WEBVTT 1 00:00:29.760 --> 00:00:33.520 Welcome to mid Rats with sal from Commander Salamander and the Eagle One from Eagle 2 00:00:33.600 --> 00:00:38.320 Speak at see or Shore your home for a discussion of national security issues and 3 00:00:38.399 --> 00:00:42.799 all things maritime. Welcome everybody to another edition of mid Rats, And for 4 00:00:42.920 --> 00:00:46.240 those that are with us live, if you'd like, you can go to 5 00:00:46.280 --> 00:00:49.520 the bottom of the show page. That's where you will bind the chat room. 6 00:00:49.560 --> 00:00:52.679 And if you'd want to join us already we see if we see Paul 7 00:00:52.719 --> 00:00:55.640 and NYC are already there, if you want to join in with them. 8 00:00:55.679 --> 00:00:59.560 If you have some observations that you wanted to share during the course of the 9 00:00:59.600 --> 00:01:03.359 show, or there was simply a question you would hope that we would ask 10 00:01:03.359 --> 00:01:07.480 our guests or in the course of the next hour, that's a great place 11 00:01:07.519 --> 00:01:10.680 to put it. We'll do our best to try to roll that into the 12 00:01:10.719 --> 00:01:15.159 conversation as we go forward. And as always, if you have it already, 13 00:01:15.799 --> 00:01:19.159 i'd ask you to go ahead and go over to iTunes, a spreaker, 14 00:01:19.280 --> 00:01:23.120 Spotify, wherever you get your podcasts. If you haven't subscribed to mid 15 00:01:23.239 --> 00:01:26.040 Rats, you can go ahead and do that. In that way, this 16 00:01:26.079 --> 00:01:30.840 show or other shows will always be available for you if you want to see 17 00:01:30.840 --> 00:01:34.599 what's going on in this world. And on today's show, when you look 18 00:01:34.599 --> 00:01:38.760 at for generations, something we were talking about a little bit in the pre 19 00:01:38.840 --> 00:01:44.799 show. From our very senior leadership down to those that are leading in the 20 00:01:44.879 --> 00:01:49.599 fields, we really have it. In the US and amongst our allies had 21 00:01:49.640 --> 00:01:56.959 an opportunity to be all that concerned about for lack of raise receiving traditional fires 22 00:01:56.959 --> 00:02:00.519 from opponents. Yes, we've had ied terror attacks, the odd one hundred 23 00:02:00.519 --> 00:02:07.719 and seven millimeter rocket lobbed in from the hillside, but we haven't really been 24 00:02:07.760 --> 00:02:12.520 on the receiving end of traditionally when you're at a pier our near pier operation 25 00:02:12.680 --> 00:02:19.159 we've had to worry about. And as such, our desire to have all 26 00:02:19.240 --> 00:02:23.400 domain awareness are whether you're looking at tactical level leadership or all the way up 27 00:02:23.439 --> 00:02:28.319 to the four star headquarters. People like to have their full video, people 28 00:02:28.400 --> 00:02:32.159 like to have that thousand yards crew driver nearby, and for that to take 29 00:02:32.199 --> 00:02:37.000 place, it takes a big staff, It takes a lot of electrons and 30 00:02:37.080 --> 00:02:40.400 a lot of habits to make it happen. And what we're going to do 31 00:02:40.439 --> 00:02:45.240 today is we're gonna look at some of the lessons in this area that we've 32 00:02:45.280 --> 00:02:50.639 seen over the course of last fifteen months during the Russia Ukrainian War. And 33 00:02:50.840 --> 00:02:54.639 our guest today for the full hour to do that is thee penant Colonel Matt 34 00:02:54.759 --> 00:03:00.400 Errol, US Army. He is the commandant of the US Army Joint Support 35 00:03:00.439 --> 00:03:04.560 Team at Hulbert Field in Florida. And if you go to the show page, 36 00:03:04.560 --> 00:03:07.560 you will see a link to the article that we're going to be using 37 00:03:07.599 --> 00:03:14.719 as kind of the touch pace the starting place for our conversation over at Military 38 00:03:14.759 --> 00:03:20.800 Review titled the Graveyard of Command Post that he co authored with two other individuals. 39 00:03:21.240 --> 00:03:25.639 And Matt welcome, Midrats. Yeah, thank you so much. I'll 40 00:03:25.639 --> 00:03:30.560 appreciate it and appreciate the opportunity to kind of talk about the article, talk 41 00:03:30.599 --> 00:03:36.199 about command and control and this large scale combat operations, the environment and in 42 00:03:36.400 --> 00:03:38.919 multip main operations. Is the understanding in the Army. I kind of wanted 43 00:03:38.960 --> 00:03:44.879 to start off give your listeners a little more understanding about my organization kind of 44 00:03:44.879 --> 00:03:50.039 what it does and why this article really is kind of significant coming out of 45 00:03:50.120 --> 00:03:53.520 US. So, the Army Joint Support Team, we're a directorate under the 46 00:03:53.599 --> 00:03:59.800 Army's Mission Command Center of Excellence, which is one of the one of the 47 00:04:00.199 --> 00:04:04.639 centers of Excellence underneath the Army's Combined Arms Center. So if you think about 48 00:04:04.759 --> 00:04:09.039 major Army commands, you have trade DOC, which is kind of our institutional 49 00:04:09.120 --> 00:04:14.039 arm and then underneath yet that you have CATS, which you know is responsible 50 00:04:14.039 --> 00:04:17.800 for integrating doctrine the entire dot NOPF and support of our operations. Mission Command 51 00:04:17.800 --> 00:04:23.680 Center of Excellence is really responsible for C two and my organization is responsible for 52 00:04:23.720 --> 00:04:29.120 integrating ARMYC two into Joint C two, specifically for air operations. And so 53 00:04:29.240 --> 00:04:32.079 if you look at kind of the buyelines of my colleagues, General Slider and 54 00:04:32.160 --> 00:04:36.639 General Beagle, you kind of understand this is really the leadership of the Army 55 00:04:38.160 --> 00:04:42.279 on C two and on Combined Arms Operations, which are which are kind of 56 00:04:42.879 --> 00:04:46.800 fostering this this discussion about command posts, because in the Army we are seeing 57 00:04:46.839 --> 00:04:51.600 that, you know, as we transition from counterinsurgency into the current operating environment. 58 00:04:53.120 --> 00:04:57.079 You know, we have gone through this transition of our operating concepts from 59 00:04:57.240 --> 00:05:00.439 unified land operations to multimin operations. And there were a lot of good reasons 60 00:05:00.480 --> 00:05:02.600 for why we did that. A lot of it had to do with threatened 61 00:05:02.680 --> 00:05:10.279 environments, the recognition and really utilization of all of those domains plus uh, 62 00:05:10.439 --> 00:05:17.839 you know, the dimensions of human information and uh and the material of physical 63 00:05:18.000 --> 00:05:23.639 dimension. And so what we're trying to really articulate with this article is that 64 00:05:23.720 --> 00:05:29.879 we have a real problem in our cqs in our command post right now between 65 00:05:29.959 --> 00:05:36.680 survivability and effectiveness. We did a really good job under Coin of pushing power 66 00:05:36.759 --> 00:05:41.800 down to the lowest possible level where it could interact with the civil populace. 67 00:05:42.199 --> 00:05:45.120 And obviously, you know, we can argue about how effective we were with 68 00:05:45.160 --> 00:05:49.319 overarching coin as a as a as a methodology, UM, but we did 69 00:05:49.360 --> 00:05:55.160 a very good job was kind of pushing that type of CQ capability down to 70 00:05:55.240 --> 00:05:58.759 the lowest possible level to interact with the populace. UM. But that the 71 00:05:59.279 --> 00:06:03.120 outcome of that has been that our our command posts and our C two writ 72 00:06:03.240 --> 00:06:09.519 large are out of balance right now for the operating environment which we find ourselves. 73 00:06:09.519 --> 00:06:13.879 So as we looked at this article, UM, General Slider really be 74 00:06:14.040 --> 00:06:20.199 in the individual responsible for SU two in the army had asked me, had 75 00:06:20.199 --> 00:06:23.319 brought me on board and said, hey, Matt, I need you to 76 00:06:23.399 --> 00:06:30.480 help craft and narratives that highlights this problem, brame that problem and and kind 77 00:06:30.519 --> 00:06:33.639 of put it into the tenants and dimensions of the Army's operating concept. And 78 00:06:33.720 --> 00:06:38.439 let's help propose a solution that can kind of move the discussion forward. So 79 00:06:38.839 --> 00:06:42.160 you know it is it isn't doctrine, it is an article. Um. 80 00:06:42.639 --> 00:06:46.519 But what we try to do is draw up those ideas and get folks in 81 00:06:46.600 --> 00:06:51.160 the Army and elsewhere to stink in terms of what it takes to be successful 82 00:06:51.759 --> 00:06:58.639 from a command post and from a two perspective in multi main operations. Yeah, 83 00:06:58.720 --> 00:07:00.519 but before we go for it, I should point out that the opinions 84 00:07:00.519 --> 00:07:05.160 expressed my mad in this show and in the article he and his co authors 85 00:07:05.399 --> 00:07:13.959 are there are there opinions that don't necessarily reflect the doctrine or interests I mean 86 00:07:13.959 --> 00:07:18.399 not interest the command to which they belonged. So he's a free agent for 87 00:07:18.439 --> 00:07:23.279 this show purpose. Um. One of the things I think we have to 88 00:07:23.279 --> 00:07:27.959 start with is, and this is the problem identified with the with the continuing 89 00:07:28.120 --> 00:07:32.160 large growth of command posts. And I think you've described it pretty well in 90 00:07:32.199 --> 00:07:36.519 the article. Could you kind of kind of set forth what prompts the concerns 91 00:07:38.120 --> 00:07:43.879 U for the US Army and probably for our other services about this this increasing 92 00:07:44.360 --> 00:07:47.959 number of people with have their fingers in the pie and and all the electronic 93 00:07:48.000 --> 00:07:53.120 stuff they bring with that, and why it's why it's a problem and what 94 00:07:53.160 --> 00:07:57.000 we're trying to avoid. We certainly don't. The lessons learn from Ukraine include 95 00:07:57.040 --> 00:08:01.319 not having your senior leadership decapitated, so kind kind of run with it. 96 00:08:01.439 --> 00:08:05.360 Yeah, So so honestly, you know, what we try to do in 97 00:08:05.439 --> 00:08:07.399 the article is kind of phrase the evolution of command posts, you know, 98 00:08:07.480 --> 00:08:11.959 going back to when it was just the commander in the saddle. Obviously, 99 00:08:11.240 --> 00:08:16.240 you know, command posts served the commander in all respects, right, so 100 00:08:16.279 --> 00:08:20.639 it there functionally as a tool to enable his decision making process. Um. 101 00:08:20.639 --> 00:08:24.600 And so as we've gone over over time, over history, you know, 102 00:08:24.639 --> 00:08:31.879 we've gone from you know, very small set piece battles to much larger um 103 00:08:31.080 --> 00:08:35.200 much larger conflicts, world wars, all those types of things. And along 104 00:08:35.240 --> 00:08:43.000 with that we have developed better and more ways of kind of reigning in the 105 00:08:43.120 --> 00:08:46.000 chaos of the warfare. Right, and so we've done that through the proliferation 106 00:08:46.000 --> 00:08:50.759 of staffs. We've done that to automation. You can kind of trace the 107 00:08:50.799 --> 00:08:56.080 technical advancement and the evolution of command posts, you know, going back three 108 00:08:56.159 --> 00:09:00.000 four hundred years to kind of get us to where we're at today, right, 109 00:09:00.039 --> 00:09:05.200 And so you get through you know, the twentieth century, and you're 110 00:09:05.240 --> 00:09:11.120 really getting into some areas where we've gone from basically you know, the maritime 111 00:09:11.159 --> 00:09:13.720 domain, the land domain. Well then you started to have in the air 112 00:09:13.799 --> 00:09:16.679 domain. Okay, so now we've got to think in three dimensions. Now 113 00:09:16.679 --> 00:09:22.799 you start talking about cyber domain and space domain and all this additional stuff that 114 00:09:22.879 --> 00:09:26.759 the commander has to be able to visualize, articulate, be able to direct 115 00:09:26.799 --> 00:09:31.960 his forces. And with all of that, because it comes a bill, 116 00:09:31.120 --> 00:09:37.279 right, he has to, regardless of circumstances, maintain decision dominance throughout right. 117 00:09:37.480 --> 00:09:39.960 And so you know, as we've discussed in the article, that led 118 00:09:41.000 --> 00:09:45.720 to the growth of staff subject matter experts being close at hand because that proximity 119 00:09:45.759 --> 00:09:50.000 will always matter. But then on top of that, you're talking about all 120 00:09:50.039 --> 00:09:54.679 the additional automation, all of the IT infrastructure, all of that that can 121 00:09:54.279 --> 00:09:58.360 really put all of those different multi domain aspects in the hands of the commander 122 00:09:58.399 --> 00:10:03.720 so it can make the best possible decision in the short shortest possible time and 123 00:10:03.759 --> 00:10:07.639 maintain that decision dominance to achieve victory on the battlefield. And over time that 124 00:10:07.799 --> 00:10:13.840 has you know, so technology has has contributed to his survivability in some respect 125 00:10:13.919 --> 00:10:20.000 and it has hindered his survivability in some respects. And we've gone through this 126 00:10:20.039 --> 00:10:26.480 period of about twenty years during during the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan where you 127 00:10:26.559 --> 00:10:33.399 really didn't have that pressure, that external threat environment, pressure to to keep 128 00:10:33.440 --> 00:10:37.720 those command posts small, right, to keep those command posts survivable, because 129 00:10:37.759 --> 00:10:43.519 they were able to deal from essentially a place of sanctuary, whether it was 130 00:10:43.559 --> 00:10:48.159 behind you know, the t wall barriers of you know, major headquarters in 131 00:10:48.159 --> 00:10:52.480 Iraq or Afghanistan, all those type of things. There wasn't necessibly existential threat 132 00:10:52.720 --> 00:10:56.919 to command posts at echelon's above you know, the brigade level. But that 133 00:10:58.039 --> 00:11:03.639 environment has now changed, and both the war in the Goono Carava and the 134 00:11:03.639 --> 00:11:07.200 war obviously in the Ukraine has highlighted that. And so as we wrote the 135 00:11:07.320 --> 00:11:11.519 article, we tried to pull on that that sense of urgency and say, 136 00:11:11.600 --> 00:11:16.200 hey, look here is for the first time in a long time, real 137 00:11:16.240 --> 00:11:22.200 empirical evidence that our command posts are not set for purpose. One thing about 138 00:11:22.279 --> 00:11:28.639 any institution that has habits, tradition or just a lot of bureaucratic inertia, 139 00:11:30.039 --> 00:11:35.600 is it can be immune to depend upon what area you're in. Inconvenient facts 140 00:11:35.960 --> 00:11:41.759 are inconvenient, history are incomplete understanding the little lessons that are there being tapped 141 00:11:41.759 --> 00:11:48.000 on the shoulder to look at. You mentioned the Nogno Correbak battle, and 142 00:11:48.000 --> 00:11:50.039 you know, going one of the favorite examples I could use, because everybody 143 00:11:50.159 --> 00:11:54.000 uses it, is, you know, all the things that we're new during 144 00:11:54.080 --> 00:12:01.279 World War Two, we're actually demonstrated and hinted at during the the Spanish Civil 145 00:12:01.320 --> 00:12:07.639 War. And the Russians obviously knew what happened in a royal Karolbak, but 146 00:12:07.639 --> 00:12:11.679 when they invaded, amongst a lot of things that they perhaps didn't fully hoist 147 00:12:11.720 --> 00:12:16.279 on board. They're also in Syria. You know, the Russians aren't like 148 00:12:16.279 --> 00:12:20.320 a lot of militaries in the world that haven't had combat operations recently. They 149 00:12:20.360 --> 00:12:28.519 have, but they also have that tradition and that mindset, in that bureaucratic 150 00:12:28.559 --> 00:12:35.000 and leadership culture that manifest itself in such a way that they learned the hard 151 00:12:35.000 --> 00:12:41.960 way themselves with the invasion of Ukraine. And you start off your article, 152 00:12:41.039 --> 00:12:46.600 I thought, with a really eye opening demonstration of this that brought together four 153 00:12:46.679 --> 00:12:54.600 or five different threads for the listeners. Describe that what happened at Shoraba. 154 00:12:54.320 --> 00:13:01.960 I think I pronounced it right. Probably not not just the less that that 155 00:13:01.159 --> 00:13:07.320 came from that, but how that one event had ripple effects throughout that theater. 156 00:13:09.240 --> 00:13:13.799 Yeah, absolutely so. The village of Churnabyevka is in the Kershan Oblast 157 00:13:15.159 --> 00:13:18.799 on the banks of the Neiper River. UM. So if you recall, 158 00:13:18.200 --> 00:13:22.759 like the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, it was a multi access invasion, 159 00:13:22.639 --> 00:13:28.080 with the Cursed On Avenue being kind of one of the southern approaches. Um, 160 00:13:28.639 --> 00:13:35.960 they were able to the Russians were able to advance across the the Nipa 161 00:13:35.039 --> 00:13:39.639 River uh and and kind of established a little bit of a foothold in Kershon 162 00:13:39.759 --> 00:13:46.480 in Cherna by Eevka. But what they were opposed by, obviously was a 163 00:13:46.639 --> 00:13:56.120 very determined Ukrainian army uh and that Ukrainian army had was reinforced by additional support 164 00:13:56.360 --> 00:14:03.399 from the US and its allies to provide a level of of ISR coupled with 165 00:14:03.879 --> 00:14:11.480 you know, uh moitoring munitions, drone capabilities, all of this additional kit, 166 00:14:11.679 --> 00:14:16.919 despite the fact that didn't have at that point really a particularly strong air 167 00:14:16.480 --> 00:14:20.639 arm, but they had the intelligence UH to be able to deliver effects in 168 00:14:20.720 --> 00:14:28.200 a very systematic manner against those UH centers of gravity that the Russians needed to 169 00:14:28.279 --> 00:14:35.639 be able to UH consolidate their games and push that that initial UM, that 170 00:14:35.879 --> 00:14:41.080 that initial U lodgment outwards from persons. They were never able to really do 171 00:14:41.279 --> 00:14:46.440 that on the western side of the Nieva River because they were never able to 172 00:14:46.559 --> 00:14:52.759 get the commander control straight. So the Russians when they were having challenges at 173 00:14:52.120 --> 00:14:56.799 Cherboa Cherabayovka, they do what Russians sometimes do. Then they don't have the 174 00:14:56.840 --> 00:15:03.440 same side of mission command seek philosophies that the West does. They put leadership 175 00:15:03.679 --> 00:15:05.759 down at the point of the problem. Right. So now you suddenly started 176 00:15:05.799 --> 00:15:11.240 seeing generals from the battlefield. You started seeing a lot of of senior leaders 177 00:15:11.519 --> 00:15:18.960 kind of coagulate, coordinating their operations in forward command posts UM. And some 178 00:15:20.080 --> 00:15:22.559 of that obviously is a result of you know, kind of the way that 179 00:15:22.679 --> 00:15:28.120 they conduct operations. But the problem with a lot of that is that those 180 00:15:28.360 --> 00:15:33.360 all of those command posts were very visible because of the ISSR support that the 181 00:15:33.559 --> 00:15:37.720 Ukrainians were getting from the US from the native allies UH, and they were 182 00:15:37.759 --> 00:15:43.240 able to very quickly reduce those those command posts right um, delivering fires and 183 00:15:43.279 --> 00:15:52.279 effects, sometimes through you know uabs, sometimes through UH coordinated UH fires from 184 00:15:52.519 --> 00:15:56.080 from from mass artillery battalions. But it was all, it was all. 185 00:15:56.320 --> 00:16:02.120 It created a very lethal, very hyperactive environment um which was very difficult for 186 00:16:02.639 --> 00:16:04.759 the Russians to kind of deal with. So they were never able to kind 187 00:16:04.799 --> 00:16:10.720 of develop the type of momentum that would be necessary to kind of push forward 188 00:16:10.799 --> 00:16:14.320 from that. And so the Russians when they would lose a command post, 189 00:16:14.440 --> 00:16:18.720 would you know, follow up failure with with more failures, so they would 190 00:16:18.759 --> 00:16:23.279 compound their their efforts. And really what you saw in Turnabayevka was a series 191 00:16:23.919 --> 00:16:29.879 of command posts getting struck at all echelons, you know, from from the 192 00:16:30.440 --> 00:16:33.759 the from the senior levels where you were having lieutenant generals getting hit you know, 193 00:16:33.879 --> 00:16:38.919 down to you know, the regimental levels within the divisions down though, 194 00:16:40.000 --> 00:16:44.720 so there was once you took away that C two structure, it was very 195 00:16:44.799 --> 00:16:48.960 difficult for the Russians to coordinate any sort of large scale combat operations which would 196 00:16:48.960 --> 00:16:53.120 have had any success in the Ukraine. Um So, so you saw that 197 00:16:53.840 --> 00:16:59.039 and Turno Bayevka is obviously a very unique case study because it happened to so 198 00:16:59.399 --> 00:17:03.559 many and posts in such close proximity. But you've seen that reflected throughout the 199 00:17:03.640 --> 00:17:07.680 rest of the Ukraine as well. And then in addition to that, you 200 00:17:07.759 --> 00:17:12.160 know you continue to see that playout. You may not necessarily be seeing all 201 00:17:12.279 --> 00:17:17.039 of the generals getting hit the way we did in the first three or four 202 00:17:17.079 --> 00:17:19.599 months, because you know, the Russians are adversary. They learned lessons too, 203 00:17:21.319 --> 00:17:25.960 but this limited ability for them to conduct commanding contull is a result of 204 00:17:26.519 --> 00:17:30.400 the highly lethal, hyperactive environment that they're finding themselves in and the ability to 205 00:17:30.839 --> 00:17:37.519 leverage outsourced ISSR effectively and US capability to make sure that there really is no 206 00:17:37.640 --> 00:17:44.079 sanctuary on the battlefield anymore. Yeah. One of the stunning things about your 207 00:17:44.200 --> 00:17:51.640 article was the images from Fort Irwin of the electronic signature of the of the 208 00:17:52.039 --> 00:17:56.640 of the command post undergoing training there. And those of us who have been 209 00:17:56.640 --> 00:18:00.079 around a while, when we used to do transits in the name across the 210 00:18:00.160 --> 00:18:04.759 Pacific and other places, and we would go totally under emission control, we 211 00:18:06.000 --> 00:18:11.359 shut everything down and try and reduce our emission signature. Now we could communicate 212 00:18:11.440 --> 00:18:15.799 a lot of other ways, but um, what what and if if the 213 00:18:15.960 --> 00:18:19.400 army is going to try and focus on reducing these signatures so that you guys 214 00:18:19.440 --> 00:18:23.119 are on these big footprints and I assume try and be able to hide in 215 00:18:23.160 --> 00:18:27.119 the ordinary clutter of the battle, uh and the other units out there? 216 00:18:27.680 --> 00:18:32.599 Uh what what? What if you could say, so without revealing any great 217 00:18:32.680 --> 00:18:36.240 state secrets, what kind of what kind of things are you looking at to 218 00:18:36.319 --> 00:18:40.759 reduce the signature of these the command posts that we will have. Well, 219 00:18:40.880 --> 00:18:45.359 I think the first step is just having awareness, right of what that signature 220 00:18:45.400 --> 00:18:48.519 actually looks like. So you know, everything you see there in terms of 221 00:18:48.599 --> 00:18:52.240 the year, the electromagnetic signature of our our command post, we weren't really 222 00:18:52.319 --> 00:18:57.279 necessarily looking at that, you know, five ten years ago, right, 223 00:18:57.799 --> 00:19:02.359 Um, we were, you know, and in many cases five ten years 224 00:19:02.359 --> 00:19:04.920 ago, we would have brigades go out to the National Training Center. So 225 00:19:06.000 --> 00:19:08.359 that's that's what the National Training Center is really good at training, is our 226 00:19:08.359 --> 00:19:12.119 brigade level formations. But they would go out there and you know, they 227 00:19:12.200 --> 00:19:18.839 may not even put up camouflage nets, right, And so there's the army 228 00:19:18.000 --> 00:19:23.559 in general has gone through this kind of do change in terms of understanding, 229 00:19:25.000 --> 00:19:29.960 Okay, this is a highly lethal environment that we're now going to be having 230 00:19:30.000 --> 00:19:33.720 a face and we need to look at all of our signatures and how do 231 00:19:33.799 --> 00:19:40.039 we go about you know, masking those right, whether it's distribution or you 232 00:19:40.119 --> 00:19:45.559 know, additional camouflage. You know, we've we've always kind of had camouflage 233 00:19:45.640 --> 00:19:48.599 ending, but we're now paying a lot closer attention to what our electrical signature 234 00:19:48.720 --> 00:19:53.559 is looking like. You know, what our noise and visual signatures are looking 235 00:19:53.640 --> 00:19:57.079 like. You know, those things are important, and we also have to 236 00:19:57.119 --> 00:20:00.759 think about it in terms of not just what is the footprint of the command 237 00:20:02.000 --> 00:20:04.680 post for the future going to look like, but what are those other tells 238 00:20:04.759 --> 00:20:10.240 that are going to lead people to where our critical command post infrastructure is, 239 00:20:10.279 --> 00:20:14.759 whether it's logistics, whether it's you know, additional support, all of those 240 00:20:14.920 --> 00:20:21.640 signatures that we have that the forest worth of of of antennas, you know, 241 00:20:22.200 --> 00:20:26.519 those are keys that an indicators that that the adversary can clew in on 242 00:20:26.680 --> 00:20:30.400 to to to enable a strike against us. So the things that I would 243 00:20:30.400 --> 00:20:34.440 expect to see and I don't know where we're at in terms of the development 244 00:20:34.480 --> 00:20:37.720 of the pipeline is because first of all, our command posts have to get 245 00:20:37.839 --> 00:20:41.079 more mobile, right. Um, we went through this period where we were 246 00:20:41.160 --> 00:20:45.519 using these huge drash tents and used to call them tak mahles whatnot, and 247 00:20:47.000 --> 00:20:52.079 you would coagulate your entire division or core staff inside these things, and it 248 00:20:52.240 --> 00:20:56.519 just made for the hugest, most comfortable but juicy target ever. Um. 249 00:20:56.000 --> 00:21:00.759 So we're going to have to, you know, scale down the size of 250 00:21:00.799 --> 00:21:03.400 our command posts and we're going to have to make those things more mobile because 251 00:21:03.440 --> 00:21:04.519 if you've ever put up like a rash in the desert, you know, 252 00:21:04.640 --> 00:21:08.200 it probably takes me about forty eight hours to get in position. You know, 253 00:21:08.279 --> 00:21:11.960 I'm using round numbers. But the challenge is obviously, you know one 254 00:21:11.960 --> 00:21:15.559 of those things are up mobile at all, right, and as the second 255 00:21:15.599 --> 00:21:19.480 piece is, you know, once they're in position, they offered no protection 256 00:21:19.559 --> 00:21:22.960 whatsoever. Right, So you know, one five rounds, one up five 257 00:21:25.319 --> 00:21:29.160 fragmentation, we'll go right through you know, anything that that's out there in 258 00:21:29.240 --> 00:21:30.359 that turn of setup. So we've got to figure out how do we harden 259 00:21:30.440 --> 00:21:33.880 these things, how do we make the more mobile, how do we reduce 260 00:21:33.960 --> 00:21:38.559 that signature in terms of electromagnetic emissions, in terms of the noise emissions, 261 00:21:38.720 --> 00:21:44.359 light emissions, and now as they're looking at you know, even quantum capabilities 262 00:21:44.640 --> 00:21:51.240 like being able to trace the movements of organizations and the movements of vehicles based 263 00:21:51.480 --> 00:21:53.440 at the atomic level. Right, that's kind of what we're looking at with 264 00:21:53.559 --> 00:21:57.519 the quantum signatures. We're going to have to figure out how do we either 265 00:21:57.720 --> 00:22:03.200 mask those signatures so that you know, our adversaries can't see them, or 266 00:22:04.400 --> 00:22:08.279 distribute them to the point where they just kind of blend into the normal fabric 267 00:22:08.359 --> 00:22:15.319 of what else is out there in terms of battlefield clutter. One of the 268 00:22:15.400 --> 00:22:18.279 things that kept hitting me as I read the article is, yes, it's 269 00:22:18.400 --> 00:22:25.160 very army focused, as one would expect, but the lessons and the concepts 270 00:22:26.039 --> 00:22:32.359 day every maritime and air commander needs to be thinking along the same lines, 271 00:22:33.279 --> 00:22:37.160 because you know, we're talking about precision fires and a lot of examples that 272 00:22:37.319 --> 00:22:41.359 we see from the Russia Ukrainian War. When you back up and you look 273 00:22:41.400 --> 00:22:45.119 at other potential theaters, especially those in the Pacific west of the International Dateline, 274 00:22:47.079 --> 00:22:52.279 you have adversaries with precision fires that go through not just this short range 275 00:22:52.799 --> 00:23:00.319 but intermediate and medium range ballistic missile range that brings a threat on the hope. 276 00:23:00.319 --> 00:23:02.119 And I don't have to tell you this, but you know, one 277 00:23:02.119 --> 00:23:06.799 of the things you always say, you know, don't don't put your airfields 278 00:23:07.039 --> 00:23:11.720 under your enemies artillery. It's the same idea. If they if they can 279 00:23:11.799 --> 00:23:15.279 reach you and they can find you, they can I And it's it's a 280 00:23:15.359 --> 00:23:18.200 balance. It's one of the things we've talked about in other contexts. Here 281 00:23:18.279 --> 00:23:23.359 is the eternal battle between um efficiency and effectiveness. And I think you also 282 00:23:23.400 --> 00:23:27.480 outline the article well that as we look at this challenge, there's some things 283 00:23:27.559 --> 00:23:30.839 you know, you just can't get rid of, but you've got to find 284 00:23:30.920 --> 00:23:37.279 the right balance between effective and survivable. And there is on the Navy side 285 00:23:37.319 --> 00:23:41.240 of the house, I know it is a joint project, there's this desire 286 00:23:41.319 --> 00:23:47.559 to have complete multi domain awareness basically for the for the people up high. 287 00:23:47.799 --> 00:23:51.440 But to do that you have to have reach back. There's a lot of 288 00:23:52.039 --> 00:23:55.519 electronics, a lot of support to do that. And so the commander is 289 00:23:55.519 --> 00:23:56.720 going to have a need for and I'm going to quote a little bit from 290 00:23:56.759 --> 00:24:02.359 your article, quote a commander's need for control of knowledge across all these areas, 291 00:24:02.759 --> 00:24:07.880 creating demand for human and technical decision support tools end quote. And then 292 00:24:07.039 --> 00:24:12.960 a little bit later on it says, quote to increase survivability, commanders sought 293 00:24:14.000 --> 00:24:18.200 to protect their command post by reducing their size, hardening them, splitting them 294 00:24:18.319 --> 00:24:22.720 up, camouflaging them, increasing their mobility, and actively defending them against all 295 00:24:22.799 --> 00:24:26.680 manner of threats, including air, cyber and electronic attack. End of quote. 296 00:24:26.200 --> 00:24:30.519 Now to do that while also you have this institutional desire that people will 297 00:24:30.559 --> 00:24:36.160 have been back when I was a six guy in the late nineties, it 298 00:24:36.319 --> 00:24:40.519 was even there that we want to have this all domain where you can't have 299 00:24:40.799 --> 00:24:45.640 both. So you have to have a way to get that compromise there. 300 00:24:45.720 --> 00:24:49.359 And you use a phrase that's been used maybe a little bit too much, 301 00:24:49.519 --> 00:24:56.599 mostly at the unit tactical level level mission command. If you want to upscale 302 00:24:56.680 --> 00:25:03.759 that a bit to the in theater operational operational level mission command, is it 303 00:25:03.839 --> 00:25:10.440 going to require a rethink or a change of expectations in order to do kind 304 00:25:10.480 --> 00:25:14.359 of what you outlined to command posts, because you still have to have that 305 00:25:14.519 --> 00:25:18.440 function, but to make it such that it can survive more than D plus 306 00:25:18.519 --> 00:25:22.559 one. Yeah, and I think that's a good point. You know, 307 00:25:22.839 --> 00:25:27.119 we look at in the Army because of the complexity and the friction inherent in 308 00:25:27.160 --> 00:25:33.599 the land domain, you know, mission commands, you know, and the 309 00:25:33.839 --> 00:25:37.640 article just you know, gives it lays out the Army's definition for mission command, 310 00:25:37.200 --> 00:25:41.720 but it really provides us with the ability to kind of, um make 311 00:25:41.839 --> 00:25:45.519 the decisions closer to the point of need, right, we kind of push 312 00:25:45.599 --> 00:25:52.640 authority down, uh into decentralized approach to executing operations UM. And we do 313 00:25:52.759 --> 00:25:57.359 that out of necessity because you know, historically speaking, you know, we 314 00:25:57.559 --> 00:26:04.240 can't be a sure that our commanders will have the ability to understand everything that's 315 00:26:04.240 --> 00:26:10.599 going down at the lowest level. And so we have over the course of 316 00:26:10.680 --> 00:26:12.920 the least you know, twenty years, we got into the situation where commanders 317 00:26:12.920 --> 00:26:17.880 suddenly were able to see kind of what's going down at the tactical level. 318 00:26:18.519 --> 00:26:23.079 And so we we acknowledge that mission command as an approach to command and control 319 00:26:23.839 --> 00:26:29.359 that we're going to have to continue to utilize in the land domain. But 320 00:26:29.480 --> 00:26:33.000 we also recognize that that the air component is adopting mission command as well. 321 00:26:33.079 --> 00:26:37.119 So if you go back and you look at Air Force doctoral publication one which 322 00:26:37.160 --> 00:26:41.559 came down I believe it was their last adjustment to that which I believe it 323 00:26:41.640 --> 00:26:47.240 was in twenty one. Twenty twenty one, they introduced mission commands kind of 324 00:26:47.279 --> 00:26:52.160 in the place where they used to have centralized control, decentral decentralized execution, 325 00:26:52.599 --> 00:26:57.200 which was their approach to air operations and command and control. They introduced that 326 00:26:57.599 --> 00:27:03.079 because they could no longer be assured that the Air Operations Center, which were 327 00:27:03.160 --> 00:27:07.279 those central nodes for the execution of the air tasking order to a CEO to 328 00:27:07.359 --> 00:27:11.799 spend all those pieces that kind of allow them to conduct centralized control. UM, 329 00:27:12.000 --> 00:27:17.640 we're going to be survivable UM in an environment such as we're facing right 330 00:27:17.720 --> 00:27:22.000 now, where you do have things like long range hypersonic weapons which can basically 331 00:27:22.119 --> 00:27:26.480 reach any AOC. You know, within a given theater, right you're gonna 332 00:27:26.480 --> 00:27:33.279 have adversaries that have capabilities that are going to be very difficult to UM to 333 00:27:33.440 --> 00:27:37.640 defeat, and so you have to assume that there's going to be some attrition 334 00:27:37.920 --> 00:27:41.880 in terms of the command and control. And so that's kind of the challenge 335 00:27:41.880 --> 00:27:45.079 that we face when we're looking at command posts or vivability is um it's not 336 00:27:45.279 --> 00:27:49.559 just you know, how do you mask, but how you maintain the same 337 00:27:49.720 --> 00:27:55.200 level of effectiveness in an environment where you're you're having to do the trade off 338 00:27:55.279 --> 00:28:00.000 between survivability and effectiveness. We propose in the article a way to kind of 339 00:28:00.039 --> 00:28:03.759 break that paradigm, and from our standpoint, or at least from from the 340 00:28:03.799 --> 00:28:07.599 author standpoint, kind of the way to do that, uh, really kind 341 00:28:07.599 --> 00:28:15.720 of puts a greater focus and priority on the information dimension, which I fully 342 00:28:15.720 --> 00:28:22.839 acknowledge is hard sometimes for the maritime component to to kind of adopt because of 343 00:28:22.920 --> 00:28:26.920 the challenge of being at sea and not necessarily having you know, land based 344 00:28:26.920 --> 00:28:30.160 servers and all this other kind of additional infrastructure that the air component, the 345 00:28:30.519 --> 00:28:34.279 land component has you know, kind of inherent in how we conduct operations. 346 00:28:34.319 --> 00:28:40.759 It's very much harder in my understanding, for the for the maritime component to 347 00:28:40.880 --> 00:28:45.319 do that while at sea. But that said, you know, we look 348 00:28:45.359 --> 00:28:47.880 at that as kind of the way in which we kind of break out of 349 00:28:47.960 --> 00:28:52.440 that survivability effectiveness paradigm and kind of you know, get us to the point 350 00:28:52.599 --> 00:29:00.559 where we can conduct distribute operations or command posts at different national ones can truly 351 00:29:00.599 --> 00:29:03.279 be fundable where we can kind of allow a brigade commanders to operate out of 352 00:29:03.279 --> 00:29:07.640 the division commanders or excuse me, allowing court commander to operate either the division 353 00:29:07.640 --> 00:29:11.079 comanders CP or the division commanders to operate out of a brigade commander CP. 354 00:29:11.799 --> 00:29:17.480 Those ideas, if you don't have the infrastructure and the it UH and the 355 00:29:17.599 --> 00:29:22.160 information capability to support that, you're you're really locked into kind of the paradigm 356 00:29:22.240 --> 00:29:26.720 that we've always historically found ourselves. UM. And so that that's a bit 357 00:29:26.720 --> 00:29:29.519 of the challenge. You know, I recognize that a lot of the stuff 358 00:29:29.559 --> 00:29:33.799 that we talked about in the article or are kind of you know, people 359 00:29:33.880 --> 00:29:36.839 be well, that's you know, that's infeasible. The technology is not there. 360 00:29:37.680 --> 00:29:40.440 It isn't it's not right. So, um, you know, we 361 00:29:40.480 --> 00:29:44.039 talked about virtual reality, we talk about augmented reality and the role that that's 362 00:29:44.079 --> 00:29:47.799 going to play in the future in terms of command and control U. But 363 00:29:47.880 --> 00:29:51.480 it really comes down to like, how do we how do we maintain a 364 00:29:51.720 --> 00:30:00.359 level of effectiveness necessary to sustain decision dominance, um, while not why fallen 365 00:30:00.400 --> 00:30:03.160 into the survivability track. That's kind of as we see the challenger. So 366 00:30:03.200 --> 00:30:07.920 I don't know if that answered your question or not. Well, it answers 367 00:30:07.960 --> 00:30:11.039 a lot of questions. One of the one of the questions I have. 368 00:30:11.200 --> 00:30:14.039 You know, you talked about it just now, and you talked about it 369 00:30:14.079 --> 00:30:18.160 in the article that we had such great communications structures, which is why we 370 00:30:18.279 --> 00:30:22.759 built these massive command posts and other devices. Where the were you know, 371 00:30:22.839 --> 00:30:26.880 I mean, gosh, you in the Vietnam War we had the president United 372 00:30:26.880 --> 00:30:32.359 States choosing targets. I mean, uh, how do we get in a 373 00:30:32.480 --> 00:30:36.480 mission command environment which I understand is driven, should be driven? Uh? 374 00:30:36.559 --> 00:30:40.880 And you correct me if I'm wrong by the commander's intent? How do we 375 00:30:41.039 --> 00:30:45.240 get how do we get the senior people to back off a little bit and 376 00:30:47.279 --> 00:30:52.559 not not micromanage and let the let the people in the field do their job. 377 00:30:52.839 --> 00:30:55.720 And if the commander's intent is clear, it shouldn't matter. I hate 378 00:30:55.720 --> 00:31:00.039 to say this, It shouldn't matter if the if the echelon above the you 379 00:31:00.079 --> 00:31:02.319 know, it gets wiped out, that we still know what we're supposed to 380 00:31:02.359 --> 00:31:04.960 be doing. Am I off base here? No? I think you're I 381 00:31:06.000 --> 00:31:08.400 think you're right on point in it. And I think that same challenge is 382 00:31:08.440 --> 00:31:11.880 felt by by all the services equally, right, So, you know, 383 00:31:14.160 --> 00:31:18.400 I think it comes back to commanders need to kind of understand what their role 384 00:31:18.680 --> 00:31:23.599 is within the capabilities and limitations that are made available to them. There are 385 00:31:23.759 --> 00:31:26.920 certain things that you're going to want the President of the United States, you 386 00:31:27.000 --> 00:31:30.440 know, making a decision on what targets are going to you know, we're 387 00:31:30.480 --> 00:31:36.440 going to strike as a country, right in terms of capabilities that have the 388 00:31:36.519 --> 00:31:41.640 ability to escalate warfare indirections that nationally we don't necessarily want to go. Those 389 00:31:41.640 --> 00:31:45.640 are decisions that you know, he should probably control at his level. And 390 00:31:45.720 --> 00:31:48.119 so what you've kind of kind of get to is a bit of a sliding 391 00:31:48.279 --> 00:31:52.119 scale of mission command where you say, okay, yes, we know you 392 00:31:52.240 --> 00:31:56.799 have all of these different capabilities at your level. You know, we're going 393 00:31:56.880 --> 00:32:01.880 to give you access to be able to utilize you know, these different multidimensional 394 00:32:01.960 --> 00:32:07.799 capabilities, but only in certain in certain contexts. Right. Um, So 395 00:32:07.119 --> 00:32:09.839 if you look at, you know, some of the capabilities that are coming 396 00:32:09.920 --> 00:32:13.720 on board for the army right now, you have the multi demand hask Force 397 00:32:14.079 --> 00:32:16.880 and it's multi Main Effects Battalion, which has like access to cyber and space 398 00:32:16.920 --> 00:32:21.960 and some of these different things without the proper guard rails, without you know, 399 00:32:22.119 --> 00:32:24.799 from a fire supporters perspective, the proper fire support coordination measures, you 400 00:32:24.839 --> 00:32:32.680 know, maneuver coordination measures or whatever multimain effects coordination measures associated with those particular 401 00:32:32.799 --> 00:32:37.400 assets. You know, you can get out of your ahead of your skis 402 00:32:37.640 --> 00:32:43.119 relatively quickly. Um And so even within mission commands, it's not a free 403 00:32:43.160 --> 00:32:45.359 for all, you know, it is bounded by the commanders intent and that 404 00:32:45.519 --> 00:32:51.960 commanders intent and reflected in the various control measures that ensure that that people are 405 00:32:52.480 --> 00:32:55.039 do stay within their length. But I do acknowledge that, you know, 406 00:32:55.200 --> 00:33:00.880 sometimes the commanders don't understand their role in some of those situation and find themselves, 407 00:33:01.519 --> 00:33:04.960 you know, getting fixated. You know, we used to call it 408 00:33:05.039 --> 00:33:07.119 during the Iraq where we used to call it predator porn. They get fixated 409 00:33:07.720 --> 00:33:15.000 on the TV show that's on their their you know, command post display showing 410 00:33:15.200 --> 00:33:17.640 a predator about rady to strike a vehicle or something like that, and not 411 00:33:17.799 --> 00:33:22.079 focused on the things that as a commander they should really be focused on, 412 00:33:22.400 --> 00:33:25.200 which is, you know, maybe operational level things, high taxicle level things, 413 00:33:25.599 --> 00:33:30.759 those kind of things that they should really understand. I like to think 414 00:33:30.240 --> 00:33:36.720 that that will kind of take care of itself as the complexities of dealing with 415 00:33:36.880 --> 00:33:42.640 large scale operations overwhelm the commander's ability to do that kind of micromanagement. I 416 00:33:42.799 --> 00:33:45.160 like to think that's going to happen. I'm not entirely confident that. I 417 00:33:45.200 --> 00:33:47.799 think that's going to be person specific. And you're going to have those commanders 418 00:33:47.839 --> 00:33:51.640 that do it really well, and you're going to have those commanders that are 419 00:33:52.079 --> 00:33:57.880 hopefully going to find themselves out of a job for doing it portly. And 420 00:33:58.799 --> 00:34:01.599 back when I was a NATO guy doing an army guy's job, and we 421 00:34:01.680 --> 00:34:10.079 would do exercises and these late Cold War bunkers way underground where you literally are 422 00:34:10.119 --> 00:34:15.639 designed that oh yeah, we could have a Hiroshima sized new clickoff about one 423 00:34:15.719 --> 00:34:19.639 hundred meters from the entrance and we'll be okay. I mean, they're pretty 424 00:34:19.639 --> 00:34:23.280 well designed. And then you'd go to Kabul and you look at the watch 425 00:34:23.360 --> 00:34:28.679 floor and you go, okay, one of those dumb one hundred and seven 426 00:34:28.719 --> 00:34:32.360 millimeter rockets gets lucky, kind of like the Iraqi's got lucky with the scud 427 00:34:34.079 --> 00:34:37.880 at the end of the Gulf War. In this place, disappears what's planned 428 00:34:37.119 --> 00:34:40.360 B, and everybody would just look at each other and we go, we 429 00:34:40.480 --> 00:34:44.840 have no plan B. I was like, well, that's interesting. I'm 430 00:34:44.840 --> 00:34:47.760 sure somebody did somewhere, but nobody on the watch floor actually did. And 431 00:34:49.880 --> 00:34:54.639 kind of the question I had is the Russians have gone through in Ukraine multiple 432 00:34:54.760 --> 00:35:00.679 cycles of attention on deck. Here's the general reef them poof, he and 433 00:35:00.760 --> 00:35:07.039 his staff are gone. What have we seen from the Russians as with each 434 00:35:07.119 --> 00:35:12.880 iteration as a as a learning institution of learning army. I assume because they 435 00:35:12.960 --> 00:35:15.039 thought this is going to be one of those seventy two hour wars that they 436 00:35:15.079 --> 00:35:19.519 were probably caught flat footed when they got punched in the face a few times 437 00:35:19.559 --> 00:35:24.000 at the senior leadership level. But what have we seen how they've adjusted their 438 00:35:24.320 --> 00:35:30.559 their approach to command in the field. Well, I think what we've seen 439 00:35:31.079 --> 00:35:37.559 is you're not seeing the massive conferences of senior Russian leaders getting together the way 440 00:35:37.599 --> 00:35:42.960 they had been in the early months of this thing. They've learned some lessons 441 00:35:43.039 --> 00:35:47.480 too, clearly, um, but I think you know that has come at 442 00:35:47.519 --> 00:35:52.679 a pretty steep cost for them. They've they've lost some from some what I 443 00:35:52.760 --> 00:35:58.199 think many people would consider a kind of first line leadership in the course of 444 00:35:58.320 --> 00:36:01.719 that happening, and it has had some significant attrition in what we would consider 445 00:36:01.840 --> 00:36:05.760 first line units, right, so you know, just off you know, 446 00:36:05.920 --> 00:36:09.920 top of mind, the first Startist tank army was very highly regarded in the 447 00:36:10.000 --> 00:36:15.320 West prior to the war, and that has been you know, essentially made 448 00:36:15.440 --> 00:36:19.639 combat and effective in the first year of this war. So you know, 449 00:36:19.760 --> 00:36:24.039 if you can really start taking off, you know, key pieces centers of 450 00:36:24.079 --> 00:36:29.760 gravity, you know, taking those pieces off the table has an effect. 451 00:36:30.039 --> 00:36:32.400 Part of the reason why we're in this level of attrition warfare is that both 452 00:36:32.440 --> 00:36:37.440 sides are exhausted at this point, right, um, and we're not necessarily 453 00:36:37.559 --> 00:36:40.599 maybe able to you know, provide our allies with the stuff that they need 454 00:36:42.400 --> 00:36:45.320 quickly enough in order to be able to tip the scales and kind of go 455 00:36:45.440 --> 00:36:49.079 back over to the offense. We anticipate that's going to happen later on this 456 00:36:49.159 --> 00:36:52.800 spring, and we should see a decent a decent counter offensive coming out of 457 00:36:52.800 --> 00:36:58.000 the Ukrainians here, you know, really any time now. But the challenge 458 00:36:58.039 --> 00:37:01.159 obviously is you know, with with a with an organization, with with a 459 00:37:01.599 --> 00:37:06.519 UM, with a country like Russia, with the country like China, they're 460 00:37:06.559 --> 00:37:10.000 pretty deep, right, they have a deep bench, right um. And 461 00:37:10.119 --> 00:37:15.159 it's one where we're going to have to be able to continue to go back 462 00:37:15.199 --> 00:37:19.400 and pound them right until we can kind of get to them to the point 463 00:37:19.440 --> 00:37:22.400 where where you know, they just they don't have anything more, can't contribute 464 00:37:22.400 --> 00:37:25.760 anything more to fight. UM. But that truly is a nutrition style of 465 00:37:25.840 --> 00:37:29.559 warfare. And it's not you know, it's not something we want to get 466 00:37:29.599 --> 00:37:31.880 ourselves, you know, involved in if we can possibly help it. So 467 00:37:31.920 --> 00:37:36.920 I don't love that it's actual question or not. But but yeah, that's 468 00:37:37.000 --> 00:37:38.239 kind of my take on and do is that's where we're at right now. 469 00:37:38.400 --> 00:37:44.960 The Russians are are um, are improving, UM, but you know kind 470 00:37:45.000 --> 00:37:49.880 of they they they paid a price for some poor decisions up front. And 471 00:37:50.519 --> 00:37:52.360 you know, I loud it to this in the article as well. You 472 00:37:52.480 --> 00:37:57.559 know, as the as the Americans and as the West UH in the mid 473 00:37:57.679 --> 00:38:00.679 two thousands kind of pushed all their combat ability down to the brigade level to 474 00:38:01.239 --> 00:38:07.800 really to conduct expeditionary operations you know in the Middle East and Afghanstand and elsewhere. 475 00:38:07.199 --> 00:38:12.119 Um, the Russians is the same thing, only instead of their you 476 00:38:12.239 --> 00:38:16.599 know, uh expeditionary operations being too you know, Iraq and Afghanistan. While 477 00:38:16.599 --> 00:38:21.599 they were to Syria or they were to Georgia or they order these other places 478 00:38:21.679 --> 00:38:25.559 live and so forth right. What that did was it pushed capability away from 479 00:38:25.679 --> 00:38:30.719 those formations of the division and core level and the command post the division and 480 00:38:30.760 --> 00:38:35.840 core level that would be necessary for conducting and coordinating large scale combat operations. 481 00:38:36.239 --> 00:38:37.840 So that was kind of, you know, where they took it in the 482 00:38:37.960 --> 00:38:44.360 teeth, you know, going directly into the Ukraine with a command post and 483 00:38:44.400 --> 00:38:46.719 a F two structure that was not fit to large scale combat operations. So 484 00:38:46.800 --> 00:38:52.559 they're they're redesigning as they go, and I think we'll see going toward what 485 00:38:52.679 --> 00:38:59.239 the results that are going to be. I love the term predator forum. 486 00:39:00.039 --> 00:39:05.079 I remember during the coast, during the Coast of Adventure, UH, that 487 00:39:05.239 --> 00:39:07.880 was also a factor then, and I think we called it pretty much the 488 00:39:07.960 --> 00:39:12.440 same thing. But you know, because the big boss can see what's going 489 00:39:12.480 --> 00:39:15.440 on in the ground and he wants to direct where things go. Um and 490 00:39:15.639 --> 00:39:22.000 that that I want to get into that you talk about data driven the process 491 00:39:22.199 --> 00:39:30.679 and how we need to move away from the current UH structure into into cloud 492 00:39:30.920 --> 00:39:32.960 and AI and all kinds of stuff. Can you kind of expound on that 493 00:39:34.079 --> 00:39:37.880 little bit? Yeah? Absolutely, And so I don't want to say like, 494 00:39:37.360 --> 00:39:40.199 well, the armies or the military doesn't use data, but you know, 495 00:39:40.920 --> 00:39:43.880 we do use data. We use it all the time. We're just 496 00:39:43.960 --> 00:39:46.360 not very efficient at using it. I guess that's what I'm saying. So 497 00:39:46.840 --> 00:39:51.880 you know right now, uh, you know, with their server stacks and 498 00:39:51.960 --> 00:39:55.400 all that kind of stuff, there's a lot of infrastructure associated with getting access 499 00:39:55.480 --> 00:40:00.119 to that data. UM. And you know, there is the potential that 500 00:40:00.920 --> 00:40:06.400 you know, data that we need to make decisions, UM, whether it's 501 00:40:06.760 --> 00:40:09.920 whether it's data for for petting targets, or whether it's whether it's data that 502 00:40:10.000 --> 00:40:15.239 we need for other types of decisions. We just don't have a system set 503 00:40:15.320 --> 00:40:20.000 up where we can easily access that data when we need to, you know, 504 00:40:20.400 --> 00:40:22.159 in order to be able to make those decisions in the timeline OUs man. 505 00:40:22.719 --> 00:40:28.440 So utilizing things like the combat cloud um, you know, as an 506 00:40:28.480 --> 00:40:31.400 example, utilizing different techniques that we you know, we bring in from you 507 00:40:31.440 --> 00:40:35.239 know, the cviiling community. We have to be a little bit careful with 508 00:40:35.320 --> 00:40:39.440 that because you know, business they use different techniques that may not hold up 509 00:40:39.599 --> 00:40:45.079 necessarily under the under the rigors of combat and types some of the types of 510 00:40:45.119 --> 00:40:46.599 things that the military institutes. We do have to be a little bit careful 511 00:40:46.639 --> 00:40:51.880 with that, UM, but but you know, the ability to access that 512 00:40:52.000 --> 00:40:55.119 and make sure that when our units are isolated, their information is isolated, 513 00:40:55.519 --> 00:41:00.119 because that's going to happen in an environment going forward, you're going to have 514 00:41:00.480 --> 00:41:04.000 units that are isolated. They're going to have to operate isolating UM. So 515 00:41:04.159 --> 00:41:06.480 you're going to have to be able to provide there. They're not only going 516 00:41:06.559 --> 00:41:09.840 to have to be able to endure to sustain themselves under that type of under 517 00:41:09.880 --> 00:41:15.159 that type of pressure, but they're also going to have to continue to get 518 00:41:15.239 --> 00:41:20.159 the information that they need to be able to continue to survive and make good 519 00:41:20.199 --> 00:41:25.400 decisions and operate effectively when they're no longer in physical contact with friendly forces UM. 520 00:41:25.800 --> 00:41:30.880 And so, movement to the cloud, greater reliance on satellite communications, 521 00:41:30.960 --> 00:41:35.920 other types of communications. The ones that are going to bear the burden for 522 00:41:36.039 --> 00:41:39.719 all of this going forward is the IT community is a communications community. They're 523 00:41:39.760 --> 00:41:43.199 going to ones that are kind of, as they always have in the past, 524 00:41:44.400 --> 00:41:46.320 kind of take it on the chin in order to kind of move the 525 00:41:46.440 --> 00:41:52.719 command and control you know, steam forward, and so, yes, greater 526 00:41:52.800 --> 00:42:00.199 emphasis on the information dimension in order to be able to accommodate that. In 527 00:42:00.239 --> 00:42:05.119 the end, it's going to be better off for everybody. Yeah. The 528 00:42:05.199 --> 00:42:08.960 old old cliche is, you know, the four shops, the logistics always 529 00:42:09.000 --> 00:42:13.280 get a veto. I think we need to modify that. Uh in this 530 00:42:13.519 --> 00:42:16.679 in this century, that the six shops get a veto too. It's uh, 531 00:42:17.079 --> 00:42:20.719 all you gotta do is come up with this this great plan and then 532 00:42:20.760 --> 00:42:23.239 you you ask for the input from the six shop and they go, we 533 00:42:23.360 --> 00:42:28.480 have no points for presence. We can't do that. There's no satellite access. 534 00:42:28.519 --> 00:42:30.920 Did you go, okay, well, let's let's let's talk about that 535 00:42:30.000 --> 00:42:37.239 for a bit. Um. It's developed and I don't want to, oh, 536 00:42:37.400 --> 00:42:39.719 go go ahead. No. What I was gonna say is is you 537 00:42:39.800 --> 00:42:44.840 know what is that require? Right? We We've spent you know, years 538 00:42:44.880 --> 00:42:47.519 and years and years spending time with our commanders talking to them about the importance 539 00:42:47.519 --> 00:42:52.239 of logistics and how those are constraining on their operations. Um. I would 540 00:42:52.320 --> 00:42:57.800 argue that we have not done due diligence on with our commanders, and and 541 00:42:58.159 --> 00:43:02.239 and and and pointing on him the importance of their data, the importance of 542 00:43:02.360 --> 00:43:07.360 communications, you know, s six. You know, I've had commanders who've 543 00:43:07.480 --> 00:43:12.480 been you know who's talked about. You know, I don't know what the 544 00:43:12.519 --> 00:43:15.920 common the ex does or what the commo guys do, but I know what 545 00:43:15.000 --> 00:43:17.519 when it's not there, you know, it's kind of like oxygen, right, 546 00:43:17.920 --> 00:43:21.760 Um, but it's But it's one of those where like we're going to 547 00:43:21.840 --> 00:43:27.920 have to really inform and educate our commanders on how they utilize data, what 548 00:43:28.079 --> 00:43:30.840 that data is for, what are the considerations they need to you know, 549 00:43:31.159 --> 00:43:36.960 develop in terms of how they plan operations. Um, because ultimately I think 550 00:43:36.960 --> 00:43:40.679 their operations are going to depend upon how they use that in making decisions. 551 00:43:43.400 --> 00:43:46.199 Yeah, that that that bandwidth thirst can get a little bit out of control 552 00:43:46.280 --> 00:43:51.039 depending upon where you are. And I don't want to scare people by using 553 00:43:51.119 --> 00:43:54.400 the d word doctrine, but doctrines and important words mean things. You know, 554 00:43:54.440 --> 00:43:59.559 people joke that, well nobody reads that crap. Well, people that 555 00:43:59.679 --> 00:44:04.039 matter and who write checks and they do read that stuff because they have to 556 00:44:04.159 --> 00:44:07.920 justify what they're trying to do. And uh, words mean things too, 557 00:44:08.239 --> 00:44:12.440 and you know how you define them, how you look at them, and 558 00:44:14.039 --> 00:44:17.880 especially in a in a combined operations you get us side the joint world, 559 00:44:19.000 --> 00:44:22.480 we very rarely do things by ourselves. Um, you know, one of 560 00:44:22.519 --> 00:44:24.599 the one of the funny exchanges. It was usually it was a Dutch our 561 00:44:24.679 --> 00:44:30.239 German. Somebody would quote Classwitz about something and then you have twenty minute discussion 562 00:44:30.280 --> 00:44:37.679 about how terrible the English translations of the original German. It's a very dangerous 563 00:44:37.719 --> 00:44:43.440 game with those guys. But you mentioned that the Army their their capstone document, 564 00:44:43.559 --> 00:44:47.480 the Field Manual three Tax zero Operations, was updated back in October, 565 00:44:49.079 --> 00:44:54.280 and you took some time, not by accident, to to to to find 566 00:44:54.400 --> 00:44:59.519 these four words when they were talking about what the direction the command code post 567 00:44:59.639 --> 00:45:02.119 need the go because you know, I get the depression by looking at at 568 00:45:02.159 --> 00:45:06.280 the Army is going, hey, this is an issue, we need to 569 00:45:06.320 --> 00:45:10.800 resolve it. And they put four words there, agility, convergence, endurance 570 00:45:12.000 --> 00:45:15.480 in depth. And I think that applies to more than just you know, 571 00:45:15.559 --> 00:45:20.719 the Army. That is a joint concern about our major C two nodes. 572 00:45:21.039 --> 00:45:24.719 You know, talk a little bit inside three tag zero how they define the 573 00:45:24.880 --> 00:45:32.000 core that agility, convergent, endurance and depth. So and I try to 574 00:45:32.039 --> 00:45:35.679 lay it out in the article the Army's definition of each of those. But 575 00:45:35.800 --> 00:45:39.760 what's interesting is that those those tenets of what we're what we're characterizing as multiple 576 00:45:39.760 --> 00:45:45.519 main operations in the current three days zero. If you look at earlier iterations 577 00:45:45.840 --> 00:45:52.360 of FM three days our catch stone operating doctrine, he'll see those terms applied. 578 00:45:52.519 --> 00:45:54.280 Right. Depth is not a new term for the Army. Endurance is 579 00:45:54.360 --> 00:45:58.719 no new term. Agility is not a new term. But in multiple main 580 00:45:58.800 --> 00:46:02.400 operations we think of those kind of in a different contexts, right, So 581 00:46:04.000 --> 00:46:07.159 you know, agility obviously no speed, but also nimbleness, the ability to 582 00:46:07.280 --> 00:46:09.920 change quickly. When we think about that in terms of command and control, 583 00:46:10.440 --> 00:46:15.039 you know, and what the point that I try to make in the in 584 00:46:15.119 --> 00:46:20.199 the article is that it's not just the ability to you know, displace in 585 00:46:20.360 --> 00:46:24.320 place all those different types of things move a command post quickly. We need 586 00:46:24.360 --> 00:46:28.360 to think about it in terms of the ability for command posts to take on 587 00:46:28.480 --> 00:46:32.079 different roles, um, whether that's a brigade doing a division's job, or 588 00:46:32.119 --> 00:46:36.199 a division doing a coorse job, or or maybe you know, up to 589 00:46:36.280 --> 00:46:39.039 the Army Service Component command of the R four level, you know, doing 590 00:46:39.079 --> 00:46:43.760 different roles based upon you know, what we need that command supposed to do, 591 00:46:43.880 --> 00:46:46.360 based upon maybe something has happened on the battlefield or something that we need 592 00:46:46.400 --> 00:46:51.679 to think about agility in different terms than perhaps we have in the past. 593 00:46:52.320 --> 00:46:57.639 The newest one, the newest tenant that they've come up with for for multimine 594 00:46:57.639 --> 00:47:00.880 operations for the current FM three, I said that virgins you know, really 595 00:47:00.920 --> 00:47:06.599 that kind of builds upon the uh, the old principle of mass, right, 596 00:47:06.760 --> 00:47:10.760 where in the past we use mass to overwhelm the an adversarious capabilities and 597 00:47:12.480 --> 00:47:15.639 understanding convergence we're talking about, you know, an outcome created by the concerted 598 00:47:15.679 --> 00:47:22.079 deployment of capabilities from multi domains and nationals against combined combinations of decisive deployments in 599 00:47:22.360 --> 00:47:27.880 any domain to create effects against systems. So it's still it's still very closely 600 00:47:27.920 --> 00:47:31.039 aligned to affect the way that mass was. However, what it what it 601 00:47:31.119 --> 00:47:36.559 tries to convey here is the multi domain aspect of it. We're now attacking 602 00:47:36.679 --> 00:47:42.519 not just like singular centers of gravity, but multiple center centers of gravity from 603 00:47:43.119 --> 00:47:46.639 with employing assets from different domains at different national ones. So it really isn't 604 00:47:47.079 --> 00:47:51.360 you know, mass as you know, new wine and an old bottom. 605 00:47:51.880 --> 00:47:55.159 Right. What we're really saying here is we're gonna take a system's approach to 606 00:47:55.280 --> 00:48:00.320 warfare and convergence is going to be the tool that we that we go to 607 00:48:00.639 --> 00:48:02.440 to get after that. And so kind of see your point earlier we were 608 00:48:02.440 --> 00:48:07.440 talking about, you know, reliance on adallies. You know we can, 609 00:48:07.840 --> 00:48:14.039 we can, we fully intend to use allied capabilities to help enable that convergence. 610 00:48:14.280 --> 00:48:17.440 So I am as a fire supporter, I'm completely uh, you know, 611 00:48:17.760 --> 00:48:22.360 agnostic as to whether you know that one five five round comes out of 612 00:48:22.400 --> 00:48:27.840 a US Triple seven howitzer or whether it comes out of a A saysar, 613 00:48:28.360 --> 00:48:31.400 a friend says are done, or whatever. Right, So you know, 614 00:48:32.000 --> 00:48:37.400 we need to kind of look at conversions as you know, the totality of 615 00:48:37.480 --> 00:48:42.760 the joint force plus you know, our our allies contributions to get after not 616 00:48:42.960 --> 00:48:46.159 just attacking one point of presence on the battlefield, but all points of presence 617 00:48:46.239 --> 00:48:50.480 relatives of a particular system that we're trying to take out, whether that's an 618 00:48:50.519 --> 00:48:54.679 indirect whether that's an integrated fire control or an integrated fire system, whether that's 619 00:48:54.719 --> 00:48:59.119 an IAD threat, whether that's something else. Right, So that's kind of 620 00:48:59.119 --> 00:49:01.159 what we're talking about. You discuss, you know, convergence. When we 621 00:49:01.199 --> 00:49:07.000 think about endurance, you know that that has some you know, historical connotations 622 00:49:07.039 --> 00:49:12.360 in terms of our ability to you know, persevere over time. UM, 623 00:49:12.440 --> 00:49:16.639 so that's kind of your survivability aspect, but it's also your ability to sustain 624 00:49:16.760 --> 00:49:22.679 the fight going forward to you know, and that's you know, through time. 625 00:49:22.760 --> 00:49:27.119 In the debt sudden operational environment, endurances is something that you know, 626 00:49:27.280 --> 00:49:30.320 historically we've kind of thinking, well, that's kind of a sustainment. You're 627 00:49:30.360 --> 00:49:34.760 going to be limited in terms of your operational uh, in terms of your 628 00:49:34.800 --> 00:49:38.320 ability to conduct operations by your logistics. You may get to a point where 629 00:49:38.320 --> 00:49:42.159 you have to culminate and then transition. You know, we're trying to kind 630 00:49:42.199 --> 00:49:47.119 of get out of just a sustainment viewpoint of endurance inn and kind of expand 631 00:49:47.199 --> 00:49:52.320 that uh into not just you know, demonstrating resilience and persistence, but also 632 00:49:52.920 --> 00:49:55.760 you know, be able to do that through through time as well. So 633 00:49:57.760 --> 00:50:00.599 that's kind of what we're talking about with that, And then we we're thinking 634 00:50:00.639 --> 00:50:05.840 about depth. Uh. You know, really we kind of view depths is 635 00:50:05.920 --> 00:50:08.159 our ability to extend our operations through time and space and through talking to the 636 00:50:08.280 --> 00:50:13.880 purpose. Um. You know, we used to think of depths purely in 637 00:50:14.039 --> 00:50:15.960 terms of how do we extend the battlefield, right, you know, in 638 00:50:16.079 --> 00:50:20.440 terms of AirLand battle, we're going to strike second national enforces or we're gonna 639 00:50:20.800 --> 00:50:23.760 you know, it had a very geographic approach to things, um, but 640 00:50:23.920 --> 00:50:28.840 now you know, we view, we're viewing depth because depth used to be 641 00:50:28.840 --> 00:50:32.199 attendant under under those operating concepts as well. Now a view and depth has 642 00:50:32.800 --> 00:50:36.519 not just you know, how are we able to do that in space? 643 00:50:37.239 --> 00:50:42.760 But you know through you know, uh, cyber means or into like space 644 00:50:42.800 --> 00:50:46.559 space or across time. You know, how do we how do we create 645 00:50:47.000 --> 00:50:52.440 some sort of advantage or exploit you know, our opportunities, uh, and 646 00:50:52.639 --> 00:50:59.480 kind of allow us to make decisions faster within our command posts so that we 647 00:51:00.000 --> 00:51:04.320 actually buy the commanders some time to make decisions, right, and so we're 648 00:51:04.360 --> 00:51:08.280 able to kind of take apart pieces of our adversary systems in detail versus kind 649 00:51:08.280 --> 00:51:12.079 of dealing with everything right up front. So that's kind of what we're talking 650 00:51:12.079 --> 00:51:20.760 about when we discuss those four tenants. And and if you if your your 651 00:51:20.840 --> 00:51:25.079 listeners really want to get a good feel for multi main operations. One of 652 00:51:25.119 --> 00:51:31.719 the main videos that I'd encourage everybody to go out on the internet and look 653 00:51:31.719 --> 00:51:37.079 for there's a YouTube video out there presented by Rich Creed, the director of 654 00:51:37.119 --> 00:51:40.239 the Combined Arms Doctrine director that for eleven with which really does a good job 655 00:51:40.280 --> 00:51:45.480 of laying out the differences between multi main operations and the tenants that I just 656 00:51:45.599 --> 00:51:51.559 describe, and kind of what came before that and why those changes exist, 657 00:51:51.599 --> 00:51:55.760 because they all exist for for really good reasons based upon the threatening environments. 658 00:51:59.480 --> 00:52:02.960 Everybody's kind of gotten on the band right wagon the last few years looking at 659 00:52:04.559 --> 00:52:08.599 the challenge of the Western Pacific and geography doesn't change, and so the same 660 00:52:08.719 --> 00:52:15.559 challenge our grandfathers and great grandfathers had with the battle west of the International Dateline 661 00:52:15.679 --> 00:52:21.559 east of India are going to repeat themselves again. And that's that's a terrain 662 00:52:22.559 --> 00:52:25.920 whether you're you're at sea or ashore or in the air. That's very different 663 00:52:27.280 --> 00:52:35.119 than the Russia Ukrainian environment. It's more more lectoral, much smaller, little 664 00:52:35.159 --> 00:52:38.039 tiny islands here and there. The Alliance networks are a little bit different. 665 00:52:38.639 --> 00:52:46.639 And I was interested on your perspective the Marine Corps, but they're the expeditionary 666 00:52:46.719 --> 00:52:52.679 mindset that General Burger, the Commandant, has been pushing recently involves having various 667 00:52:52.800 --> 00:53:01.280 units located on a vastly dispersed type of environment in different islands to present different 668 00:53:01.320 --> 00:53:07.239 talent challenges, And I think one of the larger challenges there is just being 669 00:53:07.280 --> 00:53:14.760 able to do your basic communications much less any type of command post operation that 670 00:53:14.920 --> 00:53:19.280 especially in armies looking at and though the army is looking hard and how they're 671 00:53:19.320 --> 00:53:23.079 going to be able to support any potential contingencies out in the Pacific. If 672 00:53:23.119 --> 00:53:28.880 we if we look too much at the Russia Ukrainian challenge, are there some 673 00:53:30.079 --> 00:53:37.280 some issues you see that perhaps we would encounter trying to maintain effective command and 674 00:53:37.320 --> 00:53:44.440 control throughout the Pacific theater that maybe or not directly connected to things that we're 675 00:53:44.519 --> 00:53:49.159 looking at trying to learn as we see what's going on in Ukraine. Yeah, 676 00:53:49.280 --> 00:53:53.559 so, Um, that the Western Pacific is a huge problems that for 677 00:53:53.639 --> 00:53:59.360 the for the army, but it's obviously one that we take extremely seriously. 678 00:53:59.440 --> 00:54:02.280 And if there's if there's one upside to the geography of the Pacific is that 679 00:54:02.360 --> 00:54:07.519 it goes both ways and that the Chinese will have to deal with that same 680 00:54:07.639 --> 00:54:12.639 geography go in the other direction. Um. Obviously I think the Chinese are 681 00:54:12.679 --> 00:54:15.239 looking at what's happening in the Ukraine right now, they have to be right, 682 00:54:15.760 --> 00:54:19.480 UM and kind of trying to figure out, Okay, you know, 683 00:54:19.639 --> 00:54:22.360 we just saw you know, all of their command posts get struck in very 684 00:54:22.440 --> 00:54:27.679 close order, and we don't obviously want that to happen to us as well. 685 00:54:27.719 --> 00:54:30.079 So we have to kind of understand that they're probably going to be changing 686 00:54:30.159 --> 00:54:35.239 up their methodologies for how they can command and control. UM and in the 687 00:54:35.280 --> 00:54:37.920 same way that we're looking at, you know, how how we're going to 688 00:54:37.920 --> 00:54:40.920 be there. We have to suspect, I think, and plan for the 689 00:54:42.039 --> 00:54:45.599 fact that the that the Chinese are not going to look like the Russians when 690 00:54:45.639 --> 00:54:49.000 they when we encounter them, right they're gonna have learned some lot of them. 691 00:54:49.039 --> 00:54:52.239 They're going to come to us, probably with with some better kit I 692 00:54:52.360 --> 00:54:55.679 think than what we're seeing on the battlefield right now, uh in in uh 693 00:54:57.039 --> 00:55:01.760 eastern Ukraine. UM, And it's an entirely different that's an entirely different operating 694 00:55:01.840 --> 00:55:07.800 environment. UM. That's it. I think that that that C two problem 695 00:55:07.880 --> 00:55:12.880 set, that command post problem set is very challenging in the Pacific because of 696 00:55:12.960 --> 00:55:16.519 the distances that you're talking about, UM and from a land perspective, you 697 00:55:16.599 --> 00:55:22.440 know, where we're largely reliant online of sitcoms and things of that nature. 698 00:55:22.800 --> 00:55:25.559 We're going to have to become a lot more comfortable dealing with, you know, 699 00:55:25.719 --> 00:55:30.400 alternative forms of communication, whether that's dot com, whether that's you know, 700 00:55:31.239 --> 00:55:35.199 hf U H, all those type of things where you know, we 701 00:55:35.360 --> 00:55:37.400 have not you know, spend a lot of time and effort and energy, 702 00:55:37.880 --> 00:55:42.960 you know, kind of exploring those options for enabling our command and control. 703 00:55:43.000 --> 00:55:45.639 I think we're going to have to really start taking a look at that in 704 00:55:45.679 --> 00:55:51.159 a little bit more depth and then figuring out how we work with our partners 705 00:55:51.320 --> 00:55:54.159 in the Navy, in the Marine Corps to kind of come together. I 706 00:55:54.239 --> 00:55:58.480 think all of us, whether it's the Army, the Air Force, Nabe, 707 00:55:58.519 --> 00:56:00.840 Marine Corps, we all have challenges in terms of survivability of our command 708 00:56:00.880 --> 00:56:07.000 posts. Um. You know, we've seen the capabilities of you know, 709 00:56:07.079 --> 00:56:10.320 the Chinese in terms of their ISSR, their ability to collect and we kind 710 00:56:10.320 --> 00:56:15.239 of have to assume that this isn't going to be you know, the fight 711 00:56:15.320 --> 00:56:17.960 that we have with China isn't going to be like the Battle of Midway where 712 00:56:19.000 --> 00:56:23.400 we just lost complete you know, pract of where strike groups are and things 713 00:56:23.440 --> 00:56:25.800 of that nature. That I think we're going to know, you know, 714 00:56:25.960 --> 00:56:30.920 with some significant lead time what our adversaries are doing. Um, the question 715 00:56:31.039 --> 00:56:35.360 is going to be, now that they know what we know and we know 716 00:56:35.480 --> 00:56:37.559 what they know, that how how does that play out? Right? You 717 00:56:37.639 --> 00:56:42.199 know? What survives first contact? Is it going to be where I think 718 00:56:42.239 --> 00:56:44.800 the rudder is going to meet the road on that one. So we have 719 00:56:44.920 --> 00:56:50.360 to be prepared to you know, absorb that first strike wherever it comes from, 720 00:56:50.960 --> 00:56:55.239 and be able and effective to respond in kind so that you know, 721 00:56:55.360 --> 00:57:00.639 we don't get into you know, the situations where now we're reconstitute an entire 722 00:57:00.760 --> 00:57:06.119 CTU structure, you know, in contact at great distance. That's a very 723 00:57:06.199 --> 00:57:13.280 dangerous environment for me. Um. I'm sorry I dropped off because the lectural 724 00:57:13.360 --> 00:57:17.119 storm just took all the power out or where I'm sitting, Um, and 725 00:57:17.199 --> 00:57:21.519 we're getting close to the end of the hour. We told you we'd keep 726 00:57:21.559 --> 00:57:25.679 you for uh where working our other than the article? Where can our listeners 727 00:57:25.760 --> 00:57:29.760 find more information about what you're talking about? And what do you have plans 728 00:57:29.800 --> 00:57:31.400 to write more about it in the future, and what can we look forward 729 00:57:31.480 --> 00:57:37.719 to? Yeah? Absolutely so as it so happened. Um, I'm actually 730 00:57:37.760 --> 00:57:40.039 transitioning out of the Army right now, so I'm I'm leaving h TO, 731 00:57:40.519 --> 00:57:44.760 but I will continue to be working on Commander Control. I'm actually going up 732 00:57:44.800 --> 00:57:51.280 to to Huntsville, uh TO to work with the Rapid Capabilities Critical Technologies Office 733 00:57:52.000 --> 00:57:54.199 for the Army. UM. But I'll stay very tied in with with the 734 00:57:54.280 --> 00:57:59.679 CTWO community going forward, both here in the local area and elsewhere. UM. 735 00:58:00.079 --> 00:58:01.840 You know, I've written a couple of articles. This isn't my first 736 00:58:01.960 --> 00:58:05.760 article related to C two and in fact, I think one of the reasons 737 00:58:05.840 --> 00:58:07.679 why they're all slider reached out to me was because I was kind of looking 738 00:58:07.719 --> 00:58:13.559 at some of these ideas with regard to training and education in a previous article. 739 00:58:13.679 --> 00:58:15.760 I'm going to try to continue to write. UM, you can get 740 00:58:15.800 --> 00:58:21.679 in touch with me on Twitter. It's the Army Joint cqu pro at Army 741 00:58:21.760 --> 00:58:24.480 Joint tqu pro. That's my handle, so I all occasionally post on there, 742 00:58:24.480 --> 00:58:29.639 and then obviously folks can reach out for Matt Errol on LinkedIn, and 743 00:58:30.440 --> 00:58:32.559 you know, I hang my articles there as well. But you know, 744 00:58:34.320 --> 00:58:37.320 very eager, you know, I continue to try to, you know, 745 00:58:37.239 --> 00:58:42.519 keep in in touch with the cqu community. Written large has been very good 746 00:58:42.639 --> 00:58:46.159 being down here at Hurlbert because we have so many joint leaders in the CPU 747 00:58:46.239 --> 00:58:51.559 communities, flow through the schoolhouse down here at the Fivelist Command and controlling m 748 00:58:51.760 --> 00:58:55.559 that I really have benefited, I think from the opportunity to interact with so 749 00:58:55.639 --> 00:58:59.960 many of my partners in the joint force and kind of get a truly multi 750 00:59:00.199 --> 00:59:05.119 service and allied perspective on things, which you know, I find this work 751 00:59:05.239 --> 00:59:09.400 very, very valuable, very rewarding, and it's it's one I'm I intend 752 00:59:09.480 --> 00:59:15.320 to continue to support it, you know, even into retirement. Well, 753 00:59:15.360 --> 00:59:20.079 Matt, we really appreciate it's been a great hour, real informative. I 754 00:59:20.119 --> 00:59:23.280 appreciate you being patient with a couple of Navy guys that is trying to figure 755 00:59:23.280 --> 00:59:28.880 it out. But as we've discussed everything in this article, it doesn't just 756 00:59:29.000 --> 00:59:35.679 apply to the army. This is really joint in the best sense. And 757 00:59:36.119 --> 00:59:38.840 I would copy because you did mention the article. A lot of our allies 758 00:59:38.880 --> 00:59:45.280 too have developed similar habits, and hopefully their militaries are hoisted on board some 759 00:59:45.360 --> 00:59:47.760 of the changes they need to make in this area that we got a little 760 00:59:47.760 --> 00:59:52.400 bit too settled with. And I wish you the best of luck in your 761 00:59:52.440 --> 00:59:54.519 next position. We'll be keeping track of you and look forward to the next 762 00:59:54.599 --> 01:00:00.159 opportunity to talk with you with what you're working on. All right, thank 763 01:00:00.159 --> 01:00:02.400 you so much, really appreciate it. Thank you, Matt enjoyed talking to 764 01:00:02.480 --> 01:00:08.079 you, yea, and we appreciate everybody for joining us for another edition a 765 01:00:08.159 --> 01:00:12.320 Midrat. Just to give you a heads up, we're gonna be taking a 766 01:00:12.519 --> 01:00:15.119 couple of weeks off. His life gets kind of busy, but we're gonna 767 01:00:15.119 --> 01:00:21.280 be back here on the twenty first of May, and our guest on the 768 01:00:21.360 --> 01:00:25.400 twenty first coming back. One of our favorites, Claude barrabay third novel is 769 01:00:25.559 --> 01:00:32.360 out. It's just got available this weekend over on Amazon, called The Philippine 770 01:00:32.599 --> 01:00:37.199 Pact. That's another Connor Stark novel that everybody's been waiting a few years for. 771 01:00:38.039 --> 01:00:42.440 And we look forward to talking to Claude about that. And until next 772 01:00:42.480 --> 01:00:45.679 time, I hope everybody has a great navy and what the heck, good 773 01:00:45.800 --> 01:01:04.440 army day too. Cheers your king, like my lonely want to marry me 774 01:01:04.760 --> 01:01:13.719 and live brand that be can believe for your being to blame for lovely WoT 775 01:01:13.960 --> 01:01:23.519 me silly faulting your the Dame. It's a long way to differ, It's 776 01:01:23.599 --> 01:01:35.159 a long way. It's a long way to differently. The greenes I know 777 01:01:37.199 --> 01:01:46.239 gone by becodealing well, listen to where it's a long long way to dipper 778 01:01:46.400 --> 01:01:51.719 Ram. It's but my heart blind them