WEBVTT

1
00:00:00.240 --> 00:00:04.200
All right, welcome to the Row
Hospital point. I am here with Adam

2
00:00:04.360 --> 00:00:11.519
Kehoe and no relation to Donald Keyhoe. I've been working with, you know,

3
00:00:11.560 --> 00:00:15.160
writing about Donald key Hooe for so
many years that I misspelled your name

4
00:00:15.320 --> 00:00:19.719
in a few places, So I
apologize for that. I appreciate that that's

5
00:00:19.960 --> 00:00:24.359
an increasingly common question in my life
right now about Donald key Hooe. I

6
00:00:24.440 --> 00:00:29.719
bet we're no relation. Different spelling, fairly common Irish surname, but no,

7
00:00:29.800 --> 00:00:35.159
we're no relation. Yeah. I
did have a few people asking when

8
00:00:35.159 --> 00:00:39.920
I did post this, But of
course you have your PhD and information science

9
00:00:40.359 --> 00:00:44.719
as you've got on. I kind
of stoled your Twitter bio there. You

10
00:00:44.759 --> 00:00:50.039
have an interest in AI data science
and defense policy issues, the latter of

11
00:00:50.079 --> 00:00:54.119
which I think it's probably been your
inspiration for getting involved with all of the

12
00:00:55.039 --> 00:01:00.880
interesting policy issues that arise when they
begin to ask for you pay reports from

13
00:01:00.880 --> 00:01:06.480
the different intelligence agencies. But I
would like to hear from you yourself.

14
00:01:06.519 --> 00:01:10.920
You know what is that? When
did you first kind of decide to start

15
00:01:10.959 --> 00:01:15.840
to look into this and blog about
it? Sure? Well, I think

16
00:01:15.920 --> 00:01:18.480
like a lot of people with an
interest in science, I mean, it's

17
00:01:18.480 --> 00:01:21.760
always been in at least my peripheral
vision growing up, you know, stories

18
00:01:21.799 --> 00:01:25.560
of UFOs and things like that.
You know, I never had a sighting

19
00:01:25.680 --> 00:01:29.400
or anything like that myself, and
I think, like many people, around

20
00:01:29.400 --> 00:01:34.359
twenty seventeen, the issue really started
coming up on my radar, particularly as

21
00:01:34.359 --> 00:01:38.719
we got more and more details about
the Knimets case. So the more I

22
00:01:38.799 --> 00:01:41.840
learned about nimics, the more it
seemed to me that, you know,

23
00:01:41.879 --> 00:01:47.319
there's really four broad categories of explanation, and so often, you know,

24
00:01:47.359 --> 00:01:49.599
people get lost in the debate about
what it was right, what it is

25
00:01:51.159 --> 00:01:53.359
that we sort of forget to take
a step back and think about, well,

26
00:01:53.400 --> 00:01:57.319
what are the implications for all of
the different alternatives, what would what

27
00:01:57.319 --> 00:02:00.799
would be true if it turned out
to be, you know, one thing

28
00:02:00.879 --> 00:02:06.120
or another, And so that that
really concerned me greatly. And you know,

29
00:02:06.159 --> 00:02:08.199
I think my my first piece,
which kind of laid out what the

30
00:02:08.199 --> 00:02:13.639
implications are in each one of these
scenarios, was kind of my entrance into

31
00:02:13.680 --> 00:02:15.159
this topic. And then from there, as I've learned more, it's just

32
00:02:15.159 --> 00:02:20.360
become more and more interesting and fascinating. Really, I mean, I think

33
00:02:20.400 --> 00:02:23.680
the interesting thing from a defense perspective
about UFOs is that they involve the unknown,

34
00:02:23.759 --> 00:02:28.080
right, they're on the very edge
of what we understand, what we

35
00:02:28.080 --> 00:02:30.360
can easily identify, I mean,
by definition, we can't identify them.

36
00:02:30.879 --> 00:02:37.000
Uh, and so a lot of
interesting things fall into that category. So

37
00:02:37.039 --> 00:02:40.120
that's that's what, you know,
sort of got my my interest mm hmm.

38
00:02:40.400 --> 00:02:43.439
And I do want to I'm going
to share the screen here and bring

39
00:02:43.520 --> 00:02:46.840
up your website. I just want
to show it to everybody where you have

40
00:02:46.000 --> 00:02:51.879
your articles, because I highly highly
recommend that people go there. Just blog

41
00:02:52.280 --> 00:02:58.479
dot Adam keyho e h o e
dot com uh Strategic Doubt, and they

42
00:02:58.479 --> 00:03:05.039
can see of your article, all
of which I've found really fascinating. And

43
00:03:05.080 --> 00:03:12.000
we'll get into these topics, I
guess first off, you know, it

44
00:03:12.039 --> 00:03:15.039
was always it was interesting to me, and I feel this is a real

45
00:03:15.319 --> 00:03:20.800
kind of strange policy issue. When
I first started getting involved with this,

46
00:03:20.919 --> 00:03:25.039
or at least, I decided to
become a field investigator for the Mutual UFO

47
00:03:25.159 --> 00:03:30.319
Network just to kind of speak firsthand
with witnesses who saw things. At this

48
00:03:30.439 --> 00:03:34.319
time, you know, I was
just out of journalism school or you know,

49
00:03:34.520 --> 00:03:38.599
fairly fresh out of it, and
I was a bit skeptical about the

50
00:03:38.639 --> 00:03:43.240
whole topic. So I wanted to
see, you know, how convinced these

51
00:03:43.319 --> 00:03:47.960
these witnesses and how credible are they. The very first one I had was

52
00:03:49.039 --> 00:03:53.400
a someone who just came from Iraq. He was working security at a bank.

53
00:03:53.000 --> 00:03:59.439
He had gone outside seeing this weird
object near Lookout Mountain in Colorado outside

54
00:03:59.439 --> 00:04:01.199
of Denver, and there are a
lot of commercial airplanes that go over.

55
00:04:01.240 --> 00:04:04.159
I called the FAA. I called, you know, a lot of different

56
00:04:04.240 --> 00:04:09.360
organizations, and essentially they told me
they're not interested in the FAA in particular,

57
00:04:09.479 --> 00:04:15.000
told me to talk to Bigelow or
you know, this other small UFO

58
00:04:15.120 --> 00:04:20.079
research organization that is manned by one
person who would just essentially log it in

59
00:04:20.279 --> 00:04:26.240
Washington, Newfork for those of you
who know that group. And it was

60
00:04:26.319 --> 00:04:30.079
weird that, you know, here's
a guy ex military, he's used to

61
00:04:30.199 --> 00:04:34.439
reporting things that are of you know, you would think would be something that

62
00:04:34.480 --> 00:04:40.040
could pose a danger in this pace, in this case the commercial airliner,

63
00:04:40.560 --> 00:04:45.160
and that was his concern. But
they didn't even want to take the report.

64
00:04:45.680 --> 00:04:53.120
It seemed almost you know, medieval
or something that that because of the

65
00:04:53.160 --> 00:04:58.279
taboo of UFOs, they were ignoring
a potentially important, you know, piece

66
00:04:58.279 --> 00:05:04.519
of intelligence that could you know it
could have been civilian technology that was posing

67
00:05:04.519 --> 00:05:10.560
a threat. That seems like a
real weird policy stance, don't you think.

68
00:05:11.360 --> 00:05:14.360
I do? I do, And
I think that a lot of people

69
00:05:14.360 --> 00:05:19.079
have an impression that the government is
this monolithic, super powerful thing that is

70
00:05:19.120 --> 00:05:24.240
omniscient and can track absolutely everything and
is on top of every kind of report

71
00:05:24.279 --> 00:05:28.360
that might be coming out. But
I don't think that's actually the case.

72
00:05:29.079 --> 00:05:31.720
You know, the government is this
incredibly complicated thing with many different aspects.

73
00:05:31.759 --> 00:05:36.920
It doesn't often agree with itself,
and things certainly do fall in the cracks,

74
00:05:36.959 --> 00:05:41.560
And I think that, you know, these sorts of unknown aerial sightings

75
00:05:41.600 --> 00:05:46.800
are very much one of those things
that not many are particularly incentivized to look

76
00:05:46.839 --> 00:05:48.720
at closely. And you know,
the story you just told, I think

77
00:05:48.839 --> 00:05:54.120
is a great example, you know
that playing out. And that's one of

78
00:05:54.160 --> 00:05:57.040
the things I've written about recently is
that, you know, as we go

79
00:05:57.120 --> 00:06:00.360
into the next ten twenty three years, we can expect that this eye is

80
00:06:00.360 --> 00:06:02.480
going to become a busier, more
complex space. They're going to be more

81
00:06:02.519 --> 00:06:10.360
unusual things as drone technology proliferates.
So having this kind of stilted cultural language

82
00:06:10.360 --> 00:06:15.199
to describe you know, strange sightings. It's always been dangerous, but it's

83
00:06:15.279 --> 00:06:18.000
becoming more acutely dangerous that things don't
get reported, or when they do,

84
00:06:19.000 --> 00:06:23.720
when they are reported, they aren't
taken seriously. I think it's a real

85
00:06:23.759 --> 00:06:28.680
problem and something that needs to be
examined. Mm hmm. And it seems

86
00:06:28.759 --> 00:06:30.959
that, you know, one way
to kind of deal with the taboo is

87
00:06:31.000 --> 00:06:35.759
the adoption of this term UAP.
I know Nick Pope likes to say that

88
00:06:35.800 --> 00:06:41.560
the Ministry of Defense first adopted that, but I think it actually might have

89
00:06:41.639 --> 00:06:47.800
been Newfork, a different organization headed
by scientists that looked at commercial airline.

90
00:06:47.920 --> 00:06:51.480
They lay claim to the term also, but it was a term used early

91
00:06:51.519 --> 00:06:56.800
on to move away from the term
UFO, which comes with all this baggage

92
00:06:56.839 --> 00:07:01.439
and is typically used to mean alien
spacecraft. But it almost seems as though,

93
00:07:02.319 --> 00:07:08.160
and I've always thought that that this, this evolution to this new term

94
00:07:08.399 --> 00:07:14.399
wouldn't work because you kind of need
to rebrand the concept in that that baggage

95
00:07:14.439 --> 00:07:18.120
seems to have followed them because we
still get you know, in the daily

96
00:07:18.160 --> 00:07:25.279
conversations in the media especially you know
UAP now meaning little gray men, right,

97
00:07:25.759 --> 00:07:29.079
I think that's exactly right. I
think substituting one word or term for

98
00:07:29.120 --> 00:07:33.680
another doesn't solve the root problem,
which is a kind of maturity problem to

99
00:07:33.759 --> 00:07:39.279
be able to look at this head
on to discuss it. And you know,

100
00:07:39.759 --> 00:07:43.560
something I argued recently is that almost
assuredly, you know, if you

101
00:07:43.600 --> 00:07:46.680
look at the pile of unknown cases, right, there's there's a fair amount

102
00:07:46.720 --> 00:07:50.279
of misidentification in there. I don't
think that's particularly controversial to say there's probably

103
00:07:50.360 --> 00:07:56.480
some secret black budget programs in there, you know, particularly when people are

104
00:07:56.480 --> 00:07:59.040
seeing things like some of the black
triangles. You know, that can be

105
00:07:59.079 --> 00:08:03.079
any number of different area craft.
And then you know there's likely some foreign

106
00:08:03.120 --> 00:08:07.439
adversary in there as well, particularly
in terms of some of the drone incursions

107
00:08:07.480 --> 00:08:09.839
that have been reported. There's I
think at least some reason to think some

108
00:08:09.879 --> 00:08:15.519
of that is foreign intelligence services probing
and things of that nature. And then

109
00:08:15.560 --> 00:08:18.439
finally, yes, there are some
cases that are really strange. They're just

110
00:08:18.600 --> 00:08:20.839
there's no other way to characterize them. That they're extremely strange. They're hard

111
00:08:20.839 --> 00:08:24.360
to resolve, and so what you
know, we've got to look at that

112
00:08:24.519 --> 00:08:30.720
right like we look at any other
issue. And I think until we kind

113
00:08:30.720 --> 00:08:35.000
of have a cultural reckoning with that, it's going to be hard to escape,

114
00:08:35.759 --> 00:08:39.000
you know, the kind of giggle
factor, or I think even more

115
00:08:39.000 --> 00:08:43.200
pernicious just replacing every time we encounter
UAP and then doing the mental substitution of

116
00:08:43.279 --> 00:08:48.519
that means alien or you know that
means acts or why so a little bit

117
00:08:48.600 --> 00:08:50.840
less of the debate about what is
you know, each particular thing, but

118
00:08:50.919 --> 00:08:54.320
about you know, all of these
things kind of together and what they mean

119
00:08:54.399 --> 00:08:58.720
collectively. Mm hmm, right.
And I think that's where, uh,

120
00:09:00.600 --> 00:09:03.279
I don't know if maybe the dear
these hesitant to join in on this conversation,

121
00:09:03.360 --> 00:09:09.000
but they're going to have to that
they feel, at least I read

122
00:09:09.279 --> 00:09:13.879
in their messages or messaging that they
kind of feel that, Well, we're

123
00:09:15.120 --> 00:09:20.960
the military. Of course we consider
UAPs potentially or largely to be drones or

124
00:09:20.000 --> 00:09:24.320
other man made aircraft. But I
don't think the public gets that, and

125
00:09:26.120 --> 00:09:30.759
I don't at What I've kind of
been advocating for is that we all have

126
00:09:30.879 --> 00:09:35.919
to educate the public and make sure
they under unidentified. The U in UFO

127
00:09:35.120 --> 00:09:41.360
or UAP means unidentified means we don't
know. We're looking into it because we

128
00:09:41.759 --> 00:09:46.399
just don't know. And that seems
to be a campaign. Kind of to

129
00:09:46.759 --> 00:09:54.320
your point that that you could mean
these four different categories of I'm not just

130
00:09:54.440 --> 00:10:01.080
one and the duds or any military
in the world, isn't it sensitive delegate

131
00:10:01.120 --> 00:10:05.519
position in handling these things, because
none of them are particularly great from from

132
00:10:05.559 --> 00:10:09.679
their perspective, So if you're talking
about a misidentification, there's some potential for

133
00:10:09.720 --> 00:10:16.759
embarrassment there, and there's also some
potential for revealing vulnerabilities things that don't sort

134
00:10:16.799 --> 00:10:20.639
of work well in current sensor systems, So admitting that you you know,

135
00:10:20.679 --> 00:10:24.120
you couldn't identify something as a bit
problematic. And then obviously in the other

136
00:10:24.159 --> 00:10:28.679
categories, it comes to either revealing
your own capabilities, which you don't want

137
00:10:28.720 --> 00:10:33.639
to do, or revealing what you
know about others capabilities in terms of foreign

138
00:10:33.639 --> 00:10:35.919
adversary. And then when we get
to the final category, which I think

139
00:10:37.000 --> 00:10:41.200
is you know, the most difficult, it's just so strange, it's just

140
00:10:41.240 --> 00:10:45.200
so far outside the realm of what
they're accustomed to dealing with that, you

141
00:10:45.240 --> 00:10:48.120
know, I'm not sure that there's
a kind of vocabulary to deal with those

142
00:10:48.200 --> 00:10:52.320
cases. And also there's you're always
reserving doubt of what if this is some

143
00:10:52.399 --> 00:10:58.159
sort of breakthrough project of some kind. I can understand and actually even sympathize

144
00:10:58.200 --> 00:11:01.120
a little bit with a reluctance to
deal with that. But nonetheless we have

145
00:11:01.159 --> 00:11:05.799
to be able to have the conversation
because the cost of not having the conversation

146
00:11:05.240 --> 00:11:13.399
is the stigma, which leads to
missed intelligence opportunities and all sorts of different

147
00:11:13.399 --> 00:11:16.120
things. And that's assuming that this
is all forsak, which if it's not,

148
00:11:16.240 --> 00:11:20.879
then there's a whole other kettle of
fish. Yeah, And you know,

149
00:11:20.039 --> 00:11:24.559
it's funny because as you say these
things that dozens of questions come to

150
00:11:24.600 --> 00:11:28.039
mind, because really I think tackling
each of those categories, you know,

151
00:11:28.720 --> 00:11:35.279
are very big topics. So for
instance, you know, reading just this

152
00:11:35.399 --> 00:11:41.519
week or just last night about the
Mola report and the counterintelligence report that the

153
00:11:41.519 --> 00:11:48.159
the Senate Select Committee on lou called
it sissy in my last interview the SSC,

154
00:11:48.240 --> 00:11:54.200
I, you know, in that
the manner in which counterintelligence works,

155
00:11:54.279 --> 00:11:58.919
which is very heavy towards what you
were mentioning. You don't want to tip

156
00:11:58.919 --> 00:12:05.159
your hand. You don't want to
tip your hand as that you recognize that

157
00:12:05.480 --> 00:12:09.360
this might be foreign technology. You
don't want them to know what we know

158
00:12:09.200 --> 00:12:15.120
that they have, nor do you
want to tip your hand towards technologies we

159
00:12:15.320 --> 00:12:18.879
have because we don't want them to
know what we have, which kind of

160
00:12:20.440 --> 00:12:24.159
you know, it caused difficulty with
the with the molar you know, the

161
00:12:24.200 --> 00:12:30.919
investation into the Russian interference in the
election. But of course it also pertains

162
00:12:30.960 --> 00:12:37.360
to this topic because it puts them
really in a difficult situation in that they

163
00:12:37.480 --> 00:12:41.840
really it seems to me and I've
always felt that this would be a difficult

164
00:12:41.559 --> 00:12:45.519
thing for blue Book two. You
know, if it ever came out,

165
00:12:46.879 --> 00:12:54.159
how do they categorize because they really
can't categorize. They can't definitively say,

166
00:12:54.159 --> 00:12:58.799
oh, we figured out this was
just ours. If that's the case,

167
00:12:58.879 --> 00:13:01.480
you know, it's something that we're
working on, then they're tipping their hand

168
00:13:01.480 --> 00:13:05.080
towards information that's classified that we really
don't want out there. Right. Absolutely,

169
00:13:05.159 --> 00:13:09.840
it is an incredibly, like I
said, delicate position to be in,

170
00:13:11.200 --> 00:13:13.720
and they have a lot to weigh
in making those kinds of decisions.

171
00:13:15.080 --> 00:13:18.879
You know, it's interesting hearing people
talk about blue Book I actually think that

172
00:13:18.919 --> 00:13:24.159
with the Senate Intel developments, it
might be better to look at the Post

173
00:13:24.240 --> 00:13:28.080
nine to eleven report, or even
the post Iraq War Invasion intelligence Review as

174
00:13:28.080 --> 00:13:31.200
a model for that. And one
of the reasons I say that is Chris

175
00:13:31.200 --> 00:13:37.679
Mellon obviously in that you know,
I hate to characterize anyone's career, but

176
00:13:37.399 --> 00:13:41.080
nine to eleven in Iraq, we're
really quite central for him, And as

177
00:13:41.159 --> 00:13:45.200
kind of the architect of that policy
moment, I think the idea is that

178
00:13:45.240 --> 00:13:50.360
you do a one time, relatively
short, comprehensive review that's primarily designed for

179
00:13:50.399 --> 00:13:54.879
the government, so we know from
earlier versions of the language, the kind

180
00:13:54.879 --> 00:13:58.039
of draft language that originally he envisioned, a process that may or may not

181
00:13:58.120 --> 00:14:03.120
be fully public, like there might
be a purely you know, classified component

182
00:14:03.159 --> 00:14:05.840
of it, UH, with the
intent of you map out all these issues,

183
00:14:07.200 --> 00:14:09.320
you find the gaps and the vulnerabilities, and you do it in the

184
00:14:09.399 --> 00:14:13.320
legislative branch exactly so that you can
then go and make new law, or

185
00:14:13.399 --> 00:14:16.159
reset priorities, or do whatever you
need to do to fix the problem.

186
00:14:16.480 --> 00:14:20.120
And yes, you let the public
know about it as a matter of public

187
00:14:20.120 --> 00:14:24.960
confidence, but the primary design is
to make sure that the intelligence system is

188
00:14:24.360 --> 00:14:28.840
working properly, you know. And
I think someone who's you know, his

189
00:14:28.919 --> 00:14:33.559
life experience has shown him the intelligent
system not working properly, you know,

190
00:14:33.639 --> 00:14:37.679
in two really conspicuous moments in history. So to me, I think that

191
00:14:37.879 --> 00:14:43.840
is the kind of DNA of the
Senate Intel report, and I think,

192
00:14:43.039 --> 00:14:46.759
you know, it's it's tough sometimes
in eupology, where there's a tendency to

193
00:14:46.879 --> 00:14:50.639
just look at the UFO cases and
we've got what seventy years of them,

194
00:14:50.960 --> 00:14:52.879
but it's important to take a step
back and look at the wider world because

195
00:14:54.200 --> 00:14:56.519
you know, all of this has
a context that goes, you know,

196
00:14:56.600 --> 00:15:00.440
far apart beyond UFOs. It has
everything to do with our political a moment,

197
00:15:00.480 --> 00:15:03.399
our geostrategic moment, you know,
all of these things all at once.

198
00:15:03.039 --> 00:15:07.919
Mm hmmm. I think you make
a lot of very very good points,

199
00:15:07.919 --> 00:15:09.519
and now I want to get back
to to the point you just made.

200
00:15:09.720 --> 00:15:15.000
But there is a question, someone
says, and I think you've demonstrated

201
00:15:15.399 --> 00:15:20.679
quite a bit of this already,
but they ask, silly humans asks,

202
00:15:20.919 --> 00:15:26.159
how does Adam apply his expertise to
the field and what have his recent articles

203
00:15:26.240 --> 00:15:33.759
been about? And why? Well, that's that's a it's a really good

204
00:15:33.840 --> 00:15:37.120
question and it's going to be hard
to answer very concisely. I'd recommend him

205
00:15:37.399 --> 00:15:39.799
having a little bit the site.
So in a weird way, you could

206
00:15:39.840 --> 00:15:43.480
read my first article on there in
my last article on there and it would

207
00:15:43.519 --> 00:15:46.320
be a good look. And so
most of what I do right now is

208
00:15:46.480 --> 00:15:52.919
analysis. So I take the data
and developments that are coming out and I

209
00:15:52.960 --> 00:15:56.679
try to place them in context,
right, so I try to connect them

210
00:15:56.759 --> 00:16:03.720
to other bits of history, bits
a policy and politics, and to kind

211
00:16:03.720 --> 00:16:07.440
of try to show some of the
workings of government and the kinds of questions

212
00:16:07.480 --> 00:16:11.679
that you know that come up.
But you've given me actually a really nice

213
00:16:11.679 --> 00:16:15.840
opportunity to talk about hopefully what I
what I'm planning to do more of in

214
00:16:15.840 --> 00:16:21.039
the future. So I'm actually working
with Tim McMillan, who's been a guest

215
00:16:21.080 --> 00:16:25.600
and I'm sure at least a couple
of times here, to partner on some

216
00:16:25.639 --> 00:16:32.600
stories where we kind of combine his
really incredible investigative skill with some data science

217
00:16:32.639 --> 00:16:37.200
projects. So there are quite a
few places where there is a data out

218
00:16:37.200 --> 00:16:41.080
there that can be examined and aviation
and so on, and so we're working

219
00:16:41.120 --> 00:16:44.240
together to hopefully not you know,
at least for my part, just analyze

220
00:16:44.279 --> 00:16:49.879
news, but hopefully eventually to make
some down the road. Now you know,

221
00:16:52.200 --> 00:16:55.440
getting back into your expertise, which
I think that you've demonstrated in that

222
00:16:55.600 --> 00:17:00.200
observation of policy and how policy has
made and how particular players had fit into

223
00:17:00.240 --> 00:17:06.200
that historically. In particular, Chris
Mellon is a really good point in that

224
00:17:07.000 --> 00:17:11.759
it is a similar situation in that
we had a major issue that happened that

225
00:17:11.880 --> 00:17:18.880
demonstrated we had intelligence gathering problems,
which is kind of what they're facing now,

226
00:17:18.920 --> 00:17:22.640
and that at least in Chris Mellon's
eyes, and I wouldn't believe he's

227
00:17:22.680 --> 00:17:26.839
alone in this, but who knows
what the people who actually do these jobs

228
00:17:26.880 --> 00:17:30.559
day by day, phil, but
that this represents another intelligence gathering problem and

229
00:17:30.599 --> 00:17:37.440
certainly that's the way that it was
framed by the SSCI. I think when

230
00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:41.559
they wrote their request that you know, there's disjointed there's no central location where

231
00:17:41.559 --> 00:17:48.519
this material is all captured and analyzed
to kind of get a sense of the

232
00:17:48.599 --> 00:17:52.759
situation, which is what they've requested
and what hopefully will happen, and it

233
00:17:52.799 --> 00:17:57.119
seems to be happening. But in
that sense, you know, we also

234
00:17:57.359 --> 00:18:03.279
have the a tip that it existed, you know, the program Advanced Aerospace

235
00:18:03.279 --> 00:18:11.640
Threat Identification Program that Louise Elizondo was
a part of and potentially a tip being,

236
00:18:11.960 --> 00:18:15.319
you know, event continuing on as
this UAP Task Force. Either way,

237
00:18:15.759 --> 00:18:21.279
we now have this UAP Task Force
apparently at least since June. That

238
00:18:21.400 --> 00:18:23.640
was the first time they kind of
referred to it that I'm aware of to

239
00:18:23.759 --> 00:18:27.599
Roger Glassel, a researcher. And
then you know, we have this recent

240
00:18:29.160 --> 00:18:33.240
essentially press release saying that, yeah, we did establish this officially on August

241
00:18:33.279 --> 00:18:38.799
fourth, and it exists in that
sense. Then do you feel that perhaps

242
00:18:38.920 --> 00:18:45.880
the UAP Task Force is more of
a tool to create this report or something

243
00:18:45.880 --> 00:18:52.400
that will continue on or potentially create
a report and then it'll be determined whether

244
00:18:52.839 --> 00:18:56.720
or not they continue on a role
they play. That's an excellent question and

245
00:18:57.279 --> 00:19:03.599
one I can't really amd. I
mean, my suspicion, based on what

246
00:19:03.640 --> 00:19:07.839
we know so far is that it's
largely a continuation, a continuity of previous

247
00:19:07.880 --> 00:19:15.039
efforts. I think that Alizondo and
Melon and TTSA have have played a successful

248
00:19:15.119 --> 00:19:21.279
role as a forcing function to essentially
say this is under resourced, it needs

249
00:19:21.279 --> 00:19:25.880
to be taken more seriously. So
I think that that already seemed to have

250
00:19:25.920 --> 00:19:30.480
been happening I mean only only insiders
was known for sure, and then certainly

251
00:19:30.559 --> 00:19:34.599
the Senate Intel Developments just puts an
exclamation point on all of that because it

252
00:19:34.640 --> 00:19:40.000
does create a responsibility to eventually have
this report. I don't think that the

253
00:19:40.039 --> 00:19:45.079
current effort is designed solely to produce
the report, you know, particularly because

254
00:19:45.079 --> 00:19:49.559
the language, the Senate language references
some precursor of whatever this effort was,

255
00:19:49.559 --> 00:19:52.880
So I think that there was an
awareness that it existed, was doing some

256
00:19:53.039 --> 00:20:00.440
work. But yeah, I mean
I think that again, you know,

257
00:20:00.480 --> 00:20:04.200
whenever you see references to things like
strategic surprise, like in policy terms,

258
00:20:04.279 --> 00:20:08.519
is like a primal screen, right, this is really serious, deep national

259
00:20:08.559 --> 00:20:14.799
security stuff. So I think that
there's a seriousness now, you know,

260
00:20:14.839 --> 00:20:19.160
and attending to this mm hmm,
now that you've kind of dipped your toes

261
00:20:19.200 --> 00:20:25.960
in the UFO Twitter world and you've
kind of seen what goes on in kind

262
00:20:26.000 --> 00:20:32.680
of the UFO community. Uh,
it's there seems to be a major disconnect

263
00:20:32.759 --> 00:20:36.039
to the end, and you're kind
of highlighting that and it really hasn't been

264
00:20:36.160 --> 00:20:42.240
voiced in that Chris Mellan, I
guess has somewhat gone there, but that

265
00:20:42.599 --> 00:20:48.240
you know, when you're talking about
strategic you know, blind spots. Chris

266
00:20:48.279 --> 00:20:55.440
Mellan is bringing up issues that are
gaps in our real world current government that

267
00:20:55.559 --> 00:21:00.319
could be problems that you know,
like the Intelligence Committee needs to be aware

268
00:21:00.359 --> 00:21:03.880
of the committee he worked for,
you know, in the past, that

269
00:21:03.920 --> 00:21:07.720
he's familiar with, Whereas the UFO
community is kind of looking at this,

270
00:21:07.839 --> 00:21:11.160
Oh, finally we're going to learn
about Roswell and all these other things,

271
00:21:11.200 --> 00:21:15.480
and they seem to not really get
it with those parts. So even Mellon

272
00:21:15.599 --> 00:21:22.440
had said when he recommended this this
report or this you know, attempt to

273
00:21:22.480 --> 00:21:27.960
get more information about UAPs, he
suggested it be classified and it would likely

274
00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:36.240
need to remain classified for reasons we
outlined earlier, most likely, which is

275
00:21:36.319 --> 00:21:40.480
kind of you know, the UFO
community wants, of course, more transparency.

276
00:21:40.480 --> 00:21:44.640
They don't want this to remain classified. So it does seem like completely

277
00:21:44.720 --> 00:21:48.680
different goals and ideas of what will
be happening or what this major goal is,

278
00:21:51.440 --> 00:21:56.680
and that seems to cause a lot
of problems and misinterpretation, not just

279
00:21:56.720 --> 00:22:00.519
with the UFO community, but the
media who seems to be confused about that

280
00:22:00.599 --> 00:22:03.039
as well. Yeah, and it
should really be an issue for the scientific

281
00:22:03.039 --> 00:22:07.039
community as well. So I think
one of the things that concerned me early

282
00:22:07.119 --> 00:22:15.480
on is that the understandable security issues
and secrecy issues surrounding this means that a

283
00:22:15.559 --> 00:22:19.359
very small group works on it,
and generally science, a particularly modern science,

284
00:22:19.400 --> 00:22:23.000
doesn't thrive in those conditions. You
need large teams. You need you

285
00:22:23.039 --> 00:22:27.240
know, multiple perspectives on a particular
problem. So, particularly for those really

286
00:22:27.240 --> 00:22:30.160
really hard problems, you know,
the ones that as far as we know,

287
00:22:30.200 --> 00:22:34.400
have gone unsolved for what fifteen sixteen
years, You're just not going to

288
00:22:34.480 --> 00:22:38.400
solve those with you know, four
people or or whatever it may be.

289
00:22:40.359 --> 00:22:42.440
You're going to need a wider perspective. And to be sure, you know,

290
00:22:42.480 --> 00:22:45.920
the DoD has a lot of scientific
power and technical power, there's no

291
00:22:47.240 --> 00:22:49.200
doubting that. But at the same
time, if you have a hard enough

292
00:22:49.200 --> 00:22:52.200
problem, you know, you need
more eyes. So I think that there

293
00:22:52.759 --> 00:22:56.079
there's a need for transparency. Actually, I do agree with parts of the

294
00:22:56.160 --> 00:23:00.920
UFO community quite strongly about that,
because without at least some transparency, without

295
00:23:00.920 --> 00:23:04.599
at least some you know, responsible
production of data, if it can be

296
00:23:04.640 --> 00:23:08.519
done, it's just not going to
move forward from a from a scientific perspective.

297
00:23:08.519 --> 00:23:11.480
And if it doesn't move forward,
you know, I've said this before,

298
00:23:11.559 --> 00:23:15.519
but fifteen years is a long time
to be surprised, right if we're

299
00:23:15.519 --> 00:23:19.640
talking about strategic surprise, that that
in of itself is alarming that something so

300
00:23:19.680 --> 00:23:25.279
significant has gone, you know,
so long unsolved. So there is some

301
00:23:25.400 --> 00:23:30.720
overlap I think, you know,
to those that want to throw open the

302
00:23:30.759 --> 00:23:33.279
doors or in many cases, they
may be convinced that there's a particular solution

303
00:23:33.440 --> 00:23:37.559
and they think there's a particular secret
that's that's actively being held. Well,

304
00:23:37.599 --> 00:23:41.640
I mean, I don't know,
right, maybe, but you know,

305
00:23:41.680 --> 00:23:45.400
I think it keeps It's worth bearing
in mind that there are a lot of

306
00:23:45.440 --> 00:23:48.839
things to deal with this issue,
and there's a lot of reasons why it

307
00:23:48.880 --> 00:23:53.480
may sometimes have to proceed a bit
more cautiously than people would like, right,

308
00:23:53.640 --> 00:23:56.720
And you know, I think that
people get upset, at least in

309
00:23:56.759 --> 00:24:03.319
the UFO community when the idea of
drone is brought up or uass on unmanned

310
00:24:03.359 --> 00:24:10.599
aerial systems. But that actually seems
to be maybe one of the major issues

311
00:24:11.039 --> 00:24:17.000
that this organization's you know, jumping
leaps and bounds, not only in the

312
00:24:17.000 --> 00:24:19.839
hands of our adversaries, but in
the general public who you know, in

313
00:24:21.319 --> 00:24:26.680
cases just being foolish or not knowing
the rules accidentally. You know, we

314
00:24:26.720 --> 00:24:33.799
have this incident in Colorado where the
war Zones covered it. D Johnson has

315
00:24:33.839 --> 00:24:37.400
covered it, and they still don't
know where all of these you know,

316
00:24:37.680 --> 00:24:42.599
drones that seemed to you know,
and it happened in Arizona. And that's

317
00:24:42.640 --> 00:24:45.119
actually it was a story I wrote
a couple of years ago. It was

318
00:24:45.119 --> 00:24:52.559
happening throughout you seemingly, you know, flying over nuclear facilities, in power

319
00:24:52.599 --> 00:24:56.559
plants, and people are concerned,
you know, in Europe there major concerned

320
00:24:56.599 --> 00:25:00.799
is what if these were terrorists,
you know, they could cause major problems.

321
00:25:02.359 --> 00:25:06.640
And so that seems to be something
that would be quite a tax to

322
00:25:06.839 --> 00:25:11.880
track all of that and to understand, you know, who's drones, CIEs

323
00:25:11.920 --> 00:25:15.880
ares are there, theirs are there
ours. Not only is it a difficult

324
00:25:15.920 --> 00:25:19.400
task to keep track of all of
them, but it seems to be vital

325
00:25:21.279 --> 00:25:23.759
to security to do this. I
think this is a massive issue. I

326
00:25:23.839 --> 00:25:29.599
think Johnson and then the war Zones
coverage of it has been essential and alarming.

327
00:25:30.079 --> 00:25:33.039
I think it's actually something we should
all be paying more attention to.

328
00:25:33.200 --> 00:25:37.279
I forget the exact number of cases. I think it's on the order of

329
00:25:37.319 --> 00:25:41.240
about fifty that that Johnson found in
his reporting, and only five had been

330
00:25:41.279 --> 00:25:48.799
resolved. These were specifically reactor cases
of things flying over reactors that weren't identified.

331
00:25:48.480 --> 00:25:52.720
That's a major major problem. Someone
asked earlier, you know, what

332
00:25:52.759 --> 00:25:56.000
do I write about? Actually I
write quite a bit about the security issues

333
00:25:57.039 --> 00:26:02.480
involved in that particular bit of reporting
recent peace. You know, as far

334
00:26:02.519 --> 00:26:06.759
as you know, sensitivity is to
talking about drones. I think there's an

335
00:26:06.839 --> 00:26:11.240
understandable sensitivity in the UFO community due
to years of you know, neglect and

336
00:26:11.279 --> 00:26:15.680
taboo and stigma and all of that, that anything that isn't dealing with the

337
00:26:15.759 --> 00:26:22.160
most difficult cases is deflection or some
kind of flavor of ridicule. And I

338
00:26:22.240 --> 00:26:26.119
get that sensitivity, of course.
But on the other hand, I think,

339
00:26:26.240 --> 00:26:30.599
just realistically, we've got to realize
that again, in that pile of

340
00:26:30.680 --> 00:26:33.720
unknown cases, it's just the way
it works that most of them are going

341
00:26:33.759 --> 00:26:37.279
to be misidentification, some of them
are going to be drones, and you

342
00:26:37.279 --> 00:26:41.960
know, and a few are these
really spectacular cases that everyone gets excited about.

343
00:26:41.359 --> 00:26:45.279
And I think it's important to get
to not get to exercise about that

344
00:26:45.440 --> 00:26:49.000
that when you know, unsurprisingly we
find one case sure is a is a

345
00:26:49.039 --> 00:26:52.559
misidentification or a drone that doesn't throw
everything out. You know, you have

346
00:26:52.599 --> 00:26:57.200
to work each case individually. That's
another point I mean recently, is that

347
00:26:57.240 --> 00:27:04.400
resolving one case does not resolve all
of them simultaneously. So I just want

348
00:27:04.440 --> 00:27:07.759
to make that point that if you
hear me talking about drones, it's not

349
00:27:07.799 --> 00:27:11.039
to reduce or to eliminate the strange
cases, but rather to just kind of

350
00:27:11.359 --> 00:27:15.000
deal with the data that we have
in front of us mm hmmm. Which

351
00:27:15.079 --> 00:27:18.920
I think it's going to be a
learning curve for the general public. Is

352
00:27:18.400 --> 00:27:23.880
if we start to hear a lot
of stories about drones and investigation of drones

353
00:27:23.880 --> 00:27:29.079
in this U a p task for
us, which seems appropriate, uh,

354
00:27:29.119 --> 00:27:33.680
And that that doesn't necessarily uh.
And I can see the headlines now you

355
00:27:33.680 --> 00:27:37.720
know it turns out UFOs are all
drones. You know, that won't be

356
00:27:37.839 --> 00:27:41.920
the case necessarily even if we do, and we should be prepared that we

357
00:27:42.000 --> 00:27:45.599
may hear a lot of type of
things from this this group and that's not

358
00:27:45.640 --> 00:27:48.839
necessarily a bad thing, right,
And that what we're trying to do,

359
00:27:48.920 --> 00:27:52.400
it's solve you know, unidentified cases. And I think it's it's actually really

360
00:27:52.799 --> 00:27:56.920
important to know when it's a drone. I mean, for someone who's had

361
00:27:56.920 --> 00:27:59.480
a stream sighting, I'm sure you
don't want to walk around thinking it's,

362
00:27:59.839 --> 00:28:03.960
you know, it was this this
profound thing and then it turns out to

363
00:28:03.000 --> 00:28:06.079
be a drone. You want to
know the truth, whatever, whatever that

364
00:28:06.160 --> 00:28:08.680
truth is. But then on the
other hand, I understand there there are

365
00:28:08.680 --> 00:28:12.079
plenty of people that say everything is
a drone, right, Everything that's stranger

366
00:28:12.200 --> 00:28:15.880
somehow must be a drone. It's
like the replacement for for the UFO in

367
00:28:15.920 --> 00:28:22.160
some respect, and that's you know
that that doesn't pass muster either. Again,

368
00:28:22.200 --> 00:28:25.160
it gets back to this this problem
of nuance that I think is really

369
00:28:25.200 --> 00:28:30.079
important. And I think the more
nuanced anyone can be with an interest in

370
00:28:30.079 --> 00:28:33.599
this field the better, because it's
already charged with, you know, so

371
00:28:33.680 --> 00:28:38.599
much history and emotion and everything.
Mm hmm. The other topic I wanted

372
00:28:38.640 --> 00:28:41.880
to bring up, which I know
is very curious for you and it was

373
00:28:42.000 --> 00:28:47.279
for me as well, is that
latest New York Times article that kind of

374
00:28:47.680 --> 00:28:53.359
brought into the mix UFO crashes,
which was kind of strange, a strange

375
00:28:55.599 --> 00:29:00.119
in many fronts. I'm not even
sure it. My only guess is to

376
00:29:00.200 --> 00:29:07.559
why that even happened was to kind
of playcate perhaps that that side of the

377
00:29:07.640 --> 00:29:11.599
UFO community that wants to know more
about Roswell and some of these other things.

378
00:29:11.839 --> 00:29:18.680
But the problem was it kind of
introduced some very speculative, uh and

379
00:29:19.400 --> 00:29:23.200
kind of you know, essentially hearsay, a second third hand source type of

380
00:29:23.240 --> 00:29:30.240
information, whereas so far we had
been working with some very good, you

381
00:29:30.279 --> 00:29:34.160
know, credible information and data,
you know, firsthand witnesses like like jet

382
00:29:34.200 --> 00:29:40.319
fighter pilots. That seemed to be
kind of strange. Yeah, it was

383
00:29:40.359 --> 00:29:42.480
certainly a departure from the previous stories, and you know, I want to

384
00:29:42.519 --> 00:29:45.119
be careful and respectful of the times, respectful of the reporters. I know

385
00:29:45.160 --> 00:29:51.839
they're professionals and you know they and
they're invested in these stories, clearly,

386
00:29:52.960 --> 00:29:55.119
I think. Yeah, there were
a few issues. There were the obvious

387
00:29:55.160 --> 00:29:56.759
things that I think we all talked
about. So some of them were the

388
00:29:56.759 --> 00:30:03.720
decision to paraphrase or the thing to
quote, and you know, those things

389
00:30:03.720 --> 00:30:07.279
I think proved to be probably the
most conspicuous there there were other issues there.

390
00:30:07.359 --> 00:30:11.599
So to kind of rewind in our
conversation earlier about blue Book versus nine

391
00:30:11.640 --> 00:30:17.480
to eleven, as a model the
nine to eleven report. If you the

392
00:30:17.559 --> 00:30:22.440
mistake there about having a report every
six months instead of in six months is

393
00:30:22.480 --> 00:30:25.759
actually a little bit more significant.
So it's it's a missed opportunity there to

394
00:30:25.799 --> 00:30:29.400
recognize that the idea isn't we're going
to have, you know, a rolling

395
00:30:29.839 --> 00:30:33.240
update on how things are going in
the world of UFOs, but rather that

396
00:30:33.240 --> 00:30:37.279
there's going to be this intensive not
necessarily whole of government, but the whole

397
00:30:37.359 --> 00:30:41.400
of the ICE and National security apparatus
really working on this thing for short period

398
00:30:41.440 --> 00:30:45.160
to find where the problems are and
then aggressively attack it. It's just a

399
00:30:45.200 --> 00:30:49.440
different a different animal than I think
that it was characterized there, and that

400
00:30:49.480 --> 00:30:52.759
may seem like a small mistake,
you know to the casual repeater reader.

401
00:30:52.960 --> 00:30:56.599
You know they said every you know, twice a year, you know,

402
00:30:56.640 --> 00:31:00.359
repeating report instead at once. Well
you unpack it there. There's quite a

403
00:31:00.440 --> 00:31:03.519
bit more there. I think that
the other thing that stood out to me,

404
00:31:04.559 --> 00:31:11.160
just from a perspective of science reporting
is that it's always good to have

405
00:31:11.400 --> 00:31:15.960
a expert in a field who's not
necessarily directly involved in the work at hand

406
00:31:15.599 --> 00:31:21.799
to comment. That's something that journalists
often get wrong. With science coverage is

407
00:31:21.799 --> 00:31:25.279
that they go and they talk to
someone who discovered something and they get their

408
00:31:25.319 --> 00:31:27.759
particular take on it. And of
course that person, you know, is

409
00:31:29.240 --> 00:31:32.279
really excited by their discovery and they
have a reason they want to talk it

410
00:31:32.359 --> 00:31:34.160
up. So you need to talk
to other experts in the field. And

411
00:31:34.519 --> 00:31:37.119
this is actually where I have a
ton of sympathy for them as reporters,

412
00:31:37.160 --> 00:31:40.880
because how do you do that?
Here? Right there? There there's a

413
00:31:40.960 --> 00:31:44.880
level of secrecy where it's difficult to
go and get some you know, materials

414
00:31:45.519 --> 00:31:51.480
science engineer or you know, a
material science person to to comment. But

415
00:31:51.519 --> 00:31:55.480
I you know, I think that
that kind of effort to balance a little

416
00:31:55.519 --> 00:32:00.640
bit more would have been helpful because
in scientific efforts, it really never comes

417
00:32:00.640 --> 00:32:02.240
down to, you know, one
person say so, I think there's a

418
00:32:02.240 --> 00:32:06.480
little bit of that idea that it's
just just one person who's the expert.

419
00:32:07.039 --> 00:32:10.640
It really rarely works that way.
So yeah, I mean, you're you're

420
00:32:10.720 --> 00:32:14.720
right. It was a departure.
It was striking when it came out.

421
00:32:14.720 --> 00:32:19.000
I think it surprised a lot of
people. It certainly surprised me, and

422
00:32:19.079 --> 00:32:22.720
it'll be it'd be really interesting to
see where it goes from here. Mm

423
00:32:22.799 --> 00:32:29.160
hmmm. The way Chris Mellon framed
it is that it provided in those briefings,

424
00:32:29.759 --> 00:32:37.279
uh leads for the Senate Intelligence Committee, which kind of essentially for the

425
00:32:37.599 --> 00:32:43.119
dial report that should be coming out
at some point, because it does seem

426
00:32:43.160 --> 00:32:47.359
like, you know, they are
moving forward with all of the that will

427
00:32:47.400 --> 00:32:53.599
before, which should have all of
the historic at least publicly consumable what we'll

428
00:32:53.640 --> 00:33:04.519
see historic information regarding potential of materials. Yeah, well, I mean listen,

429
00:33:04.559 --> 00:33:07.119
I mean, if if there are
materials, then let's examine them,

430
00:33:07.200 --> 00:33:13.000
right, and you know who knows
what they are. But certainly if and

431
00:33:13.079 --> 00:33:16.559
we're talking about doctor Eric Davis here
and aroundabout way, if if Davis had

432
00:33:17.440 --> 00:33:22.160
doctor Davis had examined these things and
found them to be interesting, then clearly

433
00:33:22.240 --> 00:33:25.160
at some point along the way they
had them in their custody and they were

434
00:33:25.200 --> 00:33:29.119
able to do some sort of work
on them. So it should be possible

435
00:33:29.160 --> 00:33:32.640
to do that again. So I'm
all for if they think they found something

436
00:33:32.640 --> 00:33:37.240
that has odd properties, of course, you know, let's look at it.

437
00:33:37.440 --> 00:33:42.920
But I think with something with such
a heavy kind of charge behind it,

438
00:33:42.920 --> 00:33:45.319
it would be wise to do that
work in advance and report on it

439
00:33:45.480 --> 00:33:49.480
rather than to kind of anticipate what, you know, what the report might

440
00:33:49.519 --> 00:33:54.880
say. Hmm, yeah, right. And I think and and I kind

441
00:33:54.920 --> 00:33:59.799
of asked these questions too, and
it kind of does relate to blue books

442
00:34:00.519 --> 00:34:07.319
in that the idea of transparency.
Will this or will this be as transparent

443
00:34:07.519 --> 00:34:12.840
as hoped Hill the u AP Task
Force be as transparent? You know,

444
00:34:12.880 --> 00:34:15.880
I wrote up recently kind of the
problem with the d O D Public Affairs

445
00:34:16.440 --> 00:34:22.000
Office and and the responses they've given
us thus far of the Pentagon project A

446
00:34:22.199 --> 00:34:30.880
tip and I have these today that
perhaps there will be more information that is

447
00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:36.239
along the lines of some of the
things that have demonstrably been wrong that they've

448
00:34:36.239 --> 00:34:40.519
said in the past. If that
continues, or if that happens, let's

449
00:34:40.559 --> 00:34:46.320
say, in the next few days, it doesn't bote for the type of

450
00:34:46.800 --> 00:34:52.000
I guess relationship that this organization might
have with the public in the future.

451
00:34:52.400 --> 00:34:59.199
Yeah, that's that's a question worth
asking, is how the public relation aspect

452
00:34:59.280 --> 00:35:01.079
of this will work. I mean, as I said previously, I think,

453
00:35:02.239 --> 00:35:06.800
just judging by the draft LANK which
before we you know, saw what

454
00:35:06.880 --> 00:35:09.519
the Senate Intel Committee ultimately produced,
it really I think was designed as an

455
00:35:09.519 --> 00:35:15.239
intergovernmental process primarily, So let's fix
the problem on the inside and you know,

456
00:35:15.280 --> 00:35:17.039
get things working as it should and
then along the way, you know,

457
00:35:17.039 --> 00:35:21.719
we're going to try to do what
we can for public confidence. I

458
00:35:21.760 --> 00:35:23.880
think because of all the things we
mentioned at the start of our conversation,

459
00:35:24.039 --> 00:35:29.280
all the trick wires you run into
and talking about this, so it may

460
00:35:29.280 --> 00:35:34.000
be the case that realistically, the
the you know, the public perception of

461
00:35:34.000 --> 00:35:37.960
it is not the top priority national
security is. And that's that's hard for

462
00:35:38.400 --> 00:35:43.239
all of us watching this issue and
caring about it, because of course we

463
00:35:43.280 --> 00:35:45.000
want to be informed, and like
I said, there's a good reason why

464
00:35:45.079 --> 00:35:50.840
we need to be informed actually,
but nevertheless, they're going to have to

465
00:35:50.880 --> 00:35:55.159
balance you know, this equation,
and you know, some parts of that

466
00:35:55.199 --> 00:36:02.000
may be less than satisfying for us, right, and yeah, what's been

467
00:36:02.039 --> 00:36:05.719
that kind of the theme of the
conversation. But at the same time,

468
00:36:06.320 --> 00:36:10.760
you know, they have real world
issues to you know, some very important

469
00:36:10.800 --> 00:36:22.760
national security issues to tend with here
and too arguably should be consideration committally or

470
00:36:22.840 --> 00:36:27.840
primarily anyway, even if it does
disappoint some of us in the outside who

471
00:36:28.199 --> 00:36:30.800
want to know more. Yeah,
So one of the things that I've written

472
00:36:30.840 --> 00:36:34.679
about. That's kind of on the
opposite of this, because we've been saying,

473
00:36:34.679 --> 00:36:37.239
well, there might be a need
to kind of keep the information limited,

474
00:36:37.360 --> 00:36:39.239
and you know, it may be
very quiet and so on. I

475
00:36:39.239 --> 00:36:44.440
mean, arguably there could be a
reverse dynamic down the road. So let's

476
00:36:44.440 --> 00:36:49.880
say that Christopher Mellen's basically right.
You know that there's been bureaucratic in transigency.

477
00:36:50.079 --> 00:36:52.480
The issue just hasn't been dealt with, and that some of these really

478
00:36:52.480 --> 00:37:00.000
strange cases are exotic, whatever that
might mean, and there is a recognition

479
00:37:00.719 --> 00:37:04.960
of that at some point, and
it does become at least in some measure

480
00:37:05.000 --> 00:37:07.840
of public Well, you know,
you're looking at very constrained options at that

481
00:37:07.920 --> 00:37:14.320
point, because if you then decide
not to investigate, not to communicate about

482
00:37:14.320 --> 00:37:21.440
it, you're essentially playing right into
the conspiracy and kind of cover up ideas

483
00:37:21.719 --> 00:37:24.159
that I don't think will be tolerable
at that point in time. And then,

484
00:37:24.199 --> 00:37:28.159
on the other hand, you have
now this acute question of what to

485
00:37:28.199 --> 00:37:32.719
do about it, and that is
a really serious and hard problem. I

486
00:37:32.719 --> 00:37:37.199
mean, as far as we know, in all of the strange reports,

487
00:37:37.280 --> 00:37:42.079
these things are pretty evasive that they
don't seem like they're particularly interested in having

488
00:37:42.079 --> 00:37:45.800
any kind of of an exchange.
We don't can't predict when or where they're

489
00:37:45.840 --> 00:37:51.360
going to be. So even if
we can admit it, what do we

490
00:37:51.440 --> 00:37:53.119
do, What do we actually do? You know, in the weeks or

491
00:37:53.119 --> 00:37:57.760
months after, say, you know, Melan is proven to be correct about

492
00:37:57.760 --> 00:38:02.199
this, It's a real dilemma and
it opens up all kinds of problems in

493
00:38:02.280 --> 00:38:07.960
terms of the way that the public
might react to that news and what an

494
00:38:07.000 --> 00:38:10.480
information we may have available to us
at that point. So, you know,

495
00:38:10.519 --> 00:38:14.639
as much as it sounds like this
is all kind of boring national security,

496
00:38:15.119 --> 00:38:16.880
the reality on the other side is, you know, there could be

497
00:38:16.960 --> 00:38:21.719
some really I mean, it's it
sort of feels, at least from my

498
00:38:21.760 --> 00:38:24.440
advantage, I'm newer to this,
I'm newer to these ideas. It's head

499
00:38:24.480 --> 00:38:28.519
spinning, you know, to think
about those sorts of things and to write

500
00:38:28.519 --> 00:38:34.639
about right, And that's I think
where the challenge is. And I guess

501
00:38:35.199 --> 00:38:38.440
what's interesting about this conversation because you
know, putting yourself in their shoes,

502
00:38:39.519 --> 00:38:44.480
and of course I'm always thinking about
the pr side of things. How do

503
00:38:44.559 --> 00:38:47.760
you unicate with the public on this
issue? That's a really difficult topic,

504
00:38:49.039 --> 00:38:55.559
especially when you're contending with national's you
know, classification, you know, counterintelligence.

505
00:38:57.039 --> 00:39:06.719
It's really difficult to do that,
and especially with fear or meant has.

506
00:39:06.880 --> 00:39:12.239
We do have a few indications where
they've kind of encouraged the idea of

507
00:39:13.119 --> 00:39:16.079
UFOs to cover up projects. You
know, we've heard this with the ox

508
00:39:16.159 --> 00:39:25.760
cart Pro YouTube program stuff out of
Area fifty to believe they're UFOs. H

509
00:39:27.679 --> 00:39:37.519
Uh, that's really I don't know
how they're they deal with. Yeah,

510
00:39:37.559 --> 00:39:42.000
we've got a little bit of a
delay here, so hopefully I caught you.

511
00:39:42.079 --> 00:39:45.880
Yes, I mean that this is
a really hard problem. I I

512
00:39:45.960 --> 00:39:51.960
sort of suspect that there may be
a situation where they have a great deal

513
00:39:52.000 --> 00:39:53.840
of data, meaning they have more
videos, they've got radar, they've got

514
00:39:53.840 --> 00:39:58.880
whatever other capabilities they have, but
they may not necessarily have more information.

515
00:39:59.440 --> 00:40:01.480
So what I mean by that is, for all of those videos and all

516
00:40:01.519 --> 00:40:06.239
of that data, it may be
hard to kind of make hazard tails of

517
00:40:06.400 --> 00:40:09.000
what's in them. In other words, that maybe just about as perplexed as

518
00:40:09.039 --> 00:40:12.880
the rest of us. So then
if that is the case, then how

519
00:40:12.920 --> 00:40:15.480
do you communicate that to the public, that that really the secret is a

520
00:40:15.559 --> 00:40:21.519
lack of knowledge, a lack of
understanding of what you're dealing with, particularly

521
00:40:21.599 --> 00:40:25.400
from institutions that are charged with you
know, definitively no not just knowing what's

522
00:40:25.440 --> 00:40:30.960
going on, but but defending us
against you know, whatever things maybe out

523
00:40:30.960 --> 00:40:35.159
there. So yeah, it's it's
uh, that's why I say where it's

524
00:40:35.159 --> 00:40:38.079
it's dizzying to think about the way
this chessboard looks. If you're the person

525
00:40:38.119 --> 00:40:45.880
in charge of national security, I
think that you know what might be SETI,

526
00:40:46.360 --> 00:40:53.239
or at least the SETI Institute in
tackling very something that used to be

527
00:40:53.480 --> 00:41:00.320
seeing this ringe not anymore astrobiology that
the name, and even with NASAs.

528
00:41:00.480 --> 00:41:06.800
So perhaps you know something like that
can a bit where there are things saying

529
00:41:06.800 --> 00:41:10.400
that what a group of scientists you
know, working diligently here it out.

530
00:41:12.239 --> 00:41:15.599
Yeah, I think Steudy is something
that is certainly important. I think also

531
00:41:15.880 --> 00:41:22.840
as underappreciated. But there's a parallel
effort called medi of messaging extraterrestrial intelligence.

532
00:41:22.840 --> 00:41:28.400
So scientists that think about how could
you make a comprehensible message to another species

533
00:41:28.440 --> 00:41:32.039
that doesn't perhaps share anything really with
you in common? You know, and

534
00:41:32.320 --> 00:41:36.360
and again you know this is a
bit speculative. But if there is something,

535
00:41:36.559 --> 00:41:38.559
you know, really truly strange out
there, then we may be confronted

536
00:41:38.599 --> 00:41:43.000
with that problem of how exactly do
you communicate? How do you do that

537
00:41:43.039 --> 00:41:47.440
in practice? It's actually a very
specific technical problem. It's not as easy

538
00:41:47.440 --> 00:41:52.960
as just sort of waving out the
window, right. So, and there

539
00:41:52.960 --> 00:41:57.000
are really fascinating debates within that community. So there tend to be medi scholars

540
00:41:57.039 --> 00:42:00.920
who are anthropologists and historians and people
with humanities backgrounds, and then there are

541
00:42:01.039 --> 00:42:06.960
you know, physicists and computer scientists, and the physicists and computer scientists generally

542
00:42:07.039 --> 00:42:10.440
tend to be on the side of
we can build up communication through mathematics and

543
00:42:10.480 --> 00:42:15.440
we can actually communicate very complex things
in that way. And many of the

544
00:42:15.480 --> 00:42:17.760
anthropologists and linguists and so on are
skeptical of that, and they say,

545
00:42:17.760 --> 00:42:21.480
sure, you know, you can
show that you're intelligent, but how do

546
00:42:21.519 --> 00:42:24.800
you go from mathematics to being able
to talk meaningfully about society or culture or

547
00:42:24.800 --> 00:42:28.639
ethics or you know, many of
the things that you know, we might

548
00:42:28.679 --> 00:42:32.480
want to communicate about. So those
are very real, you know, live

549
00:42:32.599 --> 00:42:37.440
debates in that community, and something
probably the public hasn't really looked at much.

550
00:42:37.960 --> 00:42:42.239
But you know, boy, that
could be very very relevant, you

551
00:42:42.280 --> 00:42:49.159
know, depending how how these efforts
go. Another difficult policy days not seem

552
00:42:49.239 --> 00:42:57.199
to be not necessarily policy, but
seemed to be unwritten, and has talked

553
00:42:57.239 --> 00:43:01.079
about when he worked at the Ministry
of Defense, working at the UFO desk,

554
00:43:01.400 --> 00:43:06.960
how they would use spinning dirties and
other words where if they're asked about

555
00:43:06.960 --> 00:43:10.559
a UFO case, they make a
joke of it and then the media runs

556
00:43:10.599 --> 00:43:16.280
with that and then does look more
deeply into their uh what they're acting,

557
00:43:16.400 --> 00:43:21.920
which is taking some of these issues
seriously. I think certainly you can see

558
00:43:21.920 --> 00:43:25.440
a parallel in the way that we've
dealt it here in the United States,

559
00:43:25.480 --> 00:43:30.480
perhaps, you know, looking especially
when I wrote my latest are you know

560
00:43:30.599 --> 00:43:37.119
looking at the the the d O
D has responded to Alizondo came coming out

561
00:43:37.159 --> 00:43:43.119
and exposing a tip. Uh it
seems that kind of is the rule,

562
00:43:44.840 --> 00:43:50.679
and it seems like it's it's nature
do that and are we be able to

563
00:43:50.840 --> 00:43:57.679
have a credible gift from that sort
of response to you know, more open

564
00:43:57.760 --> 00:44:01.800
transparent. Hey, you know your
friend and we're your partner and looking into

565
00:44:01.840 --> 00:44:07.440
all of this. Yeah, I
mean I think we're we're seeing that sort

566
00:44:07.440 --> 00:44:09.639
of transition now, you know,
and I think that's what many are trying

567
00:44:09.639 --> 00:44:13.599
to do. And so, you
know, I credit very much journalists like

568
00:44:13.679 --> 00:44:19.760
Tim McMillan and m jbn Iisen so
many others for giving this, you know,

569
00:44:19.920 --> 00:44:24.079
serious coverage and not not you know, treating it as kind of the

570
00:44:24.119 --> 00:44:29.239
wacky story of the week or whatever
is it often gets characterized as unfortunately,

571
00:44:30.280 --> 00:44:32.480
and I think, you know,
the media history is really really interesting.

572
00:44:32.519 --> 00:44:36.360
So a piece I wrote a while
back now was about the history of the

573
00:44:36.519 --> 00:44:38.880
Undish and Chorus incident, uh and
the way that that was handled in the

574
00:44:38.920 --> 00:44:45.360
press. And so in brief,
so eupologists that was actually an international team

575
00:44:45.360 --> 00:44:51.239
of euthologists from what I understand,
work through Foya you know and other beans

576
00:44:51.239 --> 00:44:55.519
to develop that case, and we're
quite successful. They got documents sort of

577
00:44:55.519 --> 00:45:00.559
in hand, and then when they
went to their colleague in the press to

578
00:45:00.559 --> 00:45:05.239
get to get to get the story
out, they went to a newspaper that

579
00:45:05.280 --> 00:45:07.800
had a huge amount of circulation but
was kind of known for more salacious types

580
00:45:07.840 --> 00:45:12.039
of stories. They were able to
break real news, but they focused on

581
00:45:12.079 --> 00:45:15.679
the more kind of exciting side.
Well, that newspaper chose to write it

582
00:45:15.760 --> 00:45:20.280
up in the most exciting possible version, but maybe not the best supported by

583
00:45:20.320 --> 00:45:22.360
the facts, so they got it's
a classic case in journalism of getting out

584
00:45:22.360 --> 00:45:28.280
over your skis, and so predictably
what happened was all the other papers knocked

585
00:45:28.280 --> 00:45:30.920
the story down because they didn't want
to see that they've been scooped on this

586
00:45:31.079 --> 00:45:36.559
major thing, and it made the
sort the story look silly very quickly,

587
00:45:36.920 --> 00:45:39.239
and then the general sense was,
well, there's nothing to it, right,

588
00:45:39.280 --> 00:45:44.639
and then then the case died.
We know from the kind of Condine

589
00:45:44.639 --> 00:45:47.559
documents the UK's effort to look at
these issues years later, there was some

590
00:45:47.639 --> 00:45:52.719
reason to think that those events were
significant. So this pattern, you know,

591
00:45:52.800 --> 00:45:55.480
plays out over and over that there's
an appetite in the public for the

592
00:45:55.519 --> 00:46:00.559
more exciting aspects of these stories,
and that appetite can actually be destructive to

593
00:46:00.599 --> 00:46:06.199
the topic because it can lead you
to again telling that most exciting version rather

594
00:46:06.239 --> 00:46:13.000
than kind of the conservative but best
factually supported version. So part of the

595
00:46:13.000 --> 00:46:15.880
answer to that is that journalists need
to be careful. We need to know

596
00:46:15.960 --> 00:46:21.360
that tendency and to have it in
mind. I think that learning from history

597
00:46:21.400 --> 00:46:23.559
basically is the best answer I can
think of at the moment to you know,

598
00:46:23.559 --> 00:46:28.079
to your question of how we deal
with this? Yeah, there,

599
00:46:28.599 --> 00:46:31.920
you know, you're an article that
brought up another great point and which I

600
00:46:31.960 --> 00:46:37.039
think you know more to it now
since you've written the article. It's the

601
00:46:37.079 --> 00:46:42.199
Air Force. All of the you
know, when it came to previous UFO

602
00:46:42.440 --> 00:46:45.920
research projects, they were headed by
the air The Air Force has always been

603
00:46:46.000 --> 00:46:52.719
kind of the go to on this
topic, but they've been practically nowhere to

604
00:46:52.800 --> 00:46:55.000
be found. They did a you
know, there was Tim McMillan, you

605
00:46:55.039 --> 00:47:00.920
know that article about uh, the
Air Force did investigate at those videos.

606
00:47:00.079 --> 00:47:06.280
That's about all that we've heard them. And O n I, the Navy

607
00:47:06.360 --> 00:47:09.960
Intelligence is in charge of all of
this. That seems pretty strange as well.

608
00:47:12.000 --> 00:47:14.559
It does. It does. I
mean that that is kind of one

609
00:47:14.599 --> 00:47:19.719
of the central policy mysteries here is
why is the you know, the military

610
00:47:19.760 --> 00:47:23.119
branch, that's his mission, it
is to defend the sky is not more

611
00:47:23.159 --> 00:47:29.920
involved you know, in these in
this particular set of issues. Yeah,

612
00:47:29.960 --> 00:47:34.920
it is. It is a It
is a fascinating question. So one of

613
00:47:34.920 --> 00:47:37.239
the things I wrote about one one
of the surprising things if you compare the

614
00:47:37.360 --> 00:47:43.400
language that that that Melon drafted and
put out publicly, and then what's in

615
00:47:43.440 --> 00:47:47.280
the actual Senate Intel report is that
the Senate Intel Reports timeline is far more

616
00:47:47.280 --> 00:47:51.519
aggressive. It's it's for if I
recall correctly, it's his third as long

617
00:47:51.800 --> 00:47:54.920
as what Melon had suggested. And
one I so that it raises the question

618
00:47:55.039 --> 00:48:00.920
right of why why that fast?
Surely it was more time to do the

619
00:48:00.039 --> 00:48:04.679
job. And I kind of lay
out that if the problem you're trying to

620
00:48:04.719 --> 00:48:08.480
solve is bureaucratic in transigence, one
solution to that might be you give it

621
00:48:08.519 --> 00:48:13.960
almost impossible to meet deadline that they're
going to have to work really really quickly

622
00:48:14.400 --> 00:48:19.760
to fulfill, because it will exactly
show you who's moving slowly. When eventually

623
00:48:19.800 --> 00:48:23.199
the Director of National Intelligence the DNI
is sitting in the chair before the Senate,

624
00:48:24.159 --> 00:48:28.199
that person is going to have to
have an answer. They're going to

625
00:48:28.239 --> 00:48:30.320
have to be able to support it. And if they're asked you know,

626
00:48:30.320 --> 00:48:34.239
why couldn't you get better answers,
they're going to need to identify someone.

627
00:48:35.039 --> 00:48:37.719
And the argument that I made is
that the Air Force is at a high

628
00:48:37.840 --> 00:48:43.719
risk of being that entity that gets
designated as the slow party, and they

629
00:48:43.760 --> 00:48:45.559
don't want to do that they don't
have to do that. I think they

630
00:48:45.559 --> 00:48:50.960
actually have an opportunity if they'd like
to be more active. I think they

631
00:48:50.960 --> 00:48:55.480
can use this issue to showcase their
incredible technological ability. There's new leadership in

632
00:48:55.519 --> 00:48:59.800
the Air Force right now, so
it's good timing from that perspective, and

633
00:49:00.400 --> 00:49:01.639
I think that on the other hand, if it doesn't, if it doesn't

634
00:49:01.719 --> 00:49:07.639
rise to the moment, it has
the risk of seeding leadership to the Navy,

635
00:49:07.079 --> 00:49:10.559
which is not great along any number
of dimensions in terms of budgets,

636
00:49:10.920 --> 00:49:15.159
but also just to the imagination of
future recruits. Do you really want to

637
00:49:15.239 --> 00:49:19.920
lead this really interesting area to another
branch because that young person that's interested in

638
00:49:19.960 --> 00:49:23.199
science and technology, they're going to
want to go to the Navy because that's

639
00:49:23.239 --> 00:49:25.800
where the interesting things are happening,
you know, not the Air Force.

640
00:49:27.320 --> 00:49:32.480
So I hope they realize that they
have an opportunity also a risk, and

641
00:49:32.519 --> 00:49:38.119
that they really grab the issue.
Another gamble they all have to make us

642
00:49:38.199 --> 00:49:47.800
to kind of gauged Publicterst also argued
that perhaps the DoD you know, miss

643
00:49:49.119 --> 00:49:52.559
miss that that they had felt there
wasn't enough public interest that this would go,

644
00:49:53.119 --> 00:49:58.320
you know, very far, and
that's why they creat these dubious claims

645
00:49:58.360 --> 00:50:00.400
to begin with, they just thought, you know, know, business as

646
00:50:00.480 --> 00:50:04.840
usual, it's been in dirty tricks. We give them an ant, they

647
00:50:04.880 --> 00:50:09.280
write their stories and they go away
to story that hasn't gone away, and

648
00:50:10.079 --> 00:50:15.199
that could be sort of you know, gamble that they might be thinking right

649
00:50:15.239 --> 00:50:17.920
now, maybe the Air Force is
thinking, well, once a report comes

650
00:50:17.960 --> 00:50:22.239
out, they might highlight us as
one of the problematic organizations. Who isn't

651
00:50:22.280 --> 00:50:28.280
all But are they really going to
push us on it? Right? Well,

652
00:50:28.320 --> 00:50:30.440
to that, I would say,
you know what percentage of scientists and

653
00:50:30.480 --> 00:50:37.239
engineers that you know are fans of
science fiction and are interested in, you

654
00:50:37.280 --> 00:50:39.239
know, all of these kinds of
issues, right, It's a very high

655
00:50:39.320 --> 00:50:45.559
percentage. And those people are plenty
mature enough to realize that, you know,

656
00:50:45.599 --> 00:50:50.239
fiction is fiction, but you know, there are these strange cases that

657
00:50:50.280 --> 00:50:52.360
we can't resolve. I mean,
that's that's the other thing. So we

658
00:50:52.360 --> 00:50:55.679
can even put the fiction's part of
the popular culture part of it aside.

659
00:50:57.000 --> 00:51:00.559
Just a mystery, just a scientific
mystery that is precise would get scientists and

660
00:51:00.559 --> 00:51:04.679
engineers out of bed in the morning, is to solve those kinds of things.

661
00:51:05.239 --> 00:51:07.800
So I would say that That would
be a pretty profound, you know,

662
00:51:07.840 --> 00:51:12.480
miscalculation to think that the public just
doesn't care or it's just a small

663
00:51:12.519 --> 00:51:15.880
group of people. Boy, just
look at movies recently and I think you'll

664
00:51:15.880 --> 00:51:21.320
see a whole lot of people are
very interested, right And I would agree,

665
00:51:21.760 --> 00:51:24.639
and you know, and it becomes
interesting though, you know, the

666
00:51:24.760 --> 00:51:30.199
role that the election plays in this. I mean, has that come up

667
00:51:30.599 --> 00:51:37.159
with Biden or Kamala who comes to
Senate Intelligence Committee? You know, our

668
00:51:37.199 --> 00:51:42.519
people behind the scenes. This might
be a Brian Bender question because he insight

669
00:51:42.639 --> 00:51:47.880
in this arena, Brian Benner being
the political writer who was Defense and Space

670
00:51:49.000 --> 00:51:53.119
editor for Political when he started writing
this now in your Correspondent. But you

671
00:51:53.159 --> 00:51:57.679
know, what is the type for
all of this? Is she on board

672
00:51:57.760 --> 00:52:00.000
in this? You know, putting, you know, getting this information?

673
00:52:01.039 --> 00:52:07.159
You know, even and the DNI
changes, fit changes, if the intation

674
00:52:07.400 --> 00:52:09.440
changes. Oh, there's so many
there's so many factors to look at there.

675
00:52:09.480 --> 00:52:12.400
But before I go into them,
let me say, let's get some

676
00:52:12.400 --> 00:52:15.840
panel discussions going. At some points
it would be really interesting to hear with

677
00:52:15.840 --> 00:52:17.199
with someone like Brian Bender would have
to say in a question like this,

678
00:52:17.320 --> 00:52:22.960
but but yeah, absolutely so the
question of who the you know, particular

679
00:52:22.039 --> 00:52:28.719
d NI is and who the people
are in these positions is massively impactful in

680
00:52:28.800 --> 00:52:31.960
terms of what life experience they bring
to that job. Also just the the

681
00:52:32.039 --> 00:52:35.760
issues and the agenda that they're going
to be working on as they go into

682
00:52:35.760 --> 00:52:37.920
that job. How much attention are
they going to have? You know,

683
00:52:37.920 --> 00:52:39.440
it's important to remember we're in the
middle of a pandemic, We're in the

684
00:52:39.480 --> 00:52:45.800
middle of serious questions about election security, among so many others, so all

685
00:52:45.840 --> 00:52:47.920
of that is going to play a
role. The world doesn't stop for UFOs

686
00:52:49.000 --> 00:52:53.920
unfortunately. Yes, and some people
have raised the question of wood Harris in

687
00:52:53.960 --> 00:52:58.079
particular, you know, be more
aware of this because she, you know,

688
00:52:58.119 --> 00:53:00.159
sat on the Intel Committee. Maybe
yeah, I think is a good

689
00:53:00.159 --> 00:53:04.119
answer to that. Probably she would
be involved. But but of course,

690
00:53:04.199 --> 00:53:07.920
like staff tends to really be where
a lot of the you know, the

691
00:53:07.039 --> 00:53:10.840
nitty gritty work gets done. So
you know, if you're relying on her

692
00:53:12.000 --> 00:53:15.079
personally having an intimate knowledge of all
of that may or may not be the

693
00:53:15.119 --> 00:53:16.639
cases. I don't think there's any
way to say, but to me,

694
00:53:16.800 --> 00:53:21.960
you know, another question is you
know, after the election, that committee

695
00:53:22.000 --> 00:53:24.800
is still going to be there and
and if they if the Biden Harris ticket

696
00:53:25.239 --> 00:53:30.440
wins, while those are going to
be her former colleagues, and so if

697
00:53:30.440 --> 00:53:32.519
they run into trouble at any point
and they need some help from the executive

698
00:53:32.559 --> 00:53:37.679
branch, you know, those relationships
may be significant. So there are all

699
00:53:37.679 --> 00:53:40.000
those kinds of factors too that are
that are hard to weigh precisely, but

700
00:53:40.360 --> 00:53:45.559
you know often are very impactful in
government. So well, it will absolutely

701
00:53:45.639 --> 00:53:47.679
have a role. And I think
if there's a turnover administration, you know,

702
00:53:47.719 --> 00:53:52.880
there are many positions that will will
likely quickly change and that will just

703
00:53:52.360 --> 00:53:57.800
inevitably change some of the tone and
tenor you know, how this work gets

704
00:53:57.840 --> 00:54:02.800
done. Mm hmm. I think
that's a great point that at least that

705
00:54:02.800 --> 00:54:07.119
that will exist, that connection that
they will have, you know, that

706
00:54:07.280 --> 00:54:12.119
leverage by having one of their one
of their own in the White House if

707
00:54:12.119 --> 00:54:19.280
that happens, absolutely yeah. They
both have unusual foreign relations and intelligence backgrounds

708
00:54:19.920 --> 00:54:22.400
that that much is for sure.
So I think you could expect that they're

709
00:54:22.400 --> 00:54:23.519
gonna have a lot on their plane
if if they win, of course,

710
00:54:23.559 --> 00:54:27.920
I mean who knows, uh,
but national security issues are going to be

711
00:54:28.000 --> 00:54:30.679
are going to be huge basically no
matter who wins the election? Mm hmm.

712
00:54:32.079 --> 00:54:38.039
And you know other questions bringing up
Brian that that he you know,

713
00:54:38.079 --> 00:54:44.239
it's kind of been tackling is especially
lately kind of this idea, and we

714
00:54:44.360 --> 00:54:51.079
might have brought it up earlier that
really kind of some of this history that's

715
00:54:51.119 --> 00:54:57.159
going on is a bit under the
bridge. That really right now, the

716
00:54:57.199 --> 00:55:00.719
big questions are what is this task
for us going to do? You know,

717
00:55:00.800 --> 00:55:05.000
what is this report going to look
like? Sort of the questions that

718
00:55:05.039 --> 00:55:09.199
we've been talking about earlier, rather
than kind of getting caught up in the

719
00:55:09.360 --> 00:55:15.519
details behind what happened in the past
with with a tip or you know,

720
00:55:15.559 --> 00:55:17.840
some of these questions of you know, when did this change, what was

721
00:55:19.000 --> 00:55:22.599
the name, who was doing what
sort of thing. Yeah, absolutely,

722
00:55:22.599 --> 00:55:28.719
I think there there are so many
issues prospectively little looking forward that we ought

723
00:55:28.719 --> 00:55:32.199
to have an eye on, exactly
who goes into these positions, the backgrounds

724
00:55:32.199 --> 00:55:37.400
they bring, all of those things. I understand that the historical questions are

725
00:55:37.400 --> 00:55:43.320
important and that they have an important
bearing, but I do agree with Brian

726
00:55:43.400 --> 00:55:47.360
Mender, you know, fairly strongly
that that some of those things are there,

727
00:55:47.440 --> 00:55:51.840
while interesting, are perhaps less important
than than where we go from here.

728
00:55:52.519 --> 00:56:00.000
Mm hmm. So I mean your
overall that I guess at where should

729
00:56:00.039 --> 00:56:06.559
would people be looking right now in
your mind with respect to you know,

730
00:56:07.119 --> 00:56:13.519
with respect to policy and where all
headed. I mean, if you were

731
00:56:13.599 --> 00:56:20.840
to kind of meter people's expectations,
how would that happen? Boy, that's

732
00:56:20.840 --> 00:56:25.079
an excellent question, I think in
general, and maybe this reveals a bias

733
00:56:25.119 --> 00:56:29.079
on my part, I would always
say meter your expectations in this field.

734
00:56:29.199 --> 00:56:34.199
Right This is also a field that's
known to have recurring moments of a feeling

735
00:56:34.239 --> 00:56:37.159
of disclosure is imminent, you know, things are really going to change any

736
00:56:37.199 --> 00:56:39.440
day, and then it usually is
not the case. That said, I

737
00:56:39.480 --> 00:56:43.159
do think we are in a departure
from that. I mean, I think

738
00:56:43.440 --> 00:56:45.800
long time observers will will know this
better than I do as being in relatively

739
00:56:46.039 --> 00:56:52.000
short term. But it things are
changing here, and exactly what it's changing

740
00:56:52.119 --> 00:56:55.400
is at the policy level. It's
that someone like a figure like you know,

741
00:56:55.519 --> 00:57:00.880
Christopher Mellan, with his you know, really deep background, has has

742
00:57:00.920 --> 00:57:05.840
tackled this, has thought through a
strategy to get the legislative branch to take

743
00:57:05.840 --> 00:57:09.920
it seriously, and further has thought
about a strategy to kind of compel parts

744
00:57:09.920 --> 00:57:13.559
of the executive branch that normally don't
want to deal with this, to deal

745
00:57:13.599 --> 00:57:17.199
with this, Wow, that's that
is a heck of a story. So

746
00:57:17.360 --> 00:57:21.159
I think that is the part that
I would look to. I would look

747
00:57:21.159 --> 00:57:27.440
to the government aspects. And if
I had any advice for people, I

748
00:57:27.480 --> 00:57:30.800
guess it would be to also read
outside of euthology too, particularly if you're

749
00:57:30.840 --> 00:57:35.559
really focused on on the small details
within kind of euthhological circles, you know,

750
00:57:35.599 --> 00:57:37.480
make sure you're keeping an eye on
foreign policy and other things rip large

751
00:57:37.519 --> 00:57:42.360
and reading some history and things in
there too for measure, because you know,

752
00:57:42.440 --> 00:57:45.119
all those other issues aren't going to
go away. If let's say there's

753
00:57:45.159 --> 00:57:49.360
a stunning breakthrough and you know,
the UAP Task Force says, yes,

754
00:57:49.480 --> 00:57:52.960
proof positive, we've got extraterrestrials visiting
us. Well, we still have a

755
00:57:53.000 --> 00:57:58.239
pandemic, we still have national divisions, we still have domestic divisions. We

756
00:57:58.320 --> 00:58:00.960
have all of these things, and
someone who's in the policy chair has got

757
00:58:01.719 --> 00:58:05.360
they don't have the luxury to just
solve one thing. They've got to deal

758
00:58:05.400 --> 00:58:08.880
with all of that all at once, and it's it's a really complicated student.

759
00:58:08.960 --> 00:58:14.199
So if you think it's going to
be simple. It's not so you

760
00:58:14.239 --> 00:58:15.360
know, read up on the part
that you don't usually read up on.

761
00:58:15.400 --> 00:58:20.280
I suppose would be my world vice
mm hmm. And my other question,

762
00:58:20.360 --> 00:58:23.480
I guess, getting kind of also
into latest news, is we also have

763
00:58:23.679 --> 00:58:28.559
kind of You've mentioned Chris Mellon a
lot. Nick Mellan gets his way,

764
00:58:28.880 --> 00:58:30.880
and I think you're crediting him a
lot with the with the kind of the

765
00:58:30.920 --> 00:58:36.119
strategy behind all of this, and
I agree with you. Uh, he

766
00:58:36.360 --> 00:58:38.920
does seemed to be the mastermind.
I mean he was. He's definitely familiar

767
00:58:39.400 --> 00:58:45.280
with with all of these organizations,
uh, and how the Hill works,

768
00:58:45.639 --> 00:58:49.199
how the Senate Intelligence Committee works,
and he kind of admitted that to me

769
00:58:49.280 --> 00:58:52.760
a bit my my interview with him, that there was this grand plan that

770
00:58:52.800 --> 00:58:57.039
seems to be coming to fruition,
and Alessando has said, you know,

771
00:58:57.079 --> 00:59:01.679
it's coming together much more quickly than
we expected. But it's also a bit

772
00:59:01.719 --> 00:59:07.280
of a handoff in that. Uh. You know, it was Elizondo that

773
00:59:07.400 --> 00:59:12.920
exposed that the Pentagon program, uh
was there then you know he joined to

774
00:59:13.039 --> 00:59:16.559
the stars in this group of people
including Melon, who then moved forward with

775
00:59:16.679 --> 00:59:22.280
this in order to get the Senate
to pay attention and get the Senate Intelligence

776
00:59:22.280 --> 00:59:28.559
Committee to ask these questions with which
they have. Now this UAP task Force

777
00:59:28.599 --> 00:59:34.519
has been formally announced, what role
is to the stars really have anymore?

778
00:59:34.599 --> 00:59:37.800
It seems that you know, now
that they've handed this off or gotten what

779
00:59:37.840 --> 00:59:44.519
they wanted, are there even necessary
and is there even a role for them

780
00:59:44.559 --> 00:59:46.000
in all of this? Oh?
I think there, I think there is

781
00:59:46.039 --> 00:59:50.239
for sure. I think that at
a at a bare minimum, as a

782
00:59:50.320 --> 00:59:52.360
kind of watchdog of the process,
because you know, remember that this this

783
00:59:52.440 --> 00:59:57.800
the Senate provision has passed, but
you know, the legislation as a whole

784
00:59:57.840 --> 01:00:01.400
has not. And the other the
important thing is that there's a long history

785
01:00:01.519 --> 01:00:07.519
of the legislative branch making a request
for something and then the executive branch stonewalling

786
01:00:07.880 --> 01:00:10.840
or just sort of not really implementing
it, you know, the way that

787
01:00:10.880 --> 01:00:14.920
it's been asked for. So there's
a lot of work to do, I

788
01:00:15.320 --> 01:00:20.480
would imagine, behind the scenes to
make sure that all of these parties that

789
01:00:20.639 --> 01:00:25.280
normally don't want to cooperate with each
other are cooperating. And someone like Chris

790
01:00:25.320 --> 01:00:29.519
Mellen, who I guess we should
say, you know, was under Secretary

791
01:00:29.559 --> 01:00:35.440
of Defense but also a senior staff
member in the Senate Intelligence Committee. You

792
01:00:35.480 --> 01:00:39.599
know, he acutely knows that that
landscape, I'm sure, and knows that

793
01:00:40.360 --> 01:00:45.559
getting these agencies to work together is
going to be no easy task. So

794
01:00:45.599 --> 01:00:47.760
there's a lot to be done there. It gets back to what we're talking

795
01:00:47.760 --> 01:00:52.360
about with monolithic government, right,
These agencies don't always play nice with each

796
01:00:52.360 --> 01:00:59.039
other, so a lot to catch
out for right, I had to take

797
01:00:59.079 --> 01:01:02.280
my out the screen to sneeze there
for a moment, but that's where I

798
01:01:02.360 --> 01:01:07.480
went. But you know, along
those lines, because I think it's just

799
01:01:07.519 --> 01:01:10.960
going to be to the stars role
to play as a watchdog, but kind

800
01:01:12.000 --> 01:01:15.360
of all of our role. But
of course that's kind of where we've been,

801
01:01:15.480 --> 01:01:19.880
and there are that large amount I
always say this that a lot of

802
01:01:20.400 --> 01:01:28.079
you know, kind of populist sort
of UFO efforts turn into alien disclosure groups,

803
01:01:28.159 --> 01:01:30.920
you know, disclose that you're dealing
with or working with, or you

804
01:01:30.039 --> 01:01:36.480
know, there's aliens. I feel
that that's kind of a definitely a tenuous

805
01:01:36.480 --> 01:01:39.360
position because I don't feel that we
have evidence strong enough to kind of go

806
01:01:39.519 --> 01:01:46.280
there really. But for those who
are serious, like yourself or others who

807
01:01:46.280 --> 01:01:50.599
are getting into this and seeing that
you know, there's a lot of legitimate

808
01:01:51.199 --> 01:01:54.519
information to the idea that there's more
of a mythy some of these cases.

809
01:01:55.239 --> 01:01:59.840
How would you recommend people go about
that? I mean, what's the responsible,

810
01:02:00.360 --> 01:02:07.360
effective way to be a watchdog?
Well, following the relevant legislation helps,

811
01:02:07.280 --> 01:02:10.079
So being aware of exactly what's in
there, you know, make sure

812
01:02:10.119 --> 01:02:14.119
that you're not just looking at the
second and third order coverage of it,

813
01:02:14.800 --> 01:02:16.119
you know, in tweets and so
on. Read the primary document, so

814
01:02:16.159 --> 01:02:21.159
to speak, and you can do
all the things that that that you know

815
01:02:21.239 --> 01:02:23.480
that we do in politics of writing
letters, you know, talking to your

816
01:02:23.519 --> 01:02:29.320
representatives when you write those letters,
I would encourage people to be simple and

817
01:02:29.360 --> 01:02:35.440
straightforward and to emphasize the importance of
taking it seriously and to be well,

818
01:02:35.519 --> 01:02:37.679
actually, I'll sort of steal a
little bit of a line from from Alisando

819
01:02:37.760 --> 01:02:42.920
and the TTSA crew of be aware
of what you believe, you know,

820
01:02:43.000 --> 01:02:45.440
what you think, and what you
know, and really, I would say

821
01:02:45.480 --> 01:02:50.400
in your advocacy, stick with what
you know. That's that's going to take

822
01:02:50.440 --> 01:02:53.079
you a lot further than than what
you may you know, think or believe,

823
01:02:53.159 --> 01:02:59.079
is the case. Yeah, And
I mean essentially that's it. I

824
01:02:59.079 --> 01:03:01.800
mean, I think stay involved in
the public discourse, you know, speaking

825
01:03:01.840 --> 01:03:07.760
your mind, following the news,
being careful and critical and your information sources

826
01:03:07.880 --> 01:03:13.000
is always an important thing in this
field. All of that, that would

827
01:03:13.000 --> 01:03:16.519
be my advice mm hm. And
you know what, You've been a great

828
01:03:16.559 --> 01:03:21.760
help in that. And I would
recommend definitely people checking out your blog and

829
01:03:21.840 --> 01:03:25.239
watching your blog for your articles.
I intend to and I hope you will

830
01:03:25.320 --> 01:03:31.800
join us again for to come as
we watch this all kind of come to

831
01:03:32.519 --> 01:03:37.199
come to come to fruition and then
yes, you know, you've got a

832
01:03:37.239 --> 01:03:40.360
great idea, and that is something
I plan to do, is more panels

833
01:03:40.400 --> 01:03:45.280
around some of these topics so we
can all talk to kind of figure some

834
01:03:45.360 --> 01:03:49.400
of this out as well. Because
all of these people you're mentioning, all

835
01:03:49.400 --> 01:03:53.280
these journalists that we've brought up or
researchers all have kind of a different piece

836
01:03:53.320 --> 01:03:59.199
of the puzzle and are getting information
from different sources. So it does help

837
01:03:59.239 --> 01:04:02.599
to come together and share information to
get a clearer view of what's going on.

838
01:04:03.440 --> 01:04:05.840
Yeah, and I'll just say,
I mean, I suspect we're coming

839
01:04:05.840 --> 01:04:09.360
to a conclusion here, but I
just want to say that some of the

840
01:04:09.400 --> 01:04:13.559
researchers and people in this community have
been some of the absolute best I've encountered

841
01:04:13.559 --> 01:04:18.239
in any field. Incredibly generous with
their time, you know, incredibly helpful

842
01:04:18.360 --> 01:04:24.199
and sharing. So there, they're
really as much as the community sometimes gets

843
01:04:24.239 --> 01:04:26.840
maligned a bit, you know,
it would be at least among the community

844
01:04:26.880 --> 01:04:31.360
researchers, there's some some real gems. So this is this is actually a

845
01:04:31.360 --> 01:04:35.599
great space to be working in.
Yeah, I look, I look forward

846
01:04:35.679 --> 01:04:41.199
to future conversations. Well, and
I guess I'll ask you know, because

847
01:04:41.239 --> 01:04:45.880
I think you've stated this was your
first interview on this topic. Now that

848
01:04:45.920 --> 01:04:47.880
we're kind of wrapping it up,
had it go? It was? It

849
01:04:48.000 --> 01:04:55.079
was easy, huh, It wasn't
too bad. The audience will ultimately be

850
01:04:55.119 --> 01:04:59.320
the ones to judge how it went. But but yes, I I this

851
01:04:59.480 --> 01:05:08.440
was a good first interview experience and
good and even if the audience doesn't appreciate

852
01:05:08.440 --> 01:05:13.280
it, which I'm sure they will, especially my audience, I greatly greatly

853
01:05:13.320 --> 01:05:16.559
appreciate it and found it very insight
just as I knew it would be all

854
01:05:16.679 --> 01:05:20.559
right anytime, anytime. Well,
thank you so much for coming on the

855
01:05:20.599 --> 01:05:26.800
show, and for those of you
who were watching live, Just so you

856
01:05:26.880 --> 01:05:32.880
know, this link this video will
change to only be viewable by YouTube members.

857
01:05:33.599 --> 01:05:39.280
However, if you're a Patreon member, I do upload a special Patreon

858
01:05:39.400 --> 01:05:44.039
video that I'll get up later today, very soon, so you'll have your

859
01:05:44.079 --> 01:05:48.119
own video that you can watch and
for good as well, so you'll all

860
01:05:48.159 --> 01:05:53.400
be taken care of. And for
those pod people, the audio listeners on

861
01:05:53.480 --> 01:05:57.360
Patreon, I'll also have an audio
version up very soon as well. But

862
01:05:57.880 --> 01:06:00.920
thank you so much for joining Adam
again. I'll bring it up again so

863
01:06:01.039 --> 01:06:06.400
people could see. Uh. The
website is a blog dot Adam key ho

864
01:06:06.760 --> 01:06:12.920
k e h o E as we
covered before, not uh in relation to

865
01:06:13.400 --> 01:06:17.679
the Donald Keyhoe and that so that
you'll be able to read all of the

866
01:06:17.800 --> 01:06:24.639
articles. So uh and how soon
is your next article coming out? Uh?

867
01:06:24.679 --> 01:06:27.360
I'm going to pass on that one. So there's a couple of things,

868
01:06:27.400 --> 01:06:29.599
a couple of things in the works. Like I said, I'm very

869
01:06:29.599 --> 01:06:33.559
excited to be working with Tim McMillan
and and yeah, well you'll be among

870
01:06:33.599 --> 01:06:36.760
the first to know, I'm sure. Just as a quick note to strategicdoubt,

871
01:06:36.840 --> 01:06:40.000
dot com should work, should take
you to the blog as well.

872
01:06:40.880 --> 01:06:44.199
Okay, great, all right,
great, Well, thank you so much

873
01:06:44.239 --> 01:06:48.079
for being on the show and uh
until next time, Yes, pleasure,

874
01:06:48.159 --> 01:06:48.760
have a good one.