> 03:00:20.200
too many general officers. You know, in two thousand and two, two

2080
03:00:20.280 --> 03:00:28.280
thousand and three in Afghanistan, you
couldn't have The standard was no element can

2081
03:00:28.319 --> 03:00:33.200
operate in Afghanistan nless it has a
general officer in charge of it. And

2082
03:00:33.239 --> 03:00:37.760
that's why, you know, my
group and Anaconda Shahikte ended up with a

2083
03:00:37.879 --> 03:00:43.399
one star Air Force general commanding us
because you had to have a general.

2084
03:00:43.879 --> 03:00:48.639
And I think we need to culturally
eradicate that idea and go in the opposite

2085
03:00:48.719 --> 03:00:58.079
direction to power down. You know, your history proves your you know,

2086
03:00:58.280 --> 03:01:05.440
combat happens at the battalion level and
below I'm not saying brigade commanders aren't important

2087
03:01:05.520 --> 03:01:09.879
because they should be training battalions,
but they're not the ones who should be

2088
03:01:09.000 --> 03:01:15.719
running ops. And it should be
company commanders, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants,

2089
03:01:15.760 --> 03:01:20.239
and squad leaders who are making battlefield
decisions. So we you know this

2090
03:01:20.920 --> 03:01:28.000
again, one of the things that
motivated me to memorialize it was as a

2091
03:01:28.680 --> 03:01:33.520
historic lesson. We need to take
this away. Our model is not the

2092
03:01:33.639 --> 03:01:37.120
right model. If we're exporting that
to Ukraine right now in these other places,

2093
03:01:37.639 --> 03:01:45.120
then we're sabotaging them because this is
not the model. The CFT massive

2094
03:01:45.840 --> 03:01:52.000
talk with you know, a million
dollars worth of fifty four inch screens and

2095
03:01:52.120 --> 03:01:56.360
computers running the whole thing. That's
not the model. We need to go

2096
03:01:56.639 --> 03:02:01.040
backwards to the guy on the hill, uh, you know, who can

2097
03:02:01.479 --> 03:02:07.879
talk and who feels the cold,
who feels the altitude, who feels the

2098
03:02:07.040 --> 03:02:13.559
threat of the enemy making the decisions. And so to me, it's a

2099
03:02:13.639 --> 03:02:18.680
cultural thing, and culture happens from
decisions you make. We need to make

2100
03:02:18.879 --> 03:02:22.920
those decisions. We need to you
know, make up our minds we're never

2101
03:02:24.000 --> 03:02:28.440
going to allow this to happen again, and and also make it known to

2102
03:02:28.520 --> 03:02:35.040
everyone that the reason that this thing
went south Afghanistan was more to do with

2103
03:02:35.239 --> 03:02:43.840
this command and control monstrosity we created
than the enemy itself. Thanks Matthy,

2104
03:02:43.959 --> 03:02:50.760
that's it's very insightful. Okay,
so questions, cessar an Omen, Thank

2105
03:02:50.799 --> 03:02:54.360
you very much, love the show, Thanks for making this happen. Has

2106
03:02:54.440 --> 03:03:01.559
the gorilla idea or something similar ever
been used outside of Bosnia? I don't

2107
03:03:01.600 --> 03:03:05.879
know, I hope so I'm sure
other I'm sure plenty of other guys have,

2108
03:03:07.159 --> 03:03:13.680
uh have similar ideas. But you
know it's uh to me, it's

2109
03:03:13.799 --> 03:03:18.959
disguises, deception and diversion. Uh, you know, that's what it's about.

2110
03:03:18.120 --> 03:03:26.000
Any form that takes uh you know, contextually should be open Uh.

2111
03:03:26.440 --> 03:03:30.879
It should be open season. And
that's what we need to train our future

2112
03:03:30.959 --> 03:03:35.000
leaders to think out of the box, uh, to not be constrained by

2113
03:03:35.159 --> 03:03:41.120
the you know, helicopter, the
you know platoon, company, battalion,

2114
03:03:41.239 --> 03:03:48.920
brigade model. Uh, you know, understand the problem and solve it uh

2115
03:03:50.120 --> 03:03:56.760
in the most economical, efficient and
sensible way possible, and sometimes that involves

2116
03:03:56.239 --> 03:04:03.600
dressing up like an ape. Thanks
again for the very generous donation, Sessa

2117
03:04:03.719 --> 03:04:09.719
Omen. The Daily Mail ran a
story that in early two thousands, the

2118
03:04:09.959 --> 03:04:15.799
SAS was chosen over Delta for having
more experience, was sent in to rescue

2119
03:04:15.840 --> 03:04:22.280
a CIA agent in Afghasian britt tabloids. So grain of salt. But you

2120
03:04:22.399 --> 03:04:28.159
have any thoughts on this in the
year two thousand, that's in the early

2121
03:04:28.280 --> 03:04:33.799
two thousands. Oh well, I
mean two thousand and one was you know,

2122
03:04:33.920 --> 03:04:35.760
my frame of reference starts at two
thousand and one. We were the

2123
03:04:37.360 --> 03:04:39.399
you know, along with the SF
guys in the north, We were first

2124
03:04:39.520 --> 03:04:46.479
in down in the dry lake beds
south of Konda Heart. You know,

2125
03:04:46.799 --> 03:04:52.200
I never heard of any mission like
that. It was actually very difficult.

2126
03:04:52.399 --> 03:04:56.760
The Brits were there, you know, in our staging base, but they

2127
03:04:56.840 --> 03:05:03.360
were given very restrict guidance. They
were only allowed to remember this is before

2128
03:05:03.399 --> 03:05:09.239
anyone's on the ground. They were
told they could only engage at target if

2129
03:05:09.319 --> 03:05:15.440
it was had to do with poppy
production and heroin trafficking. Wow. So

2130
03:05:16.840 --> 03:05:22.040
the essays was, you know,
begging us to find a way to get

2131
03:05:22.079 --> 03:05:26.840
them in into the fight. And
I don't know what happened there. You

2132
03:05:26.959 --> 03:05:33.120
know, their commander I didn't deal
with them much after that, but their

2133
03:05:33.200 --> 03:05:35.840
commander, when I you know,
when I went up to him and said,

2134
03:05:35.639 --> 03:05:41.079
you know, this doesn't make any
sense. You know, he was

2135
03:05:41.239 --> 03:05:46.760
defending the anti drug mission pretty vociferously, so of course, yeah, I

2136
03:05:46.000 --> 03:05:50.600
never heard of any other any other
mission than that. I also want to

2137
03:05:50.600 --> 03:05:54.520
give a quick shout out to one
of our audience members. You may remember

2138
03:05:54.600 --> 03:05:58.719
Paul Cunningham. He was my first
pl when I was in Ratis. Oh

2139
03:05:58.799 --> 03:06:03.360
yeah there, so uh good to
see again, Paul. I hope you're

2140
03:06:03.399 --> 03:06:09.479
doing well, buddy, Radioactive Lama. Thank you very much. Great content,

2141
03:06:09.600 --> 03:06:13.760
guys, better than watching primetime TV. Well we should hope. So

2142
03:06:15.200 --> 03:06:20.680
good job, guys. We need
that primetime TV moolah. Uh, Mike,

2143
03:06:20.719 --> 03:06:24.840
you're gonna get it. Thanks,
thanks for this more peak. Mike

2144
03:06:24.920 --> 03:06:28.840
Montgomery, thank you very much.
Question, what was the conventional wisdom regarding

2145
03:06:28.920 --> 03:06:37.680
Los Pepees while he was in Columbia
hunting Escobar? Like conventional wisdom, I

2146
03:06:37.799 --> 03:06:45.399
mean, the conventional wisdom was what
they were doing was, you know,

2147
03:06:46.319 --> 03:06:52.600
what should have been done. That
was to my knowledge and and you know

2148
03:06:52.959 --> 03:06:56.840
I was probably as close to it
as any American, me and my guys.

2149
03:06:56.600 --> 03:07:01.280
Uh, there were all kinds of
c i A takes on who the

2150
03:07:01.360 --> 03:07:07.639
lost Pepees were Dea. So they'll
remember those two were kind of in charge

2151
03:07:07.799 --> 03:07:11.959
of the mission down there and battling
each other all the time. We were

2152
03:07:13.000 --> 03:07:16.440
down there, you know, walking
this fine line between them. We didn't

2153
03:07:16.479 --> 03:07:22.639
care who got credit for anything.
The Lost Pepees to me, was an

2154
03:07:22.719 --> 03:07:31.760
uprising. It was Colombians, police
officers, they're members of their federal law

2155
03:07:31.840 --> 03:07:35.680
enforcement and their military who off duty, were getting together going, hey,

2156
03:07:37.319 --> 03:07:41.200
you know the government's not going to
stop this. The only way is for

2157
03:07:41.399 --> 03:07:45.079
us to stop this, and we've
got to take these guys out ourselves.

2158
03:07:45.639 --> 03:07:50.639
And the Lost Pepees did just that, and they, you know, of

2159
03:07:50.760 --> 03:07:54.799
all the things that brought Escobar to
his knees, I believe the Lost Pepees

2160
03:07:54.079 --> 03:07:58.959
was probably the most formidable. They
took out a number of his lieutenant.

2161
03:08:00.159 --> 03:08:05.799
It's there he did not feel safe, His family was not safe, and

2162
03:08:07.000 --> 03:08:13.520
so he took all kinds of measures
to get them safe, and ultimately those

2163
03:08:13.600 --> 03:08:18.879
measures of what ended up getting him
captured. So the Los Pepes to me,

2164
03:08:18.120 --> 03:08:22.000
was just an organic uprising of people
who had had enough of this guy

2165
03:08:22.639 --> 03:08:26.280
blowing the shit out of airplanes,
blowing up you know, cars in the

2166
03:08:26.319 --> 03:08:33.280
middle of huge intersections, assassinating police
officers by the hundreds. Uh, and

2167
03:08:33.760 --> 03:08:43.239
they took matters in their own hand
and uh and we're very effective. Sephar

2168
03:08:43.239 --> 03:08:48.040
an Omen, thank you again.
Were there Delta snipers on Overwatch when they

2169
03:08:48.079 --> 03:08:52.040
took out Escobar? What are your
thoughts on Mark Bowden's theory it was a

2170
03:08:52.159 --> 03:08:58.399
unit bullet that killed him. I
didn't know that was Mark Bowden's theory,

2171
03:08:58.559 --> 03:09:03.280
but uh, and normally I would
not comment, you know, so the

2172
03:09:03.360 --> 03:09:09.559
fact I'm commenting should tell you that
it wasn't our snipers. And I've already

2173
03:09:09.600 --> 03:09:16.120
said it. You know, people
who who you know, deny did the

2174
03:09:16.200 --> 03:09:24.280
Colombians accomplish that on their own are
people who you know, just cannot believe

2175
03:09:24.479 --> 03:09:30.680
that other countries have freedom loving you
know, warriors that can be just as

2176
03:09:30.719 --> 03:09:33.959
effective when motivated as as we are. And that's what happened there. There

2177
03:09:35.040 --> 03:09:41.680
was no snipers, you know,
there was no unique guys anywhere near there

2178
03:09:41.920 --> 03:09:46.559
at the time, and anyone else
who claims there was is just you know,

2179
03:09:46.959 --> 03:09:54.600
engaging in uh in in theory and
you know, trying to trying to

2180
03:09:54.879 --> 03:10:01.840
guess what happened and make it a
little sexier than it was. J just

2181
03:10:01.959 --> 03:10:05.559
gotscha. Thank you very much would
you happen to know the origin of advanced

2182
03:10:05.600 --> 03:10:11.399
force operations? Did that concept come
from Meadows when he went into Iran nineteen

2183
03:10:11.479 --> 03:10:16.760
eighty ahead of the Delta Force or
the Delta Rescue Force. Yeah, I

2184
03:10:18.319 --> 03:10:24.280
you know, so since you know
I was the first AFO commander, I

2185
03:10:24.319 --> 03:10:28.159
would just say it rose up organically. It was just common sense. We

2186
03:10:28.239 --> 03:10:33.280
didn't even care. You could have
called us soap dish, and you know

2187
03:10:33.479 --> 03:10:37.399
it would have been this. We
would have done the same thing we were

2188
03:10:37.639 --> 03:10:43.200
before. That Advanced force operation was
a verb, not a noun, right,

2189
03:10:43.319 --> 03:10:48.760
and so it just meant going ahead
of the main the main effort and

2190
03:10:50.360 --> 03:10:54.000
prepped in the battlefield. And for
clandestine ops, that means setting up safe

2191
03:10:54.040 --> 03:11:01.840
houses, getting vehicles, doing you
know low as rekis so that when the

2192
03:11:01.879 --> 03:11:03.799
guys come in, you can you
know, greet them, tell them the

2193
03:11:03.879 --> 03:11:07.959
lay of the land. Uh,
they have resources so they can operate.

2194
03:11:07.639 --> 03:11:13.760
We turned it into a noun.
We just called ourselves a fou. We

2195
03:11:13.879 --> 03:11:22.680
were a conglomeration of all four services
and some other government agency guys. So

2196
03:11:22.000 --> 03:11:28.079
it was you know, necessity is
the mother of invention, and uh common

2197
03:11:28.159 --> 03:11:33.719
sense is the father. And and
that's what you know, that's how AFO

2198
03:11:33.239 --> 03:11:37.879
was born out of necessity and common
sense. You know, you you mentioned

2199
03:11:37.959 --> 03:11:41.920
Columbia, and then we talked about
Bosnia. You know, you talk about

2200
03:11:43.040 --> 03:11:46.440
like the c I A and the
DEA who both had a lot of undercover

2201
03:11:46.680 --> 03:11:50.040
sort of cover type work. And
then in Bosnia, did you guys have

2202
03:11:50.120 --> 03:11:54.239
a good working relationship with like the
c I A, the d I A,

2203
03:11:54.719 --> 03:12:01.000
uh, other intel units in common
and whatnot where you weren't like creating

2204
03:12:01.040 --> 03:12:03.840
this stuff. You weren't reinventing the
wheel, but people were there kind of

2205
03:12:05.000 --> 03:12:09.280
teaching you guys how to do this
stuff. We had a great relationship.

2206
03:12:11.079 --> 03:12:16.040
And you know after nine one one
with the CIA, and that again was

2207
03:12:16.479 --> 03:12:22.760
born out of Bosnia. We had
worked with them extensively in Bosnia and so

2208
03:12:22.479 --> 03:12:28.360
we knew each other and uh,
many of the personalities knew each other.

2209
03:12:28.879 --> 03:12:31.799
In my book, I talk about
a guy code named Spider. You know,

2210
03:12:31.959 --> 03:12:37.079
he was a very good friend of
mine. We had we had operated

2211
03:12:37.159 --> 03:12:41.479
together in Bosnia multiple times, along
with other guys in the unit. He

2212
03:12:41.680 --> 03:12:46.479
was a warrior, former marine.
Uh, you know, we we trusted

2213
03:12:46.559 --> 03:12:52.680
him, he trusted us. We
shared information even you know, even information

2214
03:12:52.840 --> 03:12:58.799
people were telling us not to share
and you know, so that relationship worked

2215
03:13:00.239 --> 03:13:07.760
because of you know, of personal
relationships, and it stayed that way Afghanistan

2216
03:13:07.840 --> 03:13:11.879
in the early phases, all the
way to Iraq. He was in Iraq.

2217
03:13:13.440 --> 03:13:16.959
He came up from the south,
I came from the west and the

2218
03:13:18.079 --> 03:13:24.360
north. We ended up meeting in
bag Then International Airport right before the other

2219
03:13:24.440 --> 03:13:26.920
event I talked about. So it
was a good relationship. And it's always

2220
03:13:28.399 --> 03:13:35.760
emphasized to maintain those relationships and to
make sure that they they flourish. But

2221
03:13:35.200 --> 03:13:41.000
they're very personality dependent, and so
when you get someone in there who doesn't

2222
03:13:41.159 --> 03:13:46.079
like whether it's an agency guy who
doesn't like the army or the you know,

2223
03:13:46.239 --> 03:13:56.559
navy or vice versa, then that
relationship falters. Sessah Noman, thank

2224
03:13:56.600 --> 03:14:01.479
you very much. Were there any
other note? Were the innovations that came

2225
03:14:01.559 --> 03:14:03.920
from the unit that you could that
you can talk about during your time or

2226
03:14:05.200 --> 03:14:13.120
after other than the police spike matts, well, dogs, we brought dogs,

2227
03:14:13.280 --> 03:14:16.719
dogs, operational dogs. So a
lot of people don't know this.

2228
03:14:18.120 --> 03:14:24.319
There were operational dogs were the use
of operational dogs was ended at the end

2229
03:14:24.360 --> 03:14:28.479
of the Vietnam War, so I
think that was seventy five. From seventy

2230
03:14:28.600 --> 03:14:33.680
five to ninety eight, there were
no operational dogs in the military. There

2231
03:14:33.760 --> 03:14:41.159
were drug sniffing dogs, right,
everyone remembers the you know, drug sniffing

2232
03:14:41.239 --> 03:14:45.840
dogs. There were bombs sniffing dogs
the MPs had. There were no operational

2233
03:14:46.159 --> 03:14:52.040
dogs, you know. Back to
Dale Comstock. Dale Comstock was a dog

2234
03:14:52.159 --> 03:14:56.639
trainer and when he was in my
troop, he he had a number of

2235
03:14:56.840 --> 03:15:01.879
and I forget what kind of shepherds
they were, but he had me out

2236
03:15:01.920 --> 03:15:05.200
to his house, showed me these
dogs, and he was like a lot

2237
03:15:05.239 --> 03:15:07.239
of guys in the unit. They
were saying, hey, we should get

2238
03:15:07.319 --> 03:15:11.399
dogs. Look at all these things
they could do. And so they planted

2239
03:15:11.440 --> 03:15:18.600
that seed in my brain. When
I became a squadron commander, I had

2240
03:15:18.879 --> 03:15:24.280
in my squadron I had one guy
who had been classically trained at Lachland Air

2241
03:15:24.360 --> 03:15:30.000
Force Base. He was certified dog
trainer, and I had two guys who

2242
03:15:30.159 --> 03:15:35.600
were just kind of like amateurs.
We did a brainstorming session. One of

2243
03:15:35.680 --> 03:15:41.079
the big missions at the time was
underground tunnels, and it was pretty obvious

2244
03:15:41.239 --> 03:15:46.079
that, you know, dogs would
make an incredible impact on that mission.

2245
03:15:46.719 --> 03:15:50.840
So we flew out to Lachland Air
Force Base, met with the colonel who

2246
03:15:50.920 --> 03:15:56.959
was in charge of dog training and
again no one gave us approval for this.

2247
03:15:56.239 --> 03:16:01.840
We just did it and we told
our concept and he was luckily he

2248
03:16:03.079 --> 03:16:07.399
was a historical believer in dogs.
He was like, finally, you know,

2249
03:16:07.600 --> 03:16:11.760
somebody sees the light. He was, We'll support you guys whatever you

2250
03:16:11.879 --> 03:16:15.440
need. Uh, just you know, And we had to get approval from

2251
03:16:15.520 --> 03:16:20.840
him because in the DA PAM you
can't have dogs unless Lachlan, the dog

2252
03:16:22.000 --> 03:16:26.280
command at Lachlan says you can have
him. So he signed off on it.

2253
03:16:26.840 --> 03:16:33.079
My unit commander Cary Harrell, fantastic
guy just recently passed away. He

2254
03:16:33.840 --> 03:16:37.719
saw the you know, the potential
in it too. He said, do

2255
03:16:37.879 --> 03:16:41.200
it. You know it sounds kind
of crazy, but go ahead and do

2256
03:16:41.319 --> 03:16:48.079
it. So a week later we
flew two guys off to Belgium, but

2257
03:16:48.879 --> 03:16:56.639
to the finest Belgian melonise that money
could buy. Began the training process and

2258
03:16:56.799 --> 03:17:01.920
it was a process of discovery.
You know, who's going to handle these

2259
03:17:01.040 --> 03:17:05.479
dogs. If you bring in a
dog handler, he's going to take a

2260
03:17:05.600 --> 03:17:11.159
seat on a little bird, take
a seat in a vehicle. You know

2261
03:17:11.319 --> 03:17:16.440
what about small missions? And we
quickly concluded that we needed to make operators

2262
03:17:16.840 --> 03:17:22.600
dog handlers. And this was a
controversial decision. There were a number of

2263
03:17:22.639 --> 03:17:26.239
people even in the unit who thought
it was heresy, but we did it

2264
03:17:26.319 --> 03:17:33.399
anyway, went off the dog handling
school, got some proof of concepts done

2265
03:17:35.159 --> 03:17:41.040
right away. You could see the
potential of these animals, and we got

2266
03:17:41.120 --> 03:17:45.079
money to build kennels. And like
I said, that was ninety eight.

2267
03:17:45.280 --> 03:17:52.200
It took a while. The program
was not solid. We went to Afghanistan,

2268
03:17:52.600 --> 03:17:56.840
we took the dogs with us,
but there were no specific uses immediately.

2269
03:17:58.879 --> 03:18:03.000
Then Iraq happened two thousand and three, we took the dogs with us.

2270
03:18:03.120 --> 03:18:07.959
We infilled with dogs. We had
special vehicles that had air conditioners built

2271
03:18:09.040 --> 03:18:13.920
into them because dogs are very heat
sensitive. They were worth their weight in

2272
03:18:15.040 --> 03:18:20.000
gold. As think about setting up
a patrol base, a hide site in

2273
03:18:20.120 --> 03:18:26.520
the desert. If you've got dogs
that can detect by smell and hearing anyone,

2274
03:18:28.159 --> 03:18:33.920
you know, five hundred meters away, that's an amazing force multiplier.

2275
03:18:33.040 --> 03:18:37.399
And they were. But they made
their mark back at our safe house,

2276
03:18:39.799 --> 03:18:43.440
you know, once we got established
in our safe house, once the country

2277
03:18:43.559 --> 03:18:50.760
fell, we had a weird like
I don't know if it was a suicidal

2278
03:18:50.840 --> 03:18:54.600
attack. Two guys came in Ak's
got into the perimeter. We had a

2279
03:18:54.639 --> 03:19:03.040
big compound and we released the dog. Those were the first, uh you

2280
03:19:03.120 --> 03:19:07.159
know, that was the first operational
use of the dogs. I was there.

2281
03:19:07.200 --> 03:19:13.879
I remember running up. All I
could hear was gurgling and there was

2282
03:19:13.959 --> 03:19:18.680
a guy laying there. Uh and
AK forty seven five feet away and his

2283
03:19:18.959 --> 03:19:26.280
face was in the Belgian Malinoi's mouth. It was Arco and he that was

2284
03:19:26.360 --> 03:19:31.799
the gurgling. And from that point
on it was dogs were on every raid.

2285
03:19:33.799 --> 03:19:39.120
The first two dog casualties happened on
the Oude and Cuse raid. Oude

2286
03:19:39.200 --> 03:19:43.600
and Cuse were that are Saddam's sons. They were barricaded on the second floor

2287
03:19:43.920 --> 03:19:50.399
of the house they were hiding in. The team went in, cleared the

2288
03:19:50.479 --> 03:19:56.719
first floor, came to the stairwell, went up two steps, fuselage about

2289
03:19:56.760 --> 03:20:01.840
automatic AK fire just pounded the top
with the steps. Uh. They released

2290
03:20:01.920 --> 03:20:07.319
the two dogs. Two dogs went
up there. They could hear them.

2291
03:20:07.799 --> 03:20:11.319
Uh you know, they could hear
the dogs make contact with Udi and Kuse.

2292
03:20:11.840 --> 03:20:18.120
The team followed after, uh you
know, finished them off and uh.

2293
03:20:18.760 --> 03:20:20.959
One of those dogs was the first
casualty. He was hit by an

2294
03:20:20.959 --> 03:20:24.799
a K round when he got to
the top of the stairs. But again,

2295
03:20:26.079 --> 03:20:28.399
you know another example, it's c
QB. If you can have a

2296
03:20:28.520 --> 03:20:35.000
dog, you know, uh move
through these uh uh you know, fire

2297
03:20:35.120 --> 03:20:39.760
funnels and and to tell you whether
there's an enemy. They're they're worth their

2298
03:20:39.799 --> 03:20:45.719
weight in gold. And uh they
were and today everyone has them. You

2299
03:20:45.799 --> 03:20:48.959
know, we probably got more dogs
than we can handle in the military,

2300
03:20:50.079 --> 03:20:54.200
but they've got their place and we
should keep them there because they're they're an

2301
03:20:54.239 --> 03:21:00.159
invaluable asset. Yeah, there's malano. They're no joke, like they are

2302
03:21:00.680 --> 03:21:05.920
so courageous and yes, you're fearless. Yeah, yeah, very loyal.

2303
03:21:07.479 --> 03:21:11.600
Uh. You know, they a
lot of breakthroughs in training. Like I

2304
03:21:11.760 --> 03:21:15.440
was skeptical that. You know,
when you walk around one of those things,

2305
03:21:15.520 --> 03:21:20.639
it's like walking around a mine field
or a hand grenade with its pin

2306
03:21:20.760 --> 03:21:24.120
pulled out and the spoon still and
uh. You know, no matter how

2307
03:21:24.200 --> 03:21:31.120
comfortable you are dogs, it's it. It'll shake you. But you know,

2308
03:21:31.280 --> 03:21:35.760
these guys train these dogs, they
acclimated them to the squadron and you

2309
03:21:35.799 --> 03:21:37.920
could walk through the squadron, walk
you know, through our bar area.

2310
03:21:39.639 --> 03:21:43.000
Uh, and they were you know, they were they knew they were one

2311
03:21:43.040 --> 03:21:48.879
of the team and that that did
a lot for building trust of everybody.

2312
03:21:48.799 --> 03:21:52.680
But it was a training breakthrough because
up to that time, you know,

2313
03:21:52.879 --> 03:21:56.399
dogs were you know, just just
the handler and no one else could be

2314
03:21:56.520 --> 03:22:01.440
around them. Yeah, yeah,
yeah, I think that we have another

2315
03:22:01.559 --> 03:22:05.000
mutual from two seven to five Kelly, who was very involved in the dog

2316
03:22:05.079 --> 03:22:13.079
program, right. Uh yeah,
yeah, yep. Uh. Nation would

2317
03:22:13.079 --> 03:22:16.840
thank you very much for the donation. Clayton Jensen, good to see you,

2318
03:22:16.879 --> 03:22:20.600
buddy. If you haven't watched Clayton's
show, you should watch it.

2319
03:22:20.879 --> 03:22:24.959
Uh he he caveats this question.
He says, no specifics needed, just

2320
03:22:24.079 --> 03:22:28.399
your overall opinion, and then he
says, uh, you touched on sigan

2321
03:22:28.520 --> 03:22:33.120
stuff used in Colombia, et cetera. What do you think about the evolution

2322
03:22:33.479 --> 03:22:41.040
of the io guys, Ranger Ost
and Jays Sauds over time? Uh?

2323
03:22:43.120 --> 03:22:48.719
Yeah, well, the evolution is
just natural. You know, they've they've

2324
03:22:48.239 --> 03:22:52.239
they learned as they go along.
They've become you know, more uh,

2325
03:22:54.280 --> 03:22:58.520
you know, more mission focused and
uh you know that's the key with all

2326
03:22:58.600 --> 03:23:05.079
that all that electronic intelligence, you
got to get it down in the hands

2327
03:23:05.120 --> 03:23:07.360
of the operators. You got to
test it out, you got to give

2328
03:23:07.399 --> 03:23:11.399
it proof of concept, and if
that all works, you know you can

2329
03:23:11.799 --> 03:23:18.120
you can share it with larger groups. Jin Kelly, thank you very much.

2330
03:23:18.280 --> 03:23:20.920
And this is the last question.
Shuts up real quick. Yeah,

2331
03:23:22.360 --> 03:23:28.959
I'm listening. Any plans to bring
back the operational donkey like Merrill's Marauders.

2332
03:23:31.120 --> 03:23:35.360
Well they did bring them. They
bring them back in Afghanistan, the mules.

2333
03:23:35.440 --> 03:23:39.600
I mean, SF was experimenting with
them even before nine one one.

2334
03:23:41.079 --> 03:23:46.840
Uh. We one of the teams
in Shahiko, UH thought, you know,

2335
03:23:48.079 --> 03:23:50.799
hey, the way to get our
equipment up into the mountains is with

2336
03:23:50.920 --> 03:23:54.200
the donkey. And I have a
video of it. It's, uh,

2337
03:23:54.200 --> 03:24:00.879
it's the team and me and two
others chasing this donkey, uh, trying

2338
03:24:00.920 --> 03:24:03.840
to you know, trying to corral
it to see if we could use it.

2339
03:24:05.200 --> 03:24:09.719
And it turns into just you know, a Keystone cop moment of hilarity.

2340
03:24:09.799 --> 03:24:13.239
We're laughing so hard we can't even
chase it anymore. And uh,

2341
03:24:13.680 --> 03:24:16.200
and that's when we gave up on
the donkey idea. But I think it's

2342
03:24:16.200 --> 03:24:20.840
still has potential. All ideas like
that, you know, I know they're

2343
03:24:22.000 --> 03:24:28.520
they're trying to create robots now to
carry equipment into uh, into difficult terrain.

2344
03:24:28.639 --> 03:24:31.840
But you know, I think that's
a long way off. And if

2345
03:24:31.959 --> 03:24:37.360
the situation's right and you've got a
well trained donkey and a guy who's handled

2346
03:24:37.479 --> 03:24:43.520
donkeys before, I don't see why
you wouldn't use it. Uh. And

2347
03:24:43.680 --> 03:24:50.319
that's it. Ud, did we
have anything on Patreon? So next uh,

2348
03:24:50.639 --> 03:24:52.799
actually, the next the next episode
is not going to be Friday.

2349
03:24:52.879 --> 03:24:56.920
It's going to be Saturday, and
we're gonna have John Dovey on the show,

2350
03:24:56.520 --> 03:25:01.120
served in the s a d F
and then say and really excited to

2351
03:25:01.159 --> 03:25:05.479
talk to him. It's going to
be a very unique interview. Pete,

2352
03:25:05.559 --> 03:25:09.440
thank you for coming on the show
spending your Friday evening with us. And

2353
03:25:09.559 --> 03:25:15.159
again, his latest book is Common
Sense Leadership Matters Toxic Leadership Destroys, a

2354
03:25:15.239 --> 03:25:18.159
Case Study Book three. I hope
you guys will go and check it out.

2355
03:25:18.280 --> 03:25:24.719
And also the mission The Men and
Me and then Common Sense Way,

2356
03:25:24.879 --> 03:25:30.280
The Common Sense Way, right,
yeah, yeah, so and it's a

2357
03:25:30.360 --> 03:25:37.120
trilogy right in the sense that all
focuses around the idea of leadership, both

2358
03:25:37.159 --> 03:25:43.639
positive leadership and toxic leadership. Yeah. Just common yep, Common Sense leadership

2359
03:25:43.760 --> 03:25:50.159
applied using military stories, real world
military stories and uh, you know the

2360
03:25:50.280 --> 03:25:58.200
last one brings up the toxic leadership
destroyers point in it perfect And yeah,

2361
03:25:58.239 --> 03:26:01.200
Pete, I'd love to have you
back some time talk about the rest of

2362
03:26:01.280 --> 03:26:05.879
your career and anything else. We'll
have to do it again sometime. But

2363
03:26:05.200 --> 03:26:07.079
I mean, thank you for coming
on and doing this. Yeah, it

2364
03:26:07.200 --> 03:26:11.440
was great tonight. Yeah, I
enjoyed it too. Guys, you got

2365
03:26:11.479 --> 03:26:15.520
a great show, and keep up
the good work. Appreciate it. Yeah,

2366
03:26:15.600 --> 03:26:18.760
thank you. And before we roll
out anything else you want to plug

2367
03:26:18.959 --> 03:26:22.479
websites, anything else, people should
go check out. Where can they find

2368
03:26:22.479 --> 03:26:24.159
it? You know? Yeah,
I mean on that book, there's a

2369
03:26:24.239 --> 03:26:28.959
lot of good stuff. Pictures of
the spur. You can see, you

2370
03:26:28.040 --> 03:26:33.319
know, the view that I described
as the squad leader in the lead gungee

2371
03:26:33.760 --> 03:26:39.120
looking up at the spur. Their
color pictures. It's on Pete labor dot

2372
03:26:39.159 --> 03:26:43.239
com and you can watch the video
on firefight dot Pete labor dot com.

2373
03:26:43.799 --> 03:26:50.680
I would recommend anybody who is interested
in not just that event, but you

2374
03:26:50.760 --> 03:26:56.239
know, driving off road or terrain
to go watch that video. It's it's

2375
03:26:56.280 --> 03:26:58.920
pretty amazing. And I also have
the maps on there. That lay out

2376
03:27:00.079 --> 03:27:05.719
up the sequence of events leading up
to the firefight. So check it out

2377
03:27:05.799 --> 03:27:11.799
and uh enjoy the terrain while you're
checking it out, all right, thank

2378
03:27:11.840 --> 03:27:16.239
you, and uh we will see
all of you next Saturday. Thank you,

2379
03:27:16.920 --> 03:27:20.399
and people will talk to you next
time. Sounds good, Jack,

2380
03:27:20.719 --> 03:27:24.719
Thanks, Thanks Dave, Thanks having
a good night. You too,